1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
17 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
18 use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
19 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
21 use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
23 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
24 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
25 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
28 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,FeeEstimator};
29 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
30 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
31 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
32 use ln::router::Route;
33 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
36 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
37 use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemoryChannelKeys};
38 use util::config::UserConfig;
39 use util::{byte_utils, events};
40 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
41 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
42 use util::logger::Logger;
43 use util::errors::APIError;
46 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
47 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
48 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
49 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
50 use std::time::Duration;
51 use std::marker::{Sync, Send};
54 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
56 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
57 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
58 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
60 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
61 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
62 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
63 // before we forward it.
65 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
66 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
67 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
68 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
69 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
71 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
72 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
73 onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
74 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
75 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
76 short_channel_id: u64,
77 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
78 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
81 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
82 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
83 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
84 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
87 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
88 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
89 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
90 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
94 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
96 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
98 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
102 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
106 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
107 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
108 pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
109 short_channel_id: u64,
111 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
114 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
115 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
116 pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
117 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
120 session_priv: SecretKey,
121 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
122 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
123 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
128 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
129 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
130 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
131 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
132 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
137 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
138 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
140 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
148 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
149 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
150 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
151 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
152 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
153 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
155 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
157 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
158 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
159 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
160 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
161 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
163 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
164 err: msgs::LightningError,
165 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
167 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
169 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
171 err: LightningError {
173 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
174 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
176 data: err.to_string()
180 shutdown_finish: None,
184 fn ignore_no_close(err: &'static str) -> Self {
186 err: LightningError {
188 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
190 shutdown_finish: None,
194 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
195 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
198 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
200 err: LightningError {
202 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
203 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
205 data: err.to_string()
209 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
213 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
216 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
218 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
220 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
222 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
223 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
225 data: msg.to_string()
229 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, .. } => LightningError {
231 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
232 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
234 data: msg.to_string()
239 shutdown_finish: None,
244 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
245 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
246 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
247 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
248 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
250 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
251 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
252 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
253 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
254 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
255 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
256 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
258 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
262 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
263 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
264 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<ChanSigner>>,
265 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
266 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
267 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
268 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
269 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
270 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
271 /// payment_hash -> Vec<(amount_received, htlc_source)> for tracking things that were to us and
272 /// can be failed/claimed by the user
273 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
274 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
276 pub(super) claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(u64, HTLCPreviousHopData)>>,
277 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
278 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
279 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
282 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
283 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
285 latest_features: InitFeatures,
288 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
289 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
291 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
292 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
293 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
294 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
295 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
296 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
297 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
298 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F> = Arc<ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>>>;
300 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
301 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
302 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
303 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
304 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
305 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
306 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
307 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
308 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, M, T, F> = ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F>;
310 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
311 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
313 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
314 /// to individual Channels.
316 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
317 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
318 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
319 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
321 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
322 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
323 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_/update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
324 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
325 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
326 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
327 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
329 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
330 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
331 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
332 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
335 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
336 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
337 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
338 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
339 /// timer_chan_freshness_every_min roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
341 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
342 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
343 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
344 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
345 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
346 pub struct ChannelManager<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref>
347 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
348 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
349 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
350 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
352 default_configuration: UserConfig,
353 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
359 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
361 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
362 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
363 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
366 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
368 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
369 our_network_key: SecretKey,
371 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
372 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
373 /// are currently open with that peer.
374 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
375 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
377 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
379 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
380 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
381 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
382 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
383 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
390 /// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when
391 /// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
392 pub(crate) const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
393 /// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
394 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7;
396 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
397 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
398 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
399 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
400 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
401 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
402 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
404 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
405 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
406 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
407 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
408 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
409 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
412 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
414 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
415 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
418 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
420 macro_rules! secp_call {
421 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
424 Err(_) => return Err($err),
429 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
430 pub struct ChannelDetails {
431 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
432 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
433 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
434 /// lifetime of the channel.
435 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
436 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
437 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
438 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
439 /// The node_id of our counterparty
440 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
441 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
442 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
443 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
444 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
445 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
446 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
447 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
449 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
450 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
451 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
452 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
453 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
454 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
455 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
456 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
457 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
458 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
459 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
460 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
461 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
465 macro_rules! handle_error {
466 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr, $locked_channel_state: expr) => {
469 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
470 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
471 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
472 if let Some(update) = update_option {
473 $locked_channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
478 log_error!($self, "{}", err.err);
479 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
480 } else { $locked_channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id: $their_node_id, action: err.action.clone() }); }
481 // Return error in case higher-API need one
488 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
489 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
492 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
493 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
495 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
496 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
497 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
498 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
499 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
501 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
503 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. }) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
508 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
509 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
512 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
513 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
515 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
516 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
517 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
518 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
519 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
521 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
523 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, update }) => {
524 log_error!($self, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
525 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
526 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
527 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
529 if let Err(e) = $self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update) {
531 // Upstream channel is dead, but we want at least to fail backward HTLCs to save
532 // downstream channels. In case of PermanentFailure, we are not going to be able
533 // to claim back to_remote output on remote commitment transaction. Doesn't
534 // make a difference here, we are concern about HTLCs circuit, not onchain funds.
535 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {},
536 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {},
539 let mut shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown();
540 if shutdown_res.0.len() >= 1 {
541 log_error!($self, "You have a toxic local commitment transaction {} avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_local_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take", shutdown_res.0[0].txid());
543 shutdown_res.0.clear();
544 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
550 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
551 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
552 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
554 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
556 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
557 log_error!($self, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
558 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
559 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
560 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
562 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
563 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
564 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
565 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
566 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
567 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
568 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
569 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
570 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
571 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
574 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
575 log_info!($self, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
576 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
577 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
579 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
580 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
582 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
583 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
585 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
586 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
587 if !$resend_commitment {
588 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
591 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
593 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
594 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()))
600 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
601 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
602 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
604 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
605 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
609 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
610 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
611 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
612 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
613 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
616 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
621 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref> ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
622 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
623 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
624 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
625 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
627 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
629 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
630 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
632 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
634 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
636 /// Users must provide the current blockchain height from which to track onchain channel
637 /// funding outpoints and send payments with reliable timelocks.
639 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
640 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods.
641 /// However, rather than calling these methods directly, the user should register
642 /// the ChannelManager as a listener to the BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's
643 /// `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify all registered listeners in one
645 pub fn new(network: Network, fee_est: F, monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: Arc<Logger>, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, current_blockchain_height: usize) -> Result<ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>, secp256k1::Error> {
646 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
648 let res = ChannelManager {
649 default_configuration: config.clone(),
650 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
651 fee_estimator: fee_est,
655 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(current_blockchain_height),
656 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
659 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
660 by_id: HashMap::new(),
661 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
662 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
663 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
664 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
666 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
668 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
670 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
671 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
681 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
683 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
684 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
685 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
686 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
688 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
689 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
691 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
692 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
693 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
694 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
695 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
698 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
699 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), config)?;
700 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
702 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
703 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
704 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
705 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
706 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
707 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
709 panic!("RNG is bad???");
712 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
714 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
715 node_id: their_network_key,
721 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<ChanSigner>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
722 let mut res = Vec::new();
724 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
725 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
726 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
727 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
728 res.push(ChannelDetails {
729 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
730 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
731 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
732 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
733 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
734 inbound_capacity_msat,
735 outbound_capacity_msat,
736 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
737 is_live: channel.is_live(),
741 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
742 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
743 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
744 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
750 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
751 /// more information.
752 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
753 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
756 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
757 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
759 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
760 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
761 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
762 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
763 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
764 // really wanted anyway.
765 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
768 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
769 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
770 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
772 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
773 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
774 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
776 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
777 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
778 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
779 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
780 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
781 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
782 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
783 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
786 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
787 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
788 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
790 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
791 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
793 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
796 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
797 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
799 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
800 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
805 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
806 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
807 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
816 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
817 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
818 log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len());
819 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
820 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
822 for tx in local_txn {
823 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
824 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
828 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
829 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
830 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
831 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
834 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
835 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
836 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
837 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
838 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
845 log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
846 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
847 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
848 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
849 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
855 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
856 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
857 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
858 for chan in self.list_channels() {
859 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
863 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>) {
864 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
865 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
867 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
868 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
869 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
870 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
871 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
872 failure_code: $err_code,
873 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
878 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
879 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
882 let shared_secret = {
883 let mut arr = [0; 32];
884 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
887 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
889 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
890 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
891 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
892 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
893 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
894 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
895 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
896 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
899 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
900 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
901 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
902 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
903 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
906 let mut channel_state = None;
907 macro_rules! return_err {
908 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
910 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
911 if channel_state.is_none() {
912 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
914 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
915 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
916 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
917 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
918 })), channel_state.unwrap());
923 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
924 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
925 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
926 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
928 let error_code = match err {
929 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
930 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
931 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
932 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
933 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
935 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
938 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
939 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
940 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
947 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
950 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
951 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
952 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
953 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
954 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
955 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
956 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
957 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
958 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
959 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
960 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
961 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
965 // final_expiry_too_soon
966 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
967 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
969 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
970 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
971 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
973 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
974 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
975 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
978 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
979 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
980 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
981 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
983 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
985 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
987 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
988 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
989 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
992 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
993 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
994 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
997 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
998 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
999 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1001 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1003 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1004 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1005 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1007 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1009 let blinding_factor = {
1010 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1011 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1012 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1013 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1016 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1018 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1020 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1023 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1024 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1027 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1028 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1029 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1030 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode => {
1031 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1035 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1036 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1037 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1038 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1039 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1040 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1041 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1045 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1046 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1047 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1048 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1049 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1050 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1051 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1053 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1055 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1056 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1058 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1059 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1060 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1061 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1062 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1063 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1064 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1066 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1067 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1069 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1070 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1071 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1073 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1074 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1076 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1077 // We want to have at least LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1078 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1079 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1081 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1082 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1087 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1088 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1089 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1090 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1092 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1093 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1095 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1096 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
1098 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1100 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1105 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1108 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1109 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1110 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1111 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1112 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1116 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1118 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1119 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1120 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1121 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1122 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1123 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1124 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1125 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator),
1126 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1127 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1130 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1131 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1133 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1139 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1141 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1142 /// fields for more info.
1144 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1145 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1146 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1147 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1148 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1149 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1151 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1153 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1154 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
1155 /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1156 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
1157 /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1158 /// relevant updates.
1160 /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
1161 /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
1162 /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
1163 /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
1164 /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1165 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1166 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1167 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1169 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1170 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1171 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1172 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1176 let (session_priv, prng_seed) = self.keys_manager.get_onion_rand();
1178 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1180 let onion_keys = secp_call!(onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1181 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1182 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1183 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1184 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1186 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, &payment_hash);
1188 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1190 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1191 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1193 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1194 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1195 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1198 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1199 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1201 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1202 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1204 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1205 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
1207 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1208 route: route.clone(),
1209 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1210 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1211 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1213 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1214 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1215 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1216 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1217 // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
1218 // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
1219 // something else in case we will resend later!
1220 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1223 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1224 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1225 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1226 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1227 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1228 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1229 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1237 } else { unreachable!(); }
1241 match handle_error!(self, err, route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey, channel_lock) {
1242 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1243 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err }) }
1247 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1249 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1250 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1252 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1254 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1255 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1256 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1257 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1259 let (mut chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1260 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1261 let (res, chan) = match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1263 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1264 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1265 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
1266 } else { unreachable!(); })
1271 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id(), channel_state) {
1272 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1273 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1275 Err(_) => { return; }
1278 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1279 // lock before add_monitor
1280 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1282 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1284 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1285 match handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", *temporary_channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), None)), chan.get_their_node_id(), channel_state) {
1286 Err(_) => { return; },
1287 Ok(()) => unreachable!(),
1291 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1292 // Its completely fine to continue with a FundingCreated until the monitor
1293 // update is persisted, as long as we don't generate the FundingBroadcastSafe
1294 // until the monitor has been safely persisted (as funding broadcast is not,
1296 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1301 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1302 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1303 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1306 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1307 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1308 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1310 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1316 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1317 if !chan.should_announce() {
1318 log_trace!(self, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1322 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1324 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1326 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1327 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1329 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1330 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1331 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1332 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1333 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1337 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1339 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1340 /// Will likely generate further events.
1341 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1342 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1344 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1345 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1346 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1348 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1349 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1351 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1352 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1353 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1354 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1356 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1357 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1358 match forward_info {
1359 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1360 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1361 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1362 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1363 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1365 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1367 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1368 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1369 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1370 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1371 // problem, not ours.
1378 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1379 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1380 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1381 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1382 match forward_info {
1383 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1384 log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1385 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1386 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1387 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1388 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1390 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1392 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1393 log_trace!(self, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), msg);
1395 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1397 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1398 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1403 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1405 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1406 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1407 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1408 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1409 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1410 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1411 // this channel currently :/.
1417 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1418 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1419 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1421 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1422 log_trace!(self, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1424 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1426 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1427 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1428 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1431 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1433 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1434 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1435 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1436 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1437 // messages when we can.
1438 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1439 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1440 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1447 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1448 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment() {
1451 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1452 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1453 let their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
1454 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1455 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1456 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1458 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1459 log_trace!(self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1460 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1461 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1462 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1464 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1466 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. } => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1468 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state) {
1469 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1470 Err(_) => { continue; },
1474 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1475 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1478 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1479 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1480 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1481 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1482 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1483 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1484 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1486 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1494 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1495 match forward_info {
1496 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1497 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1498 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1499 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1500 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1502 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1503 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push((forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)),
1504 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![(forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)]); },
1506 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1507 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1508 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1511 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1512 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1520 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1522 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1523 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1527 if handle_errors.len() > 0 {
1528 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1529 for (their_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1530 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
1534 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1535 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1536 events.append(&mut new_events);
1539 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
1540 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
1541 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
1543 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
1544 pub fn timer_chan_freshness_every_min(&self) {
1545 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1546 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1547 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1548 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
1549 if chan.is_disabled_staged() && !chan.is_live() {
1550 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1551 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1556 } else if chan.is_disabled_staged() && chan.is_live() {
1558 } else if chan.is_disabled_marked() {
1559 chan.to_disabled_staged();
1564 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1565 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
1566 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
1567 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
1568 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
1569 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
1570 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1572 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1573 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1574 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1575 for (recvd_value, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1576 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1577 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1578 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash,
1579 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(recvd_value).to_vec() });
1585 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1586 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1587 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1588 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1589 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1590 /// still-available channels.
1591 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1592 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
1593 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
1594 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
1597 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, .. } => {
1598 log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1599 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1600 match &onion_error {
1601 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
1603 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1605 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1606 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1607 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1608 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1609 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1610 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1611 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1616 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1617 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1618 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1619 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1621 error_code: onion_error_code
1625 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1629 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1630 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1631 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
1632 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1634 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1635 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1636 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1637 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1638 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1639 rejected_by_dest: route.hops.len() == 1,
1641 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1647 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1648 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1649 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1650 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1651 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1652 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1654 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
1655 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1656 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1660 let mut forward_event = None;
1661 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1662 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
1664 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
1665 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1666 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
1668 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1669 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
1672 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1673 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
1674 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1675 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1676 time_forwardable: time
1683 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1684 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1685 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1687 /// You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
1688 /// available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
1689 /// reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
1690 /// payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
1691 /// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
1692 /// motivated attackers.
1694 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1695 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
1696 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1698 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1700 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1701 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1702 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1703 for (received_amount, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1704 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1705 if received_amount < expected_amount || received_amount > expected_amount * 2 {
1706 let mut htlc_msat_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(received_amount).to_vec();
1707 let mut height_data = byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).to_vec();
1708 htlc_msat_data.append(&mut height_data);
1709 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1710 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), &payment_hash,
1711 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_data });
1713 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1719 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
1720 let (their_node_id, err) = loop {
1722 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1723 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1724 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1725 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1729 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1730 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1731 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1733 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1734 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1736 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1737 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1738 // why it's missing.
1743 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
1744 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
1745 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1746 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1747 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_option {
1748 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1749 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
1750 assert!(msgs.is_none());
1752 break (chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()));
1756 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1757 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1758 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1759 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1760 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1761 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1762 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1763 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1771 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1772 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1773 //TODO: Do something with e?
1777 } else { unreachable!(); }
1783 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
1786 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1787 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1788 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1791 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
1792 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1795 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
1796 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
1798 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
1799 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
1800 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
1801 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
1803 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
1804 /// 1) You register a ManyChannelMonitor with this ChannelManager,
1805 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
1806 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
1807 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
1808 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
1809 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
1810 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
1811 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
1812 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1814 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1815 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1816 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1817 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
1820 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1821 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1822 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
1823 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1824 let channel = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
1828 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
1832 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1833 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1834 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1836 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1838 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1839 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1840 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1841 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1846 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1847 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1848 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1849 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1850 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1855 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1859 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1864 if needs_broadcast_safe {
1865 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1866 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
1867 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1870 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
1871 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1872 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1875 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
1876 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1877 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1878 msg: announcement_sigs,
1881 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
1885 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
1887 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1888 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1890 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1892 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1893 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1897 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1898 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1899 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1902 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1903 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1904 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1905 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1906 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1907 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1908 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1909 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1910 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1911 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1913 entry.insert(channel);
1919 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1920 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1921 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1922 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1923 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1924 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1925 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1926 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1928 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
1929 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1931 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1934 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1935 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1936 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1937 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1938 output_script: output_script,
1939 user_channel_id: user_id,
1944 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1945 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), mut chan) = {
1946 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1947 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1948 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1949 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1950 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1951 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1953 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
1955 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1958 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1959 // lock before add_monitor
1960 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1962 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1963 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
1964 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
1965 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
1966 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
1967 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", funding_msg.channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), None));
1969 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1970 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
1971 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
1972 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
1973 // until we have persisted our monitor.
1974 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1978 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1979 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1980 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1981 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1982 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1984 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1985 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1986 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1995 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1996 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1997 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1998 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1999 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2000 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2001 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2002 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2004 let monitor_update = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg) {
2005 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2006 Err((Some(monitor_update), e)) => {
2007 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
2008 let _ = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
2009 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
2012 Ok(update) => update,
2014 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2015 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2017 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2019 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2022 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2023 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2024 funding_txo: funding_txo,
2025 user_channel_id: user_id,
2030 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2031 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2032 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2033 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2034 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2035 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2036 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2038 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2039 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2040 log_trace!(self, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2041 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2042 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2043 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2044 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2045 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2046 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2047 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2048 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2049 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2050 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2051 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2052 msg: announcement_sigs,
2057 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2061 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2062 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2063 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2064 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2066 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2067 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2068 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2069 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2071 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2072 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2073 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2074 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2078 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2079 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2080 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2084 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2085 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2086 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2088 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2089 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2091 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2094 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2095 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2097 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2098 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2099 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2100 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2108 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2109 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2110 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2111 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2112 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2113 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2114 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2115 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2117 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2118 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2119 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2120 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2125 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2126 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2127 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2128 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2129 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2130 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2131 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2133 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2134 } else { (tx, None) }
2136 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2139 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2140 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
2141 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2143 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2144 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2145 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2146 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2154 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2155 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2156 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2157 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2159 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2160 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2161 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2162 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2164 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2165 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2167 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2168 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2169 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2170 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2172 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2173 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2174 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2175 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2176 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
2177 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
2178 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2179 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2180 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2181 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
2182 // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
2183 // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
2184 // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
2185 // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
2187 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
2188 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2189 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
2190 res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2194 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
2195 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
2196 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
2197 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
2198 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
2199 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2204 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
2206 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2211 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2212 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2214 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2215 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2216 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2217 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2218 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2220 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2222 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2225 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2229 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2230 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2231 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2232 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2233 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2234 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2235 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2237 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2239 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2244 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2245 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2246 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2247 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2248 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2249 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2250 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2252 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2253 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
2254 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2256 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2259 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2263 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2264 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2265 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2266 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2267 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2268 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2269 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2271 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
2272 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator) {
2273 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2274 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
2275 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
2276 let _ = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
2277 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
2282 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2283 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2284 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2286 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2287 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2288 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2290 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2291 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2292 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2293 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2294 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2295 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2296 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2297 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2299 commitment_signed: msg,
2303 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2304 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2305 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2311 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2316 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2317 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2318 let mut forward_event = None;
2319 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2320 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2321 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2322 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
2324 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2325 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2326 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2327 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2329 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2330 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2335 match forward_event {
2337 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2338 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2339 time_forwardable: time
2347 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2348 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2349 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2350 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2351 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2352 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2353 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2354 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2356 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2357 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
2358 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2359 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2360 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2361 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2362 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA"));
2364 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2367 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2368 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2369 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2373 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2374 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2375 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2379 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2381 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2384 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2385 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2387 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2392 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2393 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2394 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2395 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2396 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2397 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2398 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2400 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2402 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2407 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2408 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2409 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2411 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2412 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2413 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2414 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2416 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2417 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
2420 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2421 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2422 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2424 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2425 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2426 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2427 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2428 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature");
2429 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2432 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2434 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2435 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2436 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2437 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2438 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2439 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2440 contents: announcement,
2442 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2445 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2450 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2451 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2452 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2454 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2455 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2456 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2457 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2459 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, mut order, shutdown) =
2460 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2461 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
2462 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2463 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2464 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2465 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2466 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2467 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2469 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2470 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2472 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
2473 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2476 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2477 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2478 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2482 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2483 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2484 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2485 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2490 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2491 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2492 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2493 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2499 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2503 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2508 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2509 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2510 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2516 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2520 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2521 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2522 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2523 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2525 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2526 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2527 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2529 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2530 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2532 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2533 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2534 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2535 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2536 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2538 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2539 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2541 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2542 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2544 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2545 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
2546 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2548 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2551 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2552 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2553 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2554 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2555 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2556 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2557 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2558 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2568 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state_lock) {
2569 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2570 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
2575 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref> events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
2576 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
2577 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2578 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
2579 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2581 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2582 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2583 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2584 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2586 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2587 for htlc_update in self.monitor.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() {
2588 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2589 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2590 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2592 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2593 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2598 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2599 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2600 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2605 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref> events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
2606 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
2607 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2608 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
2609 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2611 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2612 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2613 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2614 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2616 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2617 for htlc_update in self.monitor.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() {
2618 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2619 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2620 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2622 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2623 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2628 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2629 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2630 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2635 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send>
2636 ChainListener for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
2637 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
2638 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2639 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
2640 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2642 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2643 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2644 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2645 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2646 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2648 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2649 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2650 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2651 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2652 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2653 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2654 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2655 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2656 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2657 msg: funding_locked,
2659 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2660 log_trace!(self, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2661 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2662 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2663 msg: announcement_sigs,
2666 log_trace!(self, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2668 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2669 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2670 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2671 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2672 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
2676 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2677 for tx in txn_matched {
2678 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2679 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2680 log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2681 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2682 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2684 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2685 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2686 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2687 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2688 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2689 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2698 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2699 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2700 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2702 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2703 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2704 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2705 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2706 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2707 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2708 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2717 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2718 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2720 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2721 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
2724 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2725 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, _: u32) {
2726 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2727 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2729 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2730 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2731 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2732 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2733 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2734 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2735 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2736 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2738 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2739 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2740 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2750 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2751 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2753 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2754 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2758 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send>
2759 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
2760 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
2761 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2762 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
2763 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2765 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
2766 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2767 let res = self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg);
2769 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2770 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2774 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
2775 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2776 let res = self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg);
2778 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2779 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2783 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
2784 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2785 let res = self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg);
2787 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2788 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2792 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
2793 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2794 let res = self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg);
2796 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2797 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2801 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
2802 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2803 let res = self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg);
2805 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2806 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2810 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
2811 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2812 let res = self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg);
2814 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2815 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2819 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
2820 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2821 let res = self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg);
2823 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2824 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2828 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
2829 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2830 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2832 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2833 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2837 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
2838 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2839 let res = self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2841 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2842 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2846 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
2847 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2848 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2850 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2851 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2855 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
2856 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2857 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2859 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2860 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2864 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
2865 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2866 let res = self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg);
2868 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2869 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2873 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
2874 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2875 let res = self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg);
2877 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2878 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2882 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
2883 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2884 let res = self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg);
2886 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2887 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2891 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
2892 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2893 let res = self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg);
2895 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2896 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2900 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
2901 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2902 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg);
2904 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2905 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2909 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2910 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2911 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2912 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2913 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
2915 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2916 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2917 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2918 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2919 if no_connection_possible {
2920 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2921 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2922 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2923 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2924 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2926 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2927 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2928 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2938 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2939 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2940 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2941 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2942 chan.to_disabled_marked();
2943 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2944 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2945 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2947 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2948 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2949 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2953 no_channels_remain = false;
2959 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
2961 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2962 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2963 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2964 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2965 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2966 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2967 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2968 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2969 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2970 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2971 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2972 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
2973 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
2974 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2975 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
2979 if no_channels_remain {
2980 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(their_node_id);
2983 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2984 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2986 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2987 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2988 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2993 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
2994 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2996 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2999 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3000 match peer_state_lock.entry(their_node_id.clone()) {
3001 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3002 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
3003 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
3006 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
3007 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
3012 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3013 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3014 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3015 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3016 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
3017 if !chan.have_received_message() {
3018 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
3019 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
3020 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
3024 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
3025 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
3026 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
3032 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
3035 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
3036 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3038 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
3039 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3040 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
3041 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
3045 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
3050 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3051 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3053 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3054 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3055 self.onion_packet.write(writer)?;
3056 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
3057 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3058 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3059 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
3060 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
3065 impl Readable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3066 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
3067 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3068 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3069 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
3070 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3071 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3072 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
3073 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
3078 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3079 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3081 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
3083 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3085 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
3087 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3094 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3095 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
3096 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3097 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3098 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3099 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3104 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3105 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3107 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
3109 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3111 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
3113 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3120 impl Readable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3121 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3122 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3123 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3124 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3125 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3130 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3133 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3136 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3137 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3139 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3141 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3143 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3145 route.write(writer)?;
3146 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3147 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3154 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
3155 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3156 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3157 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3158 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3159 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
3160 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3161 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3163 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3168 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3169 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3171 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3175 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3177 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3178 data.write(writer)?;
3185 impl Readable for HTLCFailReason {
3186 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3187 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3188 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3189 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3190 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3191 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3193 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3198 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3199 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3201 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
3203 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3204 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3205 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3207 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3209 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3210 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3217 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3218 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
3219 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3220 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
3221 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3222 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3223 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
3225 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
3226 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3227 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3229 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3234 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
3235 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
3236 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3237 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3238 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3240 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3241 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3243 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3244 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3246 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3247 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3248 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3250 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3251 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3252 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3253 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3254 unfunded_channels += 1;
3257 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3258 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3259 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3260 channel.write(writer)?;
3264 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3265 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3266 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3267 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3268 for forward in pending_forwards {
3269 forward.write(writer)?;
3273 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3274 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3275 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3276 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3277 for &(recvd_amt, ref previous_hop) in previous_hops.iter() {
3278 recvd_amt.write(writer)?;
3279 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
3283 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3284 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3285 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3286 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
3287 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3288 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
3295 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3297 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3299 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3300 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3301 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3302 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3303 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3304 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3305 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3306 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3307 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3308 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3309 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface.
3310 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner: 'a + ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref>
3311 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
3312 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3313 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3314 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3317 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3318 /// deserialization.
3319 pub keys_manager: K,
3321 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3323 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3324 pub fee_estimator: F,
3325 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3327 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3328 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3329 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3332 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3333 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3334 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3335 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
3336 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3337 /// deserialization.
3338 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3339 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3340 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3341 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3343 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3344 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3346 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3347 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
3348 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3349 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3351 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3353 pub channel_monitors: &'a mut HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>,
3356 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
3357 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
3358 impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref>
3359 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>> for (Sha256dHash, Arc<ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>>)
3360 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
3361 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3362 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3363 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3365 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3366 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>)>::read(reader, args)?;
3367 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
3371 impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref>
3372 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>)
3373 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
3374 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3375 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3376 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3378 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3379 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3380 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3381 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3382 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3385 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3386 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3387 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3389 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3391 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3392 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3393 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3394 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3395 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3396 let mut channel: Channel<ChanSigner> = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3397 if channel.last_block_connected != Default::default() && channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3398 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3401 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3402 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3403 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
3404 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3405 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3406 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() ||
3407 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
3408 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3409 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3410 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3412 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3413 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3415 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3418 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3422 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
3423 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3424 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3428 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3429 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3430 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3431 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3432 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3433 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3434 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3435 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3437 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3440 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3441 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3442 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3443 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3444 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3445 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3446 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3447 previous_hops.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3449 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3452 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3453 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, 128));
3454 for _ in 0..peer_count {
3455 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3456 let peer_state = PeerState {
3457 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
3459 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
3462 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3464 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3465 monitor: args.monitor,
3466 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3468 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3469 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3470 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3472 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3477 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3479 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3481 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
3483 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3484 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3485 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3486 logger: args.logger,
3487 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3490 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3491 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3492 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3493 //connection or two.
3496 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))