1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
39 // construct one themselves.
40 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
41 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
42 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
43 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
44 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
45 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
46 use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, RoutePath, Router};
47 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
49 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
50 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
51 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
53 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
54 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
55 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
56 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
57 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
58 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
59 use crate::util::events;
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
63 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
64 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
66 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
69 use crate::prelude::*;
71 use core::cell::RefCell;
73 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
74 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
75 use core::time::Duration;
78 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
79 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure};
81 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
83 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
84 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
85 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
87 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
88 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
89 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
90 // before we forward it.
92 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
93 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
94 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
95 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
96 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
98 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
99 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
101 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
102 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
103 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
104 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
107 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
108 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
109 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
112 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
113 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
117 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
118 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
119 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
120 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
121 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
122 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
123 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
124 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
129 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
130 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
133 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
134 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
135 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
136 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
137 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
140 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
141 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
143 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
144 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
145 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
148 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
149 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
151 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
152 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
155 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
156 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
159 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
163 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
164 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
165 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
166 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
167 short_channel_id: u64,
169 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
170 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
172 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
173 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
178 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
180 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
181 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
182 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
184 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
185 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
188 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
189 struct ClaimableHTLC {
190 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
192 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
194 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
196 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
200 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
201 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
202 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
203 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
205 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
206 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
211 impl Readable for PaymentId {
212 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
213 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
218 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
219 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
220 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
221 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
223 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
224 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
229 impl Readable for InterceptId {
230 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
231 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
236 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
237 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
238 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
239 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
240 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
243 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
245 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
246 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
247 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
249 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
250 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
254 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
255 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
256 (0, short_channel_id, required),
257 (2, htlc_id, required),
259 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
260 (0, session_priv, required),
265 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
266 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
267 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
268 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
269 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
272 session_priv: SecretKey,
273 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
274 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
275 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
276 payment_id: PaymentId,
277 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
278 /// Note that this is now "deprecated" - we write it for forwards (and read it for
279 /// backwards) compatibility reasons, but prefer to use the data in the
280 /// [`super::outbound_payment`] module, which stores per-payment data once instead of in
282 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
285 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
286 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
287 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
289 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
291 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
293 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
296 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
297 payment_id.hash(hasher);
298 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
299 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
300 payment_params.hash(hasher);
305 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
308 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
309 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
311 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
312 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
313 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
314 payment_secret: None,
315 payment_params: None,
320 struct ReceiveError {
326 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
327 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
329 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
330 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
331 pub enum FailureCode {
332 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
333 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
334 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
335 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
336 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
337 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
338 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
339 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
340 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
341 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
342 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
345 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
347 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
348 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
349 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
350 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
351 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
353 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
354 err: msgs::LightningError,
355 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
356 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
358 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
360 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
362 err: LightningError {
364 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
365 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
372 shutdown_finish: None,
376 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
377 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
380 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
382 err: LightningError {
384 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
385 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
391 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
392 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
396 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
399 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
401 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
402 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
406 log_level: Level::Warn,
409 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
411 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
413 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
415 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
416 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
424 shutdown_finish: None,
429 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
430 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
431 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
432 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
433 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
435 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
436 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
437 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
438 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
439 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
440 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
441 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
443 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
447 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
448 struct ClaimingPayment {
450 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
451 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
453 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
454 (0, amount_msat, required),
455 (2, payment_purpose, required),
456 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
459 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
460 struct ClaimablePayments {
461 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
462 /// failed/claimed by the user.
464 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
465 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
467 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
468 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
469 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
471 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
472 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
473 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
474 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
477 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
478 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
479 /// quite some time lag.
480 enum BackgroundEvent {
481 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
482 /// commitment transaction.
483 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
487 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
488 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
489 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
490 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
491 /// event can be generated.
492 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
493 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
494 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
497 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
498 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
499 (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, upgradable_required) },
502 /// State we hold per-peer.
503 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
504 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
506 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
507 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
509 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
510 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
511 latest_features: InitFeatures,
512 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
513 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
514 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
515 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
516 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
518 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
519 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
520 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
521 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
523 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
524 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
525 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
526 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
527 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
528 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
529 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
530 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
531 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
532 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
536 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
537 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
538 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
539 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
540 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
541 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
544 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
548 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
549 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
551 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
554 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
555 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
556 struct PendingInboundPayment {
557 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
558 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
559 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
560 /// this payment being removed.
562 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
563 user_payment_id: u64,
564 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
565 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
566 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
569 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
570 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
571 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
572 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
573 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
574 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
575 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
577 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
578 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
586 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
588 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
593 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
594 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
595 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
596 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
597 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
598 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
599 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
600 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
602 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
603 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
605 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
606 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
608 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
609 /// to individual Channels.
611 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
612 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
613 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
614 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
616 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
617 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
618 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
619 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
620 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
621 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
622 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
624 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
625 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
626 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
627 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
630 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
631 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
632 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
633 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
634 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
636 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, ChannelManager limits the number of inbound connections and
637 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
638 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
639 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
641 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
642 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
643 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
645 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
646 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
647 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
648 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
649 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
652 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
653 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
654 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
655 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
656 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
660 // `total_consistency_lock`
662 // |__`forward_htlcs`
664 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
666 // |__`per_peer_state`
668 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
670 // | |__`claimable_payments`
672 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
678 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
680 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
684 // | |__`pending_events`
686 // | |__`pending_background_events`
688 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
690 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
691 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
692 ES::Target: EntropySource,
693 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
694 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
695 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
699 default_configuration: UserConfig,
700 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
701 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
707 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
709 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
711 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
712 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
714 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
715 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
716 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
717 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
719 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
720 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
722 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
723 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
724 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
725 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
726 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
727 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
728 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
729 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
731 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
733 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
734 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
736 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
738 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
739 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
740 /// and via the classic SCID.
742 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
743 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
745 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
747 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
749 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
750 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
751 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
753 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
754 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
756 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
757 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
759 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
760 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
762 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
763 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
764 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
765 /// active channel list on load.
767 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
768 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
770 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
772 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
773 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
774 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
776 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
777 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
778 /// the handling of the events.
780 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
781 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
784 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
785 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
786 /// would break backwards compatability.
787 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
788 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
789 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
791 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
792 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
794 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
796 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
797 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
798 /// confirmation depth.
800 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
801 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
802 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
804 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
806 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
808 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
810 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
812 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
814 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
815 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
816 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
818 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
819 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
821 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
822 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
823 /// keeping additional state.
824 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
826 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
827 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
828 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
829 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
831 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
832 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
834 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
835 /// are currently open with that peer.
837 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
838 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
841 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
843 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
844 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
845 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
846 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
847 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
849 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
850 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
851 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
852 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
853 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
854 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
855 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
856 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
857 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
858 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
859 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
861 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
870 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
872 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
873 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
874 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
875 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
876 pub struct ChainParameters {
877 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
878 pub network: Network,
880 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
882 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
883 pub best_block: BestBlock,
886 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
892 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
893 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
894 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
895 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
896 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
897 /// updates are ready for persistence).
899 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
900 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
901 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
902 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
903 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
905 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
906 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
909 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
910 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
911 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
914 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
915 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
917 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
918 persistence_notifier: notifier,
919 should_persist: persist_check,
920 _read_guard: read_guard,
925 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
927 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
928 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
933 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
934 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
936 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
938 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
939 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
940 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
941 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
942 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
944 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
945 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
947 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
949 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
950 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
951 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
952 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
953 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
954 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
955 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
956 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
957 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
958 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
959 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
960 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
961 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
963 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
964 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
966 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
967 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
968 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
969 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
971 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
972 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
973 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
974 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
975 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
976 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
979 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
981 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
982 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
985 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
987 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
988 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
990 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
991 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
992 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
993 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
995 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
996 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
997 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
998 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1000 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1001 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1002 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1004 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1005 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1006 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1008 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1009 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1010 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1011 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1012 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1013 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1014 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1015 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1016 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1017 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1018 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1021 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1022 /// to better separate parameters.
1023 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1024 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1025 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1026 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1027 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1028 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1029 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1030 pub features: InitFeatures,
1031 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1032 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1033 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1035 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1037 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1038 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1039 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1040 /// payments to us through this channel.
1041 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1042 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1043 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1044 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1045 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1046 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1047 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1050 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1051 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1052 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1053 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1054 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1055 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1056 /// lifetime of the channel.
1057 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1058 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1059 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1060 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1061 /// our counterparty already.
1063 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1064 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1065 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1066 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1068 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1069 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1070 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1071 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1073 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1074 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1076 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1077 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1079 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1080 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1081 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1082 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1083 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1084 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1085 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1086 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1087 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1090 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1092 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1093 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1094 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1095 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1096 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1097 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1098 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1100 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1101 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1103 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1104 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1105 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1106 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1107 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1108 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1109 /// this value on chain.
1111 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1113 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1115 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1116 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1117 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1118 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1120 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1121 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1122 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1124 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1125 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1126 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1127 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1128 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1130 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1131 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1132 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1133 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1135 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1136 pub balance_msat: u64,
1137 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1138 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1139 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1140 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1142 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1144 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1145 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1146 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1147 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1148 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1149 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1150 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1151 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1153 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1154 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1155 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1156 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1157 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1158 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1159 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1161 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1162 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1163 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1164 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1165 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1166 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1167 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1168 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1169 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1171 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1173 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1174 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1175 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1176 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1177 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1179 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1180 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1181 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1182 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1183 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1184 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1185 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1187 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1188 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1189 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1190 pub is_outbound: bool,
1191 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1192 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1193 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1194 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1195 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1197 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1198 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1199 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1200 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1202 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1203 pub is_usable: bool,
1204 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1205 pub is_public: bool,
1206 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1207 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1208 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1209 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1210 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1211 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1213 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1214 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1217 impl ChannelDetails {
1218 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1219 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1220 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1222 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1223 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1224 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1225 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1228 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1229 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1230 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1232 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1233 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1234 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1235 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1238 fn from_channel<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(channel: &Channel<Signer>,
1239 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1241 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1242 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1243 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1245 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1246 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1247 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1248 features: latest_features,
1249 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1250 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1251 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1252 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1253 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1254 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1255 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1256 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1257 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1258 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1260 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1261 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1262 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1263 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1264 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1265 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1266 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1267 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1268 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(channel.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1269 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1270 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1271 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1272 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1273 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1274 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1275 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1276 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1277 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1278 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1279 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1280 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1281 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1282 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1283 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1284 config: Some(channel.config()),
1289 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1290 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1291 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1292 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1293 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1295 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1297 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1298 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1299 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1302 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1303 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1304 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1306 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1307 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1308 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1310 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1311 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1312 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1314 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1315 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1319 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1321 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1323 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1324 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1325 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1326 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1328 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1329 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1330 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1333 macro_rules! handle_error {
1334 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1337 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1338 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1339 // entering the macro.
1340 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1341 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1343 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1345 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1346 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1347 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1348 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1352 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1353 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1354 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1355 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1360 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1361 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1363 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1364 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1365 action: err.action.clone()
1369 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1370 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1371 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1372 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1373 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1377 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1384 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1385 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1386 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1387 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1388 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1389 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1391 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1392 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1393 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1394 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1395 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1397 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1398 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1400 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1404 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1405 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1406 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1408 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1409 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1411 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1412 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1414 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1415 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1416 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1417 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1418 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1419 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1425 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1426 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1430 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1432 $entry.remove_entry();
1440 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1441 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1445 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1447 $entry.remove_entry();
1455 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1456 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1458 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1459 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1465 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1466 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1467 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1468 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1469 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1471 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1472 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1473 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1474 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1475 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1476 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1477 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1478 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1479 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1480 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1485 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1486 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1487 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1489 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1490 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1491 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1492 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1493 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1494 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1497 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1502 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1503 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1504 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1505 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1506 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1507 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1508 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
1509 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1510 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1511 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1512 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1514 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1515 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1516 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1522 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1523 .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1525 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1526 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1527 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1528 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1529 updates.announcement_sigs);
1530 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1531 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1534 let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
1535 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1536 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1538 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1540 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1541 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1543 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1544 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1545 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1546 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1551 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1552 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1553 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1554 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1555 debug_assert!($self.id_to_peer.try_lock().is_ok());
1557 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1558 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1559 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1562 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1563 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1564 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1565 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1566 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1567 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
1568 $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1569 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1573 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1574 if ($update_id == 0 || $chan.get_next_monitor_update()
1575 .expect("We can't be processing a monitor update if it isn't queued")
1576 .update_id == $update_id) &&
1577 $chan.get_latest_monitor_update_id() == $update_id
1579 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1585 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1586 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1590 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1592 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1593 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1594 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1595 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1596 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1597 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1601 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1603 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1604 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1606 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1608 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1609 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1610 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1611 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1612 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1613 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1614 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1615 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1617 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1618 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1619 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1624 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1626 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1627 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1628 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1629 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1630 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1631 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1632 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1633 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1635 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1638 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1639 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1641 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1643 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1645 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1647 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1648 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1649 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1650 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1660 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1661 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1662 &self.default_configuration
1665 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1666 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1667 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1670 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1671 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1673 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1675 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1679 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1684 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1686 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1687 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1688 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1689 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1690 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1692 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1693 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1695 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1696 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1697 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1699 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1700 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1701 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1702 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1703 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1704 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1706 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1707 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1708 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1709 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1710 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1711 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1714 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1715 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1716 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1718 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1720 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1721 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1723 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1725 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1726 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1727 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1728 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1729 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1730 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1734 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1739 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1741 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1742 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1743 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1745 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1747 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1750 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1753 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1754 node_id: their_network_key,
1757 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1760 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1761 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1762 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1763 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1764 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1765 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1766 // the same channel.
1767 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1769 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1770 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1771 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1772 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1773 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1774 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1775 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height,
1776 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
1784 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1785 /// more information.
1786 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1787 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1790 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1791 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1793 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1794 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1796 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1797 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1798 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1799 // really wanted anyway.
1800 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1803 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
1804 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1805 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1806 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1808 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
1809 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1810 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1811 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1812 return peer_state.channel_by_id
1815 ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height, features.clone()))
1821 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
1822 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1824 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
1825 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
1826 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
1828 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1829 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
1830 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
1831 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
1832 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
1833 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1834 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
1835 total_msat: *total_msat,
1838 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
1839 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1841 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
1842 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1844 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
1849 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1850 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1851 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1852 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1853 Some(transaction) => {
1854 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1858 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1859 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1860 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1861 reason: closure_reason
1865 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1866 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1868 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1869 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1870 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1872 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
1873 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
1875 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1876 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1877 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1878 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1879 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
1880 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1881 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
1882 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
1883 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1885 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
1886 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
1887 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
1888 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1889 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1893 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1894 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
1895 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1896 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
1897 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
1900 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1901 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1902 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1903 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1907 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1911 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
1915 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1916 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1917 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1918 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1921 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1925 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1926 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1927 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1929 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1930 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1932 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1933 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1934 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1935 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1937 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1939 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1940 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1941 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1942 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1943 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1946 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1947 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1948 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1950 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1951 /// the channel being closed or not:
1952 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1953 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1954 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1955 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1956 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1957 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1958 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1960 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1962 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1963 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1964 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1965 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1966 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1970 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1971 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1972 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1973 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1974 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1975 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1976 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1977 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
1979 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1980 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1981 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1982 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1983 // ignore the result here.
1984 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
1988 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1989 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1990 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1991 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1992 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1993 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
1994 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
1996 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1997 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1998 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1999 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2000 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
2002 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2004 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2006 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2009 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2010 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2011 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2012 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2013 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2018 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2021 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2022 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2023 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2024 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2025 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2026 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2027 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2028 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2029 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2030 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2031 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2032 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2043 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2044 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2045 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2047 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2048 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2049 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2052 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2053 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2054 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2056 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2057 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2058 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2059 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2060 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2063 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2064 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2065 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2066 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2067 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2071 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2072 /// local transaction(s).
2073 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2074 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2075 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2079 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2080 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2082 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2083 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2084 return Err(ReceiveError {
2085 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2087 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2090 // final_expiry_too_soon
2091 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2092 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2094 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2095 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2096 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2097 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2098 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2099 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2100 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2101 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2102 return Err(ReceiveError {
2103 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2104 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2107 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2108 return Err(ReceiveError {
2110 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2111 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2115 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2116 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2117 return Err(ReceiveError {
2118 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2119 err_data: Vec::new(),
2120 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2123 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2124 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2125 return Err(ReceiveError {
2126 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2127 err_data: Vec::new(),
2128 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2130 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2131 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2133 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2134 phantom_shared_secret,
2136 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2137 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2138 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2139 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2140 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2141 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2142 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2143 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2144 return Err(ReceiveError {
2145 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2146 err_data: Vec::new(),
2147 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2151 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2153 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2156 return Err(ReceiveError {
2157 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2158 err_data: Vec::new(),
2159 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2164 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2167 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2168 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2169 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
2170 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2174 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2175 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2176 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2178 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2179 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2180 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2181 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2182 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2183 failure_code: $err_code,
2189 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2190 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2193 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2194 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2195 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2197 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2198 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2199 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2200 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2201 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2202 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2203 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2204 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2206 macro_rules! return_err {
2207 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2209 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2210 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2211 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2212 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2213 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2214 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2220 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2222 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2223 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2225 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2226 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2230 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2231 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2233 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2235 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2236 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2237 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2238 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2239 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2241 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2244 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2245 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2246 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2248 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2249 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2250 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2253 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2254 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2255 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2256 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2260 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2261 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2262 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2265 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2266 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2267 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2268 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2269 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2274 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2275 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2276 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2277 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2278 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2279 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2280 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2281 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2282 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2283 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2284 // phantom or an intercept.
2285 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2286 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2287 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2291 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2294 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2296 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2297 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2298 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2299 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2300 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2302 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2303 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2304 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2306 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2307 // have no consistency guarantees.
2308 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2312 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2313 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2314 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2315 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2316 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2318 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2319 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2320 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2321 // we don't have the channel here.
2322 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2324 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2326 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2327 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2328 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2329 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2330 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2331 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2332 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2334 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2335 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2337 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2338 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2342 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2343 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2344 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2345 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2347 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2354 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2355 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2356 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2357 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2358 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2359 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2361 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2362 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2364 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2365 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2366 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2367 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2368 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2369 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2370 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2371 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2372 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2373 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2379 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2380 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2381 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2382 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2384 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2385 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2387 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2388 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2389 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2391 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2392 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2393 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2394 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2395 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2396 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2397 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2401 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2406 pending_forward_info
2409 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2410 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2411 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2413 /// Note that in `internal_closing_signed`, this function is called without the `peer_state`
2414 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2415 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2416 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2417 if !chan.should_announce() {
2418 return Err(LightningError {
2419 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2420 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2423 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2424 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2426 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2427 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2430 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2431 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2432 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2433 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2435 /// Note that through `internal_closing_signed`, this function is called without the
2436 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2437 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2438 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2439 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2440 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2441 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2445 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2447 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2448 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2449 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2451 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2452 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2454 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2455 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2456 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2457 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2458 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2459 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2460 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2461 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2463 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2464 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2465 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2467 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2469 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2476 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2477 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2478 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
2481 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2482 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
2483 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2485 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2486 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2487 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2489 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2490 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
2491 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2492 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2493 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()});
2495 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2497 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2498 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2499 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2500 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2503 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2504 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2505 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
2506 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2507 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2508 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2509 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2510 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2512 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2513 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2514 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2516 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2517 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2519 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2520 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2521 }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2522 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2523 Some(monitor_update) => {
2524 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2525 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2526 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
2529 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2530 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2531 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2532 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2533 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2534 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2535 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2536 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2542 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2543 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2544 // `channel_by_id` map.
2545 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2546 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2551 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2552 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2554 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2559 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2561 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2562 /// fields for more info.
2564 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2565 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2567 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2569 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2570 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2571 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2572 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2573 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2575 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2576 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2577 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2578 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2579 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2581 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2582 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2583 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2584 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2586 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2588 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2589 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2590 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2592 /// In general, a path may raise:
2593 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2594 /// node public key) is specified.
2595 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2596 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2598 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2599 /// relevant updates.
2601 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2602 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2603 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2605 /// # A caution on `payment_secret`
2607 /// `payment_secret` is unrelated to `payment_hash` (or [`PaymentPreimage`]) and exists to
2608 /// authenticate the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization)
2609 /// attacks. For newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one,
2610 /// the [`Route`] must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a
2611 /// recipient-provided `payment_secret`.
2613 /// If a `payment_secret` *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret
2614 /// feature bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the
2615 /// [`Route`], we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2617 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2618 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2619 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2620 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2621 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2622 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2623 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2624 self.pending_outbound_payments
2625 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2626 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2627 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2630 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2631 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2632 pub fn send_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
2633 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2634 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2635 self.pending_outbound_payments
2636 .send_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2637 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2638 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2639 &self.pending_events,
2640 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2641 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2645 fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2646 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2647 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2648 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2649 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2650 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2654 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2655 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2656 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2660 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
2661 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
2662 /// retries are exhausted.
2664 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
2665 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2667 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2668 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2669 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2671 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2672 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
2674 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2675 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2676 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2677 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2678 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, &self.pending_events);
2681 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2682 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2683 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2684 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2685 /// never reach the recipient.
2687 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2688 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2690 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2691 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2693 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2695 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2696 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2697 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2698 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2699 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2700 route, payment_preimage, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
2702 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2703 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2706 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2707 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2709 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
2712 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
2713 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
2714 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2715 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2716 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, payment_id,
2717 retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2718 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2719 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
2720 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2721 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2724 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2725 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2726 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2727 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2728 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2729 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2730 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2731 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2732 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2735 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2738 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2739 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2742 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2743 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2744 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2745 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2746 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2747 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2748 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2749 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2751 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2752 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2755 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2757 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2759 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2760 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2761 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2762 } else { unreachable!(); })
2765 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }) },
2768 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2769 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2772 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2773 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
2778 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2779 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2782 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2783 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2784 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2786 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2787 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2788 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2789 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2798 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2799 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2800 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2804 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2806 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2807 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2809 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2810 /// across the p2p network.
2812 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2813 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2815 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2816 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2817 /// keys per-channel).
2819 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2820 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2821 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2823 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2824 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2825 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2827 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2828 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2829 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2830 /// for more details.
2832 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2833 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2834 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2835 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2837 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2838 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2839 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2840 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2845 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2846 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2847 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2848 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2849 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2850 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2851 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2855 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2856 let mut output_index = None;
2857 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2858 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2859 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2860 if output_index.is_some() {
2861 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2862 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2865 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2866 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2867 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2870 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2873 if output_index.is_none() {
2874 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2875 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2878 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2882 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2884 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2885 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2886 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2887 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2889 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2890 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2892 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2893 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2895 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2897 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2898 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2899 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2900 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2901 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2902 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2903 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2904 pub fn update_channel_config(
2905 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2906 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2907 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2908 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2909 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2913 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2914 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2916 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2917 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2918 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2919 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2920 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2921 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2922 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
2923 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2924 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2928 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2929 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2930 if !channel.update_config(config) {
2933 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2934 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2935 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2936 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2937 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2945 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
2946 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
2948 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
2949 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
2951 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
2952 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
2953 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
2954 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
2955 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
2957 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
2958 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
2960 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2963 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
2964 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2965 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
2966 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
2967 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2968 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2970 let next_hop_scid = {
2971 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2972 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
2973 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
2974 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2975 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2976 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
2978 if !chan.is_usable() {
2979 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2980 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
2983 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
2985 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2986 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
2991 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
2992 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
2993 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
2996 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
2997 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
2998 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3000 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3002 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3003 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3006 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3007 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3008 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3009 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3010 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3012 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3016 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3017 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3019 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3022 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3023 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3024 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3026 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3027 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3028 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3031 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3032 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3033 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3034 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3035 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3036 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3037 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3040 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3041 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3042 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3043 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3048 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3050 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3051 /// Will likely generate further events.
3052 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3053 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3055 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3056 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3057 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3059 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3060 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3062 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3063 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3064 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3066 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3067 match forward_info {
3068 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3069 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3070 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3071 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3072 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3075 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3076 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3077 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3079 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3080 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3081 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3082 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3083 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3084 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3087 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3088 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3090 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3093 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3094 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3100 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3101 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3103 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3107 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3108 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3110 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3114 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3115 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3116 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3117 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3118 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3120 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3121 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3122 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3123 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3124 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3126 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3128 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3129 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3133 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3134 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3135 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3136 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3142 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3145 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3148 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3149 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3150 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3151 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3152 // problem, not ours.
3158 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3159 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3161 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3165 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3166 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3167 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3168 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3171 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3172 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3173 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3174 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3175 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3178 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3179 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3180 match forward_info {
3181 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3182 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3183 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3184 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3185 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3188 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3189 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3190 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3191 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3192 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3193 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3194 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3195 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3197 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3198 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3199 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3201 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3202 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3204 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3206 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3207 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3208 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3209 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3214 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3215 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3217 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3218 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3219 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3220 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3222 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3223 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3225 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3227 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3228 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3229 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3238 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3239 match forward_info {
3240 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3241 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3242 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3243 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3246 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3247 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3248 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3249 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3251 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3252 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3254 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3257 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3258 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3259 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3260 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3261 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3262 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3263 phantom_shared_secret,
3265 value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3267 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3272 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3273 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3274 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3275 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3276 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3278 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3279 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3280 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3281 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3282 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3283 phantom_shared_secret,
3285 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3286 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3290 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3291 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3292 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3293 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3294 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3297 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3298 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3299 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3301 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3302 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3303 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3306 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3307 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3308 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3311 let (_, htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3312 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3313 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3314 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3315 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3316 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3320 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3321 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3322 total_value += htlc.value;
3323 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3324 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3325 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3326 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3327 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3328 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3330 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3332 _ => unreachable!(),
3335 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3336 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3337 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3338 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3339 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3340 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3341 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3342 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3343 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3346 amount_msat: total_value,
3347 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3348 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3350 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3352 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3353 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3355 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3357 payment_claimable_generated
3361 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3362 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3363 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3364 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3365 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3366 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3367 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3368 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3369 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3370 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3371 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3372 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3373 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3374 Ok(result) => result,
3376 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3377 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3381 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3382 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3383 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3384 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3385 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3386 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3390 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3392 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3393 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3394 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3395 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3398 match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3399 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3400 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3401 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3402 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3403 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3404 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3406 amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3408 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3409 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3412 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3413 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3414 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3420 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3421 if payment_data.is_none() {
3422 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3423 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3426 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3427 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3428 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3429 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3430 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3431 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3432 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3433 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3435 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3436 if payment_claimable_generated {
3437 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3443 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3444 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3452 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3453 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3454 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3455 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3456 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3457 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3459 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3460 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3462 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3464 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3465 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3466 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3468 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3470 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3471 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3472 events.append(&mut new_events);
3475 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3477 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3478 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3480 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3481 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3482 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3483 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3484 if background_events.is_empty() {
3488 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3490 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3491 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3492 // monitor updating completing.
3493 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3500 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3501 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3502 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3503 self.process_background_events();
3506 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3507 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3508 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3509 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
3510 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3511 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3512 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3514 if !chan.is_live() {
3515 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3516 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3517 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3519 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3520 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3522 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3523 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3527 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3528 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3529 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3530 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3531 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3532 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3533 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3535 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3537 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3538 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3539 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3540 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3541 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3542 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3543 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3551 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3553 /// This currently includes:
3554 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3555 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3556 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3558 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3559 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3560 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3562 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3563 /// estimate fetches.
3564 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3565 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3566 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3567 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3569 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3571 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3572 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3573 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3575 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3576 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3577 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3578 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3579 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3580 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3581 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3582 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3583 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3585 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3586 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3587 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3588 if needs_close { return false; }
3591 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3592 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3593 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3594 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3595 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3596 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3597 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3598 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3602 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3603 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3605 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3606 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3607 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3611 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3612 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3617 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3621 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
3622 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
3627 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
3628 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
3629 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
3630 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
3631 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
3632 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
3633 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
3634 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
3635 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3636 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
3637 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
3638 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
3639 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
3640 // have no channels to the peer.
3641 let remove_entry = {
3642 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
3643 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
3646 entry.remove_entry();
3649 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
3654 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3655 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3656 // This should be unreachable
3657 debug_assert!(false);
3660 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3661 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3662 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3663 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3665 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3666 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3667 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3669 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3676 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3677 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3678 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3679 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3680 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3683 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3684 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3687 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3689 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3690 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3691 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3692 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3693 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3700 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3701 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3702 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3704 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3705 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3706 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3707 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3709 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3710 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3711 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3712 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3713 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3714 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
3717 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
3718 /// reason for the failure.
3720 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
3721 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
3722 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3724 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3725 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3726 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3727 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
3728 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3729 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3730 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3735 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
3736 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
3737 match failure_code {
3738 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3739 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3740 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
3741 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3742 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3743 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
3748 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3749 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3751 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3753 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3754 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3755 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3756 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3757 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3758 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3759 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3761 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3763 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3764 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3766 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3771 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3772 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3773 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3774 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3775 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3776 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3777 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3778 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3779 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3780 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3782 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3783 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3784 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3785 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3787 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3788 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3789 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3790 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3791 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3795 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3796 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3797 // be surfaced to the user.
3798 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3799 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3800 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3802 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
3803 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3804 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3805 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3806 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3807 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3808 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3809 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3811 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3813 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
3816 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3817 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3818 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3819 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3823 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3824 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3825 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3826 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
3827 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
3828 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
3829 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
3830 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3831 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3834 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3835 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3836 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3839 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3840 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3841 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3843 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3844 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
3845 session_priv, payment_id, payment_params, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
3846 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
3847 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3849 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
3850 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
3851 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
3853 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
3854 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3855 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3856 push_forward_ev = true;
3858 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
3859 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3860 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
3862 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3863 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
3866 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
3867 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3868 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3869 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3870 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3871 failed_next_destination: destination,
3877 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
3878 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3880 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3881 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3882 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3884 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3885 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
3886 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3887 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3889 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
3890 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3891 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3892 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3893 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3894 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3895 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3897 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3900 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3901 if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
3902 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3903 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3904 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3905 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3906 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3907 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
3912 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
3913 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
3914 payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
3916 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
3917 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
3918 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
3919 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3924 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3926 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we check that all channels which contain a claimable
3927 // HTLC still exist. While this isn't guaranteed to remain true if a channel closes while
3928 // we're claiming (or even after we claim, before the commitment update dance completes),
3929 // it should be a relatively rare race, and we'd rather not claim HTLCs that require us to
3930 // go on-chain (and lose the on-chain fee to do so) than just reject the payment.
3932 // Note that we'll still always get our funds - as long as the generated
3933 // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` makes it out to the relevant monitor we can claim on-chain.
3935 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3936 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3937 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3938 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3939 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3941 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3942 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
3943 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3944 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3945 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3946 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3947 let (counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3948 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3955 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3956 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3961 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3962 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3964 if peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&chan_id).is_none() {
3969 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
3970 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
3971 debug_assert!(false);
3976 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
3977 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
3978 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
3979 // that there's one payment here and move on.
3980 if sources.len() != 1 {
3981 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
3982 debug_assert!(false);
3988 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
3990 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3991 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
3992 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3993 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
3996 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
3997 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3998 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
3999 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4003 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4004 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4005 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4006 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4008 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4009 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4010 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4011 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4012 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4017 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4018 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4019 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4020 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4021 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4022 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4023 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4025 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4028 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4029 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4030 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4031 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4035 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4036 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4037 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4038 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4040 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4041 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4042 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4043 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4047 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4048 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id).map(
4049 |peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap()
4053 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4054 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4055 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4056 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4057 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4058 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4060 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4061 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4062 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4063 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4064 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4066 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4067 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4068 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4069 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4070 if let Err(e) = res {
4071 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4072 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4073 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4074 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4075 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4081 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4082 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4083 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4087 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4088 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4089 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4090 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4091 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4092 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4093 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4094 // again on restart.
4095 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4096 payment_preimage, update_res);
4098 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4099 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4100 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4101 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4102 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4103 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4107 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4108 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4111 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4113 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4114 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4116 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4117 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4118 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4119 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4120 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4121 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4122 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4125 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4126 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4128 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4130 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4136 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4137 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4138 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4144 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4145 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4146 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4149 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4150 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4152 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4153 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4154 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4155 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4156 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4160 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4161 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
4167 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4168 /// update completion.
4169 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4170 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4171 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4172 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4173 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4174 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4175 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4176 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
4177 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4178 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4179 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4180 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4181 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4183 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4185 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4186 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4187 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4188 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4191 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4192 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4194 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4195 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4196 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4201 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
4203 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4204 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4205 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4206 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4211 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4212 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4213 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4214 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4215 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4220 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4224 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4230 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4231 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4232 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4238 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4239 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4241 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4242 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4244 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4245 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4246 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4247 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4248 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4253 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4254 let mut peer_state_lock;
4255 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4256 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4257 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4258 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4260 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4261 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4262 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4265 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4266 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4267 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4270 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4273 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4275 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4276 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4279 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4280 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4281 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4283 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4284 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4285 /// used to accept such channels.
4287 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4288 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4289 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4290 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4293 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4294 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4296 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4297 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4298 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4300 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4301 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4303 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4304 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4306 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4307 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4309 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4310 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4311 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4312 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4315 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4316 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4318 let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4319 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4320 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4321 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4322 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4323 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4324 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1;
4325 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4326 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4327 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4328 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4331 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4332 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4333 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4334 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4335 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4336 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4339 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4340 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4341 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4343 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4344 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4345 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4346 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4347 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4348 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4349 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4350 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4353 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4354 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4355 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4359 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4360 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4361 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4364 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4365 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4371 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4372 /// or 0-conf channels.
4374 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
4375 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
4376 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
4377 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
4378 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
4379 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4381 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4382 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
4383 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4384 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
4385 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
4386 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() {
4387 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
4391 return peers_without_funded_channels;
4394 fn unfunded_channel_count(
4395 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
4397 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
4398 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
4399 if !chan.is_outbound() && chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
4400 chan.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
4402 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
4405 num_unfunded_channels
4408 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4409 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4410 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4413 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4414 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4417 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4418 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4419 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4420 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4422 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
4423 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
4424 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
4425 let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4427 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4428 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4430 debug_assert!(false);
4431 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4433 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4434 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4436 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4437 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4438 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4439 if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() &&
4440 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
4441 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
4443 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4444 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
4445 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4448 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4449 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
4450 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4451 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
4452 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4455 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4456 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
4457 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4460 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4461 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4465 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4466 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4467 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4468 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4470 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4471 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4472 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4473 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4475 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4476 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4477 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4480 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4481 pending_events.push(
4482 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4483 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4484 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4485 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4486 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4487 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4492 entry.insert(channel);
4498 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4499 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4500 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4501 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4503 debug_assert!(false);
4504 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4506 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4507 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4508 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4509 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4510 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4511 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4513 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4516 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4517 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4518 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4519 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4520 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4522 user_channel_id: user_id,
4527 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4528 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4530 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4531 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4533 debug_assert!(false);
4534 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4537 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4538 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4539 let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
4540 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4541 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4542 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4544 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4547 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4548 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4549 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4551 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4552 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4553 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4554 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4555 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4556 funding_msg.channel_id))
4558 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4559 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4563 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4564 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4565 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4566 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4567 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
4568 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4569 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4573 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
4575 let chan = e.insert(chan);
4576 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
4577 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
4579 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4580 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4581 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4582 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4583 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4584 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4585 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4586 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
4594 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4595 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4596 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4597 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4599 debug_assert!(false);
4600 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4603 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4604 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4605 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4606 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4607 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
4608 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
4609 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
4610 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4611 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4612 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4613 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4614 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4615 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4616 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4621 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4625 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4626 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4627 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4629 debug_assert!(false);
4630 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4632 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4633 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4634 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4635 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4636 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4637 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4638 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4639 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4640 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4641 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4642 msg: announcement_sigs,
4644 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4645 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4646 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4647 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4648 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4649 // announcement_signatures.
4650 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4651 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4652 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4653 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4659 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4663 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4667 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4668 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4669 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4670 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4671 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4673 debug_assert!(false);
4674 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4676 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4677 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4678 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4679 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4681 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4682 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4683 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4684 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4687 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
4688 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
4689 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4690 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4692 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4693 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
4694 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
4695 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
4696 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4697 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4702 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4703 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
4704 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4705 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4706 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
4710 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4713 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4714 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4715 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4716 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4722 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4723 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4724 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4726 debug_assert!(false);
4727 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4729 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4730 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4731 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4732 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4733 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4734 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4735 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4736 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4737 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4742 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4743 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4744 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4745 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4746 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4747 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4748 } else { (tx, None) }
4750 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4753 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4754 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4755 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4757 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4758 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4759 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4760 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4761 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4765 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4770 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4771 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4772 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4773 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4775 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4776 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4777 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4778 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4780 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4781 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4782 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4784 debug_assert!(false);
4785 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4787 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4788 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4789 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4790 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4792 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4793 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4794 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4795 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4796 match pending_forward_info {
4797 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4798 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4799 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4800 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
4802 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
4803 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
4804 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4805 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4806 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4809 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4811 _ => pending_forward_info
4814 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4816 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4821 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4822 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4823 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4824 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4826 debug_assert!(false);
4827 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4829 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4830 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4831 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4832 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4833 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4835 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4838 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4842 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4843 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4844 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4846 debug_assert!(false);
4847 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4849 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4850 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4851 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4852 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4853 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
4855 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4860 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4861 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4862 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4864 debug_assert!(false);
4865 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4867 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4868 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4869 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4870 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4871 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4872 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4873 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
4875 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
4878 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4882 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4883 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4884 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4886 debug_assert!(false);
4887 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4889 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4890 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4891 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4892 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4893 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
4894 let monitor_update = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
4895 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4896 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4897 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4898 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
4900 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4905 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4906 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4907 let mut push_forward_event = false;
4908 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
4909 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
4910 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4911 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4912 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
4913 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4914 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4915 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4917 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
4918 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
4920 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4921 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
4922 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
4923 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4924 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4925 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
4927 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4928 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
4929 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
4931 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
4932 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4933 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
4934 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4935 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
4936 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
4937 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
4938 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
4939 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
4942 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4943 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
4945 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4946 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
4947 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4948 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4949 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4950 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4951 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4952 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4955 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
4956 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
4957 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
4962 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
4963 // payments are being processed.
4964 if forward_htlcs_empty {
4965 push_forward_event = true;
4967 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4968 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
4975 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
4976 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4979 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
4980 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4981 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
4983 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
4987 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
4988 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
4989 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4990 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
4991 .find(|ev| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
4993 if !forward_ev_exists {
4994 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4996 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5001 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5002 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5003 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5004 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5006 debug_assert!(false);
5007 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5008 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5009 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5010 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5011 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5012 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5013 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5014 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5015 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5016 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5017 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5018 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5020 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5023 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5027 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5028 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5029 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5031 debug_assert!(false);
5032 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5034 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5035 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5036 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5037 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5038 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5040 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5045 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5046 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5047 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5049 debug_assert!(false);
5050 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5052 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5053 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5054 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5055 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5056 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5057 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5060 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5061 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5062 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5063 msg, &self.default_configuration
5065 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5066 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5067 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5070 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5075 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5076 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5077 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5078 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5080 // It's not a local channel
5081 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5084 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5085 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5086 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5087 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5089 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5090 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5091 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5092 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5093 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5094 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5095 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5096 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5097 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5098 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5100 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5102 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5103 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5104 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5105 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5107 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5108 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5111 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5113 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5116 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5118 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5119 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5121 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5123 debug_assert!(false);
5124 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5126 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5127 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5128 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5129 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5130 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5131 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5132 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5133 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5134 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5135 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5136 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5137 let mut channel_update = None;
5138 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5139 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5140 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5143 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5144 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5145 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5146 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5147 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5148 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5149 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5154 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5155 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5156 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5157 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5158 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5159 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5163 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5167 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5168 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5171 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5172 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5177 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5178 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5179 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5181 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5182 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5183 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5184 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5185 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5186 match monitor_event {
5187 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5188 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5189 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5190 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5192 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5193 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5194 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5195 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5198 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5199 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5200 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5201 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5203 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5204 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5205 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5206 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5209 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5210 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5211 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5212 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5213 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5214 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5215 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5216 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5217 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5218 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5219 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5223 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5224 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5226 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5228 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5229 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5230 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5231 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5232 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5239 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5240 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5246 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5247 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5250 has_pending_monitor_events
5253 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5254 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5255 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5257 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5258 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5259 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5260 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5262 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5267 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5268 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5269 /// update was applied.
5270 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5271 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5272 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5273 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5275 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5276 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5277 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5278 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5280 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5281 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5283 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5284 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5285 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5286 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
5287 let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
5288 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5289 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5290 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5291 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5293 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5294 has_monitor_update = true;
5296 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5297 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5298 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5299 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5300 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5301 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5302 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5304 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5306 continue 'peer_loop;
5315 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5316 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5317 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5320 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5321 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5327 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5328 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5329 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5330 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5331 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5332 let mut has_update = false;
5334 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5336 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5337 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5338 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5339 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5340 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5341 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5342 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5343 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5345 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5346 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5349 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5350 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5351 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5352 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5353 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5358 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5360 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5361 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5362 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5368 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5369 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5377 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5378 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5384 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5385 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5387 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5388 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5389 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5390 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5391 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5392 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5393 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5394 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5395 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5396 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5397 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5398 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5399 assert!(should_broadcast);
5400 } else { unreachable!(); }
5401 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5403 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5407 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5408 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5410 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5411 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5414 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5416 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5417 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5418 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5419 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5420 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5421 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5422 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5423 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5424 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5425 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5426 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5427 // never fail a payment too early.
5428 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5430 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5433 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5438 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5441 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5442 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5444 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5445 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5446 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5447 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5449 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5451 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5452 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5456 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5457 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5459 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5461 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5462 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5464 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5465 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5466 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5467 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5468 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5469 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5470 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5471 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5472 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5473 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5474 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5477 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5478 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5480 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5483 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5485 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5487 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5488 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5489 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5490 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5491 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5494 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5495 /// stored external to LDK.
5497 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5498 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5499 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5501 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5502 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5505 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5506 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5507 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5508 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5510 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5511 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5512 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5513 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5514 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5516 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5517 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5518 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5519 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5520 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5522 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5523 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5525 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5526 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5530 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5531 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5533 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5535 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5536 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5538 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5539 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5540 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5541 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5542 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5543 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5544 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5547 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5548 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5550 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5553 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5555 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5557 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5558 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5561 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5562 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5564 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5565 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5566 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5569 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5570 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5572 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5573 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5574 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5575 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5577 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5578 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5579 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5580 Some(_) => continue,
5581 None => return scid_candidate
5586 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5588 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5589 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5591 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5592 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5593 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5597 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5598 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5599 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5601 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5602 /// times to get a unique scid.
5603 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5604 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5605 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5607 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5608 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5609 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5610 return scid_candidate
5614 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5615 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5616 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5617 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5619 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5620 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5621 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5622 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5623 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5624 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5625 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5626 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5635 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5636 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5637 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5638 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5639 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5643 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5644 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5645 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5650 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5651 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5652 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5656 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5657 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5661 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5662 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5665 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5666 /// using the given event handler.
5668 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5669 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5672 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5673 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5674 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5676 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5678 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5679 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5680 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5681 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5684 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5685 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5686 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5689 for event in pending_events {
5690 handler(event).await;
5693 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5694 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5699 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5701 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5702 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5703 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5704 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5705 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5706 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5710 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
5711 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
5712 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
5713 /// is always placed next to each other.
5715 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
5716 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
5717 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
5718 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
5720 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
5721 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
5722 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
5723 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5724 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5725 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5726 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5728 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5729 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5730 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5731 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5734 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5735 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5737 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5738 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5741 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5742 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5743 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5744 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5745 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5746 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
5747 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
5751 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5752 events.replace(pending_events);
5761 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5763 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5764 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5765 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5766 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5767 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5768 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5772 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5774 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5775 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5776 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5777 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5778 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5780 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5781 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5782 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5783 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5786 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5787 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5788 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5791 for event in pending_events {
5792 handler.handle_event(event);
5800 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5802 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5803 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5804 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5805 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5806 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5807 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5811 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5813 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5814 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5815 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5816 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5817 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5820 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5821 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5824 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5825 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5826 let new_height = height - 1;
5828 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5829 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5830 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5831 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5832 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5833 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5836 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5840 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5842 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5843 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5844 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5845 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5846 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5847 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5851 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5852 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5853 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5854 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5856 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5857 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5859 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5860 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
5861 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5863 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5864 if height < last_best_block_height {
5865 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5866 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5870 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5871 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5872 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5873 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5875 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5876 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5878 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5880 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5882 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5884 macro_rules! max_time {
5885 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5887 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5888 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5889 // having an explicit local time source.
5890 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5891 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5892 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5893 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5894 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5900 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5901 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5902 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5903 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5907 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5908 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
5909 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5910 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5911 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5912 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5913 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
5914 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
5921 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5922 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5923 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5924 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5925 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5926 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5927 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5928 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5933 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5935 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5936 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5937 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5938 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5939 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5940 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5944 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5945 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5947 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5948 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5949 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5950 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5951 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5953 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5954 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5956 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5957 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5958 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5959 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5960 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5961 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5962 let res = f(channel);
5963 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5964 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5965 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5966 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
5967 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
5969 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5970 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5971 if channel.is_usable() {
5972 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5973 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5974 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5975 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5980 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5984 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
5986 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5987 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5988 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5989 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5990 msg: announcement_sigs,
5992 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5993 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
5994 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5996 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5997 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5998 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6003 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6004 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6005 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6006 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6007 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6008 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6009 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6010 // is always consistent.
6011 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6012 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6013 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6014 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6015 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6018 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6019 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6020 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6021 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6022 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6023 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6024 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6028 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6029 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6030 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6031 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6032 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6033 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6034 data: reason_message,
6044 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6045 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
6046 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6047 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6048 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6049 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6050 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6051 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6052 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6053 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6055 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6056 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6057 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6061 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6064 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6065 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6066 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6067 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6068 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6069 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6070 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6071 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6072 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6075 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6076 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6077 _ => unreachable!(),
6079 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6080 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6081 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6082 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6088 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6090 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6091 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6095 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
6096 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
6097 /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
6098 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6100 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
6102 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6103 /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
6104 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6105 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6106 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6107 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
6110 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
6111 /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
6112 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6114 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6115 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6116 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
6117 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
6120 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
6121 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
6122 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
6123 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6124 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6127 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6128 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6129 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6132 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6133 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6134 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6135 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6138 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6139 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6140 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6141 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6144 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6145 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6147 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6148 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6149 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6150 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6151 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6154 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6155 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6156 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6157 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6160 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6161 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6162 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6163 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6166 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6167 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6168 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6169 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6173 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6174 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6176 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6177 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6178 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6179 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6180 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6181 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6185 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6186 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6187 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6190 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6191 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6192 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6195 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6196 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6197 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6200 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6201 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6202 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6205 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6206 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6207 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6210 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6211 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6212 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6215 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6216 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6217 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6220 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6221 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6222 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6225 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6226 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6227 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6230 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6231 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6232 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6235 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6236 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6237 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6240 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6241 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6242 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6245 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6246 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6247 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6250 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6251 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6252 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6255 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6256 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6257 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6260 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6261 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6262 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6265 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6270 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6271 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6272 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6275 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6276 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6277 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6278 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6280 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6281 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6282 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6283 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6284 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6285 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6286 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6287 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6288 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6289 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6290 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6295 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6297 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6298 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6299 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6300 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6301 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6302 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6303 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6304 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6305 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6306 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6307 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6308 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6309 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6310 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6311 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6312 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6313 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6314 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6315 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6316 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6317 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6320 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6321 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6322 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6323 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6326 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6328 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6330 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6331 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6335 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
6336 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6337 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6341 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6343 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
6344 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
6345 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
6346 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
6347 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
6348 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
6351 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6352 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6353 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6354 if inbound_peer_limited {
6357 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6358 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6359 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6360 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6361 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6365 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6366 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6367 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6369 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6370 if inbound_peer_limited &&
6371 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
6372 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
6377 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6378 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6383 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6385 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6386 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6387 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6388 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6389 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6390 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6391 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6392 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6393 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6394 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6395 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6399 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6400 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6401 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6406 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6407 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6408 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6409 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6410 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6419 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6423 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6424 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6426 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6427 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6428 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6429 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6430 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6431 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6432 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6433 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6435 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6436 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6437 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6441 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6442 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6443 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6444 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6445 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6446 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6447 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6448 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6449 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6450 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6458 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6459 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6463 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6464 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6467 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6468 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6472 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6473 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6474 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6475 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6478 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6479 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6481 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6482 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6483 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6484 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6485 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6488 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6489 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6490 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6491 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6494 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6495 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6496 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6497 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6500 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6501 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6502 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6503 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6504 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
6505 // ErroringMessageHandler.
6506 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6507 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6508 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6509 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6510 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6511 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6512 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6513 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6514 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6515 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6516 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6517 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6519 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6520 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6521 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6527 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6528 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6530 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6531 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6532 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6533 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6536 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6537 (2, node_id, required),
6538 (4, features, required),
6539 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6540 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6541 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6542 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6545 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6546 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6547 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6548 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6549 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6550 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6551 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6552 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6553 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6554 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6555 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6556 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6557 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6558 (7, self.config, option),
6559 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6560 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6561 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6562 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6563 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6564 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6565 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6566 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6567 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6568 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6569 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6570 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6571 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6572 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6573 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6574 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6575 (32, self.is_public, required),
6576 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6577 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6578 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6579 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6585 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6586 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6587 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6588 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6589 (2, channel_id, required),
6590 (3, channel_type, option),
6591 (4, counterparty, required),
6592 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6593 (6, funding_txo, option),
6594 (7, config, option),
6595 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6596 (9, confirmations, option),
6597 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6598 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6599 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6600 (16, balance_msat, required),
6601 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6602 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6603 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6604 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6605 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6606 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6607 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6608 (26, is_outbound, required),
6609 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6610 (30, is_usable, required),
6611 (32, is_public, required),
6612 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6613 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6614 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6615 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6618 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6619 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6620 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6621 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6622 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6626 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6628 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6629 outbound_scid_alias,
6633 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6634 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6636 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6637 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6638 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6639 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6640 confirmations_required,
6642 force_close_spend_delay,
6643 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6644 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6645 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6646 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6647 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6648 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6649 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
6654 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6655 (2, channels, vec_type),
6656 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6657 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6660 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6662 (0, onion_packet, required),
6663 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6666 (0, payment_data, required),
6667 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6668 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6670 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6671 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6672 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6676 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6677 (0, routing, required),
6678 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6679 (4, payment_hash, required),
6680 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6681 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6682 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6686 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6687 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6689 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6691 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6692 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6693 reason.write(writer)?;
6695 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6696 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6699 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6700 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6701 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6702 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6709 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6710 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6711 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6714 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6715 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6716 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6717 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6721 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6722 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6723 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6724 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6725 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6728 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6729 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6730 // messages contained in the variants.
6731 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6732 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6733 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6735 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6736 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6737 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6738 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6739 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6742 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6743 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6744 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6745 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6746 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6748 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6753 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6758 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6759 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6760 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6761 (2, outpoint, required),
6762 (4, htlc_id, required),
6763 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6766 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6767 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6768 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6769 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6770 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6772 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6773 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6774 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6775 (2, self.value, required),
6776 (4, payment_data, option),
6777 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6778 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6784 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6785 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6786 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6788 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6789 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6790 let mut total_msat = None;
6791 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6792 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6793 (0, prev_hop, required),
6794 (1, total_msat, option),
6795 (2, value, required),
6796 (4, payment_data, option),
6797 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6798 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6800 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6802 if payment_data.is_some() {
6803 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6805 if total_msat.is_none() {
6806 total_msat = Some(value);
6808 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6811 if total_msat.is_none() {
6812 if payment_data.is_none() {
6813 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6815 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6817 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6821 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6824 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6831 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6832 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6833 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6836 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6837 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6838 let mut path: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
6839 let mut payment_id = None;
6840 let mut payment_secret = None;
6841 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
6842 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6843 (0, session_priv, required),
6844 (1, payment_id, option),
6845 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6846 (3, payment_secret, option),
6847 (4, path, vec_type),
6848 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
6850 if payment_id.is_none() {
6851 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6853 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6855 if path.is_none() || path.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
6856 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6858 let path = path.unwrap();
6859 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
6860 if params.final_cltv_expiry_delta == 0 {
6861 params.final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta;
6864 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6865 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6866 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6868 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6873 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6874 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6879 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6880 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6882 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6884 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6885 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6886 (0, session_priv, required),
6887 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6888 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6889 (3, payment_secret, option),
6890 (4, *path, vec_type),
6891 (5, payment_params, option),
6894 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6896 field.write(writer)?;
6903 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6904 (0, forward_info, required),
6905 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6906 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6907 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6908 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6911 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6913 (0, htlc_id, required),
6914 (2, err_packet, required),
6919 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6920 (0, payment_secret, required),
6921 (2, expiry_time, required),
6922 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6923 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6924 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6927 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6929 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6930 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6931 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6932 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6933 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6934 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6938 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6939 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6941 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6943 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6945 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6946 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6947 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6950 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
6952 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6953 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6954 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
6955 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6956 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6957 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6958 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
6959 serializable_peer_count += 1;
6961 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
6962 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6963 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6964 unfunded_channels += 1;
6969 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6971 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6972 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6973 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6974 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6975 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6976 channel.write(writer)?;
6983 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6984 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6985 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
6986 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6987 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6988 for forward in pending_forwards {
6989 forward.write(writer)?;
6994 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6996 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6997 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
6998 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7000 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7001 (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7002 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
7003 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7004 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7005 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
7006 htlc.write(writer)?;
7008 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
7011 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7012 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7013 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7014 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7015 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7016 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7017 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7020 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7021 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7022 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7023 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7024 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7026 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7027 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7028 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7029 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7030 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7031 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7032 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7037 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7038 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7039 for event in events.iter() {
7040 event.write(writer)?;
7043 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
7044 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7045 for event in background_events.iter() {
7047 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
7049 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
7050 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
7055 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7056 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7057 // likely to be identical.
7058 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7059 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7061 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7062 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7063 hash.write(writer)?;
7064 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7067 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7068 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7069 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7070 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7071 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7074 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7075 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7077 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7078 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7079 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7080 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7083 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7084 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7088 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7089 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7090 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7092 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7093 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7094 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7100 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7101 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7102 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7103 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7106 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7107 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7108 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7109 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7110 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7113 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7114 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7115 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7116 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7117 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7118 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7119 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7120 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7121 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7122 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7129 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7131 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7133 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7134 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7135 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7136 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7137 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7138 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7139 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7140 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7141 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7142 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7143 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7144 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7145 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7147 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7148 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7150 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7151 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7153 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7154 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7155 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7156 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7157 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7158 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7160 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7161 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7163 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7164 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7165 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7166 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7167 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7168 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7172 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7173 pub entropy_source: ES,
7175 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7176 pub node_signer: NS,
7178 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7179 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7181 pub signer_provider: SP,
7183 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7185 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7186 pub fee_estimator: F,
7187 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7189 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7190 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7191 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7192 pub chain_monitor: M,
7194 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7195 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7196 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7197 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7198 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7199 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7201 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7203 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7204 /// deserialization.
7206 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7207 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7208 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7210 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7211 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7213 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7214 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7215 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7216 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7218 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7221 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
7222 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7225 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7226 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7228 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7229 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7230 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7231 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7232 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7233 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7237 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7238 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7239 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7240 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7241 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7243 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7244 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7249 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7250 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7251 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7252 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7254 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7255 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7256 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7257 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7258 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7259 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7263 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7264 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7265 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7269 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7270 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7272 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7273 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7274 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7275 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7276 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7277 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7281 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7282 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7284 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7285 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7286 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7288 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7290 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7291 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7292 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7293 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7294 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7295 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7296 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7297 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7298 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7300 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7301 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7302 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7303 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7304 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7305 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7306 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7307 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7308 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7309 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7310 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7311 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7312 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7313 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7314 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7315 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7316 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7317 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7318 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7319 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7320 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7321 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7322 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7323 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7324 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7325 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7326 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7327 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7328 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7329 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7330 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7331 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7333 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7334 let mut found_htlc = false;
7335 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7336 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7339 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7340 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7341 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7342 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7343 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7344 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7345 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7346 log_info!(args.logger,
7347 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7348 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7349 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7353 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7354 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7355 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7357 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7358 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7360 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7361 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7362 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7363 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7365 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7366 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7367 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7368 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7372 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7373 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7374 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7375 // safely discard the channel.
7376 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7377 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7378 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7379 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7380 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7383 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7384 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7385 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7386 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7387 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7388 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7392 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7393 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7394 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7395 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7399 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7400 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7401 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7402 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7403 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7404 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7405 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7406 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7407 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7409 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7412 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7413 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7414 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7415 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7416 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7417 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7418 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7419 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7421 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7424 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7425 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7426 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7427 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7428 let peer_state = PeerState {
7429 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7430 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7431 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7432 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7433 is_connected: false,
7435 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7438 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7439 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7440 for _ in 0..event_count {
7441 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7442 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7447 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7448 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7449 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7450 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7451 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7452 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7456 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7457 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7459 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7460 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7461 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7462 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7463 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7467 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7468 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7469 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7470 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7471 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7472 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7473 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7475 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7476 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7480 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7481 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7482 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7483 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7484 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7485 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7486 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7487 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7488 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7489 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
7490 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7491 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7492 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7493 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7494 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7495 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7496 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7497 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7498 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7499 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7501 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7502 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7505 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7506 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7509 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7510 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7513 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7514 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7515 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7516 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7517 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7518 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7520 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7522 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
7523 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7524 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
7528 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7529 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7530 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7531 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7532 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7533 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7534 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7536 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7537 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7538 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
7539 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7540 if path.is_empty() {
7541 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7542 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7545 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7546 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7547 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7548 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7549 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7550 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7551 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7552 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7554 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7555 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7556 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7557 retry_strategy: None,
7558 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
7559 payment_params: None,
7560 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7561 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7563 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7564 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7565 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7566 total_msat: path_amt,
7567 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7569 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7570 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7575 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7577 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
7578 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7579 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7580 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7582 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7583 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7584 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7585 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7586 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7587 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7588 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7589 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7590 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7591 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7592 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7597 !forwards.is_empty()
7599 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7600 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7601 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7602 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7603 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7604 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7605 intercepted_id != ev_id
7612 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
7613 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
7614 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
7615 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
7616 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
7617 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
7618 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
7619 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
7620 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
7621 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
7622 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
7623 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
7624 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
7633 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
7634 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7635 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7636 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7637 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7638 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7639 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7640 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7644 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7645 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7647 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7648 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7649 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7650 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7652 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7653 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7656 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7657 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7658 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7659 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7660 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7662 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7663 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7664 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7665 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7666 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7667 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7668 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7669 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
7671 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7672 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7676 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7678 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7680 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7681 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7683 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7687 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7688 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7690 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
7692 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7694 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7695 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7696 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7697 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7701 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7702 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
7703 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7704 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7705 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7706 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7707 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7709 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7710 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
7711 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7713 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7714 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7715 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7716 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7717 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7718 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7720 if chan.is_usable() {
7721 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7722 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7723 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7724 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7725 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7731 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7733 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7734 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7735 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7736 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7737 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7738 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7739 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7740 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7741 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7742 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7743 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7745 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7746 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7748 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7749 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7750 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7751 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7753 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7754 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7755 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7756 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7758 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7759 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7760 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7761 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7763 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7764 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
7765 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
7766 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7767 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7768 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7769 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7772 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7773 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7776 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7779 purpose: payment_purpose,
7780 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7786 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
7787 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) {
7788 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
7790 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
7791 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7795 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7797 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7798 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7799 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7800 router: args.router,
7802 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7804 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7805 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7806 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
7807 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7809 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7810 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7811 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7812 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7813 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7814 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7816 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7821 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7823 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7825 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7826 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7827 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7828 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7830 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
7831 node_signer: args.node_signer,
7832 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
7834 logger: args.logger,
7835 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7838 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7839 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7840 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7841 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7842 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7845 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7846 //connection or two.
7848 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7854 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7855 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7856 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
7857 use core::time::Duration;
7858 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7859 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7860 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, InterceptId};
7861 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7862 use crate::ln::msgs;
7863 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7864 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7865 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7866 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7867 use crate::util::test_utils;
7868 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
7869 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource;
7872 fn test_notify_limits() {
7873 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7874 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7875 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7876 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7877 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7878 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7880 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7881 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7882 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7883 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7884 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7886 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7888 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7889 // to connect messages with new values
7890 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7891 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7892 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
7893 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
7894 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
7895 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
7897 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7898 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7899 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7900 // ... but the last node should not.
7901 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7902 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7903 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7904 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7906 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7907 // about the channel.
7908 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7909 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7910 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7912 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7914 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7915 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7916 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7917 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7918 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7919 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7921 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7922 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7923 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7925 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7926 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7927 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7928 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7929 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7930 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7932 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7933 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7934 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7935 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7936 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7937 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7938 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7939 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7941 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7942 // the channel info has updated.
7943 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7944 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7945 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7946 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7947 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7948 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7952 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7953 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7955 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7956 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7957 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7958 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7959 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7961 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7962 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7963 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
7964 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
7966 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7967 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7968 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7969 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7970 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
7971 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
7972 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7973 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7974 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7975 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7977 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7978 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7979 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7980 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7981 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7982 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7983 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7984 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7985 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7986 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7987 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7988 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7989 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7990 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7991 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7992 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7993 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7994 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7995 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7996 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7997 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7998 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8000 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8001 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8002 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8003 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8004 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8005 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8007 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8008 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8009 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8010 // lightning messages manually.
8011 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8012 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8013 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8015 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8016 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8017 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8018 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8019 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8020 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8021 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8022 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8023 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8024 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8025 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8026 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8027 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8028 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8029 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8030 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8031 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8032 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8033 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8034 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8035 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8036 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8037 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8038 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8039 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8041 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8042 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8043 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8044 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8046 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8047 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8048 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8049 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8051 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8054 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8055 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8056 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8057 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8059 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8062 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8063 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8064 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8065 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8067 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8072 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8073 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8074 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8075 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8076 // fails as expected.
8077 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8078 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8079 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8080 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8081 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8082 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8083 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8085 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8086 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8087 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8089 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8090 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8091 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
8092 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8094 let route = find_route(
8095 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8096 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8098 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8099 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8100 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8101 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8102 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8103 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8104 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8105 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8106 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8107 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8108 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8109 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8110 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8111 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8112 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8113 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8114 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8115 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8116 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8117 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8118 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8119 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8120 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8122 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8123 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8125 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8126 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8127 let route = find_route(
8128 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8129 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8131 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8132 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8133 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8134 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8135 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8136 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8137 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8139 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8140 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8141 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8142 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8143 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8144 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8145 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8146 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8147 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8148 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8149 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8150 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8151 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8152 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8153 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8154 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8155 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8156 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8157 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8158 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8159 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8160 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8161 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8163 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8164 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8168 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8169 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8170 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8171 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8172 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8173 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8174 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8176 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8177 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8179 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8180 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8181 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8182 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8184 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8185 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8186 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8187 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8188 let route = find_route(
8189 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8190 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8193 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8194 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8195 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8196 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8197 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8199 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8200 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8201 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8202 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8203 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8204 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8205 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8207 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
8211 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8212 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8213 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8214 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8215 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8216 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8218 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8219 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8221 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8222 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8223 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8224 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8226 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8227 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8228 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8229 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8230 let route = find_route(
8231 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8232 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8235 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8236 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8237 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8238 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8239 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8240 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8242 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8243 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8244 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8245 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8246 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8247 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8248 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8250 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
8254 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8255 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8256 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8257 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8258 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8260 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8261 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8262 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8263 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8265 // Marshall an MPP route.
8266 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8267 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8268 route.paths.push(path);
8269 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8270 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8271 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8272 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8273 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8274 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8276 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
8277 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8278 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
8279 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8284 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8285 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8286 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8287 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8288 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8290 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8292 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8293 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8295 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8296 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8297 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8298 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8301 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8302 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8303 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8304 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8305 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8306 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8309 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8312 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8313 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8318 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8319 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8320 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8321 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8322 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8323 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8325 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8326 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8328 total_msat: 100_000,
8331 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8332 // payment verification fails as expected.
8333 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8334 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8335 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8336 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8338 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
8342 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8343 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8347 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8348 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8349 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8350 // the channel is successfully closed.
8351 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8352 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8353 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8354 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8356 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8357 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8358 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8359 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8360 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8362 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8363 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8365 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8366 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8367 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8368 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8371 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8373 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8374 // as it has the funding transaction.
8375 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8376 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8377 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8380 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8382 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8384 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8386 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8387 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8388 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8392 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8393 // as it has the funding transaction.
8394 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8395 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8396 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8398 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8399 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8400 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8401 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8402 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8403 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8404 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8406 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8407 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8408 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8409 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8411 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8412 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8414 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8415 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8416 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8417 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8418 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8419 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8420 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8424 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8425 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8426 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8427 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8428 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8429 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8430 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8433 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8435 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8436 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8437 // closing transaction).
8438 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8439 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8440 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8442 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8443 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8444 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8445 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8446 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8449 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8451 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8453 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8454 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8455 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8457 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8459 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8460 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8463 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8464 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8465 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8468 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8469 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8470 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8473 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8475 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8476 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8478 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8479 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8481 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8482 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8487 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8488 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
8489 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8490 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8491 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8492 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8493 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8494 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8497 let channel_id = [4; 32];
8498 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8499 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
8501 // Test the API functions.
8502 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
8504 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
8506 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8508 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8510 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8512 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
8514 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
8518 fn test_connection_limiting() {
8519 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
8520 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8521 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8522 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8523 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8525 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8527 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8528 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8530 let mut funding_tx = None;
8531 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8532 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8533 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8536 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8537 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
8538 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
8539 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
8540 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8542 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8543 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8544 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8546 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8547 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8549 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8552 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
8553 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8554 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8555 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8556 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8558 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
8559 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
8561 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
8562 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
8563 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8564 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8565 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
8566 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8567 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8569 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8570 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8571 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8572 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8574 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
8575 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
8576 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8577 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8578 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
8579 for ev in chan_closed_events {
8580 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
8582 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8583 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8584 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8585 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8587 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
8588 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8589 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8590 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8592 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
8593 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
8595 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
8596 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8597 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
8598 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
8599 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8601 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8602 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8603 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8605 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
8606 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8607 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
8609 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
8610 // "protected" and can connect again.
8611 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
8612 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8613 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8614 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8616 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
8618 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8619 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8623 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
8624 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
8625 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8626 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8627 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8628 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8630 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8632 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8633 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8635 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8636 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8637 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8638 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8641 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
8643 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8644 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8645 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8647 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
8648 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8649 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8651 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
8652 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8653 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8654 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8658 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
8659 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
8660 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
8661 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8662 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8663 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
8664 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8665 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
8666 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8668 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8670 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8671 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8673 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
8674 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8675 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8676 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8677 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8678 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8680 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8681 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8683 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8684 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8686 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8688 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
8689 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8692 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
8693 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8694 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8695 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8696 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8697 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8698 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8700 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8701 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
8702 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
8703 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
8707 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8709 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8710 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8712 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
8713 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8714 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8716 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8717 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8719 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8721 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8726 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
8727 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
8728 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
8729 // the channel without the anchors feature.
8730 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8731 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8732 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
8733 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8734 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8735 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
8736 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8738 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
8739 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8740 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8742 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8743 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8745 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8746 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8748 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8751 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8752 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
8754 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8755 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8757 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8761 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8763 use crate::chain::Listen;
8764 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8765 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
8766 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8767 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8768 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8769 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8770 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8771 use crate::util::test_utils;
8772 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8773 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8775 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8776 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8777 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8779 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8783 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8784 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8785 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8786 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8787 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8788 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
8789 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
8790 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8795 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8796 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8799 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8800 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8801 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8803 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8805 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8806 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8807 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8808 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
8809 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
8811 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8812 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8814 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8815 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8816 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8817 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8819 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8821 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8823 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8824 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8825 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8826 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8827 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8829 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8831 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8833 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8834 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8835 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8836 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8837 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8840 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8841 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8842 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8844 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8845 } else { panic!(); }
8847 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8848 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8850 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8853 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8856 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8857 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8859 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8860 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8861 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8862 match msg_events[0] {
8863 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8864 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8865 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8869 match msg_events[1] {
8870 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8874 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8875 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8877 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8878 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8880 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8883 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8884 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8886 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8887 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8889 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8892 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a);
8894 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8895 macro_rules! send_payment {
8896 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8897 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8898 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
8899 .with_features($node_b.invoice_features());
8900 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8901 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8902 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8903 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8904 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8905 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8907 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8908 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8910 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8911 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
8913 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8914 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8915 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8916 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8917 let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
8918 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8919 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8920 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8922 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8923 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8924 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8925 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8927 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8928 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8929 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8930 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8931 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8933 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8936 let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
8937 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8938 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8939 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8941 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8946 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8947 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);