1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, SigHashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use ln::channelmanager::{CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
34 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
35 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS};
36 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
37 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
38 use util::events::ClosureReason;
39 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
40 use util::logger::Logger;
41 use util::errors::APIError;
42 use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
43 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
47 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
49 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", debug_assertions))]
51 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
54 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
55 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
56 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
57 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
58 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
59 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
60 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
62 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
65 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
67 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
69 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
70 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
71 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
72 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
73 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
74 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
76 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
80 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
81 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
82 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
83 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
86 enum InboundHTLCState {
87 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
88 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
89 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
90 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
91 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
92 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
93 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
94 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
95 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
96 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
97 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
98 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
99 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
100 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
101 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
103 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
104 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
105 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
106 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
107 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
108 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
109 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
110 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
111 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
112 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
113 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
114 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
115 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
116 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
118 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
119 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
120 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
121 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
122 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
123 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
124 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
125 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
127 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
128 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
130 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
131 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
132 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
133 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
134 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
135 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
136 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
137 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
140 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
144 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
145 state: InboundHTLCState,
148 enum OutboundHTLCState {
149 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
150 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
151 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
152 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
153 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
154 /// money back (though we won't), and,
155 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
156 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
157 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
158 /// we'll never get out of sync).
159 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
160 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
161 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
163 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
164 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
165 RemoteRemoved(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
166 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
167 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
168 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
169 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
170 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
171 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
172 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
173 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
174 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
175 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
176 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
177 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
180 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
184 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
185 state: OutboundHTLCState,
189 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
190 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
191 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
195 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
197 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
200 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
205 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
209 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
210 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
211 /// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
212 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
213 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
214 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
215 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
217 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
218 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
219 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
220 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
221 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
222 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
223 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
225 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
226 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The FundingLocked flags are set to indicate when we
227 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
229 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a funding_locked message.
230 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
231 TheirFundingLocked = 1 << 4,
232 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a funding_locked message.
233 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
234 OurFundingLocked = 1 << 5,
236 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
237 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
239 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
240 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
241 /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
242 /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
243 MonitorUpdateFailed = 1 << 8,
244 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
245 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
246 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
247 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
249 /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
250 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
251 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
252 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
253 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
254 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
255 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
256 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
257 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
258 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
259 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
260 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
262 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
263 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
265 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
267 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
268 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
269 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
270 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
271 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
272 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
273 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
274 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
276 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
278 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
280 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
284 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
290 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
293 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
294 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
295 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
296 holding_cell_msat: u64,
297 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
300 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
301 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
302 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
303 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
304 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
305 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
306 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
307 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
308 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
311 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
312 struct HTLCCandidate {
314 origin: HTLCInitiator,
318 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
326 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
328 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
330 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
331 htlc_value_msat: u64,
332 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
337 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
338 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
339 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
340 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
341 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
343 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
344 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
345 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
346 htlc_value_msat: u64,
347 /// The update_fulfill message and commitment_signed message (if the claim was not placed
348 /// in the holding cell).
349 msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>,
351 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
352 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
356 /// The return value of `revoke_and_ack` on success, primarily updates to other channels or HTLC
358 pub(super) struct RAAUpdates {
359 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
360 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
361 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
362 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
363 pub monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
364 pub holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>,
367 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
368 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
369 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
370 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
371 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
372 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
373 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
374 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
375 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
376 pub funding_locked: Option<msgs::FundingLocked>,
379 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
380 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
381 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
382 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
383 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
384 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
385 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
386 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
387 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
388 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
389 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
391 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
393 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
395 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
396 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
397 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
398 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
400 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
401 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
402 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
403 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
405 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
406 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
407 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
408 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
409 const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
411 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
412 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
413 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
416 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
417 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
418 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
419 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
420 pub(crate) config: ChannelConfig,
421 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
422 config: ChannelConfig,
426 channel_id: [u8; 32],
428 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
429 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
431 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
433 holder_signer: Signer,
434 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
435 destination_script: Script,
437 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
438 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
439 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
441 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
442 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
443 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
444 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
445 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
446 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
448 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
449 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
450 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
451 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
452 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
453 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
455 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
457 monitor_pending_funding_locked: bool,
458 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
459 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
460 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
461 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
462 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
464 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
466 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
467 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
468 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
469 // HTLCs with similar state.
470 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
471 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
472 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
473 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
474 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
475 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
476 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
477 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
478 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
479 update_time_counter: u32,
482 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
483 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
484 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
485 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
486 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
487 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
489 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
490 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
492 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
493 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
494 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
495 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
497 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
498 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
500 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
502 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
504 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
505 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
506 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
507 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
508 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
509 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
510 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
511 channel_creation_height: u32,
513 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
515 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
517 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
519 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
521 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
522 //get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
523 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
524 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
525 // get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sats: u64): u64
526 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
527 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
529 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
531 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
532 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
533 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
535 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
537 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
538 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
540 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
541 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
542 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
544 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
546 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
548 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
549 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
550 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
551 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
553 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
554 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
555 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
557 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
558 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
559 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
561 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
562 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
563 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
564 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
565 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
566 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
567 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
568 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
570 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
571 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
572 /// funding_locked *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
573 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the funding_locked
574 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
576 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
577 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::FundingLocked>,
579 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
580 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
581 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
582 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
583 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
584 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
585 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
586 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
588 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
589 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
592 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
593 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
595 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
596 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
597 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
601 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
604 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
606 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
608 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
610 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
612 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
614 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
616 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1 << 24;
618 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
619 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
620 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
621 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
622 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
623 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
625 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
626 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
628 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
629 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
630 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
631 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
632 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
634 /// See https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/905 for more details.
635 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
637 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
638 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
639 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
640 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
644 CloseDelayBroadcast(String),
647 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
648 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
650 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
651 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
652 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
653 &ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(ref e) => write!(f, "CloseDelayBroadcast : {}", e)
658 macro_rules! secp_check {
659 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
662 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
667 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
668 // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
669 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
670 channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
673 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
676 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
677 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
678 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
679 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
682 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
683 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
687 pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(
688 fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
689 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32
690 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
691 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
692 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
694 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay;
695 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, channel_value_satoshis);
696 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
698 if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
699 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, channel_value_satoshis)});
701 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
702 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
703 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
705 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
706 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
708 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis);
709 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
710 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
713 let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
715 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
716 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
718 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_options.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
719 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
722 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
723 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
724 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
730 config: config.channel_options.clone(),
732 channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
733 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
735 channel_value_satoshis,
737 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
740 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
741 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
743 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
744 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
745 value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
747 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
748 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
749 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
750 pending_update_fee: None,
751 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
752 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
753 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
754 update_time_counter: 1,
756 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
758 monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
759 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
760 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
761 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
762 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
763 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
765 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
766 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
767 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
768 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
770 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
771 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
772 closing_fee_limits: None,
773 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
775 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
776 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
777 short_channel_id: None,
778 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
780 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
781 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
782 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
783 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
784 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
785 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
786 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
787 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
788 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
790 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
792 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
793 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
794 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
795 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
796 counterparty_parameters: None,
797 funding_outpoint: None,
800 funding_transaction: None,
802 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
803 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
804 counterparty_node_id,
806 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
808 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
810 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
811 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
813 announcement_sigs: None,
815 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
816 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
817 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
818 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
820 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
822 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
823 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
825 // We currently only actually support one channel type, so don't retry with new types
826 // on error messages. When we support more we'll need fallback support (assuming we
827 // want to support old types).
828 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(),
832 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
833 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
835 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
836 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
837 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
839 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
840 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
841 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
842 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
843 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
844 fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
845 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
846 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
851 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
852 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
853 pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref>(
854 fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
855 msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32
856 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
857 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
858 F::Target: FeeEstimator
860 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
861 // support this channel type.
862 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
863 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
864 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
866 if *channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
867 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood".to_owned()));
871 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_counterparty_init(&their_features)
873 if !channel_type.supports_static_remote_key() {
874 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
877 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
878 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
879 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
880 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
881 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
882 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
883 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
884 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
886 let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
888 if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
889 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
892 // Check sanity of message fields:
893 if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
894 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, msg.funding_satoshis)));
896 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
897 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
899 let funding_value = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
900 if msg.push_msat > funding_value {
901 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than funding value {}", msg.push_msat, funding_value)));
903 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
904 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
906 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
907 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus; channel reserve ({}) is less than dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
909 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
910 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
911 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
913 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
915 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
916 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
917 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
919 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
920 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
922 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
923 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
926 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
927 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
928 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
930 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
931 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
933 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
934 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
936 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
937 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
939 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
940 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
942 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
943 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
945 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
946 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
949 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
951 let announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
952 if config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
953 if local_config.announced_channel != announce {
954 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
957 // we either accept their preference or the preferences match
958 local_config.announced_channel = announce;
960 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
962 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
963 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
964 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
966 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
967 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
969 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
970 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
973 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
974 // for full fee payment
975 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
976 let lower_limit = background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
977 if funders_amount_msat < lower_limit {
978 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Insufficient funding amount ({}) for initial commitment. Must be at least {}", funders_amount_msat, lower_limit)));
981 let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
982 let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
983 if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
984 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment".to_owned()));
987 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
988 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
989 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
990 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
991 if script.len() == 0 {
994 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
995 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1000 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1001 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1002 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1007 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_options.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1008 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
1011 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1012 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1013 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1017 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1018 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
1020 let chan = Channel {
1022 config: local_config,
1024 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1025 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1028 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1031 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1032 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
1034 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1035 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1036 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1038 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1039 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1040 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1041 pending_update_fee: None,
1042 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1043 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1044 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1045 update_time_counter: 1,
1047 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1049 monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
1050 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1051 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1052 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1053 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1054 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1056 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1057 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1058 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1059 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1061 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1062 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1063 closing_fee_limits: None,
1064 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1066 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1067 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1068 short_channel_id: None,
1069 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1071 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1072 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1073 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1074 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1075 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1076 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1077 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1078 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1079 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1080 minimum_depth: Some(config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth),
1082 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1084 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1085 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1086 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
1087 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1088 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1089 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1090 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1092 funding_outpoint: None,
1095 funding_transaction: None,
1097 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1098 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1099 counterparty_node_id,
1101 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1103 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1105 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1106 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1108 announcement_sigs: None,
1110 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1111 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1112 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1113 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1115 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1117 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1118 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1126 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1127 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1128 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1129 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1130 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1132 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1133 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1134 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1135 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1136 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1137 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1138 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1140 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1141 where L::Target: Logger
1143 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1144 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1145 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1147 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1148 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1149 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1150 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1152 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1153 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1154 if match update_state {
1155 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1156 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1157 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1158 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1159 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1161 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1165 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1166 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1167 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1168 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1170 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1171 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1172 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1174 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1175 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1176 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1177 transaction_output_index: None
1182 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1183 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1184 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1185 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1186 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
1187 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1188 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1190 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1191 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1194 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1195 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
1196 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1197 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1199 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1200 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1206 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1207 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1208 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1209 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1210 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1211 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1212 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1216 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1217 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1219 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1221 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1222 if generated_by_local {
1223 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1224 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1233 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1234 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1235 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1236 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1237 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1238 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1239 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1243 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1244 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1246 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1248 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None)|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) => {
1249 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1251 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(None) => {
1252 if !generated_by_local {
1253 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1261 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1262 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1263 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1264 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1265 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1266 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1267 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1268 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1270 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1272 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1273 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1274 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1275 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1277 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1279 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1280 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1281 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
1282 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1285 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len());
1286 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1287 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1289 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee_sat as i64)
1292 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1293 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1294 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1295 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1297 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1300 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1301 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1306 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1307 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1312 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1314 let channel_parameters =
1315 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1316 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1317 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1320 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1325 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1328 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1329 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1330 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1331 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1333 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1334 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1335 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1343 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1344 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1349 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1350 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1351 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1352 // outside of those situations will fail.
1353 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1357 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1362 1 + // script length (0)
1366 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1367 2 + // witness marker and flag
1368 1 + // witness element count
1369 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1370 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1371 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1372 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1373 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1374 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1376 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1377 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1378 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1384 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1385 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1386 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1387 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1389 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1390 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1391 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1393 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1394 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1395 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1396 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1397 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1398 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1401 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1402 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1405 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1406 value_to_holder = 0;
1409 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1410 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1411 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1412 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1414 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1415 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1418 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1419 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1423 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1424 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1425 /// our counterparty!)
1426 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1427 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1428 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1429 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1430 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1431 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1432 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1434 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1438 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1439 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1440 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1441 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1442 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1443 //may see payments to it!
1444 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1445 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1446 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1448 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1451 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1452 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1453 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1454 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1455 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1458 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1459 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1460 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1461 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1463 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1464 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1466 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1468 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1470 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1471 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1472 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1474 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1475 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1476 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1477 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1478 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1480 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1481 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1482 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1484 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1485 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1487 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1490 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1491 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1495 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1499 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1500 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1501 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1502 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1503 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1504 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1507 // Now update local state:
1509 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1510 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1511 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1512 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1513 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1514 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1515 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1519 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1520 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1521 match pending_update {
1522 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1523 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1524 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1525 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1526 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1527 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1528 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1531 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1532 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1533 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1534 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1535 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1536 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1537 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1543 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1544 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1545 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1547 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1548 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1549 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1551 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1552 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1555 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1556 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1558 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1559 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1561 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1562 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1565 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1568 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1569 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1570 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1571 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1576 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, (ChannelError, ChannelMonitorUpdate)> where L::Target: Logger {
1577 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1578 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(update_fulfill_htlc) } => {
1579 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = match self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger) {
1580 Err(e) => return Err((e, monitor_update)),
1583 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1584 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1585 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1586 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1587 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)) })
1589 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } =>
1590 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: None }),
1591 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {}),
1595 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1596 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1597 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1598 /// before we fail backwards.
1599 /// If we do fail twice, we debug_assert!(false) and return Ok(None). Thus, will always return
1600 /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1601 pub fn get_update_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1602 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1603 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1605 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1607 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1608 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1609 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1611 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1612 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1613 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1615 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1616 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1617 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1619 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1624 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1625 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1631 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1632 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1633 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
1634 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
1635 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1639 // Now update local state:
1640 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1641 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1642 match pending_update {
1643 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1644 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1645 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1646 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1650 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1651 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1652 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1653 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1659 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1660 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1661 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1667 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1669 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1670 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
1673 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1674 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1675 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1680 // Message handlers:
1682 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1683 // Check sanity of message fields:
1684 if !self.is_outbound() {
1685 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
1687 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
1688 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
1690 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
1691 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1693 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
1694 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
1696 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1697 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? channel_reserve_satoshis was ({}). dust_limit is ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1699 let remote_reserve = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1700 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > remote_reserve {
1701 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, remote_reserve)));
1703 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1704 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1705 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1707 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1708 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
1709 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
1711 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1712 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1714 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1715 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1718 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1719 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1720 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1722 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1723 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1725 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1726 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1728 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1729 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1731 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1732 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1734 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1735 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1737 if msg.minimum_depth > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth {
1738 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
1740 if msg.minimum_depth == 0 {
1741 // Note that if this changes we should update the serialization minimum version to
1742 // indicate to older clients that they don't understand some features of the current
1744 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum confirmation depth must be at least 1".to_owned()));
1747 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1748 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1749 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1750 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1751 if script.len() == 0 {
1754 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1755 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
1757 Some(script.clone())
1760 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1761 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1762 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1767 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
1768 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
1769 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
1770 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
1771 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
1772 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
1774 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1775 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1776 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1777 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1778 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1779 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1782 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1783 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1784 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1787 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
1788 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
1790 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
1795 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1796 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1798 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1799 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
1801 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1802 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1803 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1804 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
1805 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
1806 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
1807 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
1808 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1809 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
1812 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1813 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
1815 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1816 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1817 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
1818 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1820 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
1821 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
1823 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
1824 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
1827 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1828 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1831 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1832 if self.is_outbound() {
1833 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
1835 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
1836 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
1837 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
1839 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
1841 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1842 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1843 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1844 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1847 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
1848 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
1849 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
1850 // funding_created_signature may fail.
1851 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
1853 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
1855 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
1856 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
1857 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
1860 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
1861 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
1862 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
1866 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1867 initial_commitment_tx,
1870 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1871 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1874 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx)
1875 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
1877 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
1879 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1880 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1881 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1882 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
1883 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1884 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1885 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
1886 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1887 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1889 holder_commitment_tx, best_block);
1891 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1893 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1894 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
1895 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1896 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1898 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1900 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
1901 channel_id: self.channel_id,
1903 }, channel_monitor))
1906 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
1907 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
1908 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Transaction), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1909 if !self.is_outbound() {
1910 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
1912 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
1913 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
1915 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1916 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1917 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1918 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1921 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1923 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1924 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
1925 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1926 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1928 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
1929 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1931 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1932 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
1934 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1935 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1936 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1937 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
1938 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
1939 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
1943 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1944 initial_commitment_tx,
1947 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1948 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1951 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx)
1952 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
1955 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1956 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
1957 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1958 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1959 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
1960 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1961 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1962 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
1963 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1964 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1966 holder_commitment_tx, best_block);
1968 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1970 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
1971 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1972 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1973 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1975 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1977 Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap()))
1980 pub fn funding_locked<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1981 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1982 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
1983 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
1986 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1988 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
1989 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
1990 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
1991 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1992 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1993 } else if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
1994 // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
1995 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
1996 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) ||
1997 // If we reconnected before sending our funding locked they may still resend theirs:
1998 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) ==
1999 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32)) {
2000 if self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2001 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point".to_owned()));
2003 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
2006 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time".to_owned()));
2009 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2010 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2012 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_locked from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2017 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2018 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2019 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2020 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2026 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2027 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2028 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2029 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2030 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2031 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2032 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2033 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2034 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2037 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2038 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2039 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2040 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2041 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2042 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2044 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2045 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2051 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2052 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2053 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2054 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2055 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2056 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2057 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2058 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2059 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2062 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2063 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2064 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2065 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2066 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2067 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2069 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2070 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2074 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2075 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2076 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2077 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2078 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2079 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2080 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2082 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2083 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2085 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2092 /// Get the available (ie not including pending HTLCs) inbound and outbound balance in msat.
2093 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2094 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2095 /// corner case properly.
2096 pub fn get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(&self) -> (u64, u64) {
2097 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2099 cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2100 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2101 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2102 - Self::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64 * 1000,
2104 cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2105 - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2106 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2111 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2112 (Self::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
2113 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2116 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2117 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2118 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, num_htlcs: usize) -> u64 {
2119 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2120 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2121 (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * self.feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2124 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2125 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2127 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize) -> u64 {
2128 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2131 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2132 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2133 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2135 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2136 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2138 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2139 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2141 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2142 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2144 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2145 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2149 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2150 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2156 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2157 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2158 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2161 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2162 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2163 included_htlcs += 1;
2166 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2167 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2171 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2172 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2173 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2174 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2175 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2176 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2181 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2183 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2184 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2189 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2190 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2194 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2195 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
2196 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2199 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2200 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
2202 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2203 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2204 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2206 total_pending_htlcs,
2207 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2208 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2209 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2211 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2212 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2213 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2215 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2217 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2222 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2223 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2224 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2226 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2227 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2229 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2230 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2232 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2233 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2235 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2236 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2240 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2241 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2247 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2248 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2249 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2250 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2251 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2252 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2255 included_htlcs += 1;
2258 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2259 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2262 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2263 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2265 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2266 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2267 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2272 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2273 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
2274 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2277 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2278 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
2280 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2281 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2283 total_pending_htlcs,
2284 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2285 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2286 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2288 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2289 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2290 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2292 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2294 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2299 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2300 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2301 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2302 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
2303 if local_sent_shutdown {
2304 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2306 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2307 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
2308 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2309 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2311 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2312 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2314 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2315 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2317 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2318 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2320 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2321 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2324 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2325 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2326 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2327 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2329 let holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis);
2330 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2331 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2333 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2334 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2335 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2336 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2337 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2338 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2339 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2340 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2341 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2342 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2343 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2345 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2346 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2347 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None) = htlc.state {
2348 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2349 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) = htlc.state {
2350 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2354 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2355 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2356 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2357 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2358 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2359 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2360 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2364 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2365 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2366 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2367 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2368 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2369 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2370 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2374 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2375 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2376 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2377 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2378 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2379 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2382 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2383 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2384 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2385 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2386 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2388 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2389 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2392 let chan_reserve_msat =
2393 Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000;
2394 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
2395 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2398 if !self.is_outbound() {
2399 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2400 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2401 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2402 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2403 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2404 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2405 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2406 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2407 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2408 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2409 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - chan_reserve_msat < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2410 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2411 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2412 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2413 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2416 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2417 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2418 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2419 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2420 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2423 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2424 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2426 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2427 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2430 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2431 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2432 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2436 // Now update local state:
2437 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2438 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2439 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2440 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2441 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2442 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2443 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2448 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2450 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentHash>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2451 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2452 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2453 match check_preimage {
2455 Some(payment_hash) =>
2456 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2457 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2461 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2462 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2463 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2464 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(fail_reason);
2466 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2467 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2472 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2475 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2476 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2477 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2479 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2480 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2483 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&msg.payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2484 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2487 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2488 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2489 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2491 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2492 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2495 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2499 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2500 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2501 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2503 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2504 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2507 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2511 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
2512 where L::Target: Logger
2514 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2515 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
2517 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2518 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
2520 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2521 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
2524 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2526 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2528 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2529 let commitment_txid = {
2530 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2531 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2532 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2534 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2535 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2536 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2537 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2538 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2539 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2543 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2545 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2546 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2547 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2548 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2551 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2552 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000;
2553 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2554 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
2557 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2559 if self.is_outbound() {
2560 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2561 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2562 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2563 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2564 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2565 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2566 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
2567 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2568 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2569 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
2575 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
2576 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs))));
2579 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
2580 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2581 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2582 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2583 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
2584 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
2585 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2587 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
2588 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
2589 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2590 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2591 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2592 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2593 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2595 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
2597 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
2601 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2602 commitment_stats.tx,
2604 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2605 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2606 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2609 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2610 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx)
2611 .map_err(|_| (None, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())))?;
2612 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
2614 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2615 let mut need_commitment = false;
2616 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
2617 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
2618 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
2619 need_commitment = true;
2623 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2624 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2625 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2626 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2627 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2628 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
2632 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2633 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2634 Some(forward_info.clone())
2636 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2637 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2638 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2639 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2640 need_commitment = true;
2643 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2644 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2645 Some(fail_reason.take())
2647 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2648 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2649 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(fail_reason);
2650 need_commitment = true;
2654 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2655 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
2656 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
2657 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2659 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2660 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
2661 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
2662 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2663 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2664 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
2665 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
2666 // includes the right HTLCs.
2667 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2668 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2669 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2670 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2671 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2672 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2674 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
2675 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2676 return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
2679 let commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2680 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
2681 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
2682 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
2683 let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2684 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2685 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2686 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2687 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2691 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
2692 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if commitment_signed.is_some() { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
2694 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2695 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2696 per_commitment_secret,
2697 next_per_commitment_point,
2698 }, commitment_signed, monitor_update))
2701 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
2702 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
2703 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
2704 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2705 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 &&
2706 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
2707 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
2708 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
2711 /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
2712 /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
2713 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2714 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2715 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
2716 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
2717 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2719 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2720 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
2721 updates: Vec::new(),
2724 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
2725 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
2726 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2727 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2728 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2729 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2730 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2731 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
2732 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
2733 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
2734 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
2735 // to rebalance channels.
2736 match &htlc_update {
2737 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
2738 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), logger) {
2739 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
2742 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
2743 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
2744 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2745 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
2746 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
2747 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
2748 // into the holding cell without ever being
2749 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
2750 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
2751 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
2754 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
2760 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
2761 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
2762 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
2763 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
2764 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
2765 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
2766 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
2767 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
2768 (msg, monitor_update)
2769 } else { unreachable!() };
2770 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
2771 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
2773 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
2774 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), logger) {
2775 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
2776 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
2777 // `get_update_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself
2778 // must not fail - we should never end up in a state where we
2779 // double-fail an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates
2780 // we didn't wait for a full revocation before failing.
2781 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
2784 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2786 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
2793 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
2794 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
2796 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
2797 self.send_update_fee(feerate, logger)
2802 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2803 // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
2804 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
2805 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2806 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2808 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
2809 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
2810 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
2812 Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2814 update_fulfill_htlcs,
2816 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2819 }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
2821 Ok((None, Vec::new()))
2825 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
2826 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
2827 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
2828 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
2829 /// revoke_and_ack message.
2830 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<RAAUpdates, ChannelError>
2831 where L::Target: Logger,
2833 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2834 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2836 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2837 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2839 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2840 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2843 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
2845 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2846 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2847 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
2851 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
2852 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
2853 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
2854 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
2855 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
2856 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
2857 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
2858 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
2859 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
2862 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2864 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2865 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2868 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
2869 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
2871 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
2873 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
2874 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
2875 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2876 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2877 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2878 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
2879 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
2880 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
2884 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2885 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
2886 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
2887 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
2888 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
2889 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2890 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2891 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2893 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2894 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
2895 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
2896 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2897 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2898 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2899 let mut require_commitment = false;
2900 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
2903 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
2904 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
2905 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
2907 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
2908 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2909 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2910 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2911 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2912 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2917 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2918 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) = &htlc.state {
2919 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2920 if let Some(reason) = fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
2921 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
2923 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
2924 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
2925 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2930 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2931 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
2933 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
2937 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2938 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
2940 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
2941 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2942 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
2943 require_commitment = true;
2944 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
2945 match forward_info {
2946 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
2947 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2948 require_commitment = true;
2950 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
2951 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
2952 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
2954 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
2955 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
2956 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
2960 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
2961 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2962 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
2963 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2969 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2970 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2971 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2972 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2974 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2975 Some(fail_reason.take())
2977 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2978 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
2979 require_commitment = true;
2983 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
2985 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2986 match update_state {
2987 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
2988 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
2989 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
2990 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2991 self.pending_update_fee = None;
2993 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
2994 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
2995 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2996 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
2997 require_commitment = true;
2998 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2999 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3004 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
3005 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3006 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3007 if require_commitment {
3008 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3009 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3010 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3011 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3012 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3013 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3014 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3015 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3016 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3018 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3019 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3020 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3021 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3022 return Ok(RAAUpdates {
3023 commitment_update: None, finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3024 accepted_htlcs: Vec::new(), failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3026 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new()
3030 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
3031 (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3032 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
3033 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
3034 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3036 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3037 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3038 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3041 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3042 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3043 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3044 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3047 commitment_update: Some(commitment_update),
3048 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3049 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos,
3050 failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3052 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3055 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3056 if require_commitment {
3057 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3059 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3060 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3061 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3062 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3064 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3065 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3067 commitment_update: Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3068 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3069 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3071 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
3075 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3076 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3077 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3080 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3082 commitment_update: None,
3083 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3084 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3085 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3092 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3093 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3094 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3095 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3096 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
3097 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3098 if !self.is_outbound() {
3099 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3101 if !self.is_usable() {
3102 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3104 if !self.is_live() {
3105 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3108 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3109 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3110 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3111 let keys = if let Ok(keys) = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number) { keys } else { return None; };
3112 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3113 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize) * 1000;
3114 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3115 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3116 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3117 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3121 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3122 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3123 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3124 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3125 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3128 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3129 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3133 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
3134 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3138 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3139 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3141 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3142 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3147 pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3148 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, logger) {
3149 Some(update_fee) => {
3150 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3151 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
3157 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3158 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3160 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3162 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3163 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3164 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3165 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3168 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3169 // will be retransmitted.
3170 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3171 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3172 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3174 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3175 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3177 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3178 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3179 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3180 // this HTLC accordingly
3181 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3184 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3185 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3186 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3187 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3190 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3191 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3192 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3193 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3194 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3195 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3200 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3202 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3203 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3204 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3205 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3209 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3210 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3211 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3212 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3213 // the update upon reconnection.
3214 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3218 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3219 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3222 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
3223 /// updates are partially paused.
3224 /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
3225 /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
3226 /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
3227 /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
3228 pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3229 mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3230 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3231 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3233 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3234 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3235 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3236 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3237 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3238 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
3241 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3242 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3243 /// to the remote side.
3244 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
3245 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
3246 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
3248 let funding_broadcastable = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.is_outbound() {
3249 self.funding_transaction.take()
3252 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateFailed (and
3253 // we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for us to
3254 // do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound
3255 // channel which failed to persist the monitor on funding_created, and we got the funding
3256 // transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted.
3257 let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
3258 assert!(!self.is_outbound(), "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3259 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
3260 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3261 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3262 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3263 next_per_commitment_point,
3267 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3268 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3269 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3270 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3271 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3272 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3274 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3275 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3276 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3277 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3278 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3279 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked
3283 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3284 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3286 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3287 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3290 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3291 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3292 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3293 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3294 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3295 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3296 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3297 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3298 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked
3302 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3303 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3305 if self.is_outbound() {
3306 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3308 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3309 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3311 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
3312 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3314 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3315 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3316 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3317 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3318 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3319 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3320 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3321 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3322 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3323 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3324 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3325 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3326 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3328 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3329 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3330 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3336 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3337 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3338 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3339 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3340 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3341 per_commitment_secret,
3342 next_per_commitment_point,
3346 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3347 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3348 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3349 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3350 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3352 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3353 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3354 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3355 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3356 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3357 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3358 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3359 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3360 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3365 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3366 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3368 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3369 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3370 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3371 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3372 reason: err_packet.clone()
3375 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3376 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3377 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3378 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3379 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3380 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3383 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3384 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3385 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3386 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3387 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3394 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3395 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3396 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3397 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3401 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3402 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3403 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3404 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3405 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3406 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3410 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3411 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3412 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3413 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3414 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3415 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3416 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3417 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3420 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3421 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3422 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3425 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3426 match msg.data_loss_protect {
3427 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
3428 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3429 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3430 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3431 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3432 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3434 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3435 return Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(
3436 "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting".to_owned()
3440 OptionalField::Absent => {}
3444 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3445 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3446 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3448 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3449 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3450 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3451 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3452 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3456 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3457 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any funding_locked's.
3458 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == 0 ||
3459 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3460 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3461 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet".to_owned()));
3463 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3464 return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3467 // We have OurFundingLocked set!
3468 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3469 return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3470 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3471 next_per_commitment_point,
3472 }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3475 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3476 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3477 // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
3479 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3480 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3481 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3484 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3487 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3490 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3491 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3492 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3493 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3494 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
3496 let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3497 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
3498 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3499 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3500 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3501 next_per_commitment_point,
3505 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3506 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3507 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3509 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3512 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
3513 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
3514 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
3515 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
3517 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3518 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
3519 Err(ChannelError::Warn(_)) | Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) | Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) =>
3520 panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
3521 Ok((Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3522 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(monitor_update), self.resend_order.clone(), htlcs_to_fail, shutdown_msg));
3524 Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3525 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), htlcs_to_fail, shutdown_msg));
3529 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3531 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3532 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3533 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3535 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3538 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3539 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3540 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3543 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)), None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3545 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3549 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
3550 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
3551 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
3552 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F) -> (u64, u64)
3553 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3555 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
3557 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
3558 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
3559 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
3560 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3561 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3562 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
3564 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
3565 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
3566 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
3567 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
3568 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
3570 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
3571 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
3572 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
3573 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
3576 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
3577 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
3578 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
3579 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
3580 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
3581 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
3582 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
3583 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3584 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
3585 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
3586 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
3587 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
3588 // target feerate-calculated fee.
3589 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
3590 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
3592 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
3595 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
3596 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
3599 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
3600 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
3601 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
3602 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
3603 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
3604 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
3605 self.channel_state &
3606 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
3607 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)
3608 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
3609 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
3612 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
3613 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
3614 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
3615 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3616 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
3617 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
3618 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
3620 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
3626 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L)
3627 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
3628 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3630 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
3631 return Ok((None, None));
3634 if !self.is_outbound() {
3635 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
3636 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
3638 return Ok((None, None));
3641 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
3643 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3644 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
3645 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
3646 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
3648 let sig = self.holder_signer
3649 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3650 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
3652 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
3653 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3654 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3655 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
3657 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
3658 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
3659 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
3664 pub fn shutdown<K: Deref>(
3665 &mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
3666 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
3667 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>
3669 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3670 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3672 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3673 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
3674 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
3675 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
3676 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
3678 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3679 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3680 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3683 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3685 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
3686 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3689 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
3690 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
3691 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3694 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
3697 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
3698 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
3699 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
3700 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3702 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
3705 assert!(send_shutdown);
3706 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
3707 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
3708 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
3710 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
3715 // From here on out, we may not fail!
3717 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
3718 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3720 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
3721 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3722 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3723 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3724 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
3725 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3729 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
3730 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3731 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3732 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3736 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
3737 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
3738 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
3739 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
3740 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3741 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3743 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
3744 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3751 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3752 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3754 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
3757 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
3758 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
3760 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
3762 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
3763 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
3764 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
3765 tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3766 tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3768 tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3769 tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3771 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3772 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3774 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
3778 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
3779 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3781 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
3782 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
3784 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3785 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3787 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
3788 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3790 if msg.fee_satoshis > 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
3791 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
3794 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
3795 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
3798 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 != 0 {
3799 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
3800 return Ok((None, None));
3803 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3804 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
3805 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
3806 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
3808 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
3810 match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
3813 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
3814 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
3815 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
3816 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
3817 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
3821 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
3822 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
3823 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
3827 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3828 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3829 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
3830 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3831 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3832 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3833 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
3837 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
3839 macro_rules! propose_fee {
3840 ($new_fee: expr) => {
3841 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
3842 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
3844 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
3847 let sig = self.holder_signer
3848 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3849 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3851 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
3852 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3853 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3854 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3858 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
3859 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3860 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3861 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
3863 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
3864 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
3865 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
3871 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
3872 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
3873 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
3875 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
3876 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
3878 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
3879 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
3882 if !self.is_outbound() {
3883 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
3884 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
3885 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
3886 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
3888 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
3889 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
3890 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
3892 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
3893 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
3896 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
3897 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
3898 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3899 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
3900 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
3901 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
3902 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
3903 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
3905 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
3908 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
3909 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
3910 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
3911 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
3913 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
3917 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
3918 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
3919 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
3920 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
3922 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
3928 // Public utilities:
3930 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
3934 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
3938 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
3939 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
3940 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
3944 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
3945 /// is_usable() returns true).
3946 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3947 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
3948 self.short_channel_id
3951 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
3952 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
3953 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
3954 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
3957 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
3958 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
3961 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3962 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
3965 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
3966 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
3967 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
3970 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3971 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
3974 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3975 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3976 self.counterparty_node_id
3979 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3981 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3982 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
3985 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3986 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3988 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
3989 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
3990 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
3991 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
3993 Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis)
3997 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3998 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3999 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4002 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4003 self.channel_value_satoshis
4006 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4007 self.config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4010 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4011 cmp::max(self.config.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4014 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4015 self.config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4018 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
4022 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4023 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4024 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4025 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4026 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4027 // which are near the dust limit.
4028 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4029 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4030 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4031 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4032 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4034 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4035 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4037 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4040 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4041 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4044 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4045 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4048 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4049 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4053 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4058 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4060 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4061 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4062 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4063 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4064 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4065 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4067 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4069 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4077 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4078 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4082 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4083 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
4084 self.update_time_counter
4087 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4088 self.latest_monitor_update_id
4091 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
4092 self.config.announced_channel
4095 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
4096 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
4099 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
4100 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4101 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
4102 self.config.forwarding_fee_base_msat
4105 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
4106 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
4107 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
4110 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
4111 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4112 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
4113 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
4114 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
4117 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
4118 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
4119 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4120 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
4121 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
4124 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4125 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4126 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4127 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
4130 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
4131 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
4132 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
4135 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4136 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4137 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4140 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4141 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4142 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4145 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4146 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4147 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4148 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4149 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4150 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4155 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4156 self.channel_update_status
4159 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4160 self.channel_update_status = status;
4163 fn check_get_funding_locked(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::FundingLocked> {
4164 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4168 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4169 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4170 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4173 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4177 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4178 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4179 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
4181 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
4182 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4183 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4185 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
4186 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4188 } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
4189 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
4191 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4195 if need_commitment_update {
4196 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
4197 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4198 return Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
4199 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4200 next_per_commitment_point,
4203 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
4209 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4210 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4211 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4212 pub fn transactions_confirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData, logger: &L)
4213 -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4214 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4215 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4216 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4217 // If we haven't yet sent a funding_locked, but are in FundingSent (ignoring
4218 // whether they've sent a funding_locked or not), check if we should send one.
4219 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4220 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4221 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4222 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4223 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
4224 if self.is_outbound() {
4225 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4226 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4227 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4228 // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4229 // channel and move on.
4230 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4231 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4233 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4234 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4235 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4237 if self.is_outbound() {
4238 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4239 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4240 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4241 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4242 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4243 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4247 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4248 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4249 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4250 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4251 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4255 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for funding_locked here and
4256 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4257 // may have already happened for this block).
4258 if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) {
4259 log_info!(logger, "Sending a funding_locked to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
4260 return Ok(Some(funding_locked));
4263 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4264 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4265 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4266 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4274 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4275 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4276 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4277 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4279 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4280 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4283 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4285 pub fn best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, logger: &L)
4286 -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4287 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4288 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4289 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4291 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4292 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4294 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4295 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4296 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4304 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4306 if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) {
4307 log_info!(logger, "Sending a funding_locked to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
4308 return Ok((Some(funding_locked), timed_out_htlcs));
4311 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4312 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 ||
4313 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32 {
4314 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4315 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4316 // Note that check_get_funding_locked may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4317 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4318 // indicate we've already sent a funding_locked
4319 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4322 // If we've sent funding_locked (or have both sent and received funding_locked), and
4323 // the funding transaction's confirmation count has dipped below minimum_depth / 2,
4324 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4325 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4326 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap() as i64 / 2 {
4327 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
4328 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
4329 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
4331 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
4332 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
4333 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
4334 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
4335 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
4336 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32, 0);
4337 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
4340 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs))
4343 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4344 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4345 /// before the channel has reached funding_locked and we can just wait for more blocks.
4346 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4347 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4348 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4349 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4350 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4351 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4352 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4353 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4354 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
4355 match self.best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, logger) {
4356 Ok((funding_locked, timed_out_htlcs)) => {
4357 assert!(funding_locked.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
4358 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
4364 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
4369 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
4370 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
4372 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
4373 if !self.is_outbound() {
4374 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
4376 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
4377 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
4380 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4381 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
4384 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4385 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
4389 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
4390 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
4391 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
4392 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
4393 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
4394 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
4395 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
4396 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
4397 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
4398 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
4399 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
4400 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
4401 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
4402 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
4403 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
4404 first_per_commitment_point,
4405 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
4406 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4407 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
4408 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
4410 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
4414 pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
4415 if self.is_outbound() {
4416 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
4418 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
4419 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
4421 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4422 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
4425 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4426 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
4428 msgs::AcceptChannel {
4429 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
4430 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
4431 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
4432 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
4433 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
4434 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
4435 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
4436 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
4437 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
4438 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
4439 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
4440 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
4441 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
4442 first_per_commitment_point,
4443 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4444 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
4445 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
4450 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
4451 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4452 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
4453 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
4454 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4455 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
4458 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
4459 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
4460 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
4461 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
4462 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
4463 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
4464 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
4465 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4466 if !self.is_outbound() {
4467 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
4469 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
4470 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
4472 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
4473 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4474 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4475 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
4478 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
4479 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
4481 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
4484 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
4485 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
4490 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
4492 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
4494 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
4495 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
4496 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
4498 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
4499 temporary_channel_id,
4500 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
4501 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
4506 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
4507 /// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
4508 /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
4509 /// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
4510 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
4512 /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
4513 /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
4515 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
4516 pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
4517 if !self.config.announced_channel {
4518 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
4520 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
4521 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked".to_owned()));
4523 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
4524 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing".to_owned()));
4527 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
4529 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4530 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
4532 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4533 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
4534 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
4535 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
4536 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
4537 excess_data: Vec::new(),
4540 let sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&msg, &self.secp_ctx)
4541 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4546 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
4548 fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, msghash: secp256k1::Message, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, our_bitcoin_sig: Signature) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
4549 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
4550 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
4552 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, our_node_secret);
4553 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
4554 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
4555 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
4556 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
4557 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
4558 contents: announcement,
4561 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
4565 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
4566 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
4567 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
4568 pub fn announcement_signatures(&mut self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
4569 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash)?;
4571 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
4573 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
4574 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4575 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
4576 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
4578 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
4579 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4580 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
4581 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
4584 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
4586 self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_secret, our_node_id, msghash, announcement, our_bitcoin_sig)
4589 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
4590 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
4591 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> {
4592 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash) {
4594 Err(_) => return None,
4596 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
4597 match self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_secret, our_node_id, msghash, announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) {
4598 Ok(res) => Some(res),
4603 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
4604 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
4605 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
4606 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4607 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
4608 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
4609 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
4610 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
4611 // fuzztarget mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
4612 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
4613 // valid, and valid in fuzztarget mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
4614 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
4615 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
4616 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4617 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
4618 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4619 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
4620 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
4621 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
4624 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4625 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
4626 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
4627 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
4630 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
4631 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4632 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
4633 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
4634 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
4635 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
4636 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
4637 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
4639 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
4640 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
4641 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
4642 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
4643 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
4644 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
4645 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
4646 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
4647 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
4649 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
4655 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
4657 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
4658 /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
4660 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
4662 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
4663 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
4665 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateFailed, we cannot commit to a new state as we
4666 /// may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to regenerate
4669 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to calling any other methods on this Channel!
4671 /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
4672 pub fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4673 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
4674 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
4676 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
4677 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
4678 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
4681 if amount_msat == 0 {
4682 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
4685 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
4686 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
4689 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
4690 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
4691 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
4692 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
4693 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
4694 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
4695 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
4696 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
4699 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4700 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4701 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
4702 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
4704 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4705 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
4706 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
4709 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
4710 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
4711 if !self.is_outbound() {
4712 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
4713 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4714 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4715 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000;
4716 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
4717 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
4721 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
4722 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
4723 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
4724 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4725 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
4726 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
4730 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
4731 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
4732 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
4733 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4734 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
4735 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
4739 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
4740 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
4741 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
4744 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
4745 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
4746 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4747 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
4749 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
4750 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
4753 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
4754 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
4755 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
4756 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
4757 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
4760 // Now update local state:
4761 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
4762 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4767 onion_routing_packet,
4772 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4773 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
4775 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4777 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
4781 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4782 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4783 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
4787 onion_routing_packet,
4789 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
4794 /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
4795 /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
4796 /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
4797 /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
4798 pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4799 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
4800 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
4802 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
4803 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
4805 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
4806 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
4808 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
4809 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
4811 let mut have_updates = self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
4812 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4813 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4814 have_updates = true;
4816 if have_updates { break; }
4818 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4819 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
4820 have_updates = true;
4822 if have_updates { break; }
4825 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
4827 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
4829 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
4830 fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4831 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
4832 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
4833 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
4835 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4836 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
4837 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
4839 if let Some(state) = new_state {
4840 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
4844 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4845 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
4846 Some(fail_reason.take())
4848 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
4849 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
4852 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4853 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
4854 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
4855 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4856 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4857 self.pending_update_fee = None;
4860 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
4862 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
4863 Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
4864 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4865 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
4866 htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
4867 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
4869 Err(e) => return Err(e),
4872 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4873 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4874 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4875 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
4876 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
4877 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
4878 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4879 their_revocation_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
4882 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
4883 Ok((res, monitor_update))
4886 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
4887 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
4888 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4889 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
4890 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
4891 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
4892 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
4894 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4896 if !self.is_outbound() {
4897 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
4898 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4899 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
4900 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
4901 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
4902 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
4903 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
4904 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
4905 let actual_fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs);
4906 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
4913 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
4914 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
4918 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4919 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
4921 htlc_signatures = res.1;
4923 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
4924 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
4925 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
4926 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4928 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
4929 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
4930 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
4931 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
4932 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
4933 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4937 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
4938 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4941 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
4944 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
4945 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
4946 /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
4948 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4949 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, logger)? {
4950 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
4951 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
4952 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
4958 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
4959 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
4960 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
4963 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4964 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
4965 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
4967 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
4968 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
4969 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
4970 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
4976 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
4977 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
4978 pub fn get_shutdown<K: Deref>(&mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>)
4979 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
4980 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
4981 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4982 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4983 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
4986 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
4987 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
4988 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
4990 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
4991 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
4994 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4995 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
4996 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
4999 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5002 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
5003 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5004 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5006 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5011 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5012 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5013 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5014 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5016 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5018 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5020 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5021 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5022 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5023 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5024 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5025 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5029 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5030 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5031 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5034 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5035 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5036 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5037 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5038 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5040 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5041 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5048 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5051 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
5052 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
5053 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
5054 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
5055 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
5056 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
5057 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
5058 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
5059 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
5060 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5061 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
5063 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
5064 // return them to fail the payment.
5065 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5066 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
5068 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
5069 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
5074 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5075 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
5076 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
5077 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
5078 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
5079 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
5080 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
5081 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
5082 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
5083 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5084 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5085 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5086 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
5091 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5092 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5093 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
5097 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
5098 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5100 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
5106 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
5107 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5108 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
5109 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
5110 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
5112 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
5113 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
5114 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
5115 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
5121 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
5122 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5123 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5124 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5125 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
5126 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5131 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
5132 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5133 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
5136 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5138 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
5140 // Write out the old serialization for the config object. This is read by version-1
5141 // deserializers, but we will read the version in the TLV at the end instead.
5142 self.config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
5143 self.config.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
5144 self.config.announced_channel.write(writer)?;
5145 self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
5147 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
5148 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
5149 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
5151 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
5153 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
5154 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
5155 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
5156 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
5157 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
5158 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
5160 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
5161 // deserialized from that format.
5162 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
5163 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
5164 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
5166 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
5168 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
5169 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
5170 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
5172 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
5173 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5174 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5175 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
5178 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
5179 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5180 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
5183 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5184 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
5185 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
5186 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5188 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
5189 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
5191 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
5193 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
5195 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
5197 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
5200 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
5202 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
5207 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5208 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5209 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5210 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
5211 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
5212 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5213 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
5215 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
5217 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
5219 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
5222 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
5223 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
5224 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
5227 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref fail_reason) => {
5229 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
5231 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) => {
5233 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
5238 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5239 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
5241 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
5243 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
5244 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
5245 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5246 source.write(writer)?;
5247 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
5249 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
5251 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
5252 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5254 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
5256 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5257 err_packet.write(writer)?;
5262 match self.resend_order {
5263 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
5264 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
5267 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked.write(writer)?;
5268 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
5269 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
5271 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5272 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
5273 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
5274 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5277 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5278 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
5279 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
5280 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5281 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
5284 if self.is_outbound() {
5285 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
5286 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5287 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
5289 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
5290 // commitment_signed, drop it.
5291 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
5293 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
5295 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5296 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
5297 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
5298 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
5300 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
5301 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
5302 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
5303 // consider the stale state on reload.
5306 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
5307 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
5308 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
5310 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
5311 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
5312 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
5314 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
5315 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
5317 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
5318 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
5319 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
5321 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
5322 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
5324 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
5327 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
5328 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
5329 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
5331 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
5334 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
5335 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
5337 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
5338 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
5339 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
5341 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
5343 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
5345 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
5347 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5348 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5349 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5350 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
5351 htlc.write(writer)?;
5354 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
5355 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
5356 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
5358 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5359 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
5361 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5362 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
5363 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
5364 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
5365 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
5366 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
5367 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
5369 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
5370 (2, chan_type, option),
5371 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
5372 (5, self.config, required),
5373 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
5374 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
5375 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
5376 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
5383 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
5384 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a K, u32)> for Channel<Signer>
5385 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
5386 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a K, u32)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5387 let (keys_source, serialized_height) = args;
5388 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5390 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5392 let mut config = Some(ChannelConfig::default());
5394 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
5395 config.as_mut().unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
5396 config.as_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
5397 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
5398 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5400 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
5401 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5404 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5405 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
5406 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
5408 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5410 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5411 let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
5412 while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
5413 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
5414 let mut data = [0; 1024];
5415 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
5416 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
5417 keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
5419 let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
5421 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
5422 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
5423 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
5426 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
5428 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
5429 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
5430 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
5432 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5433 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
5434 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
5435 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
5436 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5437 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
5438 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
5439 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
5440 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5441 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
5442 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
5443 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5444 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
5445 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5450 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5451 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
5452 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
5453 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5454 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5455 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
5456 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
5457 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
5458 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
5459 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5460 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
5461 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5462 2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
5463 3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Readable::read(reader)?),
5464 4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
5465 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5470 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5471 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
5472 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
5473 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5474 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5475 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
5476 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
5477 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
5478 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
5479 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
5481 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
5482 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
5483 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5485 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
5486 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5487 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
5489 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5493 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5494 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5495 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
5496 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5499 let monitor_pending_funding_locked = Readable::read(reader)?;
5500 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
5501 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
5503 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5504 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
5505 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
5506 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
5509 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5510 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
5511 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
5512 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
5515 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
5517 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
5519 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5520 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5521 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
5522 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
5524 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
5525 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
5526 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
5527 // consider the stale state on reload.
5528 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5531 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5532 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5533 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
5535 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5538 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
5539 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
5540 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5542 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
5543 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
5544 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
5545 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
5547 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
5548 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
5550 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
5551 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5553 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
5554 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
5555 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
5557 let mut minimum_depth = None;
5559 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
5560 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
5562 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
5563 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5566 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5568 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5569 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
5570 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
5571 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
5573 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5576 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
5577 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
5579 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
5581 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
5582 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5584 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5585 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
5587 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
5589 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5590 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
5591 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5593 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5594 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
5595 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
5599 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
5600 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
5601 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
5603 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
5609 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
5610 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
5611 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
5612 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
5613 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
5614 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
5615 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
5616 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5617 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
5618 (1, minimum_depth, option),
5619 (2, channel_type, option),
5620 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
5621 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
5622 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
5623 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
5624 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
5625 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
5628 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
5629 if chan_features.supports_unknown_bits() || chan_features.requires_unknown_bits() {
5630 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
5631 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
5632 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
5635 if channel_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() {
5636 // Relax this check when ChannelTypeFeatures supports anchors.
5637 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5640 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5641 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5646 config: config.unwrap(),
5650 channel_value_satoshis,
5652 latest_monitor_update_id,
5655 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5658 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5659 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5662 pending_inbound_htlcs,
5663 pending_outbound_htlcs,
5664 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
5668 monitor_pending_funding_locked,
5669 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
5670 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
5671 monitor_pending_forwards,
5672 monitor_pending_failures,
5673 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
5676 holding_cell_update_fee,
5677 next_holder_htlc_id,
5678 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
5679 update_time_counter,
5682 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5683 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
5684 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5685 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
5687 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5688 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5689 closing_fee_limits: None,
5690 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
5692 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
5693 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
5695 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
5697 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
5698 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5699 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5700 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5701 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
5702 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5703 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
5706 counterparty_forwarding_info,
5708 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
5709 funding_transaction,
5711 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
5712 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
5713 counterparty_node_id,
5715 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5719 channel_update_status,
5720 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5724 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5725 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5726 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5727 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5729 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5731 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5732 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
5734 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
5741 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
5742 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
5743 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
5744 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, SigHashType};
5745 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
5746 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
5747 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
5748 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
5750 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
5751 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentId};
5752 use ln::channel::{Channel,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLCCandidate,HTLCInitiator,TxCreationKeys};
5753 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
5754 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
5755 use ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate};
5756 use ln::script::ShutdownScript;
5758 use ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
5759 use chain::BestBlock;
5760 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
5761 use chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeysInterface, BaseSign};
5762 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
5763 use util::config::UserConfig;
5764 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
5765 use util::errors::APIError;
5766 use util::test_utils;
5767 use util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
5768 use util::logger::Logger;
5769 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message, Signature, All};
5770 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
5771 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
5772 use bitcoin::secp256k1::recovery::RecoverableSignature;
5773 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5774 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5775 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, WPubkeyHash};
5776 use core::num::NonZeroU8;
5780 struct TestFeeEstimator {
5783 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
5784 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
5790 fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
5791 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
5792 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis in existence");
5796 signer: InMemorySigner,
5798 impl KeysInterface for Keys {
5799 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
5801 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
5802 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
5803 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
5804 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5805 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
5806 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
5809 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
5810 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
5811 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5812 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
5815 fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemorySigner {
5818 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
5819 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
5820 fn sign_invoice(&self, _invoice_preimage: Vec<u8>) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> { panic!(); }
5823 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
5824 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
5828 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
5829 let features = InitFeatures::known().clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
5830 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
5831 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(NonZeroU8::new(16).unwrap(), &[0, 40]).unwrap();
5833 let seed = [42; 32];
5834 let network = Network::Testnet;
5835 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5836 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
5837 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
5840 let fee_estimator = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 };
5841 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5842 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5843 let config = UserConfig::default();
5844 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0) {
5845 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
5846 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
5848 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
5849 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
5853 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
5854 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
5856 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
5857 let original_fee = 253;
5858 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
5859 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5860 let seed = [42; 32];
5861 let network = Network::Testnet;
5862 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5864 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5865 let config = UserConfig::default();
5866 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0).unwrap();
5868 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
5869 // same as the old fee.
5870 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
5871 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
5872 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
5876 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
5877 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
5878 // dust limits are used.
5879 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5880 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5881 let seed = [42; 32];
5882 let network = Network::Testnet;
5883 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5885 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
5886 // they have different dust limits.
5888 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
5889 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5890 let config = UserConfig::default();
5891 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0).unwrap();
5893 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
5894 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
5895 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
5896 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
5897 let node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0).unwrap();
5899 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
5900 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
5901 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
5902 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, &InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
5903 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
5905 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
5906 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
5907 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
5909 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
5910 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
5911 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
5912 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5915 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5917 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
5918 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
5919 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
5920 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5921 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
5923 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5924 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
5925 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
5926 payment_secret: None,
5931 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
5932 // the dust limit check.
5933 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5934 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5935 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
5936 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
5938 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
5939 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
5940 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
5941 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(3);
5942 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5943 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5944 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
5948 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
5949 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
5950 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
5951 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
5952 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
5953 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 };
5954 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5955 let seed = [42; 32];
5956 let network = Network::Testnet;
5957 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5959 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5960 let config = UserConfig::default();
5961 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0).unwrap();
5963 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
5964 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(1);
5966 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
5967 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
5968 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
5969 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5970 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5971 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
5973 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
5974 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
5975 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
5976 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5977 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
5979 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
5981 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
5982 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
5983 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5984 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5985 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
5987 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
5988 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
5989 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
5990 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5991 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
5995 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
5996 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5997 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5998 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5999 let seed = [42; 32];
6000 let network = Network::Testnet;
6001 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
6002 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
6003 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6005 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
6007 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
6008 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6009 let config = UserConfig::default();
6010 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0).unwrap();
6012 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
6013 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
6014 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
6015 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0).unwrap();
6017 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
6018 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
6019 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, &InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
6021 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
6022 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
6023 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
6024 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
6026 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
6027 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
6028 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&logger).unwrap();
6030 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
6031 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&logger);
6033 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
6034 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
6035 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
6036 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
6037 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
6038 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
6039 match msg.data_loss_protect {
6040 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
6041 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
6046 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
6048 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
6049 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
6050 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
6051 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
6052 match msg.data_loss_protect {
6053 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
6054 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
6061 fn channel_update() {
6062 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
6063 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6064 let seed = [42; 32];
6065 let network = Network::Testnet;
6066 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
6067 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6069 // Create a channel.
6070 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6071 let config = UserConfig::default();
6072 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0).unwrap();
6073 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
6074 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
6075 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
6077 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
6078 let update = ChannelUpdate {
6079 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
6081 short_channel_id: 0,
6084 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
6085 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
6086 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
6088 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
6089 excess_data: Vec::new(),
6091 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
6093 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
6095 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
6096 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
6097 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
6098 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
6100 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
6101 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
6102 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
6104 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
6109 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
6110 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
6111 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
6112 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
6113 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6115 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
6117 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
6118 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
6119 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
6120 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
6121 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
6123 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
6124 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
6129 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
6130 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
6131 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
6133 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6134 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
6135 config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
6136 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config, 0).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
6137 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
6138 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
6140 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
6142 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6143 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
6144 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
6145 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
6146 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
6147 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
6149 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
6150 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6151 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
6152 selected_contest_delay: 144
6154 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
6155 signer.ready_channel(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
6157 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
6158 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
6160 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
6161 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
6163 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
6164 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
6166 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
6167 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
6168 // build_commitment_transaction.
6169 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
6170 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6171 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
6172 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
6173 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
6175 macro_rules! test_commitment {
6176 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, {
6177 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
6179 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
6180 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
6182 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
6183 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
6185 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
6187 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
6188 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6189 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
6190 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6191 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
6192 secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).unwrap();
6194 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
6195 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
6196 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
6197 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
6199 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6200 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
6201 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
6203 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
6205 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6206 commitment_tx.clone(),
6207 counterparty_signature,
6208 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
6209 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6210 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6212 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
6213 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
6215 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
6216 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
6217 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
6219 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
6220 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
6223 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6225 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
6226 let opt_anchors = false;
6227 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
6228 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
6229 &htlc, opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
6230 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, opt_anchors, &keys);
6231 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]).unwrap();
6232 secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).unwrap();
6234 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6237 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
6238 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
6239 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
6243 assert!(preimage.is_some());
6246 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
6247 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx), "output index");
6249 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6250 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
6251 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
6252 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
6253 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
6254 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
6255 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
6257 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
6261 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
6262 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
6264 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
6265 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
6266 "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", {});
6268 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
6269 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
6271 amount_msat: 1000000,
6273 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6274 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6276 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
6279 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
6280 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
6282 amount_msat: 2000000,
6284 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6285 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6287 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
6290 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
6291 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
6293 amount_msat: 2000000,
6295 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6296 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6297 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
6299 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
6302 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
6303 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
6305 amount_msat: 3000000,
6307 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6308 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6309 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
6311 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
6314 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
6315 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
6317 amount_msat: 4000000,
6319 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6320 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6322 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
6326 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6327 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6328 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
6330 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
6331 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
6332 "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", {
6335 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
6336 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
6337 "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" },
6340 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
6341 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
6342 "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" },
6345 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
6346 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
6347 "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" },
6350 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
6351 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
6352 "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" },
6355 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
6356 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
6357 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b04000000000000000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b8701483045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
6360 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6361 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6362 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
6364 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
6365 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
6366 "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", {
6369 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
6370 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
6371 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004830450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f014730440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b012000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a914b8bcb07f6344b42ab04250c86a6e8b75d3fdbbc688527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f401b175ac686800000000" },
6374 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
6375 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
6376 "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" },
6379 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
6380 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
6381 "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" },
6384 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
6385 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
6386 "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" },
6389 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
6390 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
6391 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe04000000000000000001da0d0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004830450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca01473044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
6394 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6395 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6396 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
6398 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
6399 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
6400 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8006d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4844e9d6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e90147304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
6403 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
6404 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
6405 "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" },
6408 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
6409 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
6410 "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" },
6413 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
6414 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
6415 "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" },
6418 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
6419 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
6420 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf103000000000000000001d90d0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be01483045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
6423 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6424 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6425 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
6427 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
6428 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
6429 "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", {
6432 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
6433 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
6434 "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" },
6437 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
6438 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
6439 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d0100000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df01483045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
6442 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
6443 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
6444 "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" },
6447 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
6448 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
6449 "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" }
6452 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6453 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6454 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
6456 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
6457 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
6458 "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", {
6461 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
6462 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
6463 "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff0000000000000000000174020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b014730440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e501008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
6466 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
6467 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
6468 "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" },
6471 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
6472 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
6473 "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" }
6476 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6477 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6478 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
6480 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
6481 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
6482 "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", {
6485 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
6486 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
6487 "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" },
6490 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
6491 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
6492 "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" },
6495 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
6496 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
6497 "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" }
6500 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6501 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6502 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
6504 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
6505 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
6506 "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", {
6509 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
6510 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
6511 "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" },
6514 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
6515 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
6516 "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" }
6519 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6520 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6521 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
6523 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
6524 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
6525 "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", {
6528 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
6529 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
6530 "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" },
6533 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
6534 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
6535 "020000000001018db483bff65c70ee71d8282aeec5a880e2e2b39e45772bda5460403095c62e3f0100000000000000000176050000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb58170147304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
6538 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6539 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6540 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
6542 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
6543 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
6544 "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", {
6547 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
6548 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
6549 "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" }
6552 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6553 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6554 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
6556 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
6557 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
6558 "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", {
6561 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
6562 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
6563 "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" }
6566 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6567 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6568 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
6570 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
6571 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
6572 "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", {});
6574 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6575 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6576 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
6578 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
6579 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
6580 "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", {});
6582 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6583 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6584 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
6586 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
6587 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
6588 "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", {});
6590 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
6591 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6592 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
6594 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
6595 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
6596 "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", {});
6598 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
6599 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
6600 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
6601 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
6602 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
6603 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
6605 amount_msat: 2000000,
6607 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6608 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6610 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
6613 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
6614 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
6615 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
6617 amount_msat: 5000000,
6619 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6620 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6621 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
6623 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
6626 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
6627 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
6629 amount_msat: 5000000,
6631 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6632 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6633 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
6635 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
6639 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
6640 "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
6641 "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", {
6644 "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
6645 "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
6646 "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" },
6648 "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
6649 "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
6650 "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" },
6652 "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
6653 "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
6654 "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" }
6659 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
6660 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
6662 let mut seed = [0; 32];
6663 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
6664 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
6665 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
6667 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
6668 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
6669 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
6671 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
6672 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
6674 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
6675 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
6677 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
6678 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
6679 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
6683 fn test_key_derivation() {
6684 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
6685 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6687 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6688 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6690 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
6691 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
6693 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
6694 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
6696 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
6697 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
6699 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
6700 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
6702 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
6703 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
6705 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
6706 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());