1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
33 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
34 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
36 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
41 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
46 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
48 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
49 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
50 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
51 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
53 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
55 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
57 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
59 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
60 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder};
61 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
62 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
63 use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, Offer, OfferBuilder};
64 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
65 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
66 use crate::onion_message::{Destination, OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
67 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
68 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
69 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
70 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
71 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
72 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
73 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
74 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
76 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
79 use crate::prelude::*;
81 use core::cell::RefCell;
83 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
84 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
85 use core::time::Duration;
88 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
89 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
90 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
92 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
94 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
95 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
96 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
98 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
99 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
100 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
101 // before we forward it.
103 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
104 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
105 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
106 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
107 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
109 /// Routing info for an inbound HTLC onion.
110 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
111 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
112 /// A forwarded HTLC.
114 /// BOLT 4 onion packet.
115 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
116 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
117 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
118 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
120 /// An HTLC paid to an invoice we generated.
122 /// Payment secret and total msat received.
123 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
124 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`] for more info.
125 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
126 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
127 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
128 /// Optional shared secret for phantom node.
129 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
130 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
131 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
133 /// Incoming keysend (sender provided the preimage in a TLV).
135 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
136 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
137 /// Preimage for this onion payment.
138 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
139 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`] for more info.
140 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
141 /// CLTV expiry of the incoming HTLC.
142 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
143 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
144 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
148 /// Full details of an incoming HTLC, including routing info.
149 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
150 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
151 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
152 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
153 /// Shared secret from the previous hop.
154 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
155 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
157 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
158 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
159 /// may overshoot this in either case)
160 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
161 /// Outgoing CLTV height.
162 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
163 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
164 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
165 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
168 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
169 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
170 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
171 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
174 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
175 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
176 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
177 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
178 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
181 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
182 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
184 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
185 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
186 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
189 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
190 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
192 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
193 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
196 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
197 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
200 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
204 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
205 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
206 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
207 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
208 short_channel_id: u64,
209 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
211 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
212 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
214 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
215 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
220 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
222 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
223 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
224 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
226 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
227 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
230 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
231 struct ClaimableHTLC {
232 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
234 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
236 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
237 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
238 sender_intended_value: u64,
239 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
241 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
242 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
243 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
244 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
246 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
247 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
250 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
251 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
252 events::ClaimedHTLC {
253 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
254 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
255 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
256 value_msat: val.value,
261 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
262 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
264 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
265 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
266 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
269 /// Number of bytes in the id.
270 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
273 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
274 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
279 impl Readable for PaymentId {
280 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
281 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
286 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
287 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
288 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
292 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
294 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
295 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
296 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
298 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
299 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
304 impl Readable for InterceptId {
305 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
306 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
311 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
312 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
313 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
314 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
315 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
318 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
320 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
321 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
322 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
324 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
325 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
329 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
330 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
331 (0, short_channel_id, required),
332 (2, htlc_id, required),
334 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
335 (0, session_priv, required),
340 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
341 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
342 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
343 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
344 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
347 session_priv: SecretKey,
348 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
349 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
350 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
351 payment_id: PaymentId,
354 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
355 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
356 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
358 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
360 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
362 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
365 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
366 payment_id.hash(hasher);
367 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
373 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
375 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
376 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
377 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
378 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
379 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
380 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
384 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
385 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
386 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
387 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
388 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
389 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
391 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
397 /// Invalid inbound onion payment.
398 pub struct InboundOnionErr {
404 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
405 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
407 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
408 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
409 pub enum FailureCode {
410 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
411 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
412 TemporaryNodeFailure,
413 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
414 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
415 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
416 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
417 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
418 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
419 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
420 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
421 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
422 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
424 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
425 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
426 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
429 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
430 fn into(self) -> u16 {
432 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
433 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
434 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
435 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
440 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
441 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
442 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
443 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
444 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
446 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
447 err: msgs::LightningError,
448 chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
449 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
450 channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
452 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
454 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
456 err: LightningError {
458 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
459 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
466 shutdown_finish: None,
467 channel_capacity: None,
471 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
472 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
475 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
476 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
477 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
478 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
479 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
480 // commitment upon reconnecting.
481 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
483 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
486 err: LightningError { err, action },
487 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
488 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
489 channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
493 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
496 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
498 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
499 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
503 log_level: Level::Warn,
506 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
508 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
510 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
512 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
513 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
521 shutdown_finish: None,
522 channel_capacity: None,
526 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
527 self.chan_id.is_some()
531 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
532 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
533 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
534 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
535 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
537 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
538 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
539 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
540 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
541 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
542 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
543 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
545 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
549 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
550 struct ClaimingPayment {
552 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
553 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
554 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
555 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
557 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
558 (0, amount_msat, required),
559 (2, payment_purpose, required),
560 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
561 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
562 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
565 struct ClaimablePayment {
566 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
567 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
568 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
571 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
572 struct ClaimablePayments {
573 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
574 /// failed/claimed by the user.
576 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
577 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
579 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
580 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
581 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
583 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
584 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
585 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
586 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
589 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
590 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
591 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
592 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
594 enum BackgroundEvent {
595 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
596 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
597 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
598 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
600 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
601 /// are regenerated on startup.
602 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
603 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
604 /// channel to continue normal operation.
606 /// In general this should be used rather than
607 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
608 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
609 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
611 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
612 /// are regenerated on startup.
613 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
614 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
615 funding_txo: OutPoint,
616 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
618 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
619 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
621 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
622 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
623 channel_id: ChannelId,
628 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
629 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
630 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
631 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
632 /// event can be generated.
633 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
634 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
635 /// operation of another channel.
637 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
638 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
639 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
640 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
642 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
643 event: events::Event,
644 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
646 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
647 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
648 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
650 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
651 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
652 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
653 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
654 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
656 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
657 /// stored for later processing.
658 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
659 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
660 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
661 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
665 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
666 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
667 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
668 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
669 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
670 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
671 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
672 (4, blocking_action, required),
674 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
675 (0, event, upgradable_required),
676 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
677 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
678 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
679 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
680 // downgrades to prior versions.
681 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
685 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
686 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
687 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
688 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
689 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
692 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
693 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
694 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
695 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
699 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
700 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
701 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
702 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
703 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
704 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
706 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
707 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
708 channel_id: ChannelId,
709 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
714 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
715 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
716 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
717 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
718 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
723 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
724 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
728 /// State we hold per-peer.
729 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
730 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
732 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
733 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
734 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
736 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
737 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
738 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
739 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
740 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
741 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
742 latest_features: InitFeatures,
743 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
744 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
745 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
746 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
747 /// user but which have not yet completed.
749 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
750 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
751 /// for a missing channel.
752 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
753 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
754 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
756 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
757 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
758 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
759 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
761 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
762 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
763 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
764 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
765 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
766 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
767 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
768 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
769 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
770 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
771 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
772 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
773 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
774 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
775 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
779 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
780 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
781 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
782 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
783 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
784 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
787 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
788 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
789 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
792 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
793 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
794 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
797 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
798 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
799 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
800 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
804 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
805 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
806 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
807 /// The original OpenChannel message.
808 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
809 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
810 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
813 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
814 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
815 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
817 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
818 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
820 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
823 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
824 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
825 struct PendingInboundPayment {
826 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
827 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
828 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
829 /// this payment being removed.
831 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
832 user_payment_id: u64,
833 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
834 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
835 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
838 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
839 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
840 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
841 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
842 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
843 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
844 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
845 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
847 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
848 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
849 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
857 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
859 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
860 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
861 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
866 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
867 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
868 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
869 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
870 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
871 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
872 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
873 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
874 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
876 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
877 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
878 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
887 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
889 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
890 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
891 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
896 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
898 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
900 pub trait AChannelManager {
901 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
902 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
903 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
904 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
905 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
906 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
907 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
908 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
909 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
910 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
911 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
912 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
913 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
914 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
915 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
916 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
917 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
918 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
919 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
920 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
921 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
922 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
923 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
924 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
925 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
926 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
927 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
928 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
929 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
930 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
931 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
932 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
933 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
934 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
935 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
936 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
939 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
940 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
942 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
943 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
944 ES::Target: EntropySource,
945 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
946 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
947 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
951 type Watch = M::Target;
953 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
955 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
957 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
959 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
960 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
962 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
964 type Router = R::Target;
966 type Logger = L::Target;
968 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
971 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
972 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
974 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
975 /// to individual Channels.
977 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
978 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
979 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
980 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
982 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
983 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
984 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
985 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
986 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
987 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
988 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
989 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
990 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
992 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
993 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
994 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
996 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
997 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
998 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
999 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1000 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1002 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1003 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1004 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1005 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1007 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1008 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1009 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1011 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1012 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1013 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1014 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1015 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1017 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1018 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1019 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1020 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1021 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1022 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1023 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1024 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1027 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1028 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1029 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1030 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1031 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1035 // `pending_offers_messages`
1037 // `total_consistency_lock`
1039 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1041 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1043 // |__`per_peer_state`
1045 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1047 // |__`claimable_payments`
1049 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1055 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1057 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1061 // |__`pending_events`
1063 // |__`pending_background_events`
1065 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1067 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1068 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1069 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1070 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1071 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1072 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1076 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1077 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1078 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1084 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1086 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1088 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1089 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1091 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1092 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1093 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1094 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1096 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1097 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1099 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1100 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1101 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1102 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1103 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1104 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1105 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1106 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1108 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1110 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1111 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1113 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1115 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1116 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1117 /// and via the classic SCID.
1119 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1120 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1122 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1124 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1126 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1127 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1128 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1130 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1131 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1133 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1134 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1136 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1137 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1139 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1140 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1141 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1142 /// active channel list on load.
1144 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1145 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1147 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1149 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1150 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1151 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1153 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1154 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1155 /// the handling of the events.
1157 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1158 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1161 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1162 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1163 /// would break backwards compatability.
1164 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1165 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1166 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1168 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1169 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
1171 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1173 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1174 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1175 /// confirmation depth.
1177 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1178 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1179 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1181 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1183 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1185 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1187 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1189 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1191 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1192 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1193 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1195 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1196 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1198 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1199 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1200 /// keeping additional state.
1201 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1203 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1204 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1205 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1206 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1208 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1209 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1211 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1212 /// are currently open with that peer.
1214 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1215 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1218 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1220 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1221 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1222 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1223 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1224 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1226 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1227 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1228 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1229 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1230 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1232 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1233 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1235 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1236 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1237 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1238 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1239 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1241 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1242 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1244 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1245 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1246 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1247 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1248 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1250 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1252 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1254 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1255 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1256 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1257 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1258 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1259 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1260 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1261 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1262 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1263 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1264 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1266 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1267 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1268 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1270 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1272 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1273 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1275 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1279 signer_provider: SP,
1284 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1286 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1287 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1288 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1289 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1290 pub struct ChainParameters {
1291 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1292 pub network: Network,
1294 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1296 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1297 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1300 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1304 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1305 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1308 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1309 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1310 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1311 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1312 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1313 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1315 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1316 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1317 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1318 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1319 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1320 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1322 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1323 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1326 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1327 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1328 /// events to handle.
1330 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1331 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1333 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1334 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1337 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1338 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1339 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1340 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1342 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1343 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1344 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1345 should_persist: move || {
1346 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1347 // processing and return that.
1348 let notify = persist_check();
1349 match (notify, force_notify) {
1350 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1351 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1352 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1353 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1354 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1357 _read_guard: read_guard,
1361 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1362 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1363 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1364 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1365 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1366 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1368 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1369 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1370 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1371 should_persist: persist_check,
1372 _read_guard: read_guard,
1377 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1378 fn drop(&mut self) {
1379 match (self.should_persist)() {
1380 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1381 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1382 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1384 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1385 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1386 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1391 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1392 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1394 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1396 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1397 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1398 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1399 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1400 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1402 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1403 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1405 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1407 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1408 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1409 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1410 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1411 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1412 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1413 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1414 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1415 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1416 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1417 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1418 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1419 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1421 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1422 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1424 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1425 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1426 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1427 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1429 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1430 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1431 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1432 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1433 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1434 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1437 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1439 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1440 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1443 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1445 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1446 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1448 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1449 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1450 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1452 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1453 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1454 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1456 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1457 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1458 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1459 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1461 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1462 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1463 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1465 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1466 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1467 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1469 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1470 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1471 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1472 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1473 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1474 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1475 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1476 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1477 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1478 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1479 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1482 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1483 /// to better separate parameters.
1484 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1485 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1486 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1487 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1488 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1489 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1490 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1491 pub features: InitFeatures,
1492 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1493 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1494 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1496 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1498 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1499 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1500 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1501 /// payments to us through this channel.
1502 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1503 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1504 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1505 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1506 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1507 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1508 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1511 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1512 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1513 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1514 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1515 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1516 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1517 /// lifetime of the channel.
1518 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1519 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1520 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1521 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1522 /// our counterparty already.
1524 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1525 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1526 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1527 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1529 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1530 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1531 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1532 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1534 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1535 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1537 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1538 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1540 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1541 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1542 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1543 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1544 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1545 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1546 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1547 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1548 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1551 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1553 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1554 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1555 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1556 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1557 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1558 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1559 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1561 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1562 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1564 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1565 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1566 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1567 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1568 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1569 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1570 /// this value on chain.
1572 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1574 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1576 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1577 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1578 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1579 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1580 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1581 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1582 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1584 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1585 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1586 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1587 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1588 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1589 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1591 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1592 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1593 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1594 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1595 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1597 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1598 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1599 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1600 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1602 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1603 pub balance_msat: u64,
1604 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1605 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1606 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1607 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1609 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1611 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1612 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1613 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1614 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1615 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1616 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1617 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1618 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1620 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1621 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1622 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1623 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1624 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1625 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1626 /// route which is valid.
1627 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1628 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1629 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1630 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1631 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1632 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1634 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1635 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1636 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1637 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1638 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1639 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1640 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1641 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1642 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1644 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1646 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1647 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1648 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1649 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1650 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1652 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1653 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1654 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1655 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1656 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1657 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1658 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1660 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1661 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1662 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1663 pub is_outbound: bool,
1664 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1665 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1666 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1667 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1668 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1670 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1671 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1672 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1673 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1674 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1675 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1676 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1678 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1679 pub is_usable: bool,
1680 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1681 pub is_public: bool,
1682 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1683 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1684 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1685 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1686 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1687 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1689 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1690 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1693 impl ChannelDetails {
1694 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1695 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1696 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1698 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1699 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1700 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1701 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1704 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1705 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1706 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1708 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1709 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1710 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1711 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1714 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1715 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1716 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1719 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1720 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1722 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1723 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1724 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1726 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1727 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1728 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1729 features: latest_features,
1730 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1731 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1732 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1733 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1734 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1735 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1736 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1737 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1738 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1739 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1741 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1742 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1743 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1744 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1745 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1746 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1747 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1748 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1749 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1750 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1751 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1752 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1753 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1754 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1755 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1756 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1757 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1758 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1759 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1760 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1761 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1762 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1763 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1764 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1765 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1766 config: Some(context.config()),
1767 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1772 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1773 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1774 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1775 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1776 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1777 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1778 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1779 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1780 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1782 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1784 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1785 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1787 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1788 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1789 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1790 /// to drop the channel.
1794 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1795 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1796 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1797 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1798 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1800 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1801 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1802 payment_id: PaymentId,
1804 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1806 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1807 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1808 payment_id: PaymentId,
1809 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1811 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1812 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1813 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1816 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1817 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1818 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1820 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1821 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1822 payment_id: PaymentId,
1823 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1824 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1825 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1827 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1828 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1829 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1831 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1832 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1833 payment_id: PaymentId,
1834 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1835 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1839 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1841 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1843 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1844 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1845 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1846 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1848 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1849 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1850 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1853 macro_rules! handle_error {
1854 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1855 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1856 // entering the macro.
1857 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1858 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1862 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1863 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1865 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1866 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1867 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1868 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1872 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1873 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1874 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1875 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1876 counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1877 channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1882 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1883 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1885 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1886 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1887 action: err.action.clone()
1891 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1892 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1893 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1894 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1895 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1899 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1904 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1907 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1908 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1909 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1915 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1916 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1917 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1918 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1919 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1920 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1922 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1923 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1924 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1925 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1926 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1928 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1929 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1931 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1935 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1936 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
1937 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
1939 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1940 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
1942 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1943 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
1945 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1946 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
1947 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
1948 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1949 let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
1950 let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
1952 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
1953 shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
1957 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1958 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
1960 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1961 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
1963 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1964 match $channel_phase {
1965 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
1966 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
1968 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
1969 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1971 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
1972 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1978 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
1979 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1983 let key = *$entry.key();
1984 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1986 $entry.remove_entry();
1994 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
1995 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1999 let key = *$entry.key();
2000 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2002 $entry.remove_entry();
2010 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2011 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2013 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2014 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2020 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2021 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2022 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2023 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2024 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2026 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2027 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2028 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2029 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2030 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2031 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2032 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2033 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2034 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2035 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2040 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2041 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2042 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2043 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2044 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2045 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2046 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2047 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2048 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2050 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2055 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2056 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2057 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2058 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2059 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2060 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2061 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2062 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2063 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2065 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2070 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2071 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2072 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
2073 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2074 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2075 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2076 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2077 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2078 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2079 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2080 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2082 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2083 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2084 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2090 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2091 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2093 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2094 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2095 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2096 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2097 updates.announcement_sigs);
2098 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2099 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2102 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2103 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2104 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2105 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2107 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2108 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2109 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2110 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2111 let mut batch_completed = false;
2112 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2113 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2114 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2115 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2117 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2118 channel_state.2 = true;
2120 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2122 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2124 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2127 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2128 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2129 if batch_completed {
2130 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2131 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2132 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2133 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2134 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2135 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2136 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2137 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2138 chan.set_batch_ready();
2139 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2140 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2144 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2145 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2146 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2151 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2153 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2154 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2156 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2157 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2158 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2159 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2164 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2165 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2166 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2168 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2169 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2170 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err_str);
2171 panic!("{}", err_str);
2173 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2174 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2175 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2178 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2184 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2185 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2186 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2188 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2189 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2190 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2191 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2192 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2193 // filter for uniqueness here.
2194 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2195 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2196 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2197 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2199 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2200 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2202 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2203 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2204 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2210 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2211 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2212 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2213 while !processed_all_events {
2214 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2221 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2222 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2223 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2225 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2226 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2227 result = $self.process_background_events();
2229 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2230 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2231 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2232 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2236 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2237 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2238 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2239 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2242 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2244 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2245 $event_to_handle = event;
2247 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2248 post_event_actions.push(action);
2253 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2254 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2255 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2256 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2257 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2258 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2261 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2262 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2263 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2264 processed_all_events = false;
2268 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2269 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2270 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2272 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2273 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2274 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2280 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2282 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2283 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2284 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2285 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2286 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2287 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2291 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2293 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2295 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2296 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2298 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2300 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2301 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2302 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2305 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2306 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2307 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2309 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2310 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2311 current_timestamp: u32,
2313 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2314 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2315 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2316 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2318 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2319 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2320 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2325 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2327 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2328 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2329 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2330 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2331 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2332 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2333 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2334 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2336 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2339 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2340 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2342 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2344 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2346 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2348 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2349 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2350 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2351 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2352 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2353 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2354 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2355 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2357 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2367 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2368 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2369 &self.default_configuration
2372 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2373 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2374 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2377 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2378 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2380 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2382 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2386 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2391 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2393 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2394 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2395 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2396 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2397 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2399 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2400 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2402 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2403 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2404 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2406 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2407 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2408 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2410 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2411 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2412 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2413 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2414 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2415 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2417 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2418 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2419 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2420 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2421 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2422 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2425 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2426 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2427 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2429 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2431 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2432 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2434 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2436 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2437 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2438 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2439 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2440 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2441 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2445 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2450 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2452 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2453 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2454 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2456 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2458 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2461 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2464 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2465 node_id: their_network_key,
2468 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2471 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2472 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2473 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2474 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2475 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2476 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2477 // the same channel.
2478 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2480 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2481 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2482 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2483 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2484 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2485 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2486 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2487 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2488 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2492 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2493 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2494 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2502 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2503 /// more information.
2504 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2505 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2506 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2507 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2508 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2509 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2510 // the same channel.
2511 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2513 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2514 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2515 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2516 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2517 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2518 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2519 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2520 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2528 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2529 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2531 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2532 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2534 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2535 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2536 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2537 // really wanted anyway.
2538 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2541 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2542 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2543 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2544 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2546 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2547 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2548 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2549 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2550 let context_to_details = |context| {
2551 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2553 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2555 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2556 .map(context_to_details)
2562 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2563 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2565 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2566 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2567 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2569 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2570 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2571 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2572 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2573 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2574 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2576 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2577 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2578 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2580 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2581 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2582 payment_id: *payment_id,
2583 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2584 total_msat: *total_msat,
2587 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2588 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2590 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2591 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2593 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2598 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2599 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2600 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2601 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2602 Some(transaction) => {
2603 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2604 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2609 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2610 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2611 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2612 reason: closure_reason,
2613 counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2614 channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2618 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2619 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2621 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2622 let shutdown_result;
2624 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2626 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2627 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2629 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2630 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2632 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2633 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2634 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2635 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2636 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2637 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs, local_shutdown_result) =
2638 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2639 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2640 shutdown_result = local_shutdown_result;
2641 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
2643 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2644 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2645 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2646 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2647 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2651 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2652 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2654 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2655 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2656 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2657 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2661 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2662 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
2663 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2664 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2668 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2674 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2675 // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2676 // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2678 // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2679 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
2680 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2681 return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2686 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2687 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2688 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2689 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2692 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2693 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2699 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2700 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2701 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2703 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2704 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2706 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2707 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2708 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2709 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2711 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2713 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2714 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2715 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2718 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2719 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2720 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2721 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2722 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2723 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2726 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2727 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2728 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2730 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2731 /// the channel being closed or not:
2732 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2733 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2734 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2735 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2736 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2737 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2738 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2740 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2741 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2742 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2743 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2745 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2747 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2748 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2749 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2752 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2753 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2754 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2755 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2756 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2759 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2760 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2761 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2762 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2763 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2766 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
2767 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
2768 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2769 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2770 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2771 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2773 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
2774 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2775 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2776 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2777 // ignore the result here.
2778 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2780 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2781 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2782 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2783 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2784 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2785 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2786 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2787 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2788 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2789 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2790 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2791 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure);
2792 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2795 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2798 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2799 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2802 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2803 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2807 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2808 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2809 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2810 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2811 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2812 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2813 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2814 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2815 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2816 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2817 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2819 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2821 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2822 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2823 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
2824 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2825 mem::drop(peer_state);
2826 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2828 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2829 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2830 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2832 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2833 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2834 // Unfunded channel has no update
2835 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2838 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2839 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2840 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2841 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2843 (None, *peer_node_id)
2845 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2848 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2849 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2850 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2851 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2852 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2853 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2854 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2855 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2856 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2862 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2865 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2866 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2867 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2868 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2869 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2870 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2871 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2872 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2873 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2874 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2875 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
2876 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
2887 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2888 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2889 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2891 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2892 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2893 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2896 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2897 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2898 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2900 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2901 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2902 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2903 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2904 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2907 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2908 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2909 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2910 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2911 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2915 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2916 /// local transaction(s).
2917 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2918 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2919 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2923 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
2924 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
2926 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
2928 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
2929 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
2932 macro_rules! return_err {
2933 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2935 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2936 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2937 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2938 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2939 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2940 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2946 let NextPacketDetails {
2947 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_scid, outgoing_cltv_value
2948 } = match next_packet_details_opt {
2949 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
2950 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
2951 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
2954 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
2955 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
2956 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2957 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
2958 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2959 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2960 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2961 // phantom or an intercept.
2962 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2963 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
2964 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
2968 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2971 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2973 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2974 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2975 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2976 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2977 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2979 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2980 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2981 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
2982 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
2985 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2986 // have no consistency guarantees.
2987 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2991 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2992 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2993 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2994 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2995 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2997 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
2998 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2999 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3000 // we don't have the channel here.
3001 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3003 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3005 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3006 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3007 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3008 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3009 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3010 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3011 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3012 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3013 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3014 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3015 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3017 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3020 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3021 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3023 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3024 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3031 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3033 if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3034 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3036 if code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() {
3037 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3038 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3039 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3040 break Some((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None))
3042 let chan_update_opt = if code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None };
3043 break Some((err_msg, code, chan_update_opt));
3049 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3050 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3051 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3052 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3054 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3055 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3057 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3058 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3059 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3061 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3062 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3063 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3064 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3065 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3066 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3067 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3071 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3073 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_pubkey)))
3076 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3077 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3078 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3079 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3080 macro_rules! return_err {
3081 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3083 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3084 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3085 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3086 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3087 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3088 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3094 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3096 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3097 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3098 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3099 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3102 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3103 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3104 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3105 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3106 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3108 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3111 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3112 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3113 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3114 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3115 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3121 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3122 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3123 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3125 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3126 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3127 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3129 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3130 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3131 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3132 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3133 return Err(LightningError {
3134 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3135 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3138 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3139 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3141 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3142 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3145 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3146 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3147 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3148 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3150 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3151 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3152 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3154 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3155 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3156 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3157 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3158 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3159 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3163 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3166 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3167 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3168 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3170 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3171 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3172 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3173 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3174 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3177 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3178 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3180 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3181 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3182 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3183 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3184 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3185 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3186 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3187 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3189 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3190 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3191 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3193 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3195 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3202 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3203 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3204 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3205 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3210 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3211 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3212 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3215 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3216 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3218 log_trace!(self.logger,
3219 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3220 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3221 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3222 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3224 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3225 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3226 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3228 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3229 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3231 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3232 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3233 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3234 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3237 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3238 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3239 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3240 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3241 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3242 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3243 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3244 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3245 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3246 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3248 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3249 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3250 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3252 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3253 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3255 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3256 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3257 Some(monitor_update) => {
3258 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3260 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3261 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3262 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3263 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3264 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3265 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3266 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3274 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3277 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3278 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3279 // `channel_by_id` map.
3280 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3281 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3286 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3287 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3289 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3294 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3296 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3297 /// fields for more info.
3299 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3300 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3302 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3304 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3305 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3306 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3307 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3308 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3310 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3311 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3312 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3313 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3314 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3316 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3317 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3318 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3319 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3321 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3323 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3324 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3325 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3327 /// In general, a path may raise:
3328 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3329 /// node public key) is specified.
3330 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3331 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3332 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3333 /// relevant updates.
3335 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3336 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3337 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3339 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3340 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3341 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3342 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3343 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3344 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3345 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3346 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3347 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3348 self.pending_outbound_payments
3349 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3350 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3351 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3354 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3355 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3356 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3357 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3358 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3359 self.pending_outbound_payments
3360 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3361 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3362 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3363 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3367 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3368 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3369 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3370 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3371 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3372 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3376 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3377 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3378 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3382 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3383 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3386 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3387 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3388 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3389 self.pending_outbound_payments
3390 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3391 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3392 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3393 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3394 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3398 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3399 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3400 /// retries are exhausted.
3402 /// # Event Generation
3404 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3405 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3407 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3408 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3409 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3411 /// # Requested Invoices
3413 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3414 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3415 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3416 /// once the invoice has been received.
3418 /// # Restart Behavior
3420 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3421 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3422 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3424 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3425 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3426 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3427 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3430 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3431 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3432 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3433 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3434 /// never reach the recipient.
3436 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3437 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3439 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3440 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3442 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3443 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3444 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3445 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3446 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3447 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3448 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3451 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3452 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3454 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3457 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3458 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3459 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3460 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3461 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3462 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3463 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3464 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3467 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3468 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3469 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3470 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3471 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3472 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3473 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3474 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3475 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3478 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3481 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3482 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3485 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3486 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3488 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3489 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3490 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3491 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3492 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3493 let payment_params =
3494 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3496 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3498 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3501 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3502 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3504 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3505 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3506 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3507 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3509 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3510 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3511 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3512 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3513 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3514 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3515 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3516 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3517 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3518 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3520 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3521 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3522 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3523 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3527 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3529 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3530 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3533 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3535 let mut res = Vec::new();
3537 for mut path in route.paths {
3538 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3539 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3540 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3541 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3542 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3545 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3548 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3549 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3551 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3553 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3554 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3559 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3562 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3567 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3568 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3569 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3571 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3572 let used_liquidity =
3573 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3575 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3576 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3578 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3581 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3586 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3587 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3588 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3595 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3596 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3597 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3598 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3599 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3600 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3601 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3602 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3603 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3605 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3606 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3607 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3608 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) => {
3609 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3611 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &self.logger)
3612 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3613 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3614 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3615 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3616 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3617 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3618 } else { unreachable!(); });
3620 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3621 Err((chan, err)) => {
3622 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3623 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3625 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3626 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3627 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3633 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3634 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3636 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3637 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3640 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3641 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3642 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3646 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3647 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3650 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3651 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3652 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3654 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3655 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3656 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3657 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3659 e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
3666 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3667 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3668 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3672 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3674 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3675 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3677 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3678 /// across the p2p network.
3680 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3681 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3683 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3684 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3685 /// keys per-channel).
3687 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3688 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3689 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3691 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3692 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3693 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3695 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3696 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3697 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3698 /// for more details.
3700 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3701 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3702 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3703 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3706 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3708 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3709 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3711 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
3712 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3713 /// signature for each channel.
3715 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3716 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3717 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3718 let mut result = Ok(());
3720 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3721 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3722 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3723 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3724 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3729 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3730 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3731 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3735 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3736 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3737 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3738 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3739 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3740 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3741 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3742 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3747 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3748 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3749 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3750 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3754 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3755 match states.entry(txid) {
3756 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3757 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3758 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3762 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3765 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
3766 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3767 temporary_channel_id,
3768 counterparty_node_id,
3769 funding_transaction.clone(),
3772 let mut output_index = None;
3773 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3774 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3775 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3776 if output_index.is_some() {
3777 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3778 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3781 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3784 if output_index.is_none() {
3785 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3786 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3789 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3790 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
3791 funding_batch_state.push((outpoint.to_channel_id(), *counterparty_node_id, false));
3797 if let Err(ref e) = result {
3798 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
3799 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
3800 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
3801 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
3802 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
3803 .into_iter().flatten()
3804 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
3806 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
3807 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
3809 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3811 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3812 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
3813 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3814 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
3815 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
3817 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3818 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() });
3819 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
3823 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3824 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3830 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3832 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3833 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3834 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3835 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3837 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3838 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3840 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3841 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3843 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3845 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3846 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3847 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3848 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3849 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3850 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3851 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3852 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3853 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3854 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3855 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3856 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3857 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3861 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3862 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3863 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3864 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3865 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3866 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3867 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3868 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
3869 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3870 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3874 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3875 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3876 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
3877 config.apply(config_update);
3878 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
3881 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
3882 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3883 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3884 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3885 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3886 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3893 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
3894 debug_assert!(false);
3895 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3897 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
3898 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3905 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3907 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3908 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3909 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3910 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3912 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3913 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3915 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3916 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3918 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3920 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3921 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3922 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3923 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3924 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3925 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3926 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3927 pub fn update_channel_config(
3928 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
3929 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3930 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
3933 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3934 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3936 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3937 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3939 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3940 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3941 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3942 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3943 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3945 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3946 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
3947 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
3950 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3953 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3954 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3955 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
3956 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3957 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3958 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3959 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3961 let next_hop_scid = {
3962 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3963 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3964 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3965 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3966 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3967 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3968 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
3969 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
3970 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3971 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
3974 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
3976 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3977 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
3978 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
3980 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3981 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3982 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
3987 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3988 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3989 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3992 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3993 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3994 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3996 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3998 let skimmed_fee_msat =
3999 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4000 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4001 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4002 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4005 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4006 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4007 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4008 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4009 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4011 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4015 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4016 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4018 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4021 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4022 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4023 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4025 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4026 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4027 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4030 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4031 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4032 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4033 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4034 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4035 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4036 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4037 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4040 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4041 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4042 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4043 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4048 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4050 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4051 /// Will likely generate further events.
4052 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4053 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4055 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4056 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4057 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4059 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4060 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4062 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4063 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4064 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4066 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4067 match forward_info {
4068 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4069 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4070 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4071 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4072 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4075 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4076 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4077 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4079 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4080 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4081 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4082 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4083 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4084 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4085 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4088 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4089 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4091 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4094 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4095 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4101 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4102 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4104 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4108 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4109 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4111 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4115 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4116 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4117 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4118 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4119 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4120 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4121 payment_hash, &self.node_signer
4124 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4125 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
4126 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4127 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4128 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4130 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4132 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4133 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4137 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4138 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4139 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4140 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4141 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4142 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4144 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4145 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4151 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4154 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4157 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4158 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4159 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4160 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4161 // problem, not ours.
4167 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4168 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4169 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4171 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4175 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4176 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4177 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4178 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4181 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4182 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4183 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4184 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4185 match forward_info {
4186 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4187 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4188 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4189 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4190 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4193 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4194 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4195 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4196 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4197 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4198 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4199 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4200 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4201 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4203 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4204 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4205 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
4208 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4209 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4211 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4213 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4214 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4215 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4216 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4221 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4222 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4224 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4225 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4226 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
4227 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
4229 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4230 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4232 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4234 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4235 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4236 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4243 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4247 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4248 match forward_info {
4249 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4250 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4251 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4252 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4253 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4256 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4257 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4258 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4259 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4260 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4261 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4262 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4264 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4265 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4266 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4270 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4271 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4274 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4277 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4278 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4279 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4280 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4281 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4282 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4283 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4284 phantom_shared_secret,
4286 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4287 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4288 // if routing nodes overpay
4289 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4290 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4292 total_value_received: None,
4293 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4296 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4299 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4301 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4302 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4303 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4304 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4305 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4306 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4308 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4309 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4310 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4311 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4312 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4313 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4314 phantom_shared_secret,
4316 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4317 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4319 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4322 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4323 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4324 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4325 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4326 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4329 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4330 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4331 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4332 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4333 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4334 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4336 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4337 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4338 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4340 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4341 .entry(payment_hash)
4342 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4343 .or_insert_with(|| {
4344 committed_to_claimable = true;
4346 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4349 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4350 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4351 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4352 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4354 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4355 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4356 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4358 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4359 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4360 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4363 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4365 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4366 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4367 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4368 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4369 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4370 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4371 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4372 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4373 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4374 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4376 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4378 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4379 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4380 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4381 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4382 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4383 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4385 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4386 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4387 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4388 committed_to_claimable = true;
4390 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4391 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4392 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4393 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4394 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4395 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4396 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4397 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4398 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4399 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4403 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4404 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4405 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4406 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4407 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4409 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4411 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4412 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4414 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4415 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4416 committed_to_claimable = true;
4419 payment_claimable_generated
4423 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4424 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4425 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4426 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4427 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4428 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4429 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4430 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4431 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4432 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4433 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4434 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4435 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4436 Ok(result) => result,
4438 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4439 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4442 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4443 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4444 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4445 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4446 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4447 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4450 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4451 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4452 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4454 check_total_value!(purpose);
4456 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4457 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4458 check_total_value!(purpose);
4462 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4463 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4464 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4465 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4467 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4468 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4469 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4470 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4471 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4472 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4473 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4474 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4476 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4477 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4478 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4480 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4481 if payment_claimable_generated {
4482 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4488 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4489 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4497 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4498 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4499 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4500 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4502 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4503 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4505 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4507 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4508 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4509 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4511 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4513 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4514 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4515 events.append(&mut new_events);
4518 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4520 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4521 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4522 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4524 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4526 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4527 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4528 if background_events.is_empty() {
4529 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4532 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4534 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4535 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4536 // monitor updating completing.
4537 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4539 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4540 let mut updated_chan = false;
4542 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4543 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4544 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4545 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4546 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4547 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4548 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4549 updated_chan = true;
4550 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4551 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4553 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4556 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4561 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4562 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4565 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4566 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4567 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4568 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4569 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4570 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4571 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4573 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4574 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4575 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4576 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4577 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4583 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4586 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4587 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4588 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4589 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4590 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4593 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4594 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4595 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4596 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4597 if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4598 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4599 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4601 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4603 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4604 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4605 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4606 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4608 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4609 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4611 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4612 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4616 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4617 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4618 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4619 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4620 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4621 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4622 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4624 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4625 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4627 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4628 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4629 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4630 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4631 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4632 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4634 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4639 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4640 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4648 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4650 /// This currently includes:
4651 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4652 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4653 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4655 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4656 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4657 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4658 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4659 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4660 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4661 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4662 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
4664 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4665 /// estimate fetches.
4667 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4668 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4669 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4670 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4671 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4673 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4674 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4676 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4677 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4678 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4679 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4681 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4682 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4683 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4684 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4685 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4686 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4688 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4689 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4690 log_error!(self.logger,
4691 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4692 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4693 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4694 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
4695 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4696 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4697 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4698 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4699 channel_id: *chan_id,
4700 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4711 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4712 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4713 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4714 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4715 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4716 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4717 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4719 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4720 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4725 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4726 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4728 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4729 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4730 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4731 if needs_close { return false; }
4734 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4735 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4736 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4737 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4738 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4739 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4740 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4741 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4743 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4744 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4745 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4746 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4750 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4752 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4755 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4757 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4758 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4759 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4760 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4764 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4766 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4772 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4774 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4775 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4776 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4777 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4778 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4779 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4780 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4781 channel_id: *chan_id,
4782 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4790 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4791 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4792 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4794 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
4795 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4796 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4801 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4802 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4803 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
4804 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4805 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4806 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4807 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4808 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4814 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
4816 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4817 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4822 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4823 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4824 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4825 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4826 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4827 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4828 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4829 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4830 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4831 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4832 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4833 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4834 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4835 // have no channels to the peer.
4836 let remove_entry = {
4837 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4838 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4841 entry.remove_entry();
4844 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4849 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4850 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4851 // This should be unreachable
4852 debug_assert!(false);
4855 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4856 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4857 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4858 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4859 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4860 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4861 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4864 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4865 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4866 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4868 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4869 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4876 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4877 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4878 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4879 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4880 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4883 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4884 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4887 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
4888 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
4891 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
4892 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
4893 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
4894 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
4895 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
4896 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
4897 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
4900 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
4901 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
4904 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4905 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4906 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4907 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4908 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4915 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4916 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4917 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4919 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4920 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4921 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4922 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4924 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4925 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4926 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4927 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4928 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4929 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4932 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4933 /// reason for the failure.
4935 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4936 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4937 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4939 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4940 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4941 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4942 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4943 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4944 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4945 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4950 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4951 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4952 match failure_code {
4953 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4954 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4955 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4956 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4957 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4958 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
4960 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
4961 let fail_data = match data {
4962 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
4965 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
4970 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4971 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4973 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4975 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4976 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4977 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4978 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4979 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4980 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
4981 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4983 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
4985 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4986 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4988 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4993 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4994 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4995 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4996 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4997 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4998 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4999 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5000 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5001 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5002 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5004 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5005 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5006 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5007 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5009 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5010 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5011 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5012 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5013 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5017 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5018 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5019 // be surfaced to the user.
5020 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5021 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5022 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5024 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5025 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5026 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5027 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5028 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5029 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5030 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5031 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5032 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5034 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5035 debug_assert!(false);
5036 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5039 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5041 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5044 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5045 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5046 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5047 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5051 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5052 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5053 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5054 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5055 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5056 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5057 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5058 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5059 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5060 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5063 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5064 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5065 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5068 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5069 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5070 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5072 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5073 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5074 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5075 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5076 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5078 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => {
5079 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error);
5080 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
5082 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5083 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5084 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5085 push_forward_ev = true;
5087 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5088 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5089 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
5091 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5092 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
5095 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5096 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5097 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5098 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5099 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5100 failed_next_destination: destination,
5106 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5107 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5109 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5110 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5111 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5112 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5114 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5115 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5116 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5117 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5119 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5120 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5121 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5123 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5124 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5125 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5126 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5127 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5128 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5129 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5130 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5131 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5134 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5135 /// even type numbers.
5139 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5140 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5142 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5143 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5144 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5147 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5148 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5150 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5153 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5154 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5155 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5156 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5157 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5158 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5159 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5160 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5165 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5166 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5167 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5168 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5169 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5171 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5172 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5173 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5177 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5178 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5179 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5180 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5181 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5182 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5183 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5184 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5185 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5186 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5187 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5196 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5198 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5199 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5200 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5201 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5202 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5203 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5204 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5205 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5206 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5207 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5208 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5209 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5210 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5211 debug_assert!(false);
5215 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5217 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5218 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5219 debug_assert!(false);
5223 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5224 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5226 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5227 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5228 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5229 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5232 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5233 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5234 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5235 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5239 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5240 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5241 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5242 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5243 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5244 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5247 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5248 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5249 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5250 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5251 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5256 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5257 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5258 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5259 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5260 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5261 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5262 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5264 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5267 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5268 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5269 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5270 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5274 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5275 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5276 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5277 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5279 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5280 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5281 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5282 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5284 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5285 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5286 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5287 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5290 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5291 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5292 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5293 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5297 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5298 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5299 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5302 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5303 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5304 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5305 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5306 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5307 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5308 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
5311 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5312 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5313 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5315 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5318 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5319 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5321 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5322 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5323 // monitor update as a background event.
5324 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5325 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5326 counterparty_node_id,
5327 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5328 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5332 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5333 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5338 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5340 log_trace!(self.logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5342 let (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker) =
5343 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5344 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5345 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5346 blocking_action: blocker,
5348 (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)
5350 debug_assert!(false,
5351 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5354 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5355 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5356 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5357 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5358 .get_mut(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
5360 let mut found_blocker = false;
5361 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5362 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5363 // which case we need to only remove the one
5364 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5365 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5366 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5367 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5369 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5372 debug_assert!(false);
5381 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5382 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5383 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5389 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5390 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5391 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5392 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5393 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5394 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5395 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5396 // again on restart.
5397 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5398 payment_preimage, update_res);
5401 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5402 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5404 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5405 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5406 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5407 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5408 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5409 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5410 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5411 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5412 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5413 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5416 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5417 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5418 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5419 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5420 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5421 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5425 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5426 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5429 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5430 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, startup_replay: bool,
5431 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5434 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5435 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5436 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5437 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5438 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5440 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5441 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5442 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5444 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5445 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5448 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5449 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5450 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5451 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5452 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5453 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5454 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5455 let chan_to_release =
5456 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5457 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5459 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5460 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5461 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5462 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5467 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5468 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5469 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5470 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5471 // in the background.
5472 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5473 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5474 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5475 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5477 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5478 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5479 funding_txo, update, ..
5481 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5482 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5483 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5484 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5486 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5492 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5493 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5494 (funding_txo, monitor_update)
5496 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5497 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5499 monitor_update.updates[0],
5500 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5505 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5506 // immediately once we get going.
5507 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5510 *channel_id == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5512 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5515 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5516 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5517 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5518 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5519 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5520 blocking_action: other_chan.2,
5524 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5525 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5526 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5529 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5530 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5532 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5533 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5534 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5535 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5537 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5541 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5542 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5543 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5549 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5550 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5551 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5554 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5555 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5556 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5557 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5559 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5561 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5562 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5563 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5565 payment_purpose: purpose,
5568 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5570 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5574 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5576 sender_intended_total_msat,
5580 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5581 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5583 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5584 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5585 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5588 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5589 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, blocking_action,
5591 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5592 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5593 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5594 Some(blocking_action),
5601 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5602 /// update completion.
5603 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5604 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5605 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5606 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5607 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5608 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5609 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5610 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5611 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5612 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5613 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5614 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5615 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5617 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5619 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5620 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5621 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5622 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5625 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5626 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5628 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5629 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5630 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5635 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5636 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5637 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5638 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5643 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5644 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5645 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5646 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5647 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5652 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5656 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5662 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5663 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5664 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5668 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5669 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5670 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5676 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5677 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5679 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5680 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5682 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5683 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5684 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5685 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5686 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5691 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5692 let mut peer_state_lock;
5693 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5694 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5695 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5696 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5698 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5701 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5702 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5703 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5704 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5705 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5708 let remaining_in_flight =
5709 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5710 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5713 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5714 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5715 remaining_in_flight);
5716 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5719 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5722 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5724 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5725 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5728 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5729 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5730 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5732 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5733 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5734 /// used to accept such channels.
5736 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5737 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5738 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5739 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5742 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5743 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5745 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5746 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5747 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5749 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5750 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5752 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5753 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5755 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5756 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5758 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5759 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5760 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5761 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5764 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5765 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5767 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5768 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5769 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5770 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5771 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5772 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5773 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5774 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5776 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5777 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5778 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5780 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5781 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5782 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5783 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5784 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5785 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5786 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5788 _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5792 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5793 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5794 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5795 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5796 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5797 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5798 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5801 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5802 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5804 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5805 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5806 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5807 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5808 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5809 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5810 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5811 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5814 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5815 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5819 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
5820 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5821 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5823 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5824 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5825 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5828 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
5833 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5834 /// or 0-conf channels.
5836 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5837 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5838 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5839 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
5840 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5841 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5843 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5844 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5845 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5846 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5847 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5848 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5849 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5853 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5856 fn unfunded_channel_count(
5857 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
5859 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5860 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
5862 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5863 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5864 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5865 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
5866 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
5868 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5871 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5872 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
5873 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5876 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
5877 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
5882 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
5885 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5886 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
5887 // likely to be lost on restart!
5888 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
5889 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5892 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
5893 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5896 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
5897 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
5898 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
5899 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
5900 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
5902 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5903 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5905 debug_assert!(false);
5906 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
5908 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5909 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5911 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5912 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5913 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5914 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
5915 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
5916 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
5918 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5919 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
5920 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5923 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5924 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
5925 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5926 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
5927 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5930 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
5931 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
5933 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5936 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
5937 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
5938 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5939 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
5940 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
5941 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5942 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
5943 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
5944 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
5946 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
5947 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
5948 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
5953 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
5954 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
5955 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
5956 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
5957 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5958 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
5959 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
5962 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
5967 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
5968 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
5969 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5971 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5972 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5975 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5976 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5978 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5979 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5980 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5982 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
5986 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5987 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
5988 // likely to be lost on restart!
5989 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
5990 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5991 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5993 debug_assert!(false);
5994 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5996 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5997 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5998 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5999 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6000 match phase.get_mut() {
6001 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6002 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6003 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6006 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6010 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6013 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6014 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6015 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6016 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6017 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6019 user_channel_id: user_id,
6024 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6025 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6027 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6028 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6030 debug_assert!(false);
6031 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6034 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6035 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6036 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
6037 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6038 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6039 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
6041 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
6042 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6043 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6044 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6045 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
6046 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
6047 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
6048 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
6049 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
6053 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) => {
6054 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6056 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6059 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
6060 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6061 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
6063 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6064 let mut id_to_peer_lock = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6065 match id_to_peer_lock.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6066 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6067 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6068 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6069 funding_msg.channel_id))
6071 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6072 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6073 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6074 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6075 mem::drop(id_to_peer_lock);
6077 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6078 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6079 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6080 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6081 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6082 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6086 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6087 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6088 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6090 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6094 log_error!(self.logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6095 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6096 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6097 funding_msg.channel_id));
6105 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6106 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6107 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6108 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6110 debug_assert!(false);
6111 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6114 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6115 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6116 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6117 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6118 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6119 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => {
6120 let monitor = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6121 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6122 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6123 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6126 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned())), chan_phase_entry)
6130 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6134 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6138 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6139 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6140 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6141 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6142 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6144 debug_assert!(false);
6145 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6147 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6148 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6149 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6150 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6151 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6152 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6153 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6154 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6155 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6156 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6157 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6158 msg: announcement_sigs,
6160 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6161 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6162 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6163 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6164 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6165 // announcement_signatures.
6166 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6167 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6168 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6169 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6176 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6177 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6182 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6183 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6186 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6187 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6192 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6193 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6194 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6196 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6197 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6199 debug_assert!(false);
6200 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6202 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6203 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6204 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6205 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6207 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6208 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6209 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6211 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6214 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6215 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6216 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6217 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6219 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6220 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6221 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6222 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6223 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6224 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6228 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6229 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6230 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6231 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6234 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6235 let context = phase.context_mut();
6236 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6237 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
6238 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6239 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
6243 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6246 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6247 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6248 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6249 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6251 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6252 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6258 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6259 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6260 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6262 debug_assert!(false);
6263 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6265 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
6266 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6267 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6268 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6269 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6270 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6271 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6272 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
6273 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6274 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6275 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6280 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6281 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6282 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6283 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6284 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6285 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
6286 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
6288 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6289 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6292 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6295 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6296 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6297 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6299 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6300 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6301 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6302 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6303 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6307 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6309 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6310 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6311 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6316 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6317 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6318 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6319 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6321 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6322 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6323 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6324 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6326 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6327 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6329 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
6330 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6331 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6333 debug_assert!(false);
6334 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6336 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6337 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6338 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6339 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6340 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6341 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6342 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6343 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
6344 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
6345 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6347 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6348 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6349 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6350 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6351 match pending_forward_info {
6352 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
6353 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6354 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6355 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6357 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6358 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6359 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6360 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6361 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6364 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6366 _ => pending_forward_info
6369 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6371 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6372 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6375 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6380 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6382 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6383 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6384 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6386 debug_assert!(false);
6387 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6389 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6390 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6391 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6392 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6393 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6394 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6395 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6396 log_trace!(self.logger,
6397 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6399 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6400 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6401 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6403 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6404 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6405 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6406 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6407 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6408 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6409 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6412 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6413 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6416 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6419 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6423 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6424 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6425 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6426 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6427 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6429 debug_assert!(false);
6430 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6432 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6433 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6434 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6435 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6436 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6437 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6439 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6440 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6443 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6448 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6449 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6450 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6451 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6452 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6454 debug_assert!(false);
6455 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6457 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6458 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6459 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6460 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6461 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6462 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6463 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6465 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6466 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6468 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6469 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6473 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6477 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6478 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6479 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6481 debug_assert!(false);
6482 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6484 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6485 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6486 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6487 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6488 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6489 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6490 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6491 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6492 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6493 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6497 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6498 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6501 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6506 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6507 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6508 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6509 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6510 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6511 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6512 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6513 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6514 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6515 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6516 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6518 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6519 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6521 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6522 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6523 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6524 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6525 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6526 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6528 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6529 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6530 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
6532 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
6533 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6534 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6535 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6536 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6537 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6538 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6539 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6540 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6543 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6544 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6546 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6547 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6548 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6549 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6550 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6551 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6552 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6553 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6554 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6557 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6558 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6559 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6564 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6565 // payments are being processed.
6566 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6567 push_forward_event = true;
6569 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6570 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6577 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6578 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6581 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6582 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6583 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6585 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6589 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6590 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6591 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6592 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6593 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6595 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6596 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6597 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6598 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6599 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6600 // real by taking more time.
6601 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6602 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6603 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6608 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6609 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6610 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6611 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6612 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6613 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6614 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6616 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6617 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6618 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6619 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6620 channel_funding_outpoint,
6621 counterparty_node_id,
6626 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6627 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6628 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6630 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6631 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6632 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6633 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6635 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6636 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6637 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6643 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6644 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6645 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6646 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6648 debug_assert!(false);
6649 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6650 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6651 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6652 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6653 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6654 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6655 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6656 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6657 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6658 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6659 *counterparty_node_id)
6661 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6662 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6663 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6664 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6665 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6666 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6667 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6671 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6672 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6675 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6678 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6682 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6683 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6684 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6686 debug_assert!(false);
6687 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6689 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6690 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6691 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6692 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6693 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6694 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6696 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6697 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6700 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6705 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6706 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6707 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6709 debug_assert!(false);
6710 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6712 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6713 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6714 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6715 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6716 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6717 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
6718 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6721 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6722 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
6723 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6724 msg, &self.default_configuration
6725 ), chan_phase_entry),
6726 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6727 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6728 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
6731 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6732 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6735 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6740 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
6741 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6742 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6743 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6745 // It's not a local channel
6746 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6749 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6750 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6751 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6752 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6754 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6755 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6756 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6757 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6758 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6759 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6760 if chan.context.should_announce() {
6761 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6762 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6763 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6764 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6766 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6768 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6769 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6770 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6771 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6773 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
6774 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6775 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
6778 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6782 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6783 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6786 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6788 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6791 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6793 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6794 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6796 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6798 debug_assert!(false);
6799 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6800 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
6804 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6805 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6806 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6807 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6808 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6809 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
6810 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
6811 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
6812 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
6813 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
6814 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
6815 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
6816 let mut channel_update = None;
6817 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
6818 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6819 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6822 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6823 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
6824 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
6825 // they have the latest channel parameters.
6826 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6827 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6828 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6833 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
6834 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
6835 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
6836 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
6837 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
6838 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
6842 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6843 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6846 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6847 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
6848 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id.0));
6849 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
6850 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
6851 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
6852 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
6853 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
6854 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
6856 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
6857 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
6858 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
6859 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
6860 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
6861 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
6862 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
6863 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6864 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6865 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
6866 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6867 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
6868 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
6869 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
6870 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
6871 next_funding_txid: None,
6874 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6875 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
6876 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6882 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
6883 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
6884 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
6885 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6888 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
6889 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
6894 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
6895 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
6896 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6898 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6899 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
6900 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
6901 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
6902 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
6903 match monitor_event {
6904 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
6905 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
6906 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
6907 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
6909 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
6910 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
6911 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6912 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6915 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
6916 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
6917 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
6919 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6920 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
6921 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6922 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
6925 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
6926 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6927 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6928 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6929 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6930 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6931 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6932 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
6933 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
6934 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6935 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6939 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
6940 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6941 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6942 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
6943 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
6951 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
6952 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
6958 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6959 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
6962 has_pending_monitor_events
6965 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
6966 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
6967 /// update events as a separate process method here.
6969 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
6970 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6971 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
6974 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
6975 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
6976 /// update was applied.
6977 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
6978 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
6979 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6981 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
6982 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
6983 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
6984 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
6986 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6987 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6989 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6990 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6991 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
6992 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
6994 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6995 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6996 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
6997 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
6998 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
6999 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7001 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7002 has_monitor_update = true;
7004 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7005 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7006 continue 'peer_loop;
7015 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7016 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7017 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7023 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7024 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7025 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7026 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7027 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7028 let mut has_update = false;
7029 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7031 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7033 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7034 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7035 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7036 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7037 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7039 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7040 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
7041 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
7042 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7044 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7045 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7048 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7049 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
7050 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
7052 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7053 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7054 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7055 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7056 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7061 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7063 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7064 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7065 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7071 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7072 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7077 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7083 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7084 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7087 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7088 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7094 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7095 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7097 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7098 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7099 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7100 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7101 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7102 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7103 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7104 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7105 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7106 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
7107 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7108 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7109 assert!(should_broadcast);
7110 } else { unreachable!(); }
7111 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7112 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7113 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7116 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7120 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7121 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7122 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7126 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the offer with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the
7127 /// introduction node and a derived signing pubkey for recipient privacy. As such, currently,
7128 /// the node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction
7129 /// node in order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7133 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7136 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7138 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7139 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7140 pub fn create_offer_builder(
7141 &self, description: String
7142 ) -> OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All> {
7143 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7144 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7145 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7146 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7147 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7149 OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx)
7150 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7154 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7155 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7159 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7160 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7162 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7163 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7164 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7167 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7168 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7169 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7171 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7172 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7176 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the refund with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as
7177 /// the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7178 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7179 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7183 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7184 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7188 /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
7189 /// or if `amount_msats` is invalid.
7191 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7193 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7194 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7195 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7196 pub fn create_refund_builder(
7197 &self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7198 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7199 ) -> Result<RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7200 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7201 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7202 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7203 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7204 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7206 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7207 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7209 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7210 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7213 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7214 self.pending_outbound_payments
7215 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7216 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7218 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7223 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7224 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7225 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7227 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7228 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7229 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7230 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7231 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7232 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7233 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7235 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7236 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7240 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7241 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7244 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7245 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7246 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7250 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7251 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7252 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7253 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7257 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
7258 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
7259 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7263 /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
7264 /// or if the provided parameters are invalid for the offer.
7266 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7267 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7268 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7269 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7270 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7271 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7272 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7273 pub fn pay_for_offer(
7274 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7275 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7276 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7277 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7278 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7279 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7280 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7283 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7284 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7285 let builder = match quantity {
7287 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7289 let builder = match amount_msats {
7291 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7293 let builder = match payer_note {
7295 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7298 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7299 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7301 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7302 self.pending_outbound_payments
7303 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7304 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7306 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7308 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7309 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7310 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7311 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7312 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7315 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7317 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7318 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7319 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7320 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7321 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7322 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7323 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7324 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7325 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7327 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7334 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7337 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7338 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7339 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7343 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
7344 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
7345 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
7346 /// received and no retries will be made.
7348 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7349 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7350 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7351 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7352 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7354 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
7355 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
7357 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
7358 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
7359 let payment_paths = vec![
7360 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
7362 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
7363 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
7364 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
7366 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7367 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
7368 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
7370 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7371 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
7372 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
7374 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
7375 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7377 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7378 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
7379 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7380 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
7381 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
7384 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7386 for path in refund.paths() {
7387 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7388 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
7389 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7390 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7392 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7398 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
7402 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7405 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7406 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7408 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7409 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7410 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7411 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7413 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7415 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7416 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7420 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7421 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7423 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7425 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7426 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7428 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7429 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7430 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7431 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7432 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7433 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7434 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7435 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7436 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7437 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7438 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7441 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7442 /// stored external to LDK.
7444 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7445 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7446 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7448 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7449 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7452 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7453 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7454 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7455 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7457 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7458 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7459 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7460 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7461 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7463 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7464 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7465 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7466 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7467 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7469 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7470 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7472 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7473 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7477 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7478 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7480 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7482 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7483 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7485 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7486 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7487 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7488 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7489 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7490 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7491 min_final_cltv_expiry)
7494 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7495 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7497 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7498 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7499 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7502 /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7504 fn create_one_hop_blinded_path(&self) -> BlindedPath {
7505 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7506 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7507 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_message(self.get_our_node_id(), entropy_source, secp_ctx).unwrap()
7510 /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7512 fn create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(
7513 &self, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
7514 ) -> (BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath) {
7515 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7516 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7518 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7519 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
7520 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
7522 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
7524 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
7527 // TODO: Err for overflow?
7528 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_payment(
7529 payee_node_id, payee_tlvs, entropy_source, secp_ctx
7533 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
7534 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
7536 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7537 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7538 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7539 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7541 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7542 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7543 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
7544 Some(_) => continue,
7545 None => return scid_candidate
7550 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
7552 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7553 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
7555 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
7556 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
7557 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
7561 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
7562 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
7563 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
7565 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
7566 /// times to get a unique scid.
7567 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7568 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7569 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7571 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7572 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7573 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
7574 return scid_candidate
7578 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
7579 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
7580 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
7581 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
7583 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7584 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7585 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7586 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7587 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
7588 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7590 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7591 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
7592 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
7601 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7602 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
7603 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7604 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
7605 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
7609 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
7610 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
7611 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7612 events.push_back((event, None));
7616 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
7617 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7618 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
7622 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
7623 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
7627 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
7628 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
7631 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
7632 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
7633 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
7634 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
7635 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
7637 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7638 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7639 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7640 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7642 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
7643 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
7644 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7645 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
7647 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
7651 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7652 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
7653 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
7654 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
7655 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
7656 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
7657 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7661 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7662 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7663 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
7664 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
7665 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
7666 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7667 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
7668 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7669 if further_update_exists {
7670 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
7675 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
7676 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7681 log_debug!(self.logger,
7682 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
7683 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7689 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
7690 for action in actions {
7692 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7693 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
7695 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
7701 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
7702 /// using the given event handler.
7704 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
7705 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
7709 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
7713 fn create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
7714 msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
7715 new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
7716 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
7717 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
7718 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
7719 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
7721 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
7722 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
7726 let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
7727 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
7728 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
7729 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } | msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. } =>
7730 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
7731 msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
7732 err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
7733 err_data: Vec::new(),
7737 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
7738 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
7739 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
7742 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
7743 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
7744 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
7745 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
7746 outgoing_cltv_value,
7747 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7751 fn create_recv_pending_htlc_info(
7752 hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
7753 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
7754 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, current_height: u32, accept_mpp_keysend: bool,
7755 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
7756 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
7757 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
7758 payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
7760 (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
7761 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive {
7762 amt_msat, total_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_secret, ..
7764 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData { payment_secret, total_msat };
7765 (Some(payment_data), None, Vec::new(), amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, None)
7767 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { .. } => {
7768 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
7769 err_code: 0x4000|22,
7770 err_data: Vec::new(),
7771 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
7775 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
7776 if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
7777 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
7778 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
7780 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
7783 // final_expiry_too_soon
7784 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
7785 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
7787 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
7788 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
7789 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
7790 if cltv_expiry <= current_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 {
7791 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
7792 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
7793 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
7794 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
7795 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
7796 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
7799 if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
7800 (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
7801 amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
7803 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
7805 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
7806 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
7810 let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
7811 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
7812 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
7813 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
7814 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
7815 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
7816 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
7817 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
7818 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
7819 err_code: 0x4000|22,
7820 err_data: Vec::new(),
7821 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
7824 if !accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
7825 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
7826 err_code: 0x4000|22,
7827 err_data: Vec::new(),
7828 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
7831 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
7835 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
7838 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
7839 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
7842 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
7843 phantom_shared_secret,
7847 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
7848 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
7849 err_data: Vec::new(),
7850 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
7853 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
7856 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
7857 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
7858 outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
7859 outgoing_cltv_value,
7860 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
7864 /// Peel one layer off an incoming onion, returning [`PendingHTLCInfo`] (either Forward or Receive).
7865 /// This does all the relevant context-free checks that LDK requires for payment relay or
7866 /// acceptance. If the payment is to be received, and the amount matches the expected amount for
7867 /// a given invoice, this indicates the [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], once fully committed in the
7868 /// channel, will generate an [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
7869 pub fn peel_payment_onion<NS: Deref, L: Deref, T: secp256k1::Verification>(
7870 msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, node_signer: &NS, logger: &L, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
7871 cur_height: u32, accept_mpp_keysend: bool,
7872 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr>
7874 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7877 let (hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) =
7878 decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, node_signer, logger, secp_ctx
7880 let (err_code, err_data) = match e {
7881 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(m) => (m.failure_code, Vec::new()),
7882 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(r) => (0x4000 | 22, r.reason.data),
7884 let msg = "Failed to decode update add htlc onion";
7885 InboundOnionErr { msg, err_code, err_data }
7888 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
7889 let NextPacketDetails {
7890 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat: _, outgoing_scid: _, outgoing_cltv_value
7891 } = match next_packet_details_opt {
7892 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
7893 // Forward should always include the next hop details
7894 None => return Err(InboundOnionErr {
7895 msg: "Failed to decode update add htlc onion",
7896 err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
7897 err_data: Vec::new(),
7901 if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
7902 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
7904 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
7907 err_data: Vec::new(),
7910 create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
7911 msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes, shared_secret,
7912 Some(next_packet_pubkey)
7915 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(received_data) => {
7916 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(
7917 received_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry,
7918 None, false, msg.skimmed_fee_msat, cur_height, accept_mpp_keysend,
7924 struct NextPacketDetails {
7925 next_packet_pubkey: Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>,
7927 outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
7928 outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
7931 fn decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion<NS: Deref, L: Deref, T: secp256k1::Verification>(
7932 msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, node_signer: &NS, logger: &L, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
7933 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<NextPacketDetails>), HTLCFailureMsg>
7935 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7938 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
7939 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
7941 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
7942 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7943 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7944 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
7945 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
7946 failure_code: $err_code,
7952 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
7953 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
7956 let shared_secret = node_signer.ecdh(
7957 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
7958 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
7960 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
7961 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
7962 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
7963 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
7964 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
7965 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
7966 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
7967 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
7969 macro_rules! return_err {
7970 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
7972 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
7973 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7974 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7975 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
7976 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
7977 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
7983 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
7984 shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac,
7985 msg.payment_hash, node_signer
7988 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
7989 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
7991 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
7992 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
7996 let next_packet_details = match next_hop {
7997 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
7998 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
7999 short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
8002 let next_packet_pubkey = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(secp_ctx,
8003 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
8005 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_scid: short_channel_id,
8006 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
8009 // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
8010 // inbound channel's state.
8011 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
8012 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } |
8013 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. }, .. } =>
8015 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
8019 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_details)))
8022 fn check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
8023 cur_height: u32, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, cltv_expiry: u32
8024 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
8025 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
8027 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
8028 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
8031 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
8032 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
8033 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
8034 if cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
8035 return Err(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14));
8037 if cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
8038 return Err(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21));
8040 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
8041 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
8042 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
8043 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
8044 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
8045 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
8046 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
8047 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
8048 if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
8049 return Err(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14));
8055 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8057 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8058 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8059 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8060 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8061 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8062 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8066 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
8067 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
8068 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
8069 /// is always placed next to each other.
8071 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
8072 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
8073 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
8074 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
8076 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
8077 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
8078 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
8079 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
8080 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8081 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8082 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8084 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
8085 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
8086 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
8087 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8090 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
8091 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8093 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
8094 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8097 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
8098 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8099 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8100 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8101 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8102 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
8103 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8107 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
8108 events.replace(pending_events);
8117 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8119 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8120 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8121 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8122 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8123 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8124 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8128 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
8130 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
8131 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
8132 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
8134 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
8138 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8140 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8141 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8142 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8143 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8144 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8145 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8149 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8151 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8152 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
8153 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
8154 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
8155 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8158 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8159 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8162 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
8163 let _persistence_guard =
8164 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8165 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8166 let new_height = height - 1;
8168 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
8169 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
8170 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
8171 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
8172 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
8173 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
8176 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
8180 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8182 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8183 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8184 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8185 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8186 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8187 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8191 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8192 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8193 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8194 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8196 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8197 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8199 let _persistence_guard =
8200 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8201 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8202 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
8203 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8205 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8206 if height < last_best_block_height {
8207 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8208 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
8212 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
8213 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8214 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8215 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8217 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8218 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8220 let _persistence_guard =
8221 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8222 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8223 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8225 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
8227 macro_rules! max_time {
8228 ($timestamp: expr) => {
8230 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8231 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8232 // having an explicit local time source.
8233 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8234 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8235 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8236 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8237 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8243 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8244 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8245 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8246 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8250 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8251 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8252 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8253 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8254 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8255 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8256 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
8257 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
8264 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8265 let _persistence_guard =
8266 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8267 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8268 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8269 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8270 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8271 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8272 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8273 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8278 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8280 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8281 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8282 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8283 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8284 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8285 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8289 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8290 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8292 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8293 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8294 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8295 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8296 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8298 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8299 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8301 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8302 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8303 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8304 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8305 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8306 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8308 // Retain unfunded channels.
8309 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8310 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8311 let res = f(channel);
8312 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8313 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8314 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8315 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8316 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8318 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8319 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8320 if channel.context.is_usable() {
8321 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8322 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8323 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8324 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8329 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8334 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8335 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8338 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8339 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8340 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8341 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8342 msg: announcement_sigs,
8344 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8345 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8346 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8348 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8349 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8350 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8355 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8356 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8357 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8358 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8359 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8360 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8361 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8362 // is always consistent.
8363 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8364 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8365 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8366 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8367 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8370 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8371 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8372 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8373 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8374 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
8375 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8376 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8380 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8381 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
8382 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8383 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8384 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8385 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8386 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8387 data: reason_message,
8400 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8401 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8402 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8403 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8404 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8405 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8406 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8407 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8408 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8409 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8411 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8412 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8413 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8417 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8420 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8421 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8422 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8423 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8424 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8425 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8426 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8427 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8428 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8429 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8432 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8433 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8434 _ => unreachable!(),
8436 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8437 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8438 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8439 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8445 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8447 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8448 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8452 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8453 /// may have events that need processing.
8455 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8456 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8458 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8459 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8460 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8461 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8464 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8465 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8466 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8469 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8470 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8471 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8474 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8475 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8476 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8477 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8480 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8481 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8482 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8483 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8486 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8487 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8489 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8490 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8491 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8492 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8493 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8496 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8497 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8498 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8499 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8502 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8503 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8504 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8505 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8508 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8509 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8510 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8511 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8514 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8515 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8516 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8517 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8521 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8522 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8524 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8525 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8526 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8527 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8528 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8529 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8533 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8534 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8535 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8536 // change to the contents.
8537 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8538 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8539 let persist = match &res {
8540 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8541 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8542 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8544 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8546 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8551 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8552 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8553 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8554 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8557 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8558 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8559 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8560 // change to the contents.
8561 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8562 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8563 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8567 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8568 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8569 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8570 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8573 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8574 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8575 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8578 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8579 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8580 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8583 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8584 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8585 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8586 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8587 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8588 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8589 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8590 let persist = match &res {
8591 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8592 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8594 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8599 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8600 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8601 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8604 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8605 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8606 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8609 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8610 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8611 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8612 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8613 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8614 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8615 let persist = match &res {
8616 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8617 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8618 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8620 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8625 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8626 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8627 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8630 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8631 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8632 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8633 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8634 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8635 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8636 let persist = match &res {
8637 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8638 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8639 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8641 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8646 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8647 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8648 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8649 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8650 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8651 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8652 let persist = match &res {
8653 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8654 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8655 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8657 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8662 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8663 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8664 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8667 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8668 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8669 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8672 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8673 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8674 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8675 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8676 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8677 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8678 let persist = match &res {
8679 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8680 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8681 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8683 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8688 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8689 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8690 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8693 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
8694 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8695 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
8698 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8703 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
8704 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8705 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8706 let persist = match &res {
8707 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8708 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8709 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8711 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8716 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8717 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8718 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8719 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8720 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8722 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8723 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8724 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8725 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8726 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8727 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8728 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8729 let context = match phase {
8730 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8731 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger).is_ok() {
8732 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8737 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
8738 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8741 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8745 // Clean up for removal.
8746 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8747 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
8748 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
8751 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8752 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8753 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8754 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8756 // V1 Channel Establishment
8757 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8758 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8759 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8760 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8761 // V2 Channel Establishment
8762 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8763 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8764 // Common Channel Establishment
8765 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8766 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8767 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8768 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8769 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8770 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8771 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8772 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8773 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8774 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8775 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8776 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8777 // Channel Operations
8778 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8779 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8780 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8781 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8782 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8783 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8785 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8786 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8787 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8788 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8789 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8790 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8791 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8792 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8793 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8796 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8797 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8798 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8799 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8802 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8804 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8806 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8807 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8811 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8812 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
8813 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8817 let mut res = Ok(());
8819 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8820 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
8821 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
8822 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
8823 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
8824 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
8825 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
8828 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8829 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
8830 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
8831 if inbound_peer_limited {
8833 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8835 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
8836 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8837 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8838 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
8839 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8840 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8841 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8842 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8846 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
8847 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
8848 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
8850 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8851 if inbound_peer_limited &&
8852 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
8853 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
8856 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8859 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
8860 peer_state.is_connected = true;
8865 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8867 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8868 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8869 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8870 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8871 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8873 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
8874 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
8875 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
8876 // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
8877 // worry about closing and removing them.
8878 debug_assert!(false);
8882 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8883 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8884 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
8889 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
8890 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
8895 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
8896 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8898 match &msg.data as &str {
8899 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
8900 "link failed to shutdown" =>
8902 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
8903 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
8904 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
8905 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
8906 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
8907 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
8908 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
8909 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8910 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8911 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8912 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8913 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8914 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
8915 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
8916 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
8917 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8921 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8922 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8923 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
8924 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
8925 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8926 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
8928 log_level: Level::Trace,
8938 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8939 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
8940 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8941 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8942 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8943 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8944 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8945 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8946 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8947 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8948 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
8950 for channel_id in channel_ids {
8951 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8952 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8956 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
8957 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8958 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8959 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8960 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8961 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8962 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
8963 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
8964 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
8965 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8973 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8974 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8978 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8979 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8982 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
8983 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8986 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
8987 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
8990 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
8991 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8992 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8993 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8996 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
8997 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8998 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8999 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9002 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
9003 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9004 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9005 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9008 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
9009 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9010 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9011 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9014 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
9015 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9016 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9017 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9020 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
9021 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9022 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9023 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9026 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
9027 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9028 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9029 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9032 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
9033 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9034 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9035 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9038 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
9039 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9040 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9041 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9045 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9046 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9048 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9049 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9050 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9051 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9052 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9053 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9057 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
9058 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9059 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
9062 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
9063 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
9066 Ok(amount_msats) => Some(amount_msats),
9067 Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9069 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9070 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
9072 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
9073 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9076 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
9078 match self.create_inbound_payment(amount_msats, relative_expiry, None) {
9079 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) if invoice_request.keys.is_some() => {
9080 let payment_paths = vec![
9081 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
9083 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
9084 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
9085 payment_paths, payment_hash
9087 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9088 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9089 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9091 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9092 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
9093 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9095 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
9096 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9097 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9100 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
9101 let payment_paths = vec![
9102 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
9104 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
9105 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
9106 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9107 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9108 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9110 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9111 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
9112 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9114 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
9115 .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
9117 match invoice.sign(|invoice| self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)) {
9118 Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9119 Err(SignError::Signing(())) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9120 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
9122 Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9123 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
9127 Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
9128 Err(error) => Some(error),
9132 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount.into()))
9136 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
9137 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9139 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
9141 Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
9142 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
9145 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
9146 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
9147 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
9154 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
9155 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
9161 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
9162 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
9166 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9167 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9168 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
9169 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
9170 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9174 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9175 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9177 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9178 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9179 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9180 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9181 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9184 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9185 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9186 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9187 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9190 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9191 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9192 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9193 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9196 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9197 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9198 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9199 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9202 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9203 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9204 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9205 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9206 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9207 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9208 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9209 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9210 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9211 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9212 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9213 features.set_payment_secret_required();
9214 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9215 features.set_wumbo_optional();
9216 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9217 features.set_channel_type_optional();
9218 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9219 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9220 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9221 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9226 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9227 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9229 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9230 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9231 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9232 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9235 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9236 (2, node_id, required),
9237 (4, features, required),
9238 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9239 (8, forwarding_info, option),
9240 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9241 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9244 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9245 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9246 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9247 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9248 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9249 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9250 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9251 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9252 (2, self.channel_id, required),
9253 (3, self.channel_type, option),
9254 (4, self.counterparty, required),
9255 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9256 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9257 (7, self.config, option),
9258 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9259 (9, self.confirmations, option),
9260 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9261 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9262 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9263 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9264 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9265 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9266 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9267 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9268 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9269 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9270 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9271 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9272 (30, self.is_usable, required),
9273 (32, self.is_public, required),
9274 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9275 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9276 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9277 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9278 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9284 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9285 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9286 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9287 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9288 (2, channel_id, required),
9289 (3, channel_type, option),
9290 (4, counterparty, required),
9291 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9292 (6, funding_txo, option),
9293 (7, config, option),
9294 (8, short_channel_id, option),
9295 (9, confirmations, option),
9296 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9297 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9298 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9299 (16, balance_msat, required),
9300 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9301 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9302 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9303 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9304 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9305 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9306 (22, confirmations_required, option),
9307 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9308 (26, is_outbound, required),
9309 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9310 (30, is_usable, required),
9311 (32, is_public, required),
9312 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9313 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9314 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9315 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9316 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9319 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9320 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9321 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9322 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9323 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9327 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9329 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9330 outbound_scid_alias,
9334 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9335 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9337 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9338 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9339 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9340 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9341 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9342 confirmations_required,
9344 force_close_spend_delay,
9345 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9346 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9347 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9348 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9349 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9350 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9351 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9352 channel_shutdown_state,
9357 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9358 (2, channels, required_vec),
9359 (4, phantom_scid, required),
9360 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9363 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9365 (0, onion_packet, required),
9366 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9369 (0, payment_data, required),
9370 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9371 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9372 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9373 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9375 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9376 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9377 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9378 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9379 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9380 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9384 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9385 (0, routing, required),
9386 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9387 (4, payment_hash, required),
9388 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9389 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9390 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9391 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9395 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9396 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9398 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9400 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9401 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9402 reason.write(writer)?;
9404 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9405 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9408 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9409 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9410 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9411 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9418 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9419 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9420 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9423 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9424 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9425 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9426 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9430 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9431 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9432 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9433 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9434 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9437 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9438 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9439 // messages contained in the variants.
9440 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9441 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9442 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9444 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9445 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9446 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9447 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9448 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9451 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9452 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9453 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9454 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9455 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9457 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9462 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9467 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9468 (0, short_channel_id, required),
9469 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9470 (2, outpoint, required),
9471 (4, htlc_id, required),
9472 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9473 (7, user_channel_id, option),
9476 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9477 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9478 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9479 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9480 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9482 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9483 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9484 (1, self.total_msat, required),
9485 (2, self.value, required),
9486 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9487 (4, payment_data, option),
9488 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9489 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9490 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9491 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9497 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9498 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9499 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9500 (0, prev_hop, required),
9501 (1, total_msat, option),
9502 (2, value_ser, required),
9503 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9504 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9505 (5, total_value_received, option),
9506 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9507 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9508 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9510 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9511 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9512 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9514 if payment_data.is_some() {
9515 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9517 if total_msat.is_none() {
9518 total_msat = Some(value);
9520 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
9523 if total_msat.is_none() {
9524 if payment_data.is_none() {
9525 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9527 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
9529 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
9533 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
9536 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
9537 total_value_received,
9538 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
9540 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
9541 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
9546 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
9547 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9548 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9551 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
9552 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
9553 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
9554 let mut payment_id = None;
9555 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
9556 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
9557 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9558 (0, session_priv, required),
9559 (1, payment_id, option),
9560 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9561 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
9562 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
9563 (6, blinded_tail, option),
9565 if payment_id.is_none() {
9566 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
9568 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
9570 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
9571 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
9572 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9574 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
9575 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
9576 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
9577 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9581 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9582 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
9583 first_hop_htlc_msat,
9585 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
9588 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
9589 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9594 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
9595 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
9597 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
9599 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
9600 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9601 (0, session_priv, required),
9602 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
9603 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9604 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
9605 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
9606 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
9607 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
9610 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
9612 field.write(writer)?;
9619 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
9620 (0, forward_info, required),
9621 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
9622 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
9623 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
9624 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
9627 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
9629 (0, htlc_id, required),
9630 (2, err_packet, required),
9635 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
9636 (0, payment_secret, required),
9637 (2, expiry_time, required),
9638 (4, user_payment_id, required),
9639 (6, payment_preimage, required),
9640 (8, min_value_msat, required),
9643 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9645 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9646 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9647 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9648 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9649 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9650 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9654 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9655 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
9657 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9659 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
9661 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9662 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
9663 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
9666 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
9668 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9669 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
9670 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9671 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9672 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9673 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9674 serializable_peer_count += 1;
9677 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
9678 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
9682 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
9684 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9685 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9686 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9687 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
9688 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
9689 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
9692 channel.write(writer)?;
9698 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9699 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9700 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
9701 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
9702 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9703 for forward in pending_forwards {
9704 forward.write(writer)?;
9709 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9711 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9712 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
9713 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9715 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
9716 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
9717 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9718 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
9719 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
9720 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9721 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
9722 htlc.write(writer)?;
9724 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
9725 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
9728 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
9729 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
9730 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9731 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
9732 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
9733 // per_peer_state lock at all.
9734 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
9737 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
9738 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9739 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
9740 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
9741 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
9743 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9744 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
9745 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
9746 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
9747 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
9748 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
9749 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
9754 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9755 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
9756 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
9757 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
9758 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
9759 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
9760 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
9761 // well save the space and not write any events here.
9762 0u64.write(writer)?;
9764 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9765 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
9766 event.write(writer)?;
9770 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
9771 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
9772 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
9773 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
9774 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
9775 0u64.write(writer)?;
9777 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
9778 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
9779 // likely to be identical.
9780 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9781 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9783 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9784 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
9785 hash.write(writer)?;
9786 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
9789 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
9790 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
9791 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9792 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
9793 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
9796 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
9797 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9799 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9800 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9801 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
9802 session_priv.write(writer)?;
9805 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
9806 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
9807 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
9808 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
9812 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
9813 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
9814 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9816 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9817 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9818 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
9824 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
9825 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9826 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
9827 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
9830 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
9831 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
9832 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
9833 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
9834 pending_claiming_payments = None;
9837 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9838 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9839 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
9840 if !updates.is_empty() {
9841 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
9842 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
9847 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9848 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
9849 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9850 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
9851 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9852 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
9853 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9854 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
9855 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
9856 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
9857 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9858 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
9859 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9866 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9867 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9868 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
9869 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
9872 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
9873 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
9874 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
9875 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
9876 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
9877 // check that the event is sane here.
9878 let event_encoded = event.encode();
9879 let event_read: Option<Event> =
9880 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
9881 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
9887 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9888 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9889 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9890 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
9891 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
9892 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
9895 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
9896 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
9897 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
9898 events.push_back((ev, action));
9899 } else if action.is_some() {
9900 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9907 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
9908 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
9909 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
9910 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
9911 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
9912 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
9915 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
9917 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
9919 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9920 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
9921 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
9922 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
9923 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
9924 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
9925 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
9926 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
9927 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9928 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
9929 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
9930 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
9931 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
9933 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
9934 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
9936 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
9937 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
9939 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
9940 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
9941 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
9942 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
9943 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
9944 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
9946 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
9947 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9949 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9950 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9951 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9952 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9953 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9954 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9958 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
9959 pub entropy_source: ES,
9961 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
9962 pub node_signer: NS,
9964 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
9965 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
9967 pub signer_provider: SP,
9969 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9971 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
9972 pub fee_estimator: F,
9973 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9975 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
9976 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
9977 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
9978 pub chain_monitor: M,
9980 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
9981 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
9982 /// force-closed during deserialization.
9983 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
9984 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
9985 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
9987 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
9989 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
9990 /// deserialization.
9992 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
9993 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
9994 pub default_config: UserConfig,
9996 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
9997 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
9999 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
10000 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
10001 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
10002 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
10004 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
10007 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
10008 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
10011 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10012 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10014 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
10015 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10016 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10017 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10018 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10019 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10023 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
10024 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
10025 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
10026 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
10027 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
10029 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
10030 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
10035 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
10036 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
10037 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10038 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
10040 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
10041 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10042 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10043 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10044 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10045 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10049 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10050 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
10051 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
10055 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10056 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
10058 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
10059 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10060 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10061 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10062 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10063 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10067 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10068 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10070 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10071 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10072 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10074 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
10076 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10077 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10078 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10079 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10080 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10081 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
10082 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
10083 for _ in 0..channel_count {
10084 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
10085 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
10087 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10088 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
10089 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
10090 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
10091 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
10092 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
10093 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10094 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
10095 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
10096 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
10097 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10098 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
10099 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
10101 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
10102 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
10103 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
10105 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
10106 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
10107 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10109 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
10110 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
10111 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10113 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
10114 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
10115 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10117 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
10118 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10119 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
10122 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
10123 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10124 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10125 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10126 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
10127 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10128 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10130 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
10131 let mut found_htlc = false;
10132 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10133 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
10136 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
10137 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
10138 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
10139 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
10140 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
10141 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
10142 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
10143 log_info!(args.logger,
10144 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
10145 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
10146 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10150 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
10151 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
10152 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10153 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
10154 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10156 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() {
10157 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
10159 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
10160 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10161 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
10162 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10164 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10165 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
10166 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10167 entry.insert(by_id_map);
10171 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10172 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10173 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10174 // safely discard the channel.
10175 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
10176 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10177 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10178 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10179 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10180 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10181 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10184 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10185 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10186 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10187 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10188 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10189 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10193 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10194 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10195 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10196 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10197 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10198 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10199 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10201 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
10205 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10206 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10207 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10208 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10209 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10210 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10211 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10212 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10213 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10215 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10218 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10219 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10220 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10221 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10222 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10223 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10224 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10225 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10227 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10230 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10233 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
10234 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10235 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10236 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10237 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10238 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10239 is_connected: false,
10243 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10244 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10245 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10246 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10247 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
10248 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10249 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10250 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10253 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10254 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10255 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10256 for _ in 0..event_count {
10257 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10258 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10263 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10264 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10265 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10267 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10268 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10269 // on-startup monitor updates.
10270 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10271 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10273 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10277 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10278 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10280 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10281 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10282 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10283 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10284 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10288 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10289 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10290 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10291 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10292 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10293 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10294 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
10296 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10297 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10301 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10302 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10303 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10304 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
10305 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10306 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10307 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10308 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10309 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10310 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
10311 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10312 let mut events_override = None;
10313 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10314 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10315 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10316 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10317 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10318 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10319 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10320 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10321 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10322 (8, events_override, option),
10323 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10324 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10325 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10326 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10328 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10329 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10332 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10333 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10336 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10337 pending_events_read = events;
10340 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10341 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10344 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10345 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10346 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10347 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
10348 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10349 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10351 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10353 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10354 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10355 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10358 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10359 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10360 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10361 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10362 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10364 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10365 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10366 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10368 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10369 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10370 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10371 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10372 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10374 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10375 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10376 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10377 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10378 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10379 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10380 pending_background_events.push(
10381 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10382 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10383 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10384 update: update.clone(),
10387 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10388 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10389 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10390 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10391 pending_background_events.push(
10392 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10393 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10394 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
10397 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10398 log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10399 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10401 max_in_flight_update_id
10405 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10406 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10407 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10408 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10409 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10410 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10412 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10413 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10414 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10415 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10416 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10417 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10418 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10419 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10420 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
10423 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10424 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10425 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10426 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10427 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10428 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10429 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10430 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10431 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10432 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10433 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10436 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10437 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10438 debug_assert!(false);
10439 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10444 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
10445 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
10446 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
10447 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
10448 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
10449 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
10450 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
10451 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
10453 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10454 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
10455 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
10457 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10458 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
10459 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10460 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10461 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10462 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10463 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10464 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10469 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
10470 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
10472 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
10473 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
10474 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
10475 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
10478 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
10479 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
10480 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
10481 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
10482 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
10483 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
10484 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
10486 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10487 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10488 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
10489 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
10490 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
10491 if path.hops.is_empty() {
10492 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
10493 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10496 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
10497 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
10498 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
10499 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
10500 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10501 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
10502 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
10503 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), &htlc.payment_hash);
10505 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10506 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
10507 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
10508 retry_strategy: None,
10509 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
10510 payment_params: None,
10511 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
10512 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
10513 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10514 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10515 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10516 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10517 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
10518 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
10519 total_msat: path_amt,
10520 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
10521 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10523 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
10524 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
10529 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10530 match htlc_source {
10531 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
10532 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
10533 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
10534 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
10536 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
10537 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
10538 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
10539 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
10540 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
10541 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
10542 forwards.retain(|forward| {
10543 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
10544 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10545 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10546 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10551 !forwards.is_empty()
10553 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
10554 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10555 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10556 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10557 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
10558 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
10559 intercepted_id != ev_id
10566 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
10567 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
10568 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
10569 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
10570 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
10571 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
10572 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
10573 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
10574 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
10575 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
10576 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
10578 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
10579 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
10580 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
10582 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
10583 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
10584 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
10591 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
10592 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
10594 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
10596 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
10597 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
10598 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
10599 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
10600 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
10601 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
10602 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
10603 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
10604 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10605 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
10608 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
10609 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
10610 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
10611 // channel still live case here.
10615 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
10616 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
10621 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
10622 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
10623 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
10624 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
10625 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
10626 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
10627 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
10628 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
10632 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
10633 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
10635 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
10636 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
10637 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10638 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10640 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
10641 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10642 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10644 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
10645 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
10647 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10648 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
10650 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10653 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
10654 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10655 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10657 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10661 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
10662 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
10663 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
10664 if htlcs.is_empty() {
10665 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10667 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
10668 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10669 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
10670 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
10671 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
10672 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
10673 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
10674 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
10676 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
10677 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10681 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
10683 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10685 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
10686 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
10688 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10689 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10694 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10695 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10697 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
10699 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10701 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
10702 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
10703 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
10704 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10708 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
10709 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10710 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10711 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10712 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10713 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10714 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
10715 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
10717 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
10718 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
10719 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
10721 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
10722 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
10723 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10724 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10725 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10726 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10728 if chan.context.is_usable() {
10729 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
10730 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10731 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10732 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10733 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10737 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10738 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10739 debug_assert!(false);
10740 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10745 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
10747 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10748 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
10749 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
10750 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
10751 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
10752 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
10753 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
10754 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
10755 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
10756 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
10757 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
10759 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
10760 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
10762 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
10763 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
10764 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
10765 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
10767 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
10768 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
10769 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
10770 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
10772 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
10773 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
10774 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
10775 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
10777 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
10778 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
10779 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
10780 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10781 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10782 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
10783 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
10786 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
10787 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
10790 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
10793 purpose: payment.purpose,
10794 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
10795 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
10796 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
10802 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
10803 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
10804 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
10805 for action in actions.iter() {
10806 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
10807 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
10808 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
10810 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
10811 log_trace!(args.logger,
10812 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
10813 blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id());
10814 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
10815 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
10816 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
10818 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
10819 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
10820 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
10821 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
10825 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
10826 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
10830 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
10832 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
10833 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10837 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
10839 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
10840 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
10841 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
10842 router: args.router,
10844 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
10846 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
10847 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
10848 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
10849 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
10851 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
10852 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
10853 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
10854 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
10855 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
10856 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
10858 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
10860 our_network_pubkey,
10863 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
10865 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
10867 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
10868 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
10869 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
10870 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
10871 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
10873 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
10874 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
10876 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
10878 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
10880 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
10881 node_signer: args.node_signer,
10882 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
10884 logger: args.logger,
10885 default_configuration: args.default_config,
10888 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
10889 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
10890 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
10891 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
10892 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
10895 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
10896 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
10897 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
10898 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
10899 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
10900 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
10903 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
10904 //connection or two.
10906 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
10912 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10913 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10914 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
10915 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
10916 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
10917 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
10918 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
10919 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
10920 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
10921 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10922 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
10923 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
10924 use crate::routing::router::{Path, PaymentParameters, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route};
10925 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
10926 use crate::util::test_utils;
10927 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
10928 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
10931 fn test_notify_limits() {
10932 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
10933 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
10934 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10935 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10936 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10937 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10939 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
10940 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
10941 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10942 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10943 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10945 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10947 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
10948 // to connect messages with new values
10949 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10950 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10951 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10952 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10953 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10954 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10956 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
10957 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10958 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10959 // ... but the last node should not.
10960 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10961 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
10962 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10963 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10965 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
10966 // about the channel.
10967 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10968 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10969 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10971 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
10973 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10974 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10975 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10976 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10977 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10978 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10980 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
10981 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10982 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10984 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
10985 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
10986 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
10987 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
10988 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
10989 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
10991 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
10992 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
10993 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10994 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10995 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10996 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10997 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10998 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11000 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
11001 // the channel info has updated.
11002 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11003 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11004 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11005 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11006 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11007 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11011 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
11012 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
11014 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11015 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11016 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11017 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11018 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11020 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
11021 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
11022 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
11023 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
11025 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11026 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
11027 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
11028 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
11029 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
11030 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
11031 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
11032 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
11033 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11034 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11035 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11036 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
11038 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
11039 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11040 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11041 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11042 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11043 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11044 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11045 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11046 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11047 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11048 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11049 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11050 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
11051 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11052 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11053 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11054 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11055 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11056 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11057 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11058 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11059 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11060 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
11062 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
11063 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
11064 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
11065 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11066 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11067 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11068 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
11070 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
11071 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
11072 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
11073 // lightning messages manually.
11074 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11075 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
11076 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
11078 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11079 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11080 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
11081 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
11082 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11083 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11084 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
11085 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11086 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11087 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
11088 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11089 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11090 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11091 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11092 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11093 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11094 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
11095 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11096 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11097 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
11098 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11099 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11100 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11101 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11102 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
11103 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11105 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
11106 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
11107 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11108 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
11110 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11111 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11112 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11113 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11115 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11118 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11119 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11120 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11121 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11123 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11128 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
11129 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
11130 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
11133 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
11134 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
11135 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
11136 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
11137 // fails as expected.
11138 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
11139 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
11140 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
11141 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
11142 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
11143 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
11144 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11145 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11146 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11147 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
11148 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11149 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11150 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11151 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11152 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11154 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
11155 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
11156 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
11158 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11159 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11160 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
11161 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
11162 let route = find_route(
11163 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11164 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11166 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11167 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11168 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11169 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11170 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11171 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11172 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11173 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11174 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11175 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11176 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
11177 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
11178 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11179 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11180 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11181 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11182 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11183 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11184 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11185 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11186 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11187 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11188 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11189 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11191 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11192 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11194 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11195 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11196 let route = find_route(
11197 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11198 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11200 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11201 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11202 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11203 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11204 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11205 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11206 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11207 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11209 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11210 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11211 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11212 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11213 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11214 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11215 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11216 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11217 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11218 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11219 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11220 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11221 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11222 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11223 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11224 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11225 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11226 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11227 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11228 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11229 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11230 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11231 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11232 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11234 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11235 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11237 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11238 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11239 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11240 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11241 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11242 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11243 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11244 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11245 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11246 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11248 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11249 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11250 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11253 let route = find_route(
11254 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11255 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11257 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11258 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11259 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11260 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11261 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11262 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11263 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11264 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11265 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11266 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11267 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11268 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11269 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11270 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11271 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11272 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11273 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11274 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11275 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11276 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11277 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11278 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11279 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11281 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11282 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11286 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11287 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11288 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11289 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11290 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11291 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11292 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11294 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11295 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11297 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11298 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11299 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11300 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
11301 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11302 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11303 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11304 let route = find_route(
11305 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11306 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11309 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11310 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11311 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11312 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11313 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11314 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11315 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11317 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11318 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11319 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11320 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11321 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11322 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11323 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11325 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11329 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11330 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11331 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11332 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11333 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11334 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11335 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11336 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11337 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11339 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11340 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11342 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11343 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11344 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11345 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
11346 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11347 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11348 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11349 let route = find_route(
11350 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11351 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11354 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11355 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11356 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
11357 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11358 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11359 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11360 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11361 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11362 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11364 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11365 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11366 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11367 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11368 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11369 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11370 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11372 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11376 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11377 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11378 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11379 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11380 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11382 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11383 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11384 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11385 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11387 // Marshall an MPP route.
11388 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11389 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11390 route.paths.push(path);
11391 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11392 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11393 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11394 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11395 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11396 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11398 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11399 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11401 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11402 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11404 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11409 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11410 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11411 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11412 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11413 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11415 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11417 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11418 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11420 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11421 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
11422 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11423 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11426 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
11427 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
11428 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11429 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
11430 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
11431 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
11434 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
11437 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
11438 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
11443 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
11444 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
11445 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11446 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11447 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11448 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11450 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
11451 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11453 total_msat: 100_000,
11456 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
11457 // payment verification fails as expected.
11458 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
11459 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
11460 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
11461 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
11463 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
11467 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
11468 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
11472 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
11473 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
11474 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
11475 // the channel is successfully closed.
11476 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11477 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11478 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11479 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11481 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
11482 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11483 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
11484 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11485 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11487 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
11488 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().into_inner());
11490 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
11491 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
11492 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11493 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11496 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11498 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11499 // as it has the funding transaction.
11500 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11501 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11502 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11505 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11507 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11509 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11511 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11512 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11513 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11515 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11518 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11519 // as it has the funding transaction.
11520 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11521 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11522 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11524 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11525 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11526 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11527 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11528 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11529 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
11530 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
11531 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
11533 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11534 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
11535 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11536 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
11538 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11539 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
11541 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
11542 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
11543 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
11544 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
11545 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11546 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11547 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11551 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
11552 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
11553 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
11554 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
11555 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11556 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11557 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11560 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
11562 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
11563 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
11564 // closing transaction).
11565 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
11566 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
11567 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11569 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
11570 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
11571 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11572 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11573 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11576 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11578 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
11580 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
11581 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
11582 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11584 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11586 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11587 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11590 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11591 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
11592 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11595 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11596 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
11597 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11600 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
11601 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
11602 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11605 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11606 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
11607 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11610 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11612 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
11613 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11615 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
11616 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11618 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
11619 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
11624 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
11625 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
11626 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
11627 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
11628 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11629 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11630 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11631 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11634 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11635 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11636 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
11638 // Test the API functions.
11639 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
11641 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
11643 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11645 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11647 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11649 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
11651 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
11655 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
11656 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
11657 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
11658 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
11659 // the given `channel_id`.
11660 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11661 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11662 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11663 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11665 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11668 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11670 // Test the API functions.
11671 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
11673 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11675 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11677 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11679 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11681 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11685 fn test_connection_limiting() {
11686 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
11687 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11688 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11689 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11690 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11692 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11694 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11695 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11697 let mut funding_tx = None;
11698 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11699 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11700 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11703 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11704 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
11705 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
11706 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
11707 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11709 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11710 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11711 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11713 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11715 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11716 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11717 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11719 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11722 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
11723 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11724 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11725 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11726 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11728 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
11729 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
11731 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
11732 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
11733 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11734 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11735 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
11736 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11737 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11740 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11741 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11742 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11743 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11744 }, true).unwrap_err();
11746 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
11747 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
11748 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11749 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11750 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
11751 for ev in chan_closed_events {
11752 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
11754 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11755 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11757 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11758 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11759 }, true).unwrap_err();
11761 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
11762 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11763 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11764 }, false).unwrap();
11765 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11767 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
11768 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
11770 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
11771 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11772 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
11773 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
11774 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11776 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11777 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11778 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11780 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
11781 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11782 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
11784 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
11785 // "protected" and can connect again.
11786 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
11787 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11788 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11790 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11792 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
11794 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11795 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11799 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
11800 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
11801 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11802 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11803 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11804 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11806 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11808 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11809 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11811 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11812 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11813 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11814 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11817 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
11819 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11820 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11821 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11823 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
11824 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11825 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11827 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
11828 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11829 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11830 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11834 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
11835 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11836 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11837 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11838 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11839 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
11840 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11841 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
11842 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11844 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11846 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11847 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11849 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
11850 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11851 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11852 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11853 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11854 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11857 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11858 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11860 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11861 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11863 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11865 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
11866 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11869 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
11870 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11871 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11872 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11873 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11875 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11876 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11878 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11879 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
11880 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
11881 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
11885 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11887 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11888 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11890 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
11891 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11892 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11894 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11895 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11897 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11899 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11903 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
11904 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11905 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11906 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11907 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11908 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
11909 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
11910 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11912 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11913 payment_metadata: None,
11914 keysend_preimage: None,
11915 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11916 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11918 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11920 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
11921 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
11922 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
11923 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
11924 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11925 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
11926 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
11928 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
11929 } else { panic!(); }
11931 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
11932 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
11934 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11935 payment_metadata: None,
11936 keysend_preimage: None,
11937 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11938 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11940 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11942 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
11943 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11944 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
11945 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
11949 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
11950 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11951 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11952 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11953 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11955 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
11956 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11958 outgoing_cltv_value: 22,
11959 payment_metadata: None,
11960 keysend_preimage: None,
11961 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11962 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
11964 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11965 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
11966 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
11968 // Should not return an error as this condition:
11969 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
11970 // is not satisfied.
11971 assert!(result.is_ok());
11975 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
11976 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11977 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11978 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11979 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11981 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
11982 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11984 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11985 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11986 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
11987 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
11988 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11990 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11991 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11993 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11994 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11995 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11996 match &msg_events[0] {
11997 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
11998 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12000 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
12001 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
12002 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
12005 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12008 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12009 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12011 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
12012 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
12013 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12015 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12019 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
12020 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
12021 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
12022 // the channel without the anchors feature.
12023 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12024 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12025 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
12026 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12027 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12028 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
12029 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12031 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
12032 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12033 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12035 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12036 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12038 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12039 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12041 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12044 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12045 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
12047 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12048 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12050 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
12051 // not have generated any events.
12052 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12056 fn test_update_channel_config() {
12057 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12058 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12059 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12060 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12061 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12062 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12063 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
12065 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12066 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12067 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12069 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
12070 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12071 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
12072 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12073 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12075 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12076 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12079 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
12080 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12081 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12083 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
12084 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12085 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
12086 ..Default::default()
12088 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12089 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12090 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12092 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12093 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12096 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
12097 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12098 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12099 ..Default::default()
12101 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12102 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
12103 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12104 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12106 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12107 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12110 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
12111 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
12112 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
12113 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
12114 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
12117 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12118 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12119 ..Default::default()
12121 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
12124 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
12125 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
12126 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12127 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12131 fn test_payment_display() {
12132 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12133 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12134 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
12135 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12136 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12137 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12141 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
12142 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12143 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12144 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12145 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12146 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12148 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
12149 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12150 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12151 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12152 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12153 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
12154 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
12155 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12157 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12158 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12159 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12162 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
12163 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
12165 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12166 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12168 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12169 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12170 }, false).unwrap();
12171 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
12172 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
12173 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
12175 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
12177 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
12178 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12179 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12180 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12181 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12182 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12183 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12184 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12185 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12186 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12187 } else { panic!() };
12188 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12189 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12190 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12191 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12193 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12195 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12196 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12197 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12202 fn test_peel_payment_onion() {
12204 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
12206 let bob = crate::sign::KeysManager::new(&[2; 32], 42, 42);
12207 let bob_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bob.get_node_secret_key());
12208 let charlie = crate::sign::KeysManager::new(&[3; 32], 42, 42);
12209 let charlie_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &charlie.get_node_secret_key());
12211 let (session_priv, total_amt_msat, cur_height, recipient_onion, preimage, payment_hash,
12212 prng_seed, hops, recipient_amount, pay_secret) = payment_onion_args(bob_pk, charlie_pk);
12216 blinded_tail: None,
12219 let (amount_msat, cltv_expiry, onion) = create_payment_onion(
12220 &secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_amt_msat, recipient_onion, cur_height,
12221 payment_hash, Some(preimage), prng_seed
12224 let msg = make_update_add_msg(amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, onion);
12225 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("bob".to_string());
12227 let peeled = peel_payment_onion(&msg, &&bob, &&logger, &secp_ctx, cur_height, true)
12228 .map_err(|e| e.msg).unwrap();
12230 let next_onion = match peeled.routing {
12231 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: _ } => {
12234 _ => panic!("expected a forwarded onion"),
12237 let msg2 = make_update_add_msg(amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, next_onion);
12238 let peeled2 = peel_payment_onion(&msg2, &&charlie, &&logger, &secp_ctx, cur_height, true)
12239 .map_err(|e| e.msg).unwrap();
12241 match peeled2.routing {
12242 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, .. } => {
12243 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, preimage);
12244 assert_eq!(peeled2.outgoing_amt_msat, recipient_amount);
12245 assert_eq!(incoming_cltv_expiry, peeled2.outgoing_cltv_value);
12246 let msgs::FinalOnionHopData{total_msat, payment_secret} = payment_data.unwrap();
12247 assert_eq!(total_msat, total_amt_msat);
12248 assert_eq!(payment_secret, pay_secret);
12250 _ => panic!("expected a received keysend"),
12254 fn make_update_add_msg(
12255 amount_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, payment_hash: PaymentHash,
12256 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket
12257 ) -> msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
12258 msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
12259 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([0; 32]),
12264 onion_routing_packet,
12265 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
12269 fn payment_onion_args(hop_pk: PublicKey, recipient_pk: PublicKey) -> (
12270 SecretKey, u64, u32, RecipientOnionFields, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, [u8; 32],
12271 Vec<RouteHop>, u64, PaymentSecret,
12273 let session_priv_bytes = [42; 32];
12274 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes).unwrap();
12275 let total_amt_msat = 1000;
12276 let cur_height = 1000;
12277 let pay_secret = PaymentSecret([99; 32]);
12278 let recipient_onion = RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(pay_secret);
12279 let preimage_bytes = [43; 32];
12280 let preimage = PaymentPreimage(preimage_bytes);
12281 let rhash_bytes = Sha256::hash(&preimage_bytes).into_inner();
12282 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(rhash_bytes);
12283 let prng_seed = [44; 32];
12285 // make a route alice -> bob -> charlie
12287 let recipient_amount = total_amt_msat - hop_fee;
12292 cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
12293 short_channel_id: 1,
12294 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
12295 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
12296 maybe_announced_channel: false,
12299 pubkey: recipient_pk,
12300 fee_msat: recipient_amount,
12301 cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
12302 short_channel_id: 2,
12303 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
12304 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
12305 maybe_announced_channel: false,
12309 (session_priv, total_amt_msat, cur_height, recipient_onion, preimage, payment_hash,
12310 prng_seed, hops, recipient_amount, pay_secret)
12313 pub fn create_payment_onion<T: bitcoin::secp256k1::Signing>(
12314 secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, path: &Path, session_priv: &SecretKey, total_msat: u64,
12315 recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, best_block_height: u32, payment_hash: PaymentHash,
12316 keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, prng_seed: [u8; 32]
12317 ) -> Result<(u64, u32, msgs::OnionPacket), ()> {
12318 let onion_keys = super::onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv).map_err(|_| ())?;
12319 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = super::onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
12323 best_block_height + 1,
12325 ).map_err(|_| ())?;
12326 let onion_packet = super::onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(
12327 onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, &payment_hash
12329 Ok((htlc_msat, htlc_cltv, onion_packet))
12335 use crate::chain::Listen;
12336 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12337 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12338 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12339 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12340 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12341 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12342 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12343 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12344 use crate::util::test_utils;
12345 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12347 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12348 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12349 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
12351 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12353 use criterion::Criterion;
12355 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12356 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12357 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12358 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12359 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12360 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12361 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12363 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12364 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12366 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12367 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12369 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12371 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12374 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12375 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12378 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12379 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12380 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12382 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12383 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12385 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12386 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12387 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12388 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12389 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
12391 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12392 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12393 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12395 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12396 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12397 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12398 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12400 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12401 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12402 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12404 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12405 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12406 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12407 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12408 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12410 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12411 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12412 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12414 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12415 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12417 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12418 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12419 }, false).unwrap();
12420 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
12421 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12422 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12425 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12426 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12427 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12429 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12430 } else { panic!(); }
12432 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12433 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12434 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12435 match events_b[0] {
12436 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12437 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12439 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12442 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12443 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12444 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12445 match events_a[0] {
12446 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12447 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12449 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12452 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
12454 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
12455 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
12456 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
12458 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12459 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12460 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12461 match msg_events[0] {
12462 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
12463 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
12464 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12468 match msg_events[1] {
12469 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12473 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12474 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12475 match events_a[0] {
12476 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12477 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12479 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12482 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12483 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12484 match events_b[0] {
12485 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12486 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12488 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12491 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
12492 macro_rules! send_payment {
12493 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
12494 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
12495 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
12496 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
12497 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
12498 payment_count += 1;
12499 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
12500 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
12502 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
12503 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
12504 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
12505 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
12506 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
12507 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12508 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
12509 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
12510 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12511 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12512 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12514 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
12515 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
12516 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12517 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
12519 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
12520 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
12521 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
12522 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12523 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
12525 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
12528 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
12529 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12530 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12531 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12533 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
12537 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
12538 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
12539 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);