1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
41 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
42 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
43 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
44 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
45 // construct one themselves.
46 pub use ln::channel::CounterpartyForwardingInfo;
47 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
48 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
49 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
51 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
53 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
54 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
55 use util::config::UserConfig;
56 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
57 use util::{byte_utils, events};
58 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
59 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
60 use util::logger::Logger;
61 use util::errors::APIError;
64 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
65 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
66 use std::sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
67 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
68 use std::time::Duration;
69 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
70 use std::time::Instant;
71 use std::marker::{Sync, Send};
73 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
75 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
77 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
78 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
79 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
81 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
82 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
83 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
84 // before we forward it.
86 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
87 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
88 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
89 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
90 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
92 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
93 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
95 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
96 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
99 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
100 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
104 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
105 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
106 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
107 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
108 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
109 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
110 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
113 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
114 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
115 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
116 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
119 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
120 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
121 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
122 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
123 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
126 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
128 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
130 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
131 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
132 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
134 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
136 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
140 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
144 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
145 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
146 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
147 short_channel_id: u64,
149 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
151 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
152 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
156 struct ClaimableHTLC {
157 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
159 /// Filled in when the HTLC was received with a payment_secret packet, which contains a
160 /// total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
161 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
162 /// are part of the same payment.
163 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
167 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
168 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
169 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
170 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
173 session_priv: SecretKey,
174 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
175 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
176 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
181 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
182 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
184 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
185 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
190 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
191 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
193 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
201 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
202 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
203 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
204 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
205 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
206 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
207 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
208 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
209 /// payment_secret type, use to authenticate sender to the receiver and tie MPP HTLCs together
210 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
211 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
212 pub struct PaymentSecret(pub [u8;32]);
214 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
216 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
217 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
218 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
219 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
220 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
222 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
223 err: msgs::LightningError,
224 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
226 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
228 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
230 err: LightningError {
232 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
233 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
239 shutdown_finish: None,
243 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
245 err: LightningError {
247 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
249 shutdown_finish: None,
253 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
254 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
257 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
259 err: LightningError {
261 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
262 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
268 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
272 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
275 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
277 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
279 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
281 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
282 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
288 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
290 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
291 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
298 shutdown_finish: None,
303 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
304 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
305 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
306 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
307 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
309 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
310 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
311 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
312 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
313 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
314 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
315 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
317 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
321 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
322 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
323 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
324 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
325 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
326 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
327 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
328 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
329 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
330 /// (payment_hash, payment_secret) -> Vec<HTLCs> for tracking HTLCs that
331 /// were to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
332 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
333 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
335 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<(PaymentHash, Option<PaymentSecret>), Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
336 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
337 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
338 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
341 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
342 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
343 /// quite some time lag.
344 enum BackgroundEvent {
345 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
346 /// commitment transaction.
347 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
350 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
351 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
353 latest_features: InitFeatures,
356 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
357 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
358 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
359 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
360 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
361 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
362 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
363 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
365 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
366 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
367 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
368 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
369 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
370 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
371 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
372 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
373 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
375 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
376 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
378 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
379 /// to individual Channels.
381 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
382 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
383 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
384 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
386 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
387 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
388 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
389 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
390 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
391 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
392 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
394 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
395 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
396 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
397 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
400 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
401 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
402 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
403 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
404 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
406 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
407 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
408 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
409 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
410 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
411 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
412 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
413 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
414 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
415 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
418 default_configuration: UserConfig,
419 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
425 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
427 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
428 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
430 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
431 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
432 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
433 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
434 our_network_key: SecretKey,
435 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
437 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
438 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
439 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
441 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
442 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
443 /// are currently open with that peer.
444 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
445 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
447 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
449 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
450 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
451 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
452 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
453 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
454 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
455 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the PersistenceNotifier
456 /// the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
457 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
459 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
466 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
468 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
469 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
470 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
471 pub struct ChainParameters {
472 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
473 pub network: Network,
475 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
477 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
478 pub best_block: BestBlock,
481 /// The best known block as identified by its hash and height.
482 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
483 pub struct BestBlock {
484 block_hash: BlockHash,
489 /// Returns the best block from the genesis of the given network.
490 pub fn from_genesis(network: Network) -> Self {
492 block_hash: genesis_block(network).header.block_hash(),
497 /// Returns the best block as identified by the given block hash and height.
498 pub fn new(block_hash: BlockHash, height: u32) -> Self {
499 BestBlock { block_hash, height }
502 /// Returns the best block hash.
503 pub fn block_hash(&self) -> BlockHash { self.block_hash }
505 /// Returns the best block height.
506 pub fn height(&self) -> u32 { self.height }
509 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
510 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
511 /// `await_persistable_update` that new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
512 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
513 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
514 /// updates are ready for persistence).
515 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> {
516 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
517 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
518 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
521 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> {
522 fn new(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> Self {
523 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
526 persistence_notifier: notifier,
527 _read_guard: read_guard,
532 impl<'a> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> {
534 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
538 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
539 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
541 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
543 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
544 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
545 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
546 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
547 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
549 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
550 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly six hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
552 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
554 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
555 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
556 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
557 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
558 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
559 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 6;
560 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
562 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
563 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
564 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
565 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
566 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
567 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
570 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
572 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
573 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
576 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
578 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
580 pub struct ChannelDetails {
581 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
582 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
583 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
584 /// lifetime of the channel.
585 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
586 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
587 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
588 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
589 /// The node_id of our counterparty
590 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
591 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
592 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
593 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
594 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
595 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
596 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
597 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
599 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
600 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
601 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
602 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
603 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
604 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
605 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
606 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
607 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
608 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
609 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
610 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
611 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
614 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
615 /// payments to us through this channel.
616 pub counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
619 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
620 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
622 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
623 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
624 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
625 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
626 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
627 ParameterError(APIError),
628 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
629 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
630 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
633 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
635 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
636 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
637 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
638 /// paths than the ones selected).
639 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
640 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
641 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
642 /// in over-/re-payment.
644 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
645 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
646 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
648 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
649 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
650 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
651 /// with the latest update_id.
652 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
655 macro_rules! handle_error {
656 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
659 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
660 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
662 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
663 // entering the macro.
664 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
667 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
669 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
670 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
671 if let Some(update) = update_option {
672 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
678 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
679 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
681 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
682 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
683 action: err.action.clone()
687 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
688 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
691 // Return error in case higher-API need one
698 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
699 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
702 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
703 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
705 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
706 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
707 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
708 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
709 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
711 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
713 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
718 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
719 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
722 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
723 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
725 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
726 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
727 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
728 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
729 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
731 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
733 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg)) => {
734 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
735 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
736 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
737 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
739 let shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown(false);
740 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
746 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
747 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
748 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
750 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
752 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
753 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
754 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
755 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
756 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
758 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
759 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
760 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
761 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
762 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
763 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
764 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
765 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
766 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
767 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
770 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
771 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
772 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
773 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
775 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
776 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
778 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
779 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
781 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
782 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
783 if !$resend_commitment {
784 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
787 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
789 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
790 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$entry.key()))
796 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
797 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
798 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
800 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
801 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
805 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
806 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
807 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
808 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
809 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
812 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
817 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
818 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
819 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
820 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
821 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
824 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
826 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
827 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
829 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
831 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
833 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
834 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
835 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
836 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
837 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
838 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
841 default_configuration: config.clone(),
842 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
843 fee_estimator: fee_est,
847 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
849 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
850 by_id: HashMap::new(),
851 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
852 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
853 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
854 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
856 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
857 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
860 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
862 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
864 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
865 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
866 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
867 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
875 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
876 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
877 &self.default_configuration
880 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
882 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady events to allow
883 /// tracking of which events correspond with which create_channel call. Note that the
884 /// user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for
885 /// user_id here. user_id has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and
886 /// otherwise ignored.
888 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
889 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
891 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
892 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
893 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
894 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
895 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
898 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
899 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?;
900 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
902 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
903 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
904 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
906 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
907 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
908 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
909 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
910 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
912 panic!("RNG is bad???");
915 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
917 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
918 node_id: their_network_key,
924 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
925 let mut res = Vec::new();
927 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
928 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
929 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
930 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
931 res.push(ChannelDetails {
932 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
933 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
934 remote_network_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
935 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
936 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
937 inbound_capacity_msat,
938 outbound_capacity_msat,
939 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
940 is_live: channel.is_live(),
941 counterparty_forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
945 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
946 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
947 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
948 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
954 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
955 /// more information.
956 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
957 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
960 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
961 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
963 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
964 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
965 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
966 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
967 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
968 // really wanted anyway.
969 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
972 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
973 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
974 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
976 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
977 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
978 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
980 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
981 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
982 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
983 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
984 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
985 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
986 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
987 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
990 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
991 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
992 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
994 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
995 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
997 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1000 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1001 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1003 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1004 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1009 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
1010 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1011 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1020 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1021 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1022 log_trace!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1023 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1024 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1026 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1027 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1028 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1029 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1030 // ignore the result here.
1031 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1035 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1037 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1038 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1039 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1040 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1041 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1042 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1045 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1046 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1048 chan.remove_entry().1
1050 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1053 log_trace!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1054 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1055 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1056 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1057 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1062 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1065 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1066 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1067 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1068 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1069 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None) {
1070 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1071 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1072 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1073 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1074 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1075 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1085 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1086 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1087 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1088 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1089 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1093 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1094 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1095 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1097 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1098 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1099 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1100 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1101 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1102 failure_code: $err_code,
1103 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1108 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1109 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1112 let shared_secret = {
1113 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1114 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1117 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1119 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1120 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1121 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1122 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1123 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1124 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1125 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1126 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1129 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1130 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1131 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1132 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1133 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1136 let mut channel_state = None;
1137 macro_rules! return_err {
1138 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1140 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1141 if channel_state.is_none() {
1142 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1144 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1145 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1146 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1147 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1148 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1153 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1154 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1155 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
1156 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1158 let error_code = match err {
1159 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1160 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1161 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1162 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1163 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1165 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1168 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1169 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1170 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1177 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1180 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1181 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1182 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1183 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1184 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1185 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1186 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1187 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1188 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1189 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1190 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1191 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1195 // final_expiry_too_soon
1196 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure we have at least
1197 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1198 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown payment hash, our payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward
1199 // before our onchain logic triggers a channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational).
1200 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1201 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1203 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1204 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1205 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1207 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1208 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1209 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1212 let payment_data = match next_hop_data.format {
1213 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => None,
1214 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1215 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data } => payment_data,
1218 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1219 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1220 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1221 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1223 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1224 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1226 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1228 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1229 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1230 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1231 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1234 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1235 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1236 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1238 // Check two things:
1239 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1240 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1241 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1243 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1245 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1246 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1247 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1249 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1251 let blinding_factor = {
1252 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1253 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1254 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1255 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1258 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1260 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1262 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1265 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1266 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1269 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1270 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1271 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1272 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1273 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1277 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1278 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1279 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1282 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1283 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1284 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1285 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1289 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1290 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1291 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1292 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1293 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1294 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1295 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1296 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1297 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1298 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1300 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1302 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1303 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1305 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1306 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1307 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1308 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1309 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1310 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1311 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1313 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1314 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1316 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1317 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1318 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1320 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1321 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1323 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1324 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1325 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1326 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1327 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1329 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1330 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1332 // In theory, we would be safe against unitentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1333 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longuer delay.
1334 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1335 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1341 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1342 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1343 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1344 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1346 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1347 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1349 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1350 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1351 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1353 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1355 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1360 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1363 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1364 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1365 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1366 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1367 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1371 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1373 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1374 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1376 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1377 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1378 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
1379 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1380 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1381 fee_base_msat: chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator),
1382 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1383 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1386 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1387 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1389 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1395 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1396 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1397 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1398 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1399 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1401 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1402 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1403 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height)?;
1404 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1405 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1407 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1409 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1411 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1412 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1413 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1414 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1415 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1418 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1419 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1421 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1422 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1424 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1425 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1427 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1429 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1430 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1431 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1433 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1434 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1435 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1436 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1437 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1438 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1439 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1440 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1441 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1444 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1445 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1446 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1447 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1448 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1449 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1450 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1458 } else { unreachable!(); }
1462 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1463 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1465 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1470 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1472 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1473 /// fields for more info.
1475 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1476 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1477 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1478 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1479 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1480 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1482 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1484 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1485 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1486 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1488 /// In general, a path may raise:
1489 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1490 /// node public key) is specified.
1491 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1492 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1494 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1495 /// relevant updates.
1497 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1498 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1499 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1501 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1502 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1503 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1504 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1506 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1507 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1508 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1509 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1510 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1511 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1513 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1514 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1515 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1516 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1517 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1519 let mut total_value = 0;
1520 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1521 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
1522 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1523 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1524 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1525 continue 'path_check;
1527 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1528 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1529 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1530 continue 'path_check;
1533 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1534 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
1536 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
1537 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
1540 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1541 let mut results = Vec::new();
1542 for path in route.paths.iter() {
1543 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height));
1545 let mut has_ok = false;
1546 let mut has_err = false;
1547 for res in results.iter() {
1548 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
1549 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
1550 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
1551 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
1558 if has_err && has_ok {
1559 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
1561 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
1567 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
1568 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
1569 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
1570 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1572 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1574 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
1576 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
1577 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1578 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
1579 } else { unreachable!(); })
1582 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
1584 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
1585 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1588 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
1589 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
1594 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1595 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1596 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1599 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1600 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1601 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1603 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1611 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1612 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
1613 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
1617 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1619 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
1620 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
1622 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1624 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
1625 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
1626 /// keys per-channel).
1628 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
1629 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
1630 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
1632 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
1633 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
1634 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
1635 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1636 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1638 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
1639 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
1640 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1641 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
1645 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
1646 let mut output_index = None;
1647 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
1648 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1649 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
1650 if output_index.is_some() {
1651 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1652 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
1655 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
1656 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1657 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
1660 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
1663 if output_index.is_none() {
1664 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1665 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
1668 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
1672 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1673 if !chan.should_announce() {
1674 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1678 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1680 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1682 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1683 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1685 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1686 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1687 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1688 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1689 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1694 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
1695 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
1696 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
1698 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::std::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
1701 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
1702 // smaller than 500:
1703 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
1705 /// Generates a signed node_announcement from the given arguments and creates a
1706 /// BroadcastNodeAnnouncement event. Note that such messages will be ignored unless peers have
1707 /// seen a channel_announcement from us (ie unless we have public channels open).
1709 /// RGB is a node "color" and alias is a printable human-readable string to describe this node
1710 /// to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
1712 /// addresses represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node accepts
1713 /// incoming connections. These will be broadcast to the network, publicly tying these
1714 /// addresses together. If you wish to preserve user privacy, addresses should likely contain
1715 /// only Tor Onion addresses.
1717 /// Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500).
1718 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
1719 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1721 if addresses.len() > 500 {
1722 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
1725 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1726 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1727 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
1728 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
1729 rgb, alias, addresses,
1730 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1731 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1733 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1735 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1736 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
1737 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
1738 signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key),
1739 contents: announcement
1744 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1746 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1747 /// Will likely generate further events.
1748 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1749 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1751 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1752 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1753 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1755 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1756 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1758 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1759 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1760 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1761 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1763 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1764 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1765 match forward_info {
1766 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
1767 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1768 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1769 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1770 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1771 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1772 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1774 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
1775 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
1778 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1779 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1780 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1781 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1782 // problem, not ours.
1789 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1790 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1791 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1792 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1793 match forward_info {
1794 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1795 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1797 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
1798 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1799 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1800 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1801 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1802 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1803 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1804 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1806 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
1808 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1809 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
1811 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1813 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1814 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
1815 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
1821 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1823 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1824 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1825 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1826 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1827 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1828 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1829 // this channel currently :/.
1835 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1836 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
1838 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1839 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1840 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1842 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1843 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1845 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1847 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1848 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1849 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1852 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1854 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1855 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1856 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1857 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1858 // messages when we can.
1859 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1860 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1861 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1868 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1869 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
1872 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1873 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1874 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1875 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1876 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1877 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1879 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1880 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1881 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1882 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1883 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1885 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1887 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1889 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
1893 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1894 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1897 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1898 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
1899 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1900 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1901 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1902 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1903 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1905 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1913 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1914 match forward_info {
1915 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1916 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry },
1917 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
1918 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1919 let prev_hop = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1920 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1921 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1922 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1923 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1926 let mut total_value = 0;
1927 let payment_secret_opt =
1928 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data { Some(data.payment_secret.clone()) } else { None };
1929 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry((payment_hash, payment_secret_opt))
1930 .or_insert(Vec::new());
1931 htlcs.push(ClaimableHTLC {
1933 value: amt_to_forward,
1934 payment_data: payment_data.clone(),
1935 cltv_expiry: incoming_cltv_expiry,
1937 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data {
1938 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1939 total_value += htlc.value;
1940 if htlc.payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat != data.total_msat {
1941 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
1943 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
1945 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > data.total_msat {
1946 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1947 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
1948 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
1949 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
1951 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1952 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
1953 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1954 htlc_id: htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
1955 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
1957 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
1960 } else if total_value == data.total_msat {
1961 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1963 payment_secret: Some(data.payment_secret),
1968 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1970 payment_secret: None,
1971 amt: amt_to_forward,
1975 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1976 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
1978 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1979 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1987 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1988 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
1991 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1992 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
1995 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1996 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1997 events.append(&mut new_events);
2000 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2002 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2003 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2005 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2006 fn process_background_events(&self) {
2007 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2008 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2009 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2011 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2012 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2013 // monitor updating completing.
2014 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2020 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2021 pub(crate) fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2022 self.process_background_events();
2025 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
2026 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
2027 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
2029 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
2031 /// Note that in some rare cases this may generate a `chain::Watch::update_channel` call.
2032 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
2033 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2034 self.process_background_events();
2036 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2037 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2038 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
2039 if chan.is_disabled_staged() && !chan.is_live() {
2040 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2041 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2046 } else if chan.is_disabled_staged() && chan.is_live() {
2048 } else if chan.is_disabled_marked() {
2049 chan.to_disabled_staged();
2054 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
2055 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
2056 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
2057 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
2058 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
2059 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> bool {
2060 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2062 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2063 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(*payment_hash, *payment_secret));
2064 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2065 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2066 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2067 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2068 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2069 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2070 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2071 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
2072 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2078 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
2079 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
2080 // be surfaced to the user.
2081 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
2082 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
2084 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
2085 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
2086 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2087 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
2088 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(&chan_entry.get()) {
2089 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
2091 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2094 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2096 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2097 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
2098 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
2100 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
2101 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2102 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2104 rejected_by_dest: false,
2116 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
2117 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
2118 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
2119 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
2120 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
2121 /// still-available channels.
2122 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
2123 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
2124 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
2125 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
2128 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
2129 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
2130 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2132 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, .. } => {
2133 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2134 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2135 match &onion_error {
2136 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
2138 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2140 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2141 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
2142 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
2143 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
2144 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
2145 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2146 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
2151 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2152 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2153 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2154 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
2156 error_code: onion_error_code,
2158 error_data: onion_error_data
2162 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2168 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
2169 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
2170 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
2171 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
2173 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
2174 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
2175 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2176 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2177 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2178 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
2180 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
2182 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
2188 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2189 let err_packet = match onion_error {
2190 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
2191 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
2192 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
2193 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
2195 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
2196 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2197 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
2201 let mut forward_event = None;
2202 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2203 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
2205 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
2206 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2207 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
2209 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2210 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
2213 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2214 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
2215 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2216 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2217 time_forwardable: time
2224 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
2225 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
2226 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
2228 /// You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
2229 /// available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
2230 /// reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
2231 /// payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
2232 /// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
2233 /// motivated attackers.
2235 /// Note that the privacy concerns in (b) are not relevant in payments with a payment_secret
2236 /// set. Thus, for such payments we will claim any payments which do not under-pay.
2238 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
2239 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
2240 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2242 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2244 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2245 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(payment_hash, *payment_secret));
2246 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2247 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
2249 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
2250 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
2251 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
2252 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
2254 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
2255 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
2256 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
2257 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
2258 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
2261 let (is_mpp, mut valid_mpp) = if let &Some(ref data) = &sources[0].payment_data {
2262 assert!(payment_secret.is_some());
2263 (true, data.total_msat >= expected_amount)
2265 assert!(payment_secret.is_none());
2269 for htlc in sources.iter() {
2270 if !is_mpp || !valid_mpp { break; }
2271 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2276 let mut errs = Vec::new();
2277 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
2278 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2279 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2280 if (is_mpp && !valid_mpp) || (!is_mpp && (htlc.value < expected_amount || htlc.value > expected_amount * 2)) {
2281 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2282 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2283 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2284 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2285 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
2286 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2288 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
2290 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.1.err.action {
2291 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
2292 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
2293 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", e.1.err.err);
2294 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
2295 } else { errs.push(e); }
2297 Err(None) if is_mpp => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
2299 log_warn!(self.logger, "Channel we expected to claim an HTLC from was closed.");
2301 Ok(()) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
2306 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
2307 // which were generated.
2308 channel_state.take();
2310 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
2311 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2312 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2319 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(), Option<(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)>> {
2320 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
2321 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
2322 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2323 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2329 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
2330 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2331 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
2332 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
2333 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_option {
2334 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2335 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2336 assert!(msgs.is_none());
2338 return Err(Some((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err())));
2342 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
2343 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2344 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2345 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2346 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2347 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
2348 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2349 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2358 // TODO: Do something with e?
2359 // This should only occur if we are claiming an HTLC at the same time as the
2360 // HTLC is being failed (eg because a block is being connected and this caused
2361 // an HTLC to time out). This should, of course, only occur if the user is the
2362 // one doing the claiming (as it being a part of a peer claim would imply we're
2363 // about to lose funds) and only if the lock in claim_funds was dropped as a
2364 // previous HTLC was failed (thus not for an MPP payment).
2365 debug_assert!(false, "This shouldn't be reachable except in absurdly rare cases between monitor updates and HTLC timeouts: {:?}", e);
2369 } else { unreachable!(); }
2372 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
2374 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
2375 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2376 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2377 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
2381 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
2382 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
2383 if let Err((counterparty_node_id, err)) = match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage) {
2386 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2387 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
2388 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2389 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2392 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
2393 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
2394 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
2395 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
2396 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
2397 payment_preimage, e);
2401 Err(Some(res)) => Err(res),
2403 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2404 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2405 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2411 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
2412 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2413 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
2416 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
2417 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
2420 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
2421 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
2423 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
2424 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
2425 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
2426 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
2428 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
2429 /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
2430 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
2431 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
2432 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
2433 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
2434 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
2435 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
2436 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
2437 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2439 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
2440 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
2441 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
2442 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
2445 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2446 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2447 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2448 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2449 let channel = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
2453 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
2457 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
2458 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2459 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), funding_txo.clone(), pending_forwards));
2461 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
2463 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
2464 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
2465 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2466 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2471 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
2472 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
2473 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2474 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2475 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2480 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2484 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2489 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
2490 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
2492 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2493 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2494 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2497 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2498 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2499 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2500 msg: announcement_sigs,
2503 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2507 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
2509 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
2510 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2512 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
2514 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
2515 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
2519 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2520 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
2521 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
2524 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
2525 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
2526 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2527 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2528 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
2529 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
2530 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2531 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
2532 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2533 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
2535 entry.insert(channel);
2541 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2542 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
2543 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2544 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2545 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
2546 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2547 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2548 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2550 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
2551 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2553 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2556 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2557 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
2558 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
2559 channel_value_satoshis: value,
2561 user_channel_id: user_id,
2566 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2567 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
2568 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
2569 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2570 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2571 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
2572 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2573 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2574 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2576 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
2578 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2581 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
2582 // lock before watch_channel
2583 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
2585 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
2586 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
2587 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
2588 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
2589 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
2590 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
2591 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
2592 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
2593 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
2594 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
2595 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
2597 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
2598 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
2599 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
2600 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
2601 // until we have persisted our monitor.
2602 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2606 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2607 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2608 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
2609 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2610 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
2612 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2613 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
2614 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2623 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2625 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
2626 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2627 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2628 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2629 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2630 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2631 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2633 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
2634 Ok(update) => update,
2635 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2637 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2638 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2642 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2645 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
2649 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2650 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2651 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2652 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2653 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2654 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2655 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2657 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2658 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2659 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2660 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2661 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2662 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2663 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2664 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2665 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2666 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2667 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2668 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2669 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2670 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2671 msg: announcement_sigs,
2676 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2680 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2681 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2682 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2683 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2685 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2686 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2687 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2688 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2690 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2691 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2692 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2693 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2697 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2698 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2699 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2703 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2704 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2705 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2707 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2708 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2710 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2713 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2714 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2716 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2717 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2718 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2719 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2727 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2728 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2729 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2730 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2731 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2732 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2733 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2734 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2736 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2737 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2738 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2739 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2744 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2745 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2746 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2747 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2748 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2749 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2750 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2752 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2753 } else { (tx, None) }
2755 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2758 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2759 log_trace!(self.logger, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
2760 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2762 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2763 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2764 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2765 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2773 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2774 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2775 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2776 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2778 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2779 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2780 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2781 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2783 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2784 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2786 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2787 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2788 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2789 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2792 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
2793 // Ensure error_code has the UPDATE flag set, since by default we send a
2794 // channel update along as part of failing the HTLC.
2795 assert!((error_code & 0x1000) != 0);
2796 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2797 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2798 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2799 match pending_forward_info {
2800 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2801 let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(chan) {
2802 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
2803 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2804 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2805 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
2806 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
2810 // The only case where we'd be unable to
2811 // successfully get a channel update is if the
2812 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
2813 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
2814 // payments over the channel back to themselves
2815 // (cause no one else should know the short_id
2816 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
2817 // no problem just calling this
2818 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
2819 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2821 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2822 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2823 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2826 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
2828 _ => pending_forward_info
2831 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2833 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2838 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2839 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2841 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2842 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2843 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2844 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2845 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2847 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2849 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2852 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2856 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2857 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2858 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2859 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2860 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2861 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2862 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2864 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2866 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2871 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2872 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2873 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2874 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2875 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2876 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2877 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2879 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2880 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
2881 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2883 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2886 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2890 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2891 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2892 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2893 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2894 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2895 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2896 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2898 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
2899 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
2900 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2901 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
2902 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
2903 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
2904 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
2909 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2910 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2911 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2913 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2914 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2915 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2917 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2918 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2919 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2920 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2921 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2922 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2923 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2924 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2926 commitment_signed: msg,
2930 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2931 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2932 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2938 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2943 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2944 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2945 let mut forward_event = None;
2946 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2947 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2948 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2949 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
2951 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2952 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
2953 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
2954 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
2956 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2957 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
2958 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2960 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2961 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
2962 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2967 match forward_event {
2969 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2970 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2971 time_forwardable: time
2979 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2980 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2982 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2983 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2984 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2985 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2986 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2987 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2989 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2990 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
2991 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2992 htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
2993 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2994 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2995 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2996 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
2998 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
3000 } else { unreachable!(); }
3003 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3004 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3005 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3009 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3010 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3011 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3015 break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
3017 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3020 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
3022 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
3023 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3024 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3026 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
3033 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3034 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3035 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3036 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3037 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3038 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3039 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3041 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
3043 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3048 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3049 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3050 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3052 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3053 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3054 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3055 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3057 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
3058 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
3061 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
3062 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
3063 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
3065 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
3066 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
3068 let their_node_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 };
3069 let their_bitcoin_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 };
3070 match (self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, their_node_key),
3071 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, their_bitcoin_key)) {
3073 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature: {:?}. Maybe using different node_secret for transport and routing msg? UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}", e, &announcement, their_node_key));
3074 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3077 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature: {:?}. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})", e, &announcement, their_bitcoin_key));
3078 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3084 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
3086 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
3087 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
3088 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
3089 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
3090 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
3091 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
3092 contents: announcement,
3094 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
3097 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3102 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3103 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3104 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3105 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
3106 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3108 // It's not a local channel
3112 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3113 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3114 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3115 // TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
3116 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), chan_id));
3118 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
3120 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
3125 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3126 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3127 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3129 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3130 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3131 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3132 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3134 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
3135 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
3136 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
3137 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3138 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, mut order, shutdown) =
3139 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3140 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
3141 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3142 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
3143 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
3144 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
3145 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
3146 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3148 if commitment_update.is_none() {
3149 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
3151 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
3152 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
3155 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
3156 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
3157 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3161 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
3162 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
3163 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3164 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3169 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
3170 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3171 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3172 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3178 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
3182 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
3187 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3188 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3189 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3195 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3199 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
3200 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
3201 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
3202 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
3203 /// (C-not exported) Cause its doc(hidden) anyway
3205 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3206 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3207 let counterparty_node_id;
3208 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3209 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3210 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3212 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3213 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("Failed to find corresponding channel for id {}", channel_id.to_hex())}),
3214 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3215 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
3216 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel".to_owned()});
3218 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3219 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
3221 if !chan.get().is_live() {
3222 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3224 counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3225 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
3226 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
3228 if let Err(_e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3231 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3232 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3233 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3234 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3235 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3236 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3237 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3238 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3248 match handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id) {
3249 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3250 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
3254 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`.
3255 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) {
3256 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3258 for monitor_event in self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events() {
3259 match monitor_event {
3260 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
3261 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
3262 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
3263 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
3265 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
3266 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3269 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => {
3270 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3271 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3272 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3273 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3274 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3275 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
3276 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3277 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3279 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
3280 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3281 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3285 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3286 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3287 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
3288 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
3297 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3298 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3302 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
3303 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
3305 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
3306 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3307 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
3308 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
3309 // reorganized out of the main chain.
3310 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
3311 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
3312 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
3313 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
3314 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
3315 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
3316 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
3317 assert!(should_broadcast);
3318 } else { unreachable!(); }
3319 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
3321 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3326 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3327 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3328 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3329 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3330 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3333 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
3334 //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query
3335 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3336 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
3338 let mut ret = Vec::new();
3339 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3340 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
3345 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3346 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3347 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3348 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3349 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3352 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
3353 //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query
3354 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3355 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
3357 let mut ret = Vec::new();
3358 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3359 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
3364 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3366 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3367 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3368 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3369 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3372 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
3374 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3375 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
3376 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
3377 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
3378 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
3381 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
3382 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
3383 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
3386 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3387 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3388 let new_height = height - 1;
3390 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
3391 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
3392 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
3393 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
3394 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
3395 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
3398 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time));
3402 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3404 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3405 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3406 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3407 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3410 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3411 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3412 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3413 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3415 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3416 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
3418 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3419 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
3422 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3423 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3424 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3425 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3427 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3428 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
3430 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3432 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3434 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time));
3437 // Update last_node_announcement_serial to be the max of its current value and the
3438 // block timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
3439 // having an explicit local time source.
3440 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully update
3441 // last_node_announcement_serial or decide we don't need to.
3442 let old_serial = self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire);
3443 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
3444 if self.last_node_announcement_serial.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
3450 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
3451 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3452 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
3453 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
3454 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
3455 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
3461 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
3462 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3463 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
3464 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
3465 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
3466 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed().map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
3467 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3468 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3473 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3475 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3476 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3477 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3478 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3481 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
3482 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
3484 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
3485 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
3486 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3487 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3488 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3490 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3491 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3493 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3494 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3495 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3496 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3497 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
3498 let res = f(channel);
3499 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
3500 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
3501 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3502 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3503 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
3507 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
3508 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
3509 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3510 msg: funding_locked,
3512 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
3513 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3514 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3515 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3516 msg: announcement_sigs,
3519 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3521 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
3523 } else if let Err(e) = res {
3524 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3525 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3527 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
3528 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
3529 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
3530 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
3531 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3535 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3536 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3537 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
3544 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
3545 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|&(ref payment_hash, _), htlcs| {
3546 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3547 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
3548 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
3549 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
3550 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
3551 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
3552 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3553 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
3554 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3555 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
3556 data: htlc_msat_height_data
3561 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
3566 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
3568 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
3569 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
3573 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
3574 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
3575 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
3577 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
3578 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
3579 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
3580 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
3583 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
3584 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
3586 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
3587 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
3590 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3591 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
3592 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
3593 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
3594 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
3599 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send>
3600 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3601 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3602 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3603 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3604 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3607 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
3608 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3609 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3612 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
3613 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3614 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3617 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
3618 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3619 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3622 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
3623 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3624 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3627 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
3628 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3629 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3632 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
3633 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3634 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3637 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
3638 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3639 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3642 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
3643 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3644 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3647 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
3648 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3649 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3652 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
3653 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3654 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3657 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
3658 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3659 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3662 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
3663 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3664 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3667 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
3668 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3669 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3672 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
3673 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3674 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3677 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
3678 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3679 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3682 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3683 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3684 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3687 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
3688 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3689 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3692 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
3693 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3694 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3695 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
3696 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
3698 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3699 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3700 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3701 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3702 if no_connection_possible {
3703 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3704 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3705 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3706 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3707 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3709 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
3710 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3711 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3721 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3722 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3723 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3724 // Note that currently on channel reestablish we assert that there are no
3725 // holding cell add-HTLCs, so if in the future we stop removing uncommitted HTLCs
3726 // on peer disconnect here, there will need to be corresponding changes in
3727 // reestablish logic.
3728 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
3729 chan.to_disabled_marked();
3730 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
3731 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3732 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
3734 if chan.is_shutdown() {
3735 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3736 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3740 no_channels_remain = false;
3746 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
3748 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3749 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3750 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3751 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3752 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3753 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3754 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3755 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3756 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3757 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3758 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3759 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3760 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3761 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
3762 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3763 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
3764 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
3765 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
3766 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
3770 if no_channels_remain {
3771 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
3774 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3775 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3777 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
3778 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
3779 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
3784 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
3785 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3787 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3790 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3791 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
3792 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3793 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
3794 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
3797 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
3798 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
3803 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3804 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3805 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3806 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3807 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3808 if !chan.have_received_message() {
3809 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
3810 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
3811 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
3815 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
3816 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3817 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
3823 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
3826 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
3827 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3829 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
3830 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3831 if chan.remote_network_id == *counterparty_node_id {
3832 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
3833 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
3837 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
3838 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
3843 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
3844 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
3845 struct PersistenceNotifier {
3846 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
3847 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
3848 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
3851 impl PersistenceNotifier {
3854 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
3860 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
3861 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
3862 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
3863 let result = *guard;
3871 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
3872 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
3873 let current_time = Instant::now();
3875 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
3876 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
3877 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
3878 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
3879 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
3880 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
3881 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
3883 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
3884 let result = *guard;
3885 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
3889 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
3890 None => return result,
3896 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
3898 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
3899 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
3900 *persistence_lock = true;
3901 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
3906 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3907 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3909 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3910 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3911 match &self.routing {
3912 &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id } => {
3914 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
3915 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3917 &PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { ref payment_data, ref incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3919 payment_data.write(writer)?;
3920 incoming_cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3923 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
3924 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3925 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
3926 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
3931 impl Readable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3932 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
3933 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3934 routing: match Readable::read(reader)? {
3935 0u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3936 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3937 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3939 1u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
3940 payment_data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3941 incoming_cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
3943 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3945 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
3946 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3947 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
3948 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
3953 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3954 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3956 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
3958 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3960 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
3962 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3969 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3970 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
3971 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3972 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3973 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3974 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3979 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3980 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3982 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
3984 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3986 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
3988 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3995 impl Readable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3996 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3997 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3998 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3999 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4000 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4005 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
4009 incoming_packet_shared_secret
4012 impl_writeable!(ClaimableHTLC, 0, {
4019 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
4020 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4022 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
4024 hop_data.write(writer)?;
4026 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
4028 path.write(writer)?;
4029 session_priv.write(writer)?;
4030 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
4037 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
4038 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
4039 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4040 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4041 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
4042 path: Readable::read(reader)?,
4043 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
4044 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4046 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4051 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
4052 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4054 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
4058 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
4060 failure_code.write(writer)?;
4061 data.write(writer)?;
4068 impl Readable for HTLCFailReason {
4069 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
4070 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4071 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
4072 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4073 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
4074 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
4076 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4081 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
4082 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4084 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_funding_outpoint, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
4086 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4087 prev_funding_outpoint.write(writer)?;
4088 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4089 forward_info.write(writer)?;
4091 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4093 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4094 err_packet.write(writer)?;
4101 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
4102 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
4103 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4104 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
4105 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4106 prev_funding_outpoint: Readable::read(reader)?,
4107 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4108 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
4110 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
4111 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4112 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4114 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4119 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4120 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4121 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4122 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4123 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4126 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4127 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
4129 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4130 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4132 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
4134 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4135 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
4136 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
4139 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4140 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
4141 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4142 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4143 unfunded_channels += 1;
4146 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
4147 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4148 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4149 channel.write(writer)?;
4153 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4154 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
4155 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4156 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4157 for forward in pending_forwards {
4158 forward.write(writer)?;
4162 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4163 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
4164 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4165 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4166 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
4167 htlc.write(writer)?;
4171 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4172 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4173 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4174 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4175 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4176 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
4179 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4180 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4181 for event in events.iter() {
4182 event.write(writer)?;
4185 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
4186 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4187 for event in background_events.iter() {
4189 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
4191 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
4192 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
4197 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4203 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
4205 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
4207 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
4208 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling:
4209 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)
4210 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
4211 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
4212 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints the same
4213 /// way you would handle a `chain::Filter` call using ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and
4214 /// ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
4215 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
4216 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
4217 /// 6) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
4219 /// Note that the ordering of #4-6 is not of importance, however all three must occur before you
4220 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized ChannelManager.
4222 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
4223 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
4224 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
4225 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
4226 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
4227 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
4228 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4229 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4230 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4231 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4232 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4235 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
4236 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
4238 pub keys_manager: K,
4240 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4242 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
4243 pub fee_estimator: F,
4244 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4246 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
4247 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
4248 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
4249 pub chain_monitor: M,
4251 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
4252 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
4253 /// force-closed during deserialization.
4254 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
4255 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
4256 /// deserialization.
4258 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
4259 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
4260 pub default_config: UserConfig,
4262 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
4263 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
4265 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
4266 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
4267 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
4268 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
4270 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
4273 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
4274 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
4277 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4278 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4279 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4280 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4281 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4282 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4285 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
4286 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
4287 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
4288 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
4289 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
4291 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
4292 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
4297 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
4298 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
4299 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4300 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
4301 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4302 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4303 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4304 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4307 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4308 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
4309 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
4313 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4314 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
4315 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4316 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4317 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4318 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4321 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4322 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4323 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4324 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
4325 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
4328 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4329 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4330 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4332 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4334 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4335 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4336 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4337 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4338 for _ in 0..channel_count {
4339 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
4340 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
4341 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
4342 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
4343 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4344 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4345 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4346 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4347 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
4348 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4349 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4350 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4351 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4352 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4353 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
4354 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
4355 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
4356 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4358 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4359 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
4361 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
4364 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4368 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
4369 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
4370 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4374 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
4375 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4376 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4377 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
4378 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4379 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4380 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
4381 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
4382 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4384 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
4387 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4388 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4389 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
4390 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4391 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4392 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
4393 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
4394 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4396 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
4399 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4400 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
4401 for _ in 0..peer_count {
4402 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4403 let peer_state = PeerState {
4404 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
4406 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
4409 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4410 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
4411 for _ in 0..event_count {
4412 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
4413 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
4418 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4419 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
4420 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
4421 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4422 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
4423 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4427 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4429 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4430 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4432 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
4434 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
4435 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
4436 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
4438 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
4440 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
4445 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
4447 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
4448 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
4451 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
4453 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
4455 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
4456 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
4457 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
4458 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
4460 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
4461 logger: args.logger,
4462 default_configuration: args.default_config,
4465 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4466 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4469 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
4470 //connection or two.
4472 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
4478 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
4480 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
4482 use std::time::Duration;
4485 fn test_wait_timeout() {
4486 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
4487 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
4489 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
4490 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
4491 thread::spawn(move || {
4493 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
4494 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4495 *persistence_lock = true;
4498 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
4504 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
4505 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
4507 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
4510 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
4515 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
4517 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
4520 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
4527 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
4530 use chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor;
4531 use chain::channelmonitor::Persist;
4532 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
4533 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
4534 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
4535 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
4536 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
4537 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
4538 use routing::router::get_route;
4539 use util::test_utils;
4540 use util::config::UserConfig;
4541 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
4543 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4544 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4545 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
4547 use std::sync::Mutex;
4551 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
4552 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
4553 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
4554 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
4555 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
4556 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
4557 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
4562 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
4563 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
4566 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
4567 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
4568 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
4570 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
4571 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
4573 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())};
4574 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 };
4576 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
4577 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
4579 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
4580 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
4581 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
4582 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
4583 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
4585 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
4587 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
4589 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
4590 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
4591 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
4592 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
4593 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
4595 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
4597 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
4599 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
4600 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4601 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4604 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
4605 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
4606 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
4608 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4609 } else { panic!(); }
4611 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4612 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4614 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
4617 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4620 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
4621 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
4623 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4624 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4626 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
4628 macro_rules! send_payment {
4629 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
4630 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
4631 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), None, Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a).unwrap();
4633 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
4634 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
4636 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap();
4637 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
4638 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4639 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
4640 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
4641 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
4642 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
4643 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4645 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
4646 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
4647 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage, &None, 10_000));
4649 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
4650 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
4651 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
4652 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4653 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
4655 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
4658 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
4659 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
4660 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
4661 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4663 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
4668 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
4669 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);