1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
2 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
3 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
4 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
5 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
6 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
7 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
9 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
10 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
13 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
14 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
15 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
17 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures};
19 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
20 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER};
21 use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
22 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, LocalCommitmentTransaction, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys};
24 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
25 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
26 use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
27 use util::transaction_utils;
28 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
29 use util::logger::{Logger, LogHolder};
30 use util::errors::APIError;
31 use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
34 use std::default::Default;
35 use std::{cmp,mem,fmt};
39 #[cfg(all(test, feature = "mutation_testing"))]
43 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
44 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
45 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
46 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
47 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
48 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
49 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
50 pub their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
53 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
54 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
55 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
56 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
59 enum InboundHTLCState {
60 /// Added by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx.
61 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
62 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
63 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
64 /// accept this HTLC. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
65 /// We also have not yet included this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on
66 /// a remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
67 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
68 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
69 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
70 /// accept this HTLC. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
71 /// We have included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
73 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
75 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
76 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
78 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
79 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
80 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
81 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
82 /// ChannelMonitor::would_broadcast_at_height) so we actually remove the HTLC from our own
83 /// local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
84 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info will not include this HTLC.
85 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
88 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
92 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
93 state: InboundHTLCState,
96 enum OutboundHTLCState {
97 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
98 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
99 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
100 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
101 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
102 /// money back (though we won't), and,
103 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
104 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
105 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
106 /// we'll never get out of sync).
107 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
108 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
109 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
111 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
112 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
113 RemoteRemoved(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
114 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
115 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
116 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
117 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
118 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
119 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
120 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
121 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
122 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
123 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
124 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
125 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
128 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
132 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
133 state: OutboundHTLCState,
137 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
138 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
139 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
143 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
145 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
148 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
153 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
157 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
158 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
159 /// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
160 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
161 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
162 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
163 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
165 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
166 OurInitSent = (1 << 0),
167 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
168 TheirInitSent = (1 << 1),
169 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
170 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
171 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
173 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
174 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The FundingLocked flags are set to indicate when we
175 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
177 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a funding_locked message.
178 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
179 TheirFundingLocked = (1 << 4),
180 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a funding_locked message.
181 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
182 OurFundingLocked = (1 << 5),
184 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
185 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
187 PeerDisconnected = (1 << 7),
188 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
189 /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
190 /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
191 MonitorUpdateFailed = (1 << 8),
192 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
193 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
194 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
195 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
197 /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
198 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = (1 << 9),
199 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
200 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
201 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
202 RemoteShutdownSent = (1 << 10),
203 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
204 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
205 /// TODO: Investigate some kind of timeout mechanism by which point the remote end must provide
206 /// us their shutdown.
207 LocalShutdownSent = (1 << 11),
208 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
209 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
210 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
212 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
213 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
215 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
217 /// Liveness is called to fluctuate given peer disconnecton/monitor failures/closing.
218 /// If channel is public, network should have a liveness view announced by us on a
219 /// best-effort, which means we may filter out some status transitions to avoid spam.
220 /// See further timer_chan_freshness_every_min.
223 /// Status has been gossiped.
225 /// Status has been changed.
227 /// Status has been marked to be gossiped at next flush
231 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
232 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
233 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
235 pub(super) struct Channel<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
236 config: ChannelConfig,
240 channel_id: [u8; 32],
242 channel_outbound: bool,
243 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
244 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
246 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
249 local_keys: ChanSigner,
251 pub(super) local_keys: ChanSigner,
252 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
253 destination_script: Script,
255 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
256 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
257 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
259 cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
260 cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
261 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
262 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
263 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
264 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
266 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
267 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
268 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
269 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
270 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
271 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
273 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
275 monitor_pending_funding_locked: bool,
276 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
277 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
278 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
279 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
281 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee
282 // For outbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated with the value from
283 // pending_update_fee when revoke_and_ack is received
285 // For inbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated when it receives
286 // commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack is generated
287 // The pending value is kept when another pair of update_fee and commitment_signed
288 // is received during AwaitingRemoteRevoke and relieved when the expected
289 // revoke_and_ack is received and new commitment_signed is generated to be
290 // sent to the funder. Otherwise, the pending value is removed when receiving
291 // commitment_signed.
292 pending_update_fee: Option<u64>,
293 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke is hold in
294 // holdina_cell_update_fee then moved to pending_udpate_fee when revoke_and_ack
295 // is received. holding_cell_update_fee is updated when there are additional
296 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
297 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u64>,
298 next_local_htlc_id: u64,
299 next_remote_htlc_id: u64,
300 update_time_counter: u32,
303 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
304 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
305 max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
306 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
307 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
308 max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
310 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, u64, Signature)>, // (feerate, fee, our_sig)
312 funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
314 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction reached our CONF_TARGET. We use this
315 /// to detect unconfirmation after a serialize-unserialize roundtrip where we may not see a full
316 /// series of block_connected/block_disconnected calls. Obviously this is not a guarantee as we
317 /// could miss the funding_tx_confirmed_in block as well, but it serves as a useful fallback.
318 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
319 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
320 /// Used to deduplicate block_connected callbacks, also used to verify consistency during
321 /// ChannelManager deserialization (hence pub(super))
322 pub(super) last_block_connected: BlockHash,
323 funding_tx_confirmations: u64,
325 their_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
327 pub(super) our_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
329 our_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
331 pub(super) their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
333 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
334 //get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
335 /// minimum channel reserve for **self** to maintain - set by them.
336 their_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
337 //get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(): u64,
338 their_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
339 our_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
340 their_to_self_delay: u16,
341 our_to_self_delay: u16,
343 pub their_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
345 their_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
346 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: our_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
349 their_pubkeys: Option<ChannelPublicKeys>,
351 their_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
353 their_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
354 their_node_id: PublicKey,
356 their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
358 /// Used exclusively to broadcast the latest local state, mostly a historical quirk that this
360 channel_monitor: Option<ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>,
361 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
363 network_sync: UpdateStatus,
368 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
369 /// Confirmation count threshold at which we close a channel. Ideally we'd keep the channel around
370 /// on ice until the funding transaction gets more confirmations, but the LN protocol doesn't
371 /// really allow for this, so instead we're stuck closing it out at that point.
372 const UNCONF_THRESHOLD: u32 = 6;
373 const SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 79; // prevout: 36, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: (3+1)/4, sig: 73/4, if-selector: 1, redeemScript: (6 ops + 2*33 pubkeys + 1*2 delay)/4
374 const B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 104; // prevout: 40, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: 3/4, sig: 73/4, pubkey: 33/4, output: 31 (TODO: Wrong? Useless?)
377 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
379 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
381 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
383 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
385 /// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
387 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1 << 24;
389 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
390 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
391 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
392 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
393 Ignore(&'static str),
395 CloseDelayBroadcast(&'static str),
398 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
399 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
401 &ChannelError::Ignore(e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
402 &ChannelError::Close(e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
403 &ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(e) => write!(f, "CloseDelayBroadcast : {}", e)
408 macro_rules! secp_check {
409 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
412 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
417 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> Channel<ChanSigner> {
418 // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
419 fn get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
420 channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
423 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value **they** need to maintain
425 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
426 pub(crate) fn get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
427 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
428 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
431 fn derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(at_open_background_feerate: u64) -> u64 {
432 cmp::max(at_open_background_feerate * B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT / 1000, 546) //TODO
436 pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, their_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, logger: Arc<Logger>, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<ChanSigner>, APIError>
437 where K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
438 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
440 let chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(false, channel_value_satoshis);
442 if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
443 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "funding value > 2^24"});
446 if push_msat > channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
447 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "push value > channel value"});
449 if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
450 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay putting user funds at risks"});
454 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
455 if Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis) < Channel::<ChanSigner>::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate) {
456 return Err(APIError::FeeRateTooHigh{err: format!("Not enough reserve above dust limit can be found at current fee rate({})", background_feerate), feerate: background_feerate});
459 let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
463 config: config.channel_options.clone(),
465 channel_id: keys_provider.get_channel_id(),
466 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
467 channel_outbound: true,
468 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
469 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis,
471 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
473 local_keys: chan_keys,
474 shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
475 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
477 cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
478 cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
479 value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
481 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
482 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
483 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
484 pending_update_fee: None,
485 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
486 next_local_htlc_id: 0,
487 next_remote_htlc_id: 0,
488 update_time_counter: 1,
490 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
492 monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
493 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
494 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
495 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
496 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
498 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
499 max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
500 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
501 max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
503 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
506 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
507 short_channel_id: None,
508 last_block_connected: Default::default(),
509 funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
511 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
512 their_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
513 our_dust_limit_satoshis: Channel::<ChanSigner>::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate),
514 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
515 their_channel_reserve_satoshis: 0,
516 their_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
517 our_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
518 their_to_self_delay: 0,
519 our_to_self_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
520 their_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
521 minimum_depth: 0, // Filled in in accept_channel
524 their_cur_commitment_point: None,
526 their_prev_commitment_point: None,
527 their_node_id: their_node_id,
529 their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
531 channel_monitor: None,
532 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
534 network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
540 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
541 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
543 if (feerate_per_kw as u64) < fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) {
544 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer's feerate much too low"));
546 if (feerate_per_kw as u64) > fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) * 2 {
547 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer's feerate much too high"));
552 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
553 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
554 pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, their_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, logger: Arc<Logger>, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<ChanSigner>, ChannelError>
555 where K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
556 F::Target: FeeEstimator
558 let mut chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
559 let their_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
560 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
561 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
562 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
563 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
564 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
566 chan_keys.set_remote_channel_pubkeys(&their_pubkeys);
567 let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
569 if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
570 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay putting user funds at risks"));
573 // Check sanity of message fields:
574 if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
575 return Err(ChannelError::Close("funding value > 2^24"));
577 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
578 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis"));
580 if msg.push_msat > (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
581 return Err(ChannelError::Close("push_msat larger than funding value"));
583 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
584 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
586 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
587 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus; channel reserve is less than dust limit"));
589 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
590 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is full channel value"));
592 Channel::<ChanSigner>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
594 if msg.to_self_delay > config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay || msg.to_self_delay > MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
595 return Err(ChannelError::Close("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period"));
597 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
598 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accpted_htlcs makes for a useless channel"));
600 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 {
601 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max_accpted_htlcs > 483"));
604 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
605 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
606 return Err(ChannelError::Close("funding satoshis is less than the user specified limit"));
608 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
609 return Err(ChannelError::Close("htlc minimum msat is higher than the user specified limit"));
611 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
612 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max htlc value in flight msat is less than the user specified limit"));
614 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
615 return Err(ChannelError::Close("channel reserve satoshis is higher than the user specified limit"));
617 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
618 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max accepted htlcs is less than the user specified limit"));
620 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
621 return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is less than the user specified limit"));
623 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
624 return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is greater than the user specified limit"));
627 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
629 let their_announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
630 if config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
631 if local_config.announced_channel != their_announce {
632 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours"));
635 // we either accept their preference or the preferences match
636 local_config.announced_channel = their_announce;
638 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
640 let our_dust_limit_satoshis = Channel::<ChanSigner>::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate);
641 let our_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
642 if our_channel_reserve_satoshis < our_dust_limit_satoshis {
643 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Suitable channel reserve not found. aborting"));
645 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < our_dust_limit_satoshis {
646 return Err(ChannelError::Close("channel_reserve_satoshis too small"));
648 if our_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
649 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Dust limit too high for our channel reserve"));
652 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
653 // for full fee payment
654 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
655 if funders_amount_msat < background_feerate * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT {
656 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment"));
659 let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
660 let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
661 if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= our_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
662 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment"));
665 let their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
666 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
667 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
668 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. We enforce it while receiving shutdown msg
669 if script.is_p2pkh() || script.is_p2sh() || script.is_v0_p2wsh() || script.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
671 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
672 } else if script.len() == 0 {
674 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
676 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format"));
679 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
680 &OptionalField::Absent => {
681 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out"));
688 config: local_config,
690 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
691 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
692 channel_outbound: false,
693 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
695 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
697 local_keys: chan_keys,
698 shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
699 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
701 cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
702 cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
703 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
705 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
706 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
707 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
708 pending_update_fee: None,
709 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
710 next_local_htlc_id: 0,
711 next_remote_htlc_id: 0,
712 update_time_counter: 1,
714 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
716 monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
717 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
718 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
719 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
720 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
722 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
723 max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
724 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
725 max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
727 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
730 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
731 short_channel_id: None,
732 last_block_connected: Default::default(),
733 funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
735 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw as u64,
736 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
737 their_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
738 our_dust_limit_satoshis: our_dust_limit_satoshis,
739 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
740 their_channel_reserve_satoshis: msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
741 their_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
742 our_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
743 their_to_self_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
744 our_to_self_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
745 their_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
746 minimum_depth: config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth,
748 their_pubkeys: Some(their_pubkeys),
749 their_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
751 their_prev_commitment_point: None,
752 their_node_id: their_node_id,
754 their_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
756 channel_monitor: None,
757 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
759 network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
767 // Utilities to derive keys:
769 fn build_local_commitment_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> SecretKey {
770 let res = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed(), idx);
771 SecretKey::from_slice(&res).unwrap()
774 // Utilities to build transactions:
776 fn get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self) -> u64 {
777 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
778 let our_payment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.payment_key());
780 let their_payment_point = &self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().payment_point.serialize();
781 if self.channel_outbound {
782 sha.input(&our_payment_point.serialize());
783 sha.input(their_payment_point);
785 sha.input(their_payment_point);
786 sha.input(&our_payment_point.serialize());
788 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
790 ((res[26] as u64) << 5*8) |
791 ((res[27] as u64) << 4*8) |
792 ((res[28] as u64) << 3*8) |
793 ((res[29] as u64) << 2*8) |
794 ((res[30] as u64) << 1*8) |
795 ((res[31] as u64) << 0*8)
798 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
799 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
800 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
801 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
802 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
804 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
805 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
806 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
807 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
808 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
809 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
810 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
811 /// Returns (the transaction built, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
812 /// transaction, the list of HTLCs which were not ignored when building the transaction).
813 /// Note that below-dust HTLCs are included in the third return value, but not the second, and
814 /// sources are provided only for outbound HTLCs in the third return value.
816 fn build_commitment_transaction(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> (Transaction, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) {
817 let obscured_commitment_transaction_number = self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor() ^ (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number);
820 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
822 previous_output: self.funding_txo.unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
823 script_sig: Script::new(),
824 sequence: ((0x80 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number >> 3*8) as u32),
830 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, Option<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)> = Vec::with_capacity(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() + 2);
831 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
833 let dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.our_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.their_dust_limit_satoshis };
834 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
835 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
836 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
838 log_trace!(self, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...", commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number), self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
840 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
841 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
842 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
844 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
845 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
846 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
847 transaction_output_index: None
852 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
853 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
854 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
855 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
856 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
857 log_trace!(self, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
859 script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
860 value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
861 }, Some((htlc_in_tx, $source))));
863 log_trace!(self, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
864 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
867 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
868 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
869 log_trace!(self, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
870 txouts.push((TxOut { // "received HTLC output"
871 script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
872 value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
873 }, Some((htlc_in_tx, $source))));
875 log_trace!(self, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
876 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
882 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
883 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
884 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
885 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
886 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
887 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
888 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
892 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
893 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
895 log_trace!(self, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
897 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
898 if generated_by_local {
899 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
900 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
909 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
910 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
911 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
912 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
913 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
914 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
915 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
919 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
920 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
922 log_trace!(self, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
924 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None)|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) => {
925 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
927 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(None) => {
928 if !generated_by_local {
929 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
937 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
938 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
939 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
940 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
941 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
942 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
943 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
944 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
946 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
948 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
949 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
950 let mut max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
951 self.max_commitment_tx_output_local.lock().unwrap()
953 self.max_commitment_tx_output_remote.lock().unwrap()
955 debug_assert!(max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
956 max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
957 debug_assert!(max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
958 max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
961 let total_fee: u64 = feerate_per_kw * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (txouts.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
962 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.channel_outbound {
963 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
965 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
968 let value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
969 let value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
971 if value_to_a >= (dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
972 log_trace!(self, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
974 script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&keys.revocation_key,
975 if local { self.their_to_self_delay } else { self.our_to_self_delay },
976 &keys.a_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
977 value: value_to_a as u64
981 if value_to_b >= (dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
982 log_trace!(self, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
983 let static_payment_pk_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&if local {
984 self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().payment_point
986 self.local_keys.pubkeys().payment_point
989 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
990 .push_slice(&static_payment_pk_hash[..])
992 value: value_to_b as u64
996 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |a, b| {
997 if let &Some(ref a_htlc) = a {
998 if let &Some(ref b_htlc) = b {
999 a_htlc.0.cltv_expiry.cmp(&b_htlc.0.cltv_expiry)
1000 // Note that due to hash collisions, we have to have a fallback comparison
1001 // here for fuzztarget mode (otherwise at least chanmon_fail_consistency
1003 .then(a_htlc.0.payment_hash.0.cmp(&b_htlc.0.payment_hash.0))
1004 // For non-HTLC outputs, if they're copying our SPK we don't really care if we
1005 // close the channel due to mismatches - they're doing something dumb:
1006 } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
1007 } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
1010 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len());
1011 let mut htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len() + included_dust_htlcs.len());
1012 for (idx, mut out) in txouts.drain(..).enumerate() {
1013 outputs.push(out.0);
1014 if let Some((mut htlc, source_option)) = out.1.take() {
1015 htlc.transaction_output_index = Some(idx as u32);
1016 htlcs_included.push((htlc, source_option));
1019 let non_dust_htlc_count = htlcs_included.len();
1020 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1024 lock_time: ((0x20 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number & 0xffffffu64) as u32),
1027 }, non_dust_htlc_count, htlcs_included)
1031 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1032 let our_channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&self.shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1033 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script()
1037 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(a_scriptpubkey: &Script, b_scriptpubkey: &Script) -> u64 {
1038 (4 + 1 + 36 + 4 + 1 + 1 + 2*(8+1) + 4 + a_scriptpubkey.len() as u64 + b_scriptpubkey.len() as u64)*4 + 2 + 1 + 1 + 2*(1 + 72)
1042 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (Transaction, u64) {
1044 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
1046 previous_output: self.funding_txo.unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1047 script_sig: Script::new(),
1048 sequence: 0xffffffff,
1049 witness: Vec::new(),
1054 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1055 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1056 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
1058 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1059 let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.channel_outbound { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1060 let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.channel_outbound { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1062 if value_to_self < 0 {
1063 assert!(self.channel_outbound);
1064 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64;
1065 } else if value_to_remote < 0 {
1066 assert!(!self.channel_outbound);
1067 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64;
1070 if !skip_remote_output && value_to_remote as u64 > self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
1071 txouts.push((TxOut {
1072 script_pubkey: self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(),
1073 value: value_to_remote as u64
1077 if value_to_self as u64 > self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
1078 txouts.push((TxOut {
1079 script_pubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
1080 value: value_to_self as u64
1084 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
1086 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
1087 for out in txouts.drain(..) {
1088 outputs.push(out.0);
1096 }, total_fee_satoshis)
1100 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1101 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1102 /// our counterparty!)
1103 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke ownership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1104 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1105 fn build_local_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1106 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(commitment_number));
1107 let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key());
1108 let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.htlc_base_key());
1109 let their_pubkeys = self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap();
1111 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys"))
1115 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1116 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1117 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1118 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1119 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1120 //may see payments to it!
1121 let revocation_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.revocation_base_key());
1122 let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.htlc_base_key());
1123 let their_pubkeys = self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap();
1125 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &their_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, &revocation_basepoint, &htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys"))
1128 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1129 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1130 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1131 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1132 let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key());
1133 make_funding_redeemscript(&our_funding_key, self.their_funding_pubkey())
1136 /// Builds the htlc-success or htlc-timeout transaction which spends a given HTLC output
1137 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1138 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1139 fn build_htlc_transaction(&self, prev_hash: &Txid, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, local: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Transaction {
1140 chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, feerate_per_kw, if local { self.their_to_self_delay } else { self.our_to_self_delay }, htlc, &keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key)
1143 /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1144 /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return a ChannelError::Ignore. Thus, will always
1145 /// return Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1147 /// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
1148 /// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
1149 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> {
1150 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1151 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1152 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1154 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1155 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1157 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1159 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1161 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1162 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1163 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1165 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1166 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1167 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1168 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1170 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1171 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1172 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1174 log_warn!(self, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1176 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already fail/fulfilled");
1177 return Ok((None, None));
1180 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1181 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1188 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1189 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
1192 // Now update local state:
1194 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1195 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1196 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1197 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1198 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1199 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1200 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1203 self.channel_monitor.as_mut().unwrap().update_monitor_ooo(monitor_update.clone()).unwrap();
1205 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1206 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1207 match pending_update {
1208 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1209 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1210 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1211 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1212 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already fulfilled");
1213 return Ok((None, None));
1216 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1217 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1218 log_warn!(self, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1219 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1220 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1221 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1222 return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1228 log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell! Current state: {}", self.channel_state);
1229 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1230 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1232 return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1236 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1237 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1239 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1240 return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1242 log_trace!(self, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
1243 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1246 Ok((Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1247 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1248 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1249 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1250 }), Some(monitor_update)))
1253 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> {
1254 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage)? {
1255 (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), Some(mut monitor_update)) => {
1256 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
1257 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1258 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1259 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1260 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1261 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1263 (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), None) => {
1264 let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
1265 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1267 (None, Some(monitor_update)) => Ok((None, Some(monitor_update))),
1268 (None, None) => Ok((None, None))
1272 /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1273 /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return a ChannelError::Ignore. Thus, will always
1274 /// return Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1276 /// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
1277 /// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
1278 pub fn get_update_fail_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> {
1279 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1280 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1282 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1284 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1285 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1286 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1288 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1289 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1290 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1292 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1293 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
1294 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already fail/fulfilled");
1298 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1299 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
1305 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1306 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
1309 // Now update local state:
1310 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1311 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1312 match pending_update {
1313 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1314 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1315 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already fulfilled");
1316 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
1319 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1320 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1321 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1322 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
1328 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1329 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1336 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1337 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
1340 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1341 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1342 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1347 // Message handlers:
1349 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_features: InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1350 // Check sanity of message fields:
1351 if !self.channel_outbound {
1352 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer"));
1354 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
1355 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time"));
1357 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
1358 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
1360 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
1361 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis"));
1363 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
1364 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve and dust_limit"));
1366 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
1367 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
1369 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) {
1370 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Dust limit is bigger than our channel reverse"));
1372 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
1373 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is full channel value"));
1375 if msg.to_self_delay > config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay || msg.to_self_delay > MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1376 return Err(ChannelError::Close("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period"));
1378 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1379 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel"));
1381 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 {
1382 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max_accepted_htlcs > 483"));
1385 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1386 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1387 return Err(ChannelError::Close("htlc minimum msat is higher than the user specified limit"));
1389 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1390 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max htlc value in flight msat is less than the user specified limit"));
1392 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1393 return Err(ChannelError::Close("channel reserve satoshis is higher than the user specified limit"));
1395 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1396 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max accepted htlcs is less than the user specified limit"));
1398 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
1399 return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is less than the user specified limit"));
1401 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
1402 return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is greater than the user specified limit"));
1404 if msg.minimum_depth > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth {
1405 return Err(ChannelError::Close("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large"));
1408 let their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1409 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1410 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1411 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. We enforce it while receiving shutdown msg
1412 if script.is_p2pkh() || script.is_p2sh() || script.is_v0_p2wsh() || script.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
1413 Some(script.clone())
1414 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1415 } else if script.len() == 0 {
1417 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
1419 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format"));
1422 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1423 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1424 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out"));
1429 self.their_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
1430 self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
1431 self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis;
1432 self.their_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
1433 self.their_to_self_delay = msg.to_self_delay;
1434 self.their_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
1435 self.minimum_depth = msg.minimum_depth;
1437 let their_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1438 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1439 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1440 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1441 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1442 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1445 self.local_keys.set_remote_channel_pubkeys(&their_pubkeys);
1446 self.their_pubkeys = Some(their_pubkeys);
1448 self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
1449 self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = their_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
1451 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
1456 fn funding_created_signature(&mut self, sig: &Signature) -> Result<(Transaction, LocalCommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> {
1457 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1459 let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1460 let local_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
1461 let local_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
1463 // They sign the "local" commitment transaction...
1464 log_trace!(self, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.their_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&local_initial_commitment_tx), log_bytes!(local_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
1465 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &sig, self.their_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer");
1467 let localtx = LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(local_initial_commitment_tx, sig.clone(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()), self.their_funding_pubkey(), local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new());
1469 let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1470 let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
1471 let remote_signature = self.local_keys.sign_remote_commitment(self.feerate_per_kw, &remote_initial_commitment_tx, &remote_keys, &Vec::new(), self.our_to_self_delay, &self.secp_ctx)
1472 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed"))?.0;
1474 // We sign the "remote" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
1475 Ok((remote_initial_commitment_tx, localtx, remote_signature))
1478 fn their_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1479 &self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().expect("their_funding_pubkey() only allowed after accept_channel").funding_pubkey
1482 pub fn funding_created(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>), ChannelError> {
1483 if self.channel_outbound {
1484 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?"));
1486 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
1487 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
1488 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
1490 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!"));
1492 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1493 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1494 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1495 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1498 let funding_txo = OutPoint::new(msg.funding_txid, msg.funding_output_index);
1499 self.funding_txo = Some(funding_txo.clone());
1501 let (remote_initial_commitment_tx, local_initial_commitment_tx, our_signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature) {
1504 self.funding_txo = None;
1509 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
1511 let their_pubkeys = self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap();
1512 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1513 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1514 macro_rules! create_monitor {
1516 let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.local_keys.clone(),
1517 &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay,
1518 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
1519 &their_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1520 self.their_to_self_delay, funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1521 self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(),
1522 local_initial_commitment_tx.clone(),
1523 self.logger.clone());
1525 channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
1530 self.channel_monitor = Some(create_monitor!());
1531 let channel_monitor = create_monitor!();
1533 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1534 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
1535 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1536 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1538 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
1539 channel_id: self.channel_id,
1540 signature: our_signature
1541 }, channel_monitor))
1544 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
1545 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
1546 pub fn funding_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>, ChannelError> {
1547 if !self.channel_outbound {
1548 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?"));
1550 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
1551 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!"));
1553 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1554 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1555 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1556 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1559 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1561 let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1562 let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
1564 let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1565 let local_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
1566 let local_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
1568 let their_funding_pubkey = &self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().funding_pubkey;
1570 // They sign the "local" commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
1571 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, their_funding_pubkey) {
1572 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer"));
1575 let their_pubkeys = self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap();
1576 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1577 let funding_txo = self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap();
1578 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1579 macro_rules! create_monitor {
1581 let local_commitment_tx = LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(local_initial_commitment_tx.clone(), msg.signature.clone(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()), their_funding_pubkey, local_keys.clone(), self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new());
1582 let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.local_keys.clone(),
1583 &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay,
1584 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo.clone(), funding_txo_script.clone()),
1585 &their_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1586 self.their_to_self_delay, funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1587 self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(),
1588 local_commitment_tx,
1589 self.logger.clone());
1591 channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
1597 self.channel_monitor = Some(create_monitor!());
1598 let channel_monitor = create_monitor!();
1600 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
1601 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1602 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1603 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1608 pub fn funding_locked(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1609 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1610 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1613 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1615 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
1616 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
1617 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
1618 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1619 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1620 } else if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
1621 // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
1622 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
1623 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) ||
1624 // If we reconnected before sending our funding locked they may still resend theirs:
1625 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) ==
1626 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32)) {
1627 if self.their_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
1628 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point"));
1630 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
1633 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time"));
1636 self.their_prev_commitment_point = self.their_cur_commitment_point;
1637 self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
1641 /// Returns (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1642 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1643 let mut htlc_inbound_value_msat = 0;
1644 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1645 htlc_inbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1647 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1650 /// Returns (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) *including* pending adds in our
1652 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1653 let mut htlc_outbound_value_msat = 0;
1654 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1655 htlc_outbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1658 let mut htlc_outbound_count = self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1659 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1660 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1661 htlc_outbound_count += 1;
1662 htlc_outbound_value_msat += amount_msat;
1666 (htlc_outbound_count as u32, htlc_outbound_value_msat)
1669 /// Get the available (ie not including pending HTLCs) inbound and outbound balance in msat.
1670 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1671 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1672 /// corner case properly.
1673 pub fn get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(&self) -> (u64, u64) {
1674 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1675 (cmp::min(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64,
1676 cmp::min(self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64)
1679 pub fn update_add_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, pending_forward_state: PendingHTLCStatus) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1680 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1681 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1683 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1684 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1686 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
1687 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel"));
1689 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
1690 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC"));
1692 if msg.amount_msat < self.our_htlc_minimum_msat {
1693 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value"));
1696 let (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat) = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
1697 if inbound_htlc_count + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
1698 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs"));
1700 // Check our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1701 if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis) {
1702 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value"));
1704 // Check our_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
1705 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
1706 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
1707 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
1708 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
1709 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
1710 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
1711 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
1712 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
1713 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
1714 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
1716 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
1717 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1718 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None) = htlc.state {
1719 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1720 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) = htlc.state {
1721 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1724 if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat + self.value_to_self_msat > (self.channel_value_satoshis - Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)) * 1000 + removed_outbound_total_msat {
1725 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"));
1727 if self.next_remote_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
1728 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote skipped HTLC ID"));
1730 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
1731 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height"));
1734 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
1735 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_state {
1736 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
1740 // Now update local state:
1741 self.next_remote_htlc_id += 1;
1742 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
1743 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1744 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
1745 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
1746 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1747 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_state),
1752 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
1754 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentHash>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
1755 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
1756 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
1757 match check_preimage {
1759 Some(payment_hash) =>
1760 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
1761 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC with an incorrect preimage"));
1765 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
1766 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC before it had been committed")),
1767 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
1768 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(fail_reason);
1770 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
1771 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC that they'd already fulfilled/failed")),
1773 return Ok(&htlc.source);
1776 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find"))
1779 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
1780 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1781 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1783 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1784 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1787 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&msg.payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
1788 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None).map(|source| source.clone())
1791 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1792 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1793 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1795 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1796 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1799 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
1803 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc<'a>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1804 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1805 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1807 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1808 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1811 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
1815 pub fn commitment_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, fee_estimator: &F) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)> where F::Target: FeeEstimator {
1816 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1817 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state")));
1819 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1820 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish")));
1822 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
1823 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds")));
1826 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1828 let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
1830 let mut update_fee = false;
1831 let feerate_per_kw = if !self.channel_outbound && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
1833 self.pending_update_fee.unwrap()
1838 let mut local_commitment_tx = {
1839 let mut commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw);
1840 let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.2.drain(..).map(|htlc| (htlc.0, htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
1841 (commitment_tx.0, commitment_tx.1, htlcs_cloned)
1843 let local_commitment_txid = local_commitment_tx.0.txid();
1844 let local_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_commitment_tx.0).sighash_all(&local_commitment_tx.0.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
1845 log_trace!(self, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.their_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&local_commitment_tx.0), log_bytes!(local_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
1846 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey()) {
1847 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer")));
1850 //If channel fee was updated by funder confirm funder can afford the new fee rate when applied to the current local commitment transaction
1852 let num_htlcs = local_commitment_tx.1;
1853 let total_fee: u64 = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1855 if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1856 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee")));
1860 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != local_commitment_tx.1 {
1861 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures from remote")));
1864 // TODO: Merge these two, sadly they are currently both required to be passed separately to
1866 let mut htlcs_without_source = Vec::with_capacity(local_commitment_tx.2.len());
1867 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(local_commitment_tx.2.len());
1868 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in local_commitment_tx.2.drain(..).enumerate() {
1869 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1870 let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&local_commitment_txid, &htlc, true, &local_keys, feerate_per_kw);
1871 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &local_keys);
1872 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]);
1873 log_trace!(self, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(local_keys.b_htlc_key.serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript));
1874 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &local_keys.b_htlc_key) {
1875 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer")));
1877 htlcs_without_source.push((htlc.clone(), Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx])));
1878 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
1880 htlcs_without_source.push((htlc.clone(), None));
1881 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
1885 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number - 1));
1886 let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed(), self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
1888 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
1889 let mut need_our_commitment = false;
1890 if !self.channel_outbound {
1891 if let Some(fee_update) = self.pending_update_fee {
1892 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_update;
1893 // We later use the presence of pending_update_fee to indicate we should generate a
1894 // commitment_signed upon receipt of revoke_and_ack, so we can only set it to None
1895 // if we're not awaiting a revoke (ie will send a commitment_signed now).
1896 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) == 0 {
1897 need_our_commitment = true;
1898 self.pending_update_fee = None;
1903 let their_funding_pubkey = self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().funding_pubkey;
1905 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1906 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1907 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1908 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo {
1909 commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(local_commitment_tx.0, msg.signature.clone(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()), &their_funding_pubkey, local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, htlcs_without_source),
1910 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
1913 self.channel_monitor.as_mut().unwrap().update_monitor_ooo(monitor_update.clone()).unwrap();
1915 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
1916 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
1917 Some(forward_info.clone())
1919 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
1920 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
1921 need_our_commitment = true;
1924 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
1925 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
1926 Some(fail_reason.take())
1928 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(fail_reason);
1929 need_our_commitment = true;
1933 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1934 // Note that if we need_our_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
1935 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
1936 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1938 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
1939 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
1940 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
1941 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
1942 if need_our_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
1943 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
1944 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
1945 // includes the right HTLCs.
1946 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
1947 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check().map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
1948 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1949 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1950 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1951 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1953 // TODO: Call maybe_propose_first_closing_signed on restoration (or call it here and
1954 // re-send the message on restoration)
1955 return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA")));
1958 let (our_commitment_signed, closing_signed) = if need_our_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
1959 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
1960 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
1961 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
1962 let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check().map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
1963 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1964 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1965 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1966 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1968 } else if !need_our_commitment {
1969 (None, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator))
1970 } else { (None, None) };
1972 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1973 channel_id: self.channel_id,
1974 per_commitment_secret: per_commitment_secret,
1975 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
1976 }, our_commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update))
1979 /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
1980 /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
1981 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs(&mut self) -> Result<Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> {
1982 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
1983 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
1984 log_trace!(self, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(), if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" });
1986 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1987 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
1988 updates: Vec::new(),
1991 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
1992 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
1993 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
1994 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
1995 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
1997 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
1998 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
1999 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
2000 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
2001 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
2002 // to rebalance channels.
2003 if err.is_some() { // We're back to AwaitingRemoteRevoke (or are about to fail the channel)
2004 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(htlc_update);
2006 match &htlc_update {
2007 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
2008 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
2009 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
2012 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
2013 log_info!(self, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2016 log_info!(self, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} resulting in a channel closure during holding_cell freeing", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2023 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
2024 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage) {
2025 Ok((update_fulfill_msg_option, additional_monitor_update_opt)) => {
2026 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
2027 if let Some(mut additional_monitor_update) = additional_monitor_update_opt {
2028 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
2032 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2034 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fulfill holding cell HTLC");
2039 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
2040 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone()) {
2041 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap()),
2043 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2045 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
2052 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(htlc_update);
2053 if let Some(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) = err {
2054 // If we failed to add the HTLC, but got an Ignore error, we should
2055 // still send the new commitment_signed, so reset the err to None.
2061 //TODO: Need to examine the type of err - if it's a fee issue or similar we may want to
2062 //fail it back the route, if it's a temporary issue we can ignore it...
2065 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
2066 // This should never actually happen and indicates we got some Errs back
2067 // from update_fulfill_htlc/update_fail_htlc, but we handle it anyway in
2068 // case there is some strange way to hit duplicate HTLC removes.
2071 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee {
2072 self.pending_update_fee = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take();
2073 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2074 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2075 feerate_per_kw: feerate as u32,
2081 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
2082 // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
2083 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
2084 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2085 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2087 Ok(Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2089 update_fulfill_htlcs,
2091 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2092 update_fee: update_fee,
2094 }, monitor_update)))
2103 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
2104 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
2105 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
2106 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
2107 /// revoke_and_ack message.
2108 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, fee_estimator: &F) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError>
2109 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2111 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2112 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state"));
2114 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2115 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
2117 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2118 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds"));
2121 if let Some(their_prev_commitment_point) = self.their_prev_commitment_point {
2122 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret")) != their_prev_commitment_point {
2123 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey"));
2127 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
2128 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
2129 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
2130 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
2131 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
2132 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
2133 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
2134 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
2135 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack"));
2138 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
2139 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one"))?;
2140 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2141 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2142 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2143 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
2144 idx: self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
2145 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
2148 self.channel_monitor.as_mut().unwrap().update_monitor_ooo(monitor_update.clone()).unwrap();
2150 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2151 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
2152 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
2153 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
2154 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
2155 self.their_prev_commitment_point = self.their_cur_commitment_point;
2156 self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2157 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2159 log_trace!(self, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA...");
2160 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
2161 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
2162 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2163 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2164 let mut require_commitment = false;
2165 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
2168 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
2169 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
2170 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
2171 let logger = LogHolder { logger: &self.logger };
2173 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
2174 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2175 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2176 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2177 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2178 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2183 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2184 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) = &htlc.state {
2185 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2186 if let Some(reason) = fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
2187 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
2189 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
2190 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2195 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2196 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
2197 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2199 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
2200 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2204 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2205 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
2207 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
2208 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
2209 require_commitment = true;
2210 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
2211 match forward_info {
2212 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
2213 require_commitment = true;
2215 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
2216 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
2217 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
2219 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
2220 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
2221 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
2225 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
2226 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
2227 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2233 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2234 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2235 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2236 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2238 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2239 Some(fail_reason.take())
2241 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2242 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
2243 require_commitment = true;
2247 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
2249 if self.channel_outbound {
2250 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee.take() {
2251 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2254 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
2255 // Because a node cannot send two commitment_signeds in a row without getting a
2256 // revoke_and_ack from us (as it would otherwise not know the per_commitment_point
2257 // it should use to create keys with) and because a node can't send a
2258 // commitment_signed without changes, checking if the feerate is equal to the
2259 // pending feerate update is sufficient to detect require_commitment.
2260 if feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2261 require_commitment = true;
2262 self.pending_update_fee = None;
2267 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
2268 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
2269 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
2270 if require_commitment {
2271 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2272 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
2273 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
2274 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
2275 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
2276 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2277 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2278 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2279 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2281 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
2282 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
2283 return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, monitor_update))
2286 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs()? {
2287 Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)) => {
2288 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
2289 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
2290 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2292 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2293 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2294 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2297 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
2298 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2299 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2300 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2302 Ok((Some(commitment_update), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update))
2305 if require_commitment {
2306 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
2308 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2309 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2310 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2311 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2313 Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2314 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2315 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2317 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2320 }), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update))
2322 Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), monitor_update))
2329 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
2330 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
2331 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
2332 fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
2333 if !self.channel_outbound {
2334 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
2336 if !self.is_usable() {
2337 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
2339 if !self.is_live() {
2340 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
2343 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
2344 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2348 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2349 self.pending_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2351 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2352 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2353 feerate_per_kw: feerate_per_kw as u32,
2357 pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> {
2358 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
2359 Some(update_fee) => {
2360 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
2361 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
2367 /// Removes any uncommitted HTLCs, to be used on peer disconnection, including any pending
2368 /// HTLCs that we intended to add but haven't as we were waiting on a remote revoke.
2369 /// Returns the set of PendingHTLCStatuses from remote uncommitted HTLCs (which we're
2370 /// implicitly dropping) and the payment_hashes of HTLCs we tried to add but are dropping.
2371 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
2373 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&mut self) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> {
2374 let mut outbound_drops = Vec::new();
2376 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2377 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2378 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2379 return outbound_drops;
2381 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
2382 // will be retransmitted.
2383 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
2385 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
2386 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2388 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
2389 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
2390 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
2391 // this HTLC accordingly
2392 inbound_drop_count += 1;
2395 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
2396 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
2397 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
2398 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
2401 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
2402 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
2403 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
2404 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
2405 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
2406 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
2411 self.next_remote_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
2413 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2414 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
2415 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
2416 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
2417 // the update upon reconnection.
2418 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2422 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
2424 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
2425 outbound_drops.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
2428 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {..} | &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {..} => true,
2431 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
2432 log_debug!(self, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops and {} waiting-to-locally-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", outbound_drops.len(), inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2436 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
2437 /// updates are partially paused.
2438 /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
2439 /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
2440 /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
2441 /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
2442 pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
2443 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2444 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = resend_raa;
2445 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = resend_commitment;
2446 assert!(self.monitor_pending_forwards.is_empty());
2447 mem::swap(&mut pending_forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2448 assert!(self.monitor_pending_failures.is_empty());
2449 mem::swap(&mut pending_fails, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2450 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
2453 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
2454 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
2455 /// to the remote side.
2456 pub fn monitor_updating_restored(&mut self) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, bool, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>) {
2457 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2458 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2460 let needs_broadcast_safe = self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_outbound;
2462 // Because we will never generate a FundingBroadcastSafe event when we're in
2463 // MonitorUpdateFailed, if we assume the user only broadcast the funding transaction when
2464 // they received the FundingBroadcastSafe event, we can only ever hit
2465 // monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound channel which failed to persist the
2466 // monitor on funding_created, and we even got the funding transaction confirmed before the
2467 // monitor was persisted.
2468 let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
2469 assert!(!self.channel_outbound, "Funding transaction broadcast without FundingBroadcastSafe!");
2470 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
2471 let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
2472 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
2473 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2474 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2475 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
2479 let mut forwards = Vec::new();
2480 mem::swap(&mut forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2481 let mut failures = Vec::new();
2482 mem::swap(&mut failures, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2484 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
2485 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2486 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2487 return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked);
2490 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
2491 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2493 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
2494 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update())
2497 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2498 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2499 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
2500 log_trace!(self, "Restored monitor updating resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
2501 if needs_broadcast_safe { "a funding broadcast safe, " } else { "" },
2502 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
2503 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
2504 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
2505 (raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked)
2508 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2509 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2511 if self.channel_outbound {
2512 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee"));
2514 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2515 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
2517 Channel::<ChanSigner>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
2518 self.pending_update_fee = Some(msg.feerate_per_kw as u64);
2519 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2523 #[cfg_attr(all(test, feature = "mutation_testing"), mutate)]
2524 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2525 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number));
2526 let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed(), self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
2527 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2528 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2529 per_commitment_secret,
2530 next_per_commitment_point,
2534 fn get_last_commitment_update(&self) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2535 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
2536 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
2537 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2538 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2540 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2541 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
2542 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
2543 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2544 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2545 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2546 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2547 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2548 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
2553 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2554 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2556 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
2557 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2558 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2559 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2560 reason: err_packet.clone()
2563 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
2564 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2565 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2566 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2567 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
2568 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
2571 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
2572 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2573 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2574 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2575 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2582 log_trace!(self, "Regenerated latest commitment update with {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
2583 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2584 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2585 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2587 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update().expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
2591 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
2592 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
2593 pub fn channel_reestablish(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> {
2594 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
2595 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
2596 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
2597 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
2598 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect"));
2601 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2602 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
2603 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish"));
2606 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
2607 match msg.data_loss_protect {
2608 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
2609 if chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed(), INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1) != data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret {
2610 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided"));
2612 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
2613 return Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(
2614 "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting"
2618 OptionalField::Absent => {}
2622 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
2623 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
2624 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
2626 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
2627 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
2628 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2629 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
2633 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2634 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any funding_locked's.
2635 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == 0 ||
2636 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2637 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
2638 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet"));
2640 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
2641 return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2644 // We have OurFundingLocked set!
2645 let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
2646 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
2647 return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2648 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2649 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
2650 }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2653 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
2654 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
2655 // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
2657 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
2658 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2659 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2662 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2665 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction"));
2668 // We increment cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
2669 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
2670 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
2671 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
2672 let our_next_remote_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
2674 let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
2675 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
2676 let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
2677 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
2678 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2679 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2680 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
2684 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == our_next_remote_commitment_number {
2685 if required_revoke.is_some() {
2686 log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2688 log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2691 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
2692 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
2693 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
2694 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
2696 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs() {
2697 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
2698 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) | Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
2699 Ok(Some((commitment_update, monitor_update))) => return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(monitor_update), self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg)),
2700 Ok(None) => return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg)),
2703 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
2705 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == our_next_remote_commitment_number - 1 {
2706 if required_revoke.is_some() {
2707 log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2709 log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2712 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2713 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2714 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
2717 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update()), None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
2719 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction"));
2723 fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F) -> Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>
2724 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2726 if !self.channel_outbound || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
2727 self.channel_state & (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK ||
2728 self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
2732 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
2733 if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
2734 proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
2736 let tx_weight = Self::get_closing_transaction_weight(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(), self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap());
2737 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate * tx_weight / 1000;
2739 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
2740 let our_sig = self.local_keys
2741 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
2743 if our_sig.is_none() { return None; }
2745 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate, total_fee_satoshis, our_sig.clone().unwrap()));
2746 Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
2747 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2748 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
2749 signature: our_sig.unwrap(),
2753 pub fn shutdown<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
2754 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2756 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2757 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
2759 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2760 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
2761 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
2762 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
2763 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation"));
2765 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2766 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2767 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs"));
2770 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2772 // BOLT 2 says we must only send a scriptpubkey of certain standard forms, which are up to
2773 // 34 bytes in length, so don't let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script.
2774 if self.channel_outbound && msg.scriptpubkey.len() > 34 {
2775 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown_scriptpubkey of absurd length from remote peer"));
2778 //Check shutdown_scriptpubkey form as BOLT says we must
2779 if !msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2pkh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2sh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
2780 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey from remote peer"));
2783 if self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
2784 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
2785 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey which did not match their previous scriptpubkey"));
2788 self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
2791 // From here on out, we may not fail!
2793 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
2794 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2796 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
2797 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
2798 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
2799 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
2800 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2801 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
2803 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
2804 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
2810 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back a update_fail_htlc
2811 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown cause we won't send
2812 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
2814 let our_shutdown = if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
2817 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
2818 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2819 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
2823 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
2824 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2826 Ok((our_shutdown, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), dropped_outbound_htlcs))
2829 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, their_sig: &Signature, our_sig: &Signature) {
2830 if tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to sign closing transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
2831 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to re-sign closing transaction"); }
2832 if tx.output.len() > 2 { panic!("Tried to sign bogus closing transaction"); }
2834 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
2836 let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()).serialize();
2837 let their_funding_key = self.their_funding_pubkey().serialize();
2838 if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
2839 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2840 tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2842 tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2843 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2845 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2846 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2848 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
2851 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
2852 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2854 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
2855 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown"));
2857 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2858 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
2860 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
2861 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs"));
2863 if msg.fee_satoshis > 21000000 * 10000000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
2864 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee"));
2867 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2868 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
2869 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
2870 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim"));
2872 let mut sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
2874 let their_funding_pubkey = &self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().funding_pubkey;
2876 match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, their_funding_pubkey) {
2879 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
2880 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
2881 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
2882 sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
2883 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.their_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer");
2887 if let Some((_, last_fee, our_sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
2888 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
2889 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &our_sig);
2890 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2891 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2892 return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
2896 macro_rules! propose_new_feerate {
2897 ($new_feerate: expr) => {
2898 let closing_tx_max_weight = Self::get_closing_transaction_weight(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(), self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap());
2899 let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000, false);
2900 let our_sig = self.local_keys
2901 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
2902 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction"))?;
2903 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee, our_sig.clone()));
2904 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
2905 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2906 fee_satoshis: used_total_fee,
2912 let proposed_sat_per_kw = msg.fee_satoshis * 1000 / closing_tx.get_weight() as u64;
2913 if self.channel_outbound {
2914 let our_max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
2915 if proposed_sat_per_kw > our_max_feerate {
2916 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
2917 if our_max_feerate <= last_feerate {
2918 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher than our Normal feerate"));
2921 propose_new_feerate!(our_max_feerate);
2924 let our_min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
2925 if proposed_sat_per_kw < our_min_feerate {
2926 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
2927 if our_min_feerate >= last_feerate {
2928 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower than our Background feerate"));
2931 propose_new_feerate!(our_min_feerate);
2935 let our_sig = self.local_keys
2936 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
2937 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction"))?;
2938 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &our_sig);
2940 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2941 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2943 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
2944 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2945 fee_satoshis: msg.fee_satoshis,
2947 }), Some(closing_tx)))
2950 // Public utilities:
2952 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
2956 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
2957 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
2958 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
2962 /// May only be called after funding has been initiated (ie is_funding_initiated() is true)
2963 pub fn channel_monitor(&mut self) -> &mut ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
2964 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2965 panic!("Can't get a channel monitor until funding has been created");
2967 self.channel_monitor.as_mut().unwrap()
2970 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
2971 /// is_usable() returns true).
2972 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2973 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2974 self.short_channel_id
2977 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
2978 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
2979 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
2983 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2984 pub fn get_their_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2988 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2989 pub fn get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2990 self.our_htlc_minimum_msat
2993 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2994 pub fn get_their_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2995 self.our_htlc_minimum_msat
2998 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
2999 self.channel_value_satoshis
3002 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
3003 self.config.fee_proportional_millionths
3007 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u64 {
3011 pub fn get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3012 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1
3015 pub fn get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3016 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
3019 pub fn get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3020 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 2
3024 pub fn get_local_keys(&self) -> &ChanSigner {
3029 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
3031 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
3032 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
3033 channel_reserve_msat: self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000,
3034 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3035 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3036 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
3038 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3040 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
3048 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
3052 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3053 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
3054 self.update_time_counter
3057 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
3058 self.latest_monitor_update_id
3061 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
3062 self.config.announced_channel
3065 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
3066 self.channel_outbound
3069 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
3070 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3071 pub fn get_our_fee_base_msat<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &F) -> u32
3072 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3074 // For lack of a better metric, we calculate what it would cost to consolidate the new HTLC
3075 // output value back into a transaction with the regular channel output:
3077 // the fee cost of the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transaction:
3078 let mut res = self.feerate_per_kw * cmp::max(HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT) / 1000;
3080 if self.channel_outbound {
3081 // + the marginal fee increase cost to us in the commitment transaction:
3082 res += self.feerate_per_kw * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC / 1000;
3085 // + the marginal cost of an input which spends the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout output:
3086 res += fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal) * SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT / 1000;
3091 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
3092 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
3093 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
3096 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
3097 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3098 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
3099 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
3100 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
3103 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
3104 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
3105 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3106 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
3107 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0)
3110 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
3111 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3112 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
3113 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
3116 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
3117 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
3118 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
3121 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
3122 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
3123 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
3124 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
3125 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
3126 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
3131 pub fn to_disabled_staged(&mut self) {
3132 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::DisabledStaged;
3135 pub fn to_disabled_marked(&mut self) {
3136 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::DisabledMarked;
3139 pub fn to_fresh(&mut self) {
3140 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::Fresh;
3143 pub fn is_disabled_staged(&self) -> bool {
3144 self.network_sync == UpdateStatus::DisabledStaged
3147 pub fn is_disabled_marked(&self) -> bool {
3148 self.network_sync == UpdateStatus::DisabledMarked
3151 /// When we receive a new block, we (a) check whether the block contains the funding
3152 /// transaction (which would start us counting blocks until we send the funding_signed), and
3153 /// (b) check the height of the block against outbound holding cell HTLCs in case we need to
3154 /// give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything else (e.g. commitment
3155 /// transaction broadcasts, channel closure detection, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
3156 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
3158 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
3159 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
3161 /// Only returns an ErrorAction of DisconnectPeer, if Err.
3163 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
3165 pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage> {
3166 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3167 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3169 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
3170 if *cltv_expiry <= height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
3171 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3178 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3179 if header.bitcoin_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
3180 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3181 self.funding_tx_confirmations += 1;
3184 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3185 for (ref tx, index_in_block) in txn_matched.iter().zip(indexes_of_txn_matched) {
3186 if tx.txid() == self.funding_txo.unwrap().txid {
3187 let txo_idx = self.funding_txo.unwrap().index as usize;
3188 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
3189 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
3190 if self.channel_outbound {
3191 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
3192 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
3193 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
3194 // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
3195 // channel and move on.
3196 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3197 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3199 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3200 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3201 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3202 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3203 data: "funding tx had wrong script/value".to_owned()
3206 if self.channel_outbound {
3207 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3208 if input.witness.is_empty() {
3209 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
3210 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
3211 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3212 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3216 self.funding_tx_confirmations = 1;
3217 self.short_channel_id = Some(((height as u64) << (5*8)) |
3218 ((*index_in_block as u64) << (2*8)) |
3219 ((txo_idx as u64) << (0*8)));
3224 if header.bitcoin_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
3225 self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
3226 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, header.time);
3227 if let Some(channel_monitor) = self.channel_monitor.as_mut() {
3228 channel_monitor.last_block_hash = self.last_block_connected;
3230 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3231 if self.funding_tx_confirmations == self.minimum_depth as u64 {
3232 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3233 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
3235 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
3236 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3237 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3239 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
3240 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
3241 // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
3243 } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
3244 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
3246 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
3247 // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
3250 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(header.bitcoin_hash());
3252 //TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us,
3253 //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda,
3254 //they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be
3255 //a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
3256 if need_commitment_update {
3257 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
3258 let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
3259 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
3260 return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3261 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3262 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
3263 }), timed_out_htlcs));
3265 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
3266 return Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs));
3272 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs))
3275 /// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being disconnected.
3276 /// Returns true if we need to close the channel now due to funding transaction
3277 /// unconfirmation/reorg.
3278 pub fn block_disconnected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader) -> bool {
3279 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3280 self.funding_tx_confirmations -= 1;
3281 if self.funding_tx_confirmations == UNCONF_THRESHOLD as u64 {
3285 if Some(header.bitcoin_hash()) == self.funding_tx_confirmed_in {
3286 self.funding_tx_confirmations = self.minimum_depth as u64 - 1;
3288 self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
3289 if let Some(channel_monitor) = self.channel_monitor.as_mut() {
3290 channel_monitor.last_block_hash = self.last_block_connected;
3295 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
3296 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
3298 pub fn get_open_channel<F: Deref>(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash, fee_estimator: &F) -> msgs::OpenChannel
3299 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3301 if !self.channel_outbound {
3302 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
3304 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
3305 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
3308 if self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3309 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3312 let local_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
3315 chain_hash: chain_hash,
3316 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3317 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3318 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
3319 dust_limit_satoshis: self.our_dust_limit_satoshis,
3320 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3321 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3322 htlc_minimum_msat: self.our_htlc_minimum_msat,
3323 feerate_per_kw: fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) as u32,
3324 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
3325 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3326 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()),
3327 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.revocation_base_key()),
3328 payment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.payment_key()),
3329 delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key()),
3330 htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.htlc_base_key()),
3331 first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret),
3332 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
3333 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3337 pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
3338 if self.channel_outbound {
3339 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
3341 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3342 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
3344 if self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3345 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3348 let local_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
3350 msgs::AcceptChannel {
3351 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3352 dust_limit_satoshis: self.our_dust_limit_satoshis,
3353 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3354 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3355 htlc_minimum_msat: self.our_htlc_minimum_msat,
3356 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth,
3357 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
3358 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3359 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()),
3360 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.revocation_base_key()),
3361 payment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.payment_key()),
3362 delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key()),
3363 htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.htlc_base_key()),
3364 first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret),
3365 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3369 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
3370 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature(&mut self) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> {
3371 let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
3372 let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
3373 Ok(self.local_keys.sign_remote_commitment(self.feerate_per_kw, &remote_initial_commitment_tx, &remote_keys, &Vec::new(), self.our_to_self_delay, &self.secp_ctx)
3374 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed"))?.0)
3377 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
3378 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
3379 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
3380 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
3381 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
3382 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
3383 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
3384 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created(&mut self, funding_txo: OutPoint) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> {
3385 if !self.channel_outbound {
3386 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
3388 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3389 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
3391 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
3392 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3393 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3394 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
3397 self.funding_txo = Some(funding_txo.clone());
3398 let our_signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature() {
3401 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
3402 self.funding_txo = None;
3407 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
3409 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
3411 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
3412 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
3414 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
3415 temporary_channel_id,
3416 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
3417 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
3418 signature: our_signature
3422 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
3423 /// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
3424 /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
3425 /// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
3426 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
3428 /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
3429 /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
3430 pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
3431 if !self.config.announced_channel {
3432 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements"));
3434 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
3435 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked"));
3437 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
3438 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing"));
3441 let were_node_one = our_node_id.serialize()[..] < self.their_node_id.serialize()[..];
3442 let our_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key());
3444 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
3445 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
3446 chain_hash: chain_hash,
3447 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
3448 node_id_1: if were_node_one { our_node_id } else { self.get_their_node_id() },
3449 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_their_node_id() } else { our_node_id },
3450 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_key } else { self.their_funding_pubkey().clone() },
3451 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.their_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { our_bitcoin_key },
3452 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3455 let sig = self.local_keys.sign_channel_announcement(&msg, &self.secp_ctx)
3456 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement"))?;
3461 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
3462 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
3463 pub fn get_channel_reestablish(&self) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish {
3464 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3465 assert_ne!(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
3466 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
3467 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
3468 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
3469 // fuzztarget mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
3470 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
3471 // valid, and valid in fuzztarget mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
3472 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
3473 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
3474 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3475 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
3476 log_trace!(self, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret));
3477 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3478 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
3479 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
3482 log_info!(self, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret");
3483 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3484 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
3485 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
3488 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
3489 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3490 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
3491 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
3492 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
3493 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
3494 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
3495 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
3497 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
3498 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
3499 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number,
3500 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
3501 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
3502 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
3503 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
3504 // cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
3505 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
3507 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
3513 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
3515 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
3516 /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
3517 /// This returns an option instead of a pure UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we are
3518 /// waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack during which time we cannot add new
3519 /// HTLCs on the wire or we wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed.
3520 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
3521 /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
3522 pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> {
3523 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3524 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down"));
3527 if amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
3528 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send more than the total value of the channel"));
3531 if amount_msat == 0 {
3532 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
3535 if amount_msat < self.their_htlc_minimum_msat {
3536 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value"));
3539 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
3540 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
3541 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
3542 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
3543 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
3544 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
3545 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
3546 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected/frozen for channel monitor update"));
3549 let (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
3550 if outbound_htlc_count + 1 > self.their_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3551 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs"));
3553 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
3554 if htlc_outbound_value_msat + amount_msat > self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3555 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept"));
3558 // Check self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
3559 // reserve for them to have something to claim if we misbehave)
3560 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 + amount_msat + htlc_outbound_value_msat {
3561 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put us over their reserve value"));
3564 // Now update local state:
3565 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3566 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3567 amount_msat: amount_msat,
3568 payment_hash: payment_hash,
3569 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
3571 onion_routing_packet: onion_routing_packet,
3576 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
3577 htlc_id: self.next_local_htlc_id,
3578 amount_msat: amount_msat,
3579 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3580 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
3581 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
3585 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3586 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3587 htlc_id: self.next_local_htlc_id,
3588 amount_msat: amount_msat,
3589 payment_hash: payment_hash,
3590 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
3591 onion_routing_packet: onion_routing_packet,
3593 self.next_local_htlc_id += 1;
3598 /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
3599 /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
3600 /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
3601 /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
3602 pub fn send_commitment(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> {
3603 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3604 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
3606 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3607 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
3609 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3610 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
3612 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
3613 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
3615 let mut have_updates = self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
3616 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3617 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3618 have_updates = true;
3620 if have_updates { break; }
3622 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3623 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3624 have_updates = true;
3626 if have_updates { break; }
3629 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
3631 self.send_commitment_no_status_check()
3633 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
3634 fn send_commitment_no_status_check(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> {
3635 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
3636 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
3638 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3639 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3640 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
3642 if let Some(state) = new_state {
3646 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3647 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
3648 Some(fail_reason.take())
3650 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
3653 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
3655 let (res, remote_commitment_tx, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update() {
3656 Ok((res, (remote_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
3657 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3658 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
3659 htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
3660 (res, remote_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
3662 Err(e) => return Err(e),
3665 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3666 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3667 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3668 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
3669 unsigned_commitment_tx: remote_commitment_tx.clone(),
3670 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
3671 commitment_number: self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number,
3672 their_revocation_point: self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
3675 self.channel_monitor.as_mut().unwrap().update_monitor_ooo(monitor_update.clone()).unwrap();
3676 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
3677 Ok((res, monitor_update))
3680 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
3681 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
3682 fn send_commitment_no_state_update(&self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Transaction, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> {
3683 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
3684 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
3685 if self.channel_outbound {
3686 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3690 let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
3691 let remote_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, true, feerate_per_kw);
3692 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
3695 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(remote_commitment_tx.2.len());
3696 for &(ref htlc, _) in remote_commitment_tx.2.iter() {
3700 let res = self.local_keys.sign_remote_commitment(feerate_per_kw, &remote_commitment_tx.0, &remote_keys, &htlcs, self.our_to_self_delay, &self.secp_ctx)
3701 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed"))?;
3703 htlc_signatures = res.1;
3705 log_trace!(self, "Signed remote commitment tx {} with redeemscript {} -> {}",
3706 encode::serialize_hex(&remote_commitment_tx.0),
3707 encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
3708 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]));
3710 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
3711 log_trace!(self, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {}",
3712 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&remote_commitment_tx.0.txid(), feerate_per_kw, self.our_to_self_delay, htlc, &remote_keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &remote_keys.revocation_key)),
3713 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &remote_keys)),
3714 log_bytes!(remote_keys.a_htlc_key.serialize()),
3715 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]));
3719 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
3720 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3723 }, (remote_commitment_tx.0, remote_commitment_tx.2)))
3726 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
3727 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
3728 /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
3730 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> {
3731 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
3732 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
3733 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
3734 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
3740 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
3741 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
3742 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError> {
3743 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3744 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3745 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first"});
3748 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
3749 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
3750 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress"});
3752 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
3753 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote"});
3756 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3757 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3758 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?"});
3761 let our_closing_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
3763 // From here on out, we may not fail!
3764 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3765 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3767 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3769 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3771 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
3772 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
3773 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
3774 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3775 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3777 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
3778 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3785 Ok((msgs::Shutdown {
3786 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3787 scriptpubkey: our_closing_script,
3788 }, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
3791 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
3792 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
3793 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
3794 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
3795 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
3796 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<OutPoint>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
3797 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
3799 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
3800 // return them to fail the payment.
3801 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3802 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3804 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
3805 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
3811 for _htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
3812 //TODO: Do something with the remaining HTLCs
3813 //(we need to have the ChannelManager monitor them so we can claim the inbound HTLCs
3817 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3818 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3819 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3820 (self.funding_txo.clone(), ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3821 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3822 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
3823 }, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
3827 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3828 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3830 impl Writeable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
3831 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3833 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref error_packet) => {
3835 error_packet.write(writer)?;
3837 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref onion_hash, ref err_code)) => {
3839 onion_hash.write(writer)?;
3840 err_code.write(writer)?;
3842 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3844 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
3851 impl Readable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
3852 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3853 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3854 0 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(Readable::read(reader)?),
3855 1 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
3856 2 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(Readable::read(reader)?),
3857 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3862 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable> Writeable for Channel<ChanSigner> {
3863 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3864 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
3865 // called but include holding cell updates (and obviously we don't modify self).
3867 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3868 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3870 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
3871 self.config.write(writer)?;
3873 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
3874 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
3875 self.channel_outbound.write(writer)?;
3876 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
3878 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
3880 self.local_keys.write(writer)?;
3881 self.shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
3882 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
3884 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
3885 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
3886 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
3888 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
3889 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3890 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3891 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
3894 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
3895 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3896 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
3899 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3900 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
3901 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3902 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3904 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
3905 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
3907 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
3909 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
3911 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
3913 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3916 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
3918 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
3923 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3924 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3925 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3926 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
3927 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3928 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3929 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
3931 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
3933 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
3935 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3938 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref fail_reason) => {
3940 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
3942 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref fail_reason) => {
3944 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
3946 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) => {
3948 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
3953 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3954 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3956 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
3958 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
3959 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3960 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3961 source.write(writer)?;
3962 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
3964 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
3966 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
3967 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3969 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3971 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3972 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3977 match self.resend_order {
3978 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
3979 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
3982 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked.write(writer)?;
3983 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
3984 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
3986 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3987 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
3988 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
3989 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3992 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3993 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
3994 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
3995 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3996 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
3999 self.pending_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4000 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4002 self.next_local_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4003 (self.next_remote_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4004 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
4005 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
4007 match self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4008 Some((feerate, fee, sig)) => {
4010 feerate.write(writer)?;
4014 None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4017 self.funding_txo.write(writer)?;
4018 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
4019 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4021 self.last_block_connected.write(writer)?;
4022 self.funding_tx_confirmations.write(writer)?;
4024 self.their_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4025 self.our_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4026 self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
4027 self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4028 self.their_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4029 self.our_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4030 self.their_to_self_delay.write(writer)?;
4031 self.our_to_self_delay.write(writer)?;
4032 self.their_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
4033 self.minimum_depth.write(writer)?;
4035 self.their_pubkeys.write(writer)?;
4036 self.their_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4038 self.their_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4039 self.their_node_id.write(writer)?;
4041 self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
4043 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
4045 self.channel_monitor.as_ref().unwrap().write_for_disk(writer)?;
4050 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable> ReadableArgs<Arc<Logger>> for Channel<ChanSigner> {
4051 fn read<R : ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4052 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4053 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4054 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
4055 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
4058 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4059 let config: ChannelConfig = Readable::read(reader)?;
4061 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4062 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
4063 let channel_outbound = Readable::read(reader)?;
4064 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4066 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4068 let local_keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
4069 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4070 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
4072 let cur_local_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4073 let cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4074 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4076 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4077 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4078 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
4079 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4080 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4081 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4082 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4083 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4084 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4085 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
4086 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4087 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4088 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4089 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4094 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4095 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4096 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
4097 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4098 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4099 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4100 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4101 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4102 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4103 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4104 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4105 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4106 2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4107 3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Readable::read(reader)?),
4108 4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4109 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4114 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4115 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
4116 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
4117 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4118 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4119 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4120 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4121 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4122 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4123 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4125 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
4126 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
4127 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4129 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
4130 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4131 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4133 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4137 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4138 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4139 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4140 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4143 let monitor_pending_funding_locked = Readable::read(reader)?;
4144 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
4145 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
4147 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4148 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4149 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
4150 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4153 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4154 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4155 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
4156 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4159 let pending_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4160 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4162 let next_local_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4163 let next_remote_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4164 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
4165 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
4167 let last_sent_closing_fee = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4169 1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
4170 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4173 let funding_txo = Readable::read(reader)?;
4174 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
4175 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4177 let last_block_connected = Readable::read(reader)?;
4178 let funding_tx_confirmations = Readable::read(reader)?;
4180 let their_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4181 let our_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4182 let their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4183 let their_channel_reserve_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4184 let their_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4185 let our_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4186 let their_to_self_delay = Readable::read(reader)?;
4187 let our_to_self_delay = Readable::read(reader)?;
4188 let their_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
4189 let minimum_depth = Readable::read(reader)?;
4191 let their_pubkeys = Readable::read(reader)?;
4192 let their_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4194 let their_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4195 let their_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4197 let their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4198 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
4200 let (monitor_last_block, channel_monitor) = ReadableArgs::read(reader, logger.clone())?;
4201 // We drop the ChannelMonitor's last block connected hash cause we don't actually bother
4202 // doing full block connection operations on the internal ChannelMonitor copies
4203 if monitor_last_block != last_block_connected {
4204 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4214 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
4215 channel_value_satoshis,
4217 latest_monitor_update_id,
4223 cur_local_commitment_transaction_number,
4224 cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number,
4227 pending_inbound_htlcs,
4228 pending_outbound_htlcs,
4229 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
4233 monitor_pending_funding_locked,
4234 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
4235 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
4236 monitor_pending_forwards,
4237 monitor_pending_failures,
4240 holding_cell_update_fee,
4242 next_remote_htlc_id,
4243 update_time_counter,
4246 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4247 max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4248 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4249 max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4251 last_sent_closing_fee,
4254 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
4256 last_block_connected,
4257 funding_tx_confirmations,
4259 their_dust_limit_satoshis,
4260 our_dust_limit_satoshis,
4261 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4262 their_channel_reserve_satoshis,
4263 their_htlc_minimum_msat,
4264 our_htlc_minimum_msat,
4265 their_to_self_delay,
4267 their_max_accepted_htlcs,
4271 their_cur_commitment_point,
4273 their_prev_commitment_point,
4276 their_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
4278 channel_monitor: Some(channel_monitor),
4281 network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
4290 use bitcoin::BitcoinHash;
4291 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
4292 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
4293 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
4294 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
4295 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
4296 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
4297 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
4298 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
4300 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
4301 use ln::channel::{Channel,ChannelKeys,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,TxCreationKeys};
4302 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
4303 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
4304 use ln::msgs::{OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
4306 use ln::chan_utils::{LocalCommitmentTransaction, ChannelPublicKeys};
4307 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
4308 use chain::keysinterface::{InMemoryChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
4309 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
4310 use util::config::UserConfig;
4311 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingChannelKeys;
4312 use util::test_utils;
4313 use util::logger::Logger;
4314 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message, Signature, All};
4315 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
4316 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4317 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4318 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, WPubkeyHash};
4320 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
4322 struct TestFeeEstimator {
4325 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
4326 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u64 {
4332 fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
4333 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
4334 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis in existence");
4338 chan_keys: InMemoryChannelKeys,
4340 impl KeysInterface for Keys {
4341 type ChanKeySigner = InMemoryChannelKeys;
4343 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
4344 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
4345 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4346 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4347 let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
4348 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
4351 fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
4352 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4353 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4354 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)
4357 fn get_channel_keys(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemoryChannelKeys {
4358 self.chan_keys.clone()
4360 fn get_onion_rand(&self) -> (SecretKey, [u8; 32]) { panic!(); }
4361 fn get_channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
4364 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
4365 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
4369 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
4370 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
4371 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
4372 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4373 let mut seed = [0; 32];
4374 let mut rng = thread_rng();
4375 rng.fill_bytes(&mut seed);
4376 let network = Network::Testnet;
4377 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network, logger.clone() as Arc<Logger>);
4379 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
4381 // Create Node A's channel
4382 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4383 let config = UserConfig::default();
4384 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingChannelKeys>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, Arc::clone(&logger), &config).unwrap();
4386 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
4387 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(), &&feeest);
4388 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
4389 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingChannelKeys>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, logger, &config).unwrap();
4391 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
4392 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
4393 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
4395 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
4396 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
4397 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
4398 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
4400 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0);
4401 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_outpoint).unwrap();
4402 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg).unwrap();
4404 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
4405 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg);
4407 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
4408 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
4409 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
4410 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish();
4411 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
4412 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
4413 match msg.data_loss_protect {
4414 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
4415 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
4420 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
4422 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
4423 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish();
4424 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
4425 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
4426 match msg.data_loss_protect {
4427 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
4428 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
4435 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
4436 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
4437 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
4438 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
4439 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4441 let mut chan_keys = InMemoryChannelKeys::new(
4443 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4444 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4445 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4446 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4447 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4449 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
4450 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
4454 assert_eq!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, chan_keys.funding_key()).serialize()[..],
4455 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
4456 let keys_provider = Keys { chan_keys: chan_keys.clone() };
4458 let their_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4459 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
4460 config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
4461 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, their_node_id, 10_000_000, 100000, 42, Arc::clone(&logger), &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
4462 chan.their_to_self_delay = 144;
4463 chan.our_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
4465 let funding_info = OutPoint::new(Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), 0);
4466 chan.funding_txo = Some(funding_info);
4468 let their_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
4469 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
4470 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4471 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
4472 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
4473 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
4475 chan_keys.set_remote_channel_pubkeys(&their_pubkeys);
4477 assert_eq!(their_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
4478 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
4480 assert_eq!(their_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
4481 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
4483 assert_eq!(their_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
4484 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
4486 // We can't just use build_local_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
4487 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
4488 // build_commitment_transaction.
4489 let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, chan.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key());
4490 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4491 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
4492 let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, chan.local_keys.htlc_base_key());
4493 let keys = TxCreationKeys::new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
4495 chan.their_pubkeys = Some(their_pubkeys);
4497 let mut unsigned_tx: (Transaction, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>);
4500 macro_rules! test_commitment {
4501 ( $their_sig_hex: expr, $our_sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, {
4502 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $their_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $our_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
4505 let mut res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, chan.feerate_per_kw);
4506 let htlcs = res.2.drain(..)
4507 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
4511 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
4512 let their_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($their_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4513 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&unsigned_tx.0).sighash_all(&unsigned_tx.0.input[0], &redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
4514 secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &their_signature, chan.their_funding_pubkey()).unwrap();
4516 let mut per_htlc = Vec::new();
4517 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
4519 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($their_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4520 per_htlc.push((unsigned_tx.1[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
4522 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), per_htlc.len());
4524 localtx = LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(unsigned_tx.0.clone(), their_signature.clone(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, chan.local_keys.funding_key()), chan.their_funding_pubkey(), keys.clone(), chan.feerate_per_kw, per_htlc);
4525 let local_sig = chan_keys.sign_local_commitment(&localtx, &chan.secp_ctx).unwrap();
4526 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($our_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), local_sig);
4528 assert_eq!(serialize(&localtx.add_local_sig(&redeemscript, local_sig))[..],
4529 hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
4531 let htlc_sigs = chan_keys.sign_local_commitment_htlc_transactions(&localtx, chan.their_to_self_delay, &chan.secp_ctx).unwrap();
4532 let mut htlc_sig_iter = localtx.per_htlc.iter().zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
4535 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($their_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4537 let ref htlc = unsigned_tx.1[$htlc_idx];
4538 let htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.0.txid(), &htlc, true, &keys, chan.feerate_per_kw);
4539 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
4540 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
4541 secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.b_htlc_key).unwrap();
4543 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
4546 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
4547 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
4548 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
4552 assert!(preimage.is_some());
4555 let mut htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
4556 while (htlc_sig.1).1.is_none() { htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap(); }
4557 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx));
4559 let our_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($our_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4560 assert_eq!(Some(our_signature), *(htlc_sig.1).1);
4561 assert_eq!(serialize(&localtx.get_signed_htlc_tx((htlc_sig.1).0, &(htlc_sig.1).1.unwrap(), &preimage, chan.their_to_self_delay))[..],
4562 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
4565 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next();
4566 if htlc_sig.is_none() { break; }
4567 assert!((htlc_sig.unwrap().1).1.is_none());
4572 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
4573 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
4575 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
4576 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
4577 "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", {});
4579 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
4580 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
4582 amount_msat: 1000000,
4584 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4585 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4587 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
4590 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
4591 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
4593 amount_msat: 2000000,
4595 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4596 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4598 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
4601 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
4602 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
4604 amount_msat: 2000000,
4606 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4607 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4608 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
4610 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
4613 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
4614 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
4616 amount_msat: 3000000,
4618 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4619 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4620 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
4622 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
4625 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
4626 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
4628 amount_msat: 4000000,
4630 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4631 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4633 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
4637 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4638 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4639 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
4641 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
4642 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
4643 "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", {
4646 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
4647 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
4648 "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" },
4651 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
4652 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
4653 "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" },
4656 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
4657 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
4658 "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" },
4661 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
4662 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
4663 "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" },
4666 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
4667 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
4668 "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" }
4671 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4672 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4673 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
4675 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
4676 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
4677 "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", {
4680 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
4681 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
4682 "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" },
4685 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
4686 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
4687 "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" },
4690 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
4691 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
4692 "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" },
4695 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
4696 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
4697 "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" },
4700 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
4701 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
4702 "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" }
4705 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4706 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4707 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
4709 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
4710 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
4711 "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", {
4714 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
4715 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
4716 "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" },
4719 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
4720 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
4721 "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" },
4724 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
4725 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
4726 "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" },
4729 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
4730 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
4731 "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" }
4734 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4735 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4736 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
4738 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
4739 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
4740 "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", {
4743 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
4744 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
4745 "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" },
4748 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
4749 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
4750 "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" },
4753 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
4754 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
4755 "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" },
4758 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
4759 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
4760 "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" }
4763 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4764 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4765 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
4767 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
4768 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
4769 "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", {
4772 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
4773 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
4774 "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" },
4777 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
4778 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
4779 "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" },
4782 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
4783 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
4784 "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" }
4787 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4788 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4789 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
4791 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
4792 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
4793 "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", {
4796 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
4797 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
4798 "02000000000101153cd825fdb3aa624bfe513e8031d5d08c5e582fb3d1d1fe8faf27d3eed410cd0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de84500148304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e015430101008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
4801 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
4802 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
4803 "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" },
4806 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
4807 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
4808 "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" }
4811 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4812 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4813 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
4815 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
4816 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
4817 "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", {
4820 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
4821 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
4822 "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" },
4825 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
4826 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
4827 "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" }
4830 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4831 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4832 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
4834 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
4835 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
4836 "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", {
4839 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
4840 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
4841 "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" },
4844 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
4845 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
4846 "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" }
4849 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4850 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4851 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
4853 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
4854 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
4855 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8003a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484eb936a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e101483045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
4858 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
4859 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
4860 "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" }
4863 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4864 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4865 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
4867 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
4868 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
4869 "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", {
4872 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
4873 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
4874 "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" }
4877 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4878 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4879 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
4881 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
4882 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
4883 "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", {});
4885 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4886 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4887 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
4889 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
4890 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
4891 "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", {});
4893 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4894 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4895 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
4897 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
4898 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
4899 "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", {});
4901 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
4902 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4903 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
4905 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
4906 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
4907 "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", {});
4911 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
4912 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
4914 let mut seed = [0; 32];
4915 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
4916 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
4917 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
4919 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
4920 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
4921 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
4923 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
4924 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
4926 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
4927 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
4929 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
4930 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
4931 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
4935 fn test_key_derivation() {
4936 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
4937 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4939 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4940 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4942 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
4943 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
4945 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
4946 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
4948 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
4949 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
4951 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
4952 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
4954 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
4955 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
4957 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
4958 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());