1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
47 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
50 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
52 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
53 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
54 use util::config::UserConfig;
55 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
56 use util::{byte_utils, events};
57 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
58 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
59 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
60 use util::errors::APIError;
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
66 use io::{Cursor, Read};
67 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
70 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
71 use std::time::Instant;
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
94 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
98 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
99 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
102 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
103 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
107 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
108 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
109 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
110 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
111 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
112 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
113 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
116 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
117 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
118 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
119 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
122 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
125 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
126 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
129 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
131 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
133 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
134 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
135 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
137 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
139 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
143 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
147 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
148 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
149 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
150 short_channel_id: u64,
152 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
154 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
155 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
160 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
161 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
162 /// are part of the same payment.
163 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
164 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
165 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
168 struct ClaimableHTLC {
169 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
172 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
175 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
176 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
177 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
179 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
180 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
185 impl Readable for PaymentId {
186 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
187 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
191 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
192 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
193 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
194 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
197 session_priv: SecretKey,
198 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
199 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
200 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
201 payment_id: PaymentId,
202 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
207 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
208 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
210 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
211 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
212 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
213 payment_secret: None,
218 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
219 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
221 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
229 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
230 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
232 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
237 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
239 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
240 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
241 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
242 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
243 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
245 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
246 err: msgs::LightningError,
247 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
248 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
250 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
252 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
254 err: LightningError {
256 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
257 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
264 shutdown_finish: None,
268 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
270 err: LightningError {
272 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
275 shutdown_finish: None,
279 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
280 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
283 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
285 err: LightningError {
287 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
288 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
294 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
295 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
299 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
302 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
304 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
306 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
308 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
310 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
312 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
313 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
319 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
321 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
322 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
330 shutdown_finish: None,
335 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
336 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
337 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
338 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
339 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
341 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
342 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
343 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
344 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
345 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
346 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
347 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
349 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
353 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
354 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
355 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
356 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
357 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
358 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
359 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
360 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
361 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
362 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
363 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
364 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
366 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
367 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
368 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
369 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
372 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
373 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
374 /// quite some time lag.
375 enum BackgroundEvent {
376 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
377 /// commitment transaction.
378 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
381 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
382 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
384 latest_features: InitFeatures,
387 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
388 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
390 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
392 struct PendingInboundPayment {
393 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
394 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
395 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
396 /// this payment being removed.
398 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
399 user_payment_id: u64,
400 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
401 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
402 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
405 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
406 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
407 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
409 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
412 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
413 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
414 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
415 pending_amt_msat: u64,
416 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
418 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
419 starting_block_height: u32,
421 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
422 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
423 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
425 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
429 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
430 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
432 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
436 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
438 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
443 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
444 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
445 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
446 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
447 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
448 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs }
451 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs };
454 /// panics if part_amt_msat is None and !self.is_fulfilled
455 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], part_amt_msat: Option<u64>) -> bool {
456 let remove_res = match self {
457 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
458 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
459 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs } => {
460 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
464 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, .. } = self {
465 *pending_amt_msat -= part_amt_msat.expect("We must only not provide an amount if the payment was already fulfilled");
471 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], part_amt_msat: u64) -> bool {
472 let insert_res = match self {
473 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
474 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
475 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
477 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false
480 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, .. } = self {
481 *pending_amt_msat += part_amt_msat;
487 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
489 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
490 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
491 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs } => {
498 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
499 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
500 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
501 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
502 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
503 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
504 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
505 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
507 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
508 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
509 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
510 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
511 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
512 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
513 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
514 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
515 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
517 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
518 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
520 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
521 /// to individual Channels.
523 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
524 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
525 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
526 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
528 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
529 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
530 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
531 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
532 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
533 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
534 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
536 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
537 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
538 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
539 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
542 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
543 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
544 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
545 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
546 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
548 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
549 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
550 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
551 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
552 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
553 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
554 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
555 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
556 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
557 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
560 default_configuration: UserConfig,
561 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
567 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
569 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
570 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
572 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
573 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
574 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
575 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
577 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
578 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
579 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
580 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
581 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
582 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
584 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
585 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
586 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
587 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
588 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
589 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
590 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
591 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
593 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
595 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
596 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
598 our_network_key: SecretKey,
599 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
601 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
602 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
603 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
605 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
606 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
607 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
608 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
610 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
611 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
612 /// are currently open with that peer.
613 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
614 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
617 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
618 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
620 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
621 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
622 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
623 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
624 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
625 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
626 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
627 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
628 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
630 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
637 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
639 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
640 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
641 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
642 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
643 pub struct ChainParameters {
644 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
645 pub network: Network,
647 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
649 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
650 pub best_block: BestBlock,
653 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
659 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
660 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
661 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
662 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
663 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
664 /// updates are ready for persistence).
666 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
667 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
668 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
669 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
670 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
672 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
673 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
676 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
677 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
678 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
681 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
682 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
684 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
685 persistence_notifier: notifier,
686 should_persist: persist_check,
687 _read_guard: read_guard,
692 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
694 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
695 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
700 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
701 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
703 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
705 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
706 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
707 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
708 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
709 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
711 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
712 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
714 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
716 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
717 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
718 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
719 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
720 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
721 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
722 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
724 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
725 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
727 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
728 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
729 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
730 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
732 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
733 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
734 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
735 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
736 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
737 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
740 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
742 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
743 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
746 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
748 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
749 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
750 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
751 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
752 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
753 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
754 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
755 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
756 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
757 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
758 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
761 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
762 /// to better separate parameters.
763 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
764 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
765 /// The node_id of our counterparty
766 pub node_id: PublicKey,
767 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
768 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
769 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
770 pub features: InitFeatures,
771 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
772 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
773 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
775 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
777 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
778 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
779 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
780 /// payments to us through this channel.
781 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
784 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
785 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
786 pub struct ChannelDetails {
787 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
788 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
789 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
790 /// lifetime of the channel.
791 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
792 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
793 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
794 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
795 /// our counterparty already.
797 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
798 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
799 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
800 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
801 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
802 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
803 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
804 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
805 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
806 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
807 /// this value on chain.
809 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
811 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
813 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
814 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
815 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
816 pub user_channel_id: u64,
817 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
818 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
819 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
820 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
822 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
823 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
824 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
825 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
826 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
827 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
828 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
829 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
830 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
832 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
833 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
834 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
835 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
836 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
837 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
838 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
839 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
840 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
842 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
844 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
845 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
846 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
847 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
848 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
849 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
850 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
851 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
852 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
854 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
855 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
856 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
857 pub is_outbound: bool,
858 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
859 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
860 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
861 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
862 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
864 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
865 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
866 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
867 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
869 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
871 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
875 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
876 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
878 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
879 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
880 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
881 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
882 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
883 ParameterError(APIError),
884 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
885 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
886 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
889 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
891 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
892 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
893 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
894 /// paths than the ones selected).
895 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
896 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
897 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
898 /// in over-/re-payment.
900 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
901 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
902 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
904 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
905 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
906 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
907 /// with the latest update_id.
908 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
911 macro_rules! handle_error {
912 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
915 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
916 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
918 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
919 // entering the macro.
920 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
921 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
924 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
926 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
927 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
928 if let Some(update) = update_option {
929 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
933 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
934 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
935 channel_id, user_channel_id,
936 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
941 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
942 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
944 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
945 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
946 action: err.action.clone()
950 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
951 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
954 // Return error in case higher-API need one
961 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
962 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
963 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
965 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
966 //TODO: Once warning messages are merged, we should send a `warning` message to our
968 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
970 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
971 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
973 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
974 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
975 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
976 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
978 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
979 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
980 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
982 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
983 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
984 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
985 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
987 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
988 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
989 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
995 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
996 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1000 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1002 $entry.remove_entry();
1010 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1011 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1015 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1017 $entry.remove_entry();
1025 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1026 ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1028 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1029 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1030 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1037 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1038 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1039 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1041 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1043 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1044 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1045 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1046 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1048 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1049 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1050 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1051 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1052 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1053 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1054 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1055 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1056 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1057 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1058 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1061 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1062 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1063 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1064 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1065 match $action_type {
1066 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1067 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1069 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1070 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1072 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1073 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1074 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1075 if !$resend_commitment {
1076 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1079 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1081 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1082 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1086 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1087 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1089 $entry.remove_entry();
1093 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1094 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new());
1098 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1099 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1100 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1102 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1103 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1107 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1108 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1109 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1110 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1111 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1114 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1119 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1120 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1121 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1122 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
1123 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1124 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1126 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1127 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1129 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1130 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1131 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1132 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1135 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1136 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1137 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1138 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1139 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1140 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1141 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1142 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1143 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1144 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1145 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1146 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1149 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1150 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1151 // before it should be allowed to.
1152 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1153 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1154 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1157 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
1158 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1159 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1160 msg: announcement_sigs,
1163 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
1166 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1167 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1168 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1169 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1170 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1171 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1172 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1173 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1174 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1175 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1176 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1177 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1178 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1179 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1180 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1181 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1182 let mut order = $order;
1184 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1186 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1190 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1191 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1192 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1193 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1198 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1199 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1200 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1201 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1202 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1207 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1211 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1216 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1217 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1218 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1223 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1224 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1225 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1226 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1227 assert!(res.is_ok());
1230 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1234 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1235 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1236 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1238 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1240 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1241 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1246 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1247 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1248 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1249 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1250 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1253 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1255 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1256 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1258 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1260 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1262 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1263 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1264 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1265 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1266 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1267 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1270 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1271 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1272 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1276 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1278 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1279 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1280 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1281 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1282 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1283 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1285 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1286 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1288 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1289 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1292 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1293 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1295 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1297 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1298 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1299 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1300 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1308 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1309 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1310 &self.default_configuration
1313 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1315 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1316 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1317 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1318 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1319 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1322 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1323 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1325 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1326 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1327 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1329 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1330 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1331 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1332 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1333 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1334 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1336 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1337 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1338 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1339 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1340 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1341 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1345 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1346 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1347 Some(peer_state) => {
1348 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1349 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1350 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1351 Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config)?
1353 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1356 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1358 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1359 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1360 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1362 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1363 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1364 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1365 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1366 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1367 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1369 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1372 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1374 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1375 node_id: their_network_key,
1378 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1381 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1382 let mut res = Vec::new();
1384 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1385 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1386 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1387 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1388 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1389 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1390 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1391 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1392 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1393 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1394 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1395 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1396 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1398 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1399 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1400 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1401 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1402 inbound_capacity_msat,
1403 outbound_capacity_msat,
1404 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1405 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1406 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1407 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1408 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1409 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1410 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1414 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1415 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1416 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1417 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1423 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1424 /// more information.
1425 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1426 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1429 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1430 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1432 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1433 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1435 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1436 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1437 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1438 // really wanted anyway.
1439 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1442 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1443 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1444 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1445 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1446 Some(transaction) => {
1447 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1451 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1452 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1453 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1454 reason: closure_reason
1458 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1459 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1461 let counterparty_node_id;
1462 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1463 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1464 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1465 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1466 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1467 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1468 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1469 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1470 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1471 Some(peer_state) => {
1472 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1473 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1474 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1476 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1478 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1480 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1481 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1482 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1483 let (result, is_permanent) =
1484 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
1486 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1492 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1493 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1497 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1498 let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1499 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1500 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1504 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1508 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1512 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1513 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1516 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1520 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1521 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1522 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1524 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1525 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1527 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1528 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1529 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1530 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1532 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1534 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1535 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1536 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1537 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1538 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
1541 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1542 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1543 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1545 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1546 /// the channel being closed or not:
1547 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1548 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1549 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1550 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1551 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1552 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1553 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1555 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1557 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1558 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1559 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1560 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1561 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1565 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1566 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1567 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1568 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1569 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1571 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1572 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1573 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1574 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1575 // ignore the result here.
1576 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1580 /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1581 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1582 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1584 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1585 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1586 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1587 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1588 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1589 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1592 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1593 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1595 if peer_node_id.is_some() {
1596 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1597 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1600 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1602 chan.remove_entry().1
1604 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1607 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1608 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1609 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1610 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1611 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1616 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1619 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1620 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1621 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1622 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1623 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
1624 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1625 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1626 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1627 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1628 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1629 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1639 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1640 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1641 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1642 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1643 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1647 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1648 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1649 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1651 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1652 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1653 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1654 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1655 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1656 failure_code: $err_code,
1657 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1662 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1663 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1666 let shared_secret = {
1667 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1668 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1671 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1673 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1674 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1675 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1676 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1677 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1678 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1679 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1680 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1683 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1684 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1685 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1686 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1687 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1690 let mut channel_state = None;
1691 macro_rules! return_err {
1692 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1694 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1695 if channel_state.is_none() {
1696 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1698 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1699 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1700 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1701 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1702 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1707 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1708 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1709 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac): (msgs::OnionHopData, _) = {
1710 match <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1712 let error_code = match err {
1713 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1714 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1715 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1716 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1717 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1719 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1722 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1723 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1724 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1731 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1734 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1735 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1736 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1737 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1738 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1739 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1740 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1741 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1742 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1743 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1744 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1745 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1749 // final_expiry_too_soon
1750 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1751 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1752 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1753 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1754 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1755 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1756 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1758 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1759 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1760 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1762 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1763 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1764 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1767 let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
1768 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
1769 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1770 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1771 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1772 return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1773 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1774 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1776 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1778 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1779 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1780 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1781 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1782 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1783 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1784 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1785 if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
1786 return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1789 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
1791 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1794 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1799 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1800 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1801 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1802 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1804 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1806 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1807 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1808 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1809 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1812 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1813 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1814 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1816 // Check two things:
1817 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1818 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1819 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1821 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1823 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1824 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1825 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1827 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1829 let blinding_factor = {
1830 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1831 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1832 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1833 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1836 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1838 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1840 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1843 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1844 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1847 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1848 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1849 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1850 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1851 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1855 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1856 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1857 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1860 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1861 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1862 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1863 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1867 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1868 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1869 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1870 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1871 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1872 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1873 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1874 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1875 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1876 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1877 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1879 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1882 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1884 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
1885 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
1886 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
1887 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
1888 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1891 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1892 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1893 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1894 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1895 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1896 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1897 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1899 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1900 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1902 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
1903 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
1904 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
1905 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1906 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1908 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1909 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1911 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1912 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1913 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1914 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1915 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1917 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1918 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1920 // In theory, we would be safe against unintentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1921 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longer delay.
1922 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1923 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1929 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1930 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1931 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1932 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1934 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1935 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1937 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1938 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1939 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1941 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1943 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1948 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1951 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
1952 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
1953 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
1955 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1956 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1957 if !chan.should_announce() {
1958 return Err(LightningError {
1959 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
1960 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
1963 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1964 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
1967 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
1968 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
1969 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
1970 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
1971 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1972 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1973 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1974 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1975 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1979 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1981 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1982 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1984 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1985 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1986 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
1987 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1988 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1989 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
1990 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1991 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1994 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1995 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1997 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2003 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2004 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2005 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2006 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2007 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2008 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2010 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2011 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2012 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2013 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2014 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2016 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2018 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2020 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2021 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2023 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2024 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2025 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2026 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2027 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2028 err: "Payment already completed"
2033 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2034 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2035 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2038 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2039 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2041 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2042 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2044 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2045 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2047 let send_res = break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2048 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2050 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2051 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2053 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2054 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2055 channel_state, chan);
2057 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2058 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2059 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2060 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2061 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2062 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2063 total_msat: total_value,
2065 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path.last().unwrap().fee_msat));
2069 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2070 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2071 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2072 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2073 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2074 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2075 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2076 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2077 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2080 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2081 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2082 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2083 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2084 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2085 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2086 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2087 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2095 } else { unreachable!(); }
2099 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2100 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2102 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2107 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2109 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2110 /// fields for more info.
2112 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2113 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2114 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2115 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2116 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2117 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2119 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2121 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2122 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2123 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2125 /// In general, a path may raise:
2126 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2127 /// node public key) is specified.
2128 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2129 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2131 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2132 /// relevant updates.
2134 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2135 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2136 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2138 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2139 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2140 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2141 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2143 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2144 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2145 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2146 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2147 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2150 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2151 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2152 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2154 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2155 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2156 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2157 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2158 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2160 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2161 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2163 let mut total_value = 0;
2164 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2165 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2166 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2167 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2168 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2169 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2170 continue 'path_check;
2172 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2173 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2174 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2175 continue 'path_check;
2178 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2179 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2181 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2182 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2184 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2185 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2186 total_value = amt_msat;
2189 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2190 let mut results = Vec::new();
2191 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2192 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2194 let mut has_ok = false;
2195 let mut has_err = false;
2196 for res in results.iter() {
2197 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2198 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2199 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2200 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2207 if has_err && has_ok {
2208 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
2210 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2216 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2218 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2219 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2220 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, or if the payment
2221 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success).
2223 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2224 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2225 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2226 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2227 if path.len() == 0 {
2228 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2229 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2234 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2235 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2236 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2238 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2239 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2241 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2242 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2243 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2244 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2247 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2249 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2250 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2251 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2254 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2255 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError {
2256 err: "Payment already completed"
2261 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2262 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2266 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2269 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2270 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2271 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2272 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2273 /// never reach the recipient.
2275 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2277 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2278 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2280 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2282 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2283 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2284 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2286 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2288 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2289 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2290 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2295 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2296 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2297 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2298 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2300 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2302 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2304 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2305 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2306 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2307 } else { unreachable!(); })
2310 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2312 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2313 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2316 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2317 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2322 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2323 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2324 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2327 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2328 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2329 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2331 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2339 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2340 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2341 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2345 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2347 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2348 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2350 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
2352 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2353 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2354 /// keys per-channel).
2356 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2357 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2358 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2360 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2361 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2362 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2364 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2365 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2366 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2368 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2369 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2370 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2371 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2375 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2376 let mut output_index = None;
2377 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2378 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2379 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2380 if output_index.is_some() {
2381 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2382 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2385 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2386 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2387 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2390 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2393 if output_index.is_none() {
2394 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2395 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2398 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2402 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
2403 if !chan.should_announce() {
2404 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2408 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2410 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
2412 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2413 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2415 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2416 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
2417 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
2418 node_signature: our_node_sig,
2419 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
2424 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2425 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2426 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2428 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2431 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2432 // smaller than 500:
2433 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2435 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2436 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2437 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2438 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2439 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2440 /// our network addresses.
2442 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2443 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2445 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2446 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2447 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2448 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2450 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2452 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2453 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2454 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2456 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2457 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2460 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2461 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2462 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2464 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2465 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2466 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2467 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2468 rgb, alias, addresses,
2469 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2470 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2472 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2473 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2475 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2476 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2478 let mut announced_chans = false;
2479 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2480 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2481 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2483 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2488 announced_chans = true;
2490 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2491 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2492 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2496 if announced_chans {
2497 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2498 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2499 signature: node_announce_sig,
2500 contents: announcement
2506 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2508 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2509 /// Will likely generate further events.
2510 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2511 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2513 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2514 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2515 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2517 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2518 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2520 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2521 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2522 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2523 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2525 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2526 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2527 match forward_info {
2528 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2529 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2530 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2531 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2532 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2533 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2534 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2536 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
2537 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
2540 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2541 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2542 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2543 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2544 // problem, not ours.
2551 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2552 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2553 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2554 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2555 match forward_info {
2556 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2557 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2559 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2560 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2561 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2562 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2563 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2564 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2565 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2566 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2568 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
2570 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2571 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2573 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2575 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
2576 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2577 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
2583 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2585 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2586 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2587 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2588 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2589 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2590 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2591 // this channel currently :/.
2597 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2598 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2600 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2601 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
2602 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
2604 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2605 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
2607 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
2609 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2610 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2611 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2614 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2616 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2617 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
2618 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
2619 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
2620 // messages when we can.
2621 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
2622 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
2623 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
2630 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
2631 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
2634 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
2635 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
2636 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2637 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
2638 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
2639 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
2641 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2642 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
2643 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
2644 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2645 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2647 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
2648 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
2650 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
2652 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
2656 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2657 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
2660 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
2661 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2662 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2663 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2664 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2665 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
2666 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2667 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
2668 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2670 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
2678 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2679 match forward_info {
2680 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2681 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
2682 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2683 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
2684 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2685 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
2686 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2687 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
2689 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2692 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
2693 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
2694 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2695 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2696 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2697 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2699 value: amt_to_forward,
2704 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2706 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
2707 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2708 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
2710 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2711 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2712 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2713 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
2714 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
2716 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
2721 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
2722 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
2723 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
2724 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
2725 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
2726 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
2727 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2728 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
2729 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2730 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2731 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => {
2732 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2733 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2735 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
2736 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
2737 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2738 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
2739 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2741 amt: amt_to_forward,
2742 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
2745 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2746 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2747 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2753 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
2755 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2758 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2759 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2762 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
2763 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2764 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2765 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
2766 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2767 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2768 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2770 let mut total_value = 0;
2771 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2772 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2773 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
2774 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
2775 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2776 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2780 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2781 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2782 total_value += htlc.value;
2783 match &htlc.onion_payload {
2784 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
2785 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2786 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2787 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
2788 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2790 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2792 _ => unreachable!(),
2795 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2796 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2797 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2798 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2801 } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2802 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2804 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
2805 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
2806 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
2807 user_payment_id: inbound_payment.get().user_payment_id,
2811 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
2812 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
2814 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
2816 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2817 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
2824 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2825 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
2833 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
2834 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
2837 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2838 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2841 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
2842 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2843 events.append(&mut new_events);
2846 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2848 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2849 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2851 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2852 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
2853 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2854 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2855 if background_events.is_empty() {
2859 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2861 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2862 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2863 // monitor updating completing.
2864 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2871 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2872 /// Process background events, for functional testing
2873 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2874 self.process_background_events();
2877 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
2878 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
2879 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
2880 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
2881 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2882 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2883 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2885 if !chan.is_live() {
2886 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
2887 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2888 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2890 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2891 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2893 let mut retain_channel = true;
2894 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
2897 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
2898 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
2902 let ret_err = match res {
2903 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
2904 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2905 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_id);
2906 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
2909 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2910 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2911 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2912 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2913 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2914 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2915 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2916 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2926 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
2930 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
2931 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
2932 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
2933 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
2934 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
2935 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2936 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2938 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
2940 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2942 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2943 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2944 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2945 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2946 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
2947 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
2948 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2950 handle_errors.push(err);
2960 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
2962 /// This currently includes:
2963 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
2964 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
2965 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
2968 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
2969 /// estimate fetches.
2970 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
2971 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2972 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2973 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2975 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
2977 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2979 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2980 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2981 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2982 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2983 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
2984 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
2985 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
2986 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2988 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
2990 if !retain_channel { return false; }
2992 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
2993 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
2994 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
2995 if needs_close { return false; }
2998 match chan.channel_update_status() {
2999 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3000 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3001 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3002 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3003 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3004 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3005 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3009 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3010 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3012 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3013 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3014 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3018 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3019 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3028 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3029 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3035 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3036 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3037 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3038 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
3039 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
3040 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
3041 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3043 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3044 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3045 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3046 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3047 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3048 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3049 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3050 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3051 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3052 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3053 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3059 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3060 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3061 // be surfaced to the user.
3062 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3063 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3065 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3066 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3067 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3068 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3069 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
3070 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
3072 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3075 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3077 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3078 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3079 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3081 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3082 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3083 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3084 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3085 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3086 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(path.last().unwrap().fee_msat)) &&
3087 !payment.get().is_fulfilled()
3089 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3090 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3092 rejected_by_dest: false,
3093 network_update: None,
3094 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3096 short_channel_id: None,
3105 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3112 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3113 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3114 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3115 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3116 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3117 /// still-available channels.
3118 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3119 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3120 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3121 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3124 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3125 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3126 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3128 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, .. } => {
3129 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3130 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3131 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3132 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3133 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3134 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(path.last().unwrap().fee_msat)) {
3135 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3138 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3139 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3142 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3143 all_paths_failed = true;
3146 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3149 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3150 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3151 match &onion_error {
3152 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3154 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3156 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3157 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3158 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3159 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3160 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3161 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3162 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3163 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3169 error_code: onion_error_code,
3171 error_data: onion_error_data
3175 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3181 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3182 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3183 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
3184 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3186 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3187 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3188 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3189 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3190 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3191 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3192 network_update: None,
3195 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3197 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3199 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3205 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3206 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3207 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3208 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3209 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3210 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3212 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3213 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3214 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3218 let mut forward_event = None;
3219 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3220 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3222 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3223 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3224 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3226 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3227 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3230 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3231 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3232 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3233 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3234 time_forwardable: time
3241 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
3242 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
3243 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
3245 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3246 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3247 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3248 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3250 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
3252 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3253 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3254 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3255 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3257 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3259 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3260 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3261 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3262 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3264 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3265 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3266 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3267 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3269 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3270 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3271 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3272 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3273 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3275 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3276 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3277 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3283 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3284 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3285 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3287 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3288 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3289 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3290 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3291 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3292 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3293 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3295 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3296 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3297 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3298 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3299 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3300 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3301 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3302 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3304 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3305 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3306 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3307 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3308 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3309 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3311 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3316 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3317 // which were generated.
3318 channel_state.take();
3320 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3321 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3322 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3329 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3330 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3331 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3332 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3333 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3335 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3339 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3340 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3341 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3342 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3343 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3344 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3345 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3346 payment_preimage, e);
3347 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3348 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3349 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3350 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3353 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3354 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3355 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3356 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3357 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3358 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3359 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3360 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3361 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3362 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3368 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3370 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3373 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3374 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3375 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3376 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3377 payment_preimage, e);
3379 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3380 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3382 chan.remove_entry();
3384 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3387 } else { unreachable!(); }
3390 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
3391 for source in sources.drain(..) {
3392 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, .. } = source {
3393 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3394 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3395 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3396 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3397 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
3398 payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None);
3399 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3407 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
3409 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3410 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3411 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3412 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3413 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3414 let found_payment = if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3415 let found_payment = !payment.get().is_fulfilled();
3416 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
3418 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
3419 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
3420 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
3422 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
3423 // irrevocably fulfilled.
3424 payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(path.last().unwrap().fee_msat));
3425 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3432 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3433 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3434 events::Event::PaymentSent {
3436 payment_hash: payment_hash
3440 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
3443 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
3444 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
3445 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
3446 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
3447 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
3448 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
3449 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
3452 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
3453 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3454 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
3455 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3456 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3459 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
3460 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
3461 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
3462 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
3463 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3464 payment_preimage, e);
3466 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
3467 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
3468 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
3469 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
3472 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3473 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
3474 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3475 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
3479 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
3480 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
3481 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
3484 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3485 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
3487 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
3495 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
3496 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3497 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
3500 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
3501 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3503 let chan_restoration_res;
3504 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
3505 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3506 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3507 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
3508 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
3509 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
3511 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
3515 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
3516 let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
3517 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
3518 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
3519 // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
3520 // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
3521 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3522 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3523 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
3526 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked);
3527 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3528 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3530 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
3532 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3533 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
3534 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3535 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3539 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3540 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
3541 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
3544 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
3545 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
3546 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3547 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3548 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
3549 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
3550 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3551 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
3552 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3553 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
3555 entry.insert(channel);
3561 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3562 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
3563 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3564 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3565 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
3566 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3567 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3568 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3570 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
3571 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
3573 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3576 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3577 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
3578 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
3579 channel_value_satoshis: value,
3581 user_channel_id: user_id,
3586 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3587 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
3588 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3589 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3590 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3591 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
3592 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3593 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3594 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3596 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
3598 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3601 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
3602 // lock before watch_channel
3603 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
3605 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
3606 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
3607 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
3608 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
3609 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
3610 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
3611 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
3612 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
3613 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
3614 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
3615 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
3617 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
3618 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
3619 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
3620 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
3621 // until we have persisted our monitor.
3622 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3626 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3627 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3628 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
3629 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3630 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
3632 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3633 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
3634 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3643 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3645 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3646 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3647 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3648 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3649 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3650 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3651 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3653 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
3654 Ok(update) => update,
3655 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3657 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
3658 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
3659 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
3660 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
3661 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
3662 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
3663 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
3664 shutdown_finish.0.take();
3671 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3674 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
3675 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
3679 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3680 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3681 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3682 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3683 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3684 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3685 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3687 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3688 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
3689 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3690 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
3691 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
3692 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
3693 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
3694 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
3695 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
3696 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
3697 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
3698 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
3699 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3700 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3701 msg: announcement_sigs,
3703 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3704 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3705 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3706 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3711 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3715 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3716 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
3717 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
3718 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3719 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3721 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3722 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3723 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3724 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3727 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
3728 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
3729 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
3730 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
3733 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3734 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
3736 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3737 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
3738 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3739 let (result, is_permanent) =
3740 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
3742 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
3748 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3749 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3750 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3757 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3760 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
3761 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3764 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
3768 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3769 let (tx, chan_option) = {
3770 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3771 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3772 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3773 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3774 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3775 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3777 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3778 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3779 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3780 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3785 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
3786 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
3787 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
3788 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
3789 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
3790 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3791 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3793 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3794 } else { (tx, None) }
3796 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3799 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
3800 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
3801 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
3803 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3804 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3805 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3806 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3810 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
3815 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3816 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
3817 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
3818 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
3820 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
3821 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
3822 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
3823 //but we should prevent it anyway.
3825 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
3826 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3828 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3829 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3830 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3831 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3834 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
3835 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
3836 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
3837 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
3838 match pending_forward_info {
3839 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3840 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
3841 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
3842 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
3843 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
3844 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
3845 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
3846 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
3850 // The only case where we'd be unable to
3851 // successfully get a channel update is if the
3852 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
3853 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
3854 // payments over the channel back to themselves
3855 // (because no one else should know the short_id
3856 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
3857 // no problem just calling this
3858 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
3859 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
3862 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
3864 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3865 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3866 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3869 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
3871 _ => pending_forward_info
3874 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3876 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3881 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3882 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3883 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
3884 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3885 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3886 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3887 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3888 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3890 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
3892 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3895 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
3899 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3900 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3901 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3902 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3903 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3904 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3905 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3907 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
3909 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3914 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3915 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3916 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3917 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3918 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3919 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3920 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3922 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
3923 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
3924 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3926 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
3929 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3933 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3934 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3935 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3936 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3937 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3938 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3939 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3941 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
3942 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
3943 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3944 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
3945 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
3946 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
3947 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
3952 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3953 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
3955 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3956 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3957 msg: revoke_and_ack,
3959 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
3960 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3961 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3962 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3963 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3964 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3965 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3966 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3968 commitment_signed: msg,
3974 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3979 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
3980 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
3981 let mut forward_event = None;
3982 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
3983 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3984 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3985 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
3987 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3988 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
3989 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
3990 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
3991 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
3993 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3994 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3995 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
3997 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3998 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3999 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4004 match forward_event {
4006 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4007 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4008 time_forwardable: time
4016 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4017 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4019 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4020 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4021 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4022 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4023 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4024 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4026 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4027 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4028 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4029 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4030 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4031 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4032 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4033 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4034 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4035 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4036 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4038 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4039 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4040 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(),
4041 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4042 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4044 } else { unreachable!(); }
4047 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4048 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4049 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4053 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4054 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4055 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4056 .expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"),
4057 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4059 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4062 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
4064 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4065 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4067 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4068 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4070 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4071 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4078 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4079 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4080 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4081 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4082 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4083 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4084 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4086 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4088 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4093 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4094 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4095 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4097 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4098 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4099 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4100 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4102 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4103 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4106 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4107 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4108 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4109 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4110 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4113 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4118 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4119 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4120 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4121 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4122 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4123 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4125 // It's not a local channel
4126 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4129 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4130 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4131 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4132 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4133 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4134 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4135 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4136 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4138 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4140 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4141 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4142 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4143 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4145 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
4148 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
4150 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4153 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4154 let chan_restoration_res;
4155 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
4156 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4157 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4159 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4160 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4161 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4162 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4164 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4165 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4166 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4167 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4168 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
4169 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4170 let mut channel_update = None;
4171 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4172 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4173 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4176 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4177 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4178 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4179 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4180 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4181 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4182 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4185 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4186 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
4187 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4188 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4190 (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
4192 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4195 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4196 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
4198 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4199 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
4204 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
4205 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
4206 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4207 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
4208 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
4209 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
4210 match monitor_event {
4211 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
4212 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
4213 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
4214 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
4216 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
4217 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4220 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
4221 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
4222 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4223 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4224 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4225 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4226 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4227 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
4228 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4229 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4231 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
4232 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4233 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4237 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
4238 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
4240 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
4242 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
4243 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4244 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4245 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4246 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4251 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
4252 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
4257 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4258 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4261 has_pending_monitor_events
4264 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
4265 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
4266 /// update events as a separate process method here.
4267 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
4268 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
4269 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
4272 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
4273 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
4274 /// update was applied.
4276 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
4277 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
4278 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
4279 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
4280 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
4281 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
4282 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4283 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
4285 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4286 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4287 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4288 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4289 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4291 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4292 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
4293 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4294 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
4295 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
4297 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
4298 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4299 has_monitor_update = true;
4300 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
4301 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
4302 if close_channel { return false; }
4304 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4305 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4306 updates: commitment_update,
4313 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4314 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4315 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
4322 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
4323 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4324 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
4327 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4328 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4334 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
4335 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
4336 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
4337 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
4338 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
4339 let mut has_update = false;
4341 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4342 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4343 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4344 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4345 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4347 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4348 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
4349 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
4350 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4352 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4353 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
4356 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
4357 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
4358 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
4359 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4360 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4363 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4364 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4369 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4371 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
4372 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4378 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4379 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4386 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4387 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4393 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
4394 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
4396 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
4397 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4398 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
4399 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
4400 // reorganized out of the main chain.
4401 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
4402 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
4403 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
4404 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
4405 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
4406 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
4407 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
4408 assert!(should_broadcast);
4409 } else { unreachable!(); }
4410 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
4412 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4416 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4417 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
4419 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4421 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4422 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4423 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4424 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4425 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
4426 payment_secret, min_value_msat, user_payment_id, payment_preimage,
4427 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
4428 // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
4429 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
4430 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
4431 // never fail a payment too early.
4432 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
4434 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
4437 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
4442 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
4445 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
4446 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
4448 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
4449 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
4450 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
4452 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
4454 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
4455 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4456 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
4457 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4458 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
4459 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4460 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4463 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
4464 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
4467 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
4468 /// stored external to LDK.
4470 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
4471 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
4472 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
4474 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
4475 /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
4477 /// `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`] events to
4478 /// allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and
4479 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply
4480 /// copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events
4481 /// with invoice metadata stored elsewhere.
4483 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
4484 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
4485 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
4486 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
4488 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
4489 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
4490 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
4491 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
4492 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
4494 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
4495 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
4496 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
4497 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
4498 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
4500 /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
4501 /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
4502 /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
4504 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
4506 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
4507 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
4509 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4510 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4511 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id
4512 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4513 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
4516 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
4517 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
4518 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4519 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
4520 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
4525 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
4526 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
4530 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4531 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4532 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4533 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4534 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4537 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
4538 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4539 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4540 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4542 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4543 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4544 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4545 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4548 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4549 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4551 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
4552 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4555 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
4556 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4557 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
4559 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4560 events.replace(pending_events);
4569 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4571 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4572 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4573 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4574 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4577 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
4579 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
4580 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
4582 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
4583 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
4584 /// restarting from an old state.
4585 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
4586 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4587 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4589 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4590 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4591 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4592 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4595 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
4596 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4597 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4600 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
4601 handler.handle_event(&event);
4609 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4611 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4612 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4613 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4614 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4617 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
4619 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4620 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
4621 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
4622 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
4623 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
4626 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
4627 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
4628 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
4631 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4632 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4633 let new_height = height - 1;
4635 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
4636 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
4637 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
4638 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
4639 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
4640 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
4643 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
4647 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4649 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4650 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4651 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4652 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4655 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4656 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4657 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4658 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4660 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4661 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
4663 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4664 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
4667 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4668 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4669 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4670 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4672 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4673 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
4675 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4677 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
4679 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
4681 macro_rules! max_time {
4682 ($timestamp: expr) => {
4684 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
4685 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
4686 // having an explicit local time source.
4687 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
4688 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
4689 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
4690 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
4691 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
4697 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
4698 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
4699 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4700 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
4701 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
4704 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4705 outbounds.retain(|_, payment| {
4706 const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
4707 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
4708 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, .. } = payment {
4709 return *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS > height
4715 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
4716 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4717 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
4718 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
4719 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
4720 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
4726 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
4727 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4728 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
4729 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
4730 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
4731 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
4732 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4733 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4738 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4740 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4741 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4742 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4743 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4746 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
4747 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
4749 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
4750 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
4751 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4752 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4753 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4755 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4756 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4758 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4759 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4760 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4761 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4762 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
4763 let res = f(channel);
4764 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
4765 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
4766 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
4767 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4768 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
4772 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
4773 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
4774 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4775 msg: funding_locked,
4777 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
4778 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4779 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4780 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4781 msg: announcement_sigs,
4783 } else if channel.is_usable() {
4784 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4785 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4786 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4787 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
4790 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4792 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
4794 } else if let Err(e) = res {
4795 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4796 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4798 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
4799 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
4800 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
4801 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
4802 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4806 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4807 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4808 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4809 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
4816 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
4817 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
4818 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4819 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
4820 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
4821 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
4822 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
4823 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
4824 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4825 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
4826 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4827 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
4828 data: htlc_msat_height_data
4833 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
4838 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
4840 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
4841 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
4845 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
4846 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
4847 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4849 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
4850 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4851 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4852 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
4855 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
4856 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4858 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
4859 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
4862 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4863 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
4864 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
4865 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
4866 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4870 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
4871 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
4872 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
4873 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
4877 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
4878 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4879 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4880 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4881 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4882 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4885 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
4886 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4887 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4890 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
4891 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4892 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4895 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
4896 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4897 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4900 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
4901 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4902 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4905 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
4906 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4907 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4910 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
4911 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4912 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4915 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
4916 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4917 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4920 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
4921 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4922 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4925 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
4926 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4927 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4930 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
4931 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4932 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4935 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
4936 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4937 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4940 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
4941 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4942 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4945 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
4946 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4947 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4950 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
4951 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4952 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4955 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
4956 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4957 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4960 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
4961 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4962 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
4965 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
4970 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
4971 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4972 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4975 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
4976 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4977 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4978 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
4980 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4981 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4982 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4983 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4984 if no_connection_possible {
4985 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4986 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4987 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4988 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4989 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4991 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
4992 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4993 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4997 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5004 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5005 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5006 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5007 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5008 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5009 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5010 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5012 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5015 no_channels_remain = false;
5021 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5023 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5024 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5025 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5026 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5027 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5028 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5029 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5030 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5031 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5032 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5033 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5034 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5035 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5036 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5037 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5038 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5039 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5040 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5041 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5045 if no_channels_remain {
5046 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
5049 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5050 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5054 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
5055 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5057 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5060 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5061 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
5062 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5063 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
5064 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
5067 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
5068 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
5073 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5074 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5075 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5076 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5077 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5078 if !chan.have_received_message() {
5079 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
5080 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
5081 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
5085 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
5086 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5087 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
5093 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
5096 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
5097 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5099 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
5100 for chan in self.list_channels() {
5101 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
5102 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5103 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5107 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5108 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5113 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
5114 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
5115 struct PersistenceNotifier {
5116 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
5117 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
5118 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
5121 impl PersistenceNotifier {
5124 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
5130 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5131 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5136 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
5137 let result = *guard;
5145 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
5146 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5147 let current_time = Instant::now();
5149 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5150 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5155 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
5156 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
5157 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
5158 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
5159 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
5161 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
5162 let result = *guard;
5163 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
5167 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
5168 None => return result,
5174 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
5176 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
5177 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5178 *persistence_lock = true;
5179 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
5184 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5185 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5187 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
5189 (0, onion_packet, required),
5190 (2, short_channel_id, required),
5193 (0, payment_data, required),
5194 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5196 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
5197 (0, payment_preimage, required),
5198 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5202 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
5203 (0, routing, required),
5204 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
5205 (4, payment_hash, required),
5206 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
5207 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
5211 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5212 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5214 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
5216 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5217 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5218 reason.write(writer)?;
5220 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5221 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
5224 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5225 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5226 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
5227 failure_code.write(writer)?;
5234 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5235 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5236 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5239 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5240 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5241 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5242 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
5246 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5247 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5248 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5249 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
5250 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
5253 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
5254 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
5255 // messages contained in the variants.
5256 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
5257 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
5258 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
5260 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5261 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5262 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5263 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5264 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
5267 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5268 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5269 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5270 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5271 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
5273 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5278 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
5283 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
5284 (0, short_channel_id, required),
5285 (2, outpoint, required),
5286 (4, htlc_id, required),
5287 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
5290 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
5291 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5292 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
5293 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
5296 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
5297 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
5298 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
5303 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
5304 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
5305 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
5311 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
5312 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5313 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5315 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
5316 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
5317 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5321 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
5322 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
5323 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
5325 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
5327 if payment_data.is_some() {
5328 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5330 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
5333 if payment_data.is_none() {
5334 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5336 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
5340 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
5348 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
5349 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5350 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5353 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5354 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
5355 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
5356 let mut payment_id = None;
5357 let mut payment_secret = None;
5358 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5359 (0, session_priv, required),
5360 (1, payment_id, option),
5361 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5362 (3, payment_secret, option),
5363 (4, path, vec_type),
5365 if payment_id.is_none() {
5366 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
5368 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
5370 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
5371 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
5372 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
5373 path: path.unwrap(),
5374 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
5378 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
5379 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5384 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
5385 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
5387 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret } => {
5389 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
5390 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5391 (0, session_priv, required),
5392 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
5393 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5394 (3, payment_secret, option),
5395 (4, path, vec_type),
5398 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
5400 field.write(writer)?;
5407 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
5408 (0, LightningError) => {
5412 (0, failure_code, required),
5413 (2, data, vec_type),
5417 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
5419 (0, forward_info, required),
5420 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
5421 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
5422 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
5425 (0, htlc_id, required),
5426 (2, err_packet, required),
5430 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
5431 (0, payment_secret, required),
5432 (2, expiry_time, required),
5433 (4, user_payment_id, required),
5434 (6, payment_preimage, required),
5435 (8, min_value_msat, required),
5438 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
5440 (0, session_privs, required),
5443 (0, session_privs, required),
5446 (0, session_privs, required),
5447 (2, payment_hash, required),
5448 (4, payment_secret, option),
5449 (6, total_msat, required),
5450 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
5451 (10, starting_block_height, required),
5455 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5456 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5457 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5458 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5459 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5462 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5463 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
5465 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5467 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
5469 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5470 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
5471 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
5474 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5475 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
5476 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5477 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5478 unfunded_channels += 1;
5481 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
5482 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5483 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5484 channel.write(writer)?;
5488 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5489 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
5490 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
5491 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5492 for forward in pending_forwards {
5493 forward.write(writer)?;
5497 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5498 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
5499 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5500 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5501 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
5502 htlc.write(writer)?;
5506 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5507 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5508 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5509 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
5510 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5511 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
5514 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5515 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5516 for event in events.iter() {
5517 event.write(writer)?;
5520 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5521 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5522 for event in background_events.iter() {
5524 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
5526 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
5527 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
5532 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5533 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5535 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5536 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5537 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
5538 hash.write(writer)?;
5539 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
5542 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5543 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
5544 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
5545 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5546 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() {
5547 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
5550 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
5551 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5553 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
5554 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
5555 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
5556 session_priv.write(writer)?;
5559 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
5563 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
5564 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
5565 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5567 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
5568 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
5569 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
5574 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5575 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
5576 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
5583 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
5585 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
5587 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
5588 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
5589 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
5590 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
5591 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
5592 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
5593 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
5594 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
5595 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
5596 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
5597 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
5598 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
5599 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
5601 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
5602 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
5604 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
5605 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
5607 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
5608 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
5609 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
5610 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
5611 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
5612 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
5614 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
5615 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5616 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5617 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5618 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5619 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5622 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
5623 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
5625 pub keys_manager: K,
5627 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5629 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
5630 pub fee_estimator: F,
5631 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5633 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
5634 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
5635 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
5636 pub chain_monitor: M,
5638 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
5639 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
5640 /// force-closed during deserialization.
5641 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
5642 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
5643 /// deserialization.
5645 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
5646 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
5647 pub default_config: UserConfig,
5649 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
5650 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
5652 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
5653 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
5654 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
5655 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
5657 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
5660 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
5661 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
5664 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5665 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5666 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5667 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5668 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5669 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5672 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
5673 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
5674 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
5675 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
5676 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
5678 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
5679 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
5684 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
5685 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
5686 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5687 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
5688 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5689 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5690 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5691 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5694 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5695 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
5696 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
5700 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5701 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
5702 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5703 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5704 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5705 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5708 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5709 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5711 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5712 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5713 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5715 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5717 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5718 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5719 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5720 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5721 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
5722 for _ in 0..channel_count {
5723 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
5724 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
5725 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
5726 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
5727 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5728 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5729 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5730 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5731 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
5732 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
5733 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5734 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5735 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5736 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5737 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5738 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5739 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5740 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5741 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5742 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5743 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5744 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
5745 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
5746 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
5747 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5748 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5749 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
5750 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
5751 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5752 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
5753 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5754 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
5755 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
5758 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5759 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
5761 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
5764 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5765 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5766 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5767 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5768 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5769 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5773 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
5774 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
5775 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5779 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
5780 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5781 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5782 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
5783 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5784 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5785 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
5786 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
5787 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5789 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
5792 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5793 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5794 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
5795 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5796 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5797 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
5798 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
5799 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5801 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
5804 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5805 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
5806 for _ in 0..peer_count {
5807 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5808 let peer_state = PeerState {
5809 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
5811 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
5814 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5815 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
5816 for _ in 0..event_count {
5817 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
5818 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
5822 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
5823 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
5824 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
5825 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
5826 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
5827 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
5828 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5829 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
5833 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5834 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
5835 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
5836 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5837 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
5838 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5842 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5843 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5845 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5846 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
5847 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
5848 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
5849 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5853 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5854 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
5855 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
5856 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
5857 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
5858 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
5859 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
5861 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
5862 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5866 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
5867 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
5868 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
5869 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5870 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
5871 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
5873 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
5874 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
5875 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
5876 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
5877 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
5878 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
5880 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
5883 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5884 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5886 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
5887 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
5890 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
5892 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
5893 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
5894 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
5896 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
5898 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
5903 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
5905 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
5906 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
5908 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
5909 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
5912 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
5913 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
5915 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
5917 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
5918 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
5919 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
5920 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
5922 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
5923 logger: args.logger,
5924 default_configuration: args.default_config,
5927 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5928 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
5931 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
5932 //connection or two.
5934 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
5940 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5941 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5942 use core::time::Duration;
5943 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
5944 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
5945 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
5946 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
5948 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
5949 use routing::router::{get_keysend_route, get_route};
5950 use routing::scorer::Scorer;
5951 use util::errors::APIError;
5952 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
5953 use util::test_utils;
5955 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5957 fn test_wait_timeout() {
5958 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
5960 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
5963 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
5964 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
5966 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
5967 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
5968 thread::spawn(move || {
5970 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
5971 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5972 *persistence_lock = true;
5975 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
5981 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
5982 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
5984 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
5987 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
5992 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
5994 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
5997 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6004 fn test_notify_limits() {
6005 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
6006 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
6007 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6008 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6009 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6010 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6012 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
6013 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
6014 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6015 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6016 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6018 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6020 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
6021 // to connect messages with new values
6022 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6023 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6024 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6025 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6027 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
6028 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6029 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6030 // ... but the last node should not.
6031 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6032 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
6033 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6034 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6036 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
6037 // about the channel.
6038 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6039 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6040 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6042 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
6044 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6045 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6046 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6047 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6048 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6049 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6051 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
6052 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6053 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6055 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
6056 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
6057 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
6058 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
6059 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
6060 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
6062 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
6063 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
6064 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6065 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6066 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6067 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6068 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6069 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6071 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
6072 // the channel info has updated.
6073 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6074 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6075 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6076 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6077 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6078 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6082 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
6083 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
6085 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6086 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6087 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6088 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6089 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6091 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
6092 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
6093 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
6094 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
6095 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
6096 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
6097 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6098 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6099 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6100 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6101 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
6103 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
6104 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6105 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6106 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6107 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6108 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6109 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6110 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6111 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6112 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6113 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6114 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6115 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6116 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6117 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6118 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6119 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6120 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6121 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6122 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6123 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6124 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
6126 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
6127 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6128 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6129 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6130 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6131 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
6133 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
6134 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
6135 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
6136 // lightning messages manually.
6137 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6138 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6139 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6140 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6141 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
6142 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6143 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6144 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
6145 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6146 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6147 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
6148 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6149 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6150 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6151 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6152 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6153 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6154 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
6155 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6156 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6157 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
6158 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6159 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6160 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6161 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6162 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
6163 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6165 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate 1 event upon the first path's success. No
6166 // further events will be generated for subsequence path successes.
6167 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6169 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash } => {
6170 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
6171 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
6173 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6178 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
6179 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
6180 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
6181 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
6182 // fails as expected.
6183 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6184 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6185 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6186 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6187 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6188 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6189 let scorer = Scorer::new(0);
6191 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
6192 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
6193 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
6195 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
6196 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger, &scorer).unwrap();
6197 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6198 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6199 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6200 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6201 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6202 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6203 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6204 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6205 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6206 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6207 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6208 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6209 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6210 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6211 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6212 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6213 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6214 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6215 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6216 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6217 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6219 // Finally, claim the original payment.
6220 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6222 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
6223 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6224 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger, &scorer).unwrap();
6225 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6226 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6227 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6228 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6229 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
6230 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
6231 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
6233 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
6234 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6235 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6236 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6237 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6238 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6239 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6240 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6241 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6242 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6243 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6244 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6245 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6246 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6247 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6248 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6249 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6250 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6251 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6252 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6253 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6254 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6255 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6257 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
6258 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6262 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
6263 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
6264 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
6265 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6266 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6267 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6268 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6270 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6271 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6272 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6273 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6275 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6276 let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
6277 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
6278 let scorer = Scorer::new(0);
6279 let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
6280 Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
6281 nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
6283 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6284 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
6285 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
6286 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6288 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6289 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6290 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6291 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6292 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6293 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6294 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6296 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
6300 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
6301 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
6302 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6303 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6304 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6305 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6307 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6308 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6309 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6310 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6312 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6313 let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
6314 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
6315 let scorer = Scorer::new(0);
6316 let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
6317 Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
6318 nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
6320 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6321 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6322 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
6323 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
6324 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6326 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6327 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6328 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6329 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6330 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6331 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6332 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6334 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
6338 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
6339 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
6340 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
6341 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
6342 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6344 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6345 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6346 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6347 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6349 // Marshall an MPP route.
6350 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
6351 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
6352 route.paths.push(path);
6353 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6354 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
6355 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
6356 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
6357 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
6358 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
6360 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
6361 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
6362 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
6363 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
6368 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
6371 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
6372 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
6373 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
6374 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
6375 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6376 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
6377 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
6378 use routing::router::get_route;
6379 use routing::scorer::Scorer;
6380 use util::test_utils;
6381 use util::config::UserConfig;
6382 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
6384 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6385 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6386 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
6388 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
6392 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
6393 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
6394 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
6395 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
6396 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
6397 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
6398 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
6403 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
6404 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
6407 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
6408 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
6409 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
6411 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
6412 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
6414 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
6415 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
6417 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
6418 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
6420 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
6421 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
6422 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
6423 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
6424 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
6426 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
6428 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
6430 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
6431 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
6432 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
6433 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
6434 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
6436 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
6438 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
6440 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6441 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6442 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
6443 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6444 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6447 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
6448 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
6449 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
6451 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
6452 } else { panic!(); }
6454 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6455 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6457 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
6460 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
6463 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
6464 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
6466 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6467 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6468 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
6469 match msg_events[0] {
6470 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
6471 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
6472 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
6476 match msg_events[1] {
6477 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6481 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
6483 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
6484 macro_rules! send_payment {
6485 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
6486 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
6487 let scorer = Scorer::new(0);
6488 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()),
6489 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer).unwrap();
6491 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
6492 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
6494 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
6495 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
6497 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6498 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
6499 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6500 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
6501 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6502 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6503 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6504 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6506 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
6507 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
6508 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6510 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
6511 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
6512 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6513 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6514 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6516 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
6519 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
6520 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6521 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6522 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6524 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
6529 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
6530 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);