1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
54 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
57 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
58 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
60 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
64 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
65 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
68 pub struct AvailableBalances {
69 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
70 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
71 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
72 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
73 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
74 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
75 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
76 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
79 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
81 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
83 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
84 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
85 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
86 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
87 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
88 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
90 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
94 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
95 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
96 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
97 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
100 enum InboundHTLCState {
101 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
102 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
103 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
104 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
105 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
106 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
107 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
108 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
109 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
110 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
111 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
112 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
113 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
114 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
115 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
117 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
118 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
119 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
120 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
121 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
122 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
123 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
124 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
125 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
126 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
127 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
128 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
129 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
130 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
132 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
133 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
134 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
135 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
136 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
137 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
138 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
139 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
141 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
142 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
144 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
145 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
146 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
147 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
148 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
149 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
150 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
151 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
154 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
158 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
159 state: InboundHTLCState,
162 enum OutboundHTLCState {
163 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
164 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
165 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
166 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
167 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
168 /// money back (though we won't), and,
169 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
170 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
171 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
172 /// we'll never get out of sync).
173 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
174 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
175 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
177 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
178 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
179 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
180 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
181 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
182 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
183 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
184 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
185 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
186 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
187 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
188 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
189 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
190 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
191 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
195 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
196 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
197 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
198 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
201 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
202 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
204 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
205 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
210 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
211 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
213 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
214 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
219 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
223 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
224 state: OutboundHTLCState,
226 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
229 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
230 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
231 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
235 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
237 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
238 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
239 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
242 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
247 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
251 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
252 /// We first move through init with `OurInitSent` -> `TheirInitSent` -> `FundingCreated` -> `FundingSent`.
253 /// `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` then get set on `FundingSent`, and when both are set we
254 /// move on to `ChannelReady`.
255 /// Note that `PeerDisconnected` can be set on both `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent`.
256 /// `ChannelReady` can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
257 /// move on to `ShutdownComplete`, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
259 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
260 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
261 /// Implies we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message
262 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
263 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to `FundingSent`.
264 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate `funding_signed`
265 /// upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
267 /// Set when we have received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting
268 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The `ChannelReady` flags are set to indicate when we
269 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
271 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate they sent us a `channel_ready` message.
272 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
273 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
274 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate we sent them a `channel_ready` message.
275 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
276 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
278 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent` indicating remote side is considered
279 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a `channel_reestablish`
281 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
282 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady`, FundingCreated, and `FundingSent` indicating the user has
283 /// told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
284 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
285 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
286 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
287 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
288 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
289 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
291 /// Flag is set on `ChannelReady`.
292 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
293 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after receiving a shutdown message from
294 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
295 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
296 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
297 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after sending a shutdown message. At this
298 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
299 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
300 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
301 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
302 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
304 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
305 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
307 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
309 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
311 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
312 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
313 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
314 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
318 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
320 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
322 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
324 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
325 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
326 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
327 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
328 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
330 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
331 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
333 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
335 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
336 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
338 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
339 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
340 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
341 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
342 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
343 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
345 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
346 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
348 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
349 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
350 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
351 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
352 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
354 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
355 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
357 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
358 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
360 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
361 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
362 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
363 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
369 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
370 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
372 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
373 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
374 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
379 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
380 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
382 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
383 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
384 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
389 macro_rules! secp_check {
390 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
393 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
398 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
399 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
400 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
401 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
402 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
403 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
404 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
405 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
407 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
409 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
411 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
415 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
417 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
418 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
419 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
421 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
422 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
424 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
425 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
426 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
427 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
428 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
430 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
431 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
435 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
441 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
444 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
445 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
446 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
447 holding_cell_msat: u64,
448 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
451 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
452 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
453 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
454 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
455 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
456 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
457 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
458 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
459 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
460 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
463 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
464 struct HTLCCandidate {
466 origin: HTLCInitiator,
470 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
478 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
480 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
482 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
483 htlc_value_msat: u64,
484 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
489 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
490 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
491 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
492 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
493 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
495 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
496 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
497 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
498 htlc_value_msat: u64,
500 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
501 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
505 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
506 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
507 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
508 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
509 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
510 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
511 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
512 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
513 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
514 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
515 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
518 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
519 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
520 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
521 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
522 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
523 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
524 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
525 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
528 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
530 /// Contains a (counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]) tuple
531 /// followed by a list of HTLCs to fail back in the form of the (source, payment hash, and this
532 /// channel's counterparty_node_id and channel_id).
533 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
534 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
535 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>
538 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
539 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
540 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
541 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
542 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
543 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
544 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
545 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
546 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
547 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
548 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
549 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
550 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
551 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
552 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
554 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
555 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
556 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
557 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
559 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
560 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
561 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
562 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
564 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
565 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
566 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
567 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
568 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
570 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
571 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
572 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
573 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
575 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
576 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
577 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
579 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
580 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
581 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
582 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
583 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
585 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
586 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
589 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
590 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
592 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
593 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
594 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
595 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
597 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
598 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
601 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
602 (0, update, required),
605 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
606 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
607 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
608 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
609 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
611 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
612 /// in a timely manner.
613 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
616 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
617 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
618 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
620 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
621 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
622 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
623 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
627 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
628 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
629 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
631 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
632 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
633 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
634 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
636 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
640 channel_id: [u8; 32],
641 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
644 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
645 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
647 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
648 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
649 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
651 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
652 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
653 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
654 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
656 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
657 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
659 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
661 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
662 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
663 destination_script: Script,
665 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
666 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
667 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
669 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
670 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
671 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
672 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
673 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
674 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
676 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
677 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
678 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
679 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
680 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
681 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
683 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
685 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
686 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
687 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
689 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
690 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
691 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
692 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
693 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
694 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
695 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
697 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
699 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
700 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
701 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
702 // HTLCs with similar state.
703 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
704 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
705 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
706 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
707 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
708 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
709 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
710 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
711 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
714 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
715 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
716 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
718 update_time_counter: u32,
720 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
721 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
722 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
723 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
724 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
725 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
727 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
728 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
730 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
731 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
732 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
733 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
735 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
736 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
738 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
740 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
742 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
743 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
744 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
745 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
746 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
747 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
748 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
749 channel_creation_height: u32,
751 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
754 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
756 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
759 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
761 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
764 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
766 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
768 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
769 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
772 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
774 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
776 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
777 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
779 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
781 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
782 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
783 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
785 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
787 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
788 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
790 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
791 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
792 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
794 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
796 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
798 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
799 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
800 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
801 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
803 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
804 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
805 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
807 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
808 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
809 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
811 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
812 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
813 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
814 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
815 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
816 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
817 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
818 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
820 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
821 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
822 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
823 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
824 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
826 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
827 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
829 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
830 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
831 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
832 /// unblock the state machine.
834 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
835 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
836 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
838 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
839 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
840 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
842 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
843 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
844 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
845 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
846 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
847 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
848 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
849 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
851 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
852 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
854 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
855 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
856 // the channel's funding UTXO.
858 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
859 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
860 // associated channel mapping.
862 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
863 // to store all of them.
864 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
866 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
867 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
868 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
869 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
870 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
872 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
873 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
875 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
876 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
878 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
879 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
880 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
882 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
883 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
884 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
887 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
888 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
889 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
890 self.update_time_counter
893 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
894 self.latest_monitor_update_id
897 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
898 self.config.announced_channel
901 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
902 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
905 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
906 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
907 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
908 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
911 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
912 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
913 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
916 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
917 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
918 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
919 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
920 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
923 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
924 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
925 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
926 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete;
928 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_state & (ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == 0 {
929 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated;
931 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
932 return ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs;
934 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
935 return ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee;
937 return ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown;
940 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
941 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
942 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
943 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
945 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
946 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
947 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
948 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK
951 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
952 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
953 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
954 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
955 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
960 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
964 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
966 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
967 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
968 self.temporary_channel_id
971 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
975 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
976 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
977 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
981 /// Gets the channel's type
982 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
986 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
988 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
989 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
990 self.short_channel_id
993 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
994 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
995 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
998 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
999 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1000 self.outbound_scid_alias
1003 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1004 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1005 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1006 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1007 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1008 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1011 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1012 /// get_funding_created.
1013 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1014 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1017 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1018 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1019 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1022 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1023 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1024 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1025 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1029 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1032 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1033 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1036 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1037 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1040 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1041 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1042 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1045 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1046 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1049 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1050 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1051 self.counterparty_node_id
1054 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1055 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1056 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1059 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1060 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1061 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1064 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1065 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1067 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1068 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1069 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1070 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1072 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1076 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1077 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1078 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1081 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1082 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1083 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1086 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1087 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1088 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1090 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1091 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1096 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1097 self.channel_value_satoshis
1100 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1101 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1104 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1105 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1108 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1109 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1110 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1112 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1113 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1114 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1115 ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
1116 feerate_per_kw as u64 * multiplier
1118 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1122 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1123 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1124 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1127 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1128 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1129 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1132 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1133 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1134 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1137 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1138 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1139 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1142 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1143 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1144 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1147 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1148 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1149 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1152 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1153 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1154 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1155 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1156 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1159 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1161 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1162 self.prev_config = None;
1166 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1167 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1171 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1172 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1173 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1174 let did_channel_update =
1175 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1176 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1177 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1178 if did_channel_update {
1179 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1180 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1181 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1182 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1184 self.config.options = *config;
1188 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
1189 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
1190 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
1193 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1194 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1195 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1196 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1197 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1199 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1200 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1201 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1202 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1203 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1204 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1205 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1207 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1208 where L::Target: Logger
1210 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1211 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1212 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1214 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1215 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1216 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1217 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1219 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1220 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1221 if match update_state {
1222 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1223 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1224 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1225 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1226 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1228 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1232 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1233 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1234 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1235 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1237 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1238 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1239 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1241 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1242 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1243 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1244 transaction_output_index: None
1249 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1250 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1251 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1252 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1253 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1256 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1258 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1259 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1260 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1262 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1263 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1266 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1267 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1270 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1272 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1273 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1274 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1276 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1277 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1283 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1284 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1285 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1286 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1287 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1288 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1289 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1293 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1294 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1296 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1298 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1299 if generated_by_local {
1300 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1301 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1310 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1312 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1313 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1314 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1315 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1316 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1317 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1318 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1321 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1322 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1323 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1324 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1328 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1329 preimages.push(preimage);
1333 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1334 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1336 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1338 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1339 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1341 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1342 if !generated_by_local {
1343 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1351 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1352 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1353 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1354 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1355 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1356 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1357 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1358 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1360 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1362 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1363 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1364 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1365 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1367 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1369 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1370 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1371 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1372 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1375 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1376 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1377 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1378 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1380 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1383 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1384 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1385 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1386 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1388 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1391 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1392 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1397 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1398 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1403 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1405 let channel_parameters =
1406 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1407 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1408 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1415 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1418 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1419 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1420 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1421 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1423 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1424 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1425 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1433 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1434 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1440 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1441 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1442 /// our counterparty!)
1443 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1444 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1445 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1446 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1447 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1448 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1449 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1451 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1455 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1456 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1457 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1458 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1459 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1460 //may see payments to it!
1461 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1462 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1463 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1465 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1468 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1469 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1470 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1471 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1472 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1475 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1476 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1479 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1483 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1484 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1485 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1486 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1487 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1488 // which are near the dust limit.
1489 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1490 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1491 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1492 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1493 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1495 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1496 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1498 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1501 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1502 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1503 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1506 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1507 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1509 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1510 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1511 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1512 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1513 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1514 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1515 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1518 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1521 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1522 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1523 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1525 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1526 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1527 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1528 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1529 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1530 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1532 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1533 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1539 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1540 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1542 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1543 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1544 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1545 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1546 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1547 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1548 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1551 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1554 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1555 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1556 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1558 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1559 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1560 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1561 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1562 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1563 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1565 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1566 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1570 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1571 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1572 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1573 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1574 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1575 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1576 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1578 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1579 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1581 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1588 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1589 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1590 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1591 /// corner case properly.
1592 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1593 -> AvailableBalances
1594 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1596 let context = &self;
1597 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1598 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1599 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1601 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1602 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1604 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1606 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1608 if context.is_outbound() {
1609 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1610 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1612 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1613 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1615 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1616 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1617 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1618 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1621 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1622 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1623 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1624 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1626 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1627 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1628 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1629 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
1630 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1631 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1632 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1633 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1634 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1635 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1637 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1640 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1641 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1642 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1643 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1644 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1647 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1648 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1650 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1651 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1652 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1654 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
1655 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1656 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1657 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1661 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1663 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1664 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1665 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1666 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1667 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1668 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1669 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
1671 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1672 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1674 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1675 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1676 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1678 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1679 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1680 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1681 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1682 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1685 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1686 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1687 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1688 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1689 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1690 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1693 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1694 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1695 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1697 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1701 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1702 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1704 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1705 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1709 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1710 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1711 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1712 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1714 outbound_capacity_msat,
1715 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1716 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1720 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1721 let context = &self;
1722 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1725 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1726 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1728 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1729 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1731 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1732 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1734 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1735 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1736 let context = &self;
1737 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1739 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1742 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1743 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1745 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1746 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1748 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1749 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1751 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1752 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1756 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1757 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1763 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1764 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1765 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1768 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1769 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1770 included_htlcs += 1;
1773 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1774 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1778 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1779 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1780 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1781 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1782 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1783 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1788 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1790 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1791 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1796 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1797 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1801 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1802 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1803 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1806 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1807 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1809 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1810 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1811 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1813 total_pending_htlcs,
1814 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1815 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1816 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1818 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1819 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1820 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1822 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1824 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1829 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1830 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1832 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1833 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1835 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1836 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1838 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1839 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1840 let context = &self;
1841 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1843 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1846 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1847 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1849 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1850 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1852 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1853 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1855 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1856 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1860 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1861 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1867 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1868 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1869 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1870 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1871 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1872 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1875 included_htlcs += 1;
1878 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1879 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1882 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1883 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1885 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1886 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1887 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1892 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1893 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1894 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1897 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1898 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1900 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1901 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1903 total_pending_htlcs,
1904 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1905 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1906 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1908 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1909 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1910 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1912 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1914 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1919 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
1920 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
1921 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
1922 self.funding_transaction.clone()
1928 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
1929 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
1930 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
1931 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
1932 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
1933 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
1934 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
1935 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
1936 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
1937 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
1938 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
1940 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
1941 // return them to fail the payment.
1942 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
1943 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
1944 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
1946 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
1947 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
1952 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
1953 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
1954 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
1955 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
1956 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
1957 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
1958 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
1959 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
1960 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1961 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
1962 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1963 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1964 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
1969 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
1970 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1971 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
1975 // Internal utility functions for channels
1977 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
1978 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
1979 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
1981 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
1983 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
1984 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
1985 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
1987 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
1990 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
1992 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
1995 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
1996 /// required by us according to the configured or default
1997 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
1999 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2001 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2002 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2003 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2004 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2005 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2008 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2009 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2010 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2011 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2012 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2013 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2014 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2017 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2018 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2020 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2021 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2024 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2025 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2026 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2027 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2028 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2029 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2032 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
2033 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
2034 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_funding_signed on an
2037 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2038 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2039 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2040 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2043 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2044 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2046 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2047 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2048 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2052 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2053 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2054 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2056 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2057 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2058 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2059 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2061 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2062 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2063 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2064 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust. This doesn't
2065 // apply to channels supporting anchor outputs since HTLC transactions are pre-signed with a
2066 // zero fee, so their fee is no longer considered to determine dust limits.
2067 if !channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2068 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
2069 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
2070 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2071 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2075 // We can afford to use a lower bound with anchors than previously since we can now bump
2076 // fees when broadcasting our commitment. However, we must still make sure we meet the
2077 // minimum mempool feerate, until package relay is deployed, such that we can ensure the
2078 // commitment transaction propagates throughout node mempools on its own.
2079 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2080 ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum
2082 ConfirmationTarget::Background
2084 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2085 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
2086 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
2087 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
2088 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
2089 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
2090 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2091 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2093 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2094 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2098 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2104 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2105 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2106 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2107 // outside of those situations will fail.
2108 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2112 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2117 1 + // script length (0)
2121 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2122 2 + // witness marker and flag
2123 1 + // witness element count
2124 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2125 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2126 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2127 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2128 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2129 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2131 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2132 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2133 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2139 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2140 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2141 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2142 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2144 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2145 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2146 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2148 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2149 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2150 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2151 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2152 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2153 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2156 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2157 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2160 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2161 value_to_holder = 0;
2164 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2165 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2166 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2167 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2169 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2170 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2173 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2174 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2177 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2180 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2181 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2183 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2185 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2186 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2187 where L::Target: Logger {
2188 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2189 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2190 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2191 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2192 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2193 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2194 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2195 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2199 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2200 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2201 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2202 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2204 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2205 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2207 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2209 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
2211 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2212 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2213 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2215 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2216 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2217 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2218 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2219 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
2220 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
2221 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
2223 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2224 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2225 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2227 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2228 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2230 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2233 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2234 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2238 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2242 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2243 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2244 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2245 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2246 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2247 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2250 // Now update local state:
2252 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2253 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2254 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2255 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2256 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2257 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2258 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2262 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2263 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2264 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2265 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2266 // do not not get into this branch.
2267 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2268 match pending_update {
2269 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2270 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2271 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2272 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2273 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2274 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2275 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2278 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2279 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2280 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2281 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2282 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2283 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2284 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2290 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), self.context.channel_state);
2291 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2292 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2294 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2295 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2296 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2298 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2299 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2302 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2303 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2305 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2306 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2308 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2309 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2312 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2315 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2316 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2317 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2318 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2323 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2324 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2325 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2326 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2327 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2328 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2329 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2330 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2331 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2332 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2333 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2334 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2335 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2336 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2337 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2339 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2340 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2341 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2342 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2343 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2346 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2347 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2348 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2354 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2355 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2357 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2361 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2362 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2363 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2364 /// before we fail backwards.
2366 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2367 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2368 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2369 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2370 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2371 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2372 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2375 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2376 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2377 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2378 /// before we fail backwards.
2380 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2381 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2382 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2383 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2384 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2385 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2386 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2388 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2390 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2391 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2392 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2394 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2395 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2396 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2398 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2399 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2400 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2402 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2407 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2408 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2414 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2415 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2416 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2417 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2418 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2422 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2423 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2424 force_holding_cell = true;
2427 // Now update local state:
2428 if force_holding_cell {
2429 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2430 match pending_update {
2431 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2432 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2433 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2434 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2438 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2439 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2440 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2441 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2447 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2448 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2449 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2455 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2457 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2458 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2461 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2462 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2463 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2468 // Message handlers:
2470 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2471 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2472 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
2473 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2474 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, ChannelError>
2478 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2479 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2481 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2482 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2484 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2485 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2486 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2487 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2490 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2492 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2493 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2494 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2495 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2497 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2498 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2500 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2501 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2503 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2504 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2505 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2506 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2507 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2508 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2512 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2513 initial_commitment_tx,
2516 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2517 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2520 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2521 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2524 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2525 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2526 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2527 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2528 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2529 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2530 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2531 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2532 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2533 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2534 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2535 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2537 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2539 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2541 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2542 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2543 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2544 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2546 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2548 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2549 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2553 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2554 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2556 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2557 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2558 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2559 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2561 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2564 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2565 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2566 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2569 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2570 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2571 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2572 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2573 // when routing outbound payments.
2574 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2578 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2580 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2581 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2582 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2583 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2584 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2585 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2586 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2587 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2588 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2590 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2591 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2592 let expected_point =
2593 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2594 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2596 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2597 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2598 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2599 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2600 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2601 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2603 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2604 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2605 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2606 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2607 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2609 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2610 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2614 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2617 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2618 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2620 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2622 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2625 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
2626 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
2627 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
2628 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2629 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
2630 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2632 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2633 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2634 if local_sent_shutdown {
2635 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2637 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2638 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2639 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2640 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2642 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2643 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2645 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2646 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2648 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2649 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2651 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2652 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2655 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2656 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2657 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2658 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2660 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2661 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2663 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2664 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2665 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2666 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2667 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2668 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2669 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2670 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2671 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2672 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2673 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2675 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2676 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2677 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2678 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2679 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2680 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2684 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2685 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2688 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2689 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2690 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2692 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2693 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2694 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2695 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2696 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2697 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2698 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2702 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2703 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2704 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2705 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2706 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2707 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2708 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2712 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2713 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2714 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2715 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2716 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2717 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2720 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2721 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2722 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2723 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2724 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2726 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2727 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2730 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2731 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2734 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2735 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2736 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2737 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2738 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2739 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2740 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2741 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2742 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2743 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2744 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2745 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2746 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2747 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2748 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2749 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2752 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2753 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2754 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2755 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2756 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2759 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2760 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2762 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2763 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2766 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2767 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2768 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2772 // Now update local state:
2773 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2774 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2775 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2776 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2777 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2778 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2779 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2784 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2786 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2787 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2788 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2789 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2790 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2791 None => fail_reason.into(),
2792 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2793 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2794 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2795 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2797 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2801 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2802 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2803 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2804 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2806 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2807 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2812 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2815 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2816 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2817 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2819 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2820 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2823 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2826 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2827 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2828 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2830 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2831 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2834 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2838 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2839 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2840 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2842 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2843 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2846 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2850 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
2851 where L::Target: Logger
2853 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2854 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2856 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2857 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2859 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2860 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2863 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2865 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2867 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2868 let commitment_txid = {
2869 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2870 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2871 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2873 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2874 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2875 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2876 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2877 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2878 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2882 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2884 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2885 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2886 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
2887 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2890 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2891 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2892 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2893 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
2896 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2898 if self.context.is_outbound() {
2899 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2900 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2901 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2902 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2903 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2904 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2905 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
2906 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2907 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
2908 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
2914 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
2915 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
2918 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
2919 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
2920 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
2921 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
2922 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
2923 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
2924 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
2925 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
2926 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
2927 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
2928 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
2929 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
2930 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
2933 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2934 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2935 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2936 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2937 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
2938 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
2939 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2941 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
2942 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
2943 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
2944 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2945 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2946 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2947 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2948 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2950 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2951 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
2954 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
2956 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2957 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
2958 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
2961 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
2964 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2965 commitment_stats.tx,
2967 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2968 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2969 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2972 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
2973 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2975 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2976 let mut need_commitment = false;
2977 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
2978 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
2979 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
2980 need_commitment = true;
2984 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2985 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2986 Some(forward_info.clone())
2988 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2989 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2990 &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2991 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2992 need_commitment = true;
2995 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2996 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2997 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
2998 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2999 &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
3000 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3001 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3002 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3003 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3004 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3005 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3006 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3007 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3008 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3010 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3012 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3013 need_commitment = true;
3017 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3018 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3019 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3020 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3021 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3022 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3024 nondust_htlc_sources,
3028 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3029 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3030 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3031 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3033 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3034 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3035 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3036 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3037 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3038 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3039 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3040 // includes the right HTLCs.
3041 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3042 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3043 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3044 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3045 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3046 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3048 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3049 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
3050 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3053 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3054 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3055 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3056 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3057 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3058 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3059 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3060 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3061 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3065 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3066 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3067 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3068 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3071 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3072 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3073 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3074 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3075 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3076 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3077 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3079 if self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3080 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3081 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3082 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3085 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3086 /// for our counterparty.
3087 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3088 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3089 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3090 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3092 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3093 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3094 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3095 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3097 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3098 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3099 updates: Vec::new(),
3102 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3103 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3104 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3105 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3106 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3107 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3108 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3109 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3110 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3111 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3112 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3113 // to rebalance channels.
3114 match &htlc_update {
3115 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3116 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3117 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3119 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3120 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
3122 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3125 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3126 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3127 &payment_hash, msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3128 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3129 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3130 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3131 // into the holding cell without ever being
3132 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3133 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3134 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3137 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3143 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3144 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3145 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3146 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3147 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3148 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3149 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3150 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3151 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3152 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3153 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3154 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3156 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3157 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3158 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3159 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3160 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3161 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3162 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3163 // for a full revocation before failing.
3164 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3165 update_fail_count += 1;
3168 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3170 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3177 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3178 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3180 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3181 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3186 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3187 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3188 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3189 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3190 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3192 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3193 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3194 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3196 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3197 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3203 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3204 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3205 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3206 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3207 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3208 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3209 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3210 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3211 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3213 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3214 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3216 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3217 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3219 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3220 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3223 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3225 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3226 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3227 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3231 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3232 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3233 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3234 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3235 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3236 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3237 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3238 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3239 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3242 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3244 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3245 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3248 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3249 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3250 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3251 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3253 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3257 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3258 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3259 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3260 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3261 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3262 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3263 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3264 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3268 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3269 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3270 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3271 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3272 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3273 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3274 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3275 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3276 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3278 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3279 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3282 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3283 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3284 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3285 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3286 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3287 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3288 let mut require_commitment = false;
3289 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3292 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3293 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3294 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3296 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3297 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3298 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3299 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3300 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3301 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3306 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3307 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3308 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3309 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3310 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3312 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3313 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3314 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3319 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3320 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3322 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3326 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3327 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3329 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3330 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3331 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3332 require_commitment = true;
3333 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3334 match forward_info {
3335 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3336 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
3337 require_commitment = true;
3339 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3340 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3341 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3343 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3344 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3345 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3349 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3350 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3351 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3352 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3358 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3359 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3360 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3361 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3363 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3364 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3365 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3366 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3367 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3368 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3369 require_commitment = true;
3373 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3375 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3376 match update_state {
3377 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3378 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3379 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3380 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3381 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3383 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3384 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3385 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3386 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3387 require_commitment = true;
3388 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3389 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3394 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3395 let release_state_str =
3396 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3397 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3398 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3399 if !release_monitor {
3400 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3401 update: monitor_update,
3403 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3405 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3410 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3411 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3412 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3413 if require_commitment {
3414 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3415 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3416 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3417 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3418 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3419 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3420 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3421 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3422 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3424 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3425 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3426 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3427 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3428 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3431 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3432 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3433 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3434 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3435 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3436 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3438 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3439 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), release_state_str);
3441 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3442 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3444 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3445 if require_commitment {
3446 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3448 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3449 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3450 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3451 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3453 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3454 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()),
3455 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3458 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3459 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3461 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3462 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), release_state_str);
3464 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3465 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3471 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3472 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3473 /// commitment update.
3474 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3475 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3476 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3478 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3479 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3482 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3483 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3484 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3485 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3487 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3488 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3489 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3490 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3491 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3492 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3493 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3495 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3496 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3498 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3499 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3501 if !self.context.is_live() {
3502 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3505 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3506 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3507 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3508 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3509 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3510 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3511 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3512 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3513 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3514 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3518 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3519 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3520 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3521 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3522 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3523 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3526 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3527 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3531 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3532 force_holding_cell = true;
3535 if force_holding_cell {
3536 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3540 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3541 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3543 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3544 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3549 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3550 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3552 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3554 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3555 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3556 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3557 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3561 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3562 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3563 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3567 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3568 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3571 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3572 // will be retransmitted.
3573 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3574 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3575 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3577 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3578 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3580 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3581 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3582 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3583 // this HTLC accordingly
3584 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3587 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3588 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3589 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3590 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3593 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3594 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3595 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3596 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3597 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3598 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3603 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3605 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3606 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3607 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3608 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3612 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3613 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3614 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3615 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3616 // the update upon reconnection.
3617 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3621 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3623 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3624 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3627 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3628 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3629 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3630 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3631 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3632 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3633 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3635 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3636 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3637 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3638 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3639 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3640 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3641 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3643 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3644 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3645 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3646 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3647 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3648 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3649 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3652 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3653 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3654 /// to the remote side.
3655 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3656 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3657 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3658 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3661 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3663 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3664 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3666 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3667 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3668 // first received the funding_signed.
3669 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3670 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3671 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3673 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3674 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3675 if self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3676 funding_broadcastable = None;
3679 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3680 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3681 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3682 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3683 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3684 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3685 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3686 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3687 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3688 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3689 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3690 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3691 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3692 next_per_commitment_point,
3693 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3697 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3699 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3700 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3701 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3702 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3703 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3704 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3706 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3707 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3708 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3709 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3710 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3711 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3715 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3716 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3718 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3719 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3720 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3723 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3724 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3725 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3726 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3727 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3728 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3729 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3730 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3731 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3735 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3736 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3738 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3739 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3741 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3742 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3744 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3745 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3747 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3748 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3749 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3750 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3751 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3752 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3753 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3754 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3755 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3756 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3757 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3758 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3759 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3760 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3762 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3763 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3764 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3770 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3771 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3772 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3773 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3774 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3775 per_commitment_secret,
3776 next_per_commitment_point,
3778 next_local_nonce: None,
3782 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3783 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3784 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3785 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3786 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3788 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3789 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3790 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3791 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3792 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3793 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3794 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3795 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3796 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3797 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
3802 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3803 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3805 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3806 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3807 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3808 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3809 reason: err_packet.clone()
3812 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3813 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3814 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3815 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3816 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3817 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3820 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3821 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3822 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3823 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3824 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3831 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3832 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3833 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3834 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3838 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3839 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3840 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3841 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3842 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3843 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3847 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
3848 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
3849 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3850 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3851 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3852 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3853 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3858 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3859 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3861 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3862 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3863 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3864 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3865 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3866 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3867 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3868 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3871 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3873 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3874 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3875 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3876 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3877 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3880 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3881 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3882 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
3885 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3886 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3887 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3888 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3889 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3890 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3892 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3893 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3894 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3895 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3896 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3899 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3900 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3901 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3902 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3903 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3904 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3905 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3906 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3910 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3911 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3912 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3913 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3915 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3919 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3920 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3921 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3922 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3924 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
3926 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
3928 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3929 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3930 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3931 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3932 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3933 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3935 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3936 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3937 channel_ready: None,
3938 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3939 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3940 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3944 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3945 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3946 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3947 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3948 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3949 next_per_commitment_point,
3950 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3952 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3953 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3954 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3958 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3959 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3960 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
3962 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3963 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3964 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3967 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3970 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3973 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3974 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3975 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3976 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3977 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
3978 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3979 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3981 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
3983 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3984 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
3985 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3986 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3987 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3988 next_per_commitment_point,
3989 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3993 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3994 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3995 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3997 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4000 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4001 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4002 raa: required_revoke,
4003 commitment_update: None,
4004 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4006 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4007 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4008 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4010 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4013 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4014 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4015 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4016 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4017 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4018 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4021 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4022 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4023 raa: required_revoke,
4024 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4025 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4029 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4033 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4034 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4035 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4036 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4038 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4040 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4042 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4043 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4044 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4045 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4046 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4047 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4049 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4050 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4051 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4052 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4053 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4055 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4056 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4057 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4058 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4061 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4062 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4063 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4064 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4065 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4066 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4067 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4068 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4069 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4070 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4071 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4072 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4073 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4074 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4075 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4077 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4080 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4081 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4084 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4085 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4086 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4087 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4088 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4089 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4092 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4093 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4094 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4095 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4096 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4097 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4098 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4100 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4106 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4107 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4108 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4109 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4111 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4112 return Ok((None, None));
4115 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4116 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4117 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4119 return Ok((None, None));
4122 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4124 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4125 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4126 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4127 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4129 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4130 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4132 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4133 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4135 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4136 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4137 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4138 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4140 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4141 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4142 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4149 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4150 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4152 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4153 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4156 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4157 /// within our expected timeframe.
4159 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4160 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4161 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4164 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4167 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4168 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4172 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4173 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4175 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4176 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4178 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4179 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4180 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4181 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4182 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4184 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4185 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4186 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4189 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4191 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4192 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4195 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4196 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4197 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4200 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4203 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4204 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4205 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4206 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4208 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4211 assert!(send_shutdown);
4212 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4213 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4214 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4216 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4217 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4219 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4224 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4226 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4227 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4229 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4230 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4231 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4232 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4233 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4234 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4237 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4238 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4240 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4241 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4242 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4243 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4247 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4248 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4249 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4250 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4251 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4252 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4254 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4255 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4262 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4263 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4265 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4268 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4269 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4271 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4273 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4274 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4275 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4276 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4277 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4278 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4279 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4280 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4281 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4283 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4284 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4287 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4291 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4292 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4293 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4294 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4296 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4297 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4299 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4300 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4302 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4303 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4305 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4306 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4309 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4310 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4313 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4314 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4315 return Ok((None, None));
4318 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4319 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4320 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4321 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4323 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4325 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4328 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4329 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4330 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4331 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4332 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4336 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4337 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4338 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4342 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4343 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4344 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4345 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4346 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4347 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4348 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4352 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4354 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4355 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4356 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4357 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4359 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4362 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
4363 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4365 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4366 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4368 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4369 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4370 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4371 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4375 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4376 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4377 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4378 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4380 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4381 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4382 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4390 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4391 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4392 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4394 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4395 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4397 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4398 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4401 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4402 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4403 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4404 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4405 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4407 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4408 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4409 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4411 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4412 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4415 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4416 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4417 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4418 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4419 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4420 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4421 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4422 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4424 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4427 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4428 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4429 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4430 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4432 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4436 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4437 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4438 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4439 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4441 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4447 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4448 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4449 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4450 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4451 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4452 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4453 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4455 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4456 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4459 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4461 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4462 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4468 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4469 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4470 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4471 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4472 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4473 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4474 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4476 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4477 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4484 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4485 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4488 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4489 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4492 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4493 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4497 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> {
4498 &self.context.holder_signer
4502 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4504 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4505 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4506 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4507 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4508 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4509 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4511 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4513 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4521 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4522 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4526 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4527 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4528 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4529 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4532 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
4533 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4534 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4535 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4538 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4539 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4540 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4541 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4542 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4543 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4546 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4547 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4548 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4549 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4550 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4551 if !release_monitor {
4552 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4561 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4562 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
4565 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4566 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4567 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4569 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4570 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4571 if self.context.channel_state &
4572 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4573 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4574 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4575 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4576 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4579 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4580 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4581 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4582 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4583 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4584 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4586 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4587 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4588 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4590 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4591 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4592 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4593 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4594 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4595 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4601 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4602 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4603 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4606 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4607 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4608 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4611 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4612 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4613 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4616 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4617 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4618 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4619 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4620 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4621 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4626 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4627 self.context.channel_update_status
4630 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4631 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4632 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4635 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4637 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4638 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4639 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4643 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4644 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4645 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4648 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4652 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4653 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4654 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4656 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4657 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4658 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4660 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4661 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4664 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4665 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4666 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4667 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4668 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4669 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4670 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4671 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4672 self.context.channel_state);
4674 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4678 if need_commitment_update {
4679 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4680 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4681 let next_per_commitment_point =
4682 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4683 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4684 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4685 next_per_commitment_point,
4686 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4690 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4696 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4697 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4698 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4699 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4700 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
4701 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4702 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4704 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4707 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
4708 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4709 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4710 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4711 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4712 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4713 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4714 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4715 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
4716 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4717 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4718 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4719 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4720 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4721 // channel and move on.
4722 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4723 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4725 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4726 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4727 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4729 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4730 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4731 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4732 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4733 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4734 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4735 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4739 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4740 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4741 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4742 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4743 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4747 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4748 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4749 // may have already happened for this block).
4750 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4751 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4752 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
4753 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4756 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4757 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4758 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4759 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4767 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4768 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4769 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4770 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4772 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4773 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4776 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4778 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4779 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
4780 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4781 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4783 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4786 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
4789 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4790 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
4791 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
4792 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4794 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4797 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4798 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4799 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4801 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4802 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4804 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4805 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4806 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4814 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4816 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4817 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4818 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4820 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4821 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
4824 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4825 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
4826 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
4827 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4828 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4829 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4830 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4831 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
4832 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4835 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
4836 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
4837 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4838 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4840 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
4841 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
4842 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
4844 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
4845 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
4846 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
4847 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
4849 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
4850 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
4851 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4852 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
4853 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
4854 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
4855 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
4858 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4859 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4861 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
4864 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4865 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4866 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
4867 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4868 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4869 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4870 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4871 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4872 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4873 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4874 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4875 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
4876 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
4877 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
4878 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
4879 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
4880 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
4886 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
4891 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
4892 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
4894 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
4895 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
4896 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
4897 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
4899 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
4902 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
4904 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
4905 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4906 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4907 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4908 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
4909 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
4911 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4912 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
4915 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
4916 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
4917 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4918 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4919 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
4920 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
4922 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4923 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
4926 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
4927 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
4928 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
4929 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
4930 excess_data: Vec::new(),
4936 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4937 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4938 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
4939 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
4941 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4944 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4948 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4952 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
4953 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
4957 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
4961 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4962 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
4965 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
4969 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
4971 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
4976 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4977 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4978 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
4980 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
4985 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
4987 None => return None,
4990 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
4992 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
4993 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4995 node_signature: our_node_sig,
4996 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5002 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5004 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5005 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5006 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5007 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5008 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5009 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5010 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5012 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5013 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5014 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5015 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5016 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5017 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5018 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5019 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5020 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5021 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5022 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5023 contents: announcement,
5028 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5032 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5033 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5034 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5035 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5036 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5037 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5038 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5039 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5041 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5043 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5044 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5045 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5046 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5048 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5049 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5050 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5051 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5054 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5055 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5056 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5057 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5060 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5063 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5064 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5065 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5066 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5067 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5068 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5071 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5073 Err(_) => return None,
5075 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5076 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5081 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5082 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5083 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5084 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5085 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5086 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5087 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5088 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5089 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5090 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5091 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5092 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5093 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5094 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5095 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5096 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5099 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5102 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5103 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5104 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5105 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5106 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5107 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5108 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5109 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5110 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5112 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5113 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5114 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5115 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5116 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5117 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5118 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5119 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5120 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5122 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5123 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5124 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5125 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5126 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5127 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5128 next_funding_txid: None,
5133 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5135 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5136 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5137 /// commitment update.
5139 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5140 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5141 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5142 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5143 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5144 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5145 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5148 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5149 skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
5150 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5152 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5153 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5158 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5159 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5161 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5163 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5164 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5166 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5167 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5168 /// regenerate them.
5170 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5171 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5173 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5174 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5175 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5176 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5177 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5178 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5179 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5181 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5182 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5184 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5185 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5186 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5189 if amount_msat == 0 {
5190 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5193 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5194 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5195 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5196 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5199 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5200 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5201 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5204 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5205 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5206 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5207 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5208 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5209 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5210 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5211 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5214 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5215 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
5216 payment_hash, amount_msat,
5217 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5218 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5219 else { "to peer" });
5221 if need_holding_cell {
5222 force_holding_cell = true;
5225 // Now update local state:
5226 if force_holding_cell {
5227 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5232 onion_routing_packet,
5238 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5239 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5241 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5243 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5248 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5249 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5250 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5254 onion_routing_packet,
5257 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5262 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5263 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5264 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5265 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5267 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5268 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5269 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5271 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5272 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5276 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5277 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5278 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5279 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5280 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5281 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5282 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5285 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5286 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5287 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5288 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5289 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5290 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5293 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5295 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5296 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5297 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5299 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5300 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5303 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5304 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5305 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5306 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5307 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5308 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5309 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5310 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5313 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5317 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
5318 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5319 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5320 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5322 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5324 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5325 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5326 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5327 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5328 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5329 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5330 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5331 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5332 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5333 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5334 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5340 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
5343 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5344 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5345 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5346 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5347 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5348 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5350 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5351 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5352 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5354 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5355 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5356 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5359 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5360 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5364 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5365 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5367 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5369 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5370 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5371 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5372 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5374 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5375 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5376 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5377 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5378 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5379 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5383 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5384 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5388 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5389 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5394 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5395 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5397 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5398 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5399 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5400 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
5401 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5402 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5403 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
5404 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5406 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5407 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger);
5408 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5411 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5412 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5413 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5419 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5420 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5421 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5423 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5424 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5425 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5426 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5432 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5433 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5435 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5436 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5437 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5438 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5439 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5441 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5442 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5443 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5446 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5447 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5448 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5450 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5451 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5454 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5455 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5457 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5458 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5459 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5462 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5463 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5464 let mut chan_closed = false;
5465 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5469 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5471 None if !chan_closed => {
5472 // use override shutdown script if provided
5473 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5474 Some(script) => script,
5476 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5477 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5478 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5479 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5483 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5484 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5486 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5492 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5493 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5494 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5495 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5497 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5499 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5501 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5502 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5503 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5504 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5505 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5506 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5509 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5510 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5512 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5513 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5514 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5517 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5518 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5519 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5520 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5521 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5523 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5524 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5531 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5532 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5534 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5537 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5538 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5539 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5541 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5542 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5546 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5550 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5551 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5552 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
5553 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
5556 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5557 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
5558 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5559 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5560 outbound_scid_alias: u64
5561 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
5562 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5563 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5565 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5566 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5567 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5568 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5570 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5571 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5573 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5574 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5576 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5577 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5578 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5580 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5581 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5583 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5584 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5585 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5586 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5587 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5590 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5591 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5593 let commitment_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5594 ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum
5596 ConfirmationTarget::Normal
5598 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
5600 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5601 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5602 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
5603 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5606 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5607 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5609 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5610 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5611 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5612 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5616 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5617 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5618 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5622 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5623 Ok(script) => script,
5624 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5627 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
5630 context: ChannelContext {
5633 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5634 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5635 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5636 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5641 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5643 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5644 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5645 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5646 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5648 channel_value_satoshis,
5650 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5652 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
5653 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5656 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5657 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5660 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5661 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5662 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5663 pending_update_fee: None,
5664 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5665 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5666 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
5667 update_time_counter: 1,
5669 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5671 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
5672 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
5673 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
5674 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
5675 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
5676 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
5678 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5679 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5680 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5681 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5683 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5684 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5685 closing_fee_limits: None,
5686 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
5688 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
5689 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
5690 short_channel_id: None,
5691 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
5693 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
5694 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
5695 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
5696 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
5697 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
5698 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5699 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5700 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
5701 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
5702 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
5703 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
5704 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5706 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
5708 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
5709 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
5710 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
5711 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5712 counterparty_parameters: None,
5713 funding_outpoint: None,
5714 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
5716 funding_transaction: None,
5718 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
5719 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
5720 counterparty_node_id,
5722 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
5724 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
5726 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5727 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5729 announcement_sigs: None,
5731 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5732 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5733 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5734 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5736 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5737 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
5739 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
5740 outbound_scid_alias,
5742 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
5743 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
5745 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5746 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
5751 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
5753 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
5757 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
5758 fn get_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5759 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5760 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5761 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5762 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
5763 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5764 Ok(ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5765 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5770 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5771 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5772 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5773 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5774 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5775 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5776 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5777 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L)
5778 -> Result<(Channel<SP>, msgs::FundingCreated), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
5779 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5780 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5782 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5783 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5785 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5786 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5787 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5788 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5791 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5792 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5794 let signature = match self.get_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5797 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5798 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5799 return Err((self, e));
5803 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5805 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5807 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5808 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5809 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5811 let channel = Channel {
5812 context: self.context,
5815 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingCreated {
5816 temporary_channel_id,
5817 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5818 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5821 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5823 next_local_nonce: None,
5827 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
5828 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
5829 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
5830 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
5831 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
5832 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5833 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
5834 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
5835 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
5836 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
5839 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
5840 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
5841 // `only_static_remotekey`.
5842 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
5843 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5844 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
5850 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
5851 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
5852 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
5853 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
5854 &mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
5855 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
5857 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5859 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
5860 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5861 // We've exhausted our options
5864 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
5865 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
5868 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
5869 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
5870 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
5871 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
5873 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5874 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
5875 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
5876 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
5877 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
5878 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
5880 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5882 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
5883 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
5886 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5887 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5888 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5890 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5891 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5894 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5895 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5898 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5899 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
5903 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5904 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5905 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5906 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5907 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5908 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5909 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5910 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5911 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5912 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5913 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5914 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5915 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5916 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5917 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5918 first_per_commitment_point,
5919 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5920 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5921 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5922 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5924 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
5929 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5930 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
5932 // Check sanity of message fields:
5933 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5934 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
5936 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5937 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
5939 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
5940 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
5942 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5943 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
5945 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5946 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5948 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5949 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
5950 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5952 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
5953 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
5954 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
5956 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5957 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
5958 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
5960 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
5961 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
5963 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
5964 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
5967 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
5968 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
5969 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5971 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5972 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5974 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5975 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5977 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
5978 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5980 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5981 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5983 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5984 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5986 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
5987 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
5990 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
5991 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
5992 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
5994 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
5995 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
5997 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
5998 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5999 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6001 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
6002 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
6005 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6006 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6007 &Some(ref script) => {
6008 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6009 if script.len() == 0 {
6012 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6013 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6015 Some(script.clone())
6018 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6020 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6025 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6026 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6027 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6028 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6029 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6031 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6032 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6034 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6037 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6038 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6039 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6040 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6041 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6042 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6045 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6046 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6047 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6050 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6051 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6053 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
6054 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6060 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6061 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6062 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6063 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6066 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6067 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6068 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6069 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6070 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6071 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6072 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6073 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6074 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6075 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6076 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6079 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6081 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6082 // support this channel type.
6083 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6084 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6085 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6088 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6089 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6090 // `static_remote_key`.
6091 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6092 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6094 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6095 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6096 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6098 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6099 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6101 channel_type.clone()
6103 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6104 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6105 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6110 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6111 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6112 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6113 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6114 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6115 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6116 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6117 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6118 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6121 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6122 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6125 // Check sanity of message fields:
6126 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6127 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6129 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6130 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6132 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6133 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6135 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6136 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6137 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6139 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6140 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6142 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6143 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6145 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6147 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6148 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6149 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6151 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6152 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6154 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6155 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6158 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6159 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6160 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6162 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6163 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6165 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6166 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6168 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6169 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6171 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6172 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6174 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6175 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6177 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6178 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6181 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6183 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6184 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6185 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6189 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6190 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6191 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6192 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6193 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6195 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6196 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6198 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6199 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6200 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6202 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6203 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6206 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6207 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6208 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6209 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6210 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
6211 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
6214 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
6215 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6216 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6217 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6218 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6221 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6222 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6223 &Some(ref script) => {
6224 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6225 if script.len() == 0 {
6228 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6229 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6231 Some(script.clone())
6234 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6236 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6241 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6242 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6243 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6244 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6248 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6249 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6250 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6254 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6255 Ok(script) => script,
6256 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6259 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6260 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6262 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
6265 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
6269 context: ChannelContext {
6272 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6273 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6275 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6280 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6282 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6283 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6284 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6285 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6288 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6290 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6291 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6294 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6295 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6296 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6298 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6299 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6300 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6301 pending_update_fee: None,
6302 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6303 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6304 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6305 update_time_counter: 1,
6307 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6309 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6310 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6311 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6312 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6313 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6314 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6316 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6317 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6318 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6319 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6321 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6322 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6323 closing_fee_limits: None,
6324 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6326 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6327 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6328 short_channel_id: None,
6329 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6331 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6332 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6333 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6334 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6335 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6336 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6337 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6338 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6339 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6340 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6341 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6342 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6345 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6347 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6348 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6349 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6350 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6351 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6352 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6353 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6355 funding_outpoint: None,
6356 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6358 funding_transaction: None,
6360 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6361 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6362 counterparty_node_id,
6364 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6366 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6368 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6369 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6371 announcement_sigs: None,
6373 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6374 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6375 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6376 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6378 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6379 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6381 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6382 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
6384 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6385 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6387 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6388 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6393 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6395 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6401 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6402 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6404 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6405 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6406 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6407 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6409 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6410 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6412 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6413 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6416 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6419 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6420 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6421 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6423 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6424 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6425 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6426 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6428 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6429 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6430 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6431 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6432 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6433 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6434 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6435 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6436 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6437 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6438 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6439 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6440 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6441 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6442 first_per_commitment_point,
6443 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6444 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6445 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6447 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6449 next_local_nonce: None,
6453 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6454 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6456 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6458 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6459 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6462 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6463 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6465 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6466 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6468 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6469 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6470 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6471 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6472 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6473 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6474 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6475 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6476 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6479 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6480 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6482 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6483 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6484 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6485 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6487 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6488 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
6489 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6490 let counterparty_signature = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6491 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
6493 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
6494 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
6499 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
6500 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6501 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6505 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6506 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6508 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6509 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6510 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6512 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6514 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6515 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6516 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6517 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6520 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6521 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6522 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6523 // funding_created_signature may fail.
6524 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6526 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6528 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6529 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6530 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6533 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6534 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6535 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6539 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6540 initial_commitment_tx,
6543 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6544 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6547 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6548 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6551 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6553 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6554 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6555 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6556 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6557 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6558 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6559 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6560 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6561 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6562 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6563 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6565 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6567 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
6569 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6570 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6571 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6572 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6574 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6576 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6577 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6578 let mut channel = Channel {
6579 context: self.context,
6581 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id.clone();
6582 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6583 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6585 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingSigned {
6589 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6590 }, channel_monitor))
6594 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6595 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6597 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6603 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6604 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6605 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6606 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6607 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6609 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6610 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6611 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6612 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6618 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6619 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6620 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6621 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6622 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6623 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6628 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6629 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6630 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6631 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6633 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6634 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6635 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6636 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6641 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6642 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6643 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6644 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6645 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6646 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6651 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6652 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6653 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6656 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6658 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6659 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6660 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6661 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6662 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6664 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6665 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6666 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6667 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6669 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6670 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6671 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6673 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6675 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6676 // TODO (taproot|arik): Introduce serialization distinction for non-ECDSA signers.
6677 self.context.holder_signer.as_ecdsa().expect("Only ECDSA signers may be serialized").write(&mut key_data)?;
6678 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6679 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6680 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6681 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6683 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6684 // deserialized from that format.
6685 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6686 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6687 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6689 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6691 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6692 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6693 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6695 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6696 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6697 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6698 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6701 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6702 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6703 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6706 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6707 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6708 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6709 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6711 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6712 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6714 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6716 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6718 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6720 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6723 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6725 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6730 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6731 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6733 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6734 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
6735 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6736 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6737 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6738 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6739 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6741 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6743 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6745 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6748 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6749 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6750 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6753 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6755 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6756 preimages.push(preimage);
6758 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6759 reason.write(writer)?;
6761 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6763 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6764 preimages.push(preimage);
6766 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6767 reason.write(writer)?;
6770 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
6771 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6772 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6774 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6775 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6776 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
6780 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6781 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6782 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
6784 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6785 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
6789 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6790 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6791 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6792 source.write(writer)?;
6793 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6795 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
6796 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6797 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6799 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6800 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6802 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6804 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6805 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6807 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6809 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6810 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6815 match self.context.resend_order {
6816 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6817 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6820 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6821 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6822 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6824 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6825 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6826 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6827 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6830 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6831 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6832 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6833 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6834 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6837 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6838 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6839 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6840 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6842 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6843 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6844 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6846 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6848 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6849 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6850 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6851 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6853 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6854 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6855 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6856 // consider the stale state on reload.
6859 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6860 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6861 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6863 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6864 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6865 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6867 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6868 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6870 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6871 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6872 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6874 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6875 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6877 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6880 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6881 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6882 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6884 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6887 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6888 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6890 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6891 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6892 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6894 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6896 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6898 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6900 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6901 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6902 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6903 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6904 htlc.write(writer)?;
6907 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6908 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6909 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6911 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6912 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
6914 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6915 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6916 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6917 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6918 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6919 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
6920 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6922 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6923 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6924 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6925 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6926 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6928 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6929 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6931 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6932 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6933 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6934 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6936 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6938 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6939 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
6940 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6941 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6942 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6943 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6944 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6946 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
6947 (2, chan_type, option),
6948 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6949 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6950 (5, self.context.config, required),
6951 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6952 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6953 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
6954 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6955 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
6956 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
6957 (15, preimages, required_vec),
6958 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6959 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6960 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6961 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6962 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6963 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
6964 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6965 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
6966 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6967 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6968 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6975 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6976 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
6978 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6979 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6981 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6982 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6983 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6985 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6986 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6987 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6988 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6990 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6992 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6993 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6994 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6995 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6996 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6998 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6999 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7002 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7003 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
7004 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7006 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7008 let mut keys_data = None;
7010 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7011 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7012 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7013 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7014 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7015 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7016 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7017 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7018 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7019 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7023 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7024 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7025 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7028 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7030 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7031 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7032 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7034 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7036 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7037 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7038 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7039 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7040 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7041 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7042 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7043 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7044 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7045 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7046 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7047 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7048 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7053 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7054 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7055 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7056 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7057 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7058 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7059 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7060 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7061 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7062 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7063 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7064 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7066 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7067 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7070 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7071 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7074 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7075 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7077 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7079 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7083 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7084 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7085 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7086 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7087 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7088 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7089 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7090 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7091 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7092 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7093 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7095 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7096 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7097 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7099 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7100 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7101 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7103 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7107 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7108 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7109 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7110 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7113 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7114 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7115 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7117 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7118 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7119 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7120 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7123 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7124 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7125 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7126 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7129 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7131 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7133 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7134 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7135 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7136 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7138 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7139 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7140 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7141 // consider the stale state on reload.
7142 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7145 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7146 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7147 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7149 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7152 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7153 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7154 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7156 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7157 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7158 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7159 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7161 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7162 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7164 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7165 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7167 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7168 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7169 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7171 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7173 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7174 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7176 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7177 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7180 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7182 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7183 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7184 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7185 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7187 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7190 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7191 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
7193 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7195 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7196 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7198 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7199 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7201 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7203 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7204 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7205 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7207 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7208 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7209 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7213 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7214 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7215 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7217 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7223 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7224 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7225 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7226 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7227 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7228 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7229 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7230 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7231 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7232 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7234 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7235 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7236 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7237 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7238 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7239 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7240 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7242 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7243 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7244 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7245 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7247 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7249 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7250 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7252 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7253 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7254 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7255 (2, channel_type, option),
7256 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7257 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7258 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7259 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7260 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7261 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7262 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7263 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
7264 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7265 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
7266 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7267 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7268 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7269 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7270 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7271 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7272 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7273 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7274 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7275 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7276 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7279 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7280 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7281 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7282 // required channel parameters.
7283 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7284 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7285 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7287 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7289 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7290 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7291 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7292 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7295 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7296 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7297 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7299 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7300 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7302 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7303 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7308 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7309 if iter.next().is_some() {
7310 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7314 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7315 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7316 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7317 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7318 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7321 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7322 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7323 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7325 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7326 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7328 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7329 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7330 // separate u64 values.
7331 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7333 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7335 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7336 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7337 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7338 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7340 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7341 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7343 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7344 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7345 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7346 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7347 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7350 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7351 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7355 context: ChannelContext {
7358 config: config.unwrap(),
7362 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7363 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7364 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7367 temporary_channel_id,
7369 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7371 channel_value_satoshis,
7373 latest_monitor_update_id,
7375 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7376 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7379 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7380 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7383 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7384 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7385 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7386 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7390 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7391 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7392 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7393 monitor_pending_forwards,
7394 monitor_pending_failures,
7395 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7398 holding_cell_update_fee,
7399 next_holder_htlc_id,
7400 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7401 update_time_counter,
7404 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7405 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7406 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7407 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7409 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7410 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7411 closing_fee_limits: None,
7412 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7414 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7415 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7417 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7419 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7420 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7421 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7422 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7423 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7424 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7425 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7426 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7427 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7430 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7432 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7433 funding_transaction,
7435 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7436 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7437 counterparty_node_id,
7439 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7443 channel_update_status,
7444 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7448 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7449 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7450 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7451 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7453 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7454 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7456 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7457 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7458 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7460 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7461 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7463 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7464 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7466 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7469 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7478 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7479 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7480 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7481 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7482 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7484 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7485 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7486 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7487 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7488 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7489 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7490 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7491 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7492 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7493 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7494 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7495 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7496 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7497 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7498 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7499 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7500 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7501 use crate::util::test_utils;
7502 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
7503 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7504 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7505 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7506 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7507 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7508 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7509 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7510 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7511 use crate::prelude::*;
7513 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7516 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7517 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7523 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7524 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7525 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7526 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7530 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7531 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7532 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7533 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7534 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7535 assert!(Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::check_remote_fee(
7536 &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &bounded_fee_estimator,
7537 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7541 signer: InMemorySigner,
7544 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7545 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7548 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7549 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7551 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7552 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7555 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7559 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7561 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7562 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7563 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7564 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7565 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7568 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7569 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7570 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7571 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7575 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
7576 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7577 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7581 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7582 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7583 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7584 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7586 let seed = [42; 32];
7587 let network = Network::Testnet;
7588 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7589 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7590 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7593 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7594 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7595 let config = UserConfig::default();
7596 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7597 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7598 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7600 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7601 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7605 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7606 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7608 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7609 let original_fee = 253;
7610 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7611 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7612 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7613 let seed = [42; 32];
7614 let network = Network::Testnet;
7615 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7617 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7618 let config = UserConfig::default();
7619 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7621 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7622 // same as the old fee.
7623 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7624 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7625 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7629 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7630 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7631 // dust limits are used.
7632 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7633 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7634 let seed = [42; 32];
7635 let network = Network::Testnet;
7636 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7637 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7638 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7640 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7641 // they have different dust limits.
7643 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7644 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7645 let config = UserConfig::default();
7646 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7648 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7649 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7650 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7651 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7652 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7654 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7655 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7656 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7657 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7658 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7660 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7661 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7662 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7663 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7665 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7666 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7667 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7669 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7670 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7672 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7673 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7674 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7676 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7677 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7678 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7679 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7682 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7684 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7685 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7686 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7687 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7688 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7689 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7690 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7691 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7692 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7694 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7697 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7698 // the dust limit check.
7699 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7700 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7701 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7702 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7704 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7705 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7706 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7707 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7708 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7709 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7710 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7714 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7715 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7716 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7717 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7718 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7719 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7720 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7721 let seed = [42; 32];
7722 let network = Network::Testnet;
7723 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7725 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7726 let config = UserConfig::default();
7727 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7729 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7730 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7732 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7733 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7734 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7735 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7736 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7737 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7739 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7740 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7741 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7742 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7743 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7745 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7747 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7748 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7749 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7750 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7751 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7753 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7754 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7755 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7756 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7757 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7761 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7762 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7763 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7764 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7765 let seed = [42; 32];
7766 let network = Network::Testnet;
7767 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7768 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7769 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7771 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7773 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7774 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7775 let config = UserConfig::default();
7776 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7778 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7779 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7780 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7781 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7783 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7784 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7785 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7787 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7788 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7789 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7790 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7792 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7793 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7794 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7796 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7797 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7799 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7800 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7801 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7802 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7803 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7804 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7805 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7807 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7809 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7810 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7811 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7812 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7813 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7817 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7818 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7819 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7820 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7821 let seed = [42; 32];
7822 let network = Network::Testnet;
7823 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7824 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7825 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7827 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7828 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7829 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7830 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7831 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7832 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7833 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7834 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7836 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7837 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7838 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7839 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7840 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7841 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7843 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7844 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7845 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7846 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7848 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7850 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7851 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7852 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7853 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7854 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7855 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7857 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7858 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7859 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7860 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7862 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7863 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7864 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7865 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7866 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7868 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7869 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7871 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7872 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7873 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7875 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7876 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7877 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7878 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7879 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7881 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7882 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7884 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7885 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7886 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7890 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7892 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
7893 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7894 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7896 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7897 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7898 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7899 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7901 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7902 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7903 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7905 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7907 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7908 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7911 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7912 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7913 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7914 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7915 let seed = [42; 32];
7916 let network = Network::Testnet;
7917 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7918 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7919 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7922 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7923 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7924 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7926 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7927 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7929 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7930 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7931 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7933 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7934 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7936 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7938 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7939 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7941 // Channel Negotiations failed
7942 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
7943 assert!(result.is_err());
7948 fn channel_update() {
7949 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7950 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7951 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7952 let seed = [42; 32];
7953 let network = Network::Testnet;
7954 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7955 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7956 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7958 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7959 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7960 let config = UserConfig::default();
7961 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7963 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7964 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7965 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7966 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7967 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7969 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7970 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7971 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7972 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7973 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7975 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7976 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7977 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7978 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7980 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7981 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7982 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7984 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7985 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7987 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7988 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7989 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7991 short_channel_id: 0,
7994 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7995 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7996 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7998 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7999 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8001 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
8003 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
8005 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
8006 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
8007 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8008 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8010 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8011 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8012 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8014 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8018 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
8020 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
8021 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
8022 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
8023 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
8024 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8025 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
8026 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
8027 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
8028 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
8029 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
8030 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
8031 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
8032 use crate::sync::Arc;
8034 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
8035 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
8036 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
8037 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8039 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
8041 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8042 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8043 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8044 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8045 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8047 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
8048 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
8054 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8055 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
8056 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
8058 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8059 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8060 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
8061 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
8062 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8063 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
8065 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
8067 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8068 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8069 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8070 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
8071 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8072 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
8074 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
8075 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
8076 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
8077 selected_contest_delay: 144
8079 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
8080 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8082 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
8083 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8085 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8086 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
8088 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
8089 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8091 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
8092 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
8093 // build_commitment_transaction.
8094 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
8095 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8096 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8097 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
8098 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8100 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8101 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8102 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8103 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
8107 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8108 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8109 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8110 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
8114 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8115 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8116 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8118 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8119 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8121 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8122 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8124 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8126 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8127 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8128 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8129 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8130 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8131 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
8132 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8134 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8135 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8136 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8137 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8139 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8140 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8141 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8143 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8145 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8146 commitment_tx.clone(),
8147 counterparty_signature,
8148 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8149 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8150 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8152 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8153 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8155 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8156 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8157 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8159 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8160 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
8163 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8164 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8166 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8167 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8168 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8169 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8170 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8171 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8172 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8173 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8175 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8178 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8179 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8180 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8184 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8187 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8188 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8189 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8191 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8192 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
8193 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
8194 let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
8195 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8196 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
8197 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
8198 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8200 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8204 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8205 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8206 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8207 "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", {});
8209 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8210 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8212 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8213 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8214 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48454a56a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004730440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae05564714201483045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8216 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8217 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8218 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8219 "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", {});
8221 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8222 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8224 amount_msat: 1000000,
8226 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8227 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8229 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8232 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8233 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8235 amount_msat: 2000000,
8237 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8238 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8240 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8243 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8244 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8246 amount_msat: 2000000,
8248 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8249 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8250 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8251 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8253 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8256 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8257 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8259 amount_msat: 3000000,
8261 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8262 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8263 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8264 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8266 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8269 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8270 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8272 amount_msat: 4000000,
8274 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8275 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8277 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8281 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8282 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8283 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8285 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8286 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8287 "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", {
8290 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8291 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8292 "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" },
8295 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8296 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8297 "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" },
8300 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8301 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8302 "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" },
8305 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8306 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8307 "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" },
8310 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8311 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8312 "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" }
8315 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8316 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8317 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8319 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8320 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8321 "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", {
8324 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8325 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8326 "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" },
8329 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8330 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8331 "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" },
8334 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8335 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8336 "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" },
8339 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8340 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8341 "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" },
8344 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8345 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8346 "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" }
8349 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8350 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8351 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8353 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8354 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8355 "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", {
8358 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8359 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8360 "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" },
8363 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8364 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8365 "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" },
8368 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8369 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8370 "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" },
8373 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8374 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8375 "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" }
8378 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8379 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8380 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8381 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8383 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8384 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8385 "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", {
8388 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8389 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8390 "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" },
8393 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8394 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8395 "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" },
8398 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8399 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8400 "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" },
8403 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8404 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8405 "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" }
8408 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8409 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8410 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8411 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8413 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8414 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8415 "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", {
8418 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8419 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8420 "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" },
8423 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8424 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8425 "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" },
8428 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8429 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8430 "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" },
8433 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8434 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8435 "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" }
8438 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8439 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8440 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8442 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8443 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8444 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484da966a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c10147304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8447 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8448 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8449 "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" },
8452 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8453 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8454 "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" },
8457 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8458 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8459 "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" }
8462 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8463 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8464 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8466 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8467 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8468 "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", {
8471 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8472 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8473 "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" },
8476 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8477 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8478 "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" },
8481 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8482 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8483 "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" }
8486 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8487 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8488 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8490 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8491 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8492 "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", {
8495 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8496 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8497 "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" },
8500 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8501 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8502 "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" }
8505 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8506 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8507 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8508 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8509 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8510 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8512 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8513 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8514 "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", {
8517 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8518 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8519 "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" },
8522 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8523 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8524 "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" }
8527 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8528 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8529 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8530 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8531 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8533 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8534 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8535 "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", {
8538 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8539 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8540 "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" },
8543 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8544 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8545 "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" }
8548 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8549 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8550 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8552 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8553 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8554 "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", {
8557 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8558 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8559 "0200000000010120060e4a29579d429f0f27c17ee5f1ee282f20d706d6f90b63d35946d8f3029a0000000000000000000175050000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a01483045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8562 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8563 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8564 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8565 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8566 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8568 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8569 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8570 "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", {
8573 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8574 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8575 "02000000000101542562b326c08e3a076d9cfca2be175041366591da334d8d513ff1686fd95a6002000000000100000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c83483045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
8578 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8579 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8580 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8581 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8582 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8584 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8585 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8586 "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", {
8589 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8590 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8591 "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" }
8594 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8595 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8596 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8597 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8599 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8600 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8601 "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", {});
8603 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8604 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8605 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8606 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8607 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8609 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8610 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8611 "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", {});
8613 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8614 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8615 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8616 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8617 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8619 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8620 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8621 "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", {});
8623 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8624 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8625 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8627 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8628 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8629 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8001c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484040047304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a3790147304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8631 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8632 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8633 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8634 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8635 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8637 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8638 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8639 "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", {});
8641 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8642 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8643 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8644 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8645 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
8647 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8648 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8649 "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", {});
8651 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8652 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8653 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8654 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8655 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8656 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8658 amount_msat: 2000000,
8660 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8661 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8663 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8666 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8667 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8668 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8670 amount_msat: 5000001,
8672 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8673 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8674 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8675 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8677 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8680 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8681 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8683 amount_msat: 5000000,
8685 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8686 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8687 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8688 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8690 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8694 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8695 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8696 "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", {
8699 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8700 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8701 "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" },
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8705 "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" },
8707 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8708 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8709 "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" }
8712 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8713 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
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8715 "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", {
8718 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8719 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8720 "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" },
8722 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8723 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8724 "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" },
8726 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8727 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8728 "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" }
8733 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8734 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8736 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8737 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8738 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8739 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8741 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8742 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8743 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8745 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8746 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8748 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8749 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8751 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8752 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8753 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8757 fn test_key_derivation() {
8758 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8759 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8761 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8762 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8764 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8765 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8767 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8768 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8770 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8771 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8773 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8774 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8776 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8777 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8779 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8780 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8784 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8785 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8786 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8787 let seed = [42; 32];
8788 let network = Network::Testnet;
8789 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8790 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8792 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8793 let config = UserConfig::default();
8794 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8795 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8797 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8798 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8800 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8801 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8802 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8803 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8804 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8805 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8806 assert!(res.is_ok());
8810 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8811 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8812 // resulting `channel_type`.
8813 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8814 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8815 let network = Network::Testnet;
8816 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8817 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8819 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8820 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8822 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8823 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8825 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8826 // need to signal it.
8827 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8828 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8829 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8832 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8834 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8835 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8836 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8838 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8839 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8840 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8843 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8844 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8845 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8846 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8847 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
8850 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8851 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8855 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8856 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8857 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8858 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8859 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8860 let network = Network::Testnet;
8861 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8862 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8864 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8865 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8867 let config = UserConfig::default();
8869 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8870 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8871 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8872 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8873 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8875 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8876 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8877 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8880 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8881 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8882 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8884 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8885 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8886 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8887 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8888 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8889 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
8891 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8895 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8896 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8898 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8899 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8900 let network = Network::Testnet;
8901 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8902 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8904 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8905 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8907 let config = UserConfig::default();
8909 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8910 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8911 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8912 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8913 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8914 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8915 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8916 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8918 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8919 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8920 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8921 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8922 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8923 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8926 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8927 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8929 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8930 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8931 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8932 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
8934 assert!(res.is_err());
8936 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8937 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8938 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8940 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8941 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8942 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8945 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8947 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8948 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8949 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8950 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
8953 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8954 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8956 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8957 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8959 assert!(res.is_err());