1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::{Confirm, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 pub use ln::channel::CounterpartyForwardingInfo;
47 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus};
48 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
49 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
51 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
53 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
54 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
55 use util::config::UserConfig;
56 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
57 use util::{byte_utils, events};
58 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
59 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
60 use util::logger::Logger;
61 use util::errors::APIError;
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
66 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
67 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
70 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
71 use std::time::Instant;
73 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
75 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
77 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
78 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
79 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
81 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
82 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
83 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
84 // before we forward it.
86 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
87 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
88 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
89 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
90 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
92 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
93 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
95 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
96 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
99 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
100 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
103 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
104 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
108 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
109 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
110 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
111 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
112 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
113 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
114 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
117 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
118 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
119 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
120 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
123 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
124 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
125 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
126 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
127 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
130 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
132 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
134 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
135 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
136 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
138 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
140 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
144 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
148 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
149 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
150 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
151 short_channel_id: u64,
153 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
155 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
156 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
160 struct ClaimableHTLC {
161 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
163 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
164 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
165 /// are part of the same payment.
166 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
170 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
171 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
172 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
173 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
176 session_priv: SecretKey,
177 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
178 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
179 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
184 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
185 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
187 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
188 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
193 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
194 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
196 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
204 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
206 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
207 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
208 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
209 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
210 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
212 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
213 err: msgs::LightningError,
214 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
216 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
218 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
220 err: LightningError {
222 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
223 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
229 shutdown_finish: None,
233 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
235 err: LightningError {
237 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
239 shutdown_finish: None,
243 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
244 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
247 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
249 err: LightningError {
251 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
252 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
258 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
262 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
265 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
267 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
269 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
271 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
272 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
278 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
280 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
281 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
288 shutdown_finish: None,
293 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
294 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
295 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
296 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
297 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
299 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
300 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
301 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
302 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
303 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
304 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
305 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
307 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
311 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
312 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
313 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
314 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
315 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
316 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
317 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
318 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
319 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
320 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
321 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
322 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
324 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
325 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
326 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
327 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
330 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
331 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
332 /// quite some time lag.
333 enum BackgroundEvent {
334 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
335 /// commitment transaction.
336 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
339 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
340 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
342 latest_features: InitFeatures,
345 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
346 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
348 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
350 struct PendingInboundPayment {
351 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
352 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
353 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
354 /// this payment being removed.
356 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
357 user_payment_id: u64,
358 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
359 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
360 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
363 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
364 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
365 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
366 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
367 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
368 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
369 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
370 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
372 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
373 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
374 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
375 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
376 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
377 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
378 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
379 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
380 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
382 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
383 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
385 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
386 /// to individual Channels.
388 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
389 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
390 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
391 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
393 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
394 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
395 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
396 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
397 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
398 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
399 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
401 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
402 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
403 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
404 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
407 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
408 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
409 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
410 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
411 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
413 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
414 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
415 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
416 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
417 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
418 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
419 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
420 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
421 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
422 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
425 default_configuration: UserConfig,
426 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
432 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
434 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
435 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
437 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
438 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
439 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
440 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
442 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
443 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
444 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
445 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
446 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
447 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
449 /// The session_priv bytes of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
450 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
451 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
452 /// PaymentSent/PaymentFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
453 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
454 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
455 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
456 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
458 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
459 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashSet<[u8; 32]>>,
461 our_network_key: SecretKey,
462 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
464 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
465 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
466 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
468 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
469 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
470 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
471 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
473 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
474 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
475 /// are currently open with that peer.
476 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
477 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
479 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
481 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
482 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
483 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
484 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
485 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
486 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
487 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
488 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
489 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
491 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
498 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
500 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
501 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
502 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
503 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
504 pub struct ChainParameters {
505 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
506 pub network: Network,
508 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
510 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
511 pub best_block: BestBlock,
514 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
520 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
521 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
522 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
523 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
524 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
525 /// updates are ready for persistence).
527 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
528 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
529 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
530 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
531 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
533 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
534 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
537 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
538 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
539 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
542 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
543 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
545 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
546 persistence_notifier: notifier,
547 should_persist: persist_check,
548 _read_guard: read_guard,
553 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
555 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
556 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
561 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
562 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
564 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
566 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
567 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
568 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
569 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
570 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
572 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
573 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
575 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
577 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
578 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
579 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
580 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
581 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
582 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
583 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
585 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
586 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
588 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
589 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
590 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
591 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
593 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
594 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
595 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
596 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
597 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
598 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
601 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
603 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
604 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
607 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
609 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
610 /// to better separate parameters.
611 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
612 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
613 /// The node_id of our counterparty
614 pub node_id: PublicKey,
615 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
616 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
617 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
618 pub features: InitFeatures,
619 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
620 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
621 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
623 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
625 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
626 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
627 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
628 /// payments to us through this channel.
629 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
632 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
633 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
634 pub struct ChannelDetails {
635 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
636 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
637 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
638 /// lifetime of the channel.
639 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
640 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
641 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
642 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
643 /// our counterparty already.
645 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
646 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
647 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
648 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
649 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
650 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
651 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
652 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
653 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
654 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
655 /// this value on chain.
657 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
659 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
661 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
662 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
663 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
665 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
666 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
667 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
668 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
670 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
671 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
672 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
673 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
674 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
675 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
676 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
677 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
678 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
680 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
681 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
682 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
683 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
684 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
685 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
686 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
687 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
688 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
690 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
692 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
693 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
694 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
695 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
696 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
697 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
698 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
699 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
700 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
702 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
703 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
704 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
705 pub is_outbound: bool,
706 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
707 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
708 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
709 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
710 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
712 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
713 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
714 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
715 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
717 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
719 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
723 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
724 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
726 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
727 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
728 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
729 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
730 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
731 ParameterError(APIError),
732 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
733 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
734 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
737 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
739 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
740 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
741 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
742 /// paths than the ones selected).
743 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
744 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
745 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
746 /// in over-/re-payment.
748 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
749 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
750 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
752 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
753 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
754 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
755 /// with the latest update_id.
756 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
759 macro_rules! handle_error {
760 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
763 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
764 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
766 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
767 // entering the macro.
768 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
771 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
773 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
774 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
775 if let Some(update) = update_option {
776 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
782 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
783 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
785 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
786 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
787 action: err.action.clone()
791 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
792 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
795 // Return error in case higher-API need one
802 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
803 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
804 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
806 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
807 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
809 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
810 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
811 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
812 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
814 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
815 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
817 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
818 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
819 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
820 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
822 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
823 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
829 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
830 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
834 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
836 $entry.remove_entry();
844 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
845 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
849 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
851 $entry.remove_entry();
859 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
860 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
861 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
863 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
865 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
866 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
867 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
868 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
870 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
871 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
872 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
873 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
874 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
875 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
876 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
877 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
878 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
879 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id,
880 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
883 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
884 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
885 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
886 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
888 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
889 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
891 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
892 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
894 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
895 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
896 if !$resend_commitment {
897 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
900 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
902 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
903 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
907 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => { {
908 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $entry.key());
910 $entry.remove_entry();
916 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
917 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
918 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
920 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
921 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
925 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
926 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
927 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
928 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
929 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
932 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
937 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
938 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
939 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
940 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
941 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
942 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
944 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
945 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
947 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
948 if !forwards.is_empty() {
949 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
950 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
953 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
954 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
955 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
956 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
957 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
958 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
959 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
960 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
961 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
962 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
963 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
964 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
967 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
968 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
969 // before it should be allowed to.
970 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
971 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
972 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
975 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
976 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
977 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
978 msg: announcement_sigs,
981 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
984 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
985 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
986 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
987 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
988 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
989 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
990 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
991 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
992 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
993 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
994 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
995 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
996 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
997 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
998 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
999 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1000 let mut order = $order;
1002 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1004 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1008 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1009 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1010 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1011 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1016 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1017 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1018 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1019 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1020 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1025 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1029 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1034 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1035 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1036 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1041 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1042 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1043 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1044 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1045 assert!(res.is_ok());
1048 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1052 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1053 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1054 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1056 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1058 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1059 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1064 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1065 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1066 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1067 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1068 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1071 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1073 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1074 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1076 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1078 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1080 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1081 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1082 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1083 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1084 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1085 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1088 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1089 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1090 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1094 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1096 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1097 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1098 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1099 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1100 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1101 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1103 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1104 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1106 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1107 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1110 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1111 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1113 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1115 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1116 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1117 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1118 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1126 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1127 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1128 &self.default_configuration
1131 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1133 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady events to allow
1134 /// tracking of which events correspond with which create_channel call. Note that the
1135 /// user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for
1136 /// user_id here. user_id has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and
1137 /// otherwise ignored.
1139 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
1140 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
1142 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
1143 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
1145 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1146 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1147 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten.
1148 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1149 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1150 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1153 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1154 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?;
1155 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1157 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1158 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1159 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1161 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1162 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1163 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1164 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1165 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1167 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1170 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1172 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1173 node_id: their_network_key,
1179 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1180 let mut res = Vec::new();
1182 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1183 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1184 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1185 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1186 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1187 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1188 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1189 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1190 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1191 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1192 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1193 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1194 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1196 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1197 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1198 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1199 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1200 inbound_capacity_msat,
1201 outbound_capacity_msat,
1202 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1203 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1204 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1205 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1206 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1207 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1208 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1212 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1213 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1214 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1215 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1221 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1222 /// more information.
1223 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1224 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1227 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1228 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1230 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1231 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1233 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1234 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1235 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1236 // really wanted anyway.
1237 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1240 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1241 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1242 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1244 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1245 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1246 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1248 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1249 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1250 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1251 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1252 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1253 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
1254 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1255 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
1258 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1259 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1260 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1262 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1263 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
1265 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1268 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1269 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1271 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1272 self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok()
1275 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
1276 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1277 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1286 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1287 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1288 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1289 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1290 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1292 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1293 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1294 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1295 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1296 // ignore the result here.
1297 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1301 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1303 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1304 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1305 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1306 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1307 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1308 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1311 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1312 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1314 chan.remove_entry().1
1316 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1319 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1320 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1321 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1322 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1323 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1328 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1331 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1332 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1333 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1334 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1335 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None) {
1336 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1337 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1338 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1339 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1340 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1341 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1351 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1352 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1353 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1354 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1355 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1359 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1360 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1361 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1363 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1364 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1365 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1366 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1367 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1368 failure_code: $err_code,
1369 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1374 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1375 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1378 let shared_secret = {
1379 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1380 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1383 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1385 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1386 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1387 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1388 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1389 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1390 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1391 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1392 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1395 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1396 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1397 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1398 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1399 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1402 let mut channel_state = None;
1403 macro_rules! return_err {
1404 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1406 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1407 if channel_state.is_none() {
1408 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1410 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1411 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1412 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1413 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1414 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1419 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1420 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1421 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
1422 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1424 let error_code = match err {
1425 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1426 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1427 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1428 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1429 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1431 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1434 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1435 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1436 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1443 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1446 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1447 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1448 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1449 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1450 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1451 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1452 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1453 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1454 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1455 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1456 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1457 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1461 // final_expiry_too_soon
1462 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure we have at least
1463 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1464 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown payment hash, our payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward
1465 // before our onchain logic triggers a channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational).
1466 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1467 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1469 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1470 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1471 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1473 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1474 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1475 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1478 let payment_data = match next_hop_data.format {
1479 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => None,
1480 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1481 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, .. } => payment_data,
1484 if payment_data.is_none() {
1485 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1488 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1489 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1490 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1491 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1493 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1494 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1495 payment_data: payment_data.unwrap(),
1496 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1498 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1499 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1500 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1501 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1504 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1505 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1506 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1508 // Check two things:
1509 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1510 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1511 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1513 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1515 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1516 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1517 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1519 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1521 let blinding_factor = {
1522 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1523 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1524 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1525 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1528 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1530 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1532 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1535 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1536 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1539 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1540 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1541 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1542 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1543 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1547 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1548 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1549 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1552 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1553 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1554 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1555 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1559 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1560 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1561 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1562 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1563 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1564 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1565 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1566 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1567 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1568 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1569 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1571 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1574 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1576 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
1577 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
1578 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
1579 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
1580 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1583 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1584 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1585 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1586 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1587 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1588 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1589 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1591 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1592 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1594 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
1595 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
1596 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
1597 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1598 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1600 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1601 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1603 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1604 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1605 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1606 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1607 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1609 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1610 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1612 // In theory, we would be safe against unintentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1613 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longer delay.
1614 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1615 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1621 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1622 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1623 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1624 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1626 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1627 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1629 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1630 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1631 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1633 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1635 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1640 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1643 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
1644 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
1645 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
1647 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1648 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1649 if !chan.should_announce() {
1650 return Err(LightningError {
1651 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
1652 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
1655 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1656 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
1659 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
1660 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
1661 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
1662 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
1663 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1664 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1665 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1666 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1667 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1671 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1673 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1674 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1676 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1677 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1678 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
1679 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1680 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1681 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
1682 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1683 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1686 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1687 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1689 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1695 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1696 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1697 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1698 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1699 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1700 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1702 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1703 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1704 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height)?;
1705 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1706 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1708 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1710 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1711 assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().insert(session_priv_bytes));
1713 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1714 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1715 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1716 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1717 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1720 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1721 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1723 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1724 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1726 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1727 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1729 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1731 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1732 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1733 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1735 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1736 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1737 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1738 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1739 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1740 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1741 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1742 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1743 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1746 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
1747 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1748 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1749 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1750 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1751 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1752 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1753 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1761 } else { unreachable!(); }
1765 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1766 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1768 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1773 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1775 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1776 /// fields for more info.
1778 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1779 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1780 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1781 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1782 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1783 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1785 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1787 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1788 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1789 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1791 /// In general, a path may raise:
1792 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1793 /// node public key) is specified.
1794 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1795 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1797 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1798 /// relevant updates.
1800 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1801 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1802 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1804 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1805 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1806 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1807 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1809 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1810 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1811 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1812 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1813 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1814 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1816 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1817 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1818 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1819 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1820 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1822 let mut total_value = 0;
1823 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1824 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
1825 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1826 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1827 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1828 continue 'path_check;
1830 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1831 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1832 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1833 continue 'path_check;
1836 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1837 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
1839 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
1840 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
1843 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1844 let mut results = Vec::new();
1845 for path in route.paths.iter() {
1846 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height));
1848 let mut has_ok = false;
1849 let mut has_err = false;
1850 for res in results.iter() {
1851 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
1852 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
1853 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
1854 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
1861 if has_err && has_ok {
1862 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
1864 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
1870 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
1871 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
1872 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
1873 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1875 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1877 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
1879 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
1880 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1881 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
1882 } else { unreachable!(); })
1885 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
1887 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
1888 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1891 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
1892 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
1897 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1898 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1899 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1902 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1903 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1904 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1906 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1914 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1915 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
1916 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
1920 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1922 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
1923 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
1925 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1927 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
1928 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
1929 /// keys per-channel).
1931 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
1932 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
1933 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
1935 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
1936 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
1937 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
1939 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
1940 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1941 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1943 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
1944 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
1945 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1946 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
1950 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
1951 let mut output_index = None;
1952 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
1953 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1954 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
1955 if output_index.is_some() {
1956 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1957 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
1960 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
1961 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1962 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
1965 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
1968 if output_index.is_none() {
1969 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1970 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
1973 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
1977 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1978 if !chan.should_announce() {
1979 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1983 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1985 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1987 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1988 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1990 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1991 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1992 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1993 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1994 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1999 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2000 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2001 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2003 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2006 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2007 // smaller than 500:
2008 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2010 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2011 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2012 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2013 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2014 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2015 /// our network addresses.
2017 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2018 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2020 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2021 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2022 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2023 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2025 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2027 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2028 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2029 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2031 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2032 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2035 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2036 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2037 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2039 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2040 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2041 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2042 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2043 rgb, alias, addresses,
2044 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2045 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2047 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2048 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2050 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2051 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2053 let mut announced_chans = false;
2054 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2055 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2056 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2058 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2063 announced_chans = true;
2065 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2066 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2067 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2071 if announced_chans {
2072 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2073 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2074 signature: node_announce_sig,
2075 contents: announcement
2081 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2083 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2084 /// Will likely generate further events.
2085 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2086 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2088 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2089 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2090 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2092 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2093 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2095 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2096 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2097 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2098 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2100 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2101 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2102 match forward_info {
2103 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2104 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2105 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2106 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2107 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2108 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2109 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2111 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
2112 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
2115 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2116 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2117 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2118 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2119 // problem, not ours.
2126 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2127 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2128 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2129 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2130 match forward_info {
2131 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2132 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2134 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2135 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2136 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2137 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2138 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2139 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2140 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2141 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2143 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
2145 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2146 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2148 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2150 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
2151 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2152 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
2158 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2160 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2161 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2162 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2163 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2164 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2165 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2166 // this channel currently :/.
2172 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2173 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2175 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2176 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
2177 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
2179 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2180 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
2182 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
2184 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2185 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2186 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2189 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2191 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2192 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
2193 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
2194 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
2195 // messages when we can.
2196 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
2197 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
2198 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
2205 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
2206 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
2209 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
2210 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
2211 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2212 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
2213 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
2214 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
2216 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2217 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
2218 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
2219 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2220 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2222 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
2224 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
2226 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
2230 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2231 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
2234 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
2235 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2236 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2237 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2238 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2239 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
2240 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2241 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
2242 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2244 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
2252 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2253 match forward_info {
2254 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2255 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry },
2256 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
2257 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2258 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
2259 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
2260 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2261 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2262 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2263 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2265 value: amt_to_forward,
2266 payment_data: payment_data.clone(),
2267 cltv_expiry: incoming_cltv_expiry,
2270 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2272 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
2273 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2274 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
2276 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2277 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2278 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2279 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
2280 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
2282 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
2287 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
2288 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
2289 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
2290 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
2291 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
2292 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
2293 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2294 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
2295 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2296 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2297 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2299 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
2300 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
2301 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2302 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2303 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
2304 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2305 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2306 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2308 let mut total_value = 0;
2309 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2310 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2311 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2312 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2313 total_value += htlc.value;
2314 if htlc.payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2315 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2316 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc.payment_data.total_msat);
2317 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2319 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2321 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2322 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2323 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2324 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2327 } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2328 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2330 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
2331 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
2333 user_payment_id: inbound_payment.get().user_payment_id,
2335 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
2336 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
2338 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
2340 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2341 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
2348 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2349 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2351 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2352 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
2360 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
2361 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
2364 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2365 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2368 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
2369 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2370 events.append(&mut new_events);
2373 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2375 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2376 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2378 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2379 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
2380 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2381 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2382 if background_events.is_empty() {
2386 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2388 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2389 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2390 // monitor updating completing.
2391 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2398 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2399 /// Process background events, for functional testing
2400 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2401 self.process_background_events();
2404 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
2405 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
2406 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
2408 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
2410 /// Note that in some rare cases this may generate a `chain::Watch::update_channel` call.
2411 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
2412 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2413 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2414 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2416 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2417 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2418 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
2419 match chan.channel_update_status() {
2420 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
2421 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
2422 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
2423 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
2424 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
2425 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2426 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2430 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2431 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
2433 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
2434 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2435 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2439 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2440 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
2450 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
2451 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
2452 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
2453 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
2454 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
2455 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
2456 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2458 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2459 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
2460 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2461 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2462 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2463 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2464 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2465 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2466 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2467 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
2468 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2474 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
2475 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
2476 // be surfaced to the user.
2477 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
2478 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
2480 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
2481 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
2482 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2483 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
2484 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
2485 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
2487 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2490 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2492 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2493 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
2494 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
2496 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => {
2498 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2499 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2500 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2502 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2503 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2505 rejected_by_dest: false,
2513 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2520 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
2521 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
2522 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
2523 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
2524 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
2525 /// still-available channels.
2526 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
2527 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
2528 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
2529 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
2532 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
2533 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
2534 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2536 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, .. } => {
2538 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2539 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2540 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2542 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2545 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2546 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2547 match &onion_error {
2548 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
2550 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2552 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2553 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
2554 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
2555 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
2556 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
2557 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2558 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
2563 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2564 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2565 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2566 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
2568 error_code: onion_error_code,
2570 error_data: onion_error_data
2574 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2580 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
2581 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
2582 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
2583 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
2585 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
2586 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
2587 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2588 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2589 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2590 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
2592 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
2594 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
2600 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2601 let err_packet = match onion_error {
2602 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
2603 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
2604 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
2605 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
2607 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
2608 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2609 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
2613 let mut forward_event = None;
2614 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2615 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
2617 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
2618 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2619 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
2621 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2622 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
2625 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2626 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
2627 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2628 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2629 time_forwardable: time
2636 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
2637 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
2638 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
2640 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
2641 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
2642 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
2643 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
2645 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
2647 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
2648 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
2649 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
2650 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2652 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2654 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2655 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
2656 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2657 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
2659 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
2660 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
2661 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
2662 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
2664 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
2665 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
2666 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
2667 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
2668 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
2670 let mut valid_mpp = true;
2671 for htlc in sources.iter() {
2672 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2678 let mut errs = Vec::new();
2679 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
2680 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2682 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2683 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2684 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2685 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2686 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2687 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
2688 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2690 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
2692 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.1.err.action {
2693 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
2694 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
2695 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", e.1.err.err);
2696 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
2697 } else { errs.push(e); }
2699 Err(None) => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
2700 Ok(()) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
2705 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
2706 // which were generated.
2707 channel_state.take();
2709 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
2710 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2711 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2718 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(), Option<(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)>> {
2719 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
2720 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
2721 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2722 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2728 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
2729 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2730 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
2731 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
2732 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_option {
2733 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2734 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2735 assert!(msgs.is_none());
2737 return Err(Some((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err())));
2741 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
2742 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
2743 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2744 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2745 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2746 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2747 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2748 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
2749 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2750 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2759 // TODO: Do something with e?
2760 // This should only occur if we are claiming an HTLC at the same time as the
2761 // HTLC is being failed (eg because a block is being connected and this caused
2762 // an HTLC to time out). This should, of course, only occur if the user is the
2763 // one doing the claiming (as it being a part of a peer claim would imply we're
2764 // about to lose funds) and only if the lock in claim_funds was dropped as a
2765 // previous HTLC was failed (thus not for an MPP payment).
2766 debug_assert!(false, "This shouldn't be reachable except in absurdly rare cases between monitor updates and HTLC timeouts: {:?}", e);
2770 } else { unreachable!(); }
2773 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
2775 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => {
2776 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2778 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2779 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2780 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2782 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2783 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
2787 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
2790 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
2791 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
2792 if let Err((counterparty_node_id, err)) = match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage) {
2795 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2796 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
2797 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2798 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2801 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
2802 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
2803 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
2804 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
2805 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
2806 payment_preimage, e);
2810 Err(Some(res)) => Err(res),
2812 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2813 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2814 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2820 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
2821 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2822 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
2825 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
2826 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
2829 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
2830 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
2832 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
2833 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
2834 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
2835 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
2837 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
2838 /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
2839 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
2840 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
2841 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
2842 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
2843 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
2844 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
2845 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
2846 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2848 let chan_restoration_res;
2849 let mut pending_failures = {
2850 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2851 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2852 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
2853 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
2854 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
2856 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
2860 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, pending_failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked) = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
2861 let channel_update = if funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
2862 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2863 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
2864 // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
2865 // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
2866 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2867 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2868 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
2871 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, raa, commitment_update, order, None, pending_forwards, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked);
2872 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2873 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2877 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
2878 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2879 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2883 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2884 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
2885 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
2888 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
2889 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
2890 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2891 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2892 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
2893 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
2894 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2895 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
2896 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2897 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
2899 entry.insert(channel);
2905 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2906 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
2907 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2908 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2909 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
2910 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2911 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2912 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2914 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
2915 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2917 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2920 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2921 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
2922 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
2923 channel_value_satoshis: value,
2925 user_channel_id: user_id,
2930 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2931 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
2932 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
2933 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2934 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2935 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
2936 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2937 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2938 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2940 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
2942 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2945 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
2946 // lock before watch_channel
2947 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
2949 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
2950 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
2951 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
2952 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
2953 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
2954 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
2955 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
2956 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
2957 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
2958 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
2959 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
2961 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
2962 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
2963 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
2964 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
2965 // until we have persisted our monitor.
2966 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2970 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2971 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2972 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
2973 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2974 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
2976 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2977 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
2978 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2987 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2989 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
2990 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2991 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2992 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2993 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2994 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2995 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2997 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
2998 Ok(update) => update,
2999 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3001 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
3002 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
3006 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3009 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
3010 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
3014 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3015 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3016 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3017 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3018 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3019 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3020 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3022 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3023 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
3024 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3025 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
3026 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
3027 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
3028 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
3029 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
3030 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
3031 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
3032 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
3033 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
3034 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3035 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3036 msg: announcement_sigs,
3038 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3039 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3040 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3041 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3046 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3050 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3051 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
3052 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3053 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3055 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3056 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3057 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3058 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3060 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3061 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3062 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3063 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3067 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3068 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3069 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3073 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
3074 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3075 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3077 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3078 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
3080 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3083 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
3084 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3086 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3087 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3088 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3089 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3097 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3098 let (tx, chan_option) = {
3099 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3100 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3101 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3102 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3103 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3104 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3106 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3107 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3108 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3109 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3114 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
3115 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
3116 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
3117 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
3118 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
3119 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3120 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3122 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3123 } else { (tx, None) }
3125 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3128 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
3129 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
3130 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
3132 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3133 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3134 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3135 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3143 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3144 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
3145 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
3146 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
3148 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
3149 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
3150 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
3151 //but we should prevent it anyway.
3153 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
3154 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3156 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3157 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3158 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3159 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3162 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
3163 // Ensure error_code has the UPDATE flag set, since by default we send a
3164 // channel update along as part of failing the HTLC.
3165 assert!((error_code & 0x1000) != 0);
3166 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
3167 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
3168 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
3169 match pending_forward_info {
3170 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3171 let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
3172 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
3173 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
3174 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
3175 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
3176 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
3180 // The only case where we'd be unable to
3181 // successfully get a channel update is if the
3182 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
3183 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
3184 // payments over the channel back to themselves
3185 // (cause no one else should know the short_id
3186 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
3187 // no problem just calling this
3188 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
3189 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
3191 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3192 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3193 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3196 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
3198 _ => pending_forward_info
3201 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3203 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3208 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3209 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3211 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3212 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3213 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3214 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3215 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3217 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
3219 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3222 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
3226 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3227 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3228 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3229 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3230 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3231 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3232 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3234 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
3236 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3241 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3242 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3243 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3244 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3245 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3246 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3247 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3249 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
3250 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
3251 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3253 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
3256 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3260 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3261 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3262 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3263 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3264 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3265 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3266 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3268 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
3269 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
3270 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3271 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
3272 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
3273 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
3274 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
3279 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3280 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
3281 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
3283 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3284 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3285 msg: revoke_and_ack,
3287 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
3288 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3289 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3290 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3291 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3292 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3293 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3294 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3296 commitment_signed: msg,
3300 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3301 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3302 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3308 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3313 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
3314 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
3315 let mut forward_event = None;
3316 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
3317 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3318 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3319 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
3321 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3322 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
3323 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
3324 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
3325 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
3327 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3328 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3329 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
3331 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3332 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3333 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
3338 match forward_event {
3340 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3341 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3342 time_forwardable: time
3350 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3351 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3353 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3354 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3355 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3356 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3357 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3358 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3360 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
3361 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
3362 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3363 htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
3364 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3365 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
3366 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
3367 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
3369 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
3371 } else { unreachable!(); }
3374 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3375 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3376 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3380 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3381 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3382 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3386 break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
3388 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3391 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
3393 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
3394 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3395 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3397 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
3404 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3405 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3406 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3407 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3408 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3409 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3410 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3412 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
3414 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3419 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3420 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3421 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3423 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3424 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3425 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3426 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3428 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
3429 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
3432 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
3433 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
3434 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
3435 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
3436 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3439 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3444 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
3445 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3446 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3447 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3448 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
3449 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3451 // It's not a local channel
3452 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
3455 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3456 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3457 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3458 if chan.get().should_announce() {
3459 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
3460 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
3461 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
3462 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
3464 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
3466 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3467 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
3468 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
3469 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
3471 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
3474 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
3476 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
3479 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3480 let chan_restoration_res;
3481 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
3482 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3483 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3485 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3486 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3487 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3488 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3490 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
3491 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
3492 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
3493 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3494 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
3495 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3496 let mut channel_update = None;
3497 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3498 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3499 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3502 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3503 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
3504 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
3505 // they have the latest channel parameters.
3506 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3507 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3508 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3511 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
3512 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
3513 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3514 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3516 (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
3518 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3521 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3522 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
3524 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
3525 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
3530 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
3531 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
3532 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
3533 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
3534 /// (C-not exported) Cause its doc(hidden) anyway
3536 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3537 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3538 let counterparty_node_id;
3539 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3540 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3541 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3543 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3544 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("Failed to find corresponding channel for id {}", channel_id.to_hex())}),
3545 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3546 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
3547 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel".to_owned()});
3549 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3550 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
3552 if !chan.get().is_live() {
3553 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3555 counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3556 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
3557 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
3559 if let Err(_e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3562 log_debug!(self.logger, "Updating fee resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3563 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3564 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3565 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3566 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3567 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3568 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3569 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3570 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3580 match handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id) {
3581 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3582 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
3586 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
3587 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
3588 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3589 let pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
3590 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
3591 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events {
3592 match monitor_event {
3593 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
3594 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
3595 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
3596 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
3598 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
3599 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3602 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => {
3603 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3604 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3605 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3606 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3607 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3608 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
3609 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3610 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3612 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
3613 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3614 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3618 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3619 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3620 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
3621 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
3629 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3630 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3633 has_pending_monitor_events
3636 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
3637 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
3638 /// update was applied.
3640 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
3641 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
3642 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
3643 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
3644 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
3645 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
3646 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3647 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3649 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3650 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3651 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3652 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3653 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3655 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
3656 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
3657 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
3658 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
3659 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
3661 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
3662 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3663 has_monitor_update = true;
3664 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
3665 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
3666 if close_channel { return false; }
3668 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3669 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3670 updates: commitment_update,
3677 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
3678 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
3685 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
3686 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3687 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
3690 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3691 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3697 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
3698 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
3700 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
3701 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3702 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
3703 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
3704 // reorganized out of the main chain.
3705 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
3706 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
3707 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
3708 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
3709 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
3710 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
3711 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
3712 assert!(should_broadcast);
3713 } else { unreachable!(); }
3714 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
3716 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3720 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
3721 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
3723 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3725 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3726 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3727 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3728 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3729 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
3730 payment_secret, min_value_msat, user_payment_id, payment_preimage,
3731 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
3732 // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
3733 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
3734 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
3735 // never fail a payment too early.
3736 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
3738 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
3741 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
3746 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
3749 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
3750 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
3752 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
3753 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
3754 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
3756 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
3758 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
3759 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
3760 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
3761 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3762 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
3763 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3764 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3767 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
3768 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
3771 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
3772 /// stored external to LDK.
3774 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
3775 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
3776 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
3778 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
3779 /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
3781 /// `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentReceived::user_payment_id`] events to
3782 /// allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and
3783 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply
3784 /// copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events
3785 /// with invoice metadata stored elsewhere.
3787 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
3788 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
3789 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
3790 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
3792 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
3793 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
3794 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
3795 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
3796 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
3798 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
3799 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
3800 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
3801 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
3802 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
3804 /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
3805 /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
3806 /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
3808 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
3810 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
3811 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
3813 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3814 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
3815 /// [`PaymentReceived::user_payment_id`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::user_payment_id
3816 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
3817 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
3820 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
3821 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
3822 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
3823 let event_handler = |event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
3824 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
3829 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3830 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3831 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3832 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3833 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3836 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
3837 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
3838 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3839 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3841 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
3842 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3843 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
3844 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3847 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3848 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3851 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
3852 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3853 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
3855 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
3856 events.replace(pending_events);
3865 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3867 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3868 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3869 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3870 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3873 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
3875 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
3876 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
3878 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
3879 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
3880 /// restarting from an old state.
3881 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
3882 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3883 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3885 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
3886 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3887 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
3888 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3891 let mut pending_events = std::mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
3892 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
3893 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3896 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
3897 handler.handle_event(event);
3905 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3907 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3908 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3909 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3910 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3913 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
3915 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3916 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
3917 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
3918 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
3919 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
3922 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
3923 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
3924 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
3927 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3928 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3929 let new_height = height - 1;
3931 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
3932 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
3933 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
3934 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
3935 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
3936 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
3939 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
3943 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3945 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3946 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3947 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3948 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3951 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3952 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3953 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3954 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3956 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3957 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
3959 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3960 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
3963 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3964 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3965 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3966 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3968 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3969 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
3971 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3973 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3975 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
3977 macro_rules! max_time {
3978 ($timestamp: expr) => {
3980 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
3981 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
3982 // having an explicit local time source.
3983 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
3984 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
3985 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
3986 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
3987 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
3993 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
3994 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
3995 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3996 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
3997 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
4001 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
4002 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4003 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
4004 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
4005 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
4006 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
4012 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
4013 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4014 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
4015 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
4016 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
4017 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
4018 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4019 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4024 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4026 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4027 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4028 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4029 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4032 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
4033 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
4035 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
4036 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
4037 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4038 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4039 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4041 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4042 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4044 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4045 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4046 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4047 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4048 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
4049 let res = f(channel);
4050 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
4051 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
4052 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
4053 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4054 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
4058 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
4059 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
4060 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4061 msg: funding_locked,
4063 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
4064 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4065 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4066 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4067 msg: announcement_sigs,
4069 } else if channel.is_usable() {
4070 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4071 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4072 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4073 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
4076 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4078 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
4080 } else if let Err(e) = res {
4081 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4082 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4084 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
4085 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
4086 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
4087 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
4088 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4092 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4093 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4094 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
4101 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
4102 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
4103 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4104 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
4105 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
4106 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
4107 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
4108 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
4109 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4110 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
4111 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4112 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
4113 data: htlc_msat_height_data
4118 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
4123 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
4125 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
4126 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
4130 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
4131 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
4132 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4134 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
4135 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4136 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4137 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
4140 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
4141 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4143 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
4144 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
4147 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4148 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
4149 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
4150 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
4151 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4155 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
4156 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
4157 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
4158 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
4162 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
4163 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4164 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4165 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4166 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4167 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4170 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
4171 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4172 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4175 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
4176 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4177 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4180 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
4181 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4182 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4185 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
4186 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4187 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4190 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
4191 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4192 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4195 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
4196 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4197 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4200 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
4201 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4202 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4205 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
4206 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4207 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4210 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
4211 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4212 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4215 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
4216 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4217 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4220 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
4221 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4222 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4225 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
4226 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4227 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4230 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
4231 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4232 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4235 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
4236 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4237 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4240 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
4241 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4242 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4245 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
4246 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4247 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
4250 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
4255 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
4256 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4257 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4260 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
4261 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4262 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4263 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
4265 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4266 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4267 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4268 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4269 if no_connection_possible {
4270 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4271 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4272 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4273 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4274 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4276 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
4277 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4278 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4288 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4289 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4290 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4291 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
4292 if chan.is_shutdown() {
4293 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4294 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4298 no_channels_remain = false;
4304 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
4306 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4307 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4308 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4309 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4310 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4311 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4312 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4313 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4314 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4315 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4316 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4317 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4318 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4319 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
4320 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4321 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4322 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
4323 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
4324 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
4325 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
4329 if no_channels_remain {
4330 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
4333 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4334 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4338 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
4339 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4341 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4344 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4345 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
4346 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4347 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
4348 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
4351 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
4352 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
4357 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4358 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4359 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4360 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4361 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4362 if !chan.have_received_message() {
4363 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
4364 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
4365 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
4369 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
4370 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4371 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
4377 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
4380 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
4381 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4383 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
4384 for chan in self.list_channels() {
4385 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
4386 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4387 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4391 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4392 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4397 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
4398 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
4399 struct PersistenceNotifier {
4400 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
4401 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
4402 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
4405 impl PersistenceNotifier {
4408 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
4414 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4415 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4420 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
4421 let result = *guard;
4429 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4430 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4431 let current_time = Instant::now();
4433 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4434 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4439 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
4440 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
4441 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
4442 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
4443 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
4445 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
4446 let result = *guard;
4447 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
4451 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
4452 None => return result,
4458 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
4460 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
4461 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4462 *persistence_lock = true;
4463 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
4468 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4469 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4471 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
4473 (0, onion_packet, required),
4474 (2, short_channel_id, required),
4477 (0, payment_data, required),
4478 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
4480 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
4481 (0, payment_preimage, required),
4482 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
4486 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
4487 (0, routing, required),
4488 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
4489 (4, payment_hash, required),
4490 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
4491 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
4494 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailureMsg, ;
4498 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
4503 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
4504 (0, short_channel_id, required),
4505 (2, outpoint, required),
4506 (4, htlc_id, required),
4507 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
4510 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimableHTLC, {
4511 (0, prev_hop, required),
4512 (2, value, required),
4513 (4, payment_data, required),
4514 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
4517 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCSource,
4518 (0, OutboundRoute) => {
4519 (0, session_priv, required),
4520 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
4521 (4, path, vec_type),
4523 (1, PreviousHopData)
4526 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
4527 (0, LightningError) => {
4531 (0, failure_code, required),
4532 (2, data, vec_type),
4536 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
4538 (0, forward_info, required),
4539 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
4540 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
4541 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
4544 (0, htlc_id, required),
4545 (2, err_packet, required),
4549 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
4550 (0, payment_secret, required),
4551 (2, expiry_time, required),
4552 (4, user_payment_id, required),
4553 (6, payment_preimage, required),
4554 (8, min_value_msat, required),
4557 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4558 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4559 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4560 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4561 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4564 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4565 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
4567 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4569 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
4571 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4572 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
4573 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
4576 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4577 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
4578 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4579 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4580 unfunded_channels += 1;
4583 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
4584 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4585 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4586 channel.write(writer)?;
4590 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4591 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
4592 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4593 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4594 for forward in pending_forwards {
4595 forward.write(writer)?;
4599 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4600 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
4601 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4602 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4603 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
4604 htlc.write(writer)?;
4608 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4609 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4610 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4611 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4612 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4613 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
4616 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4617 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4618 for event in events.iter() {
4619 event.write(writer)?;
4622 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
4623 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4624 for event in background_events.iter() {
4626 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
4628 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
4629 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
4634 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4635 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4637 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4638 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4639 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
4640 hash.write(writer)?;
4641 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
4644 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4645 (pending_outbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4646 for session_priv in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
4647 session_priv.write(writer)?;
4650 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {});
4656 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
4658 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
4660 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
4661 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling:
4662 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)
4663 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
4664 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
4665 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints the same
4666 /// way you would handle a `chain::Filter` call using ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and
4667 /// ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
4668 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
4669 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
4670 /// 6) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
4672 /// Note that the ordering of #4-6 is not of importance, however all three must occur before you
4673 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized ChannelManager.
4675 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
4676 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
4677 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
4678 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
4679 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
4680 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
4681 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4682 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4683 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4684 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4685 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4688 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
4689 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
4691 pub keys_manager: K,
4693 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4695 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
4696 pub fee_estimator: F,
4697 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4699 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
4700 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
4701 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
4702 pub chain_monitor: M,
4704 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
4705 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
4706 /// force-closed during deserialization.
4707 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
4708 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
4709 /// deserialization.
4711 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
4712 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
4713 pub default_config: UserConfig,
4715 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
4716 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
4718 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
4719 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
4720 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
4721 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
4723 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
4726 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
4727 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
4730 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4731 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4732 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4733 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4734 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4735 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4738 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
4739 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
4740 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
4741 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
4742 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
4744 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
4745 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
4750 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
4751 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
4752 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4753 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
4754 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4755 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4756 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4757 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4760 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4761 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
4762 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
4766 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4767 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
4768 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4769 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4770 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4771 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4774 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4775 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4777 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4778 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4779 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4781 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4783 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4784 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4785 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4786 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4787 for _ in 0..channel_count {
4788 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
4789 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
4790 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
4791 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
4792 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4793 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4794 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4795 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4796 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
4797 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
4798 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
4799 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4800 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
4801 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
4802 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
4803 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
4804 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4805 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4806 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4807 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4808 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4809 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
4810 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
4811 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
4812 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4814 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4815 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
4817 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
4820 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4821 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
4822 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
4823 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
4824 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
4825 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4829 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
4830 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
4831 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4835 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
4836 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4837 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4838 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
4839 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4840 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4841 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
4842 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
4843 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4845 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
4848 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4849 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4850 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
4851 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4852 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4853 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
4854 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
4855 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4857 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
4860 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4861 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
4862 for _ in 0..peer_count {
4863 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4864 let peer_state = PeerState {
4865 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
4867 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
4870 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4871 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
4872 for _ in 0..event_count {
4873 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
4874 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
4879 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4880 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
4881 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
4882 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4883 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
4884 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4888 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4889 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4891 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4892 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
4893 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
4894 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
4895 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4899 let pending_outbound_payments_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4900 let mut pending_outbound_payments: HashSet<[u8; 32]> = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
4901 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count {
4902 if !pending_outbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?) {
4903 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4907 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {});
4909 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4910 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4912 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
4914 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
4915 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
4916 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
4918 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
4920 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
4925 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
4927 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
4928 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments),
4930 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
4931 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
4934 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
4935 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
4937 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
4939 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
4940 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
4941 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
4942 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
4944 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
4945 logger: args.logger,
4946 default_configuration: args.default_config,
4949 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4950 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4953 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
4954 //connection or two.
4956 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
4962 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
4964 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
4966 use core::time::Duration;
4967 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
4968 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
4969 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
4971 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
4973 fn test_wait_timeout() {
4974 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
4975 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
4977 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
4978 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
4979 thread::spawn(move || {
4981 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
4982 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4983 *persistence_lock = true;
4986 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
4992 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
4993 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
4995 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
4998 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
5003 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
5005 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
5008 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
5015 fn test_notify_limits() {
5016 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
5017 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
5018 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5019 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5020 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5021 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5023 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5025 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
5026 // to connect messages with new values
5027 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
5028 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
5029 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
5030 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
5032 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
5033 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5034 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5035 // ... but the last node should not.
5036 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5037 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
5038 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5039 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5041 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
5042 // about the channel.
5043 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5044 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5045 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5047 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
5049 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5050 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5051 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5052 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5053 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5054 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5056 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
5057 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5058 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5060 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
5061 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
5062 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
5063 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
5064 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
5065 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
5067 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
5068 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
5069 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
5070 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
5071 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5072 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5073 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5074 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5076 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
5077 // the channel info has updated.
5078 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
5079 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
5080 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5081 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5082 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5083 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5087 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
5090 use chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor;
5091 use chain::channelmonitor::Persist;
5092 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
5093 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
5094 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
5095 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
5096 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
5097 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
5098 use routing::router::get_route;
5099 use util::test_utils;
5100 use util::config::UserConfig;
5101 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
5103 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5104 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5105 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
5107 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
5111 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
5112 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
5113 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
5114 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
5115 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
5116 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
5117 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
5122 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
5123 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
5126 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
5127 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
5128 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
5130 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
5131 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
5133 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
5134 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
5136 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
5137 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
5139 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
5140 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
5141 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
5142 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
5143 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
5145 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
5147 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
5149 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
5150 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
5151 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
5152 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
5153 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
5155 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
5157 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
5159 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
5160 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5161 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5164 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
5165 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
5166 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
5168 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
5169 } else { panic!(); }
5171 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5172 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5174 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
5177 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5180 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
5181 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
5183 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5184 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5185 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
5186 match msg_events[0] {
5187 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
5188 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
5189 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
5193 match msg_events[1] {
5194 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5198 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
5200 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
5201 macro_rules! send_payment {
5202 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
5203 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
5204 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()),
5205 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a).unwrap();
5207 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
5208 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
5210 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
5211 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
5213 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5214 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
5215 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5216 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
5217 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
5218 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5219 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
5220 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5222 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
5223 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
5224 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5226 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
5227 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
5228 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
5229 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5230 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
5232 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
5235 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
5236 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5237 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
5238 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5240 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
5245 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
5246 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);