1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, RoutePath, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure};
82 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
84 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
85 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
86 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
88 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
89 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
90 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
91 // before we forward it.
93 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
94 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
95 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
96 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
97 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
99 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
100 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
102 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
103 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
104 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
105 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
108 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
109 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
110 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
113 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
114 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
118 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
119 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
120 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
121 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
122 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
124 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
125 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
126 /// may overshoot this in either case)
127 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
128 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
131 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
132 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
133 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
134 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
137 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
138 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
139 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
140 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
141 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
144 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
145 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
147 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
148 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
149 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
152 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
153 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
155 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
156 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
159 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
160 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
163 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
167 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
168 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
169 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
170 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
171 short_channel_id: u64,
173 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
174 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
176 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
177 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
182 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
184 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
185 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
186 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
188 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
189 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
192 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
193 struct ClaimableHTLC {
194 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
196 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
198 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
199 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
200 sender_intended_value: u64,
201 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
203 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
204 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
205 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
206 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
210 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
212 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
213 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
214 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
216 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
217 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
222 impl Readable for PaymentId {
223 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
224 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
229 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
231 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
232 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
233 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
235 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
236 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
241 impl Readable for InterceptId {
242 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
243 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
248 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
249 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
250 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
251 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
252 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
255 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
257 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
258 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
259 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
261 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
262 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
266 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
267 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
268 (0, short_channel_id, required),
269 (2, htlc_id, required),
271 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
272 (0, session_priv, required),
277 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
278 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
279 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
280 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
281 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
284 session_priv: SecretKey,
285 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
286 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
287 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
288 payment_id: PaymentId,
289 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
292 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
293 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
294 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
296 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
298 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
300 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
303 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
304 payment_id.hash(hasher);
305 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
306 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
311 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
314 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
315 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
317 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
318 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
319 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
320 payment_secret: None,
325 struct ReceiveError {
331 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
332 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
334 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
335 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
336 pub enum FailureCode {
337 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
338 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
339 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
340 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
341 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
342 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
343 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
344 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
345 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
346 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
347 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
350 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
352 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
353 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
354 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
355 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
356 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
358 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
359 err: msgs::LightningError,
360 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
361 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
363 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
365 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
367 err: LightningError {
369 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
370 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
377 shutdown_finish: None,
381 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
382 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
385 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
387 err: LightningError {
389 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
390 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
396 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
397 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
401 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
404 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
406 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
407 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
411 log_level: Level::Warn,
414 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
416 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
418 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
420 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
421 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
429 shutdown_finish: None,
434 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
435 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
436 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
437 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
438 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
440 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
441 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
442 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
443 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
444 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
445 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
446 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
448 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
452 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
453 struct ClaimingPayment {
455 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
456 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
458 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
459 (0, amount_msat, required),
460 (2, payment_purpose, required),
461 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
464 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
465 struct ClaimablePayments {
466 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
467 /// failed/claimed by the user.
469 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
470 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
472 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
473 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
474 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
476 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
477 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
478 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
479 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
482 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
483 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
484 /// quite some time lag.
485 enum BackgroundEvent {
486 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
487 /// commitment transaction.
488 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
492 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
493 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
494 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
495 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
496 /// event can be generated.
497 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
498 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
499 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
502 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
503 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
504 (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, upgradable_required) },
507 /// State we hold per-peer.
508 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
509 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
511 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
512 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
514 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
515 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
516 latest_features: InitFeatures,
517 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
518 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
519 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
520 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
521 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
523 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
524 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
525 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
526 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
528 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
529 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
530 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
531 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
532 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
533 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
534 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
535 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
536 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
537 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
541 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
542 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
543 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
544 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
545 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
546 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
549 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
553 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
554 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
556 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
559 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
560 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
561 struct PendingInboundPayment {
562 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
563 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
564 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
565 /// this payment being removed.
567 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
568 user_payment_id: u64,
569 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
570 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
571 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
574 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
575 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
576 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
577 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
578 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
579 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
580 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
581 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
583 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
584 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
592 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
594 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
599 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
600 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
601 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
602 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
603 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
604 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
605 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
606 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
607 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
609 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
610 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
612 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
613 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
615 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
616 /// to individual Channels.
618 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
619 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
620 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
621 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
623 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
624 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
625 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
626 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
627 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
628 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
629 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
631 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
632 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
633 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
635 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
636 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
637 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
638 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
639 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
641 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
642 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
643 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
644 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
646 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
647 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
648 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
650 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
651 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
652 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
653 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
654 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
656 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
657 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
658 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
659 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
660 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
661 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
662 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
663 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
666 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
667 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
668 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
669 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
670 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
674 // `total_consistency_lock`
676 // |__`forward_htlcs`
678 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
680 // |__`per_peer_state`
682 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
684 // | |__`claimable_payments`
686 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
692 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
694 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
698 // | |__`pending_events`
700 // | |__`pending_background_events`
702 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
704 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
705 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
706 ES::Target: EntropySource,
707 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
708 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
709 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
713 default_configuration: UserConfig,
714 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
715 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
721 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
723 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
725 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
726 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
728 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
729 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
730 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
731 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
733 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
734 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
736 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
737 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
738 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
739 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
740 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
741 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
742 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
743 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
745 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
747 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
748 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
750 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
752 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
753 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
754 /// and via the classic SCID.
756 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
757 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
759 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
761 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
763 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
764 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
765 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
767 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
768 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
770 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
771 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
773 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
774 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
776 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
777 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
778 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
779 /// active channel list on load.
781 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
782 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
784 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
786 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
787 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
788 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
790 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
791 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
792 /// the handling of the events.
794 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
795 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
798 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
799 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
800 /// would break backwards compatability.
801 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
802 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
803 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
805 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
806 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
808 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
810 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
811 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
812 /// confirmation depth.
814 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
815 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
816 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
818 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
820 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
822 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
824 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
826 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
828 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
829 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
830 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
832 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
833 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
835 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
836 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
837 /// keeping additional state.
838 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
840 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
841 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
842 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
843 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
845 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
846 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
848 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
849 /// are currently open with that peer.
851 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
852 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
855 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
857 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
858 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
859 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
860 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
861 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
863 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
864 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
865 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
866 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
867 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
868 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
869 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
870 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
871 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
872 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
873 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
875 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
884 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
886 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
887 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
888 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
889 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
890 pub struct ChainParameters {
891 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
892 pub network: Network,
894 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
896 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
897 pub best_block: BestBlock,
900 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
906 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
907 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
908 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
909 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
910 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
911 /// updates are ready for persistence).
913 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
914 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
915 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
916 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
917 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
919 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
920 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
923 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
924 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
925 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
928 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
929 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
931 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
932 persistence_notifier: notifier,
933 should_persist: persist_check,
934 _read_guard: read_guard,
939 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
941 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
942 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
947 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
948 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
950 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
952 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
953 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
954 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
955 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
956 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
958 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
959 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
961 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
963 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
964 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
965 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
966 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
967 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
968 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
969 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
970 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
971 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
972 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
973 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
974 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
975 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
977 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
978 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
980 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
981 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
982 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
983 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
985 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
986 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
987 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
988 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
989 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
990 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
993 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
995 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
996 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
999 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1001 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1002 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1004 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1005 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1006 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1007 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1009 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1010 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1011 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1012 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1014 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1015 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1016 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1018 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1019 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1020 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1022 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1023 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1024 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1025 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1026 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1027 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1028 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1029 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1030 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1031 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1032 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1035 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1036 /// to better separate parameters.
1037 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1038 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1039 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1040 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1041 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1042 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1043 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1044 pub features: InitFeatures,
1045 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1046 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1047 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1049 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1051 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1052 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1053 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1054 /// payments to us through this channel.
1055 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1056 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1057 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1058 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1059 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1060 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1061 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1064 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1065 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1066 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1067 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1068 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1069 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1070 /// lifetime of the channel.
1071 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1072 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1073 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1074 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1075 /// our counterparty already.
1077 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1078 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1079 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1080 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1082 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1083 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1084 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1085 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1087 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1088 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1090 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1091 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1093 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1094 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1095 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1096 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1097 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1098 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1099 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1100 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1101 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1104 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1106 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1107 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1108 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1109 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1110 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1111 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1112 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1114 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1115 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1117 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1118 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1119 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1120 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1121 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1122 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1123 /// this value on chain.
1125 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1127 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1129 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1130 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1131 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1132 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1134 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1135 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1136 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1138 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1139 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1140 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1141 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1142 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1144 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1145 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1146 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1147 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1149 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1150 pub balance_msat: u64,
1151 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1152 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1153 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1154 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1156 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1158 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1159 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1160 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1161 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1162 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1163 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1164 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1165 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1167 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1168 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1169 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1170 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1171 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1172 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1173 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1175 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1176 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1177 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1178 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1179 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1180 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1181 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1182 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1183 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1185 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1187 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1188 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1189 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1190 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1191 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1193 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1194 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1195 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1196 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1197 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1198 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1199 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1201 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1202 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1203 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1204 pub is_outbound: bool,
1205 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1206 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1207 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1208 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1209 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1211 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1212 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1213 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1214 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1216 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1217 pub is_usable: bool,
1218 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1219 pub is_public: bool,
1220 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1221 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1222 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1223 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1224 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1225 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1227 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1228 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1231 impl ChannelDetails {
1232 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1233 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1234 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1236 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1237 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1238 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1239 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1242 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1243 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1244 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1246 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1247 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1248 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1249 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1252 fn from_channel<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(channel: &Channel<Signer>,
1253 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1255 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1256 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1257 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1259 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1260 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1261 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1262 features: latest_features,
1263 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1264 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1265 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1266 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1267 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1268 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1269 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1270 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1271 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1272 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1274 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1275 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1276 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1277 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1278 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1279 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1280 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1281 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1282 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(channel.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1283 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1284 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1285 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1286 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1287 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1288 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1289 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1290 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1291 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1292 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1293 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1294 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1295 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1296 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1297 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1298 config: Some(channel.config()),
1303 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1304 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1305 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1306 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1307 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1309 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1311 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1312 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1313 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1316 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1317 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1318 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1320 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1321 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1322 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1324 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1325 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1326 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1328 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1329 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1333 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1335 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1337 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1338 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1339 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1340 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1342 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1343 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1344 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1347 macro_rules! handle_error {
1348 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1349 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1350 // entering the macro.
1351 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1352 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1356 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1357 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1359 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1360 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1361 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1362 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1366 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1367 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1368 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1369 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1374 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1375 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1377 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1378 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1379 action: err.action.clone()
1383 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1384 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1385 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1386 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1387 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1391 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1398 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1399 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1400 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1401 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1402 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1403 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1405 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1406 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1407 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1408 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1409 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1411 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1412 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1414 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1418 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1419 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1420 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1422 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1423 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1425 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1426 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1428 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1429 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1430 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1431 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1432 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1433 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1439 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1440 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1444 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1446 $entry.remove_entry();
1454 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1455 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1459 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1461 $entry.remove_entry();
1469 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1470 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1472 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1473 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1479 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1480 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1481 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1482 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1483 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1485 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1486 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1487 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1488 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1489 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1490 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1491 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1492 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1493 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1494 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1499 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1500 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1501 if $channel.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1502 $locked_events.push(events::Event::ChannelPending {
1503 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1504 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.temporary_channel_id(),
1505 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1506 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1507 funding_txo: $channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1509 $channel.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1514 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1515 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1516 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1517 debug_assert!($channel.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1518 $locked_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1519 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1520 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1521 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1522 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1524 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1529 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1530 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1531 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1532 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1533 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1534 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1535 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
1536 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1537 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1538 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1539 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1541 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1542 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1543 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1549 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1550 .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1552 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1553 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1554 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1555 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1556 updates.announcement_sigs);
1557 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1558 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1561 let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
1562 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1563 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1565 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1567 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1568 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1570 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1571 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1572 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1573 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1578 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1579 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1580 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1581 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1582 debug_assert!($self.id_to_peer.try_lock().is_ok());
1584 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1585 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1586 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1589 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1590 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1591 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1592 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1593 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1594 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
1595 $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1596 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1600 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1601 if ($update_id == 0 || $chan.get_next_monitor_update()
1602 .expect("We can't be processing a monitor update if it isn't queued")
1603 .update_id == $update_id) &&
1604 $chan.get_latest_monitor_update_id() == $update_id
1606 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1612 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1613 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1617 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1619 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1620 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1621 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1622 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1623 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1624 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1628 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
1630 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1631 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
1633 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1635 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
1636 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
1637 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
1640 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
1641 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
1642 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
1643 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1644 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1645 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1646 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1647 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1649 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1650 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1651 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1656 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1658 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1659 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1660 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1661 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1662 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1663 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1664 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1665 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1667 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1670 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1671 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1673 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1675 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1677 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1679 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1680 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1681 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1682 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1692 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1693 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1694 &self.default_configuration
1697 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1698 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1699 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1702 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1703 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1705 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1707 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1711 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1716 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1718 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1719 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1720 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1721 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1722 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1724 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1725 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1727 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1728 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1729 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1731 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1732 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1733 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1734 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1735 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1736 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1738 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1739 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1740 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1741 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1742 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1743 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1746 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1747 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1748 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1750 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1752 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1753 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1755 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1757 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1758 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1759 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1760 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1761 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1762 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1766 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1771 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1773 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1774 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1775 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1777 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1779 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1782 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1785 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1786 node_id: their_network_key,
1789 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1792 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1793 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1794 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1795 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1796 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1797 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1798 // the same channel.
1799 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1801 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1802 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1803 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1804 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1805 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1806 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1807 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height,
1808 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
1816 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
1817 /// more information.
1818 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1819 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1822 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1823 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1825 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1826 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1828 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1829 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1830 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1831 // really wanted anyway.
1832 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1835 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
1836 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1837 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1838 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1840 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
1841 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1842 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1843 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1844 return peer_state.channel_by_id
1847 ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height, features.clone()))
1853 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
1854 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1856 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
1857 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
1858 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
1860 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1861 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
1862 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
1863 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
1864 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
1865 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1866 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
1867 total_msat: *total_msat,
1870 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
1871 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1873 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
1874 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1876 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
1881 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1882 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1883 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1884 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1885 Some(transaction) => {
1886 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1890 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1891 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1892 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1893 reason: closure_reason
1897 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1898 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1900 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1901 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1902 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1904 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
1905 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
1907 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1908 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1909 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1910 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1911 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
1912 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1913 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
1914 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
1915 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1917 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
1918 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
1919 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
1920 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1921 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1925 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1926 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
1927 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1928 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
1929 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
1932 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1933 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1934 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1935 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1939 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1943 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
1947 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1948 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1949 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1950 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1953 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1957 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1958 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1959 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1961 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1962 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1964 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1965 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1966 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1967 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1969 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
1971 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1972 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1973 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1974 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
1975 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1976 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1979 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1980 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1981 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1983 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1984 /// the channel being closed or not:
1985 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1986 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1987 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1988 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1989 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1990 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1991 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1993 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
1995 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1996 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1997 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1998 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
1999 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2000 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
2004 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2005 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2006 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2007 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2008 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2009 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2010 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2011 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2013 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2014 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2015 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2016 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2017 // ignore the result here.
2018 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2022 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2023 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2024 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2025 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2026 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2027 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2028 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2030 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2031 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2032 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2033 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2034 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) });
2036 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2038 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2040 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2043 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2044 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2045 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2046 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2047 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2052 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2055 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2056 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2057 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2058 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2059 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2060 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2061 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2062 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2063 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2064 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2065 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2066 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2077 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2078 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2079 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2081 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2082 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2083 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2086 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2087 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2088 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2090 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2091 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2092 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2093 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2094 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2097 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2098 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2099 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2100 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2101 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2105 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2106 /// local transaction(s).
2107 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2108 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2109 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2113 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2114 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2116 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2117 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2118 return Err(ReceiveError {
2119 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2121 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2124 // final_expiry_too_soon
2125 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2126 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2128 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2129 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2130 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2131 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2132 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2133 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2134 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2135 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2136 return Err(ReceiveError {
2137 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2138 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2141 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2142 return Err(ReceiveError {
2144 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2145 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2149 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2150 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2151 return Err(ReceiveError {
2152 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2153 err_data: Vec::new(),
2154 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2157 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2158 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2159 return Err(ReceiveError {
2160 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2161 err_data: Vec::new(),
2162 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2164 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2165 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2167 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2168 phantom_shared_secret,
2170 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2171 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2172 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2173 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2174 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2175 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2176 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2177 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2178 return Err(ReceiveError {
2179 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2180 err_data: Vec::new(),
2181 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2185 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2187 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2190 return Err(ReceiveError {
2191 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2192 err_data: Vec::new(),
2193 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2198 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2201 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2202 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2203 outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2204 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2208 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2209 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2210 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2212 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2213 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2214 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2215 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2216 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2217 failure_code: $err_code,
2223 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2224 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2227 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2228 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2229 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2231 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2232 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2233 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2234 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2235 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2236 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2237 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2238 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2240 macro_rules! return_err {
2241 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2243 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2244 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2245 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2246 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2247 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2248 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2254 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2256 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2257 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2259 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2260 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2264 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2265 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2267 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2269 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2270 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2271 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2272 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2273 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2275 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2278 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2279 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2280 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2282 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2283 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2284 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2287 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2288 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2289 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2290 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2294 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2295 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2296 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2299 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2300 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2301 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2302 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2303 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2308 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2309 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2310 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2311 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2312 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2313 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2314 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2315 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2316 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2317 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2318 // phantom or an intercept.
2319 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2320 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2321 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2325 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2328 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2330 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2331 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2332 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2333 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2334 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2336 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2337 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2338 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2340 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2341 // have no consistency guarantees.
2342 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2346 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2347 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2348 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2349 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2350 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2352 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2353 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2354 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2355 // we don't have the channel here.
2356 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2358 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2360 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2361 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2362 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2363 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2364 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2365 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2366 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2368 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2369 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2371 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2372 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2376 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2377 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2378 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2379 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2381 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2388 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2389 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2390 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2391 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2392 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2393 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2395 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2396 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2398 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2399 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2400 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2401 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2402 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2403 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2404 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2405 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2406 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2407 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2413 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2414 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2415 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2416 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2418 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2419 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2421 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2422 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2423 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2425 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2426 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2427 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2428 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2429 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2430 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2431 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2435 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2440 pending_forward_info
2443 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2444 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2445 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2447 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
2448 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2449 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2451 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2452 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2453 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2454 if !chan.should_announce() {
2455 return Err(LightningError {
2456 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2457 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2460 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2461 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2463 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2464 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2467 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2468 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
2469 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2470 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2472 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
2473 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2474 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2476 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2477 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2478 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2479 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2480 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2481 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2485 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2487 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2488 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2489 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2491 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2492 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2494 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2495 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2496 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2497 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2498 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2499 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2500 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2501 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2503 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2504 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2505 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2507 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2509 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2516 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2517 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2518 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
2521 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2522 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
2523 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2525 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2526 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2527 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2529 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2530 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
2531 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2532 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2533 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()});
2535 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2537 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2538 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2539 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2540 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2543 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2544 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2545 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
2546 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2547 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2548 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2549 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2550 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2552 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2553 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2554 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2556 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2557 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2559 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2560 }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2561 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2562 Some(monitor_update) => {
2563 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2564 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2565 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
2568 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2569 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2570 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2571 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2572 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2573 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2574 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2575 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2581 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2582 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2583 // `channel_by_id` map.
2584 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2585 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2590 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2591 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2593 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2598 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2600 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2601 /// fields for more info.
2603 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2604 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2606 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2608 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2609 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2610 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2611 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2612 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2614 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2615 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2616 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2617 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2618 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2620 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2621 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2622 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2623 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2625 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2627 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
2628 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2629 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2631 /// In general, a path may raise:
2632 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2633 /// node public key) is specified.
2634 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2635 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2637 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2638 /// relevant updates.
2640 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
2641 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2642 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2644 /// # A caution on `payment_secret`
2646 /// `payment_secret` is unrelated to `payment_hash` (or [`PaymentPreimage`]) and exists to
2647 /// authenticate the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization)
2648 /// attacks. For newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one,
2649 /// the [`Route`] must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a
2650 /// recipient-provided `payment_secret`.
2652 /// If a `payment_secret` *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret
2653 /// feature bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the
2654 /// [`Route`], we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2656 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2657 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2658 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
2659 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2660 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2661 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2662 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2663 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2664 self.pending_outbound_payments
2665 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2666 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2667 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2670 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2671 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2672 pub fn send_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
2673 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2674 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2675 self.pending_outbound_payments
2676 .send_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2677 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2678 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2679 &self.pending_events,
2680 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2681 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2685 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2686 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2687 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2688 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2689 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2690 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2694 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2695 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2696 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2700 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
2701 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
2702 /// retries are exhausted.
2704 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
2705 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2707 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2708 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2709 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2711 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2712 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
2714 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2715 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2716 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2717 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2718 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, &self.pending_events);
2721 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2722 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2723 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2724 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2725 /// never reach the recipient.
2727 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2728 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2730 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2731 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2733 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2735 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2736 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2737 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2738 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2739 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2740 route, payment_preimage, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
2742 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2743 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2746 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2747 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2749 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
2752 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
2753 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
2754 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2755 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2756 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, payment_id,
2757 retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2758 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2759 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
2760 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2761 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2764 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2765 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2766 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2767 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2768 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2769 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2770 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2771 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2772 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2775 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2778 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2779 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2782 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2783 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2784 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2785 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2786 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2787 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2788 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2789 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2791 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2792 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2793 let (msg, chan) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2795 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2797 let funding_res = chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2798 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2799 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2800 } else { unreachable!(); });
2802 Ok(funding_msg) => (funding_msg, chan),
2804 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
2805 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2807 let _ = handle_error!(self, funding_res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
2808 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2809 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
2815 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2817 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
2818 log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2823 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2824 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2827 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2828 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2829 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2831 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2832 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2833 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2834 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2843 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2844 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2845 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2849 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2851 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2852 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2854 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2855 /// across the p2p network.
2857 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2858 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2860 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2861 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2862 /// keys per-channel).
2864 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2865 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2866 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2868 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2869 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2870 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2872 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2873 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2874 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2875 /// for more details.
2877 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2878 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2879 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2880 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2882 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2883 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2884 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2885 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2890 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2891 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2892 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2893 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2894 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2895 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2896 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2900 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2901 let mut output_index = None;
2902 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2903 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2904 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2905 if output_index.is_some() {
2906 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2907 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2910 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2911 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2912 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2915 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2918 if output_index.is_none() {
2919 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2920 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2923 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2927 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2929 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2930 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2931 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2932 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2934 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2935 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2937 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2938 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2940 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2942 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2943 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2944 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2945 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2946 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2947 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2948 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2949 pub fn update_channel_config(
2950 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2951 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2952 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2953 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2954 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2958 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2959 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2961 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2962 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2963 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2964 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2965 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2966 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2967 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
2968 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2969 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2973 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2974 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2975 if !channel.update_config(config) {
2978 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2979 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2980 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2981 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2982 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2990 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
2991 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
2993 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
2994 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
2996 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
2997 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
2998 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
2999 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3000 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3002 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3003 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
3005 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3008 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3009 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3010 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3011 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3012 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3013 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3015 let next_hop_scid = {
3016 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3017 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3018 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3019 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3020 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3021 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3023 if !chan.is_usable() {
3024 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3025 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3028 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
3030 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3031 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3036 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3037 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3038 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3041 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3042 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3043 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3045 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3047 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3048 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3051 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3052 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3053 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3054 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3055 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3057 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3061 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3062 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3064 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3067 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3068 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3069 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3071 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3072 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3073 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3076 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3077 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3078 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3079 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3080 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3081 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3082 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3085 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3086 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3087 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3088 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3093 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3095 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3096 /// Will likely generate further events.
3097 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3098 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3100 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3101 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3102 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3104 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3105 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3107 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3108 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3109 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3111 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3112 match forward_info {
3113 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3114 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3115 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3116 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3117 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3120 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3121 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3122 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3124 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3125 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3126 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3127 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3128 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3129 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3132 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3133 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3135 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3138 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3139 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3145 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3146 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3148 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3152 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3153 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3155 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3159 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3160 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3161 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3162 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3163 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3165 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3166 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3167 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3168 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3169 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3171 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3173 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3174 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3178 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3179 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3180 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3181 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3187 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3190 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3193 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3194 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3195 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3196 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3197 // problem, not ours.
3203 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3204 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3206 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3210 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3211 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3212 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3213 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3216 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3217 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3218 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3219 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3220 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3223 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3224 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3225 match forward_info {
3226 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3227 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3228 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3229 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3230 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3233 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3234 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3235 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3236 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3237 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3238 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3239 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3240 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3242 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3243 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3244 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3246 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3247 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3249 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3251 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3252 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3253 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3254 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3259 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3260 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3262 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3263 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3264 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3265 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3267 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3268 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3270 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3272 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3273 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3274 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3283 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3284 match forward_info {
3285 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3286 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3287 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3288 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3291 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3292 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3293 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3294 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3296 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3297 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3299 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3302 let mut claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3303 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3304 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3305 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3306 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3307 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3308 phantom_shared_secret,
3310 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
3311 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
3312 // if routing nodes overpay
3313 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
3314 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3316 total_value_received: None,
3317 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3322 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3323 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3324 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3325 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3326 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3328 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3329 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3330 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3331 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3332 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3333 phantom_shared_secret,
3335 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3336 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3340 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3341 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3342 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3343 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3344 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3347 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3348 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3349 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3351 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3352 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3353 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3356 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3357 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3358 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3361 let (_, ref mut htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3362 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3363 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3364 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3365 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3366 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3370 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
3371 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3372 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
3373 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3374 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3375 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3376 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3377 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3378 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3380 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3382 _ => unreachable!(),
3385 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
3386 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
3387 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
3388 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3389 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3390 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
3391 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3392 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3393 } else if total_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3394 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3395 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3396 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
3397 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
3398 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3399 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3403 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3404 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3406 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3408 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3409 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3411 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3413 payment_claimable_generated
3417 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3418 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3419 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3420 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3421 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3422 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3423 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3424 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3425 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3426 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3427 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3428 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3429 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3430 Ok(result) => result,
3432 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3433 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3437 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3438 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3439 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3440 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3441 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3442 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3446 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3448 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3449 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3450 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3451 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3454 match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3455 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3456 let amount_msat = claimable_htlc.value;
3457 claimable_htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat);
3458 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3459 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3460 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3461 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3462 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3466 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3467 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3470 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3471 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3472 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3478 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3479 if payment_data.is_none() {
3480 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3481 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3484 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3485 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3486 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3487 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3488 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3489 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3490 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3491 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3493 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3494 if payment_claimable_generated {
3495 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3501 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3502 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3510 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3511 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3512 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3513 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3514 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3515 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3517 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3518 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3520 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3522 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3523 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3524 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3526 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3528 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3529 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3530 events.append(&mut new_events);
3533 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3535 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3536 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3538 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3539 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3540 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3541 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3542 if background_events.is_empty() {
3546 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3548 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3549 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3550 // monitor updating completing.
3551 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3558 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3559 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3560 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3561 self.process_background_events();
3564 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3565 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3566 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3567 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
3568 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3569 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3570 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3572 if !chan.is_live() {
3573 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3574 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3575 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3577 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3578 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3580 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3581 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3585 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3586 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3587 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3588 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3589 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3590 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3591 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3593 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3595 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3596 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3597 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3598 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3599 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3600 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3601 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3609 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3611 /// This currently includes:
3612 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3613 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3614 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3616 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3617 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
3618 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3620 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
3621 /// estimate fetches.
3623 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3624 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
3625 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3626 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3627 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3628 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3630 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3632 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3633 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3634 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3636 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3637 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3638 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3639 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3640 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3641 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3642 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3643 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3644 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3646 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3647 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3648 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3649 if needs_close { return false; }
3652 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3653 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3654 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3655 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3656 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3657 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3658 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3659 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3663 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3664 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3666 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3667 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3668 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3672 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3673 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3678 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3682 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
3683 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
3688 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
3689 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
3690 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
3691 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
3692 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
3693 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
3694 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
3695 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
3696 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3697 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
3698 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
3699 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
3700 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
3701 // have no channels to the peer.
3702 let remove_entry = {
3703 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
3704 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
3707 entry.remove_entry();
3710 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
3715 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3716 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3717 // This should be unreachable
3718 debug_assert!(false);
3721 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3722 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3723 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3724 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
3725 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
3726 if htlcs[0].total_msat <= htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value) {
3728 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3729 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3730 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3732 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3739 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3740 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3741 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3742 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3743 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3746 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3747 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3750 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3752 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3753 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3754 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3755 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3756 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3763 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3764 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3765 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3767 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3768 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3769 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3770 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3772 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3773 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3774 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3775 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3776 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3777 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
3780 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
3781 /// reason for the failure.
3783 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
3784 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
3785 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3787 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3788 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3789 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3790 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
3791 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3792 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3793 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3798 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
3799 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
3800 match failure_code {
3801 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3802 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3803 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
3804 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3805 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3806 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
3811 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3812 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3814 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3816 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3817 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3818 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3819 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3820 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3821 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3822 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3824 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3826 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3827 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3829 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3834 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3835 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3836 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3837 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3838 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3839 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3840 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3841 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3842 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3843 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3845 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3846 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3847 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3848 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3850 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3851 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3852 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3853 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3854 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3858 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3859 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3860 // be surfaced to the user.
3861 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3862 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3863 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3865 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
3866 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3867 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3868 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3869 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3870 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3871 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3872 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3874 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3876 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
3879 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3880 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3881 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3882 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3886 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3887 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3888 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3889 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
3890 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
3891 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
3892 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
3893 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3894 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3897 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3898 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3899 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3902 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3903 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3904 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3906 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
3907 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
3908 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
3909 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
3910 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3912 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
3913 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
3914 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
3916 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
3917 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3918 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3919 push_forward_ev = true;
3921 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
3922 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3923 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
3925 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3926 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
3929 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
3930 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3931 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3932 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3933 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3934 failed_next_destination: destination,
3940 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
3941 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3943 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3944 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3945 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3947 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3948 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
3949 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3950 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3952 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
3953 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3954 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3955 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3956 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3957 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3958 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3960 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3963 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3964 if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
3965 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3966 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3967 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3968 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3969 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3970 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
3975 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
3976 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
3977 payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
3979 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
3980 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
3981 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
3982 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3987 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3989 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we check that all channels which contain a claimable
3990 // HTLC still exist. While this isn't guaranteed to remain true if a channel closes while
3991 // we're claiming (or even after we claim, before the commitment update dance completes),
3992 // it should be a relatively rare race, and we'd rather not claim HTLCs that require us to
3993 // go on-chain (and lose the on-chain fee to do so) than just reject the payment.
3995 // Note that we'll still always get our funds - as long as the generated
3996 // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` makes it out to the relevant monitor we can claim on-chain.
3998 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3999 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
4000 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
4001 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
4002 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
4004 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4005 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4006 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4007 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4008 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4009 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4010 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4011 let (counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4012 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
4019 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4020 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4025 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4026 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4028 if peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&chan_id).is_none() {
4033 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4034 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4035 debug_assert!(false);
4039 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4041 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4042 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4043 debug_assert!(false);
4047 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4049 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4050 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4051 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4052 if sources.len() != 1 {
4053 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4054 debug_assert!(false);
4060 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4062 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4063 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4064 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4065 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4068 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4069 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4070 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4071 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4075 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4076 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4077 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4078 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4080 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4081 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4082 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4083 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4084 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4089 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4090 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4091 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4092 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4093 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4094 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4095 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4097 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4100 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4101 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4102 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4103 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4107 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4108 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4109 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4110 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4112 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4113 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4114 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4115 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4119 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4120 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id).map(
4121 |peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap()
4125 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4126 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4127 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4128 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4129 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4130 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4132 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4133 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4134 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4135 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4136 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4138 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4139 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4140 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4141 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4142 if let Err(e) = res {
4143 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4144 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4145 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4146 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4147 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4153 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4154 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4155 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4159 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4160 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4161 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4162 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4163 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4164 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4165 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4166 // again on restart.
4167 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4168 payment_preimage, update_res);
4170 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4171 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4172 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4173 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4174 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4175 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4179 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4180 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4183 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4185 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4186 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4188 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4189 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4190 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4191 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4192 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4193 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4194 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4197 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4198 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4200 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4202 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4205 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
4209 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4210 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4211 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4217 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4218 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4219 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4222 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4223 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4225 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4226 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4227 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4228 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4229 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4233 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4234 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
4240 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4241 /// update completion.
4242 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4243 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4244 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4245 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4246 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4247 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4248 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4249 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
4250 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4251 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4252 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4253 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4254 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4256 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4258 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4259 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4260 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4261 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4264 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4265 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4267 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4268 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4269 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4274 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4275 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4276 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4277 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4282 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4283 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4284 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4285 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4286 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4291 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4295 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4301 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4302 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4303 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4307 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4308 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
4309 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
4315 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4316 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4318 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4319 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4321 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4322 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4323 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4324 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4325 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4330 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4331 let mut peer_state_lock;
4332 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4333 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4334 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4335 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4337 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4338 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4339 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4342 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4343 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4344 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4347 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4350 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4352 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4353 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4356 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4357 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4358 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4360 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4361 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4362 /// used to accept such channels.
4364 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4365 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4366 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4367 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4370 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4371 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4373 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4374 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4375 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4377 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4378 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4380 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4381 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4383 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4384 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4386 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4387 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4388 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4389 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4392 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4393 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4395 let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4396 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4397 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4398 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4399 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4400 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4401 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1;
4402 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4403 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4404 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4405 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4408 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4409 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4410 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4411 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4412 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4413 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4416 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4417 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4418 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4420 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4421 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4422 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4423 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4424 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4425 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4426 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4427 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4430 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4431 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4432 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4436 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4437 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4438 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4441 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4442 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4448 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4449 /// or 0-conf channels.
4451 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
4452 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
4453 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
4454 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
4455 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
4456 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4458 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4459 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
4460 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4461 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
4462 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
4463 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() {
4464 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
4468 return peers_without_funded_channels;
4471 fn unfunded_channel_count(
4472 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
4474 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
4475 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
4476 if !chan.is_outbound() && chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
4477 chan.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
4479 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
4482 num_unfunded_channels
4485 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4486 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4487 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4490 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4491 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4494 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4495 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4496 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4497 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4499 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
4500 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
4501 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
4502 let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4504 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4505 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4507 debug_assert!(false);
4508 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4510 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4511 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4513 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4514 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4515 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4516 if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() &&
4517 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
4518 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
4520 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4521 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
4522 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4525 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4526 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
4527 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4528 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
4529 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4532 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4533 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
4534 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4537 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4538 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4542 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4543 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4544 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4545 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4547 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4548 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4549 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4550 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4552 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4553 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4554 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4557 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4558 pending_events.push(
4559 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4560 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4561 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4562 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4563 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4564 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4569 entry.insert(channel);
4575 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4576 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4577 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4578 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4580 debug_assert!(false);
4581 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4583 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4584 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4585 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4586 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4587 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4588 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4590 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4593 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4594 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4595 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4596 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4597 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4599 user_channel_id: user_id,
4604 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4605 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4607 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4608 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4610 debug_assert!(false);
4611 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4614 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4615 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4616 let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
4617 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4618 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4619 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4621 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4624 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4625 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4626 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4628 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4629 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4630 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4631 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4632 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4633 funding_msg.channel_id))
4635 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4636 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4640 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4641 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4642 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4643 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4644 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
4645 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4646 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4650 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
4652 let chan = e.insert(chan);
4653 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
4654 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
4656 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4657 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4658 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4659 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4660 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4661 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4662 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4663 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
4671 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4672 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4673 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4674 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4676 debug_assert!(false);
4677 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4680 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4681 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4682 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4683 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4684 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
4685 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
4686 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
4687 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4688 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4689 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4690 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4691 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4692 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4693 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4698 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4702 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4703 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4704 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4706 debug_assert!(false);
4707 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4709 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4710 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4711 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4712 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4713 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4714 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4715 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4716 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4717 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4718 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4719 msg: announcement_sigs,
4721 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4722 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4723 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4724 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4725 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4726 // announcement_signatures.
4727 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4728 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4729 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4730 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4737 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4738 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
4743 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4747 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4748 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4749 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4750 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4751 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4753 debug_assert!(false);
4754 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4756 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4757 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4758 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4759 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4761 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4762 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4763 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4764 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4767 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
4768 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
4769 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4770 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4772 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4773 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
4774 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
4775 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
4776 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4777 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4782 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4783 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
4784 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4785 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4786 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
4790 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4793 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4794 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4795 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4796 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4802 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4803 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4804 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4806 debug_assert!(false);
4807 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4809 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4810 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4811 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4812 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4813 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4814 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4815 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4816 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4817 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4822 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4823 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4824 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4825 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4826 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4827 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4828 } else { (tx, None) }
4830 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4833 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4834 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4835 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4837 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4838 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4839 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4840 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4841 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4845 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4850 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4851 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4852 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4853 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4855 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4856 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4857 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4858 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4860 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4861 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4862 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4864 debug_assert!(false);
4865 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4867 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4868 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4869 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4870 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4872 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4873 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4874 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4875 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4876 match pending_forward_info {
4877 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4878 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4879 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4880 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
4882 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
4883 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
4884 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4885 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4886 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4889 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4891 _ => pending_forward_info
4894 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4896 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4901 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4902 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4903 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4904 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4906 debug_assert!(false);
4907 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4909 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4910 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4911 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4912 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4913 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4915 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4918 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4922 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4923 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4924 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4926 debug_assert!(false);
4927 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4929 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4930 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4931 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4932 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4933 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
4935 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4940 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4941 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4942 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4944 debug_assert!(false);
4945 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4947 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4948 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4949 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4950 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4951 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4952 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4953 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
4955 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
4958 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4962 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4963 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4964 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4966 debug_assert!(false);
4967 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4969 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4970 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4971 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4972 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4973 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
4974 let monitor_update = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
4975 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4976 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4977 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4978 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
4980 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4985 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4986 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4987 let mut push_forward_event = false;
4988 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
4989 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
4990 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4991 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4992 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
4993 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4994 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4995 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4997 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
4998 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5000 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5001 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5002 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5003 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5004 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5005 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5007 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5008 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5009 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5011 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5012 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5013 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5014 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5015 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5016 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5017 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5018 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5019 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5022 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5023 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5025 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5026 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5027 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5028 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5029 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5030 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5031 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5032 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5035 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5036 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5037 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5042 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5043 // payments are being processed.
5044 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5045 push_forward_event = true;
5047 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5048 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5055 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5056 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5059 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5060 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5061 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5063 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5067 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
5068 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5069 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5070 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
5071 .find(|ev| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
5073 if !forward_ev_exists {
5074 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5076 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5081 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5082 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5083 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5084 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5086 debug_assert!(false);
5087 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5088 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5089 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5090 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5091 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5092 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5093 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5094 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5095 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5096 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5097 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5098 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5100 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5103 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5107 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5108 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5109 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5111 debug_assert!(false);
5112 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5114 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5115 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5116 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5117 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5118 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5120 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5125 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5126 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5127 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5129 debug_assert!(false);
5130 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5132 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5133 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5134 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5135 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5136 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5137 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5140 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5141 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5142 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5143 msg, &self.default_configuration
5145 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5146 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5147 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5150 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5155 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5156 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5157 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5158 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5160 // It's not a local channel
5161 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5164 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5165 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5166 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5167 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5169 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5170 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5171 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5172 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5173 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5174 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5175 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5176 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5177 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5178 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5180 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5182 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5183 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5184 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5185 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5187 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5188 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5191 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5193 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5196 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5198 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5199 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5201 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5203 debug_assert!(false);
5204 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5206 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5207 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5208 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5209 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5210 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5211 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5212 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5213 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5214 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5215 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5216 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5217 let mut channel_update = None;
5218 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5219 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5220 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5223 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5224 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5225 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5226 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5227 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5228 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5229 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5234 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5235 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5236 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5237 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5238 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5239 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5243 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5247 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5248 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5251 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5252 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5257 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
5258 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5259 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5261 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5262 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5263 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5264 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5265 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5266 match monitor_event {
5267 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5268 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5269 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5270 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5272 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5273 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5274 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5275 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5278 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5279 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5280 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5281 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5283 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5284 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5285 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5286 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5289 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5290 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5291 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5292 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5293 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5294 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5295 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5296 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5297 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5298 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5299 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5303 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5304 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5306 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5308 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5309 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5310 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5311 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5312 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5319 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5320 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5326 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5327 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5330 has_pending_monitor_events
5333 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5334 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5335 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5337 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5338 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5339 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5340 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5342 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5347 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5348 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5349 /// update was applied.
5350 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5351 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5352 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5353 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5355 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5356 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5357 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5358 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5360 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5361 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5363 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5364 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5365 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5366 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
5367 let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
5368 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5369 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5370 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5371 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5373 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5374 has_monitor_update = true;
5376 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5377 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5378 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5379 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5380 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5381 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5382 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5384 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5386 continue 'peer_loop;
5395 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5396 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5397 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5400 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5401 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5407 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5408 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5409 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5410 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5411 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5412 let mut has_update = false;
5414 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5416 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5417 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5418 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5419 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5420 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5421 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5422 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5423 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5425 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5426 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5429 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5430 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5431 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5432 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5433 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5438 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5440 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5441 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5442 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5448 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5449 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5457 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5458 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5464 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5465 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5467 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5468 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5469 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5470 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5471 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5472 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5473 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5474 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5475 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5476 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5477 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5478 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5479 assert!(should_broadcast);
5480 } else { unreachable!(); }
5481 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5483 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5487 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5488 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5490 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5491 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5494 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5496 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5497 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5498 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5499 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5500 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5501 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5502 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5503 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5504 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5505 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5506 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5507 // never fail a payment too early.
5508 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5510 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5513 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5518 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5521 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5522 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5524 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5525 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5526 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5527 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5529 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5531 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5532 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5536 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5537 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5539 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5541 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5542 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5544 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5545 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5546 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5547 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5548 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5549 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5550 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5551 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5552 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5553 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5554 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5557 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5558 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5560 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5563 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5565 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5567 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5568 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5569 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5570 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5571 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5574 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5575 /// stored external to LDK.
5577 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5578 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5579 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5581 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5582 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5585 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5586 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5587 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5588 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5590 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5591 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5592 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5593 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5594 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5596 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5597 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5598 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5599 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5600 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5602 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5603 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5605 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5606 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5610 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5611 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5613 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5615 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5616 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5618 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5619 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5620 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5621 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5622 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5623 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5624 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5627 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5628 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5630 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5633 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5635 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5637 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5638 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5641 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5642 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5644 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5645 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5646 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5649 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5650 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5652 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5653 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5654 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5655 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5657 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5658 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5659 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5660 Some(_) => continue,
5661 None => return scid_candidate
5666 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5668 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5669 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5671 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5672 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5673 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5677 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5678 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5679 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5681 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5682 /// times to get a unique scid.
5683 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5684 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5685 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5687 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5688 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5689 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5690 return scid_candidate
5694 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5695 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5696 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5697 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5699 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5700 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5701 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5702 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5703 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5704 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5705 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5706 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5715 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5716 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5717 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5718 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5719 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5723 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5724 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5725 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5730 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5731 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5732 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5736 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5737 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5741 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5742 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5745 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5746 /// using the given event handler.
5748 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5749 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5752 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5753 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5754 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5756 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5758 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5759 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5760 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5761 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5764 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5765 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5766 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5769 for event in pending_events {
5770 handler(event).await;
5773 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5774 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5779 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5781 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5782 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5783 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5784 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5785 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5786 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5790 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
5791 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
5792 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
5793 /// is always placed next to each other.
5795 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
5796 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
5797 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
5798 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
5800 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
5801 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
5802 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
5803 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5804 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5805 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5806 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5808 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5809 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5810 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5811 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5814 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5815 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5817 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5818 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5821 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5822 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5823 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5824 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5825 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5826 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
5827 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
5831 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5832 events.replace(pending_events);
5841 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5843 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5844 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5845 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5846 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5847 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5848 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5852 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5854 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5855 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5856 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5857 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5858 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5860 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5861 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5862 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5863 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5866 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5867 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5868 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5871 for event in pending_events {
5872 handler.handle_event(event);
5880 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5882 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5883 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5884 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5885 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5886 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5887 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5891 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5893 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5894 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5895 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5896 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5897 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5900 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5901 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5904 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5905 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5906 let new_height = height - 1;
5908 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5909 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5910 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5911 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5912 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5913 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5916 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5920 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5922 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5923 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5924 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5925 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5926 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5927 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5931 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5932 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5933 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5934 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5936 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5937 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5939 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5940 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
5941 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5943 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5944 if height < last_best_block_height {
5945 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5946 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5950 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5951 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5952 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5953 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5955 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5956 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5958 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5960 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5962 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5964 macro_rules! max_time {
5965 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5967 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5968 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5969 // having an explicit local time source.
5970 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5971 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5972 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5973 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5974 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5980 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5981 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5982 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5983 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5987 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5988 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
5989 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5990 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5991 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5992 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5993 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
5994 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
6001 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6002 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6003 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6004 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
6005 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6006 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6007 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6008 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6013 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6015 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6016 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6017 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6018 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6019 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6020 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6024 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6025 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6027 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6028 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6029 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6030 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6031 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6033 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6034 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6036 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6037 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6038 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6039 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6040 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6041 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6042 let res = f(channel);
6043 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6044 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6045 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6046 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6047 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
6049 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6050 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6051 if channel.is_usable() {
6052 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6053 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6054 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6055 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6060 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6065 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6066 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6069 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6070 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6071 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6072 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6073 msg: announcement_sigs,
6075 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6076 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6077 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6079 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6080 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6081 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6086 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6087 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6088 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6089 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6090 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6091 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6092 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6093 // is always consistent.
6094 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6095 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6096 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6097 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6098 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6101 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6102 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6103 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6104 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6105 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6106 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6107 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6111 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6112 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6113 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6114 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6115 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6116 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6117 data: reason_message,
6127 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6128 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
6129 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6130 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6131 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6132 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6133 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6134 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6135 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6136 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6138 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6139 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6140 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6144 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6147 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6148 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6149 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6150 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6151 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6152 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6153 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6154 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6155 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6158 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6159 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6160 _ => unreachable!(),
6162 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6163 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6164 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6165 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6171 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6173 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6174 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6178 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
6180 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
6181 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
6183 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6184 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6187 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6188 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6189 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6192 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6193 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6194 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6195 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6198 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6199 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6200 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6201 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6204 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6205 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6207 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6208 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6209 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6210 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6211 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6214 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6215 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6216 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6217 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6220 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6221 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6222 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6223 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6226 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6227 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6228 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6229 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6233 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6234 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6236 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6237 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6238 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6239 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6240 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6241 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6245 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6246 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6247 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6250 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6251 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6252 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6255 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6256 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6257 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6260 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6261 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6262 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6265 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6266 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6267 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6270 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6271 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6272 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6275 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6276 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6277 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6280 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6281 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6282 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6285 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6286 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6287 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6290 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6291 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6292 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6295 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6296 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6297 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6300 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6301 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6302 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6305 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6306 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6307 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6310 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6311 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6312 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6315 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6316 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6317 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6320 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6321 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6322 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6325 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6330 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6331 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6332 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6335 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6336 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6337 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6338 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6340 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6341 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6342 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6343 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6344 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6345 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6346 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6347 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6348 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6349 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6350 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6355 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6357 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6358 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6359 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6360 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6361 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6362 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6363 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6364 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6365 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6366 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6367 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6368 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6369 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6370 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6371 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6372 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6373 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6374 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6375 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6376 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6377 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6380 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6381 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6382 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6383 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6386 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6388 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6390 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6391 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6395 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
6396 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6397 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6401 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6403 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
6404 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
6405 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
6406 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
6407 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
6408 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
6411 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6412 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6413 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6414 if inbound_peer_limited {
6417 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6418 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6419 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6420 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6421 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6425 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6426 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6427 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6429 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6430 if inbound_peer_limited &&
6431 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
6432 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
6437 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6438 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6443 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6445 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6446 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6447 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6448 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6449 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6450 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6451 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6452 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6453 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6454 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6455 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6459 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6460 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6461 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6466 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6467 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6468 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6469 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6470 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6479 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6483 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6484 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6486 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6487 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6488 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6489 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6490 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6491 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6492 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6493 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6495 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6496 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6497 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6501 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6502 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6503 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6504 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6505 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6506 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6507 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6508 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6509 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6510 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6518 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6519 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6523 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6524 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6527 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6528 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6532 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6533 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6534 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6535 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6538 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6539 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6541 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6542 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6543 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6544 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6545 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6548 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6549 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6550 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6551 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6554 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6555 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6556 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6557 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6560 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6561 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6562 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6563 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6564 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
6565 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
6566 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6567 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6568 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6569 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6570 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6571 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6572 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6573 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6574 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6575 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6576 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6577 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6579 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6580 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6581 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6587 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6588 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6590 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6591 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6592 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6593 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6596 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6597 (2, node_id, required),
6598 (4, features, required),
6599 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6600 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6601 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6602 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6605 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6606 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6607 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6608 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6609 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6610 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6611 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6612 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6613 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6614 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6615 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6616 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6617 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6618 (7, self.config, option),
6619 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6620 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6621 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6622 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6623 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6624 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6625 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6626 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6627 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6628 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6629 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6630 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6631 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6632 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6633 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6634 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6635 (32, self.is_public, required),
6636 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6637 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6638 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6639 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6645 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6646 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6647 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6648 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6649 (2, channel_id, required),
6650 (3, channel_type, option),
6651 (4, counterparty, required),
6652 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6653 (6, funding_txo, option),
6654 (7, config, option),
6655 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6656 (9, confirmations, option),
6657 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6658 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6659 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6660 (16, balance_msat, required),
6661 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6662 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6663 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6664 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6665 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6666 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6667 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6668 (26, is_outbound, required),
6669 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6670 (30, is_usable, required),
6671 (32, is_public, required),
6672 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6673 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6674 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6675 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6678 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6679 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6680 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6681 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6682 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6686 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6688 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6689 outbound_scid_alias,
6693 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6694 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6696 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6697 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6698 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6699 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6700 confirmations_required,
6702 force_close_spend_delay,
6703 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6704 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6705 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6706 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6707 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6708 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6709 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
6714 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6715 (2, channels, vec_type),
6716 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6717 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6720 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6722 (0, onion_packet, required),
6723 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6726 (0, payment_data, required),
6727 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6728 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6730 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6731 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6732 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6736 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6737 (0, routing, required),
6738 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6739 (4, payment_hash, required),
6740 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6741 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6742 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6746 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6747 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6749 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6751 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6752 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6753 reason.write(writer)?;
6755 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6756 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6759 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6760 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6761 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6762 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6769 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6770 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6771 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6774 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6775 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6776 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6777 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6781 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6782 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6783 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6784 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6785 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6788 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6789 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6790 // messages contained in the variants.
6791 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6792 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6793 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6795 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6796 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6797 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6798 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6799 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6802 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6803 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6804 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6805 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6806 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6808 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6813 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6818 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6819 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6820 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6821 (2, outpoint, required),
6822 (4, htlc_id, required),
6823 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6826 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6827 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6828 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6829 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6830 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6832 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6833 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6834 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6835 (2, self.value, required),
6836 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
6837 (4, payment_data, option),
6838 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
6839 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6840 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6846 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6847 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6848 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6850 let mut sender_intended_value = None;
6851 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6852 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6853 let mut total_value_received = None;
6854 let mut total_msat = None;
6855 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6856 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6857 (0, prev_hop, required),
6858 (1, total_msat, option),
6859 (2, value, required),
6860 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
6861 (4, payment_data, option),
6862 (5, total_value_received, option),
6863 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6864 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6866 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6868 if payment_data.is_some() {
6869 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6871 if total_msat.is_none() {
6872 total_msat = Some(value);
6874 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6877 if total_msat.is_none() {
6878 if payment_data.is_none() {
6879 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6881 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6883 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6887 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6890 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
6891 total_value_received,
6892 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6899 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6900 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6901 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6904 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6905 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6906 let mut path: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
6907 let mut payment_id = None;
6908 let mut payment_secret = None;
6909 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
6910 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6911 (0, session_priv, required),
6912 (1, payment_id, option),
6913 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6914 (3, payment_secret, option),
6915 (4, path, vec_type),
6916 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
6918 if payment_id.is_none() {
6919 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6921 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6923 if path.is_none() || path.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
6924 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6926 let path = path.unwrap();
6927 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
6928 if params.final_cltv_expiry_delta == 0 {
6929 params.final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta;
6932 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6933 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6934 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6936 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6940 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6941 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6946 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6947 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6949 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret } => {
6951 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6952 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6953 (0, session_priv, required),
6954 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6955 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6956 (3, payment_secret, option),
6957 (4, *path, vec_type),
6958 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
6961 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6963 field.write(writer)?;
6970 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6971 (0, forward_info, required),
6972 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6973 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6974 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6975 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6978 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6980 (0, htlc_id, required),
6981 (2, err_packet, required),
6986 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6987 (0, payment_secret, required),
6988 (2, expiry_time, required),
6989 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6990 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6991 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6994 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6996 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6997 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6998 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6999 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7000 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7001 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7005 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7006 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
7008 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7010 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7012 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7013 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7014 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7017 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
7019 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7020 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7021 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
7022 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7023 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7024 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7025 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7026 serializable_peer_count += 1;
7028 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
7029 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7030 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7031 unfunded_channels += 1;
7036 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7038 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7039 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7040 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7041 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7042 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7043 channel.write(writer)?;
7050 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7051 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7052 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7053 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7054 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7055 for forward in pending_forwards {
7056 forward.write(writer)?;
7061 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7063 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7064 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7065 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7067 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7068 (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7069 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
7070 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7071 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7072 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
7073 htlc.write(writer)?;
7075 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
7078 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7079 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7080 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7081 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7082 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7083 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7084 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7087 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7088 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7089 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7090 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7091 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7093 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7094 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7095 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7096 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7097 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7098 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7099 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7104 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7105 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7106 for event in events.iter() {
7107 event.write(writer)?;
7110 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
7111 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7112 for event in background_events.iter() {
7114 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
7116 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
7117 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
7122 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7123 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7124 // likely to be identical.
7125 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7126 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7128 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7129 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7130 hash.write(writer)?;
7131 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7134 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7135 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7136 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7137 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7138 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7141 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7142 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7144 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7145 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7146 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7147 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7150 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7151 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7155 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7156 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7157 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7159 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7160 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7161 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7167 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7168 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7169 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7170 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7173 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7174 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7175 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7176 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7177 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7180 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7181 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7182 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7183 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7184 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7185 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7186 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7187 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7188 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7189 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7196 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7198 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7200 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7201 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7202 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7203 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7204 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7205 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7206 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7207 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7208 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7209 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7210 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7211 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7212 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7214 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7215 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7217 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7218 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7220 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7221 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7222 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7223 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7224 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7225 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7227 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7228 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7230 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7231 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7232 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7233 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7234 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7235 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7239 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7240 pub entropy_source: ES,
7242 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7243 pub node_signer: NS,
7245 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7246 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7248 pub signer_provider: SP,
7250 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7252 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7253 pub fee_estimator: F,
7254 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7256 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7257 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7258 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7259 pub chain_monitor: M,
7261 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7262 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7263 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7264 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7265 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7266 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7268 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7270 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7271 /// deserialization.
7273 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7274 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7275 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7277 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7278 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7280 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7281 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7282 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7283 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7285 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7288 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
7289 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7292 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7293 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7295 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7296 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7297 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7298 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7299 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7300 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7304 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7305 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7306 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7307 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7308 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7310 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7311 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7316 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7317 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7318 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7319 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7321 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7322 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7323 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7324 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7325 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7326 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7330 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7331 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7332 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7336 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7337 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7339 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7340 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7341 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7342 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7343 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7344 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7348 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7349 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7351 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7352 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7353 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7355 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7357 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7358 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7359 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7360 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7361 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7362 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7363 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
7364 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7365 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7366 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7368 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7369 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7370 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7371 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7372 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7373 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7374 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7375 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7376 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7377 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7378 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7379 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7380 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7381 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7382 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7383 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7384 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7385 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7386 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7387 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7388 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7389 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7390 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7391 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7392 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7393 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7394 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
7395 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate(monitor_update));
7397 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7398 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7399 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7400 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7401 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7403 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7404 let mut found_htlc = false;
7405 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7406 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7409 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7410 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7411 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7412 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7413 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7414 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7415 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7416 log_info!(args.logger,
7417 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7418 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7419 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7423 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7424 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7425 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7427 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7428 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7430 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7431 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7432 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7433 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7435 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7436 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7437 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7438 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7442 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7443 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7444 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7445 // safely discard the channel.
7446 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7447 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7448 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7449 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7450 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7453 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7454 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7455 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7456 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7457 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7458 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7462 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7463 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7464 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7465 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
7466 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
7468 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
7472 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7473 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7474 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7475 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7476 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7477 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7478 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7479 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7480 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7482 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7485 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7486 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7487 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7488 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7489 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7490 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7491 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7492 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7494 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7497 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7498 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7499 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7500 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7501 let peer_state = PeerState {
7502 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7503 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7504 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7505 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7506 is_connected: false,
7508 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7511 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7512 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7513 for _ in 0..event_count {
7514 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7515 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7520 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7521 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7522 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7524 let (funding_txo, monitor_update): (OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate) = (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
7525 if pending_background_events.iter().find(|e| {
7526 let BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((pending_funding_txo, pending_monitor_update)) = e;
7527 *pending_funding_txo == funding_txo && *pending_monitor_update == monitor_update
7529 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)));
7532 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7536 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7537 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7539 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7540 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7541 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7542 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7543 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7547 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7548 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7549 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7550 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7551 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7552 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7553 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7555 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7556 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7560 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7561 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7562 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7563 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7564 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7565 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7566 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7567 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7568 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7569 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
7570 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7571 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7572 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7573 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7574 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7575 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7576 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7577 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7578 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7579 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7581 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7582 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7585 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7586 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7589 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7590 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7593 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7594 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7595 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7596 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7597 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7598 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7600 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7602 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
7603 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7604 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
7608 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7609 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7610 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7611 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7612 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7613 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7614 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7616 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7617 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7618 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
7619 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7620 if path.is_empty() {
7621 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7622 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7625 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7626 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7627 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7628 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7629 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7630 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7631 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7632 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7634 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7635 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7636 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7637 retry_strategy: None,
7638 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
7639 payment_params: None,
7640 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7641 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7643 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7644 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7645 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7646 total_msat: path_amt,
7647 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7649 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7650 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7655 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7657 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
7658 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7659 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7660 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7662 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7663 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7664 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7665 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7666 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7667 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7668 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7669 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7670 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7671 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7672 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7677 !forwards.is_empty()
7679 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7680 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7681 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7682 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7683 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7684 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7685 intercepted_id != ev_id
7692 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
7693 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
7694 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
7695 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
7696 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
7697 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
7698 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
7699 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
7700 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
7701 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
7702 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
7703 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
7704 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
7713 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
7714 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7715 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7716 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7717 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7718 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7719 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7720 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7724 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7725 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7727 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7728 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7729 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7730 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7732 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7733 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7736 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7737 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7738 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7739 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7740 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7742 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7743 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7744 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7745 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7746 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7747 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7748 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7749 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
7751 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7752 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7756 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7758 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7760 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7761 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7763 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7767 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7768 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7770 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
7772 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7774 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7775 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7776 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7777 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7781 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7782 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
7783 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7784 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7785 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7786 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7787 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7789 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7790 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
7791 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7793 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7794 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7795 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7796 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7797 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7798 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7800 if chan.is_usable() {
7801 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7802 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7803 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7804 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7805 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7811 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7813 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7814 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7815 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7816 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7817 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7818 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7819 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7820 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7821 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7822 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7823 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7825 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7826 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7828 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7829 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7830 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7831 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7833 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7834 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7835 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7836 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7838 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7839 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7840 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7841 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7843 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7844 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
7845 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
7846 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7847 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7848 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7849 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7852 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7853 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7856 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7859 purpose: payment_purpose,
7860 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7866 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
7867 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) {
7868 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
7870 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
7871 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7875 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7877 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7878 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7879 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7880 router: args.router,
7882 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7884 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7885 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7886 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
7887 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7889 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7890 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7891 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7892 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7893 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7894 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7896 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7901 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7903 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7905 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7906 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
7907 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7908 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7910 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
7911 node_signer: args.node_signer,
7912 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
7914 logger: args.logger,
7915 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7918 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7919 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7920 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7921 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7922 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7925 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7926 //connection or two.
7928 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7934 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7935 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7936 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
7937 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
7938 use core::time::Duration;
7939 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7940 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7941 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7942 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, InterceptId};
7943 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7944 use crate::ln::msgs;
7945 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7946 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7947 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7948 use crate::util::test_utils;
7949 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
7950 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource;
7953 fn test_notify_limits() {
7954 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7955 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7956 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7957 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7958 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7959 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7961 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7962 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7963 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7964 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7965 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7967 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7969 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7970 // to connect messages with new values
7971 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7972 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7973 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
7974 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
7975 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
7976 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
7978 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7979 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7980 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7981 // ... but the last node should not.
7982 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7983 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7984 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7985 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7987 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7988 // about the channel.
7989 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7990 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7991 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7993 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7995 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7996 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7997 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7998 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7999 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8000 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8002 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
8003 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8004 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8006 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
8007 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
8008 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
8009 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
8010 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
8011 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
8013 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
8014 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
8015 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8016 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8017 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8018 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8019 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8020 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8022 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
8023 // the channel info has updated.
8024 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8025 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8026 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8027 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8028 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8029 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8033 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
8034 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
8036 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8037 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8038 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8039 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8040 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8042 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
8043 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8044 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
8045 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
8047 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
8048 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
8049 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
8050 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
8051 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
8052 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
8053 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8054 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8055 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8056 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
8058 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
8059 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8060 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8061 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8062 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8063 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8064 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8065 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8066 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8067 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8068 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8069 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8070 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8071 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8072 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8073 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8074 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8075 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8076 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8077 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8078 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8079 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8081 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8082 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8083 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8084 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8085 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8086 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8088 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8089 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8090 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8091 // lightning messages manually.
8092 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8093 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8094 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8096 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8097 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8098 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8099 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8100 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8101 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8102 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8103 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8104 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8105 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8106 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8107 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8108 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8109 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8110 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8111 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8112 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8113 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8114 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8115 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8116 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8117 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8118 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8119 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8120 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8122 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8123 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8124 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8125 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8127 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8128 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8129 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8130 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8132 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8135 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8136 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8137 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8138 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8140 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8143 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8144 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8145 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8146 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8148 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8153 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8154 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8155 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8156 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8157 // fails as expected.
8158 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8159 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8160 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8161 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8162 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8163 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8164 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8166 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8167 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8168 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8170 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8171 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8172 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
8173 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8175 let route = find_route(
8176 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8177 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8179 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8180 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8181 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8182 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8183 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8184 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8185 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8186 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8187 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8188 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8189 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8190 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8191 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8192 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8193 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8194 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8195 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8196 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8197 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8198 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8199 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8200 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8201 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8203 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8204 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8206 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8207 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8208 let route = find_route(
8209 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8210 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8212 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8213 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8214 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8215 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8216 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8217 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8218 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8220 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8221 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8222 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8223 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8224 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8225 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8226 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8227 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8228 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8229 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8230 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8231 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8232 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8233 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8234 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8235 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8236 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8237 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8238 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8239 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8240 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8241 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8242 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8244 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8245 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8249 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8250 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8251 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8252 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8253 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8254 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8255 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8257 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8258 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8260 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8261 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8262 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8263 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8265 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8266 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8267 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8268 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8269 let route = find_route(
8270 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8271 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8274 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8275 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8276 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8277 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8278 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8280 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8281 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8282 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8283 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8284 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8285 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8286 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8288 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
8292 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8293 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8294 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8295 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8296 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8297 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8299 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8300 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8302 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8303 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8304 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8305 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8307 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8308 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8309 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8310 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8311 let route = find_route(
8312 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8313 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8316 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8317 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8318 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8319 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8320 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8321 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8323 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8324 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8325 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8326 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8327 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8328 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8329 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8331 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
8335 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8336 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8337 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8338 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8339 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8341 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8342 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8343 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8344 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8346 // Marshall an MPP route.
8347 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8348 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8349 route.paths.push(path);
8350 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8351 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8352 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8353 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8354 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8355 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8357 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
8358 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8359 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
8361 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8366 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8367 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8368 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8369 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8370 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8372 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8374 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8375 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8377 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8378 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8379 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8380 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8383 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8384 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8385 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8386 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8387 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8388 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8391 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8394 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8395 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8400 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8401 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8402 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8403 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8404 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8405 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8407 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8408 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8410 total_msat: 100_000,
8413 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8414 // payment verification fails as expected.
8415 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8416 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8417 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8418 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8420 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
8424 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8425 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8429 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8430 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8431 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8432 // the channel is successfully closed.
8433 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8434 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8435 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8436 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8438 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8439 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8440 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8441 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8442 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8444 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8445 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8447 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8448 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8449 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8450 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8453 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8455 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8456 // as it has the funding transaction.
8457 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8458 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8459 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8462 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8464 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8466 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8468 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8469 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8470 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8472 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8475 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8476 // as it has the funding transaction.
8477 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8478 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8479 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8481 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8482 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8483 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8484 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8485 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8486 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8487 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8488 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8490 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8491 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8492 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8493 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8495 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8496 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8498 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8499 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8500 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8501 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8502 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8503 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8504 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8508 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8509 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8510 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8511 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8512 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8513 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8514 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8517 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8519 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8520 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8521 // closing transaction).
8522 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8523 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8524 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8526 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8527 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8528 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8529 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8530 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8533 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8535 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8537 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8538 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8539 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8541 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8543 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8544 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8547 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8548 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8549 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8552 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8553 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8554 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8557 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8559 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8560 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8562 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8563 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8565 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8566 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8571 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8572 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
8573 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8574 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8575 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8576 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8577 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8578 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8581 let channel_id = [4; 32];
8582 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8583 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
8585 // Test the API functions.
8586 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
8588 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
8590 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8592 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8594 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8596 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
8598 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
8602 fn test_connection_limiting() {
8603 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
8604 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8605 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8606 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8607 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8609 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8611 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8612 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8614 let mut funding_tx = None;
8615 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8616 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8617 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8620 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8621 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
8622 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
8623 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
8624 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8626 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8627 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8628 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8630 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8632 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8633 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8634 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8636 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8639 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
8640 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8641 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8642 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8643 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8645 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
8646 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
8648 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
8649 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
8650 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8651 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8652 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
8653 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8654 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8656 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8657 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8658 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8659 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8661 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
8662 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
8663 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8664 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8665 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
8666 for ev in chan_closed_events {
8667 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
8669 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8670 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8671 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8672 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8674 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
8675 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8676 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8677 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8679 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
8680 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
8682 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
8683 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8684 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
8685 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
8686 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8688 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8689 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8690 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8692 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
8693 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8694 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
8696 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
8697 // "protected" and can connect again.
8698 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
8699 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8700 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8701 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8703 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
8705 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8706 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8710 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
8711 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
8712 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8713 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8714 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8715 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8717 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8719 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8720 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8722 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8723 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8724 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8725 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8728 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
8730 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8731 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8732 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8734 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
8735 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8736 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8738 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
8739 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8740 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8741 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8745 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
8746 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
8747 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
8748 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8749 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8750 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
8751 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8752 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
8753 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8755 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8757 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8758 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8760 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
8761 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8762 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8763 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8764 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8765 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8767 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8768 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8770 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8771 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8773 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8775 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
8776 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8779 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
8780 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8781 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8782 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8783 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8784 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8785 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8787 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8788 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
8789 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
8790 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
8794 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8796 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8797 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8799 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
8800 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8801 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8803 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8804 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8806 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8808 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8813 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
8814 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
8815 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
8816 // the channel without the anchors feature.
8817 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8818 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8819 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
8820 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8821 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8822 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
8823 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8825 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
8826 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8827 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8829 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8830 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8832 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8833 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8835 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8838 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8839 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
8841 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8842 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8844 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8848 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8850 use crate::chain::Listen;
8851 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8852 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
8853 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8854 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8855 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8856 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8857 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8858 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8859 use crate::util::test_utils;
8860 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8862 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8863 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8864 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8866 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8870 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8871 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8872 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8873 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8874 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8875 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
8876 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
8877 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8882 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8883 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8886 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8887 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8888 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8890 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8892 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8893 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8894 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8895 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
8896 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
8898 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8899 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8901 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8902 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8903 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8904 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8906 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8908 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8910 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8911 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8912 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8913 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8914 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8916 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8918 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8920 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8921 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8922 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8923 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8924 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8927 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8928 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8929 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8931 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8932 } else { panic!(); }
8934 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8935 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8936 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8938 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8939 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8941 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8944 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8945 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8946 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8948 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8949 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8951 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8954 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8957 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8960 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8961 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8963 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8964 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8965 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8966 match msg_events[0] {
8967 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8968 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8969 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8973 match msg_events[1] {
8974 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8978 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8979 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8981 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8982 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8984 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8987 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8988 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8990 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8991 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8993 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8996 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a);
8998 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8999 macro_rules! send_payment {
9000 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
9001 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
9002 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9003 .with_features($node_b.invoice_features());
9004 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9005 let seed = [3u8; 32];
9006 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
9007 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9008 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
9009 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9011 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
9012 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
9014 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
9015 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
9017 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9018 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
9019 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9020 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
9021 let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
9022 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9023 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9024 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9026 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
9027 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
9028 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9029 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
9031 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
9032 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
9033 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
9034 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9035 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
9037 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
9040 let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
9041 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9042 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9043 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9045 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
9050 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
9051 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);