1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
76 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
77 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
80 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
82 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
84 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
85 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
86 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
87 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
88 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
89 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
91 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
95 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
96 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
97 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
98 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
101 enum InboundHTLCState {
102 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
103 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
104 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
105 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
106 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
107 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
108 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
109 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
110 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
111 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
112 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
113 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
114 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
115 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
116 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
118 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
119 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
120 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
121 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
122 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
123 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
124 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
125 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
126 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
127 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
128 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
129 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
130 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
131 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
133 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
134 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
135 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
136 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
137 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
138 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
139 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
140 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
142 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
143 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
145 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
146 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
147 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
148 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
149 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
150 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
151 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
152 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
155 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
159 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
160 state: InboundHTLCState,
163 enum OutboundHTLCState {
164 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
165 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
166 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
167 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
168 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
169 /// money back (though we won't), and,
170 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
171 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
172 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
173 /// we'll never get out of sync).
174 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
175 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
176 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
178 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
179 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
180 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
181 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
182 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
183 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
184 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
185 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
186 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
187 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
188 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
189 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
190 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
191 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
192 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
196 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
197 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
198 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
199 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
202 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
203 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
205 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
206 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
211 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
212 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
214 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
215 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
220 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
224 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
225 state: OutboundHTLCState,
227 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
230 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
231 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
232 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
236 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
238 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
239 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
240 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
243 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
248 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
252 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
253 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
254 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
255 /// move on to ChannelReady.
256 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
257 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
258 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
260 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
261 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
262 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
263 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
264 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
265 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
266 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
268 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
269 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
270 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
272 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
273 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
274 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
275 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
276 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
277 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
279 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
280 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
282 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
283 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
284 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
285 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
286 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
287 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
288 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
289 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
290 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
292 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
293 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
294 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
295 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
296 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
297 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
298 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
299 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
300 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
301 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
302 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
303 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
305 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
306 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
308 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
310 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
312 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
313 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
314 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
315 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
319 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
321 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
323 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
325 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
326 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
327 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
328 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
329 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
331 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
332 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
334 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
336 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
337 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
339 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
340 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
341 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
342 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
343 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
344 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
346 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
347 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
349 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
350 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
351 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
352 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
353 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
355 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
356 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
358 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
359 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
361 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
362 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
363 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
364 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
370 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
371 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
373 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
374 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
375 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
380 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
381 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
383 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
384 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
385 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
390 macro_rules! secp_check {
391 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
394 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
399 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
400 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
401 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
402 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
403 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
404 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
405 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
406 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
408 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
410 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
412 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
416 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
418 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
419 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
420 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
422 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
423 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
425 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
426 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
427 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
428 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
429 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
431 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
432 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
436 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
442 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
445 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
446 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
447 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
448 holding_cell_msat: u64,
449 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
452 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
453 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
454 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
455 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
456 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
457 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
458 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
459 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
460 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
461 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
464 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
465 struct HTLCCandidate {
467 origin: HTLCInitiator,
471 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
479 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
481 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
483 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
484 htlc_value_msat: u64,
485 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
490 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
491 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
492 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
493 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
494 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
496 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
497 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
498 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
499 htlc_value_msat: u64,
501 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
502 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
506 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
507 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
508 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
509 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
510 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
511 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
512 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
513 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
514 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
515 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
516 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
519 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
520 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
521 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
522 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
523 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
524 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
525 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
526 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
529 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
530 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
531 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
532 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>
535 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
536 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
537 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
538 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
539 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
540 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
541 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
542 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
543 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
544 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
545 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
546 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
547 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
548 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
549 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
551 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
552 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
553 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
554 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
556 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
557 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
558 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
559 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
561 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
562 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
563 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
564 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
565 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
567 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
568 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
569 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
570 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
572 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
573 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
574 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
576 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
577 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
578 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
579 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
580 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
582 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
583 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
586 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
587 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
589 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
590 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
591 /// In some cases we need to delay letting the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] go until after an
592 /// `Event` is processed by the user. This bool indicates the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] is
593 /// blocked on some external event and the [`ChannelManager`] will update us when we're ready.
595 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
599 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
600 (0, update, required),
601 (2, blocked, required),
604 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
605 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
606 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
608 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
609 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
610 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
611 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
613 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
617 channel_id: [u8; 32],
618 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
621 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
622 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
624 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
625 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
626 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
628 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
629 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
630 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
631 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
633 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
634 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
636 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
638 holder_signer: Signer,
639 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
640 destination_script: Script,
642 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
643 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
644 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
646 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
647 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
648 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
649 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
650 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
651 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
653 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
654 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
655 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
656 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
657 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
658 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
660 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
662 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
663 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
664 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
666 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
667 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
668 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
669 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
670 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
671 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
672 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
674 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
676 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
677 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
678 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
679 // HTLCs with similar state.
680 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
681 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
682 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
683 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
684 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
685 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
686 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
687 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
688 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
691 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
692 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
693 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
695 update_time_counter: u32,
697 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
698 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
699 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
700 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
701 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
702 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
704 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
705 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
707 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
708 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
709 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
710 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
712 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
713 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
715 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
717 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
719 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
720 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
721 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
722 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
723 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
724 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
726 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
727 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
728 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
729 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
730 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
732 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
733 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
734 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
735 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
736 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
737 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
738 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
739 channel_creation_height: u32,
741 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
744 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
746 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
749 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
751 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
754 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
756 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
758 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
759 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
762 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
764 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
766 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
767 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
769 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
771 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
772 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
773 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
775 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
777 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
778 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
780 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
781 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
782 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
784 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
786 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
788 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
789 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
790 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
791 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
793 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
794 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
795 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
797 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
798 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
799 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
801 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
802 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
803 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
804 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
805 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
806 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
807 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
808 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
810 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
811 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
812 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
813 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
814 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
816 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
817 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
819 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
820 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
821 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
822 /// unblock the state machine.
824 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
825 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
826 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
828 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
829 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
830 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
832 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
833 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
834 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
835 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
836 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
837 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
838 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
839 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
841 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
842 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
844 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
845 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
846 // the channel's funding UTXO.
848 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
849 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
850 // associated channel mapping.
852 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
853 // to store all of them.
854 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
856 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
857 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
858 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
859 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
860 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
862 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
863 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
865 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
866 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
868 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
869 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
870 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
872 /// When we generate [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to persist, they may not be persisted immediately.
873 /// If we then persist the [`channelmanager::ChannelManager`] and crash before the persistence
874 /// completes we still need to be able to complete the persistence. Thus, we have to keep a
875 /// copy of the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] here until it is complete.
876 pending_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
879 impl<Signer: ChannelSigner> ChannelContext<Signer> {
880 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
881 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
884 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
885 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
886 self.update_time_counter
889 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
890 self.latest_monitor_update_id
893 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
894 self.config.announced_channel
897 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
898 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
901 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
902 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
903 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
904 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
907 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
908 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
909 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
912 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
913 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
914 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
915 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
916 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
919 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
920 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
921 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
922 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
923 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
928 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
932 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
934 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
935 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
936 self.temporary_channel_id
939 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
943 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
944 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
945 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
949 /// Gets the channel's type
950 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
954 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
955 /// is_usable() returns true).
956 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
957 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
958 self.short_channel_id
961 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
962 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
963 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
966 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
967 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
968 self.outbound_scid_alias
971 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
972 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
973 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
974 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
975 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
978 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
979 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
980 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
981 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
984 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
985 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
986 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
989 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
990 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
991 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
992 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
996 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
999 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1000 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1003 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1004 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1007 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1008 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1009 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1012 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1013 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1016 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1017 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1018 self.counterparty_node_id
1021 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1022 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1023 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1026 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1027 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1028 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1031 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1032 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1034 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1035 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1036 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1037 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1039 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1043 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1044 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1045 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1048 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1049 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1050 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1053 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1054 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1055 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1057 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1058 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1063 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1064 self.channel_value_satoshis
1067 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1068 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1071 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1072 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1075 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1076 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
1079 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1080 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1081 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1084 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1085 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1086 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1089 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1090 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1091 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1094 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1095 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1096 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1099 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1100 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1101 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1104 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1105 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1106 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1109 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1110 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1111 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1112 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1113 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1116 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1118 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1119 self.prev_config = None;
1123 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1124 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1128 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1129 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1130 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1131 let did_channel_update =
1132 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1133 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1134 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1135 if did_channel_update {
1136 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1137 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1138 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1139 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1141 self.config.options = *config;
1145 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
1146 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
1147 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
1150 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1151 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1152 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1153 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1154 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1156 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1157 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1158 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1159 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1160 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1161 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1162 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1164 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1165 where L::Target: Logger
1167 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1168 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1169 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1171 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1172 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1173 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1174 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1176 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1177 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1178 if match update_state {
1179 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1180 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1181 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1182 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1183 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1185 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1189 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1190 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1191 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1192 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1194 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1195 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1196 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1198 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1199 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1200 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1201 transaction_output_index: None
1206 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1207 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1208 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1209 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1210 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1213 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1215 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1216 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1217 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1219 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1220 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1223 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1224 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1227 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1229 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1230 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1231 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1233 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1234 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1240 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1241 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1242 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1243 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1244 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1245 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1246 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1250 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1251 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1253 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1255 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1256 if generated_by_local {
1257 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1258 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1267 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1269 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1270 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1271 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1272 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1273 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1274 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1275 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1278 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1279 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1280 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1281 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1285 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1286 preimages.push(preimage);
1290 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1291 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1293 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1295 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1296 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1298 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1299 if !generated_by_local {
1300 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1308 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1309 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1310 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1311 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1312 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1313 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1314 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1315 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1317 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1319 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1320 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1321 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1322 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1324 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1326 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1327 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1328 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1329 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1332 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1333 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1334 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1335 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1337 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1340 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1341 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1342 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1343 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1345 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1348 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1349 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1354 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1355 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1360 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1362 let channel_parameters =
1363 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1364 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1365 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1368 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1373 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1376 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1377 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1378 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1379 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1381 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1382 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1383 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1391 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1392 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1398 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1399 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1400 /// our counterparty!)
1401 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1402 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1403 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1404 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1405 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1406 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1407 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1409 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1413 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1414 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1415 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1416 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1417 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1418 //may see payments to it!
1419 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1420 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1421 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1423 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1426 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1427 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1428 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1429 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1430 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1433 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1434 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1437 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1441 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1442 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1443 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1444 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1445 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1446 // which are near the dust limit.
1447 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1448 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1449 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1450 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1451 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1453 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1454 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1456 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1459 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1460 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1461 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1464 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1465 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1467 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1468 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1469 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1470 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1471 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1472 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1473 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1476 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1479 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1480 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1481 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1483 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1484 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1485 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1486 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1487 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1488 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1490 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1491 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1497 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1498 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1500 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1501 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1502 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1503 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1504 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1505 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1506 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1509 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1512 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1513 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1514 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1516 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1517 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1518 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1519 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1520 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1521 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1523 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1524 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1528 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1529 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1530 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1531 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1532 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1533 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1534 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1536 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1537 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1539 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1546 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1547 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1548 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1549 /// corner case properly.
1550 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
1551 let context = &self;
1552 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1553 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1554 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1556 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1557 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1558 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1559 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1562 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1564 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1565 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1567 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1569 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1571 if context.is_outbound() {
1572 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1573 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1575 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1576 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1578 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1579 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1580 if !context.opt_anchors() {
1581 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000;
1584 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1585 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1586 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1587 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1589 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1590 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1591 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1592 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
1593 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1594 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1595 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1596 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1597 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1598 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1600 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1603 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1604 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1605 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1606 if !context.opt_anchors() {
1607 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000;
1610 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1611 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1613 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1614 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1615 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1617 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
1618 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1619 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1620 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1624 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1626 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1627 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1628 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1629 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1630 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1631 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1633 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1634 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1636 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1637 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1638 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1640 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1641 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 {
1642 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1643 Some(context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1644 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1647 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1648 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 {
1649 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1650 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1651 context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1652 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1655 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1656 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1657 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1659 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1663 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1664 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1666 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1667 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1671 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1672 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1673 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1674 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1676 outbound_capacity_msat,
1677 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1678 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1683 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1684 let context = &self;
1685 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1688 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1689 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1691 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1692 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1694 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1695 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1697 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1698 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1699 let context = &self;
1700 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1702 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1705 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1706 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1708 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1709 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1711 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1712 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1714 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1715 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1719 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1720 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1726 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1727 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1728 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1731 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1732 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1733 included_htlcs += 1;
1736 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1737 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1741 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1742 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1743 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1744 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1745 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1746 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1751 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1753 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1754 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1759 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1760 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1764 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1765 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, context.opt_anchors());
1766 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1769 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1770 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, context.opt_anchors());
1772 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1773 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1774 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1776 total_pending_htlcs,
1777 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1778 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1779 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1781 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1782 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1783 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1785 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1787 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1792 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1793 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1795 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1796 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1798 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1799 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1801 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1802 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1803 let context = &self;
1804 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1806 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1809 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1810 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1812 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1813 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1815 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1816 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1818 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1819 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1823 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1824 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1830 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1831 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1832 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1833 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1834 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1835 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1838 included_htlcs += 1;
1841 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1842 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1845 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1846 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1848 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1849 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1850 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1855 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1856 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, context.opt_anchors());
1857 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1860 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1861 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, context.opt_anchors());
1863 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1864 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1866 total_pending_htlcs,
1867 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1868 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1869 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1871 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1872 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1873 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1875 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1877 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1882 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
1883 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
1884 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
1885 self.funding_transaction.clone()
1891 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
1892 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
1893 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
1894 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
1895 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
1896 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
1897 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
1898 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
1899 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
1900 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
1901 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
1903 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
1904 // return them to fail the payment.
1905 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
1906 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
1907 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
1909 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
1910 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
1915 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
1916 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
1917 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
1918 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
1919 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
1920 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
1921 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
1922 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
1923 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1924 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
1925 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1926 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1927 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
1932 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
1933 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1934 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
1938 // Internal utility functions for channels
1940 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
1941 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
1942 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
1944 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
1946 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
1947 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
1948 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
1950 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
1953 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
1955 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
1958 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
1959 /// required by us according to the configured or default
1960 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
1962 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
1964 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
1965 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
1966 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
1967 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
1968 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
1971 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
1972 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
1973 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
1974 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
1975 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
1976 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
1977 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
1980 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1981 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1983 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1984 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
1987 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1988 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1989 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1990 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
1991 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
1992 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1995 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
1996 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
1997 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
2000 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2001 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2002 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
2003 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
2006 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2007 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2009 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2010 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2011 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2015 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
2016 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2017 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
2018 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2020 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2021 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2022 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2023 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
2024 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
2025 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
2026 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2027 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2029 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
2030 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
2031 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
2032 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
2033 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
2034 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
2035 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2036 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2038 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2039 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2043 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2049 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2050 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2051 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2052 // outside of those situations will fail.
2053 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2057 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2062 1 + // script length (0)
2066 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2067 2 + // witness marker and flag
2068 1 + // witness element count
2069 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2070 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2071 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2072 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2073 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2074 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2076 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2077 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2078 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2084 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2085 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2086 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2087 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2089 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2090 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2091 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2093 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2094 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2095 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2096 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2097 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2098 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2101 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2102 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2105 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2106 value_to_holder = 0;
2109 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2110 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2111 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2112 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2114 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2115 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2118 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2119 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2122 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2125 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2126 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2128 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2130 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2131 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2132 where L::Target: Logger {
2133 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2134 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2135 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2136 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2137 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2138 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2139 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2140 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2144 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2145 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2146 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2147 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2149 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2150 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2152 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2154 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
2156 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2157 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2158 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2160 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2161 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2162 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2163 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2164 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
2166 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2167 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2168 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2170 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2171 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2173 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2176 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2177 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2181 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2185 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2186 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2187 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2188 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2189 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2190 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2193 // Now update local state:
2195 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2196 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2197 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2198 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2199 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2200 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2201 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2205 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2206 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2207 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2208 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2209 // do not not get into this branch.
2210 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2211 match pending_update {
2212 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2213 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2214 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2215 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2216 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2217 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2218 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2221 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2222 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2223 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2224 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2225 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2226 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2227 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2233 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), self.context.channel_state);
2234 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2235 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2237 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2238 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2239 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2241 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2242 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2245 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2246 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2248 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2249 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2251 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2252 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2255 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2258 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2259 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2260 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2261 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2266 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2267 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
2268 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2269 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2270 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2271 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2272 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2273 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2274 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2275 let unblocked_update_pos = if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2276 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2277 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2278 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2279 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2280 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2281 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2282 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2284 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len() - 1
2286 let insert_pos = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd.blocked)
2287 .unwrap_or(self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len());
2288 let new_mon_id = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.get(insert_pos)
2289 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2290 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2291 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.insert(insert_pos, PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2292 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2294 for held_update in self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter_mut().skip(insert_pos + 1) {
2295 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2298 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2299 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2300 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2301 update, blocked: true,
2306 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2307 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
2308 monitor_update: self.context.pending_monitor_updates.get(unblocked_update_pos)
2309 .expect("We just pushed the monitor update").update.clone(),
2313 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2317 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2318 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2319 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2320 /// before we fail backwards.
2322 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2323 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2324 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2325 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2326 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2327 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2328 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2331 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2332 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2333 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2334 /// before we fail backwards.
2336 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2337 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2338 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2339 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2340 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2341 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2342 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2344 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2346 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2347 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2348 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2350 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2351 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2352 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2354 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2355 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2356 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2358 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2363 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2364 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2370 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2371 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2372 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2373 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2374 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2378 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2379 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2380 force_holding_cell = true;
2383 // Now update local state:
2384 if force_holding_cell {
2385 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2386 match pending_update {
2387 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2388 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2389 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2390 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2394 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2395 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2396 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2397 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2403 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2404 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2405 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2411 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2413 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2414 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2417 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2418 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2419 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2424 // Message handlers:
2426 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2427 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2428 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2429 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2430 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2432 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2435 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2436 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2438 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2439 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2441 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2442 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2443 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2444 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2447 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2449 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2450 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2451 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2452 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2454 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2455 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2457 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2458 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2460 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2461 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2462 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2463 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2464 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2465 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2469 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2470 initial_commitment_tx,
2473 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2474 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2477 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2478 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2481 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2482 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2483 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2484 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2485 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2486 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2487 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2488 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2489 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2490 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2491 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2492 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2494 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2496 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2498 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2499 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2500 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2501 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2503 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2505 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2506 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2510 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2511 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2513 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2514 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2515 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2516 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2518 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2521 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2522 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2523 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2526 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2527 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2528 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2529 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2530 // when routing outbound payments.
2531 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2535 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2537 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2538 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2539 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2540 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2541 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2542 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2543 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2544 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2545 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2547 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2548 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2549 let expected_point =
2550 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2551 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2553 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2554 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2555 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2556 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2557 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2558 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2560 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2561 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2562 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2563 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2564 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2566 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2567 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2571 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2574 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2575 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2577 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2579 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2582 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2583 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2584 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2585 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2586 if local_sent_shutdown {
2587 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2589 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2590 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2591 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2592 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2594 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2595 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2597 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2598 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2600 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2601 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2603 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2604 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2607 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2608 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2609 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2610 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2612 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2613 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2615 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2616 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2617 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2618 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2619 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2620 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2621 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2622 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2623 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2624 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2625 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2627 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2628 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2629 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2630 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2631 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2632 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2636 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.opt_anchors() {
2639 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2640 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2641 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2643 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2644 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2645 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2646 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2647 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2648 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2649 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2653 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2654 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2655 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2656 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2657 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2658 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2659 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2663 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2664 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2665 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2666 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2667 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2668 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2671 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2672 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2673 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2674 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2675 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2677 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2678 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2681 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2682 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2685 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2686 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2687 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2688 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2689 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2690 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2691 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2692 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2693 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2694 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2695 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2696 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2697 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2698 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2699 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2700 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2703 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2704 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2705 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2706 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2707 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2710 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2711 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2713 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2714 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2717 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2718 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2719 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2723 // Now update local state:
2724 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2725 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2726 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2727 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2728 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2729 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2730 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2735 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2737 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2738 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2739 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2740 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2741 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2742 None => fail_reason.into(),
2743 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2744 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2745 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2746 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2748 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2752 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2753 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2754 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2755 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2757 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2758 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2763 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2766 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2767 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2768 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2770 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2771 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2774 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2777 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2778 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2779 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2781 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2782 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2785 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2789 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2790 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2791 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2793 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2794 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2797 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2801 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
2802 where L::Target: Logger
2804 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2805 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2807 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2808 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2810 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2811 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2814 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2816 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2818 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2819 let commitment_txid = {
2820 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2821 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2822 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2824 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2825 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2826 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2827 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2828 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2829 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2833 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2835 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2836 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2837 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
2838 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2841 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2842 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2843 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2844 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
2847 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2849 if self.context.is_outbound() {
2850 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2851 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2852 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2853 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2854 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2855 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2856 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
2857 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2858 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
2859 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
2865 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
2866 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
2869 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
2870 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
2871 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
2872 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
2873 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
2874 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
2875 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
2876 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
2877 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
2878 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
2879 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
2880 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
2881 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
2884 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2885 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2886 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2887 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2888 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
2889 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(),
2890 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2892 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(), &keys);
2893 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
2894 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
2895 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2896 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2897 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2898 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2899 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2901 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2902 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
2905 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
2907 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2908 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
2909 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
2912 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
2915 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2916 commitment_stats.tx,
2918 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2919 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2920 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2923 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
2924 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2926 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2927 let mut need_commitment = false;
2928 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
2929 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
2930 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
2931 need_commitment = true;
2935 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2936 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2937 Some(forward_info.clone())
2939 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2940 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2941 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2942 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2943 need_commitment = true;
2946 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2947 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2948 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
2949 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2950 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2951 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
2952 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
2953 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
2954 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
2955 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
2956 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
2957 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
2958 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
2959 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
2961 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
2963 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
2964 need_commitment = true;
2968 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2969 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2970 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2971 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2972 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2973 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
2975 nondust_htlc_sources,
2979 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2980 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
2981 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
2982 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2984 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
2985 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
2986 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
2987 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2988 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2989 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
2990 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
2991 // includes the right HTLCs.
2992 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2993 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2994 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2995 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2996 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2997 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2999 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3000 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
3001 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3004 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3005 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3006 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3007 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3008 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3009 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3010 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3011 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3012 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3016 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3017 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3018 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3019 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3022 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3023 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3024 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3025 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3026 if self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3027 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3028 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3029 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3032 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3033 /// for our counterparty.
3034 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3035 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3036 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3037 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3038 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3040 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3041 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3042 updates: Vec::new(),
3045 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3046 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3047 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3048 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3049 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3050 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3051 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3052 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3053 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3054 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3055 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3056 // to rebalance channels.
3057 match &htlc_update {
3058 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3059 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3060 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3062 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3063 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, logger)
3065 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3068 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3069 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3070 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3071 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3072 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3073 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3074 // into the holding cell without ever being
3075 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3076 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3077 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3080 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3086 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3087 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3088 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3089 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3090 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3091 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3092 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3093 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3094 (msg, monitor_update)
3095 } else { unreachable!() };
3096 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3097 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3099 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3100 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3101 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3102 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3103 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3104 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3105 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3106 // for a full revocation before failing.
3107 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3110 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3112 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3119 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3120 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3122 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3123 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3128 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3129 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3130 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3131 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3132 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3134 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3135 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3136 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3138 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3139 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3145 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3146 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3147 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3148 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3149 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3150 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3151 where L::Target: Logger,
3153 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3154 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3156 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3157 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3159 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3160 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3163 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3165 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3166 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3167 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3171 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3172 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3173 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3174 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3175 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3176 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3177 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3178 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3179 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3182 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3184 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3185 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3188 self.context.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3189 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3191 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3193 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3194 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3195 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3196 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3197 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3198 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3199 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3200 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3204 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3205 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3206 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3207 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3208 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3209 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3210 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3211 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3212 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3214 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3215 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3218 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3219 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3220 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3221 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3222 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3223 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3224 let mut require_commitment = false;
3225 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3228 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3229 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3230 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3232 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3233 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3234 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3235 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3236 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3237 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3242 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3243 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3244 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3245 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3246 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3248 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3249 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3250 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3255 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3256 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3258 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3262 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3263 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3265 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3266 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3267 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3268 require_commitment = true;
3269 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3270 match forward_info {
3271 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3272 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3273 require_commitment = true;
3275 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3276 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3277 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3279 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3280 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3281 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3285 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3286 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3287 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3288 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3294 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3295 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3296 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3297 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3299 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3300 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3301 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3302 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3303 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3304 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3305 require_commitment = true;
3309 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3311 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3312 match update_state {
3313 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3314 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3315 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3316 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3317 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3319 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3320 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3321 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3322 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3323 require_commitment = true;
3324 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3325 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3330 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3331 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3332 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3333 if require_commitment {
3334 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3335 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3336 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3337 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3338 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3339 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3340 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3341 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3342 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3344 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3345 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3346 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3347 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3348 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)));
3351 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3352 (Some(_), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3353 let mut additional_update = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.pop().unwrap().update;
3354 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3355 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3356 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3357 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3359 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3360 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3362 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3363 if require_commitment {
3364 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3366 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3367 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3368 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3369 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3371 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3372 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3373 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3374 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3376 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3377 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3378 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3384 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3385 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3386 /// commitment update.
3387 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3388 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3389 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3392 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3393 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3394 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3395 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3397 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3398 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3399 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3400 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3401 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3403 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3404 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3406 if !self.context.is_live() {
3407 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3410 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3411 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3412 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3413 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3414 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3415 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3416 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3417 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3418 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3419 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3423 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3424 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3425 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3426 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3427 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3430 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3431 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3435 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3436 force_holding_cell = true;
3439 if force_holding_cell {
3440 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3444 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3445 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3447 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3448 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3453 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3454 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3456 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3458 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3459 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3460 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3461 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3465 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3466 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3467 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3471 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3472 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3475 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3476 // will be retransmitted.
3477 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3478 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3479 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3481 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3482 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3484 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3485 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3486 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3487 // this HTLC accordingly
3488 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3491 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3492 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3493 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3494 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3497 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3498 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3499 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3500 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3501 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3502 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3507 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3509 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3510 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3511 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3512 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3516 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3517 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3518 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3519 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3520 // the update upon reconnection.
3521 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3525 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3527 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3528 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3531 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3532 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3533 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3534 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3535 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3536 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3537 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3539 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3540 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3541 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3542 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3543 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3544 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3545 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3547 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3548 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3549 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3550 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3551 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3552 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3553 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3556 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3557 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3558 /// to the remote side.
3559 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3560 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3561 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3562 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3565 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3567 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3568 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3569 let mut found_blocked = false;
3570 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| {
3571 if found_blocked { debug_assert!(upd.blocked, "No mons may be unblocked after a blocked one"); }
3572 if upd.blocked { found_blocked = true; }
3576 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3577 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3578 // first received the funding_signed.
3579 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3580 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3581 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3583 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3584 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3585 if self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3586 funding_broadcastable = None;
3589 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3590 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3591 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3592 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3593 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3594 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3595 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3596 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3597 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3598 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3599 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3600 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3601 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3602 next_per_commitment_point,
3603 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3607 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3609 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3610 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3611 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3612 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3613 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3614 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3616 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3617 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3618 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3619 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3620 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3621 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3625 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3626 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3628 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3629 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3630 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3633 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3634 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3635 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3636 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3637 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3638 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3639 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3640 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3641 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3645 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3646 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3648 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3649 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3651 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3652 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3654 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3655 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3657 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3658 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3659 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3660 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3661 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3662 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3663 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3664 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3665 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3666 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3667 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3668 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3669 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3671 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3672 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3673 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3679 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3680 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3681 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3682 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3683 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3684 per_commitment_secret,
3685 next_per_commitment_point,
3687 next_local_nonce: None,
3691 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3692 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3693 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3694 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3695 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3697 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3698 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3699 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3700 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3701 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3702 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3703 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3704 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3705 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3706 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
3711 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3712 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3714 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3715 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3716 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3717 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3718 reason: err_packet.clone()
3721 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3722 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3723 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3724 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3725 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3726 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3729 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3730 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3731 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3732 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3733 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3740 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3741 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3742 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3743 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3747 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3748 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3749 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3750 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3751 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3752 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3756 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3757 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3759 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3760 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3761 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3762 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3763 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3764 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3765 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3766 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3769 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3771 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3772 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3773 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3774 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3775 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3778 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3779 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3780 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
3783 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3784 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3785 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3786 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3787 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3788 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3790 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3791 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3792 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3793 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3794 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3797 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3798 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3799 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3800 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3801 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3802 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3803 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3804 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3808 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3809 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3810 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3811 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3813 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3817 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3818 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3819 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3820 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3822 let shutdown_msg = if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3823 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3824 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3825 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3826 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3830 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
3832 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3833 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3834 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3835 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3836 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3837 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3839 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3840 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3841 channel_ready: None,
3842 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3843 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3844 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3848 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3849 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3850 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3851 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3852 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3853 next_per_commitment_point,
3854 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3856 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3857 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3858 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3862 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3863 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3864 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
3866 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3867 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3868 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3871 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3874 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3877 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3878 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3879 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3880 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3881 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
3882 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3883 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3885 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
3887 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3888 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
3889 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3890 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3891 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3892 next_per_commitment_point,
3893 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3897 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3898 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3899 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3901 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3904 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3905 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3906 raa: required_revoke,
3907 commitment_update: None,
3908 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3910 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3911 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3912 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3914 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3917 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3918 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3919 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3920 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3921 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
3922 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3925 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3926 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3927 raa: required_revoke,
3928 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
3929 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3933 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
3937 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
3938 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
3939 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
3940 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
3942 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3944 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
3946 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
3947 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
3948 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
3949 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3950 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3951 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
3953 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
3954 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
3955 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
3956 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
3957 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
3959 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
3960 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
3961 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
3962 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
3965 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
3966 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
3967 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
3968 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
3969 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
3970 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
3971 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
3972 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3973 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
3974 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
3975 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
3976 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
3977 // target feerate-calculated fee.
3978 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
3979 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
3981 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
3984 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
3985 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
3988 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
3989 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
3990 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
3991 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
3992 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
3993 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
3994 self.context.channel_state &
3995 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
3996 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
3997 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
3998 self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4001 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4002 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4003 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4004 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4005 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4006 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4007 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4009 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4015 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4016 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4017 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4018 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4020 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4021 return Ok((None, None));
4024 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4025 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4026 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4028 return Ok((None, None));
4031 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4033 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4034 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4035 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4036 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4038 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4039 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4040 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4042 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4043 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4044 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4045 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4047 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4048 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4049 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4054 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4055 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4057 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4058 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4061 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4062 /// within our expected timeframe.
4064 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4065 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4066 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4069 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4072 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4073 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4076 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4077 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4078 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4079 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4081 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4082 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4084 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4085 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4086 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4087 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4088 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4090 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4091 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4092 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4095 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4097 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4098 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4101 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4102 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4103 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4106 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4109 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4110 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4111 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4112 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4114 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4117 assert!(send_shutdown);
4118 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4119 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4120 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4122 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4123 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4125 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4130 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4132 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4133 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4135 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4136 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4137 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4138 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4139 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4140 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4143 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4144 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4146 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4147 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4148 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4149 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4153 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4154 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4155 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4156 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4157 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4158 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4160 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4161 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4168 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4169 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4171 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4174 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4175 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4177 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4179 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4180 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4181 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4182 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4183 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4184 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4185 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4186 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4187 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4189 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4190 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4193 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4197 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4198 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4199 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4200 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4202 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4203 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4205 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4206 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4208 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4209 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4211 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4212 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4215 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4216 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4219 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4220 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4221 return Ok((None, None));
4224 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4225 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4226 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4227 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4229 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4231 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4234 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4235 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4236 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4237 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4238 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4242 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4243 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4244 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4248 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4249 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4250 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4251 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4252 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4253 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4254 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4258 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4260 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4261 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4262 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4263 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4265 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4268 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4269 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4270 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4272 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4273 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4274 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4275 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4279 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4280 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4281 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4282 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4284 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4285 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4286 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4292 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4293 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4294 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4296 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4297 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4299 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4300 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4303 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4304 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4305 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4306 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4307 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4309 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4310 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4311 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4313 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4314 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4317 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4318 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4319 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4320 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4321 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4322 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4323 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4324 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4326 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4329 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4330 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4331 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4332 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4334 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4338 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4339 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4340 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4341 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4343 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4349 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4350 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4351 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4352 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4353 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4354 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4355 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4357 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4358 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4361 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4363 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4364 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4370 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4371 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4372 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4373 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4374 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4375 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4376 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4378 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4379 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4386 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4387 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4390 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4391 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4394 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4395 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4399 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4400 &self.context.holder_signer
4404 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4406 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4407 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4408 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4409 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4410 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4411 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4413 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4415 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4423 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4424 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4428 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4429 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4430 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4431 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4434 pub fn get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4435 if self.context.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4436 self.context.pending_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4439 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4440 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4441 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4442 for i in 0..self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len() {
4443 if self.context.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked {
4444 self.context.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked = false;
4445 return Some((self.context.pending_monitor_updates[i].update.clone(),
4446 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len() > i + 1));
4452 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4453 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4454 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4455 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4456 let release_monitor = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
4457 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4458 update, blocked: !release_monitor,
4460 if release_monitor { self.context.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| upd.update.clone()) } else { None }
4463 pub fn no_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> bool {
4464 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty()
4467 pub fn complete_all_mon_updates_through(&mut self, update_id: u64) {
4468 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| {
4469 if upd.update.update_id <= update_id {
4470 assert!(!upd.blocked, "Completed update must have flown");
4476 pub fn complete_one_mon_update(&mut self, update_id: u64) {
4477 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| upd.update.update_id != update_id);
4480 /// Returns an iterator over all unblocked monitor updates which have not yet completed.
4481 pub fn uncompleted_unblocked_mon_updates(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4482 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter()
4483 .filter_map(|upd| if upd.blocked { None } else { Some(&upd.update) })
4486 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4487 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4488 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4490 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4491 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4492 if self.context.channel_state &
4493 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4494 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4495 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4496 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4497 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4500 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4501 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4502 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4503 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4504 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4505 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4507 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4508 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4509 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4511 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4512 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4513 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4514 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4515 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4516 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4522 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4523 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4524 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4527 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4528 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4529 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4532 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4533 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4534 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4537 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4538 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4539 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4540 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4541 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4542 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4547 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4548 self.context.channel_update_status
4551 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4552 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4553 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4556 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4558 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4559 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4560 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4564 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4565 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4566 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4569 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4573 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4574 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4575 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4577 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4578 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4579 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4581 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4582 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4585 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4586 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4587 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4588 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4589 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4590 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4591 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4592 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4593 self.context.channel_state);
4595 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4599 if need_commitment_update {
4600 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4601 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4602 let next_per_commitment_point =
4603 self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4604 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4605 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4606 next_per_commitment_point,
4607 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4611 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4617 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4618 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4619 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4620 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4621 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
4622 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4623 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4625 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4628 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
4629 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4630 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4631 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4632 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4633 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4634 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4635 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4636 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
4637 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4638 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4639 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4640 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4641 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4642 // channel and move on.
4643 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4644 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4646 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4647 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4648 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4650 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4651 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4652 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4653 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4654 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4655 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4656 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4660 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4661 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4662 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4663 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4664 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4668 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4669 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4670 // may have already happened for this block).
4671 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4672 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4673 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
4674 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4677 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4678 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4679 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4680 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4688 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4689 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4690 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4691 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4693 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4694 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4697 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4699 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4700 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
4701 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4702 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4704 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4707 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
4710 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4711 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
4712 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
4713 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4715 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4718 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4719 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4720 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4722 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4723 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4725 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4726 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4727 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4735 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4737 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4738 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4739 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4741 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4742 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
4745 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4746 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
4747 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
4748 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4749 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4750 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4751 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4752 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
4753 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4756 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
4757 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
4758 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4759 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4761 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
4762 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
4763 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
4765 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
4766 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
4767 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
4768 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
4770 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
4771 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
4772 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4773 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
4774 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
4775 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
4776 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
4779 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4780 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4782 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
4785 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4786 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4787 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
4788 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4789 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4790 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4791 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4792 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4793 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4794 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4795 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4796 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
4797 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
4798 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
4799 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
4800 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
4801 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
4807 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
4812 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
4813 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
4815 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
4816 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
4817 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
4818 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
4820 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
4823 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
4824 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4825 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4826 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4827 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
4828 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
4830 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4831 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
4834 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4835 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4836 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
4837 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
4839 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4840 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
4842 short_channel_id: self.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4843 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
4844 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
4845 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
4846 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
4847 excess_data: Vec::new(),
4853 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4854 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4855 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
4856 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
4858 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4861 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4865 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4869 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
4870 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
4874 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
4878 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4879 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
4882 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
4886 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
4888 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
4893 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
4895 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
4900 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
4902 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
4903 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4904 short_channel_id: self.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4905 node_signature: our_node_sig,
4906 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
4910 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
4912 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4913 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
4914 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4915 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
4916 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4917 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4918 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
4920 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
4921 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4922 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4923 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4924 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
4925 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
4926 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
4927 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
4928 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
4929 contents: announcement,
4932 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
4936 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
4937 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
4938 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
4939 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
4940 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
4941 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
4942 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4943 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
4945 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
4947 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
4948 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4949 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
4950 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
4952 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
4953 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4954 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
4955 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
4958 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
4959 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4960 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
4961 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
4964 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
4967 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
4968 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
4969 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4970 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
4971 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4972 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4975 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
4977 Err(_) => return None,
4979 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
4980 Ok(res) => Some(res),
4985 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
4986 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
4987 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
4988 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4989 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
4990 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
4991 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
4992 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
4993 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
4994 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
4995 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
4996 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
4997 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
4998 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4999 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5000 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5003 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5006 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5007 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5008 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5009 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5010 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5011 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5012 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5013 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5014 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5016 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5017 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5018 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5019 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5020 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5021 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5022 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5023 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5024 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5026 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5027 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5028 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5029 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5030 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5031 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5032 next_funding_txid: None,
5037 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5039 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5040 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5041 /// commitment update.
5043 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5044 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(
5045 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5046 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, logger: &L
5047 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5049 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5050 skimmed_fee_msat, logger)
5051 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5053 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5054 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5059 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5060 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5062 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5064 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5065 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5067 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5068 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5069 /// regenerate them.
5071 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5072 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5074 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5075 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(
5076 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5077 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5078 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, logger: &L
5079 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5080 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5081 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5083 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5084 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5085 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5088 if amount_msat == 0 {
5089 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5092 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances();
5093 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5094 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5095 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5098 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5099 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5100 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5103 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5104 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5105 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5106 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5107 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5108 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5109 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5110 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5113 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5114 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC for {} msat {}", amount_msat,
5115 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5116 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5117 else { "to peer" });
5119 if need_holding_cell {
5120 force_holding_cell = true;
5123 // Now update local state:
5124 if force_holding_cell {
5125 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5130 onion_routing_packet,
5136 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5137 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5139 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5141 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5146 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5147 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5148 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5152 onion_routing_packet,
5155 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5160 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5161 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5162 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5163 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5165 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5166 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5167 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5169 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5170 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5174 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5175 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5176 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5177 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5178 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5179 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5180 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5183 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5184 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5185 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5186 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5187 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5188 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5191 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5193 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5194 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5195 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5197 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5198 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5201 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5202 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5203 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5204 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5205 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5206 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5207 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5208 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5211 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5215 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
5216 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5217 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5218 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5220 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5222 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5223 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5224 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5225 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5226 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5227 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5228 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5229 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5230 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5231 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.opt_anchors());
5232 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5238 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
5241 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5242 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5243 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5244 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5245 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5246 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5248 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5249 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5250 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5251 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5254 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5255 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5259 let res = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5260 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5262 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5264 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5265 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5266 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5267 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5269 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5270 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5271 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5272 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5273 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5274 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5278 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5279 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5283 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5284 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5287 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5288 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5290 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5291 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5292 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(
5293 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5294 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, logger: &L
5295 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5296 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5297 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, logger);
5298 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5301 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5302 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5303 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5309 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5310 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5311 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5313 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5314 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5315 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5316 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5322 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5323 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5325 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5326 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5327 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5328 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5329 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5330 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5331 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5332 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5333 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5336 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5337 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5338 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5340 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5341 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5344 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5345 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5347 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5348 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5349 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5352 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5353 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5354 let mut chan_closed = false;
5355 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5359 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5361 None if !chan_closed => {
5362 // use override shutdown script if provided
5363 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5364 Some(script) => script,
5366 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5367 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5368 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5369 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5373 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5374 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5376 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5382 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5383 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5384 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5385 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5387 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5389 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5391 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5392 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5393 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5394 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5395 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5396 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5399 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5400 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5402 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5403 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5404 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5407 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5408 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5409 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5410 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5411 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5413 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5414 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5421 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5422 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5424 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5427 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5428 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5429 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5431 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5432 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5436 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5440 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5441 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
5442 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
5445 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> OutboundV1Channel<Signer> {
5446 pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
5447 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5448 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5449 outbound_scid_alias: u64
5450 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<Signer>, APIError>
5451 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5452 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
5453 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5455 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5456 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5457 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5458 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5460 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5461 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5463 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5464 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5466 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5467 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5468 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5470 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5471 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5473 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5474 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5475 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5476 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5477 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5480 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5481 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5483 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
5485 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5486 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
5487 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
5488 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5491 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5492 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5494 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5495 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5496 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5497 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5501 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5502 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5503 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5507 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5508 Ok(script) => script,
5509 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5512 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
5515 context: ChannelContext {
5518 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5519 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5520 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5521 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5526 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5528 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5529 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5530 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5531 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5533 channel_value_satoshis,
5535 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5538 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5541 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5542 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5545 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5546 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5547 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5548 pending_update_fee: None,
5549 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5550 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5551 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
5552 update_time_counter: 1,
5554 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5556 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
5557 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
5558 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
5559 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
5560 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
5561 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
5563 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5564 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5565 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5566 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5568 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5569 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5570 closing_fee_limits: None,
5571 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
5573 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
5575 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
5576 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
5577 short_channel_id: None,
5578 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
5580 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
5581 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
5582 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
5583 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
5584 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
5585 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5586 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5587 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
5588 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
5589 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
5590 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
5591 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5593 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
5595 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
5596 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
5597 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
5598 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5599 counterparty_parameters: None,
5600 funding_outpoint: None,
5601 opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None },
5602 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
5604 funding_transaction: None,
5606 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
5607 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
5608 counterparty_node_id,
5610 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
5612 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
5614 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5615 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5617 announcement_sigs: None,
5619 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5620 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5621 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5622 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5624 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5625 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
5627 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
5628 outbound_scid_alias,
5630 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
5631 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
5633 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5634 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
5639 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
5644 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5645 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5646 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5647 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5648 Ok(self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5649 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5652 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5653 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5654 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5655 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5656 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5657 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5658 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5659 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L)
5660 -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingCreated), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
5661 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5662 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5664 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5665 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5667 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5668 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5669 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5670 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5673 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5674 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5676 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5679 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5680 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5681 return Err((self, e));
5685 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5687 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5689 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5690 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5691 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5693 let channel = Channel {
5694 context: self.context,
5697 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingCreated {
5698 temporary_channel_id,
5699 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5700 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5703 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5705 next_local_nonce: None,
5709 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
5710 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
5711 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
5712 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
5713 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
5714 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5715 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
5716 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
5717 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
5718 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
5721 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
5722 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
5723 // `only_static_remotekey`.
5725 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
5726 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
5727 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5728 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
5735 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
5736 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
5737 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
5738 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
5739 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
5740 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5741 // We've exhausted our options
5744 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
5745 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
5748 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
5749 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
5750 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
5751 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
5753 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5754 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
5755 assert!(self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none());
5756 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
5757 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
5758 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
5760 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5762 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
5765 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5766 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5767 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5769 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5770 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5773 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5774 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5777 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5778 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
5782 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5783 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5784 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5785 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5786 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5787 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5788 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5789 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5790 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5791 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5792 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5793 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5794 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5795 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5796 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5797 first_per_commitment_point,
5798 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5799 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5800 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5801 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5803 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
5808 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5809 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
5811 // Check sanity of message fields:
5812 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5813 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
5815 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5816 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
5818 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
5819 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
5821 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5822 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
5824 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5825 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5827 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5828 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
5829 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5831 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
5832 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
5833 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
5835 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5836 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
5837 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
5839 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
5840 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
5842 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
5843 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
5846 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
5847 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
5848 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5850 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5851 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5853 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5854 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5856 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
5857 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5859 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5860 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5862 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5863 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5865 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
5866 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
5869 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
5870 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
5871 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
5873 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
5874 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
5876 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
5877 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5878 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
5880 self.context.channel_type = channel_type;
5883 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
5884 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5885 &Some(ref script) => {
5886 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
5887 if script.len() == 0 {
5890 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
5891 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
5893 Some(script.clone())
5896 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
5898 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
5903 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
5904 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
5905 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
5906 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
5907 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
5909 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
5910 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
5912 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
5915 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5916 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
5917 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
5918 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
5919 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5920 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
5923 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5924 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
5925 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
5928 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
5929 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
5931 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
5932 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
5938 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5939 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
5940 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
5943 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> InboundV1Channel<Signer> {
5944 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
5945 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
5946 pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5947 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
5948 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
5949 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
5950 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
5951 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
5952 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5953 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
5954 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5957 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
5959 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
5960 // support this channel type.
5961 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
5962 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
5963 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
5966 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
5967 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
5968 // `static_remote_key`.
5969 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
5970 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
5972 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
5973 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
5974 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
5976 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
5977 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
5979 channel_type.clone()
5981 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
5982 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5983 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
5987 let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
5989 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
5990 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5991 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5992 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5993 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
5994 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
5995 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
5996 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5997 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6000 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6001 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6004 // Check sanity of message fields:
6005 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6006 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6008 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6009 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6011 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6012 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6014 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6015 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6016 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6018 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6019 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6021 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6022 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6024 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6026 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6027 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6028 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6030 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6031 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6033 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6034 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6037 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6038 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6039 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6041 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6042 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6044 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6045 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6047 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6048 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6050 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6051 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6053 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6054 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6056 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6057 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6060 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6062 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6063 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6064 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6068 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6069 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6070 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6071 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6072 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6074 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6075 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6077 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6078 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6079 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6081 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6082 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6085 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6086 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6087 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6088 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
6089 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
6090 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
6093 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
6094 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6095 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6096 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6097 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6100 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6101 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6102 &Some(ref script) => {
6103 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6104 if script.len() == 0 {
6107 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6108 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6110 Some(script.clone())
6113 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6115 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6120 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6121 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6122 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6123 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6127 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6128 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6129 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6133 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6134 Ok(script) => script,
6135 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6138 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6139 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6142 context: ChannelContext {
6145 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6146 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6148 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6153 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6155 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6156 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6157 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6158 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6161 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6164 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6167 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6168 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6169 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6171 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6172 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6173 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6174 pending_update_fee: None,
6175 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6176 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6177 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6178 update_time_counter: 1,
6180 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6182 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6183 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6184 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6185 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6186 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6187 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6189 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6190 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6191 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6192 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6194 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6195 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6196 closing_fee_limits: None,
6197 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6199 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
6201 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6202 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6203 short_channel_id: None,
6204 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6206 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6207 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6208 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6209 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6210 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6211 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6212 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6213 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6214 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6215 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6216 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6217 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6218 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
6220 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6222 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6223 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6224 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6225 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6226 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6227 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6228 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6230 funding_outpoint: None,
6231 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
6232 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
6234 funding_transaction: None,
6236 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6237 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6238 counterparty_node_id,
6240 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6242 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6244 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6245 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6247 announcement_sigs: None,
6249 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6250 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6251 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6252 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6254 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6255 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6257 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6258 outbound_scid_alias,
6260 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6261 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6263 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6264 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6269 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6276 pub fn is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
6277 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept
6280 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
6281 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
6282 assert!(self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept);
6283 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(0);
6286 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6287 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6289 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6290 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6291 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6292 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6294 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6295 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6297 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6298 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6300 if !self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
6301 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
6304 self.context.user_id = user_id;
6305 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
6307 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6310 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6311 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6312 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6314 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6315 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6316 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6317 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6319 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6320 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6321 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6322 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6323 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6324 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6325 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6326 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6327 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6328 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6329 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6330 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6331 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6332 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6333 first_per_commitment_point,
6334 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6335 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6336 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6338 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6340 next_local_nonce: None,
6344 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6345 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6347 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6349 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6350 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6353 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6354 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6356 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6357 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6359 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6360 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6361 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6362 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6363 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6364 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6365 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6366 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6367 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6370 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6371 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6373 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6374 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6375 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6376 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6378 let counterparty_signature = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6379 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
6381 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
6382 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
6385 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
6386 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6387 ) -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6389 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
6392 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6393 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6395 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6396 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6397 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6399 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6401 if self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
6402 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned())));
6404 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6405 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6406 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6407 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6410 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6411 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6412 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6413 // funding_created_signature may fail.
6414 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6416 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6418 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6419 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6420 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6423 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6424 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6425 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6429 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6430 initial_commitment_tx,
6433 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6434 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6437 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6438 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6441 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6443 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6444 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6445 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6446 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6447 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6448 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6449 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6450 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6451 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6452 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6453 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6455 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6457 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
6459 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6460 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6461 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6462 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6464 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6466 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6467 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6468 let mut channel = Channel {
6469 context: self.context,
6471 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id.clone();
6472 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6473 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6475 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingSigned {
6479 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6480 }, channel_monitor))
6484 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6485 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6487 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6493 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6494 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6495 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6496 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6497 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6499 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6500 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6501 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6502 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6508 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6509 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6510 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6511 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6512 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6513 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6518 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6519 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6520 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6521 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6523 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6524 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6525 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6526 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6531 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6532 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6533 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6534 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6535 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6536 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6541 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6542 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6543 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6546 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6548 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6549 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6550 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6551 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6552 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6554 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6555 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6556 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6557 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6559 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6560 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6561 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6563 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6565 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6566 self.context.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6567 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6568 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6569 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6570 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6572 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6573 // deserialized from that format.
6574 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6575 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6576 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6578 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6580 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6581 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6582 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6584 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6585 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6586 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6587 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6590 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6591 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6592 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6595 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6596 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6597 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6598 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6600 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6601 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6603 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6605 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6607 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6609 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6612 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6614 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6619 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6620 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6622 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6623 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
6624 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6625 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6626 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6627 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6628 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6630 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6632 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6634 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6637 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6638 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6639 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6642 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6644 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6645 preimages.push(preimage);
6647 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6648 reason.write(writer)?;
6650 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6652 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6653 preimages.push(preimage);
6655 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6656 reason.write(writer)?;
6659 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
6660 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6661 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6663 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6664 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6665 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
6669 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6670 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6671 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
6673 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6674 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
6678 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6679 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6680 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6681 source.write(writer)?;
6682 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6684 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
6685 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6686 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6688 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6689 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6691 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6693 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6694 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6696 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6698 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6699 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6704 match self.context.resend_order {
6705 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6706 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6709 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6710 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6711 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6713 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6714 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6715 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6716 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6719 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6720 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6721 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6722 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6723 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6726 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6727 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6728 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6729 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6731 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6732 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6733 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6735 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6737 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6738 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6739 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6740 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6742 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6743 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6744 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6745 // consider the stale state on reload.
6748 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6749 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6750 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6752 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6753 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6754 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6756 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6757 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6759 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6760 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6761 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6763 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6764 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6766 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6769 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6770 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6771 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6773 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6776 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6777 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6779 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6780 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6781 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6783 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6785 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6787 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6789 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6790 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6791 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6792 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6793 htlc.write(writer)?;
6796 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6797 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6798 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6800 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6801 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
6803 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6804 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6805 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6806 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6807 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6808 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
6809 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6811 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6812 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6813 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6814 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6815 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6817 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6818 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6820 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6821 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6822 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6823 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6825 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6827 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6828 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
6829 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6830 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6831 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6832 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6833 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6835 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
6836 (2, chan_type, option),
6837 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6838 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6839 (5, self.context.config, required),
6840 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6841 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6842 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6843 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6844 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
6845 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6846 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6847 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6848 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6849 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6850 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6851 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
6852 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6853 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
6854 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6855 (33, self.context.pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
6856 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6857 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6864 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6865 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6867 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6868 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6870 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6871 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6872 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6874 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6875 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6876 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6877 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6879 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6881 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6882 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6883 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6884 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6885 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6887 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6888 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6891 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6892 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6893 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6895 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6897 let mut keys_data = None;
6899 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6900 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6901 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6902 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6903 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6904 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6905 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6906 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6907 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6908 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6912 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6913 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6914 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6917 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6919 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6920 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6921 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6923 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6925 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6926 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6927 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6928 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6929 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6930 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6931 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6932 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6933 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6934 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6935 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6936 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6937 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6942 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6943 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6944 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6945 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6946 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6947 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6948 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6949 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6950 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6951 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6952 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6953 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6955 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6956 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6959 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6960 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6963 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6964 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6966 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6968 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
6972 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6973 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6974 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6975 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6976 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6977 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6978 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6979 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6980 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6981 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6982 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
6984 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6985 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6986 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6988 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6989 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6990 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6992 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6996 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6997 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6998 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6999 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7002 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7003 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7004 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7006 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7007 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7008 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7009 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7012 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7013 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7014 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7015 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7018 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7020 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7022 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7023 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7024 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7025 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7027 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7028 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7029 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7030 // consider the stale state on reload.
7031 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7034 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7035 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7036 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7038 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7041 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7042 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7043 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7045 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7046 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7047 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7048 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7050 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7051 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7053 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7054 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7056 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7057 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7058 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7060 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7062 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7063 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7065 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7066 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7069 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7071 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7072 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7073 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7074 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7076 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7079 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7080 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
7082 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7084 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7085 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7087 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7088 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7090 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7092 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7093 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7094 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7096 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7097 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7098 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7102 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7103 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7104 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7106 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7112 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7113 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7114 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7115 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7116 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7117 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7118 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7119 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7120 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7121 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7123 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7124 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7125 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7126 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7127 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7128 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7129 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7131 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7132 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7133 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7134 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7136 let mut pending_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7138 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7139 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7141 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7142 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7143 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7144 (2, channel_type, option),
7145 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7146 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7147 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7148 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7149 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7150 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7151 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
7152 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7153 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
7154 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7155 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7156 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7157 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7158 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7159 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7160 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7161 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7162 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7163 (33, pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
7164 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7165 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7168 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7169 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7170 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7171 // required channel parameters.
7172 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7173 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7174 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7176 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7178 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7179 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7180 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7181 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7184 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7185 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7186 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7188 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7189 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7191 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7192 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7197 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7198 if iter.next().is_some() {
7199 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7203 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7204 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7205 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7206 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7207 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7210 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7211 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7213 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7214 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7215 // separate u64 values.
7216 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7218 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7220 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7221 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7222 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7223 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7225 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7226 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7228 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7229 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7230 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7231 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7232 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7235 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7236 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7240 context: ChannelContext {
7243 config: config.unwrap(),
7247 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7248 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7249 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7252 temporary_channel_id,
7254 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7256 channel_value_satoshis,
7258 latest_monitor_update_id,
7261 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7264 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7265 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7268 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7269 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7270 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7271 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7275 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7276 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7277 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7278 monitor_pending_forwards,
7279 monitor_pending_failures,
7280 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7283 holding_cell_update_fee,
7284 next_holder_htlc_id,
7285 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7286 update_time_counter,
7289 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7290 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7291 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7292 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7294 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7295 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7296 closing_fee_limits: None,
7297 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7299 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
7301 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7302 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7304 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7306 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7307 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7308 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7309 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7310 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7311 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7312 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7313 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7314 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7317 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7319 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7320 funding_transaction,
7322 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7323 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7324 counterparty_node_id,
7326 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7330 channel_update_status,
7331 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7335 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7336 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7337 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7338 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7340 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7341 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7343 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7344 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7345 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7347 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7348 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7350 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7351 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7353 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7356 pending_monitor_updates: pending_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7365 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7366 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7367 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7368 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7369 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7371 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7372 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7374 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7375 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7376 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7377 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7378 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7379 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7380 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7381 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7382 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7383 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7384 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7385 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7386 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7387 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7388 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
7389 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7390 use crate::util::test_utils;
7391 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
7392 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7393 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7394 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7395 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7396 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7397 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7398 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7399 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7400 use crate::prelude::*;
7402 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7405 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7406 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7412 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7413 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7414 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7415 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7419 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7420 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7421 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7422 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7423 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7424 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
7425 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7429 signer: InMemorySigner,
7432 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7433 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7436 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7437 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7439 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7440 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7443 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7447 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7449 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7450 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7451 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7452 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7453 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7456 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7457 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7458 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7459 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7463 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7464 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7465 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7469 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7470 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7471 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7472 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7474 let seed = [42; 32];
7475 let network = Network::Testnet;
7476 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7477 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7478 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7481 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7482 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7483 let config = UserConfig::default();
7484 match OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7485 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7486 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7488 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7489 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7493 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7494 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7496 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7497 let original_fee = 253;
7498 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7499 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7500 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7501 let seed = [42; 32];
7502 let network = Network::Testnet;
7503 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7505 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7506 let config = UserConfig::default();
7507 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7509 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7510 // same as the old fee.
7511 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7512 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7513 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7517 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7518 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7519 // dust limits are used.
7520 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7521 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7522 let seed = [42; 32];
7523 let network = Network::Testnet;
7524 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7525 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7526 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7528 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7529 // they have different dust limits.
7531 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7532 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7533 let config = UserConfig::default();
7534 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7536 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7537 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7538 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7539 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7540 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7542 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7543 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7544 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7545 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7546 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7548 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7549 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7550 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7551 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7553 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7554 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7555 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7557 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7558 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7560 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7561 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7562 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7564 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7565 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7566 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7567 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7570 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7572 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7573 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7574 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7575 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7576 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7577 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7578 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7579 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7580 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7582 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7585 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7586 // the dust limit check.
7587 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7588 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7589 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.opt_anchors());
7590 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7592 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7593 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7594 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7595 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.opt_anchors());
7596 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7597 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7598 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7602 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7603 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7604 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7605 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7606 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7607 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7608 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7609 let seed = [42; 32];
7610 let network = Network::Testnet;
7611 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7613 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7614 let config = UserConfig::default();
7615 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7617 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.opt_anchors());
7618 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.opt_anchors());
7620 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7621 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7622 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7623 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7624 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7625 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7627 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7628 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7629 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7630 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7631 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7633 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7635 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7636 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7637 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7638 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7639 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7641 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7642 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7643 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7644 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7645 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7649 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7650 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7651 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7652 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7653 let seed = [42; 32];
7654 let network = Network::Testnet;
7655 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7656 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7657 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7659 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7661 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7662 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7663 let config = UserConfig::default();
7664 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7666 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7667 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7668 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7669 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7671 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7672 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7673 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7675 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7676 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7677 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7678 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7680 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7681 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7682 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7684 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7685 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7687 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7688 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7689 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7690 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7691 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7692 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7693 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7695 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7697 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7698 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7699 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7700 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7701 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7705 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7706 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7707 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7708 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7709 let seed = [42; 32];
7710 let network = Network::Testnet;
7711 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7712 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7713 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7715 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7716 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7717 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7718 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7719 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7720 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7721 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7722 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7724 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7725 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7726 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7727 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7728 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7729 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7731 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7732 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7733 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7734 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7736 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7738 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7739 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7740 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7741 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7742 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7743 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7745 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7746 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7747 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7748 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7750 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7751 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7752 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7753 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7754 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7756 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7757 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7759 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7760 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7761 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7763 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7764 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7765 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7766 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7767 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7769 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7770 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7772 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7773 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7774 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7778 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7780 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
7781 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7782 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7784 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7785 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7786 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7787 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7789 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7790 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7791 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7793 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7795 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7796 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7799 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7800 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7801 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7802 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7803 let seed = [42; 32];
7804 let network = Network::Testnet;
7805 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7806 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7807 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7810 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7811 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7812 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7814 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7815 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7817 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7818 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7819 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7821 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7822 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7824 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7826 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7827 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7829 // Channel Negotiations failed
7830 let result = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7831 assert!(result.is_err());
7836 fn channel_update() {
7837 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7838 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7839 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7840 let seed = [42; 32];
7841 let network = Network::Testnet;
7842 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7843 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7844 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7846 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7847 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7848 let config = UserConfig::default();
7849 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7851 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7852 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7853 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7854 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7855 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7857 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7858 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7859 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7860 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7861 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7863 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7864 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7865 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7866 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7868 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7869 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7870 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7872 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7873 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7875 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7876 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7877 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7879 short_channel_id: 0,
7882 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7883 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7884 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7886 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7887 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7889 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7891 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7893 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7894 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7895 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7896 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7898 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7899 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7900 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7902 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7906 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
7908 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7909 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7910 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7911 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7912 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7913 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7914 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7915 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7916 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7917 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7918 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7919 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7920 use crate::sync::Arc;
7922 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7923 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7924 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7925 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7927 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7929 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7930 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7931 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7932 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7933 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7935 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7936 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7942 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7943 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7944 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7946 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7947 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7948 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7949 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7950 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7951 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7953 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7955 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7956 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7957 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7958 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7959 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7960 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7962 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7963 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7964 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7965 selected_contest_delay: 144
7967 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7968 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7970 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7971 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7973 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7974 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7976 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7977 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7979 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7980 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7981 // build_commitment_transaction.
7982 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7983 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7984 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7985 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7986 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7988 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7989 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7990 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7991 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7995 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7996 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7997 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7998 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
8002 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8003 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8004 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8006 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8007 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8009 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8010 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8012 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8014 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8015 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8016 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8017 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8018 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8019 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
8020 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8022 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8023 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8024 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8025 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8027 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8028 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8029 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8031 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8033 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8034 commitment_tx.clone(),
8035 counterparty_signature,
8036 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8037 &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8038 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8040 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8041 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8043 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8044 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8045 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8047 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8048 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
8051 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8052 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8054 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8055 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8056 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8057 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8058 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8059 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8060 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8061 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8063 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8066 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8067 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8068 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8072 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8075 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8076 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
8077 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8079 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8080 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
8081 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
8082 let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
8083 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8084 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
8085 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
8086 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8088 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8092 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8093 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8094 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8095 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80024a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f10529800000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778014730440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a865801475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8097 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8098 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8100 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8101 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8102 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48454a56a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004730440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae05564714201483045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8104 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8105 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8106 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8107 "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", {});
8109 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8110 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8112 amount_msat: 1000000,
8114 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8115 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8117 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8120 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8121 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8123 amount_msat: 2000000,
8125 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8126 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8128 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8131 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8132 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8134 amount_msat: 2000000,
8136 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8137 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8138 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8139 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8141 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8144 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8145 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8147 amount_msat: 3000000,
8149 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8150 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8151 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8152 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8154 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8157 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8158 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8160 amount_msat: 4000000,
8162 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8163 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8165 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8169 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8170 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8171 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8173 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8174 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8175 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8007e80300000000000022002052bfef0479d7b293c27e0f1eb294bea154c63a3294ef092c19af51409bce0e2ad007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484e0a06a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea01473044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8178 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8179 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8180 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b00000000000000000001e8030000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b014730440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce012000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a914b8bcb07f6344b42ab04250c86a6e8b75d3fdbbc688527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f401b175ac686800000000" },
8183 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8184 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8185 "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" },
8188 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8189 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8190 "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" },
8193 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8194 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8195 "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" },
8198 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8199 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8200 "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" }
8203 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8204 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8205 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8207 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8208 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8209 "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", {
8212 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8213 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8214 "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" },
8217 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8218 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8219 "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" },
8222 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8223 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8224 "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" },
8227 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8228 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8229 "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" },
8232 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8233 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8234 "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" }
8237 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8238 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8239 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8241 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8242 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8243 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8006d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4844e9d6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e90147304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8246 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8247 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8248 "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" },
8251 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8252 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8253 "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" },
8256 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8257 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8258 "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" },
8261 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8262 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8263 "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" }
8266 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8267 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8268 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8269 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8271 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8272 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8273 "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", {
8276 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8277 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8278 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320002000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc28283483045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef0901008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6851b27568f6010000" },
8281 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8282 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8283 "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" },
8286 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8287 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8288 "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" },
8291 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8292 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8293 "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" }
8296 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8297 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8298 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8299 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8301 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8302 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8303 "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", {
8306 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8307 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8308 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d0000000000000000000175020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f69901483045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
8311 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8312 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8313 "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" },
8316 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8317 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8318 "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" },
8321 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8322 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8323 "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" }
8326 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8327 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8328 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8330 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8331 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8332 "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", {
8335 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8336 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8337 "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" },
8340 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8341 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8342 "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" },
8345 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8346 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8347 "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff02000000000000000001f1090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504014730440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8350 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8351 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8352 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8354 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8355 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8356 "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", {
8359 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8360 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8361 "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" },
8364 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8365 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8366 "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" },
8369 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8370 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8371 "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" }
8374 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8375 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8376 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8378 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8379 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8380 "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", {
8383 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8384 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8385 "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" },
8388 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8389 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8390 "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" }
8393 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8394 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8395 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8396 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8398 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8399 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8400 "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", {
8403 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8404 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8405 "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" },
8408 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8409 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8410 "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" }
8413 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8414 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8415 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8416 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8418 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8419 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8420 "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", {
8423 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8424 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8425 "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" },
8428 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8429 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8430 "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" }
8433 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8434 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8435 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8437 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8438 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8439 "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", {
8442 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8443 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8444 "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" }
8447 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8448 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8449 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8450 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8452 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8453 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8454 "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", {
8457 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8458 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8459 "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" }
8462 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8463 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8464 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8465 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8467 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8468 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8469 "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", {
8472 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8473 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8474 "02000000000101a9172908eace869cc35128c31fc2ab502f72e4dff31aab23e0244c4b04b11ab00000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374014730440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8477 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8478 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8479 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8480 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8482 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8483 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8484 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484fa926a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf50147304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a72001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8486 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8487 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8488 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8489 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8491 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8492 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8493 "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", {});
8495 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8496 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8497 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8498 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8500 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8501 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8502 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b800222020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80ec0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4840400483045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de0147304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8504 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8505 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8506 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8508 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8509 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8510 "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", {});
8512 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8513 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8514 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8515 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8517 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8518 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8519 "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", {});
8521 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8522 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8523 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8524 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8526 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8527 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8528 "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", {});
8530 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8531 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8532 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8533 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8534 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8535 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8537 amount_msat: 2000000,
8539 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8540 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8542 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8545 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8546 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8547 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8549 amount_msat: 5000001,
8551 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8552 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8553 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8554 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8556 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8559 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8560 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8562 amount_msat: 5000000,
8564 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8565 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8566 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8567 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8569 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8573 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8574 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8575 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2d8813000000000000220020305c12e1a0bc21e283c131cea1c66d68857d28b7b2fce0a6fbc40c164852121b8813000000000000220020305c12e1a0bc21e283c131cea1c66d68857d28b7b2fce0a6fbc40c164852121bc0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484a69f6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c0147304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c801475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8578 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8579 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8580 "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" },
8582 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8583 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8584 "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" },
8586 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8587 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8588 "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" }
8591 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
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8593 "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", {
8596 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8597 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8598 "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" },
8600 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8601 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8602 "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" },
8604 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8605 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8606 "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" }
8611 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8612 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8614 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8615 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8616 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8617 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8619 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8620 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8621 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8623 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8624 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8626 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8627 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8629 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8630 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8631 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8635 fn test_key_derivation() {
8636 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8637 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8639 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8640 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8642 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8643 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8645 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8646 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8648 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8649 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8651 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8652 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8654 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8655 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8657 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8658 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8662 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8663 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8664 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8665 let seed = [42; 32];
8666 let network = Network::Testnet;
8667 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8668 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8670 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8671 let config = UserConfig::default();
8672 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8673 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8675 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8676 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8678 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8679 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8680 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8681 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8682 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8683 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8684 assert!(res.is_ok());
8689 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8690 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8691 // resulting `channel_type`.
8692 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8693 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8694 let network = Network::Testnet;
8695 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8696 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8698 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8699 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8701 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8702 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8704 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8705 // need to signal it.
8706 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8707 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8708 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8711 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8713 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8714 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8715 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8717 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8718 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8719 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8722 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8723 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8724 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8725 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8726 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8729 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8730 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8735 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8736 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8737 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8738 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8739 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8740 let network = Network::Testnet;
8741 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8742 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8744 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8745 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8747 let config = UserConfig::default();
8749 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8750 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8751 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8752 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8753 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8755 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8756 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8757 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8760 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8761 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8762 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8764 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8765 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8766 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8767 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8768 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8769 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8771 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8776 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8777 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8779 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8780 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8781 let network = Network::Testnet;
8782 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8783 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8785 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8786 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8788 let config = UserConfig::default();
8790 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8791 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8792 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8793 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8794 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8795 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8796 assert!(simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8797 assert!(simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8799 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8800 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8801 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8802 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8803 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8804 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8807 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8808 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8810 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8811 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8812 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8813 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8815 assert!(res.is_err());
8817 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8818 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8819 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8821 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8822 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8823 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8826 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8828 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8829 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8830 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8831 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8834 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8835 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8837 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8838 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8840 assert!(res.is_err());