1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
76 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
77 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
80 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
82 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
84 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
85 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
86 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
87 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
88 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
89 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
91 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
95 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
96 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
97 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
98 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
101 enum InboundHTLCState {
102 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
103 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
104 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
105 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
106 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
107 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
108 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
109 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
110 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
111 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
112 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
113 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
114 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
115 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
116 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
118 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
119 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
120 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
121 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
122 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
123 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
124 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
125 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
126 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
127 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
128 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
129 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
130 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
131 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
133 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
134 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
135 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
136 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
137 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
138 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
139 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
140 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
142 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
143 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
145 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
146 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
147 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
148 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
149 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
150 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
151 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
152 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
155 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
159 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
160 state: InboundHTLCState,
163 enum OutboundHTLCState {
164 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
165 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
166 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
167 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
168 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
169 /// money back (though we won't), and,
170 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
171 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
172 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
173 /// we'll never get out of sync).
174 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
175 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
176 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
178 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
179 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
180 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
181 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
182 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
183 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
184 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
185 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
186 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
187 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
188 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
189 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
190 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
191 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
192 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
196 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
197 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
198 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
199 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
202 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
203 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
205 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
206 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
211 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
212 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
214 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
215 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
220 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
224 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
225 state: OutboundHTLCState,
227 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
230 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
231 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
232 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
236 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
238 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
239 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
240 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
243 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
248 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
252 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
253 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
254 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
255 /// move on to ChannelReady.
256 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
257 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
258 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
260 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
261 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
262 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
263 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
264 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
265 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
266 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
268 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
269 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
270 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
272 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
273 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
274 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
275 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
276 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
277 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
279 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
280 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
282 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
283 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
284 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
285 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
286 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
287 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
288 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
289 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
290 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
292 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
293 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
294 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
295 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
296 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
297 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
298 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
299 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
300 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
301 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
302 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
303 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
305 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
306 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
308 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
310 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
312 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
313 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
314 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
315 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
319 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
321 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
323 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
325 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
326 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
327 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
328 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
329 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
331 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
332 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
334 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
336 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
337 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
339 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
340 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
341 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
342 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
343 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
344 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
346 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
347 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
349 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
350 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
351 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
352 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
353 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
355 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
356 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
358 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
359 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
361 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
362 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
363 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
364 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
370 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
371 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
373 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
374 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
375 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
380 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
381 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
383 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
384 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
385 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
390 macro_rules! secp_check {
391 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
394 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
399 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
400 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
401 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
402 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
403 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
404 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
405 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
406 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
408 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
410 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
412 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
416 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
418 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
419 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
420 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
422 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
423 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
425 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
426 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
427 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
428 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
429 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
431 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
432 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
436 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
442 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
445 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
446 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
447 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
448 holding_cell_msat: u64,
449 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
452 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
453 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
454 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
455 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
456 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
457 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
458 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
459 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
460 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
461 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
464 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
465 struct HTLCCandidate {
467 origin: HTLCInitiator,
471 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
479 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
481 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
483 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
484 htlc_value_msat: u64,
485 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
490 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
491 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch<'a> {
492 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
493 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
494 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
496 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
497 monitor_update: &'a ChannelMonitorUpdate,
498 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
499 htlc_value_msat: u64,
501 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
502 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
506 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
507 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
508 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
509 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
510 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
511 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
512 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
513 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
514 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
515 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
516 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
519 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
520 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
521 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
522 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
523 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
524 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
525 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
526 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
529 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
530 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
531 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
532 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>
535 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
536 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
537 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
538 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
539 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
540 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
541 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
542 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
543 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
544 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
545 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
546 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
547 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
548 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
549 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
551 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
552 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
553 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
554 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
556 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
557 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
558 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
559 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
561 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
562 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
563 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
564 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
565 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
567 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
568 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
569 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
570 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
572 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
573 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
574 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
576 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
577 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
578 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
579 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
580 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
582 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
583 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
586 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
587 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
589 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
590 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
591 /// In some cases we need to delay letting the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] go until after an
592 /// `Event` is processed by the user. This bool indicates the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] is
593 /// blocked on some external event and the [`ChannelManager`] will update us when we're ready.
595 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
599 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
600 (0, update, required),
601 (2, blocked, required),
604 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
605 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
606 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
608 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
609 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
610 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
611 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
613 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
617 channel_id: [u8; 32],
618 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
621 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
622 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
624 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
625 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
626 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
628 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
629 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
630 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
631 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
633 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
634 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
636 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
638 holder_signer: Signer,
639 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
640 destination_script: Script,
642 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
643 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
644 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
646 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
647 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
648 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
649 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
650 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
651 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
653 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
654 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
655 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
656 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
657 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
658 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
660 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
662 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
663 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
664 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
666 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
667 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
668 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
669 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
670 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
671 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
672 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
674 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
676 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
677 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
678 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
679 // HTLCs with similar state.
680 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
681 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
682 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
683 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
684 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
685 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
686 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
687 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
688 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
691 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
692 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
693 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
695 update_time_counter: u32,
697 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
698 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
699 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
700 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
701 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
702 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
704 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
705 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
707 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
708 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
709 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
710 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
712 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
713 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
715 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
717 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
719 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
720 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
721 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
722 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
723 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
724 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
726 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
727 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
728 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
729 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
730 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
732 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
733 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
734 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
735 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
736 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
737 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
738 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
739 channel_creation_height: u32,
741 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
744 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
746 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
749 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
751 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
754 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
756 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
758 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
759 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
762 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
764 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
766 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
767 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
769 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
771 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
772 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
773 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
775 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
777 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
778 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
780 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
781 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
782 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
784 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
786 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
788 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
789 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
790 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
791 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
793 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
794 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
795 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
797 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
798 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
799 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
801 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
802 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
803 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
804 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
805 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
806 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
807 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
808 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
810 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
811 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
812 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
813 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
814 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
816 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
817 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
819 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
820 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
821 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
822 /// unblock the state machine.
824 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
825 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
826 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
828 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
829 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
830 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
832 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
833 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
834 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
835 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
836 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
837 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
838 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
839 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
841 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
842 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
844 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
845 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
846 // the channel's funding UTXO.
848 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
849 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
850 // associated channel mapping.
852 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
853 // to store all of them.
854 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
856 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
857 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
858 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
859 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
860 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
862 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
863 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
865 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
866 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
868 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
869 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
870 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
872 /// When we generate [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to persist, they may not be persisted immediately.
873 /// If we then persist the [`channelmanager::ChannelManager`] and crash before the persistence
874 /// completes we still need to be able to complete the persistence. Thus, we have to keep a
875 /// copy of the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] here until it is complete.
876 pending_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
879 impl<Signer: ChannelSigner> ChannelContext<Signer> {
880 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
881 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
884 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
885 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
886 self.update_time_counter
889 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
890 self.latest_monitor_update_id
893 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
894 self.config.announced_channel
897 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
898 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
901 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
902 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
903 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
904 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
907 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
908 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
909 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
912 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
913 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
914 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
915 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
916 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
919 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
920 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
921 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
922 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
923 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
928 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
932 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
934 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
935 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
936 self.temporary_channel_id
939 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
943 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
944 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
945 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
949 /// Gets the channel's type
950 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
954 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
955 /// is_usable() returns true).
956 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
957 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
958 self.short_channel_id
961 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
962 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
963 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
966 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
967 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
968 self.outbound_scid_alias
971 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
972 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
973 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
974 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
975 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
978 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
979 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
980 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
981 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
984 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
985 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
986 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
989 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
990 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
991 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
992 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
996 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
999 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1000 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1003 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1004 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1007 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1008 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1009 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1012 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1013 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1016 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1017 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1018 self.counterparty_node_id
1021 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1022 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1023 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1026 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1027 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1028 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1031 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1032 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1034 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1035 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1036 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1037 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1039 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1043 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1044 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1045 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1048 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1049 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1050 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1053 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1054 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1055 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1057 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1058 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1063 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1064 self.channel_value_satoshis
1067 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1068 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1071 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1072 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1075 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1076 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
1079 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1080 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1081 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1084 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1085 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1086 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1089 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1090 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1091 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1094 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1095 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1096 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1099 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1100 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1101 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1104 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1105 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1106 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1109 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1110 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1111 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1112 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1113 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1116 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1118 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1119 self.prev_config = None;
1123 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1124 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1128 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1129 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1130 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1131 let did_channel_update =
1132 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1133 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1134 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1135 if did_channel_update {
1136 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1137 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1138 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1139 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1141 self.config.options = *config;
1145 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
1146 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
1147 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
1150 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1151 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1152 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1153 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1154 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1156 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1157 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1158 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1159 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1160 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1161 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1162 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1164 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1165 where L::Target: Logger
1167 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1168 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1169 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1171 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1172 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1173 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1174 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1176 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1177 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1178 if match update_state {
1179 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1180 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1181 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1182 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1183 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1185 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1189 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1190 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1191 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1192 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1194 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1195 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1196 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1198 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1199 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1200 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1201 transaction_output_index: None
1206 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1207 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1208 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1209 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1210 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1213 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1215 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1216 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1217 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1219 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1220 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1223 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1224 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1227 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1229 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1230 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1231 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1233 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1234 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1240 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1241 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1242 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1243 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1244 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1245 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1246 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1250 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1251 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1253 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1255 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1256 if generated_by_local {
1257 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1258 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1267 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1269 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1270 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1271 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1272 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1273 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1274 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1275 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1278 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1279 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1280 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1281 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1285 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1286 preimages.push(preimage);
1290 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1291 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1293 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1295 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1296 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1298 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1299 if !generated_by_local {
1300 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1308 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1309 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1310 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1311 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1312 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1313 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1314 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1315 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1317 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1319 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1320 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1321 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1322 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1324 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1326 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1327 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1328 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1329 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1332 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1333 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1334 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1335 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1337 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1340 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1341 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1342 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1343 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1345 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1348 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1349 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1354 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1355 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1360 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1362 let channel_parameters =
1363 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1364 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1365 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1368 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1373 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1376 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1377 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1378 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1379 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1381 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1382 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1383 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1391 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1392 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1398 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1399 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1400 /// our counterparty!)
1401 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1402 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1403 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1404 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1405 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1406 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1407 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1409 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1413 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1414 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1415 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1416 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1417 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1418 //may see payments to it!
1419 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1420 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1421 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1423 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1426 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1427 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1428 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1429 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1430 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1433 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1434 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1437 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1441 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1442 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1443 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1444 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1445 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1446 // which are near the dust limit.
1447 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1448 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1449 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1450 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1451 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1453 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1454 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1456 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1459 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1460 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1461 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1464 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1465 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1467 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1468 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1469 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1470 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1471 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1472 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1473 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1476 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1479 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1480 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1481 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1483 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1484 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1485 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1486 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1487 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1488 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1490 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1491 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1497 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1498 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1500 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1501 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1502 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1503 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1504 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1505 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1506 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1509 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1512 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1513 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1514 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1516 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1517 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1518 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1519 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1520 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1521 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1523 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1524 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1528 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1529 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1530 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1531 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1532 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1533 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1534 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1536 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1537 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1539 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1546 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1547 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1548 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1549 /// corner case properly.
1550 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
1551 let context = &self;
1552 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1553 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1554 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1556 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1557 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1558 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1559 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1562 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1564 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1565 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1567 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1569 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1571 if context.is_outbound() {
1572 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1573 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1575 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1576 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1578 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1579 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1580 if !context.opt_anchors() {
1581 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000;
1584 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1585 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1586 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1587 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1589 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1590 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1591 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1592 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
1593 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1594 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1595 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1596 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1597 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1598 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1600 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1603 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1604 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1605 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1606 if !context.opt_anchors() {
1607 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000;
1610 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1611 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1613 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1614 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1615 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1617 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
1618 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1619 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1620 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1624 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1626 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1627 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1628 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1629 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1630 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1631 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1633 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1634 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1636 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1637 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1638 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1640 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1641 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 {
1642 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1643 Some(context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1644 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1647 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1648 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 {
1649 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1650 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1651 context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1652 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1655 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1656 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1657 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1659 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1663 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1664 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1666 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1667 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1671 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1672 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1673 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1674 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1676 outbound_capacity_msat,
1677 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1678 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1683 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1684 let context = &self;
1685 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1688 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1689 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1691 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1692 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1694 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1695 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1697 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1698 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1699 let context = &self;
1700 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1702 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1705 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1706 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1708 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1709 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1711 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1712 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1714 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1715 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1719 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1720 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1726 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1727 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1728 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1731 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1732 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1733 included_htlcs += 1;
1736 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1737 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1741 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1742 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1743 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1744 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1745 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1746 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1751 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1753 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1754 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1759 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1760 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1764 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1765 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, context.opt_anchors());
1766 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1769 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1770 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, context.opt_anchors());
1772 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1773 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1774 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1776 total_pending_htlcs,
1777 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1778 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1779 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1781 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1782 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1783 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1785 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1787 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1792 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1793 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1795 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1796 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1798 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1799 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1801 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1802 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1803 let context = &self;
1804 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1806 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1809 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1810 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1812 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1813 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1815 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1816 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1818 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1819 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1823 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1824 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1830 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1831 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1832 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1833 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1834 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1835 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1838 included_htlcs += 1;
1841 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1842 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1845 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1846 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1848 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1849 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1850 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1855 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1856 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, context.opt_anchors());
1857 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1860 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1861 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, context.opt_anchors());
1863 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1864 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1866 total_pending_htlcs,
1867 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1868 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1869 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1871 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1872 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1873 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1875 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1877 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1882 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
1883 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
1884 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
1885 self.funding_transaction.clone()
1891 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
1892 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
1893 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
1894 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
1895 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
1896 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
1897 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
1898 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
1899 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
1900 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
1901 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
1903 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
1904 // return them to fail the payment.
1905 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
1906 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
1907 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
1909 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
1910 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
1915 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
1916 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
1917 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
1918 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
1919 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
1920 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
1921 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
1922 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
1923 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1924 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
1925 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1926 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1927 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
1932 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
1933 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1934 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
1938 // Internal utility functions for channels
1940 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
1941 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
1942 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
1944 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
1946 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
1947 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
1948 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
1950 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
1953 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
1955 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
1958 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
1959 /// required by us according to the configured or default
1960 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
1962 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
1964 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
1965 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
1966 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
1967 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
1968 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
1971 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
1972 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
1973 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
1974 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
1975 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
1976 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
1977 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
1980 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1981 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1983 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1984 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
1987 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1988 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1989 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1990 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
1991 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
1992 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1995 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
1996 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
1997 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
2000 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2001 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2002 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
2003 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
2006 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2007 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2009 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2010 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2011 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2015 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
2016 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2017 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
2018 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2020 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2021 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2022 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2023 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
2024 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
2025 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
2026 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2027 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2029 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
2030 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
2031 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
2032 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
2033 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
2034 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
2035 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2036 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2038 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2039 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2043 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2049 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2050 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2051 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2052 // outside of those situations will fail.
2053 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2057 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2062 1 + // script length (0)
2066 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2067 2 + // witness marker and flag
2068 1 + // witness element count
2069 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2070 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2071 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2072 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2073 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2074 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2076 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2077 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2078 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2084 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2085 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2086 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2087 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2089 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2090 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2091 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2093 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2094 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2095 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2096 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2097 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2098 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2101 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2102 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2105 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2106 value_to_holder = 0;
2109 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2110 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2111 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2112 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2114 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2115 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2118 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2119 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2122 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2125 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2126 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2128 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2130 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2131 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2132 where L::Target: Logger {
2133 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2134 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2135 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2136 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2137 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2138 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2139 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2140 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2144 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2145 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2146 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2147 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2149 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2150 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2152 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2154 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
2156 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2157 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2158 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2160 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2161 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2162 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2163 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2164 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
2166 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2167 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2168 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2170 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2171 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2173 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2176 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2177 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2181 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2185 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2186 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2187 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2188 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2189 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2190 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2193 // Now update local state:
2195 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2196 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2197 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2198 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2199 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2200 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2201 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2205 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2206 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2207 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2208 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2209 // do not not get into this branch.
2210 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2211 match pending_update {
2212 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2213 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2214 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2215 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2216 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2217 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2218 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2221 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2222 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2223 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2224 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2225 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2226 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2227 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2233 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), self.context.channel_state);
2234 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2235 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2237 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2238 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2239 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2241 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2242 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2245 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2246 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2248 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2249 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2251 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2252 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2255 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2258 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2259 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2260 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2261 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2266 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2267 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
2268 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2269 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2270 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2271 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2272 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2273 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2274 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2275 let unblocked_update_pos = if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2276 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2277 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2278 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2279 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2280 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2281 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2282 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2284 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len() - 1
2286 let insert_pos = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd.blocked)
2287 .unwrap_or(self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len());
2288 let new_mon_id = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.get(insert_pos)
2289 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2290 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2291 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.insert(insert_pos, PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2292 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2294 for held_update in self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter_mut().skip(insert_pos + 1) {
2295 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2298 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2299 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2300 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2301 update, blocked: true,
2306 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2307 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
2308 monitor_update: &self.context.pending_monitor_updates.get(unblocked_update_pos)
2309 .expect("We just pushed the monitor update").update,
2313 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2317 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2318 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2319 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2320 /// before we fail backwards.
2322 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2323 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2324 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2325 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2326 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2327 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2328 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2331 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2332 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2333 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2334 /// before we fail backwards.
2336 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2337 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2338 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2339 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2340 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2341 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2342 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2344 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2346 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2347 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2348 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2350 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2351 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2352 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2354 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2355 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2356 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2358 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2363 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2364 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2370 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2371 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2372 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2373 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2374 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2378 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2379 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2380 force_holding_cell = true;
2383 // Now update local state:
2384 if force_holding_cell {
2385 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2386 match pending_update {
2387 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2388 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2389 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2390 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2394 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2395 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2396 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2397 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2403 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2404 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2405 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2411 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2413 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2414 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2417 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2418 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2419 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2424 // Message handlers:
2426 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2427 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2428 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2429 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2430 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2432 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2435 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2436 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2438 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2439 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2441 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2442 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2443 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2444 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2447 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2449 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2450 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2451 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2452 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2454 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2455 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2457 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2458 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2460 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2461 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2462 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2463 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2464 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2465 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2469 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2470 initial_commitment_tx,
2473 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2474 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2477 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2478 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2481 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2482 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2483 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2484 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2485 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2486 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2487 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2488 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2489 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2490 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2491 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2492 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2494 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2496 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2498 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2499 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2500 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2501 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2503 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2505 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2506 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2510 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2511 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2513 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2514 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2515 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2516 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2518 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2521 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2522 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2523 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2526 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2527 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2528 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2529 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2530 // when routing outbound payments.
2531 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2535 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2537 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2538 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2539 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2540 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2541 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2542 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2543 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2544 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2545 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2547 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2548 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2549 let expected_point =
2550 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2551 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2553 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2554 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2555 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2556 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2557 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2558 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2560 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2561 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2562 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2563 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2564 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2566 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2567 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2571 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2574 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2575 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2577 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2579 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2582 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2583 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2584 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2585 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2586 if local_sent_shutdown {
2587 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2589 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2590 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2591 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2592 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2594 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2595 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2597 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2598 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2600 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2601 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2603 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2604 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2607 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2608 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2609 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2610 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2612 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2613 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2615 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2616 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2617 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2618 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2619 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2620 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2621 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2622 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2623 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2624 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2625 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2627 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2628 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2629 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2630 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2631 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2632 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2636 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.opt_anchors() {
2639 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2640 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2641 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2643 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2644 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2645 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2646 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2647 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2648 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2649 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2653 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2654 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2655 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2656 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2657 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2658 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2659 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2663 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2664 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2665 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2666 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2667 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2668 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2671 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2672 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2673 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2674 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2675 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2677 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2678 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2681 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2682 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2685 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2686 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2687 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2688 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2689 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2690 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2691 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2692 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2693 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2694 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2695 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2696 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2697 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2698 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2699 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2700 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2703 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2704 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2705 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2706 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2707 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2710 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2711 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2713 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2714 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2717 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2718 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2719 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2723 // Now update local state:
2724 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2725 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2726 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2727 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2728 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2729 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2730 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2735 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2737 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2738 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2739 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2740 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2741 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2742 None => fail_reason.into(),
2743 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2744 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2745 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2746 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2748 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2752 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2753 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2754 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2755 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2757 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2758 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2763 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2766 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2767 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2768 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2770 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2771 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2774 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2777 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2778 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2779 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2781 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2782 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2785 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2789 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2790 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2791 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2793 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2794 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2797 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2801 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
2802 where L::Target: Logger
2804 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2805 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2807 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2808 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2810 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2811 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2814 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2816 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2818 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2819 let commitment_txid = {
2820 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2821 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2822 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2824 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2825 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2826 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2827 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2828 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2829 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2833 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2835 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2836 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2837 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
2838 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2841 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2842 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2843 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2844 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
2847 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2849 if self.context.is_outbound() {
2850 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2851 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2852 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2853 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2854 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2855 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2856 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
2857 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2858 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
2859 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
2865 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
2866 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
2869 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
2870 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
2871 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
2872 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
2873 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
2874 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
2875 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
2876 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
2877 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
2878 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
2879 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
2880 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
2881 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
2884 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2885 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2886 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2887 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2888 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
2889 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(),
2890 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2892 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(), &keys);
2893 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
2894 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
2895 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2896 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2897 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2898 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2899 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2901 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2902 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
2905 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
2907 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2908 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
2909 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
2912 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
2915 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2916 commitment_stats.tx,
2918 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2919 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2920 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2923 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
2924 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2926 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2927 let mut need_commitment = false;
2928 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
2929 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
2930 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
2931 need_commitment = true;
2935 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2936 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2937 Some(forward_info.clone())
2939 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2940 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2941 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2942 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2943 need_commitment = true;
2946 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2947 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2948 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
2949 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2950 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2951 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
2952 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
2953 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
2954 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
2955 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
2956 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
2957 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
2958 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
2959 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
2961 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
2963 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
2964 need_commitment = true;
2968 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2969 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2970 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2971 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2972 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2973 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
2975 nondust_htlc_sources,
2979 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2980 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
2981 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
2982 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2984 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
2985 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
2986 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
2987 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2988 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2989 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
2990 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
2991 // includes the right HTLCs.
2992 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2993 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2994 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2995 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2996 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2997 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2999 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3000 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
3001 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3004 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3005 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3006 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3007 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3008 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3009 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3010 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3011 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3012 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3016 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3017 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3018 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3019 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3022 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3023 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3024 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3025 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3026 if self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3027 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3028 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3029 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3032 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3033 /// for our counterparty.
3034 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3035 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3036 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3037 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3038 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3040 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3041 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3042 updates: Vec::new(),
3045 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3046 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3047 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3048 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3049 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3050 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3051 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3052 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3053 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3054 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3055 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3056 // to rebalance channels.
3057 match &htlc_update {
3058 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3059 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3060 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3063 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3064 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3065 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3066 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3067 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3068 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3069 // into the holding cell without ever being
3070 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3071 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3072 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3075 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3081 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3082 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3083 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3084 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3085 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3086 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3087 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3088 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3089 (msg, monitor_update)
3090 } else { unreachable!() };
3091 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3092 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3094 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3095 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3096 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3097 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3098 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3099 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3100 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3101 // for a full revocation before failing.
3102 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3105 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3107 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3114 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3115 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3117 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3118 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3123 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3124 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3125 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3126 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3127 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3129 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3130 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3131 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3133 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3134 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3140 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3141 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3142 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3143 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3144 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3145 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3146 where L::Target: Logger,
3148 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3149 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3151 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3152 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3154 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3155 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3158 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3160 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3161 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3162 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3166 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3167 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3168 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3169 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3170 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3171 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3172 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3173 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3174 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3177 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3179 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3180 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3183 self.context.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3184 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3186 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3188 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3189 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3190 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3191 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3192 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3193 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3194 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3195 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3199 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3200 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3201 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3202 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3203 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3204 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3205 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3206 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3207 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3209 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3210 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3213 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3214 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3215 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3216 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3217 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3218 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3219 let mut require_commitment = false;
3220 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3223 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3224 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3225 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3227 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3228 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3229 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3230 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3231 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3232 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3237 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3238 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3239 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3240 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3241 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3243 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3244 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3245 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3250 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3251 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3253 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3257 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3258 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3260 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3261 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3262 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3263 require_commitment = true;
3264 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3265 match forward_info {
3266 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3267 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3268 require_commitment = true;
3270 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3271 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3272 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3274 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3275 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3276 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3280 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3281 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3282 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3283 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3289 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3290 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3291 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3292 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3294 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3295 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3296 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3297 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3298 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3299 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3300 require_commitment = true;
3304 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3306 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3307 match update_state {
3308 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3309 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3310 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3311 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3312 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3314 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3315 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3316 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3317 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3318 require_commitment = true;
3319 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3320 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3325 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3326 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3327 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3328 if require_commitment {
3329 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3330 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3331 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3332 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3333 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3334 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3335 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3336 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3337 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3339 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3340 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3341 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3342 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3343 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)));
3346 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3347 (Some(_), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3348 let mut additional_update = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.pop().unwrap().update;
3349 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3350 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3351 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3352 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3354 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3355 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3357 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3358 if require_commitment {
3359 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3361 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3362 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3363 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3364 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3366 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3367 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3368 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3369 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3371 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3372 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3373 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3379 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3380 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3381 /// commitment update.
3382 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3383 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3384 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3387 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3388 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3389 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3390 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3392 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3393 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3394 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3395 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3396 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3398 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3399 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3401 if !self.context.is_live() {
3402 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3405 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3406 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3407 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3408 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3409 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3410 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3411 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3412 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3413 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3414 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3418 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3419 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3420 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3421 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3422 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3425 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3426 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3430 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3431 force_holding_cell = true;
3434 if force_holding_cell {
3435 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3439 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3440 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3442 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3443 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3448 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3449 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3451 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3453 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3454 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3455 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3456 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3460 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3461 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3462 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3466 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3467 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3470 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3471 // will be retransmitted.
3472 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3473 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3474 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3476 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3477 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3479 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3480 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3481 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3482 // this HTLC accordingly
3483 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3486 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3487 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3488 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3489 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3492 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3493 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3494 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3495 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3496 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3497 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3502 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3504 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3505 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3506 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3507 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3511 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3512 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3513 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3514 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3515 // the update upon reconnection.
3516 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3520 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3522 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3523 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3526 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3527 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3528 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3529 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3530 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3531 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3532 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3534 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3535 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3536 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3537 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3538 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3539 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3540 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3542 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3543 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3544 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3545 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3546 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3547 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3548 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3551 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3552 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3553 /// to the remote side.
3554 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3555 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3556 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3557 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3560 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3562 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3563 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3564 let mut found_blocked = false;
3565 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| {
3566 if found_blocked { debug_assert!(upd.blocked, "No mons may be unblocked after a blocked one"); }
3567 if upd.blocked { found_blocked = true; }
3571 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3572 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3573 // first received the funding_signed.
3574 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3575 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3576 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3578 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3579 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3580 if self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3581 funding_broadcastable = None;
3584 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3585 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3586 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3587 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3588 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3589 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3590 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3591 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3592 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3593 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3594 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3595 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3596 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3597 next_per_commitment_point,
3598 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3602 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3604 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3605 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3606 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3607 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3608 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3609 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3611 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3612 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3613 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3614 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3615 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3616 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3620 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3621 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3623 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3624 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3625 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3628 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3629 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3630 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3631 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3632 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3633 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3634 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3635 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3636 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3640 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3641 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3643 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3644 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3646 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3647 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3649 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3650 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3652 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3653 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3654 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3655 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3656 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3657 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3658 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3659 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3660 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3661 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3662 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3663 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3664 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3666 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3667 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3668 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3674 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3675 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3676 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3677 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3678 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3679 per_commitment_secret,
3680 next_per_commitment_point,
3682 next_local_nonce: None,
3686 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3687 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3688 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3689 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3690 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3692 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3693 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3694 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3695 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3696 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3697 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3698 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3699 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3700 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3701 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
3706 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3707 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3709 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3710 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3711 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3712 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3713 reason: err_packet.clone()
3716 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3717 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3718 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3719 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3720 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3721 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3724 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3725 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3726 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3727 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3728 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3735 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3736 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3737 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3738 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3742 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3743 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3744 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3745 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3746 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3747 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3751 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3752 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3754 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3755 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3756 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3757 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3758 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3759 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3760 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3761 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3764 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3766 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3767 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3768 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3769 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3770 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3773 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3774 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3775 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
3778 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3779 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3780 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3781 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3782 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3783 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3785 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3786 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3787 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3788 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3789 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3792 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3793 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3794 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3795 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3796 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3797 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3798 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3799 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3803 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3804 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3805 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3806 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3808 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3812 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3813 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3814 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3815 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3817 let shutdown_msg = if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3818 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3819 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3820 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3821 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3825 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
3827 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3828 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3829 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3830 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3831 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3832 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3834 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3835 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3836 channel_ready: None,
3837 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3838 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3839 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3843 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3844 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3845 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3846 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3847 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3848 next_per_commitment_point,
3849 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3851 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3852 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3853 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3857 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3858 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3859 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
3861 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3862 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3863 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3866 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3869 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3872 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3873 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3874 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3875 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3876 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
3877 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3878 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3880 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
3882 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3883 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
3884 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3885 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3886 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3887 next_per_commitment_point,
3888 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3892 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3893 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3894 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3896 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3899 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3900 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3901 raa: required_revoke,
3902 commitment_update: None,
3903 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3905 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3906 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3907 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3909 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3912 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3913 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3914 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3915 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3916 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
3917 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3920 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3921 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3922 raa: required_revoke,
3923 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
3924 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3928 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
3932 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
3933 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
3934 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
3935 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
3937 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3939 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
3941 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
3942 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
3943 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
3944 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3945 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3946 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
3948 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
3949 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
3950 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
3951 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
3952 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
3954 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
3955 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
3956 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
3957 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
3960 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
3961 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
3962 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
3963 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
3964 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
3965 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
3966 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
3967 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3968 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
3969 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
3970 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
3971 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
3972 // target feerate-calculated fee.
3973 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
3974 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
3976 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
3979 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
3980 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
3983 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
3984 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
3985 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
3986 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
3987 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
3988 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
3989 self.context.channel_state &
3990 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
3991 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
3992 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
3993 self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none()
3996 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
3997 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
3998 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
3999 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4000 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4001 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4002 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4004 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4010 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4011 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4012 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4013 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4015 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4016 return Ok((None, None));
4019 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4020 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4021 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4023 return Ok((None, None));
4026 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4028 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4029 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4030 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4031 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4033 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4034 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4035 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4037 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4038 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4039 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4040 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4042 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4043 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4044 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4049 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4050 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4052 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4053 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4056 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4057 /// within our expected timeframe.
4059 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4060 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4061 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4064 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4067 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4068 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4071 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4072 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4073 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4074 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4076 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4077 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4079 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4080 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4081 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4082 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4083 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4085 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4086 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4087 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4090 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4092 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4093 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4096 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4097 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4098 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4101 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4104 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4105 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4106 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4107 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4109 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4112 assert!(send_shutdown);
4113 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4114 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4115 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4117 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4118 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4120 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4125 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4127 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4128 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4130 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4131 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4132 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4133 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4134 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4135 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4138 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4139 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
4140 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
4143 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4144 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4145 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4146 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4150 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4151 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4152 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4153 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4154 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4155 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4157 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4158 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4165 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4166 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4168 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4171 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4172 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4174 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4176 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4177 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4178 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4179 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4180 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4181 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4182 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4183 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4184 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4186 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4187 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4190 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4194 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4195 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4196 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4197 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4199 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4200 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4202 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4203 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4205 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4206 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4208 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4209 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4212 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4213 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4216 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4217 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4218 return Ok((None, None));
4221 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4222 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4223 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4224 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4226 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4228 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4231 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4232 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4233 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4234 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4235 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4239 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4240 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4241 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4245 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4246 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4247 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4248 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4249 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4250 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4251 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4255 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4257 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4258 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4259 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4260 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4262 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4265 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4266 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4267 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4269 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4270 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4271 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4272 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4276 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4277 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4278 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4279 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4281 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4282 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4283 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4289 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4290 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4291 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4293 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4294 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4296 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4297 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4300 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4301 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4302 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4303 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4304 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4306 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4307 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4308 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4310 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4311 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4314 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4315 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4316 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4317 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4318 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4319 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4320 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4321 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4323 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4326 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4327 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4328 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4329 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4331 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4335 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4336 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4337 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4338 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4340 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4346 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4347 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4348 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4349 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4350 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4351 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4352 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4354 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4355 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4358 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4360 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4361 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4367 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4368 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4369 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4370 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4371 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4372 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4373 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4375 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4376 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4383 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4384 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4387 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4388 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4391 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4392 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4396 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4397 &self.context.holder_signer
4401 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4403 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4404 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4405 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4406 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4407 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4408 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4410 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4412 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4420 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4421 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4425 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4426 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4427 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4428 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4431 pub fn get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4432 if self.context.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4433 self.context.pending_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4436 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4437 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4438 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(&ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4439 for i in 0..self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len() {
4440 if self.context.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked {
4441 self.context.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked = false;
4442 return Some((&self.context.pending_monitor_updates[i].update,
4443 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len() > i + 1));
4449 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning whether it should be
4450 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or if it should be held as blocked.
4451 fn push_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> bool {
4452 let release_monitor = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
4453 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4454 update, blocked: !release_monitor
4459 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning a reference to it if
4460 /// it should be immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as
4462 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4463 -> Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4464 let release_monitor = self.push_blockable_mon_update(update);
4465 if release_monitor { self.context.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update) } else { None }
4468 pub fn no_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> bool {
4469 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty()
4472 pub fn complete_all_mon_updates_through(&mut self, update_id: u64) {
4473 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| {
4474 if upd.update.update_id <= update_id {
4475 assert!(!upd.blocked, "Completed update must have flown");
4481 pub fn complete_one_mon_update(&mut self, update_id: u64) {
4482 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| upd.update.update_id != update_id);
4485 /// Returns an iterator over all unblocked monitor updates which have not yet completed.
4486 pub fn uncompleted_unblocked_mon_updates(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4487 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter()
4488 .filter_map(|upd| if upd.blocked { None } else { Some(&upd.update) })
4491 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4492 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4493 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4495 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4496 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4497 if self.context.channel_state &
4498 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4499 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4500 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4501 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4502 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4505 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4506 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4507 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4508 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4509 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4510 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4512 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4513 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4514 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4516 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4517 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4518 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4519 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4520 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4521 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4527 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4528 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4529 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4532 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4533 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4534 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4537 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4538 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4539 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4542 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4543 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4544 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4545 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4546 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4547 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4552 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4553 self.context.channel_update_status
4556 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4557 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4558 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4561 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4563 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4564 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4565 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4569 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4570 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4571 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4574 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4578 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4579 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4580 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4582 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4583 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4584 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4586 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4587 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4590 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4591 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4592 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4593 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4594 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4595 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4596 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4597 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4598 self.context.channel_state);
4600 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4604 if need_commitment_update {
4605 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4606 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4607 let next_per_commitment_point =
4608 self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4609 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4610 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4611 next_per_commitment_point,
4612 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4616 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4622 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4623 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4624 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4625 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4626 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
4627 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4628 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4630 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4633 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
4634 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4635 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4636 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4637 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4638 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4639 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4640 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4641 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
4642 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4643 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4644 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4645 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4646 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4647 // channel and move on.
4648 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4649 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4651 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4652 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4653 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4655 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4656 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4657 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4658 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4659 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4660 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4661 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4665 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4666 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4667 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4668 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4669 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4673 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4674 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4675 // may have already happened for this block).
4676 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4677 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4678 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
4679 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4682 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4683 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4684 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4685 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4693 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4694 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4695 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4696 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4698 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4699 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4702 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4704 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4705 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
4706 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4707 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4709 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4712 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
4715 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4716 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
4717 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
4718 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4720 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4723 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4724 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4725 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4727 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4728 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4730 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4731 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4732 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4740 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4742 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4743 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4744 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4746 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4747 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
4750 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4751 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
4752 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
4753 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4754 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4755 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4756 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4757 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
4758 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4761 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
4762 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
4763 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4764 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4766 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
4767 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
4768 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
4770 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
4771 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
4772 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
4773 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
4775 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
4776 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
4777 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4778 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
4779 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
4780 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
4781 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
4784 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4785 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4787 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
4790 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4791 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4792 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
4793 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4794 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4795 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4796 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4797 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4798 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4799 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4800 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4801 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
4802 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
4803 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
4804 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
4805 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
4806 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
4812 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
4817 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
4818 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
4820 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
4821 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
4822 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
4823 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
4825 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
4828 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
4829 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4830 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4831 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4832 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
4833 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
4835 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4836 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
4839 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4840 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4841 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
4842 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
4844 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4845 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
4847 short_channel_id: self.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4848 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
4849 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
4850 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
4851 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
4852 excess_data: Vec::new(),
4858 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4859 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4860 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
4861 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
4863 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4866 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4870 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4874 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
4875 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
4879 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
4883 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4884 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
4887 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
4891 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
4893 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
4898 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
4900 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
4905 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
4907 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
4908 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4909 short_channel_id: self.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4910 node_signature: our_node_sig,
4911 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
4915 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
4917 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4918 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
4919 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4920 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
4921 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4922 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4923 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
4925 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
4926 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4927 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4928 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4929 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
4930 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
4931 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
4932 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
4933 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
4934 contents: announcement,
4937 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
4941 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
4942 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
4943 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
4944 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
4945 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
4946 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
4947 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4948 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
4950 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
4952 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
4953 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4954 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
4955 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
4957 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
4958 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4959 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
4960 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
4963 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
4964 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4965 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
4966 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
4969 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
4972 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
4973 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
4974 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4975 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
4976 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4977 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4980 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
4982 Err(_) => return None,
4984 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
4985 Ok(res) => Some(res),
4990 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
4991 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
4992 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
4993 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4994 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
4995 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
4996 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
4997 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
4998 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
4999 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5000 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5001 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5002 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5003 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5004 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5005 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5008 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5011 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5012 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5013 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5014 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5015 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5016 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5017 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5018 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5019 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5021 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5022 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5023 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5024 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5025 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5026 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5027 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5028 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5029 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5031 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5032 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5033 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5034 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5035 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5036 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5037 next_funding_txid: None,
5042 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5044 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5045 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5046 /// commitment update.
5048 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5049 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5050 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
5051 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5053 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
5054 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5056 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5057 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5062 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5063 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5065 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5067 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5068 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5070 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5071 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5072 /// regenerate them.
5074 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5075 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5077 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5078 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5079 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
5080 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5081 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5082 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5084 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5085 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5086 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5089 if amount_msat == 0 {
5090 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5093 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances();
5094 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5095 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5096 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5099 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5100 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5101 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5104 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5105 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5106 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5107 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5108 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5109 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5110 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5111 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5114 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5115 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC for {} msat {}", amount_msat,
5116 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5117 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5118 else { "to peer" });
5120 if need_holding_cell {
5121 force_holding_cell = true;
5124 // Now update local state:
5125 if force_holding_cell {
5126 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5131 onion_routing_packet,
5132 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
5137 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5138 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5140 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5142 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5144 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
5147 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5148 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5149 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5153 onion_routing_packet,
5154 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
5156 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5161 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5162 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5163 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5164 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5166 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5167 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5168 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5170 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5171 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5175 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5176 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5177 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5178 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5179 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5180 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5181 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5184 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5185 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5186 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5187 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5188 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5189 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5192 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5194 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5195 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5196 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5198 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5199 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5202 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5203 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5204 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5205 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5206 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5207 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5208 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5209 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5212 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5216 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
5217 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5218 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5219 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5221 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5223 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5224 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5225 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5226 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5227 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5228 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5229 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5230 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5231 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5232 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.opt_anchors());
5233 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5239 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
5242 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5243 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5244 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5245 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5246 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5247 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5249 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5250 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5251 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5252 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5255 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5256 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5260 let res = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5261 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5263 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5265 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5266 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5267 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5268 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5270 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5271 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5272 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5273 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5274 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5275 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5279 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5280 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5284 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5285 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5288 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5289 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5291 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5292 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5293 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5294 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger);
5295 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5298 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5299 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5300 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5306 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5307 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5308 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5310 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5311 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5312 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5313 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5319 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5320 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5322 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5323 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5324 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5325 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5326 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5327 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5328 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5329 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5330 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5333 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5334 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5335 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5337 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5338 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5341 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5342 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5344 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5345 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5346 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5349 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5350 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5351 let mut chan_closed = false;
5352 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5356 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5358 None if !chan_closed => {
5359 // use override shutdown script if provided
5360 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5361 Some(script) => script,
5363 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5364 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5365 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5366 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5370 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5371 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5373 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5379 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5380 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5381 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5382 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5384 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5386 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5388 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5389 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5390 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5391 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5392 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5393 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5396 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5397 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
5398 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
5401 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5402 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5403 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5406 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5407 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5408 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5409 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5410 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5412 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5413 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5420 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5421 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5423 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5426 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5427 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5428 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5430 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5431 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5435 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5439 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5440 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
5441 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
5444 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> OutboundV1Channel<Signer> {
5445 pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
5446 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5447 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5448 outbound_scid_alias: u64
5449 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<Signer>, APIError>
5450 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5451 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
5452 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5454 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5455 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5456 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5457 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5459 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5460 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5462 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5463 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5465 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5466 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5467 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5469 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5470 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5472 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5473 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5474 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5475 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5476 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5479 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5480 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5482 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
5484 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5485 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
5486 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
5487 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5490 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5491 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5493 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5494 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5495 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5496 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5500 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5501 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5502 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5506 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5507 Ok(script) => script,
5508 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5511 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
5514 context: ChannelContext {
5517 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5518 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5519 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5520 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5525 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5527 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5528 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5529 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5530 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5532 channel_value_satoshis,
5534 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5537 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5540 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5541 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5544 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5545 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5546 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5547 pending_update_fee: None,
5548 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5549 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5550 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
5551 update_time_counter: 1,
5553 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5555 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
5556 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
5557 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
5558 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
5559 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
5560 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
5562 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5563 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5564 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5565 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5567 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5568 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5569 closing_fee_limits: None,
5570 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
5572 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
5574 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
5575 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
5576 short_channel_id: None,
5577 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
5579 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
5580 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
5581 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
5582 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
5583 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
5584 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5585 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5586 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
5587 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
5588 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
5589 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
5590 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5592 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
5594 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
5595 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
5596 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
5597 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5598 counterparty_parameters: None,
5599 funding_outpoint: None,
5600 opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None },
5601 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
5603 funding_transaction: None,
5605 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
5606 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
5607 counterparty_node_id,
5609 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
5611 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
5613 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5614 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5616 announcement_sigs: None,
5618 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5619 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5620 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5621 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5623 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5624 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
5626 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
5627 outbound_scid_alias,
5629 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
5630 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
5632 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5633 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
5638 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
5643 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5644 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5645 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5646 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5647 Ok(self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5648 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5651 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5652 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5653 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5654 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5655 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5656 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5657 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5658 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L)
5659 -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingCreated), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
5660 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5661 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5663 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5664 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5666 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5667 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5668 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5669 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5672 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5673 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5675 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5678 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5679 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5680 return Err((self, e));
5684 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5686 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5688 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5689 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5690 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5692 let channel = Channel {
5693 context: self.context,
5696 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingCreated {
5697 temporary_channel_id,
5698 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5699 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5702 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5704 next_local_nonce: None,
5708 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
5709 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
5710 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
5711 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
5712 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
5713 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5714 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
5715 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
5716 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
5717 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
5720 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
5721 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
5722 // `only_static_remotekey`.
5724 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
5725 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
5726 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5727 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
5734 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
5735 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
5736 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
5737 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
5738 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
5739 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5740 // We've exhausted our options
5743 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
5744 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
5747 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
5748 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
5749 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
5750 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
5752 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5753 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
5754 assert!(self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none());
5755 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
5756 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
5757 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
5759 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5761 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
5764 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5765 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5766 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5768 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5769 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5772 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5773 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5776 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5777 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
5781 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5782 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5783 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5784 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5785 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5786 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5787 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5788 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5789 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5790 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5791 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5792 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5793 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5794 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5795 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5796 first_per_commitment_point,
5797 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5798 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5799 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5800 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5802 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
5807 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5808 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
5810 // Check sanity of message fields:
5811 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5812 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
5814 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5815 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
5817 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
5818 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
5820 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5821 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
5823 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5824 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5826 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5827 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
5828 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5830 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
5831 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
5832 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
5834 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5835 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
5836 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
5838 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
5839 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
5841 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
5842 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
5845 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
5846 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
5847 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5849 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5850 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5852 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5853 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5855 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
5856 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5858 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5859 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5861 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5862 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5864 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
5865 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
5868 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
5869 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
5870 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
5872 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
5873 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
5875 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
5876 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5877 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
5879 self.context.channel_type = channel_type;
5882 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
5883 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5884 &Some(ref script) => {
5885 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
5886 if script.len() == 0 {
5889 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
5890 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
5892 Some(script.clone())
5895 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
5897 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
5902 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
5903 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
5904 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
5905 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
5906 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
5908 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
5909 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
5911 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
5914 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5915 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
5916 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
5917 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
5918 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5919 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
5922 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5923 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
5924 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
5927 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
5928 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
5930 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
5931 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
5937 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5938 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
5939 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
5942 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> InboundV1Channel<Signer> {
5943 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
5944 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
5945 pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5946 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
5947 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
5948 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
5949 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
5950 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
5951 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5952 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
5953 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5956 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
5958 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
5959 // support this channel type.
5960 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
5961 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
5962 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
5965 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
5966 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
5967 // `static_remote_key`.
5968 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
5969 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
5971 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
5972 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
5973 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
5975 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
5976 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
5978 channel_type.clone()
5980 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
5981 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5982 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
5986 let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
5988 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
5989 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5990 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5991 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5992 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
5993 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
5994 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
5995 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5996 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
5999 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6000 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6003 // Check sanity of message fields:
6004 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6005 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6007 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6008 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6010 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6011 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6013 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6014 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6015 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6017 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6018 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6020 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6021 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6023 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6025 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6026 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6027 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6029 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6030 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6032 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6033 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6036 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6037 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6038 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6040 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6041 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6043 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6044 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6046 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6047 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6049 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6050 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6052 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6053 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6055 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6056 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6059 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6061 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6062 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6063 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6067 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6068 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6069 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6070 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6071 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6073 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6074 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6076 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6077 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6078 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6080 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6081 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6084 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6085 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6086 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6087 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
6088 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
6089 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
6092 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
6093 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6094 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6095 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6096 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6099 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6100 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6101 &Some(ref script) => {
6102 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6103 if script.len() == 0 {
6106 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6107 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6109 Some(script.clone())
6112 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6114 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6119 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6120 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6121 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6122 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6126 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6127 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6128 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6132 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6133 Ok(script) => script,
6134 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6137 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6138 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6141 context: ChannelContext {
6144 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6145 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6147 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6152 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6154 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6155 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6156 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6157 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6160 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6163 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6166 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6167 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6168 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6170 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6171 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6172 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6173 pending_update_fee: None,
6174 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6175 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6176 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6177 update_time_counter: 1,
6179 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6181 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6182 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6183 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6184 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6185 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6186 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6188 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6189 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6190 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6191 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6193 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6194 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6195 closing_fee_limits: None,
6196 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6198 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
6200 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6201 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6202 short_channel_id: None,
6203 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6205 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6206 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6207 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6208 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6209 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6210 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6211 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6212 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6213 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6214 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6215 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6216 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6217 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
6219 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6221 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6222 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6223 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6224 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6225 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6226 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6227 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6229 funding_outpoint: None,
6230 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
6231 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
6233 funding_transaction: None,
6235 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6236 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6237 counterparty_node_id,
6239 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6241 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6243 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6244 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6246 announcement_sigs: None,
6248 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6249 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6250 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6251 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6253 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6254 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6256 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6257 outbound_scid_alias,
6259 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6260 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6262 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6263 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6268 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6275 pub fn is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
6276 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept
6279 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
6280 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
6281 assert!(self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept);
6282 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(0);
6285 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6286 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6288 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6289 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6290 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6291 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6293 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6294 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6296 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6297 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6299 if !self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
6300 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
6303 self.context.user_id = user_id;
6304 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
6306 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6309 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6310 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6311 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6313 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6314 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6315 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6316 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6318 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6319 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6320 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6321 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6322 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6323 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6324 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6325 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6326 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6327 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6328 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6329 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6330 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6331 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6332 first_per_commitment_point,
6333 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6334 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6335 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6337 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6339 next_local_nonce: None,
6343 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6344 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6346 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6348 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6349 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6352 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6353 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6355 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6356 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6358 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6359 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6360 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6361 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6362 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6363 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6364 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6365 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6366 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6369 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6370 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6372 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6373 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6374 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6375 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6377 let counterparty_signature = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6378 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
6380 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
6381 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
6384 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
6385 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6386 ) -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6388 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
6391 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6392 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6394 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6395 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6396 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6398 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6400 if self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
6401 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned())));
6403 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6404 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6405 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6406 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6409 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6410 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6411 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6412 // funding_created_signature may fail.
6413 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6415 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6417 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6418 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6419 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6422 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6423 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6424 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6428 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6429 initial_commitment_tx,
6432 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6433 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6436 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6437 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6440 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6442 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6443 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6444 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6445 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6446 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6447 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6448 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6449 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6450 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6451 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6452 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6454 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6456 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
6458 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6459 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6460 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6461 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6463 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6465 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6466 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6467 let mut channel = Channel {
6468 context: self.context,
6470 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id.clone();
6471 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6472 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6474 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingSigned {
6478 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6479 }, channel_monitor))
6483 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6484 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6486 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6492 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6493 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6494 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6495 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6496 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6498 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6499 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6500 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6501 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6507 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6508 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6509 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6510 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6511 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6512 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6517 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6518 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6519 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6520 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6522 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6523 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6524 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6525 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6530 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6531 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6532 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6533 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6534 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6535 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6540 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6541 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6542 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6545 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6547 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6548 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6549 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6550 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6551 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6553 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6554 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6555 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6556 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6558 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6559 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6560 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6562 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6564 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6565 self.context.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6566 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6567 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6568 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6569 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6571 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6572 // deserialized from that format.
6573 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6574 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6575 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6577 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6579 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6580 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6581 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6583 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6584 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6585 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6586 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6589 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6590 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6591 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6594 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6595 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6596 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6597 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6599 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6600 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6602 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6604 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6606 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6608 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6611 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6613 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6618 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6619 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6621 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6622 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
6623 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6624 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6625 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6626 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6627 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6629 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6631 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6633 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6636 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6637 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6638 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6641 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6643 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6644 preimages.push(preimage);
6646 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6647 reason.write(writer)?;
6649 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6651 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6652 preimages.push(preimage);
6654 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6655 reason.write(writer)?;
6658 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
6659 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6660 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6662 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6663 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6664 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
6668 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6669 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6670 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
6672 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6673 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
6677 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6678 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6679 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6680 source.write(writer)?;
6681 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6683 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
6684 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6685 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6687 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6688 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6690 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6692 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6693 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6695 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6697 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6698 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6703 match self.context.resend_order {
6704 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6705 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6708 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6709 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6710 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6712 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6713 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6714 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6715 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6718 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6719 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6720 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6721 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6722 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6725 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6726 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6727 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6728 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6730 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6731 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6732 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6734 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6736 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6737 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6738 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6739 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6741 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6742 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6743 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6744 // consider the stale state on reload.
6747 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6748 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6749 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6751 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6752 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6753 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6755 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6756 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6758 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6759 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6760 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6762 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6763 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6765 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6768 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6769 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6770 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6772 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6775 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6776 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6778 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6779 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6780 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6782 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6784 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6786 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6788 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6789 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6790 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6791 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6792 htlc.write(writer)?;
6795 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6796 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6797 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6799 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6800 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
6802 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6803 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6804 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6805 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6806 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6807 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
6808 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6810 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6811 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6812 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6813 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6814 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6816 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6817 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6819 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6820 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6821 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6822 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6824 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6826 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6827 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
6828 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6829 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6830 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6831 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6832 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6834 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
6835 (2, chan_type, option),
6836 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6837 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6838 (5, self.context.config, required),
6839 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6840 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6841 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6842 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6843 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
6844 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6845 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6846 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6847 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6848 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6849 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6850 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
6851 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6852 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
6853 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6854 (33, self.context.pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
6855 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6856 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6863 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6864 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6866 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6867 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6869 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6870 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6871 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6873 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6874 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6875 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6876 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6878 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6880 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6881 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6882 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6883 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6884 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6886 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6887 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6890 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6891 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6892 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6894 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6896 let mut keys_data = None;
6898 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6899 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6900 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6901 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6902 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6903 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6904 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6905 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6906 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6907 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6911 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6912 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6913 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6916 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6918 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6919 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6920 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6922 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6924 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6925 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6926 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6927 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6928 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6929 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6930 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6931 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6932 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6933 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6934 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6935 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6936 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6941 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6942 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6943 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6944 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6945 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6946 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6947 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6948 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6949 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6950 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6951 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6952 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6954 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6955 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6958 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6959 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6962 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6963 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6965 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6967 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
6971 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6972 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6973 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6974 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6975 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6976 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6977 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6978 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6979 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6980 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6981 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
6983 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6984 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6985 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6987 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6988 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6989 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6991 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6995 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6996 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6997 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6998 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7001 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7002 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7003 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7005 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7006 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7007 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7008 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7011 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7012 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7013 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7014 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7017 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7019 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7021 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7022 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7023 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7024 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7026 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7027 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7028 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7029 // consider the stale state on reload.
7030 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7033 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7034 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7035 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7037 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7040 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7041 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7042 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7044 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7045 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7046 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7047 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7049 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7050 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7052 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7053 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7055 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7056 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7057 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7059 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7061 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7062 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7064 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7065 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7068 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7070 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7071 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7072 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7073 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7075 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7078 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7079 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
7081 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7083 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7084 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7086 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7087 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7089 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7091 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7092 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7093 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7095 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7096 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7097 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7101 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7102 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7103 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7105 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7111 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7112 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7113 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7114 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7115 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7116 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7117 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7118 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7119 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7120 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7122 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7123 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7124 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7125 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7126 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7127 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7128 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7130 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7131 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7132 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7133 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7135 let mut pending_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7137 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7138 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7140 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7141 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7142 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7143 (2, channel_type, option),
7144 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7145 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7146 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7147 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7148 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7149 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7150 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
7151 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7152 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
7153 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7154 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7155 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7156 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7157 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7158 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7159 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7160 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7161 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7162 (33, pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
7163 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7164 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7167 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7168 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7169 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7170 // required channel parameters.
7171 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7172 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7173 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7175 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7177 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7178 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7179 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7180 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7183 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7184 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7185 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7187 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7188 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7190 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7191 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7196 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7197 if iter.next().is_some() {
7198 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7202 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7203 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7204 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7205 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7206 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7209 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7210 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7212 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7213 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7214 // separate u64 values.
7215 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7217 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7219 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7220 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7221 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7222 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7224 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7225 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7227 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7228 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7229 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7230 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7231 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7234 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7235 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7239 context: ChannelContext {
7242 config: config.unwrap(),
7246 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7247 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7248 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7251 temporary_channel_id,
7253 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7255 channel_value_satoshis,
7257 latest_monitor_update_id,
7260 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7263 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7264 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7267 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7268 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7269 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7270 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7274 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7275 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7276 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7277 monitor_pending_forwards,
7278 monitor_pending_failures,
7279 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7282 holding_cell_update_fee,
7283 next_holder_htlc_id,
7284 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7285 update_time_counter,
7288 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7289 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7290 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7291 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7293 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7294 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7295 closing_fee_limits: None,
7296 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7298 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
7300 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7301 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7303 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7305 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7306 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7307 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7308 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7309 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7310 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7311 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7312 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7313 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7316 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7318 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7319 funding_transaction,
7321 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7322 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7323 counterparty_node_id,
7325 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7329 channel_update_status,
7330 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7334 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7335 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7336 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7337 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7339 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7340 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7342 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7343 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7344 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7346 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7347 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7349 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7350 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7352 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7355 pending_monitor_updates: pending_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7364 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7365 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7366 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7367 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7368 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7370 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7371 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7373 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7374 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7375 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7376 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7377 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7378 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7379 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7380 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7381 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7382 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7383 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7384 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7385 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7386 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7387 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
7388 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7389 use crate::util::test_utils;
7390 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
7391 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7392 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7393 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7394 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7395 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7396 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7397 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7398 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7399 use crate::prelude::*;
7401 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7404 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7405 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7411 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7412 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7413 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7414 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7418 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7419 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7420 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7421 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7422 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7423 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
7424 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7428 signer: InMemorySigner,
7431 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7432 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7435 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7436 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7438 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7439 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7442 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7446 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7448 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7449 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7450 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7451 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7452 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7455 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7456 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7457 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7458 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7462 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7463 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7464 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7468 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7469 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7470 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7471 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7473 let seed = [42; 32];
7474 let network = Network::Testnet;
7475 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7476 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7477 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7480 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7481 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7482 let config = UserConfig::default();
7483 match OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7484 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7485 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7487 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7488 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7492 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7493 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7495 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7496 let original_fee = 253;
7497 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7498 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7499 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7500 let seed = [42; 32];
7501 let network = Network::Testnet;
7502 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7504 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7505 let config = UserConfig::default();
7506 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7508 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7509 // same as the old fee.
7510 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7511 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7512 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7516 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7517 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7518 // dust limits are used.
7519 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7520 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7521 let seed = [42; 32];
7522 let network = Network::Testnet;
7523 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7524 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7525 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7527 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7528 // they have different dust limits.
7530 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7531 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7532 let config = UserConfig::default();
7533 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7535 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7536 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7537 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7538 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7539 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7541 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7542 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7543 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7544 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7545 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7547 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7548 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7549 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7550 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7552 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7553 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7554 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7556 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7557 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7559 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7560 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7561 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7563 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7564 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7565 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7566 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7569 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7571 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7572 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7573 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7574 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7575 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7576 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7577 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7578 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7579 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7581 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7584 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7585 // the dust limit check.
7586 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7587 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7588 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.opt_anchors());
7589 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7591 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7592 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7593 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7594 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.opt_anchors());
7595 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7596 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7597 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7601 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7602 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7603 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7604 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7605 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7606 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7607 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7608 let seed = [42; 32];
7609 let network = Network::Testnet;
7610 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7612 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7613 let config = UserConfig::default();
7614 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7616 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.opt_anchors());
7617 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.opt_anchors());
7619 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7620 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7621 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7622 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7623 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7624 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7626 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7627 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7628 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7629 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7630 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7632 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7634 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7635 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7636 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7637 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7638 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7640 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7641 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7642 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7643 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7644 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7648 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7649 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7650 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7651 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7652 let seed = [42; 32];
7653 let network = Network::Testnet;
7654 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7655 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7656 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7658 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7660 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7661 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7662 let config = UserConfig::default();
7663 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7665 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7666 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7667 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7668 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7670 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7671 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7672 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7674 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7675 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7676 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7677 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7679 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7680 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7681 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7683 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7684 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7686 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7687 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7688 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7689 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7690 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7691 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7692 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7694 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7696 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7697 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7698 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7699 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7700 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7704 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7705 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7706 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7707 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7708 let seed = [42; 32];
7709 let network = Network::Testnet;
7710 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7711 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7712 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7714 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7715 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7716 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7717 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7718 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7719 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7720 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7721 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7723 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7724 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7725 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7726 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7727 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7728 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7730 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7731 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7732 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7733 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7735 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7737 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7738 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7739 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7740 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7741 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7742 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7744 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7745 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7746 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7747 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7749 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7750 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7751 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7752 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7753 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7755 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7756 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7758 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7759 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7760 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7762 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7763 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7764 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7765 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7766 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7768 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7769 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7771 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7772 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7773 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7777 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7779 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
7780 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7781 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7783 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7784 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7785 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7786 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7788 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7789 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7790 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7792 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7794 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7795 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7798 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7799 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7800 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7801 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7802 let seed = [42; 32];
7803 let network = Network::Testnet;
7804 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7805 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7806 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7809 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7810 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7811 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7813 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7814 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7816 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7817 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7818 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7820 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7821 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7823 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7825 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7826 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7828 // Channel Negotiations failed
7829 let result = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7830 assert!(result.is_err());
7835 fn channel_update() {
7836 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7837 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7838 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7839 let seed = [42; 32];
7840 let network = Network::Testnet;
7841 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7842 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7843 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7845 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7846 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7847 let config = UserConfig::default();
7848 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7850 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7851 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7852 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7853 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7854 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7856 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7857 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7858 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7859 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7860 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7862 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7863 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7864 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7865 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7867 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7868 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7869 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7871 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7872 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7874 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7875 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7876 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7878 short_channel_id: 0,
7881 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7882 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7883 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7885 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7886 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7888 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7890 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7892 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7893 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7894 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7895 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7897 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7898 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7899 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7901 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7905 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
7907 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7908 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7909 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7910 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7911 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7912 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7913 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7914 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7915 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7916 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7917 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7918 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7919 use crate::sync::Arc;
7921 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7922 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7923 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7924 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7926 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7928 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7929 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7930 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7931 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7932 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7934 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7935 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7941 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7942 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7943 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7945 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7946 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7947 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7948 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7949 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7950 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7952 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7954 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7955 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7956 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7957 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7958 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7959 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7961 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7962 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7963 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7964 selected_contest_delay: 144
7966 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7967 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7969 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7970 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7972 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7973 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7975 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7976 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7978 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7979 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7980 // build_commitment_transaction.
7981 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7982 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7983 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7984 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7985 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7987 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7988 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7989 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7990 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7994 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7995 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7996 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7997 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
8001 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8002 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8003 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8005 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8006 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8008 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8009 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8011 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8013 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8014 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8015 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8016 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8017 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8018 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
8019 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8021 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8022 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8023 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8024 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8026 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8027 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8028 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8030 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8032 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8033 commitment_tx.clone(),
8034 counterparty_signature,
8035 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8036 &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8037 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8039 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8040 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8042 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8043 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8044 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8046 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8047 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
8050 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8051 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8053 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8054 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8055 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8056 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8057 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8058 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8059 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8060 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8062 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8065 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8066 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8067 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8071 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8074 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8075 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
8076 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8078 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8079 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
8080 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
8081 let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
8082 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8083 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
8084 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
8085 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8087 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8091 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8092 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8093 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8094 "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", {});
8096 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8097 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8099 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8100 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8101 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48454a56a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004730440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae05564714201483045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8103 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8104 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8105 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8106 "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", {});
8108 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8109 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8111 amount_msat: 1000000,
8113 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8114 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8116 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8119 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8120 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8122 amount_msat: 2000000,
8124 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8125 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8127 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8130 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8131 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8133 amount_msat: 2000000,
8135 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8136 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8137 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8138 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8140 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8143 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8144 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8146 amount_msat: 3000000,
8148 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8149 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8150 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8151 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8153 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8156 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8157 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8159 amount_msat: 4000000,
8161 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8162 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8164 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8168 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8169 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8170 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8172 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8173 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8174 "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", {
8177 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8178 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8179 "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" },
8182 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8183 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8184 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b01000000000000000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f89600401483045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
8187 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8188 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8189 "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" },
8192 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8193 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8194 "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" },
8197 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8198 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8199 "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" }
8202 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8203 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8204 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8206 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8207 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8208 "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", {
8211 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8212 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8213 "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" },
8216 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8217 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8218 "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" },
8221 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8222 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8223 "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" },
8226 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8227 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8228 "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" },
8231 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8232 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8233 "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" }
8236 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8237 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8238 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8240 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8241 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8242 "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", {
8245 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8246 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8247 "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" },
8250 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8251 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8252 "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" },
8255 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8256 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8257 "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" },
8260 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8261 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8262 "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" }
8265 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8266 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8267 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8268 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8270 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8271 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8272 "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", {
8275 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8276 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8277 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320002000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc28283483045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef0901008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6851b27568f6010000" },
8280 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8281 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8282 "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" },
8285 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8286 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8287 "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" },
8290 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8291 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8292 "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" }
8295 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8296 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8297 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8298 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8300 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8301 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8302 "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", {
8305 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8306 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8307 "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" },
8310 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8311 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8312 "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" },
8315 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8316 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8317 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d020000000000000000015d060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e001473044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c1801008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8320 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8321 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8322 "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" }
8325 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8326 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8327 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8329 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8330 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8331 "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", {
8334 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8335 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8336 "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" },
8339 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8340 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8341 "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" },
8344 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8345 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8346 "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" }
8349 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8350 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8351 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8353 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8354 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8355 "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", {
8358 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8359 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8360 "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" },
8363 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8364 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8365 "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" },
8368 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8369 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8370 "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" }
8373 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8374 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8375 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8377 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8378 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8379 "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", {
8382 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8383 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8384 "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" },
8387 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8388 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8389 "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" }
8392 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8393 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8394 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8395 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8397 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8398 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8399 "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", {
8402 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8403 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8404 "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" },
8407 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8408 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8409 "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" }
8412 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8413 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8414 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8415 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8417 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8418 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8419 "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", {
8422 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8423 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8424 "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" },
8427 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8428 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8429 "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" }
8432 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8433 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8434 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8436 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8437 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8438 "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", {
8441 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8442 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8443 "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" }
8446 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8447 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8448 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8449 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8451 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8452 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8453 "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", {
8456 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8457 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8458 "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" }
8461 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8462 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8463 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8464 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8466 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8467 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8468 "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", {
8471 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8472 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8473 "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" }
8476 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8477 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8478 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8479 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8481 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8482 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8483 "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", {});
8485 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8486 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8487 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8488 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8490 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8491 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8492 "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", {});
8494 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8495 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8496 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8497 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8499 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8500 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8501 "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", {});
8503 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8504 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8505 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8507 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8508 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8509 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8001c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484040047304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a3790147304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8511 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8512 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8513 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8514 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8516 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8517 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8518 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80024a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994a04004830450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1014830450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8520 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8521 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8522 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8523 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8525 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8526 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8527 "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", {});
8529 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8530 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8531 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8532 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8533 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8534 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8536 amount_msat: 2000000,
8538 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8539 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8541 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8544 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8545 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8546 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8548 amount_msat: 5000001,
8550 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8551 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8552 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8553 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8555 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8558 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8559 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8561 amount_msat: 5000000,
8563 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8564 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8565 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8566 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8568 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8572 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8573 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8574 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2d8813000000000000220020305c12e1a0bc21e283c131cea1c66d68857d28b7b2fce0a6fbc40c164852121b8813000000000000220020305c12e1a0bc21e283c131cea1c66d68857d28b7b2fce0a6fbc40c164852121bc0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484a69f6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c0147304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c801475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8577 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8578 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8579 "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" },
8581 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8582 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8583 "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" },
8585 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8586 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8587 "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" }
8590 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8591 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8592 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80074a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994d007000000000000220020fe0598d74fee2205cc3672e6e6647706b4f3099713b4661b62482c3addd04a5e881300000000000022002018e40f9072c44350f134bdc887bab4d9bdfc8aa468a25616c80e21757ba5dac7881300000000000022002018e40f9072c44350f134bdc887bab4d9bdfc8aa468a25616c80e21757ba5dac7c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994aad9c6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b7601473044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c72501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8595 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8596 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8597 "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" },
8599 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8600 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8601 "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" },
8603 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8604 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8605 "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" }
8610 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8611 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8613 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8614 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8615 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8616 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8618 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8619 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8620 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8622 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8623 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8625 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8626 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8628 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8629 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8630 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8634 fn test_key_derivation() {
8635 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8636 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8638 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8639 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8641 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8642 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8644 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8645 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8647 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8648 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8650 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8651 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8653 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8654 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8656 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8657 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8661 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8662 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8663 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8664 let seed = [42; 32];
8665 let network = Network::Testnet;
8666 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8667 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8669 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8670 let config = UserConfig::default();
8671 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8672 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8674 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8675 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8677 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8678 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8679 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8680 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8681 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8682 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8683 assert!(res.is_ok());
8688 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8689 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8690 // resulting `channel_type`.
8691 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8692 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8693 let network = Network::Testnet;
8694 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8695 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8697 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8698 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8700 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8701 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8703 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8704 // need to signal it.
8705 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8706 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8707 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8710 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8712 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8713 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8714 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8716 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8717 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8718 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8721 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8722 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8723 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8724 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8725 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8728 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8729 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8734 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8735 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8736 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8737 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8738 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8739 let network = Network::Testnet;
8740 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8741 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8743 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8744 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8746 let config = UserConfig::default();
8748 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8749 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8750 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8751 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8752 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8754 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8755 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8756 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8759 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8760 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8761 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8763 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8764 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8765 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8766 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8767 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8768 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8770 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8775 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8776 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8778 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8779 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8780 let network = Network::Testnet;
8781 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8782 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8784 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8785 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8787 let config = UserConfig::default();
8789 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8790 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8791 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8792 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8793 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8794 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8795 assert!(simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8796 assert!(simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8798 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8799 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8800 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8801 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8802 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8803 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8806 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8807 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8809 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8810 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8811 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8812 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8814 assert!(res.is_err());
8816 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8817 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8818 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8820 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8821 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8822 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8825 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8827 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8828 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8829 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8830 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8833 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8834 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8836 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8837 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8839 assert!(res.is_err());