1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
47 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
50 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
52 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
53 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
54 use util::config::UserConfig;
55 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
56 use util::{byte_utils, events};
57 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
58 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
59 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
60 use util::errors::APIError;
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
66 use io::{Cursor, Read};
67 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
70 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
71 use std::time::Instant;
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
94 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
98 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
99 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
102 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
103 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
107 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
108 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
109 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
110 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
111 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
112 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
113 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
116 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
117 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
118 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
119 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
122 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
125 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
126 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
129 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
131 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
133 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
134 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
135 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
137 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
139 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
143 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
147 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
148 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
149 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
150 short_channel_id: u64,
152 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
154 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
155 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
160 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
161 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
162 /// are part of the same payment.
163 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
164 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
165 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
168 struct ClaimableHTLC {
169 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
172 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
175 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
176 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
177 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
179 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
180 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
185 impl Readable for PaymentId {
186 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
187 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
191 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
192 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
193 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
194 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
197 session_priv: SecretKey,
198 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
199 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
200 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
201 payment_id: PaymentId,
206 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
207 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
209 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
210 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
211 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
216 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
217 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
219 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
227 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
228 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
230 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
235 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
237 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
238 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
239 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
240 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
241 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
243 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
244 err: msgs::LightningError,
245 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
246 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
248 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
250 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
252 err: LightningError {
254 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
255 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
262 shutdown_finish: None,
266 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
268 err: LightningError {
270 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
273 shutdown_finish: None,
277 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
278 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
281 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
283 err: LightningError {
285 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
286 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
292 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
293 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
297 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
300 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
302 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
304 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
306 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
308 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
310 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
311 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
317 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
319 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
320 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
328 shutdown_finish: None,
333 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
334 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
335 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
336 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
337 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
339 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
340 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
341 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
342 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
343 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
344 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
345 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
347 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
351 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
352 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
353 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
354 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
355 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
356 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
357 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
358 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
359 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
360 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
361 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
362 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
364 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
365 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
366 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
367 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
370 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
371 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
372 /// quite some time lag.
373 enum BackgroundEvent {
374 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
375 /// commitment transaction.
376 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
379 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
380 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
382 latest_features: InitFeatures,
385 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
386 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
388 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
390 struct PendingInboundPayment {
391 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
392 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
393 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
394 /// this payment being removed.
396 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
397 user_payment_id: u64,
398 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
399 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
400 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
403 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
404 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
405 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
407 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
410 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
411 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
412 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
413 pending_amt_msat: u64,
414 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
416 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
417 starting_block_height: u32,
419 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
420 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
421 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
423 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
427 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
428 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
430 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
434 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
436 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
441 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
442 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
443 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
444 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
445 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
446 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs }
449 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs };
452 /// panics if part_amt_msat is None and !self.is_fulfilled
453 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], part_amt_msat: Option<u64>) -> bool {
454 let remove_res = match self {
455 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
456 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
457 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs } => {
458 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
462 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, .. } = self {
463 *pending_amt_msat -= part_amt_msat.expect("We must only not provide an amount if the payment was already fulfilled");
469 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], part_amt_msat: u64) -> bool {
470 let insert_res = match self {
471 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
472 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
473 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
475 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false
478 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, .. } = self {
479 *pending_amt_msat += part_amt_msat;
485 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
487 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
488 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
489 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs } => {
496 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
497 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
498 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
499 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
500 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
501 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
502 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
503 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
505 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
506 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
507 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
508 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
509 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
510 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
511 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
512 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
513 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
515 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
516 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
518 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
519 /// to individual Channels.
521 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
522 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
523 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
524 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
526 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
527 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
528 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
529 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
530 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
531 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
532 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
534 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
535 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
536 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
537 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
540 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
541 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
542 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
543 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
544 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
546 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
547 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
548 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
549 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
550 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
551 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
552 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
553 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
554 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
555 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
558 default_configuration: UserConfig,
559 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
565 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
567 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
568 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
570 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
571 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
572 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
573 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
575 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
576 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
577 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
578 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
579 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
580 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
582 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
583 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
584 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
585 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
586 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
587 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
588 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
589 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
591 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
593 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
594 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
596 our_network_key: SecretKey,
597 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
599 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
600 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
601 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
603 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
604 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
605 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
606 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
608 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
609 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
610 /// are currently open with that peer.
611 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
612 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
615 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
616 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
618 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
619 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
620 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
621 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
622 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
623 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
624 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
625 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
626 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
628 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
635 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
637 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
638 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
639 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
640 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
641 pub struct ChainParameters {
642 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
643 pub network: Network,
645 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
647 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
648 pub best_block: BestBlock,
651 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
657 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
658 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
659 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
660 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
661 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
662 /// updates are ready for persistence).
664 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
665 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
666 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
667 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
668 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
670 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
671 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
674 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
675 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
676 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
679 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
680 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
682 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
683 persistence_notifier: notifier,
684 should_persist: persist_check,
685 _read_guard: read_guard,
690 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
692 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
693 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
698 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
699 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
701 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
703 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
704 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
705 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
706 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
707 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
709 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
710 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
712 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
714 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
715 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
716 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
717 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
718 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
719 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
720 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
722 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
723 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
725 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
726 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
727 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
728 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
730 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
731 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
732 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
733 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
734 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
735 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
738 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
740 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
741 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
744 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
746 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
747 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
748 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
749 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
750 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
751 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
752 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
753 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
754 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
755 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
756 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
759 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
760 /// to better separate parameters.
761 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
762 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
763 /// The node_id of our counterparty
764 pub node_id: PublicKey,
765 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
766 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
767 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
768 pub features: InitFeatures,
769 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
770 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
771 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
773 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
775 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
776 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
777 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
778 /// payments to us through this channel.
779 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
782 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
783 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
784 pub struct ChannelDetails {
785 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
786 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
787 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
788 /// lifetime of the channel.
789 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
790 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
791 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
792 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
793 /// our counterparty already.
795 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
796 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
797 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
798 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
799 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
800 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
801 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
802 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
803 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
804 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
805 /// this value on chain.
807 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
809 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
811 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
812 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
813 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
814 pub user_channel_id: u64,
815 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
816 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
817 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
818 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
820 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
821 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
822 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
823 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
824 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
825 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
826 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
827 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
828 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
830 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
831 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
832 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
833 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
834 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
835 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
836 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
837 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
838 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
840 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
842 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
843 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
844 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
845 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
846 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
847 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
848 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
849 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
850 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
852 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
853 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
854 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
855 pub is_outbound: bool,
856 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
857 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
858 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
859 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
860 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
862 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
863 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
864 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
865 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
867 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
869 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
873 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
874 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
876 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
877 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
878 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
879 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
880 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
881 ParameterError(APIError),
882 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
883 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
884 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
887 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
889 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
890 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
891 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
892 /// paths than the ones selected).
893 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
894 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
895 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
896 /// in over-/re-payment.
898 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
899 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
900 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
902 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
903 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
904 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
905 /// with the latest update_id.
906 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
909 macro_rules! handle_error {
910 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
913 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
914 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
916 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
917 // entering the macro.
918 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
919 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
922 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
924 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
925 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
926 if let Some(update) = update_option {
927 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
931 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
932 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
933 channel_id, user_channel_id,
934 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
939 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
940 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
942 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
943 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
944 action: err.action.clone()
948 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
949 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
952 // Return error in case higher-API need one
959 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
960 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
961 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
963 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
964 //TODO: Once warning messages are merged, we should send a `warning` message to our
966 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
968 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
969 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
971 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
972 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
973 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
974 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
976 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
977 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
978 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
980 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
981 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
982 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
983 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
985 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
986 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
987 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
993 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
994 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
998 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1000 $entry.remove_entry();
1008 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1009 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1013 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1015 $entry.remove_entry();
1023 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1024 ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1026 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1027 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1028 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1035 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1036 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1037 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1039 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1041 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1042 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1043 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1044 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1046 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1047 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1048 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1049 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1050 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1051 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1052 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1053 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1054 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1055 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1056 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1059 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1060 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1061 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1062 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1063 match $action_type {
1064 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1065 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1067 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1068 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1070 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1071 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1072 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1073 if !$resend_commitment {
1074 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1077 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1079 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1080 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1084 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1085 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1087 $entry.remove_entry();
1091 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1092 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new());
1096 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1097 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1098 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1100 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1101 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1105 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1106 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1107 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1108 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1109 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1112 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1117 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1118 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1119 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1120 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
1121 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1122 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1124 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1125 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1127 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1128 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1129 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1130 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1133 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1134 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1135 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1136 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1137 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1138 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1139 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1140 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1141 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1142 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1143 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1144 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1147 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1148 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1149 // before it should be allowed to.
1150 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1151 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1152 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1155 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
1156 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1157 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1158 msg: announcement_sigs,
1161 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
1164 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1165 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1166 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1167 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1168 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1169 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1170 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1171 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1172 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1173 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1174 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1175 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1176 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1177 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1178 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1179 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1180 let mut order = $order;
1182 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1184 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1188 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1189 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1190 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1191 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1196 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1197 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1198 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1199 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1200 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1205 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1209 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1214 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1215 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1216 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1221 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1222 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1223 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1224 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1225 assert!(res.is_ok());
1228 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1232 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1233 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1234 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1236 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1238 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1239 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1244 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1245 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1246 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1247 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1248 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1251 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1253 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1254 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1256 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1258 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1260 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1261 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1262 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1263 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1264 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1265 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1268 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1269 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1270 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1274 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1276 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1277 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1278 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1279 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1280 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1281 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1283 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1284 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1286 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1287 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1290 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1291 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1293 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1295 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1296 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1297 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1298 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1306 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1307 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1308 &self.default_configuration
1311 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1313 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1314 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1315 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1316 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1317 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1320 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1321 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1323 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1324 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1325 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1327 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1328 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1329 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1330 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1331 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1332 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1334 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1335 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1336 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1337 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1338 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1339 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1343 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1344 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1345 Some(peer_state) => {
1346 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1347 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1348 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1349 Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config)?
1351 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1354 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1356 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1357 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1358 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1360 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1361 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1362 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1363 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1364 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1365 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1367 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1370 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1372 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1373 node_id: their_network_key,
1376 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1379 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1380 let mut res = Vec::new();
1382 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1383 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1384 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1385 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1386 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1387 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1388 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1389 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1390 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1391 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1392 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1393 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1394 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1396 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1397 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1398 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1399 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1400 inbound_capacity_msat,
1401 outbound_capacity_msat,
1402 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1403 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1404 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1405 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1406 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1407 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1408 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1412 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1413 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1414 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1415 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1421 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1422 /// more information.
1423 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1424 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1427 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1428 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1430 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1431 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1433 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1434 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1435 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1436 // really wanted anyway.
1437 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1440 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1441 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1442 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1443 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1444 Some(transaction) => {
1445 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1449 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1450 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1451 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1452 reason: closure_reason
1456 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1457 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1459 let counterparty_node_id;
1460 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1461 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1462 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1463 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1464 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1465 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1466 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1467 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1468 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1469 Some(peer_state) => {
1470 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1471 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1472 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1474 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1476 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1478 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1479 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1480 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1481 let (result, is_permanent) =
1482 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
1484 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1490 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1491 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1495 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1496 let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1497 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1498 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1502 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1506 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1510 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1511 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1514 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1518 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1519 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1520 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1522 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1523 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1525 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1526 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1527 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1528 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1530 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1532 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1533 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1534 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1535 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1536 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
1539 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1540 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1541 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1543 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1544 /// the channel being closed or not:
1545 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1546 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1547 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1548 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1549 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1550 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1551 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1553 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1555 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1556 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1557 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1558 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1559 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1563 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1564 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1565 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1566 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1567 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1569 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1570 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1571 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1572 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1573 // ignore the result here.
1574 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1578 /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1579 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1580 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1582 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1583 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1584 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1585 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1586 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1587 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1590 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1591 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1593 if peer_node_id.is_some() {
1594 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1595 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1598 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1600 chan.remove_entry().1
1602 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1605 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1606 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1607 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1608 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1609 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1614 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1617 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1618 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1619 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1620 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1621 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
1622 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1623 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1624 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1625 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1626 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1627 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1637 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1638 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1639 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1640 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1641 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1645 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1646 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1647 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1649 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1650 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1651 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1652 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1653 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1654 failure_code: $err_code,
1655 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1660 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1661 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1664 let shared_secret = {
1665 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1666 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1669 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1671 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1672 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1673 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1674 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1675 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1676 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1677 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1678 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1681 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1682 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1683 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1684 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1685 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1688 let mut channel_state = None;
1689 macro_rules! return_err {
1690 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1692 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1693 if channel_state.is_none() {
1694 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1696 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1697 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1698 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1699 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1700 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1705 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1706 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1707 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac): (msgs::OnionHopData, _) = {
1708 match <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1710 let error_code = match err {
1711 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1712 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1713 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1714 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1715 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1717 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1720 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1721 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1722 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1729 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1732 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1733 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1734 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1735 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1736 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1737 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1738 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1739 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1740 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1741 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1742 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1743 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1747 // final_expiry_too_soon
1748 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1749 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1750 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1751 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1752 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1753 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1754 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1756 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1757 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1758 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1760 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1761 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1762 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1765 let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
1766 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
1767 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1768 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1769 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1770 return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1771 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1772 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1774 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1776 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1777 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1778 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1779 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1780 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1781 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1782 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1783 if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
1784 return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1787 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
1789 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1792 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1797 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1798 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1799 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1800 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1802 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1804 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1805 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1806 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1807 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1810 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1811 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1812 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1814 // Check two things:
1815 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1816 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1817 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1819 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1821 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1822 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1823 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1825 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1827 let blinding_factor = {
1828 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1829 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1830 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1831 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1834 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1836 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1838 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1841 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1842 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1845 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1846 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1847 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1848 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1849 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1853 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1854 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1855 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1858 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1859 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1860 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1861 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1865 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1866 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1867 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1868 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1869 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1870 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1871 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1872 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1873 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1874 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1875 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1877 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1880 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1882 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
1883 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
1884 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
1885 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
1886 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1889 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1890 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1891 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1892 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1893 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1894 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1895 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1897 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1898 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1900 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
1901 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
1902 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
1903 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1904 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1906 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1907 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1909 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1910 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1911 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1912 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1913 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1915 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1916 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1918 // In theory, we would be safe against unintentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1919 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longer delay.
1920 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1921 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1927 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1928 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1929 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1930 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1932 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1933 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1935 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1936 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1937 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1939 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1941 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1946 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1949 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
1950 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
1951 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
1953 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1954 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1955 if !chan.should_announce() {
1956 return Err(LightningError {
1957 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
1958 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
1961 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1962 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
1965 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
1966 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
1967 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
1968 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
1969 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1970 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1971 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1972 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1973 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1977 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1979 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1980 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1982 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1983 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1984 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
1985 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1986 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1987 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
1988 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1989 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1992 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1993 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1995 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2001 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2002 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2003 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2004 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2005 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2006 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2008 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2009 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2010 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2011 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2012 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2014 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2016 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2018 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2019 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2021 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2022 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2023 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2024 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2025 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2026 err: "Payment already completed"
2031 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2032 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2033 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2036 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2037 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2039 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2040 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2042 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2043 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2045 let send_res = break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2046 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2048 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2049 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2051 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2052 channel_state, chan);
2054 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2055 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2056 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2057 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2058 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2059 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2060 total_msat: total_value,
2062 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path.last().unwrap().fee_msat));
2066 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2067 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2068 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2069 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2070 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2071 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2072 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2073 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2074 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2077 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2078 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2079 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2080 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2081 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2082 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2083 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2084 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2092 } else { unreachable!(); }
2096 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2097 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2099 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2104 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2106 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2107 /// fields for more info.
2109 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2110 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2111 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2112 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2113 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2114 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2116 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2118 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2119 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2120 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2122 /// In general, a path may raise:
2123 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2124 /// node public key) is specified.
2125 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2126 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2128 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2129 /// relevant updates.
2131 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2132 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2133 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2135 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2136 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2137 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2138 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2140 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2141 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2142 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2143 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2144 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2147 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2148 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2149 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2151 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2152 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2153 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2154 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2155 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2157 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2158 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2160 let mut total_value = 0;
2161 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2162 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2163 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2164 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2165 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2166 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2167 continue 'path_check;
2169 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2170 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2171 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2172 continue 'path_check;
2175 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2176 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2178 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2179 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2181 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2182 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2183 total_value = amt_msat;
2186 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2187 let mut results = Vec::new();
2188 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2189 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2191 let mut has_ok = false;
2192 let mut has_err = false;
2193 for res in results.iter() {
2194 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2195 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2196 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2197 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2204 if has_err && has_ok {
2205 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
2207 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2213 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2215 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2216 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2217 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, or if the payment
2218 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success).
2220 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2221 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2222 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2223 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2224 if path.len() == 0 {
2225 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2226 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2231 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2232 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2233 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2235 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2236 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2238 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2239 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2240 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2241 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2244 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2246 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2247 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2248 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2251 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2252 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError {
2253 err: "Payment already completed"
2258 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2259 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2263 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2266 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2267 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2268 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2269 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2270 /// never reach the recipient.
2272 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2274 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2275 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2277 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2279 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2280 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2281 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2283 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2285 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2286 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2287 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2292 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2293 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2294 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2295 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2297 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2299 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2301 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2302 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2303 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2304 } else { unreachable!(); })
2307 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2309 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2310 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2313 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2314 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2319 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2320 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2321 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2324 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2325 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2326 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2328 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2336 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2337 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2338 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2342 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2344 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2345 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2347 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
2349 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2350 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2351 /// keys per-channel).
2353 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2354 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2355 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2357 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2358 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2359 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2361 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2362 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2363 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2365 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2366 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2367 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2368 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2372 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2373 let mut output_index = None;
2374 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2375 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2376 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2377 if output_index.is_some() {
2378 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2379 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2382 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2383 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2384 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2387 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2390 if output_index.is_none() {
2391 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2392 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2395 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2399 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
2400 if !chan.should_announce() {
2401 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2405 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2407 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
2409 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2410 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2412 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2413 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
2414 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
2415 node_signature: our_node_sig,
2416 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
2421 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2422 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2423 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2425 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2428 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2429 // smaller than 500:
2430 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2432 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2433 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2434 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2435 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2436 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2437 /// our network addresses.
2439 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2440 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2442 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2443 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2444 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2445 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2447 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2449 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2450 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2451 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2453 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2454 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2457 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2458 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2459 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2461 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2462 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2463 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2464 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2465 rgb, alias, addresses,
2466 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2467 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2469 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2470 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2472 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2473 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2475 let mut announced_chans = false;
2476 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2477 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2478 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2480 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2485 announced_chans = true;
2487 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2488 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2489 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2493 if announced_chans {
2494 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2495 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2496 signature: node_announce_sig,
2497 contents: announcement
2503 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2505 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2506 /// Will likely generate further events.
2507 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2508 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2510 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2511 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2512 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2514 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2515 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2517 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2518 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2519 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2520 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2522 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2523 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2524 match forward_info {
2525 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2526 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2527 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2528 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2529 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2530 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2531 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2533 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
2534 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
2537 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2538 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2539 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2540 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2541 // problem, not ours.
2548 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2549 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2550 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2551 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2552 match forward_info {
2553 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2554 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2556 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2557 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2558 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2559 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2560 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2561 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2562 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2563 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2565 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
2567 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2568 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2570 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2572 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
2573 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2574 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
2580 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2582 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2583 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2584 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2585 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2586 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2587 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2588 // this channel currently :/.
2594 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2595 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2597 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2598 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
2599 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
2601 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2602 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
2604 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
2606 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2607 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2608 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2611 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2613 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2614 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
2615 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
2616 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
2617 // messages when we can.
2618 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
2619 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
2620 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
2627 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
2628 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
2631 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
2632 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
2633 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2634 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
2635 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
2636 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
2638 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2639 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
2640 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
2641 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2642 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2644 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
2645 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
2647 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
2649 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
2653 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2654 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
2657 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
2658 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2659 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2660 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2661 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2662 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
2663 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2664 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
2665 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2667 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
2675 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2676 match forward_info {
2677 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2678 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
2679 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2680 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
2681 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2682 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
2683 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2684 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
2686 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2689 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
2690 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
2691 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2692 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2693 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2694 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2696 value: amt_to_forward,
2701 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2703 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
2704 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2705 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
2707 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2708 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2709 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2710 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
2711 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
2713 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
2718 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
2719 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
2720 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
2721 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
2722 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
2723 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
2724 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2725 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
2726 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2727 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2728 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => {
2729 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2730 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2732 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
2733 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
2734 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2735 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
2736 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2738 amt: amt_to_forward,
2739 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
2742 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2743 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2744 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2750 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
2752 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2755 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2756 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2759 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
2760 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2761 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2762 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
2763 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2764 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2765 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2767 let mut total_value = 0;
2768 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2769 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2770 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
2771 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
2772 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2773 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2777 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2778 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2779 total_value += htlc.value;
2780 match &htlc.onion_payload {
2781 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
2782 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2783 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2784 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
2785 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2787 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2789 _ => unreachable!(),
2792 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2793 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2794 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2795 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2798 } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2799 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2801 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
2802 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
2803 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
2804 user_payment_id: inbound_payment.get().user_payment_id,
2808 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
2809 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
2811 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
2813 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2814 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
2821 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2822 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
2830 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
2831 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
2834 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2835 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2838 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
2839 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2840 events.append(&mut new_events);
2843 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2845 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2846 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2848 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2849 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
2850 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2851 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2852 if background_events.is_empty() {
2856 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2858 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2859 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2860 // monitor updating completing.
2861 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2868 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2869 /// Process background events, for functional testing
2870 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2871 self.process_background_events();
2874 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
2875 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
2876 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
2877 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
2878 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2879 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2880 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2882 if !chan.is_live() {
2883 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
2884 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2885 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2887 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2888 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2890 let mut retain_channel = true;
2891 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
2894 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
2895 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
2899 let ret_err = match res {
2900 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
2901 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2902 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_id);
2903 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
2906 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2907 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2908 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2909 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2910 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2911 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2912 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2913 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2923 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
2927 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
2928 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
2929 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
2930 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
2931 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
2932 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2933 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2935 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
2937 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2939 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2940 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2941 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2942 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2943 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
2944 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
2945 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2947 handle_errors.push(err);
2957 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
2959 /// This currently includes:
2960 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
2961 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
2962 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
2965 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
2966 /// estimate fetches.
2967 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
2968 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2969 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2970 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2972 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
2974 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2976 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2977 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2978 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2979 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2980 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
2981 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
2982 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
2983 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2985 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
2987 if !retain_channel { return false; }
2989 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
2990 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
2991 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
2992 if needs_close { return false; }
2995 match chan.channel_update_status() {
2996 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
2997 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
2998 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
2999 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3000 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3001 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3002 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3006 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3007 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3009 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3010 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3011 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3015 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3016 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3025 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3026 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3032 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3033 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3034 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3035 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
3036 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
3037 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
3038 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3040 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3041 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3042 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3043 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3044 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3045 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3046 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3047 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3048 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3049 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3050 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3056 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3057 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3058 // be surfaced to the user.
3059 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3060 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3062 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3063 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3064 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3065 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3066 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
3067 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
3069 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3072 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3074 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3075 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3076 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3078 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3079 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3080 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3081 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3082 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3083 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(path.last().unwrap().fee_msat)) &&
3084 !payment.get().is_fulfilled()
3086 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3087 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3089 rejected_by_dest: false,
3090 network_update: None,
3091 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3093 short_channel_id: None,
3102 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3109 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3110 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3111 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3112 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3113 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3114 /// still-available channels.
3115 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3116 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3117 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3118 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3121 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3122 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3123 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3125 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, .. } => {
3126 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3127 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3128 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3129 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3130 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut sessions) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3131 if !sessions.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(path.last().unwrap().fee_msat)) {
3132 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3135 if sessions.get().is_fulfilled() {
3136 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3139 if sessions.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3140 all_paths_failed = true;
3143 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3146 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3147 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3148 match &onion_error {
3149 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3151 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3153 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3154 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3155 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3156 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3157 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3158 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3159 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3160 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3166 error_code: onion_error_code,
3168 error_data: onion_error_data
3172 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3178 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3179 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3180 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
3181 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3183 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3184 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3185 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3186 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3187 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3188 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3189 network_update: None,
3192 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3194 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3196 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3202 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3203 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3204 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3205 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3206 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3207 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3209 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3210 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3211 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3215 let mut forward_event = None;
3216 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3217 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3219 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3220 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3221 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3223 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3224 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3227 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3228 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3229 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3230 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3231 time_forwardable: time
3238 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
3239 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
3240 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
3242 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3243 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3244 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3245 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3247 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
3249 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3250 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3251 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3252 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3254 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3256 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3257 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3258 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3259 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3261 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3262 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3263 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3264 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3266 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3267 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3268 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3269 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3270 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3272 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3273 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3274 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3280 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3281 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3282 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3284 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3285 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3286 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3287 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3288 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3289 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3290 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3292 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3293 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3294 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3295 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3296 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3297 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3298 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3299 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3301 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3302 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3303 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3304 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3305 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3306 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3308 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3313 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3314 // which were generated.
3315 channel_state.take();
3317 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3318 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3319 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3326 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3327 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3328 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3329 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3330 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3332 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3336 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3337 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3338 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3339 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3340 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3341 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3342 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3343 payment_preimage, e);
3344 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3345 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3346 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3347 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3350 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3351 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3352 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3353 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3354 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3355 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3356 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3357 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3358 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3359 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3365 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3367 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3370 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3371 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3372 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3373 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3374 payment_preimage, e);
3376 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3377 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3379 chan.remove_entry();
3381 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3384 } else { unreachable!(); }
3387 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
3388 for source in sources.drain(..) {
3389 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, .. } = source {
3390 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3391 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3392 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3393 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut sessions) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3394 assert!(sessions.get().is_fulfilled());
3395 sessions.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None);
3396 if sessions.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3404 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
3406 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3407 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3408 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3409 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3410 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3411 let found_payment = if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut sessions) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3412 let found_payment = !sessions.get().is_fulfilled();
3413 sessions.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
3415 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
3416 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
3417 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
3419 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
3420 // irrevocably fulfilled.
3421 sessions.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(path.last().unwrap().fee_msat));
3422 if sessions.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3429 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3430 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3431 events::Event::PaymentSent {
3433 payment_hash: payment_hash
3437 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
3440 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
3441 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
3442 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
3443 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
3444 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
3445 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
3446 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
3449 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
3450 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3451 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
3452 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3453 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3456 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
3457 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
3458 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
3459 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
3460 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3461 payment_preimage, e);
3463 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
3464 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
3465 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
3466 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
3469 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3470 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
3471 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3472 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
3476 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
3477 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
3478 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
3481 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3482 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
3484 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
3492 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
3493 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3494 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
3497 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
3498 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3500 let chan_restoration_res;
3501 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
3502 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3503 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3504 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
3505 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
3506 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
3508 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
3512 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
3513 let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
3514 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
3515 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
3516 // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
3517 // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
3518 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3519 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3520 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
3523 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked);
3524 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3525 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3527 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
3529 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3530 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
3531 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3532 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3536 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3537 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
3538 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
3541 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
3542 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
3543 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3544 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3545 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
3546 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
3547 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3548 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
3549 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3550 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
3552 entry.insert(channel);
3558 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3559 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
3560 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3561 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3562 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
3563 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3564 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3565 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3567 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
3568 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
3570 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3573 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3574 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
3575 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
3576 channel_value_satoshis: value,
3578 user_channel_id: user_id,
3583 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3584 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
3585 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3586 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3587 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3588 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
3589 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3590 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3591 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3593 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
3595 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3598 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
3599 // lock before watch_channel
3600 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
3602 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
3603 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
3604 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
3605 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
3606 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
3607 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
3608 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
3609 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
3610 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
3611 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
3612 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
3614 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
3615 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
3616 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
3617 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
3618 // until we have persisted our monitor.
3619 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3623 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3624 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3625 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
3626 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3627 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
3629 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3630 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
3631 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3640 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3642 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3643 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3644 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3645 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3646 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3647 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3648 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3650 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
3651 Ok(update) => update,
3652 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3654 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
3655 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
3656 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
3657 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
3658 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
3659 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
3660 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
3661 shutdown_finish.0.take();
3668 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3671 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
3672 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
3676 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3677 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3678 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3679 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3680 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3681 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3682 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3684 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3685 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
3686 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3687 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
3688 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
3689 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
3690 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
3691 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
3692 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
3693 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
3694 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
3695 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
3696 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3697 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3698 msg: announcement_sigs,
3700 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3701 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3702 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3703 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3708 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3712 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3713 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
3714 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
3715 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3716 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3718 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3719 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3720 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3721 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3724 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
3725 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
3726 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
3727 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
3730 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3731 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
3733 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3734 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
3735 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3736 let (result, is_permanent) =
3737 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
3739 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
3745 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3746 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3747 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3754 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3757 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
3758 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3761 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
3765 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3766 let (tx, chan_option) = {
3767 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3768 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3769 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3770 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3771 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3772 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3774 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3775 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3776 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3777 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3782 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
3783 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
3784 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
3785 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
3786 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
3787 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3788 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3790 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3791 } else { (tx, None) }
3793 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3796 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
3797 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
3798 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
3800 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3801 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3802 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3803 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3807 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
3812 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3813 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
3814 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
3815 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
3817 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
3818 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
3819 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
3820 //but we should prevent it anyway.
3822 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
3823 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3825 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3826 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3827 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3828 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3831 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
3832 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
3833 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
3834 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
3835 match pending_forward_info {
3836 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3837 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
3838 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
3839 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
3840 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
3841 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
3842 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
3843 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
3847 // The only case where we'd be unable to
3848 // successfully get a channel update is if the
3849 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
3850 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
3851 // payments over the channel back to themselves
3852 // (because no one else should know the short_id
3853 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
3854 // no problem just calling this
3855 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
3856 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
3859 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
3861 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3862 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3863 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3866 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
3868 _ => pending_forward_info
3871 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3873 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3878 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3879 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3880 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
3881 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3882 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3883 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3884 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3885 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3887 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
3889 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3892 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
3896 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3897 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3898 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3899 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3900 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3901 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3902 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3904 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
3906 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3911 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3912 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3913 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3914 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3915 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3916 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3917 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3919 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
3920 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
3921 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3923 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
3926 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3930 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3931 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3932 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3933 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3934 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3935 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3936 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3938 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
3939 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
3940 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3941 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
3942 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
3943 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
3944 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
3949 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3950 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
3952 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3953 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3954 msg: revoke_and_ack,
3956 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
3957 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3958 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3959 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3960 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3961 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3962 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3963 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3965 commitment_signed: msg,
3971 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3976 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
3977 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
3978 let mut forward_event = None;
3979 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
3980 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3981 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3982 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
3984 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3985 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
3986 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
3987 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
3988 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
3990 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3991 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3992 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
3994 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3995 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3996 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4001 match forward_event {
4003 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4004 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4005 time_forwardable: time
4013 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4014 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4016 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4017 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4018 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4019 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4020 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4021 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4023 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4024 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4025 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4026 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4027 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4028 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4029 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4030 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4031 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4032 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4033 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4035 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4036 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4037 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(),
4038 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4039 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4041 } else { unreachable!(); }
4044 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4045 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4046 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4050 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4051 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4052 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4053 .expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"),
4054 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4056 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4059 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
4061 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4062 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4064 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4065 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4067 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4068 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4075 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4076 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4077 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4078 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4079 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4080 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4081 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4083 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4085 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4090 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4091 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4092 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4094 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4095 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4096 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4097 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4099 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4100 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4103 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4104 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4105 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4106 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4107 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4110 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4115 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4116 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4117 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4118 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4119 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4120 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4122 // It's not a local channel
4123 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4126 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4127 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4128 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4129 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4130 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4131 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4132 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4133 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4135 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4137 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4138 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4139 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4140 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4142 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
4145 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
4147 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4150 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4151 let chan_restoration_res;
4152 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
4153 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4154 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4156 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4157 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4158 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4159 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4161 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4162 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4163 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4164 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4165 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
4166 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4167 let mut channel_update = None;
4168 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4169 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4170 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4173 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4174 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4175 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4176 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4177 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4178 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4179 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4182 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4183 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
4184 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4185 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4187 (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
4189 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4192 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4193 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
4195 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4196 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
4201 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
4202 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
4203 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4204 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
4205 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
4206 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
4207 match monitor_event {
4208 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
4209 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
4210 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
4211 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
4213 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
4214 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4217 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
4218 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
4219 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4220 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4221 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4222 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4223 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4224 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
4225 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4226 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4228 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
4229 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4230 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4234 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
4235 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
4237 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
4239 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
4240 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4241 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4242 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4243 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4248 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
4249 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
4254 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4255 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4258 has_pending_monitor_events
4261 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
4262 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
4263 /// update events as a separate process method here.
4264 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
4265 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
4266 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
4269 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
4270 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
4271 /// update was applied.
4273 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
4274 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
4275 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
4276 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
4277 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
4278 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
4279 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4280 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
4282 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4283 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4284 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4285 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4286 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4288 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4289 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
4290 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4291 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
4292 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
4294 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
4295 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4296 has_monitor_update = true;
4297 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
4298 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
4299 if close_channel { return false; }
4301 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4302 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4303 updates: commitment_update,
4310 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4311 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4312 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
4319 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
4320 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4321 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
4324 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4325 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4331 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
4332 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
4333 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
4334 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
4335 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
4336 let mut has_update = false;
4338 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4339 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4340 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4341 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4342 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4344 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4345 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
4346 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
4347 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4349 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4350 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
4353 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
4354 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
4355 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
4356 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4357 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4360 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4361 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4366 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4368 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
4369 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4375 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4376 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4383 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4384 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4390 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
4391 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
4393 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
4394 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4395 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
4396 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
4397 // reorganized out of the main chain.
4398 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
4399 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
4400 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
4401 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
4402 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
4403 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
4404 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
4405 assert!(should_broadcast);
4406 } else { unreachable!(); }
4407 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
4409 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4413 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4414 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
4416 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4418 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4419 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4420 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4421 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4422 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
4423 payment_secret, min_value_msat, user_payment_id, payment_preimage,
4424 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
4425 // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
4426 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
4427 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
4428 // never fail a payment too early.
4429 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
4431 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
4434 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
4439 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
4442 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
4443 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
4445 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
4446 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
4447 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
4449 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
4451 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
4452 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4453 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
4454 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4455 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
4456 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4457 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4460 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
4461 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
4464 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
4465 /// stored external to LDK.
4467 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
4468 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
4469 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
4471 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
4472 /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
4474 /// `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`] events to
4475 /// allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and
4476 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply
4477 /// copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events
4478 /// with invoice metadata stored elsewhere.
4480 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
4481 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
4482 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
4483 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
4485 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
4486 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
4487 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
4488 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
4489 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
4491 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
4492 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
4493 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
4494 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
4495 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
4497 /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
4498 /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
4499 /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
4501 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
4503 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
4504 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
4506 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4507 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4508 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id
4509 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4510 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
4513 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
4514 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
4515 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4516 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
4517 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
4522 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
4523 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
4527 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4528 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4529 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4530 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4531 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4534 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
4535 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4536 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4537 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4539 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4540 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4541 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4542 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4545 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4546 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4548 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
4549 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4552 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
4553 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4554 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
4556 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4557 events.replace(pending_events);
4566 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4568 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4569 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4570 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4571 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4574 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
4576 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
4577 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
4579 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
4580 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
4581 /// restarting from an old state.
4582 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
4583 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4584 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4586 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4587 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4588 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4589 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4592 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
4593 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4594 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4597 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
4598 handler.handle_event(&event);
4606 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4608 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4609 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4610 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4611 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4614 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
4616 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4617 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
4618 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
4619 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
4620 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
4623 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
4624 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
4625 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
4628 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4629 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4630 let new_height = height - 1;
4632 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
4633 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
4634 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
4635 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
4636 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
4637 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
4640 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
4644 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4646 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4647 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4648 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4649 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4652 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4653 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4654 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4655 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4657 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4658 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
4660 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4661 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
4664 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4665 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4666 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4667 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4669 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4670 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
4672 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4674 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
4676 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
4678 macro_rules! max_time {
4679 ($timestamp: expr) => {
4681 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
4682 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
4683 // having an explicit local time source.
4684 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
4685 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
4686 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
4687 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
4688 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
4694 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
4695 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
4696 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4697 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
4698 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
4701 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4702 outbounds.retain(|_, payment| {
4703 const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
4704 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
4705 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, .. } = payment {
4706 return *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS > height
4712 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
4713 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4714 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
4715 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
4716 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
4717 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
4723 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
4724 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4725 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
4726 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
4727 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
4728 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
4729 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4730 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4735 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4737 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4738 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4739 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4740 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4743 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
4744 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
4746 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
4747 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
4748 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4749 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4750 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4752 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4753 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4755 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4756 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4757 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4758 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4759 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
4760 let res = f(channel);
4761 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
4762 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
4763 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
4764 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4765 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
4769 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
4770 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
4771 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4772 msg: funding_locked,
4774 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
4775 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4776 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4777 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4778 msg: announcement_sigs,
4780 } else if channel.is_usable() {
4781 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4782 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4783 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4784 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
4787 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4789 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
4791 } else if let Err(e) = res {
4792 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4793 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4795 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
4796 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
4797 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
4798 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
4799 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4803 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4804 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4805 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4806 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
4813 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
4814 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
4815 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4816 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
4817 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
4818 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
4819 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
4820 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
4821 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4822 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
4823 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4824 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
4825 data: htlc_msat_height_data
4830 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
4835 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
4837 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
4838 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
4842 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
4843 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
4844 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4846 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
4847 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4848 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4849 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
4852 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
4853 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4855 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
4856 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
4859 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4860 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
4861 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
4862 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
4863 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4867 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
4868 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
4869 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
4870 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
4874 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
4875 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4876 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4877 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4878 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4879 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4882 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
4883 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4884 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4887 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
4888 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4889 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4892 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
4893 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4894 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4897 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
4898 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4899 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4902 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
4903 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4904 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4907 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
4908 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4909 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4912 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
4913 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4914 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4917 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
4918 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4919 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4922 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
4923 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4924 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4927 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
4928 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4929 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4932 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
4933 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4934 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4937 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
4938 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4939 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4942 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
4943 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4944 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4947 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
4948 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4949 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4952 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
4953 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4954 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4957 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
4958 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4959 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
4962 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
4967 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
4968 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4969 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4972 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
4973 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4974 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4975 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
4977 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4978 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4979 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4980 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4981 if no_connection_possible {
4982 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4983 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4984 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4985 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4986 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4988 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
4989 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4990 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4994 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5001 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5002 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5003 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5004 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5005 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5006 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5007 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5009 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5012 no_channels_remain = false;
5018 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5020 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5021 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5022 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5023 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5024 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5025 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5026 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5027 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5028 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5029 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5030 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5031 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5032 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5033 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5034 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5035 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5036 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5037 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5038 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5042 if no_channels_remain {
5043 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
5046 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5047 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5051 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
5052 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5054 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5057 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5058 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
5059 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5060 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
5061 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
5064 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
5065 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
5070 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5071 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5072 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5073 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5074 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5075 if !chan.have_received_message() {
5076 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
5077 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
5078 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
5082 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
5083 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5084 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
5090 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
5093 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
5094 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5096 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
5097 for chan in self.list_channels() {
5098 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
5099 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5100 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5104 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5105 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5110 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
5111 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
5112 struct PersistenceNotifier {
5113 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
5114 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
5115 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
5118 impl PersistenceNotifier {
5121 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
5127 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5128 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5133 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
5134 let result = *guard;
5142 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
5143 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5144 let current_time = Instant::now();
5146 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5147 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5152 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
5153 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
5154 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
5155 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
5156 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
5158 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
5159 let result = *guard;
5160 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
5164 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
5165 None => return result,
5171 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
5173 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
5174 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5175 *persistence_lock = true;
5176 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
5181 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5182 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5184 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
5186 (0, onion_packet, required),
5187 (2, short_channel_id, required),
5190 (0, payment_data, required),
5191 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5193 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
5194 (0, payment_preimage, required),
5195 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5199 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
5200 (0, routing, required),
5201 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
5202 (4, payment_hash, required),
5203 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
5204 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
5208 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5209 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5211 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
5213 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5214 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5215 reason.write(writer)?;
5217 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5218 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
5221 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5222 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5223 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
5224 failure_code.write(writer)?;
5231 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5232 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5233 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5236 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5237 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5238 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5239 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
5243 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5244 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5245 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5246 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
5247 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
5250 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
5251 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
5252 // messages contained in the variants.
5253 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
5254 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
5255 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
5257 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5258 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5259 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5260 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5261 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
5264 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5265 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5266 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5267 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5268 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
5270 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5275 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
5280 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
5281 (0, short_channel_id, required),
5282 (2, outpoint, required),
5283 (4, htlc_id, required),
5284 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
5287 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
5288 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5289 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
5290 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
5293 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
5294 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
5295 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
5300 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
5301 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
5302 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
5308 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
5309 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5310 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5312 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
5313 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
5314 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5318 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
5319 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
5320 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
5322 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
5324 if payment_data.is_some() {
5325 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5327 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
5330 if payment_data.is_none() {
5331 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5333 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
5337 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
5345 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
5346 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5347 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5350 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5351 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
5352 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
5353 let mut payment_id = None;
5354 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5355 (0, session_priv, required),
5356 (1, payment_id, option),
5357 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5358 (4, path, vec_type),
5360 if payment_id.is_none() {
5361 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
5363 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
5365 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
5366 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
5367 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
5368 path: path.unwrap(),
5369 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
5372 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
5373 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5378 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
5379 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
5381 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
5383 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
5384 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5385 (0, session_priv, required),
5386 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
5387 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5388 (4, path, vec_type),
5391 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
5393 field.write(writer)?;
5400 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
5401 (0, LightningError) => {
5405 (0, failure_code, required),
5406 (2, data, vec_type),
5410 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
5412 (0, forward_info, required),
5413 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
5414 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
5415 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
5418 (0, htlc_id, required),
5419 (2, err_packet, required),
5423 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
5424 (0, payment_secret, required),
5425 (2, expiry_time, required),
5426 (4, user_payment_id, required),
5427 (6, payment_preimage, required),
5428 (8, min_value_msat, required),
5431 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
5433 (0, session_privs, required),
5436 (0, session_privs, required),
5439 (0, session_privs, required),
5440 (2, payment_hash, required),
5441 (4, payment_secret, option),
5442 (6, total_msat, required),
5443 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
5444 (10, starting_block_height, required),
5448 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5449 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5450 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5451 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5452 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5455 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5456 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
5458 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5460 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
5462 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5463 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
5464 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
5467 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5468 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
5469 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5470 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5471 unfunded_channels += 1;
5474 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
5475 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5476 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5477 channel.write(writer)?;
5481 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5482 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
5483 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
5484 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5485 for forward in pending_forwards {
5486 forward.write(writer)?;
5490 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5491 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
5492 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5493 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5494 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
5495 htlc.write(writer)?;
5499 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5500 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5501 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5502 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
5503 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5504 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
5507 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5508 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5509 for event in events.iter() {
5510 event.write(writer)?;
5513 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5514 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5515 for event in background_events.iter() {
5517 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
5519 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
5520 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
5525 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5526 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5528 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5529 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5530 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
5531 hash.write(writer)?;
5532 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
5535 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5536 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
5537 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
5538 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5539 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() {
5540 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
5543 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
5544 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5546 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
5547 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
5548 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
5549 session_priv.write(writer)?;
5552 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
5556 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
5557 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
5558 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5560 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
5561 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
5562 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
5567 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5568 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
5569 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
5576 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
5578 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
5580 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
5581 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
5582 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
5583 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
5584 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
5585 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
5586 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
5587 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
5588 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
5589 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
5590 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
5591 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
5592 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
5594 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
5595 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
5597 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
5598 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
5600 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
5601 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
5602 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
5603 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
5604 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
5605 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
5607 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
5608 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5609 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5610 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5611 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5612 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5615 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
5616 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
5618 pub keys_manager: K,
5620 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5622 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
5623 pub fee_estimator: F,
5624 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5626 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
5627 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
5628 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
5629 pub chain_monitor: M,
5631 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
5632 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
5633 /// force-closed during deserialization.
5634 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
5635 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
5636 /// deserialization.
5638 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
5639 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
5640 pub default_config: UserConfig,
5642 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
5643 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
5645 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
5646 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
5647 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
5648 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
5650 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
5653 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
5654 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
5657 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5658 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5659 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5660 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5661 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5662 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5665 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
5666 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
5667 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
5668 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
5669 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
5671 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
5672 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
5677 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
5678 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
5679 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5680 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
5681 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5682 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5683 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5684 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5687 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5688 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
5689 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
5693 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5694 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
5695 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5696 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5697 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5698 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5701 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5702 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5704 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5705 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5706 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5708 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5710 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5711 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5712 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5713 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5714 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
5715 for _ in 0..channel_count {
5716 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
5717 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
5718 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
5719 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
5720 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5721 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5722 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5723 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5724 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
5725 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
5726 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5727 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5728 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5729 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5730 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5731 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5732 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5733 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5734 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5735 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5736 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5737 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
5738 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
5739 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
5740 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5741 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5742 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
5743 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
5744 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5745 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
5746 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5747 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
5748 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
5751 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5752 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
5754 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
5757 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5758 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5759 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5760 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5761 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5762 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5766 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
5767 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
5768 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5772 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
5773 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5774 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5775 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
5776 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5777 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5778 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
5779 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
5780 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5782 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
5785 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5786 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5787 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
5788 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5789 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5790 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
5791 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
5792 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5794 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
5797 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5798 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
5799 for _ in 0..peer_count {
5800 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5801 let peer_state = PeerState {
5802 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
5804 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
5807 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5808 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
5809 for _ in 0..event_count {
5810 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
5811 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
5815 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
5816 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
5817 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
5818 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
5819 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
5820 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
5821 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5822 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
5826 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5827 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
5828 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
5829 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5830 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
5831 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5835 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5836 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5838 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5839 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
5840 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
5841 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
5842 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5846 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5847 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
5848 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
5849 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
5850 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
5851 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
5852 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
5854 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
5855 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5859 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
5860 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
5861 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
5862 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5863 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
5864 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
5866 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
5867 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
5868 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
5869 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
5870 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
5871 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
5873 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
5876 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5877 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5879 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
5880 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
5883 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
5885 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
5886 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
5887 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
5889 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
5891 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
5896 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
5898 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
5899 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
5901 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
5902 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
5905 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
5906 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
5908 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
5910 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
5911 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
5912 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
5913 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
5915 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
5916 logger: args.logger,
5917 default_configuration: args.default_config,
5920 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5921 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
5924 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
5925 //connection or two.
5927 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
5933 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5934 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5935 use core::time::Duration;
5936 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
5937 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
5938 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
5939 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
5941 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
5942 use routing::router::{get_keysend_route, get_route};
5943 use routing::scorer::Scorer;
5944 use util::errors::APIError;
5945 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
5946 use util::test_utils;
5948 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5950 fn test_wait_timeout() {
5951 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
5953 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
5956 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
5957 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
5959 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
5960 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
5961 thread::spawn(move || {
5963 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
5964 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5965 *persistence_lock = true;
5968 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
5974 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
5975 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
5977 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
5980 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
5985 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
5987 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
5990 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
5997 fn test_notify_limits() {
5998 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
5999 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
6000 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6001 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6002 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6003 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6005 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
6006 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
6007 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6008 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6009 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6011 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6013 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
6014 // to connect messages with new values
6015 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6016 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6017 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6018 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6020 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
6021 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6022 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6023 // ... but the last node should not.
6024 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6025 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
6026 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6027 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6029 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
6030 // about the channel.
6031 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6032 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6033 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6035 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
6037 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6038 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6039 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6040 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6041 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6042 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6044 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
6045 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6046 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6048 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
6049 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
6050 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
6051 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
6052 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
6053 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
6055 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
6056 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
6057 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6058 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6059 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6060 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6061 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6062 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6064 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
6065 // the channel info has updated.
6066 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6067 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6068 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6069 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6070 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6071 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6075 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
6076 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
6078 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6079 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6080 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6081 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6082 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6084 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
6085 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
6086 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
6087 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
6088 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
6089 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
6090 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6091 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6092 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6093 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6094 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
6096 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
6097 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6098 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6099 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6100 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6101 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6102 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6103 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6104 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6105 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6106 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6107 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6108 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6109 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6110 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6111 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6112 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6113 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6114 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6115 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6116 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6117 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
6119 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
6120 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6121 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6122 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6123 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6124 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
6126 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
6127 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
6128 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
6129 // lightning messages manually.
6130 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6131 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6132 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6133 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6134 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
6135 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6136 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6137 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
6138 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6139 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6140 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
6141 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6142 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6143 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6144 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6145 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6146 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6147 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
6148 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6149 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6150 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
6151 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6152 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6153 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6154 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6155 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
6156 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6158 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate 1 event upon the first path's success. No
6159 // further events will be generated for subsequence path successes.
6160 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6162 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash } => {
6163 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
6164 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
6166 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6171 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
6172 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
6173 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
6174 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
6175 // fails as expected.
6176 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6177 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6178 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6179 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6180 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6181 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6182 let scorer = Scorer::new(0);
6184 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
6185 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
6186 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
6188 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
6189 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger, &scorer).unwrap();
6190 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6191 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6192 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6193 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6194 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6195 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6196 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6197 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6198 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6199 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6200 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6201 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6202 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6203 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6204 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6205 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6206 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6207 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6208 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6209 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6210 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6212 // Finally, claim the original payment.
6213 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6215 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
6216 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6217 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger, &scorer).unwrap();
6218 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6219 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6220 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6221 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6222 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
6223 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
6224 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
6226 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
6227 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6228 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6229 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6230 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6231 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6232 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6233 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6234 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6235 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6236 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6237 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6238 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6239 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6240 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6241 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6242 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6243 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6244 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6245 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6246 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6247 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6248 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6250 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
6251 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6255 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
6256 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
6257 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
6258 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6259 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6260 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6261 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6263 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6264 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6265 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6266 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6268 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6269 let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
6270 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
6271 let scorer = Scorer::new(0);
6272 let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
6273 Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
6274 nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
6276 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6277 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
6278 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
6279 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6281 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6282 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6283 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6284 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6285 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6286 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6287 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6289 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
6293 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
6294 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
6295 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6296 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6297 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6298 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6300 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6301 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6302 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6303 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6305 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6306 let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
6307 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
6308 let scorer = Scorer::new(0);
6309 let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
6310 Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
6311 nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
6313 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6314 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6315 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
6316 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
6317 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6319 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6320 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6321 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6322 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6323 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6324 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6325 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6327 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
6331 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
6332 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
6333 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
6334 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
6335 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6337 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6338 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6339 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6340 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6342 // Marshall an MPP route.
6343 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
6344 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
6345 route.paths.push(path);
6346 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6347 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
6348 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
6349 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
6350 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
6351 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
6353 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
6354 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
6355 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
6356 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
6361 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
6364 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
6365 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
6366 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
6367 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
6368 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6369 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
6370 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
6371 use routing::router::get_route;
6372 use routing::scorer::Scorer;
6373 use util::test_utils;
6374 use util::config::UserConfig;
6375 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
6377 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6378 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6379 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
6381 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
6385 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
6386 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
6387 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
6388 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
6389 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
6390 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
6391 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
6396 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
6397 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
6400 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
6401 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
6402 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
6404 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
6405 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
6407 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
6408 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
6410 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
6411 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
6413 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
6414 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
6415 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
6416 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
6417 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
6419 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
6421 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
6423 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
6424 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
6425 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
6426 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
6427 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
6429 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
6431 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
6433 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6434 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6435 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
6436 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6437 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6440 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
6441 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
6442 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
6444 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
6445 } else { panic!(); }
6447 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6448 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6450 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
6453 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
6456 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
6457 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
6459 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6460 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6461 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
6462 match msg_events[0] {
6463 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
6464 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
6465 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
6469 match msg_events[1] {
6470 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6474 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
6476 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
6477 macro_rules! send_payment {
6478 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
6479 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
6480 let scorer = Scorer::new(0);
6481 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()),
6482 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer).unwrap();
6484 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
6485 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
6487 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
6488 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
6490 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6491 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
6492 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6493 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
6494 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6495 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6496 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6497 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6499 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
6500 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
6501 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6503 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
6504 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
6505 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6506 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6507 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6509 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
6512 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
6513 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6514 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6515 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6517 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
6522 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
6523 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);