1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
78 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
80 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
82 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
83 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
84 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
85 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
86 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
87 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
89 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
93 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
94 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
95 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
96 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
99 enum InboundHTLCState {
100 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
101 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
102 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
103 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
104 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
105 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
106 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
107 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
108 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
109 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
110 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
111 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
112 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
113 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
114 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
116 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
117 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
118 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
119 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
120 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
121 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
122 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
123 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
124 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
125 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
126 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
127 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
128 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
129 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
131 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
132 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
133 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
134 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
135 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
136 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
138 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
140 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
141 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
143 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
144 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
145 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
146 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
147 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
148 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
149 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
150 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
153 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
157 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
158 state: InboundHTLCState,
161 enum OutboundHTLCState {
162 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
163 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
164 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
165 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
166 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
167 /// money back (though we won't), and,
168 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
169 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
170 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
171 /// we'll never get out of sync).
172 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
173 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
174 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
176 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
177 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
178 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
179 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
180 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
181 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
182 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
183 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
184 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
185 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
186 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
187 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
188 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
189 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
190 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
194 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
195 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
196 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
197 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
200 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
201 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
203 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
204 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
209 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
210 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
212 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
213 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
218 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
222 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
223 state: OutboundHTLCState,
227 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
228 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
229 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
233 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
235 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
238 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
243 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
247 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
248 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
249 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
250 /// move on to ChannelReady.
251 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
252 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
253 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
255 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
256 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
257 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
258 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
259 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
260 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
261 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
263 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
264 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
265 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
267 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
268 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
269 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
270 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
271 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
272 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
274 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
275 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
277 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
278 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
279 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
280 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
281 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
282 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
283 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
284 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
285 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
287 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
288 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
289 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
290 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
291 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
292 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
293 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
294 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
295 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
296 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
297 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
298 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
300 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
301 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
303 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
305 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
306 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
307 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
308 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
309 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
310 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
311 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
312 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
314 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
316 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
318 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
322 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
324 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
325 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
326 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
328 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
329 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
331 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
332 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
333 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
334 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
335 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
337 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
338 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
342 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
348 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
351 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
352 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
353 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
354 holding_cell_msat: u64,
355 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
358 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
359 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
360 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
361 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
362 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
363 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
364 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
365 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
366 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
367 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
370 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
371 struct HTLCCandidate {
373 origin: HTLCInitiator,
377 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
385 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
387 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
389 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
390 htlc_value_msat: u64,
391 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
396 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
397 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch<'a> {
398 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
399 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
400 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
402 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
403 monitor_update: &'a ChannelMonitorUpdate,
404 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
405 htlc_value_msat: u64,
407 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
408 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
412 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
413 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
414 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
415 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
416 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
417 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
418 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
419 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
420 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
421 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
422 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
425 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
426 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
427 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
428 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
429 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
430 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
431 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
432 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
435 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
436 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
437 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
438 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
439 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
440 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
441 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
442 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
443 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
444 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
445 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
446 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
447 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
448 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
449 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
451 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
452 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
453 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
454 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
456 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
457 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
458 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
459 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
461 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
462 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
463 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
464 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
465 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
467 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
468 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
469 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
470 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
472 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
473 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
474 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
476 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
477 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
478 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
479 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
480 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
482 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
483 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
484 /// In some cases we need to delay letting the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] go until after an
485 /// `Event` is processed by the user. This bool indicates the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] is
486 /// blocked on some external event and the [`ChannelManager`] will update us when we're ready.
488 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
492 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
493 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
494 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
497 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
498 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
499 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
500 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
502 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
503 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
504 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
505 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
507 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
511 channel_id: [u8; 32],
512 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
515 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
516 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
518 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
519 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
520 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
522 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
523 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
524 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
525 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
527 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
528 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
530 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
532 holder_signer: Signer,
533 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
534 destination_script: Script,
536 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
537 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
538 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
540 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
541 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
542 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
543 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
544 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
545 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
547 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
548 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
549 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
550 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
551 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
552 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
554 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
556 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
557 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
558 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
560 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
561 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
562 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
563 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
564 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
565 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
566 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
568 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
570 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
571 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
572 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
573 // HTLCs with similar state.
574 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
575 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
576 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
577 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
578 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
579 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
580 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
581 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
582 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
585 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
586 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
587 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
589 update_time_counter: u32,
591 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
592 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
593 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
594 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
595 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
596 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
598 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
599 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
601 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
602 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
603 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
604 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
606 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
607 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
609 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
611 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
613 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
614 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
615 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
616 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
617 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
618 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
620 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
621 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
622 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
623 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
624 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
626 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
627 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
628 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
629 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
630 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
631 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
632 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
633 channel_creation_height: u32,
635 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
638 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
640 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
643 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
645 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
648 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
650 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
652 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
653 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
656 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
658 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
660 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
661 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
663 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
665 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
666 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
667 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
669 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
671 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
672 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
674 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
675 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
676 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
678 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
680 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
682 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
683 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
684 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
685 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
687 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
688 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
689 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
691 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
692 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
693 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
695 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
696 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
697 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
698 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
699 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
700 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
701 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
702 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
704 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
705 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
706 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
707 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
708 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
710 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
711 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
713 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
714 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
715 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
716 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
717 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
718 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
719 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
720 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
722 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
723 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
725 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
726 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
727 // the channel's funding UTXO.
729 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
730 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
731 // associated channel mapping.
733 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
734 // to store all of them.
735 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
737 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
738 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
739 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
740 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
741 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
743 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
744 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
746 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
747 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
749 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
750 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
751 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
753 /// When we generate [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to persist, they may not be persisted immediately.
754 /// If we then persist the [`channelmanager::ChannelManager`] and crash before the persistence
755 /// completes we still need to be able to complete the persistence. Thus, we have to keep a
756 /// copy of the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] here until it is complete.
757 pending_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
760 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
761 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
763 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
764 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
765 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
769 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
771 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
772 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
773 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
774 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
778 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
780 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
782 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
784 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
785 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
786 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
787 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
788 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
790 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
791 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
793 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
795 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
796 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
798 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
799 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
800 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
801 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
802 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
803 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
805 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
806 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
808 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
809 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
810 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
811 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
812 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
814 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
815 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
817 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
818 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
820 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
821 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
822 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
823 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
829 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
830 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
832 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
833 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
834 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
839 macro_rules! secp_check {
840 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
843 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
848 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
849 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
850 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
851 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
853 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
855 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
856 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
857 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
859 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
862 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
864 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
867 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
868 /// required by us according to the configured or default
869 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
871 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
873 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
874 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
875 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
876 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
877 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
880 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
881 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
882 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
883 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
884 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
885 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
886 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
889 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
890 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
893 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
894 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
895 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
896 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
897 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
898 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
899 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
900 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
901 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
902 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
905 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
906 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
907 // `only_static_remotekey`.
909 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
910 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
911 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
912 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
919 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
920 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
921 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
922 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
923 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
924 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
925 // We've exhausted our options
928 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
929 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
932 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
933 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
934 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
935 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
937 if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
938 self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
939 assert!(self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none());
940 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
941 } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
942 self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
944 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
946 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
950 pub fn new_outbound<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
951 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
952 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
953 outbound_scid_alias: u64
954 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
955 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
956 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
957 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
959 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
960 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
961 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
962 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
964 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
965 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
967 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
968 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
970 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
971 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
972 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
974 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
975 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
977 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
978 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
979 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
980 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
981 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
984 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
985 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
987 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
989 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
990 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
991 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
992 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
995 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
996 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
998 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
999 Some(signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
1002 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1003 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1004 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
1008 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
1013 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1014 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1015 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
1016 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1021 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
1023 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
1024 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
1025 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
1026 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1028 channel_value_satoshis,
1030 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1033 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1034 destination_script: signer_provider.get_destination_script(),
1036 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1037 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1040 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1041 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1042 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1043 pending_update_fee: None,
1044 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1045 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1046 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1047 update_time_counter: 1,
1049 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1051 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1052 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1053 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1054 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1055 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1056 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1058 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1059 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1060 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1061 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1063 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1064 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1065 closing_fee_limits: None,
1066 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1068 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1070 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1071 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1072 short_channel_id: None,
1073 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1075 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1076 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1077 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1078 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1079 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1080 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1081 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1082 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1083 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1084 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1085 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1086 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1088 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1090 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1091 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1092 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1093 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1094 counterparty_parameters: None,
1095 funding_outpoint: None,
1096 opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None },
1097 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1099 funding_transaction: None,
1101 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1102 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1103 counterparty_node_id,
1105 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1107 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1109 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1110 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1112 announcement_sigs: None,
1114 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1115 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1116 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1117 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1119 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1121 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1122 outbound_scid_alias,
1124 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1125 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1127 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1128 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1133 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1137 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1138 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
1139 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
1141 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1142 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1143 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1144 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1145 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1146 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1147 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1148 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1150 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1151 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1152 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1153 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1154 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1155 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1156 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
1157 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
1159 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
1160 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
1164 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1169 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1170 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1171 pub fn new_from_req<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1172 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
1173 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
1174 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
1175 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
1176 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1177 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
1178 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
1179 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1182 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1184 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1185 // support this channel type.
1186 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1187 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1188 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1191 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
1192 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
1193 // `static_remote_key`.
1194 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
1195 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1197 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
1198 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
1199 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
1201 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1202 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1204 channel_type.clone()
1206 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
1207 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1208 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
1212 let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
1214 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
1215 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1216 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1217 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1218 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1219 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1220 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1221 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1222 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1225 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1226 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1229 // Check sanity of message fields:
1230 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1231 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1233 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1234 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1236 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1237 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1239 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1240 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1241 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1243 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1244 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1246 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1247 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1249 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
1251 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1252 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1253 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1255 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1256 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1258 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1259 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1262 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1263 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1264 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1266 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1267 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1269 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1270 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1272 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1273 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1275 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1276 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1278 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1279 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1281 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1282 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1285 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1287 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1288 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1289 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1293 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1294 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1295 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1296 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1297 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1299 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1300 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1302 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1303 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1304 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1306 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1307 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1310 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1311 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1312 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1313 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1314 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1315 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1318 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1319 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1320 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1321 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1322 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1325 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1326 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1327 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1328 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1329 if script.len() == 0 {
1332 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1333 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1335 Some(script.clone())
1338 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1339 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1340 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1345 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1346 Some(signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
1349 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1350 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1351 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1355 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1356 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1358 let chan = Channel {
1361 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1362 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1364 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1369 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1371 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1372 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
1373 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1374 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1377 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1380 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1381 destination_script: signer_provider.get_destination_script(),
1383 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1384 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1385 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1387 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1388 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1389 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1390 pending_update_fee: None,
1391 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1392 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1393 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1394 update_time_counter: 1,
1396 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1398 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1399 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1400 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1401 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1402 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1403 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1405 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1406 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1407 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1408 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1410 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1411 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1412 closing_fee_limits: None,
1413 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1415 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1417 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1418 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1419 short_channel_id: None,
1420 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1422 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1423 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1424 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1425 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1426 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1427 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1428 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1429 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1430 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1431 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1432 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1433 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1434 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1436 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1438 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1439 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1440 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1441 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1442 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1443 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1444 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1446 funding_outpoint: None,
1447 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1448 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1450 funding_transaction: None,
1452 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1453 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1454 counterparty_node_id,
1456 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1458 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1460 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1461 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1463 announcement_sigs: None,
1465 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1466 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1467 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1468 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1470 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1472 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1473 outbound_scid_alias,
1475 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1476 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1478 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1479 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1484 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1490 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1491 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1492 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1493 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1494 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1496 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1497 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1498 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1499 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1500 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1501 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1502 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1504 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1505 where L::Target: Logger
1507 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1508 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1509 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1511 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1512 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1513 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1514 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1516 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1517 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1518 if match update_state {
1519 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1520 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1521 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1522 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1523 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1525 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1529 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1530 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1531 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1532 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1534 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1535 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1536 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1538 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1539 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1540 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1541 transaction_output_index: None
1546 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1547 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1548 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1549 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1550 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1553 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1555 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1556 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1557 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1559 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1560 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1563 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1564 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1567 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1569 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1570 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1571 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1573 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1574 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1580 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1581 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1582 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1583 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1584 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1585 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1586 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1590 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1591 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1593 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1595 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1596 if generated_by_local {
1597 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1598 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1607 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1609 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1610 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1611 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1612 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1613 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1614 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1615 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1618 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1619 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1620 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1621 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1625 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1626 preimages.push(preimage);
1630 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1631 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1633 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1635 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1636 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1638 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1639 if !generated_by_local {
1640 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1648 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1649 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1650 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1651 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1652 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1653 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1654 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1655 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1657 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1659 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1660 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1661 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1662 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1664 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1666 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1667 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1668 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1669 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1672 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1673 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1674 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1675 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1677 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1680 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1681 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1682 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1683 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1685 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1688 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1689 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1694 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1695 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1700 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1702 let channel_parameters =
1703 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1704 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1705 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1708 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1713 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1716 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1717 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1718 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1719 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1721 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1722 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1723 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1731 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1732 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1738 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1739 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1740 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1741 // outside of those situations will fail.
1742 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1746 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1751 1 + // script length (0)
1755 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1756 2 + // witness marker and flag
1757 1 + // witness element count
1758 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1759 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1760 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1761 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1762 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1763 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1765 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1766 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1767 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1773 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1774 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1775 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1776 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1778 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1779 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1780 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1782 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1783 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1784 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1785 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1786 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1787 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1790 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1791 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1794 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1795 value_to_holder = 0;
1798 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1799 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1800 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1801 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1803 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1804 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1807 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1808 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1812 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1813 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1814 /// our counterparty!)
1815 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1816 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1817 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1818 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1819 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1820 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1821 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1823 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1827 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1828 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1829 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1830 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1831 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1832 //may see payments to it!
1833 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1834 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1835 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1837 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1840 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1841 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1842 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1843 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1844 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1847 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1850 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1851 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1853 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1855 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1856 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1857 where L::Target: Logger {
1858 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1859 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1860 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1861 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1862 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1863 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1864 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1865 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1869 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1870 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1871 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1872 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1874 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1875 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1877 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1879 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1881 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1882 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1883 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1885 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1886 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1887 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1888 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1889 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1891 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1892 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1893 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1895 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1896 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1898 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1901 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1902 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1906 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1910 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1911 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1912 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1913 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1914 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1915 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1918 // Now update local state:
1920 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1921 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1922 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1923 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1924 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1925 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1926 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1930 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1931 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1932 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1933 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1934 // do not not get into this branch.
1935 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1936 match pending_update {
1937 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1938 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1939 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1940 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1941 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1942 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1943 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1946 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1947 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1948 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1949 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1950 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1951 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1952 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1958 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1959 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1960 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1962 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1963 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1964 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1966 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1967 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1970 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1971 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1973 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1974 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1976 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1977 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1980 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1983 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1984 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1985 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1986 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1991 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1992 let release_cs_monitor = self.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
1993 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1994 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
1995 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
1996 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
1997 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
1998 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
1999 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2000 let unblocked_update_pos = if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2001 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2002 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2003 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2004 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2005 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2006 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2007 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2009 self.pending_monitor_updates.len() - 1
2011 let insert_pos = self.pending_monitor_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd.blocked)
2012 .unwrap_or(self.pending_monitor_updates.len());
2013 let new_mon_id = self.pending_monitor_updates.get(insert_pos)
2014 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2015 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2016 self.pending_monitor_updates.insert(insert_pos, PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2017 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2019 for held_update in self.pending_monitor_updates.iter_mut().skip(insert_pos + 1) {
2020 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2023 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2024 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2025 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2026 update, blocked: true,
2031 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2032 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
2033 monitor_update: &self.pending_monitor_updates.get(unblocked_update_pos)
2034 .expect("We just pushed the monitor update").update,
2038 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2042 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2043 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2044 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2045 /// before we fail backwards.
2047 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2048 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2049 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2050 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2051 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2052 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2053 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2056 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2057 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2058 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2059 /// before we fail backwards.
2061 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2062 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2063 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2064 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2065 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2066 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2067 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2069 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2071 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2072 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2073 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2075 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2076 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2077 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2079 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2080 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2081 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2083 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2088 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2089 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2095 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2096 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2097 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2098 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2099 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2103 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2104 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2105 force_holding_cell = true;
2108 // Now update local state:
2109 if force_holding_cell {
2110 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2111 match pending_update {
2112 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2113 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2114 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2115 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2119 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2120 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2121 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2122 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2128 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2129 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2130 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2136 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2138 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2139 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2142 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2143 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2144 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2149 // Message handlers:
2151 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2152 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2154 // Check sanity of message fields:
2155 if !self.is_outbound() {
2156 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2158 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2159 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2161 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2162 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2164 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2165 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2167 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2168 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2170 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2171 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2172 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2174 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2175 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2176 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2178 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2179 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2180 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2182 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2183 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2185 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2186 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2189 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2190 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2191 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2193 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2194 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2196 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2197 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2199 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2200 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2202 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2203 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2205 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2206 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2208 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2209 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2212 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2213 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2214 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2216 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2217 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2219 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
2220 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
2221 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
2223 self.channel_type = channel_type;
2226 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2227 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2228 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
2229 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2230 if script.len() == 0 {
2233 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2234 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2236 Some(script.clone())
2239 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2240 &OptionalField::Absent => {
2241 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2246 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2247 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2248 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2249 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2250 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2252 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2253 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2255 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2258 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2259 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2260 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2261 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2262 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2263 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2266 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2267 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2268 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2271 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2272 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2274 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2275 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2280 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2281 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2283 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2284 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2286 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2287 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2288 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2289 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2290 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2291 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2292 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2293 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2294 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2297 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2298 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2300 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2301 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2302 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2303 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2305 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2306 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2308 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2309 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2312 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2313 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2316 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2317 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2318 ) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError>
2320 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2323 if self.is_outbound() {
2324 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2326 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2327 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2328 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2330 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2332 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2333 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2335 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2336 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2337 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2338 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2341 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2342 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2343 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2344 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2345 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2347 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2349 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2350 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2351 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2354 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2355 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2356 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2360 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2361 initial_commitment_tx,
2364 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2365 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2368 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2369 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2371 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2373 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2374 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2375 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2376 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2377 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2378 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2379 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2380 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2381 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2382 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2383 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2385 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2387 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2389 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2390 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2391 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2392 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2394 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2396 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2397 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2399 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2400 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2403 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2404 }, channel_monitor))
2407 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2408 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2409 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2410 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2411 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2413 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2416 if !self.is_outbound() {
2417 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2419 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2420 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2422 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2423 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2424 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2425 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2428 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2430 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2431 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2432 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2433 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2435 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2436 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2438 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2439 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2441 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2442 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2443 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2444 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2445 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2446 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2450 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2451 initial_commitment_tx,
2454 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2455 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2458 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2459 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2462 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2463 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2464 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2465 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2466 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2467 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2468 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2469 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2470 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2471 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2472 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2473 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2475 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2477 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2479 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2480 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2481 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2482 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2484 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2486 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2487 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2491 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2492 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2494 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2495 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2496 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2497 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2499 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2502 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2503 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2504 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2507 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2508 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2509 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2510 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2511 // when routing outbound payments.
2512 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2516 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2518 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2519 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2520 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2521 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2522 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2523 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2524 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2525 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2526 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2528 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2529 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2530 let expected_point =
2531 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2532 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2534 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2535 } else if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2536 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2537 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2538 debug_assert!(self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2539 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2541 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2542 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2543 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2544 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2545 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2547 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2548 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2552 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2555 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2556 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2558 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2560 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2563 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2564 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2565 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2566 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2572 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2573 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2574 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2575 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2576 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2577 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2578 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2579 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2580 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2583 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2586 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2587 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2588 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2590 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2591 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2592 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2593 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2594 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2595 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2597 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2598 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2604 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2605 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2606 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2607 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2608 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2609 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2610 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2611 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2612 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2615 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2618 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2619 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2620 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2622 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2623 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2624 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2625 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2626 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2627 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2629 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2630 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2634 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2635 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2636 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2637 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2638 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2639 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2640 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2642 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2643 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2645 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2652 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2653 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2654 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2655 /// corner case properly.
2656 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2657 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2658 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2660 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2661 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2662 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2663 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2666 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2668 let outbound_capacity_msat = cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2669 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2670 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2673 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2674 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2675 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2676 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2678 outbound_capacity_msat,
2679 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(outbound_capacity_msat as i64,
2680 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
2681 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
2687 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2688 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2691 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2692 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2693 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2694 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2695 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2696 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2699 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2700 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2702 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2703 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2706 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2707 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2708 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2710 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2711 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2713 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2716 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2717 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2719 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2720 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2722 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2723 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2725 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2726 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2730 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2731 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2737 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2738 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2739 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2742 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2743 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2744 included_htlcs += 1;
2747 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2748 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2752 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2753 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2754 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2755 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2756 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2757 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2762 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2764 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2765 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2770 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2771 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2775 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2776 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2777 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2780 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2781 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2783 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2784 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2785 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2787 total_pending_htlcs,
2788 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2789 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2790 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2792 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2793 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2794 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2796 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2798 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2803 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2804 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2805 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2807 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2808 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2810 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2813 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2814 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2816 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2817 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2819 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2820 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2822 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2823 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2827 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2828 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2834 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2835 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2836 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2837 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2838 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2839 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2842 included_htlcs += 1;
2845 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2846 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2849 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2850 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2852 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2853 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2854 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2859 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2860 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2861 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2864 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2865 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2867 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2868 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2870 total_pending_htlcs,
2871 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2872 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2873 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2875 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2876 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2877 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2879 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2881 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2886 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2887 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2888 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2889 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2890 if local_sent_shutdown {
2891 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2893 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2894 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2895 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2896 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2898 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2899 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2901 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2902 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2904 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2905 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2907 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2908 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2911 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2912 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2913 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2914 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2916 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2917 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2919 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2920 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2921 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2922 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2923 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2924 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2925 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2926 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2927 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2928 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2929 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2931 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2932 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2933 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2934 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2935 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2936 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2940 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2943 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2944 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2945 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2947 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2948 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2949 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2950 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2951 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2952 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2953 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2957 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2958 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2959 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2960 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2961 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2962 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2963 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2967 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2968 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2969 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2970 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2971 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2972 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2975 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2976 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2977 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2978 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2979 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2981 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2982 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2985 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2986 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2989 if !self.is_outbound() {
2990 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2991 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2992 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2993 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2994 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2995 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2996 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2997 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2998 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2999 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
3000 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
3001 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
3002 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
3003 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3004 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3007 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3008 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3009 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3010 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3011 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3014 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
3015 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
3017 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
3018 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
3021 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
3022 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
3023 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
3027 // Now update local state:
3028 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
3029 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3030 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3031 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
3032 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3033 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3034 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3039 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3041 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3042 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3043 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3044 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3045 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3046 None => fail_reason.into(),
3047 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3048 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3049 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3050 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3052 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3056 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3057 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3058 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3059 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3061 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3062 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3067 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3070 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3071 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3072 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3074 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3075 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3078 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3081 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3082 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3083 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3085 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3086 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3089 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3093 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3094 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3095 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3097 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3098 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3101 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3105 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3106 where L::Target: Logger
3108 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3109 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3111 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3112 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3114 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3115 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3118 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3120 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3122 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3123 let commitment_txid = {
3124 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3125 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3126 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
3128 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3129 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3130 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3131 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3132 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3133 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3137 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3139 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3140 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3141 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3142 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3145 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3146 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3147 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3148 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3151 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3153 if self.is_outbound() {
3154 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3155 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3156 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3157 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3158 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3159 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3160 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
3161 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3162 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
3163 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3169 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3170 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3173 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3174 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3175 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3176 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3177 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3178 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3179 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3180 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3181 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3182 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3183 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3184 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3185 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3188 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3189 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3190 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3191 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3192 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3193 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3194 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3196 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3197 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3198 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3199 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3200 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3201 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3202 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3203 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3205 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3206 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3209 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3211 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3212 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3213 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3216 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3219 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3220 commitment_stats.tx,
3222 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3223 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3224 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3227 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3228 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3230 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3231 let mut need_commitment = false;
3232 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
3233 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3234 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3235 need_commitment = true;
3239 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3240 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3241 Some(forward_info.clone())
3243 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3244 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3245 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3246 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3247 need_commitment = true;
3250 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3251 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3252 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3253 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3254 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3255 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3256 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3257 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3258 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3259 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3260 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3261 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3262 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3263 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3265 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3267 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3268 need_commitment = true;
3272 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3273 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3274 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3275 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3276 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3277 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3279 nondust_htlc_sources,
3283 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3284 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3285 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3286 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3288 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3289 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3290 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3291 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3292 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3293 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3294 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3295 // includes the right HTLCs.
3296 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3297 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3298 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3299 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3300 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3301 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3303 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3304 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3305 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3308 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3309 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3310 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3311 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3312 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3313 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3314 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3315 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3316 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3320 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3321 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3322 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3323 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3326 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3327 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3328 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3329 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3330 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3331 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3332 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3333 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3336 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3337 /// for our counterparty.
3338 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3339 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3340 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3341 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3342 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3344 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3345 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3346 updates: Vec::new(),
3349 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3350 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3351 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3352 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3353 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3354 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3355 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3356 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3357 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3358 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3359 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3360 // to rebalance channels.
3361 match &htlc_update {
3362 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3363 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3364 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3367 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3368 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3369 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3370 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3371 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3372 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3373 // into the holding cell without ever being
3374 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3375 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3376 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3379 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3385 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3386 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3387 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3388 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3389 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3390 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3391 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3392 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3393 (msg, monitor_update)
3394 } else { unreachable!() };
3395 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3396 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3398 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3399 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3400 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3401 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3402 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3403 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3404 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3405 // for a full revocation before failing.
3406 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3409 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3411 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3418 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3419 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3421 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3422 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3427 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3428 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3429 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3430 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3431 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3433 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3434 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3435 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3437 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3438 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3444 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3445 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3446 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3447 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3448 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3449 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3450 where L::Target: Logger,
3452 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3453 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3455 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3456 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3458 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3459 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3462 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3464 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3465 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3466 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3470 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3471 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3472 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3473 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3474 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3475 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3476 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3477 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3478 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3481 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3483 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3484 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3487 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3488 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3490 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3492 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3493 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3494 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3495 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3496 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3497 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3498 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3499 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3503 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3504 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3505 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3506 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3507 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3508 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3509 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3510 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3512 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3513 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3516 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3517 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3518 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3519 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3520 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3521 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3522 let mut require_commitment = false;
3523 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3526 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3527 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3528 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3530 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3531 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3532 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3533 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3534 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3535 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3540 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3541 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3542 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3543 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3544 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3546 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3547 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3548 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3553 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3554 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3556 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3560 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3561 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3563 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3564 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3565 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3566 require_commitment = true;
3567 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3568 match forward_info {
3569 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3570 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3571 require_commitment = true;
3573 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3574 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3575 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3577 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3578 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3579 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3583 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3584 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3585 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3586 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3592 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3593 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3594 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3595 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3597 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3598 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3599 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3600 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3601 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3602 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3603 require_commitment = true;
3607 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3609 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3610 match update_state {
3611 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3612 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3613 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3614 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3615 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3617 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3618 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3619 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3620 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3621 require_commitment = true;
3622 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3623 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3628 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3629 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3630 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3631 if require_commitment {
3632 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3633 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3634 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3635 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3636 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3637 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3638 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3639 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3640 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3642 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3643 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3644 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3645 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3646 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)));
3649 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3650 (Some(_), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3651 let mut additional_update = self.pending_monitor_updates.pop().unwrap().update;
3652 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3653 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3654 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3655 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3657 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3658 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3660 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3661 if require_commitment {
3662 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3664 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3665 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3666 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3667 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3669 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3670 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3671 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3672 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3674 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3675 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3676 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3682 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3683 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3684 /// commitment update.
3685 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3686 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3687 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3690 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3691 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3692 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3693 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3695 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3696 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3697 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3698 if !self.is_outbound() {
3699 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3701 if !self.is_usable() {
3702 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3704 if !self.is_live() {
3705 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3708 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3709 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3710 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3711 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3712 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3713 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3714 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3715 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3716 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3717 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3721 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3722 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3723 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3724 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3725 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3728 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3729 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3733 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3734 force_holding_cell = true;
3737 if force_holding_cell {
3738 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3742 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3743 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3745 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3746 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3751 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3752 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3754 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3756 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3757 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3758 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3759 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3763 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3764 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3765 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3769 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3770 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3773 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3774 // will be retransmitted.
3775 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3776 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3777 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3779 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3780 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3782 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3783 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3784 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3785 // this HTLC accordingly
3786 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3789 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3790 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3791 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3792 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3795 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3796 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3797 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3798 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3799 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3800 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3805 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3807 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3808 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3809 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3810 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3814 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3815 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3816 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3817 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3818 // the update upon reconnection.
3819 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3823 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3824 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3827 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3828 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3829 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3830 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3831 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3832 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3833 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3835 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3836 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3837 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3838 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3839 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3840 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3841 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3843 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3844 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3845 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3846 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3847 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3848 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3849 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3852 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3853 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3854 /// to the remote side.
3855 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3856 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3857 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3858 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3861 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3863 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3864 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3865 let mut found_blocked = false;
3866 self.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| {
3867 if found_blocked { debug_assert!(upd.blocked, "No mons may be unblocked after a blocked one"); }
3868 if upd.blocked { found_blocked = true; }
3872 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3873 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3874 // first received the funding_signed.
3875 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3876 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3877 self.funding_transaction.take()
3879 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3880 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3881 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3882 funding_broadcastable = None;
3885 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3886 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3887 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3888 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3889 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3890 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3891 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3892 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3893 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3894 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3895 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3896 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3897 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3898 next_per_commitment_point,
3899 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3903 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3905 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3906 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3907 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3908 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3909 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3910 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3912 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3913 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3914 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3915 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3916 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3917 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3921 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3922 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3924 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3925 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3928 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3929 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3930 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3931 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3932 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3933 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3934 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3935 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3936 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3940 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3941 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3943 if self.is_outbound() {
3944 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3946 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3947 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3949 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3950 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3952 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3953 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3954 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3955 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3956 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3957 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3958 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3959 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3960 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3961 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3962 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3963 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3964 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3966 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3967 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3968 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3974 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3975 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3976 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3977 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3978 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3979 per_commitment_secret,
3980 next_per_commitment_point,
3982 next_local_nonce: None,
3986 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3987 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3988 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3989 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3990 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3992 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3993 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3994 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3995 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3996 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3997 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3998 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3999 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4000 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4005 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4006 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4008 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4009 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4010 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4011 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4012 reason: err_packet.clone()
4015 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4016 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4017 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4018 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4019 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4020 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4023 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4024 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4025 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4026 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4027 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4034 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4035 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4036 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4037 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4041 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4042 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4043 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4044 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4045 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4046 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
4050 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4051 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4053 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4054 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4055 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4056 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4057 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4058 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4059 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4060 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4063 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4065 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4066 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4067 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4068 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4069 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4072 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4073 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4074 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4077 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4078 match msg.data_loss_protect {
4079 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
4080 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4081 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4082 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4083 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4084 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4086 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4087 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4088 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4089 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4090 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4093 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4094 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4095 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4096 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4097 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4098 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4099 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4100 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4103 OptionalField::Absent => {}
4107 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4108 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4109 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4110 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4112 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4116 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4117 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4118 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4120 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4121 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4122 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4123 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4124 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4128 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4130 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4131 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4132 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4133 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4134 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4135 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4137 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4138 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4139 channel_ready: None,
4140 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4141 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4142 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4146 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4147 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4148 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4149 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4150 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4151 next_per_commitment_point,
4152 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4154 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4155 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4156 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4160 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4161 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4162 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4164 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4165 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4166 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4169 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4172 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4175 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4176 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4177 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4178 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4179 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
4181 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4182 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4183 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4184 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4185 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4186 next_per_commitment_point,
4187 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4191 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4192 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4193 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4195 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4198 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4199 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4200 raa: required_revoke,
4201 commitment_update: None,
4202 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4204 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4205 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4206 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4208 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4211 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4212 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4213 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4214 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4215 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4216 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4219 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4220 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4221 raa: required_revoke,
4222 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4223 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4227 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4231 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4232 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4233 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4234 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4236 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4238 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4240 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4241 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4242 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4243 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4244 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4245 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4247 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4248 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4249 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4250 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4251 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4253 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4254 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4255 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4256 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4259 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4260 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4261 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4262 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4263 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4264 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4265 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4266 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4267 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4268 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4269 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4270 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4271 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4272 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4273 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4275 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4278 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4279 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4282 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4283 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4284 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4285 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4286 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4287 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4288 self.channel_state &
4289 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4290 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4291 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4292 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4295 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4296 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4297 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4298 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4299 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4300 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4301 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4303 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4309 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4310 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4311 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4312 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4314 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4315 return Ok((None, None));
4318 if !self.is_outbound() {
4319 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4320 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4322 return Ok((None, None));
4325 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4327 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4328 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4329 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4330 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4332 let sig = self.holder_signer
4333 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4334 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4336 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4337 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4338 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4339 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4341 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4342 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4343 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4348 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4349 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4350 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4351 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4353 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4354 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4356 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4357 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4358 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4359 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4360 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4362 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4363 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4364 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4367 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4369 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4370 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4373 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4374 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4375 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4378 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4381 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4382 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4383 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4384 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4386 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4389 assert!(send_shutdown);
4390 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4391 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4392 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4394 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4399 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4401 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4402 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4404 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4405 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4406 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4407 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4408 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4409 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4412 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4413 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
4414 self.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
4417 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4418 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4419 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4420 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4424 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4425 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4426 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4427 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4428 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4429 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4431 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4432 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4439 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4440 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4442 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4445 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4446 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4448 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4450 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4451 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4452 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4453 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4454 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4455 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4456 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4457 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4458 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4460 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4461 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4464 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4468 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4469 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4470 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4471 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4473 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4474 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4476 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4477 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4479 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4480 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4482 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4483 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4486 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4487 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4490 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4491 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4492 return Ok((None, None));
4495 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4496 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4497 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4498 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4500 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4502 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4505 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4506 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4507 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4508 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4509 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4513 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4514 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4515 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4519 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4520 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4521 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4522 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4523 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4524 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4525 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4529 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4531 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4532 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4533 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4534 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4536 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4539 let sig = self.holder_signer
4540 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4541 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4543 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4544 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4545 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4546 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4550 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4551 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4552 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4553 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4555 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4556 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4557 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4563 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4564 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4565 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4567 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4568 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4570 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4571 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4574 if !self.is_outbound() {
4575 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4576 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4577 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4578 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4580 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4581 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4582 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4584 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4585 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4588 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4589 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4590 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4591 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4592 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4593 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4594 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4595 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4597 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4600 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4601 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4602 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4603 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4605 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4609 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4610 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4611 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4612 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4614 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4620 // Public utilities:
4622 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4626 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
4628 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
4629 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
4630 self.temporary_channel_id
4633 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4637 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4638 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4639 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
4643 /// Gets the channel's type
4644 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4648 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4649 /// is_usable() returns true).
4650 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4651 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4652 self.short_channel_id
4655 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4656 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4657 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4660 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4661 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4662 self.outbound_scid_alias
4664 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4665 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4666 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4667 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4668 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4671 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4672 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4673 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4674 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4677 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
4678 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
4679 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
4682 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
4683 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
4684 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4685 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
4689 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
4692 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4693 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4696 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4697 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4700 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4701 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4702 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4705 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4706 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4709 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4710 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4711 self.counterparty_node_id
4714 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4715 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4716 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4719 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4720 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4721 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4724 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4725 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4727 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4728 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4729 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4730 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4732 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4736 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4737 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4738 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4741 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4742 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4743 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4746 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4747 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4748 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4750 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4751 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4756 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4757 self.channel_value_satoshis
4760 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4761 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4764 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4765 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4768 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4769 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4772 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4773 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4774 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4777 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
4778 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4779 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
4782 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
4783 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
4784 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
4787 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
4788 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4789 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
4792 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
4793 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4794 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
4797 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
4798 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4799 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
4802 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4803 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4804 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4805 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4806 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4809 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4811 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4812 self.prev_config = None;
4816 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4817 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4821 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4822 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4823 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4824 let did_channel_update =
4825 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4826 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4827 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4828 if did_channel_update {
4829 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4830 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4831 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4832 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4834 self.config.options = *config;
4838 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4839 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4840 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4841 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4842 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4843 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4844 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4846 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4847 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4850 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4852 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4853 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4859 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4860 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4861 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4862 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4863 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4864 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4865 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4867 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4868 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4875 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
4879 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4880 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4881 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4882 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4883 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4884 // which are near the dust limit.
4885 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4886 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4887 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4888 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4889 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4891 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4892 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4894 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4897 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4898 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4901 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4902 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4905 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4906 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4910 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4915 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4917 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4918 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4919 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4920 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4921 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4922 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4924 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4926 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4934 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4935 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4939 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4940 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
4941 self.update_time_counter
4944 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4945 self.latest_monitor_update_id
4948 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
4949 self.config.announced_channel
4952 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
4953 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
4956 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
4957 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4958 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
4959 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
4962 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
4963 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
4964 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
4967 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
4968 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4969 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
4970 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
4971 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
4974 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
4975 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
4976 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4977 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
4978 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
4981 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4982 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4983 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4984 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4987 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4988 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4989 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(&ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4990 for i in 0..self.pending_monitor_updates.len() {
4991 if self.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked {
4992 self.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked = false;
4993 return Some((&self.pending_monitor_updates[i].update,
4994 self.pending_monitor_updates.len() > i + 1));
5000 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning whether it should be
5001 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or if it should be held as blocked.
5002 fn push_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> bool {
5003 let release_monitor = self.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
5004 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
5005 update, blocked: !release_monitor
5010 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning a reference to it if
5011 /// it should be immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as
5013 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
5014 -> Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
5015 let release_monitor = self.push_blockable_mon_update(update);
5016 if release_monitor { self.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update) } else { None }
5019 pub fn no_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> bool {
5020 self.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty()
5023 pub fn complete_one_mon_update(&mut self, update_id: u64) {
5024 self.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| upd.update.update_id != update_id);
5027 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
5028 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
5029 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
5032 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
5033 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
5034 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
5036 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
5037 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
5038 if self.channel_state &
5039 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
5040 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5041 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
5042 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
5043 debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
5046 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
5047 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
5048 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
5049 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
5050 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
5051 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
5053 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
5054 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
5055 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
5057 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
5058 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
5059 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
5060 if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
5061 assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
5062 assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
5068 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
5069 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
5070 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
5073 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5074 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5075 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
5078 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5079 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5080 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
5083 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
5084 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
5085 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
5086 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5087 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
5088 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
5093 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
5094 self.channel_update_status
5097 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
5098 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5099 self.channel_update_status = status;
5102 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
5104 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
5105 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
5106 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5110 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5111 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
5112 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
5115 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
5119 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5120 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5121 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
5123 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
5124 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5125 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5127 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
5128 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5131 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
5132 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5133 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5134 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5135 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5136 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5137 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
5138 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5139 self.channel_state);
5141 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5145 if need_commitment_update {
5146 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
5147 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
5148 let next_per_commitment_point =
5149 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
5150 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5151 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5152 next_per_commitment_point,
5153 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
5157 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5163 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5164 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5165 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5166 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5167 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5168 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5169 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5171 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5174 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5175 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5176 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5177 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5178 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5179 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5180 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5181 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5182 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
5183 if self.is_outbound() {
5184 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5185 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5186 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5187 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5188 // channel and move on.
5189 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5190 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5192 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5193 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5194 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5196 if self.is_outbound() {
5197 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5198 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5199 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5200 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5201 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5202 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5206 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5207 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5208 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5209 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5210 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5214 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5215 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5216 // may have already happened for this block).
5217 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5218 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5219 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5220 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
5223 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5224 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5225 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5226 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5234 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5235 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5236 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5237 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5239 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5240 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5243 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5245 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5246 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
5247 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5248 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5250 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5253 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5256 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5257 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5258 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5259 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5261 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5264 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5265 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5266 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5268 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5269 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5271 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5272 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5273 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5281 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5283 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5284 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5285 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5287 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5288 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5291 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5292 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5293 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5294 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5295 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5296 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5297 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5298 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5299 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5302 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5303 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5304 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5305 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5307 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5308 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5309 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5311 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5312 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5313 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5314 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5316 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5317 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5318 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5319 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5320 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5321 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5322 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5325 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5326 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5328 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5331 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5332 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5333 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5334 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5335 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5336 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5337 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5338 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5339 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5340 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5341 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5342 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5343 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5344 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5345 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5346 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5347 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5353 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5358 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5359 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5361 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5362 if !self.is_outbound() {
5363 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5365 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5366 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5369 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5370 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5373 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5374 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5378 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5379 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5380 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5381 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5382 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5383 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5384 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5385 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5386 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5387 max_accepted_htlcs: self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5388 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5389 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5390 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5391 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5392 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5393 first_per_commitment_point,
5394 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5395 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5396 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5397 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5399 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5403 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5404 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5407 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5408 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5409 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5410 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5413 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5414 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5416 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5417 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5418 if self.is_outbound() {
5419 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5421 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5422 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5424 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5425 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5427 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5428 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5431 self.user_id = user_id;
5432 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5434 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5437 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5438 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5439 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5441 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5442 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5443 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5444 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5446 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5447 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5448 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5449 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5450 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5451 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5452 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5453 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5454 max_accepted_htlcs: self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5455 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5456 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5457 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5458 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5459 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5460 first_per_commitment_point,
5461 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5462 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5463 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5465 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5467 next_local_nonce: None,
5471 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5472 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5474 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5476 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5477 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5480 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5481 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5482 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5483 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5484 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5485 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5488 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5489 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5490 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5491 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5492 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5493 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5494 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5495 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5496 if !self.is_outbound() {
5497 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5499 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5500 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5502 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5503 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5504 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5505 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5508 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5509 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5511 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5514 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5515 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5520 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5522 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5524 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5525 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5526 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5528 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5529 temporary_channel_id,
5530 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5531 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5534 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5536 next_local_nonce: None,
5540 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5541 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5542 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5543 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5545 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5548 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5549 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5550 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5551 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5552 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5553 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5555 if !self.is_usable() {
5556 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5559 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5560 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5561 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.get_counterparty_node_id());
5562 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5564 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5565 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5567 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5568 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5569 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5570 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5571 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5572 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5578 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5579 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5580 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5581 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5583 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5586 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5590 if !self.is_usable() {
5594 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5595 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5599 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5603 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5604 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
5607 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5611 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5613 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5618 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5620 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5625 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5627 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5628 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5629 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5630 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5631 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5635 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5637 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5638 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5639 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5640 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5641 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5642 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5643 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5645 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5646 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5647 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5648 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5649 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5650 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5651 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5652 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5653 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5654 contents: announcement,
5657 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5661 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5662 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5663 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5664 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5665 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5666 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5667 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5668 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5670 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5672 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5673 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5674 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5675 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5677 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5678 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5679 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5680 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5683 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5684 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5685 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5686 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5689 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5692 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5693 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5694 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5695 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5696 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5697 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5700 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5702 Err(_) => return None,
5704 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5705 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5710 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5711 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5712 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5713 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5714 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5715 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5716 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5717 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5718 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5719 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5720 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5721 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5722 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5723 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5724 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5725 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5726 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5727 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5728 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
5731 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5732 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5733 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
5734 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5737 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5738 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5739 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5740 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5741 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5742 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5743 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5744 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5746 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5747 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5748 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5749 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5750 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5751 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5752 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5753 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5754 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5756 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5762 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5764 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5765 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5766 /// commitment update.
5768 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5769 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5770 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
5771 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5773 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
5774 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5776 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5777 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5782 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5783 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5785 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5787 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5788 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5790 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5791 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5792 /// regenerate them.
5794 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5795 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5797 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5798 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5799 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
5800 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5801 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5802 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5804 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5805 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5806 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5809 if amount_msat == 0 {
5810 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5813 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5814 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5817 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5818 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5819 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5820 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5821 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5822 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5823 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5824 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5827 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5828 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5829 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5830 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5832 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5833 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5834 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5837 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
5838 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5839 if !self.is_outbound() {
5840 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5841 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5842 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5843 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5844 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5845 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5849 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
5852 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5853 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
5854 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
5856 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5857 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5858 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5859 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5860 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5861 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5865 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5866 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5867 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5868 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5869 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5870 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5874 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5875 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5876 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5879 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5880 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5881 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5882 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5884 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5885 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5888 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5889 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5890 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5891 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5892 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5895 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
5896 force_holding_cell = true;
5899 // Now update local state:
5900 if force_holding_cell {
5901 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5906 onion_routing_packet,
5911 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5912 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5914 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5916 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5920 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5921 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5922 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5926 onion_routing_packet,
5928 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5933 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5934 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5935 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5936 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5938 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5939 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5940 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5942 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5943 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5947 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5948 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5949 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5950 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5951 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5952 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5953 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5956 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5957 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5958 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
5959 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5960 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5961 self.pending_update_fee = None;
5964 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5966 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5967 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5968 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5970 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5971 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5974 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5975 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5976 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5977 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5978 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5979 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5980 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5981 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5984 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5988 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
5989 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5990 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5991 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5993 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5995 if !self.is_outbound() {
5996 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5997 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5998 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5999 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
6000 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
6001 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
6002 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
6003 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
6004 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
6005 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
6011 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
6014 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
6015 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
6016 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6017 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
6018 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6019 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6021 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6022 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6023 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6024 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
6027 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
6028 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
6032 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
6033 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
6035 htlc_signatures = res.1;
6037 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
6038 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
6039 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
6040 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
6042 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
6043 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
6044 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
6045 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
6046 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
6047 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
6051 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
6052 channel_id: self.channel_id,
6056 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6057 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
6060 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
6061 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
6063 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
6064 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
6065 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6066 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger);
6067 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
6070 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
6071 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6072 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
6078 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
6079 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
6080 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
6083 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6084 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
6085 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
6087 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6088 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
6089 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
6090 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
6096 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
6097 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
6099 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
6100 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
6101 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6102 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>)
6103 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
6104 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6105 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6106 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6107 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
6110 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
6111 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
6112 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
6114 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
6115 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
6118 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
6119 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
6120 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
6123 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
6124 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
6125 let mut chan_closed = false;
6126 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6130 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6132 None if !chan_closed => {
6133 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
6134 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
6135 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6137 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6143 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6144 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6145 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6146 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6148 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
6150 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6152 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6153 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6154 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6155 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6156 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6157 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6160 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6161 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
6162 self.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
6165 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6166 channel_id: self.channel_id,
6167 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6170 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6171 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6172 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6173 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6174 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6176 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6177 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6184 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6185 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6187 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6190 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
6191 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
6192 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
6193 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
6194 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
6195 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>) {
6196 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
6197 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
6198 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
6199 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6200 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
6202 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
6203 // return them to fail the payment.
6204 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6205 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
6206 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
6208 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
6209 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
6214 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
6215 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
6216 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
6217 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
6218 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
6219 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
6220 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
6221 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
6222 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
6223 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
6224 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6225 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6226 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
6231 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6232 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6233 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
6236 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6237 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6238 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6240 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6241 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6245 .chain(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6249 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6250 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6252 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6258 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6259 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6260 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6261 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6262 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6264 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6265 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6266 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6267 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6273 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6274 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6275 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6276 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6277 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6278 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6283 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6284 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6285 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6286 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6288 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6289 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6290 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6291 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6296 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6297 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6298 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6299 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6300 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6301 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6306 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6307 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6308 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6311 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6313 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6314 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6315 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6316 let user_id_low = self.user_id as u64;
6317 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6319 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6320 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6321 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6322 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6324 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6325 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6326 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6328 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6330 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6331 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6332 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6333 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6334 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6335 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6337 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6338 // deserialized from that format.
6339 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6340 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6341 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6343 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6345 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6346 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6347 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6349 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6350 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6351 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6352 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6355 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6356 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6357 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6360 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6361 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6362 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6363 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6365 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6366 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6368 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6370 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6372 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6374 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6377 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6379 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6384 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6386 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6387 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6388 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6389 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6390 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6391 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6392 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6394 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6396 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6398 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6401 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6402 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6403 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6406 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6408 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6409 preimages.push(preimage);
6411 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6412 reason.write(writer)?;
6414 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6416 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6417 preimages.push(preimage);
6419 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6420 reason.write(writer)?;
6425 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6426 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6428 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6430 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6431 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6432 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6433 source.write(writer)?;
6434 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6436 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6438 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6439 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6441 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6443 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6444 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6449 match self.resend_order {
6450 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6451 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6454 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6455 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6456 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6458 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6459 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6460 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6461 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6464 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6465 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6466 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6467 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6468 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6471 if self.is_outbound() {
6472 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6473 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6474 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6476 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6477 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6478 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6480 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6482 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6483 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6484 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6485 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6487 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6488 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6489 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6490 // consider the stale state on reload.
6493 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6494 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6495 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6497 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6498 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6499 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6501 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6502 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6504 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6505 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6506 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6508 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6509 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6511 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6514 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6515 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6516 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6518 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6521 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6522 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6524 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6525 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6526 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6528 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6530 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6532 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6534 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6535 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6536 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6537 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6538 htlc.write(writer)?;
6541 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6542 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6543 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6545 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6546 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6548 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6549 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6550 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6551 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6552 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6553 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6554 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6556 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6557 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6558 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6559 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6560 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6562 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6563 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6565 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6566 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6567 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6568 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6570 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6572 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6573 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6574 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6575 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6576 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6577 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6578 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6580 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6581 (2, chan_type, option),
6582 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6583 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6584 (5, self.config, required),
6585 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6586 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6587 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6588 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6589 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6590 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6591 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6592 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6593 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6594 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6595 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6596 (27, self.channel_keys_id, required),
6597 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6598 (29, self.temporary_channel_id, option),
6599 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6606 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6607 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6609 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6610 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6612 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6613 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6614 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6616 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6617 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6618 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6619 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6621 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6623 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6624 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6625 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6626 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6627 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6629 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6630 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6633 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6634 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6635 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6637 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6639 let mut keys_data = None;
6641 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6642 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6643 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6644 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6645 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6646 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6647 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6648 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6649 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6650 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6654 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6655 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6656 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6659 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6661 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6662 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6663 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6665 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6667 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6668 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6669 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6670 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6671 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6672 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6673 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6674 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6675 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6676 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6677 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6678 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6679 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6684 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6685 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6686 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6687 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6688 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6689 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6690 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6691 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6692 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6693 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6694 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6695 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6697 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6698 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6701 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6702 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6705 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6706 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6708 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6713 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6714 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6715 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6716 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6717 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6718 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6719 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6720 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6721 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6722 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6724 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6725 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6726 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6728 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6729 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6730 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6732 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6736 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6737 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6738 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6739 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6742 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6743 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6744 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6746 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6747 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6748 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6749 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6752 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6753 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6754 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6755 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6758 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6760 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6762 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6763 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6764 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6765 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6767 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6768 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6769 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6770 // consider the stale state on reload.
6771 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6774 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6775 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6776 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6778 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6781 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6782 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6783 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6785 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6786 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6787 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6788 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6790 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6791 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6793 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6794 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6796 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6797 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6798 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6800 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6802 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6803 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6805 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6806 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6809 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6811 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6812 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6813 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6814 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6816 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6819 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6820 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6822 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6824 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6825 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6827 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6828 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6830 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6832 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6833 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6834 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6836 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6837 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6838 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6842 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6843 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6844 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6846 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6852 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6853 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6854 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6855 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6856 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6857 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6858 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6859 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6860 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6861 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6863 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6864 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6865 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6866 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6867 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6868 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
6869 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
6871 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
6872 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6873 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6874 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
6876 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6877 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6878 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6879 (2, channel_type, option),
6880 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6881 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6882 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6883 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6884 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6885 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6886 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6887 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
6888 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
6889 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
6890 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6891 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6892 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6893 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6894 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
6895 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6896 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
6897 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6900 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
6901 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6902 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
6903 // required channel parameters.
6904 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
6905 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
6906 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
6908 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
6910 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
6911 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6912 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
6913 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
6916 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
6917 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
6918 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6920 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6921 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6923 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6924 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6929 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
6930 if iter.next().is_some() {
6931 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6935 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
6936 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6937 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
6938 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
6939 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
6942 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6943 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6945 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
6946 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
6947 // separate u64 values.
6948 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
6950 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
6955 config: config.unwrap(),
6959 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
6960 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
6961 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6964 temporary_channel_id,
6966 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
6968 channel_value_satoshis,
6970 latest_monitor_update_id,
6973 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6976 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6977 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6980 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6981 pending_inbound_htlcs,
6982 pending_outbound_htlcs,
6983 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
6987 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
6988 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
6989 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
6990 monitor_pending_forwards,
6991 monitor_pending_failures,
6992 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
6995 holding_cell_update_fee,
6996 next_holder_htlc_id,
6997 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
6998 update_time_counter,
7001 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7002 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7003 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7004 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7006 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7007 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7008 closing_fee_limits: None,
7009 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7011 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
7013 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7014 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7016 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7018 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7019 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7020 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7021 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7022 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7023 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7024 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7025 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7026 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7029 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7031 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7032 funding_transaction,
7034 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7035 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7036 counterparty_node_id,
7038 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7042 channel_update_status,
7043 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7047 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7048 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7049 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7050 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7052 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7054 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7055 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7056 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7058 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7059 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7061 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7062 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7064 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7067 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
7075 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7076 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7077 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7078 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7079 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7081 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7082 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7084 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7085 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
7086 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7087 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7088 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7089 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7090 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7091 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7092 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7093 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7094 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7095 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7096 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7097 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7098 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
7099 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7100 use crate::util::test_utils;
7101 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
7102 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7103 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7104 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7105 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7106 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7107 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7108 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7109 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7110 use crate::prelude::*;
7112 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7115 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7116 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7122 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7123 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7124 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7125 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7129 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7130 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7131 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7132 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7133 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7134 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
7135 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7139 signer: InMemorySigner,
7142 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7143 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7146 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7147 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7149 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7150 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7153 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7157 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7159 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
7160 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7161 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7162 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7163 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
7166 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
7167 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7168 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7169 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
7173 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7174 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7175 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7179 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7180 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7181 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7182 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7184 let seed = [42; 32];
7185 let network = Network::Testnet;
7186 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7187 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7188 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7191 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7192 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7193 let config = UserConfig::default();
7194 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7195 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7196 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7198 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7199 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7203 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7204 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7206 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7207 let original_fee = 253;
7208 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7209 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7210 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7211 let seed = [42; 32];
7212 let network = Network::Testnet;
7213 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7215 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7216 let config = UserConfig::default();
7217 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7219 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7220 // same as the old fee.
7221 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7222 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7223 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7227 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7228 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7229 // dust limits are used.
7230 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7231 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7232 let seed = [42; 32];
7233 let network = Network::Testnet;
7234 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7235 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7237 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7238 // they have different dust limits.
7240 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7241 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7242 let config = UserConfig::default();
7243 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7245 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7246 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7247 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7248 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7249 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7251 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7252 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7253 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7254 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7255 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7257 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7258 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7259 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7261 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7262 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7263 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7264 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7267 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7269 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7270 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7271 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7272 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7273 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7274 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7275 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7276 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7277 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7281 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7282 // the dust limit check.
7283 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7284 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7285 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7286 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7288 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7289 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7290 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7291 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7292 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7293 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7294 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7298 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7299 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7300 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7301 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7302 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7303 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7304 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7305 let seed = [42; 32];
7306 let network = Network::Testnet;
7307 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7309 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7310 let config = UserConfig::default();
7311 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7313 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
7314 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
7316 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7317 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7318 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7319 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7320 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7321 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7323 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7324 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7325 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7326 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7327 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7329 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7331 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7332 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7333 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7334 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7335 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7337 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7338 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7339 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7340 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7341 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7345 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7346 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7347 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7348 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7349 let seed = [42; 32];
7350 let network = Network::Testnet;
7351 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7352 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7353 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7355 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7357 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7358 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7359 let config = UserConfig::default();
7360 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7362 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7363 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7364 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7365 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7367 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7368 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7369 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7371 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7372 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7373 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7374 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7376 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7377 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7378 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7380 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7381 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
7383 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7384 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7385 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7386 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7387 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7388 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7389 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7390 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7391 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7396 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7398 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7399 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7400 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7401 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7402 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7403 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7404 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7411 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7412 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7413 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7414 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7415 let seed = [42; 32];
7416 let network = Network::Testnet;
7417 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7418 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7419 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7421 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7422 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7423 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7424 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7425 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7426 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7427 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7428 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7430 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7431 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7432 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7433 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7434 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7435 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7437 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7438 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7439 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7440 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7442 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7444 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7445 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7446 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7447 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7448 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7449 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7451 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7452 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7453 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7454 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7456 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7457 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7458 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7459 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7460 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7462 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7463 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7465 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7466 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7467 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7469 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7470 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7471 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7472 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7473 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7475 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7476 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7478 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7479 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7480 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7484 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7486 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7487 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7488 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7490 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7491 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7492 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7493 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7495 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7496 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7497 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7499 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7501 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7502 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7505 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7506 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7507 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7508 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7509 let seed = [42; 32];
7510 let network = Network::Testnet;
7511 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7512 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7513 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7516 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7517 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7518 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7520 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7521 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7523 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7524 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7525 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7527 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7528 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7530 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7532 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7533 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7535 // Channel Negotiations failed
7536 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7537 assert!(result.is_err());
7542 fn channel_update() {
7543 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7544 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7545 let seed = [42; 32];
7546 let network = Network::Testnet;
7547 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7548 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7550 // Create a channel.
7551 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7552 let config = UserConfig::default();
7553 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7554 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7555 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7556 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7558 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7559 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7560 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7562 short_channel_id: 0,
7565 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7566 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7567 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7569 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7570 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7572 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7574 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7576 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7577 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7578 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7579 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7581 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7582 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7583 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7585 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7589 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
7591 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7592 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7593 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7594 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7595 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7596 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7597 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7598 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7599 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7600 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7601 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7602 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7603 use crate::sync::Arc;
7605 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7606 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7607 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7608 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7610 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7612 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7613 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7614 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7615 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7616 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7618 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7619 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7625 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7626 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7627 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7629 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7630 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7631 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7632 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7633 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7634 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7636 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7638 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7639 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7640 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7641 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7642 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7643 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7645 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7646 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7647 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7648 selected_contest_delay: 144
7650 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7651 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7653 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7654 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7656 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7657 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7659 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7660 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7662 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7663 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7664 // build_commitment_transaction.
7665 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7666 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7667 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7668 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7669 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7671 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7672 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7673 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7674 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7678 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7679 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7680 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7681 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7685 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7686 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7687 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7689 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7690 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7692 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7693 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7695 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7697 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7698 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7699 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7700 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7701 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7702 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7703 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7705 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7706 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7707 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7708 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7710 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7711 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7712 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7714 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7716 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7717 commitment_tx.clone(),
7718 counterparty_signature,
7719 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7720 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7721 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7723 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7724 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7726 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7727 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7728 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7730 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7731 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7734 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7735 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7737 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7738 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7739 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7740 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7741 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7742 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7743 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7744 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7746 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7749 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7750 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7751 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7755 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7758 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7759 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7760 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7762 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7763 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7764 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7765 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7766 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7767 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7768 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7769 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7771 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7775 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
7776 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
7777 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
7778 "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", {});
7780 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7781 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7783 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7784 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7785 "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", {});
7787 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7788 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7789 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7790 "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", {});
7792 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7793 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7795 amount_msat: 1000000,
7797 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7798 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7800 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7803 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7804 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7806 amount_msat: 2000000,
7808 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7809 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7811 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7814 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7815 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7817 amount_msat: 2000000,
7819 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7820 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7821 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7823 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7826 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7827 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7829 amount_msat: 3000000,
7831 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7832 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7833 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7835 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7838 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7839 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7841 amount_msat: 4000000,
7843 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7844 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7846 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7850 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7851 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7852 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7854 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7855 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7856 "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", {
7859 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7860 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7861 "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" },
7864 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7865 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7866 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b01000000000000000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f89600401483045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
7869 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7870 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7871 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b02000000000000000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d4335201483045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
7874 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7875 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7876 "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" },
7879 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7880 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7881 "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" }
7884 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7885 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7886 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7888 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7889 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7890 "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", {
7893 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7894 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7895 "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" },
7898 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
7899 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
7900 "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" },
7903 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
7904 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
7905 "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" },
7908 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
7909 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
7910 "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" },
7913 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
7914 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
7915 "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" }
7918 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7919 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7920 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
7922 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
7923 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
7924 "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", {
7927 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
7928 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
7929 "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" },
7932 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
7933 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
7934 "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" },
7937 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
7938 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
7939 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf1020000000000000000010b0a0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc62553298901483045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e226079601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
7942 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
7943 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
7944 "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" }
7947 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7948 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7949 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
7950 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
7952 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
7953 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
7954 "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", {
7957 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
7958 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
7959 "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" },
7962 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
7963 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
7964 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320003000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e83483045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac6851b2756800000000" },
7967 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
7968 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
7969 "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" },
7972 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
7973 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
7974 "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" }
7977 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7978 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7979 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
7980 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7982 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
7983 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
7984 "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", {
7987 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
7988 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
7989 "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" },
7992 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
7993 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
7994 "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" },
7997 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
7998 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
7999 "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" },
8002 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8003 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8004 "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" }
8007 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8008 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8009 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8011 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8012 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8013 "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", {
8016 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8017 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8018 "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" },
8021 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8022 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8023 "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" },
8026 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8027 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8028 "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" }
8031 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8032 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8033 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8035 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8036 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8037 "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", {
8040 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8041 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8042 "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" },
8045 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8046 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8047 "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" },
8050 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8051 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8052 "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" }
8055 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8056 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8057 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8059 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8060 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8061 "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", {
8064 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8065 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8066 "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" },
8069 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8070 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8071 "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" }
8074 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8075 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8076 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8077 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8079 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8080 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8081 "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", {
8084 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8085 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8086 "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" },
8089 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8090 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8091 "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" }
8094 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8095 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8096 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8097 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8099 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8100 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8101 "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", {
8104 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8105 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8106 "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" },
8109 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8110 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8111 "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" }
8114 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8115 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8116 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8118 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8119 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8120 "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", {
8123 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8124 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8125 "0200000000010120060e4a29579d429f0f27c17ee5f1ee282f20d706d6f90b63d35946d8f3029a0000000000000000000175050000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a01483045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8128 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8129 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8130 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8131 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8133 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8134 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8135 "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", {
8138 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8139 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8140 "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" }
8143 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8144 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8145 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8146 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8148 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8149 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8150 "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", {
8153 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8154 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8155 "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" }
8158 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8159 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8160 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8161 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8163 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8164 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8165 "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", {});
8167 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8168 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8169 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8170 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8172 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8173 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8174 "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", {});
8176 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8177 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8178 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8179 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8181 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8182 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8183 "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", {});
8185 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8186 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8187 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8189 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8190 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8191 "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", {});
8193 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8194 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8195 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8196 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8198 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8199 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8200 "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", {});
8202 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8203 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8204 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8205 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8207 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8208 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8209 "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", {});
8211 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8212 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8213 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8214 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8215 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8216 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8218 amount_msat: 2000000,
8220 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8221 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8223 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8226 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8227 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8228 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8230 amount_msat: 5000001,
8232 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8233 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8234 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8236 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8239 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8240 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8242 amount_msat: 5000000,
8244 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8245 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8246 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8248 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8252 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8253 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8254 "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", {
8257 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8258 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8259 "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" },
8261 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8262 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8263 "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" },
8265 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8266 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8267 "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" }
8270 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8271 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8272 "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", {
8275 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8276 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8277 "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" },
8279 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8280 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8281 "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" },
8283 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8284 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8285 "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" }
8290 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8291 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8293 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8294 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8295 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8296 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8298 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8299 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8300 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8302 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8303 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8305 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8306 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8308 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8309 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8310 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8314 fn test_key_derivation() {
8315 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8316 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8318 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8319 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8321 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8322 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8324 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8325 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8327 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8328 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8330 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8331 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8333 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8334 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8336 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8337 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8341 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8342 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8343 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8344 let seed = [42; 32];
8345 let network = Network::Testnet;
8346 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8347 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8349 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8350 let config = UserConfig::default();
8351 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8352 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8354 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8355 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8357 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8358 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8359 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8360 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8361 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8362 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8363 assert!(res.is_ok());
8368 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8369 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8370 // resulting `channel_type`.
8371 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8372 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8373 let network = Network::Testnet;
8374 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8375 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8377 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8378 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8380 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8381 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8383 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8384 // need to signal it.
8385 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8386 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8387 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8390 assert!(!channel_a.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8392 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8393 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8394 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8396 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8397 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8398 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8401 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8402 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8403 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8404 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8405 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8408 assert_eq!(channel_a.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8409 assert_eq!(channel_b.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8414 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8415 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8416 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8417 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8418 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8419 let network = Network::Testnet;
8420 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8421 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8423 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8424 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8426 let config = UserConfig::default();
8428 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8429 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8430 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8431 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8432 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8434 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8435 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8436 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8439 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8440 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8441 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8443 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8444 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8445 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8446 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8447 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8448 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8450 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8455 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8456 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8458 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8459 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8460 let network = Network::Testnet;
8461 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8462 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8464 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8465 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8467 let config = UserConfig::default();
8469 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8470 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8471 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8472 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8473 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8474 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8475 assert!(simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8476 assert!(simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8478 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8479 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8480 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8481 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8482 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8483 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8486 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8487 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8489 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8490 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8491 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8492 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8494 assert!(res.is_err());
8496 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8497 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8498 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8500 let mut channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8501 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8502 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8505 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8507 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8508 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8509 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8510 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8513 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8514 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8516 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8517 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8519 assert!(res.is_err());