1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
17 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
18 use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
19 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
21 use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
23 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
24 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
25 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
28 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,FeeEstimator};
29 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
30 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
31 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
32 use ln::router::Route;
33 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
36 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
37 use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface, InMemoryChannelKeys};
38 use util::config::UserConfig;
39 use util::{byte_utils, events};
40 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
41 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
42 use util::logger::Logger;
43 use util::errors::APIError;
46 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
47 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
48 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
49 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
50 use std::time::Duration;
51 use std::marker::{Sync, Send};
54 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
56 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
57 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
58 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
60 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
61 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
62 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
63 // before we forward it.
65 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
66 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
67 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
68 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
69 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
71 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
72 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
73 onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
74 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
75 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
76 short_channel_id: u64,
77 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
78 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
81 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
82 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
83 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
84 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
87 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
88 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
89 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
90 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
94 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
96 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
98 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
102 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
106 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
107 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
108 pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
109 short_channel_id: u64,
111 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
114 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
115 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
116 pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
117 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
120 session_priv: SecretKey,
121 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
122 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
123 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
128 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
129 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
130 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
131 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
132 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
137 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
138 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
140 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
148 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
149 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
150 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
151 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
152 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
153 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
155 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
157 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
158 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
159 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
160 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
161 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
163 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
164 err: msgs::LightningError,
165 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
167 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
169 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
171 err: LightningError {
173 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
174 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
176 data: err.to_string()
180 shutdown_finish: None,
184 fn ignore_no_close(err: &'static str) -> Self {
186 err: LightningError {
188 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
190 shutdown_finish: None,
194 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
195 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
198 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
200 err: LightningError {
202 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
203 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
205 data: err.to_string()
209 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
213 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
216 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
218 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
220 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
222 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
223 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
225 data: msg.to_string()
229 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, .. } => LightningError {
231 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
232 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
234 data: msg.to_string()
239 shutdown_finish: None,
244 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
245 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
246 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
247 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
248 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
250 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
251 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
252 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
253 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
254 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
255 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
256 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
258 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
262 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
263 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
264 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<ChanSigner>>,
265 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
266 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
267 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
268 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
269 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
270 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
271 /// payment_hash -> Vec<(amount_received, htlc_source)> for tracking things that were to us and
272 /// can be failed/claimed by the user
273 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
274 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
276 pub(super) claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(u64, HTLCPreviousHopData)>>,
277 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
278 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
279 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
282 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
283 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
285 latest_features: InitFeatures,
288 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
289 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
291 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
292 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
293 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
294 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
295 /// issues such as overly long function definitions.
296 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M> = Arc<ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, Arc<M>>>;
298 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
299 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
300 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
301 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
302 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
303 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions.
304 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, M> = ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, &'a M>;
306 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
307 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
309 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
310 /// to individual Channels.
312 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
313 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
314 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
315 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
317 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
318 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
319 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
320 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
321 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
322 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
323 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
325 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
326 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
327 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
328 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
331 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
332 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
333 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
334 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
335 /// timer_chan_freshness_every_min roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
337 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
338 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
339 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
340 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
341 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
342 pub struct ChannelManager<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
343 default_configuration: UserConfig,
344 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
345 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
347 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
350 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
352 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
353 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
354 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
357 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
359 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
360 our_network_key: SecretKey,
362 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
364 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
365 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
366 /// are currently open with that peer.
367 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
368 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
370 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
372 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
373 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
374 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
375 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
376 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
378 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>,
383 /// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when
384 /// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
385 pub(crate) const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
386 /// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
387 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7;
389 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
390 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
391 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
392 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
393 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
394 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
395 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
397 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
398 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
399 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
400 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
401 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
402 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
405 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
407 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
408 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
411 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
413 macro_rules! secp_call {
414 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
417 Err(_) => return Err($err),
422 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
423 pub struct ChannelDetails {
424 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
425 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
426 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
427 /// lifetime of the channel.
428 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
429 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
430 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
431 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
432 /// The node_id of our counterparty
433 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
434 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
435 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
436 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
437 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
438 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
439 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
440 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
442 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
443 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
444 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
445 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
446 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
447 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
448 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
449 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
450 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
451 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
452 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
453 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
454 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
458 macro_rules! handle_error {
459 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr, $locked_channel_state: expr) => {
462 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
463 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
464 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
465 if let Some(update) = update_option {
466 $locked_channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
471 log_error!($self, "{}", err.err);
472 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
473 } else { $locked_channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id: $their_node_id, action: err.action.clone() }); }
474 // Return error in case higher-API need one
481 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
482 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
485 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
486 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
488 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
489 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
490 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
491 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
492 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
494 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
496 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. }) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
501 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
502 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
505 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
506 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
508 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
509 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
510 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
511 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
512 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
514 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
516 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, update }) => {
517 log_error!($self, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
518 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
519 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
520 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
522 if let Some(update) = update {
523 if let Err(e) = $self.monitor.add_update_monitor(update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update) {
525 // Upstream channel is dead, but we want at least to fail backward HTLCs to save
526 // downstream channels. In case of PermanentFailure, we are not going to be able
527 // to claim back to_remote output on remote commitment transaction. Doesn't
528 // make a difference here, we are concern about HTLCs circuit, not onchain funds.
529 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {},
530 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {},
534 let mut shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown();
535 if shutdown_res.0.len() >= 1 {
536 log_error!($self, "You have a toxic local commitment transaction {} avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_local_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take", shutdown_res.0[0].txid());
538 shutdown_res.0.clear();
539 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
545 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
546 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
547 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
549 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
551 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
552 log_error!($self, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
553 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
554 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
555 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
557 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
558 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
559 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
560 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
561 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
562 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
563 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
564 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
565 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
566 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
569 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
570 log_info!($self, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
571 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
572 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
574 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
575 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
577 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
578 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
580 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
581 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
582 if !$resend_commitment {
583 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
586 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
588 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
589 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()))
595 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
596 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
597 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
599 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
600 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
604 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
605 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
606 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
607 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
608 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
611 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
616 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref> ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
617 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
619 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
620 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
622 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
624 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
626 /// Users must provide the current blockchain height from which to track onchain channel
627 /// funding outpoints and send payments with reliable timelocks.
629 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
630 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods.
631 /// However, rather than calling these methods directly, the user should register
632 /// the ChannelManager as a listener to the BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's
633 /// `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify all registered listeners in one
635 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>, config: UserConfig, current_blockchain_height: usize) -> Result<ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M>, secp256k1::Error> {
636 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
638 let res = ChannelManager {
639 default_configuration: config.clone(),
640 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
641 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
645 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(current_blockchain_height),
646 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
649 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
650 by_id: HashMap::new(),
651 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
652 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
653 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
654 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
656 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
658 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
660 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
662 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
663 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
673 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
675 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
676 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
677 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
678 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
680 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
681 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
683 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
684 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
685 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
686 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
687 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
690 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
691 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
693 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
694 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
695 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
696 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
697 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
698 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
700 panic!("RNG is bad???");
703 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
705 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
706 node_id: their_network_key,
712 fn list_channels_with_filter<F: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<ChanSigner>)) -> bool>(&self, f: F) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
713 let mut res = Vec::new();
715 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
716 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
717 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
718 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
719 res.push(ChannelDetails {
720 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
721 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
722 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
723 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
724 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
725 inbound_capacity_msat,
726 outbound_capacity_msat,
727 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
728 is_live: channel.is_live(),
732 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
733 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
734 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
735 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
741 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
742 /// more information.
743 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
744 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
747 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
748 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
750 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
751 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
752 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
753 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
754 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
755 // really wanted anyway.
756 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
759 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
760 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
761 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
763 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
764 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
765 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
767 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
768 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
769 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
770 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
771 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
772 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
773 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
774 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
777 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
778 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
779 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
781 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
782 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
784 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
787 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
788 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
790 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
791 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
796 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
797 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
798 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
807 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
808 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
809 log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len());
810 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
811 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
813 for tx in local_txn {
814 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
815 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
819 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
820 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
821 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
822 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
825 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
826 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
827 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
828 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
829 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
836 log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
837 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
838 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
839 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
840 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
846 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
847 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
848 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
849 for chan in self.list_channels() {
850 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
854 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>) {
855 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
856 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
858 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
859 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
860 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
861 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
862 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
863 failure_code: $err_code,
864 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
869 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
870 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
873 let shared_secret = {
874 let mut arr = [0; 32];
875 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
878 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
880 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
881 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
882 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
883 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
884 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
885 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
886 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
887 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
890 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
891 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
892 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
893 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
894 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
897 let mut channel_state = None;
898 macro_rules! return_err {
899 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
901 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
902 if channel_state.is_none() {
903 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
905 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
906 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
907 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
908 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
909 })), channel_state.unwrap());
914 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
915 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
916 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
917 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
919 let error_code = match err {
920 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
921 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
922 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
923 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
924 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
926 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
929 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
930 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
931 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
938 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
941 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
942 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
943 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
944 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
945 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
946 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
947 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
948 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
949 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
950 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
951 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
952 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
956 // final_expiry_too_soon
957 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
958 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
960 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
961 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
962 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
964 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
965 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
966 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
969 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
970 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
971 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
972 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
974 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
976 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
978 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
979 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
980 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
983 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
984 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
985 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
988 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
989 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
990 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
992 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
994 chacha_stream.chacha.process_inline(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
996 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
998 let blinding_factor = {
999 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1000 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1001 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1002 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1005 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1007 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1009 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1012 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1013 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1016 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1017 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1018 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1019 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode => {
1020 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1024 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1025 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1026 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1027 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1028 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1029 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1030 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1034 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1035 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1036 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1037 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1038 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1039 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1040 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1042 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1044 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1045 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1047 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1048 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1049 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1050 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1051 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1052 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1053 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1055 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1056 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1058 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1059 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1060 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1062 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1063 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1065 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1066 // We want to have at least LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1067 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1068 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1070 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1071 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1076 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1077 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1078 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1079 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1081 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1082 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1084 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1085 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
1087 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1089 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1094 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1097 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1098 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1099 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1100 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1101 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1105 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1107 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1108 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1109 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1110 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1111 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1112 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1113 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1114 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1115 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1116 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1119 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1120 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1122 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1128 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1130 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1131 /// fields for more info.
1133 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1134 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1135 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1136 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1137 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1138 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1140 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1142 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1143 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
1144 /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1145 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
1146 /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1147 /// relevant updates.
1149 /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
1150 /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
1151 /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
1152 /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
1153 /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1154 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1155 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1156 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1158 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1159 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1160 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1161 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1165 let (session_priv, prng_seed) = self.keys_manager.get_onion_rand();
1167 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1169 let onion_keys = secp_call!(onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1170 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1171 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1172 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1173 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route had too large size once"});
1175 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, &payment_hash);
1177 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1179 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1180 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1182 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1183 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1184 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1187 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1188 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1190 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1191 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1193 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1194 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
1196 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1197 route: route.clone(),
1198 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1199 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1200 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1202 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1203 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1204 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1205 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1206 // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
1207 // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
1208 // something else in case we will resend later!
1209 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1212 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1213 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1214 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1215 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1216 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1217 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1218 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1226 } else { unreachable!(); }
1230 match handle_error!(self, err, route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey, channel_lock) {
1231 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1232 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err }) }
1236 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1238 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1239 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1241 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1243 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1244 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1245 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1246 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1248 let (mut chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1249 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1250 let (res, chan) = match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1252 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1253 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1254 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
1255 } else { unreachable!(); })
1260 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id(), channel_state) {
1261 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1262 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1264 Err(_) => { return; }
1267 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1268 // lock before add_update_monitor
1269 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1271 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1273 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1274 match handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", *temporary_channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), None)), chan.get_their_node_id(), channel_state) {
1275 Err(_) => { return; },
1276 Ok(()) => unreachable!(),
1280 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1281 // Its completely fine to continue with a FundingCreated until the monitor
1282 // update is persisted, as long as we don't generate the FundingBroadcastSafe
1283 // until the monitor has been safely persisted (as funding broadcast is not,
1285 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1290 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1291 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1292 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1295 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1296 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1297 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1299 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1305 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1306 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1308 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1310 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1312 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1313 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1315 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1316 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1317 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1318 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1319 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1323 /// Generates a signed node_announcement from the given arguments and creates a
1324 /// BroadcastNodeAnnouncement event.
1326 /// RGB is a node "color" and alias a printable human-readable string to describe this node to
1327 /// humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
1329 /// addresses represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node accepts
1330 /// incoming connections.
1331 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: msgs::NetAddressSet) {
1332 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1334 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1335 features: NodeFeatures::supported(),
1336 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
1337 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
1339 addresses: addresses.to_vec(),
1340 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1341 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1343 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1345 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1346 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
1347 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
1348 signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key),
1349 contents: announcement
1354 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1356 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1357 /// Will likely generate further events.
1358 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1359 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1361 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1362 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1363 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1365 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1366 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1368 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1369 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1370 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1371 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1373 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1374 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1375 match forward_info {
1376 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1377 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1378 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1379 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1380 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1382 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1384 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1385 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1386 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1387 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1388 // problem, not ours.
1395 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1396 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1397 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1398 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1399 match forward_info {
1400 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1401 log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1402 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1403 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1404 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1405 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1407 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1409 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1410 log_trace!(self, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), msg);
1412 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1414 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1415 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1420 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1422 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1423 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1424 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1425 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1426 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1427 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1428 // this channel currently :/.
1434 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1435 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1436 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1438 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1439 log_trace!(self, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1441 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1443 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1444 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1445 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1448 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1450 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1451 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1452 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1453 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1454 // messages when we can.
1455 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1456 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1457 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1464 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1465 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment() {
1468 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1469 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1470 let their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
1471 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1472 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1473 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1475 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1476 log_trace!(self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1477 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1478 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1479 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1481 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1483 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. } => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1485 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state) {
1486 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1487 Err(_) => { continue; },
1491 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1492 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1495 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1496 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1497 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1498 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1499 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1500 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1501 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1503 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1511 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1512 match forward_info {
1513 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1514 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1515 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1516 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1517 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1519 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1520 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push((forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)),
1521 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![(forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)]); },
1523 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1524 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1525 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1528 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1529 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1537 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1539 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1540 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1544 if handle_errors.len() > 0 {
1545 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1546 for (their_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1547 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
1551 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1552 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1553 events.append(&mut new_events);
1556 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
1557 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
1558 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
1560 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
1561 pub fn timer_chan_freshness_every_min(&self) {
1562 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1563 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1564 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1565 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
1566 if chan.is_disabled_staged() && !chan.is_live() {
1567 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1568 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1573 } else if chan.is_disabled_staged() && chan.is_live() {
1575 } else if chan.is_disabled_marked() {
1576 chan.to_disabled_staged();
1581 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1582 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
1583 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
1584 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
1585 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
1586 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
1587 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1589 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1590 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1591 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1592 for (recvd_value, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1593 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1594 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1595 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash,
1596 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(recvd_value).to_vec() });
1602 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1603 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1604 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1605 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1606 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1607 /// still-available channels.
1608 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1609 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
1610 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
1611 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
1614 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, .. } => {
1615 log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1616 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1617 match &onion_error {
1618 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
1620 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1622 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1623 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1624 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1625 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1626 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1627 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1628 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1633 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1634 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1635 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1636 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1638 error_code: onion_error_code
1642 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1646 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1647 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1648 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
1649 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1651 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1652 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1653 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1654 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1655 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1656 rejected_by_dest: route.hops.len() == 1,
1658 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1664 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1665 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1666 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1667 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1668 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1669 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1671 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
1672 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1673 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1677 let mut forward_event = None;
1678 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1679 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
1681 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
1682 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1683 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
1685 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1686 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
1689 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1690 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
1691 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1692 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1693 time_forwardable: time
1700 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1701 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1702 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1704 /// You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
1705 /// available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
1706 /// reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
1707 /// payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
1708 /// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
1709 /// motivated attackers.
1711 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1712 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
1713 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1715 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1717 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1718 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1719 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1720 for (received_amount, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1721 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1722 if received_amount < expected_amount || received_amount > expected_amount * 2 {
1723 let mut htlc_msat_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(received_amount).to_vec();
1724 let mut height_data = byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).to_vec();
1725 htlc_msat_data.append(&mut height_data);
1726 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1727 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), &payment_hash,
1728 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_data });
1730 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1736 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
1737 let (their_node_id, err) = loop {
1739 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1740 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1741 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1742 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1746 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1747 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1748 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1750 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1751 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1753 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1754 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1755 // why it's missing.
1760 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
1761 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
1762 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1763 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1764 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1765 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1766 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
1767 assert!(msgs.is_none());
1769 break (chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()));
1773 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1774 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1775 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1776 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1777 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1778 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1779 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1780 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1788 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1789 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1790 //TODO: Do something with e?
1794 } else { unreachable!(); }
1800 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
1803 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1804 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1805 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1808 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1809 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1811 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1812 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1813 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1814 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1815 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
1816 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1819 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1820 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1821 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
1822 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1823 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1824 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1825 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor().clone();
1826 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1828 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1829 // TODO: There may be some pending HTLCs that we intended to fail
1830 // backwards when a monitor update failed. We should make sure
1831 // knowledge of those gets moved into the appropriate in-memory
1832 // ChannelMonitor and they get failed backwards once we get
1833 // on-chain confirmations.
1834 // Note I think #198 addresses this, so once it's merged a test
1835 // should be written.
1836 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1837 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1839 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1840 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1841 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1847 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1850 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1851 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1852 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1854 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1856 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1857 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1858 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1859 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1864 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1865 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1866 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1867 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1868 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1873 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1877 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1882 if needs_broadcast_safe {
1883 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1884 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
1885 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1888 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
1889 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1890 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1893 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
1894 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1895 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1896 msg: announcement_sigs,
1899 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
1907 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
1909 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1910 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1912 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1914 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1915 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1919 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1920 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1921 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1924 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1925 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1926 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1927 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1928 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1929 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1930 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1931 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1932 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1933 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1935 entry.insert(channel);
1941 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1942 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1943 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1944 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1945 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1946 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1947 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1948 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1950 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
1951 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1953 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1956 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1957 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1958 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1959 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1960 output_script: output_script,
1961 user_channel_id: user_id,
1966 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1967 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), mut chan) = {
1968 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1969 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1970 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1971 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1972 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1973 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1975 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
1977 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1980 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1981 // lock before add_update_monitor
1982 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1984 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1985 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
1986 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
1987 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
1988 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
1989 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", funding_msg.channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), None));
1991 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1992 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
1993 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
1994 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
1995 // until we have persisted our monitor.
1996 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2000 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2001 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2002 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
2003 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2004 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
2006 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2007 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
2008 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2017 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2018 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
2019 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2020 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2021 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2022 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2023 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2024 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2026 let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2027 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2028 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2030 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2032 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2035 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2036 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2037 funding_txo: funding_txo,
2038 user_channel_id: user_id,
2043 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2044 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2045 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2046 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2047 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2048 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2049 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2051 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2052 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2053 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2054 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2055 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2056 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2057 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2058 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2059 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2060 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2061 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2062 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2063 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2064 msg: announcement_sigs,
2069 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2073 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2074 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2075 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2076 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2078 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2079 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2080 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2081 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2083 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2084 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2085 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2086 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2090 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2091 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2092 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2096 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2097 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2098 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2100 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2101 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2103 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2106 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2107 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2109 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2110 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2111 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2112 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2120 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2121 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2122 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2123 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2124 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2125 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2126 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2127 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2129 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2130 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2131 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2132 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2137 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2138 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2139 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2140 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2141 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2142 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2143 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2145 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2146 } else { (tx, None) }
2148 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2151 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2152 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
2153 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2155 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2156 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2157 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2158 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2166 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2167 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2168 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2169 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2171 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2172 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2173 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2174 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2176 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2177 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2179 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2180 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2181 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2182 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2184 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2185 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2186 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2187 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2188 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
2189 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
2190 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2191 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2192 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2193 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
2194 // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
2195 // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
2196 // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
2197 // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
2199 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
2200 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2201 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
2202 res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2206 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
2207 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
2208 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
2209 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
2210 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
2211 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2216 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
2218 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2223 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2224 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2226 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2227 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2228 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2229 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2230 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2232 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2234 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2237 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2241 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2242 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2243 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2244 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2245 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2246 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2247 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2249 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2251 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2256 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2257 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2258 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2259 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2260 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2261 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2262 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2264 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2265 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set")), channel_state, chan);
2267 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2270 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2274 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2275 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2276 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2277 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2278 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2279 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2280 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2282 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2283 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2284 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2285 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2286 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2288 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2289 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2290 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2292 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2293 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2294 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2295 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2296 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2297 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2298 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2299 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2301 commitment_signed: msg,
2305 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2306 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2307 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2313 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2318 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2319 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2320 let mut forward_event = None;
2321 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2322 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2323 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2324 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
2326 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2327 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2328 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2329 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2331 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2332 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2337 match forward_event {
2339 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2340 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2341 time_forwardable: time
2349 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2350 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2351 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2352 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2353 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2354 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2355 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2356 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2358 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2359 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2360 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2361 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2362 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2363 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2364 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA"));
2366 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2369 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2370 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2371 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2375 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2376 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2377 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2381 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2383 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2386 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2387 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2389 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2394 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2395 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2396 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2397 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2398 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2399 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2400 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2402 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2404 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2409 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2410 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2411 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2413 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2414 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2415 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2416 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2418 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2419 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
2422 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2423 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2424 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2426 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2427 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2428 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2429 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2430 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature")), channel_state, chan);
2433 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2435 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2436 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2437 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2438 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2439 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2440 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2441 contents: announcement,
2443 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2446 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2451 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2452 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2453 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2455 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2456 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2457 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2458 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2460 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, mut order, shutdown) =
2461 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2462 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2463 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2464 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2465 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2466 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2467 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2468 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2470 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2471 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2473 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
2474 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2477 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2478 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2479 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2483 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2484 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2485 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2486 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2491 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2492 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2493 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2494 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2500 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2504 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2509 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2510 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2511 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2517 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2521 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2522 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2523 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2524 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2526 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2527 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2528 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2530 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2531 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2533 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2534 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2535 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2536 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2537 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2539 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2540 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2542 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2543 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2545 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2546 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) =
2547 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2549 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2552 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2553 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2554 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2555 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2556 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2557 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2558 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2559 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2569 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state_lock) {
2570 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2571 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
2576 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref> events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
2577 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2578 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2579 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2580 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2582 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2583 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2584 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2585 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2586 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2588 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2589 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2594 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2595 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2596 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2601 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref> events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
2602 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2603 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2604 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2605 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2607 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2608 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2609 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2610 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2611 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2613 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2614 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2619 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2620 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2621 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2626 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send> ChainListener for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
2627 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2628 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2629 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2630 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2631 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2633 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2634 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2635 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2636 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2637 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2638 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2639 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2640 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2641 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2642 msg: funding_locked,
2644 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2645 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2646 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2647 msg: announcement_sigs,
2650 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2651 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2652 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2653 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2654 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
2658 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2659 for tx in txn_matched {
2660 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2661 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2662 log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2663 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2664 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2666 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2667 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2668 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2669 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2670 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2671 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2680 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2681 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2682 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2684 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2685 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2686 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2687 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2688 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2689 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2690 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2699 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2700 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2702 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2703 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
2706 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2707 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, _: u32) {
2708 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2709 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2711 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2712 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2713 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2714 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2715 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2716 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2717 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2718 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2720 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2721 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2722 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2732 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2733 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2735 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2736 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2740 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send> ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
2741 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
2742 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2743 let res = self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg);
2745 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2746 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2750 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
2751 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2752 let res = self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg);
2754 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2755 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2759 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
2760 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2761 let res = self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg);
2763 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2764 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2768 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
2769 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2770 let res = self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg);
2772 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2773 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2777 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
2778 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2779 let res = self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg);
2781 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2782 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2786 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
2787 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2788 let res = self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg);
2790 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2791 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2795 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
2796 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2797 let res = self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg);
2799 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2800 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2804 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
2805 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2806 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2808 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2809 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2813 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
2814 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2815 let res = self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2817 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2818 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2822 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
2823 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2824 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2826 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2827 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2831 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
2832 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2833 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2835 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2836 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2840 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
2841 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2842 let res = self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg);
2844 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2845 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2849 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
2850 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2851 let res = self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg);
2853 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2854 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2858 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
2859 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2860 let res = self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg);
2862 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2863 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2867 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
2868 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2869 let res = self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg);
2871 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2872 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2876 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
2877 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2878 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg);
2880 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2881 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2885 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2886 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2887 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2888 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2889 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
2891 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2892 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2893 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2894 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2895 if no_connection_possible {
2896 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2897 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2898 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2899 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2900 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2902 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2903 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2904 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2914 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2915 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2916 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2917 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2918 chan.to_disabled_marked();
2919 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2920 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2921 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2923 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2924 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2925 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2929 no_channels_remain = false;
2935 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
2937 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2938 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2939 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2940 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2941 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2942 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2943 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2944 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2945 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2946 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2947 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2948 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
2949 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
2950 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
2951 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2952 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
2956 if no_channels_remain {
2957 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(their_node_id);
2960 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2961 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2963 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2964 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2965 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2970 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
2971 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2973 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2976 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
2977 match peer_state_lock.entry(their_node_id.clone()) {
2978 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2979 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
2980 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
2983 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
2984 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
2989 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2990 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2991 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2992 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2993 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2994 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2995 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2996 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2997 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
3001 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
3002 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
3003 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
3009 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
3012 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
3013 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3015 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
3016 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3017 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
3018 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
3022 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
3027 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3028 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3030 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3031 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3032 self.onion_packet.write(writer)?;
3033 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
3034 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3035 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3036 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
3037 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
3042 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCInfo {
3043 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
3044 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3045 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3046 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
3047 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3048 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3049 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
3050 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
3055 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3056 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3058 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
3060 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3062 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
3064 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3071 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
3072 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
3073 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3074 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3075 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3076 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3081 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3082 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3084 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
3086 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3088 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
3090 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3097 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
3098 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3099 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3100 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3101 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3102 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3107 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3110 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3113 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3114 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3116 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3118 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3120 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3122 route.write(writer)?;
3123 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3124 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3131 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
3132 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3133 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3134 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3135 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3136 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
3137 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3138 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3140 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3145 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3146 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3148 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3152 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3154 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3155 data.write(writer)?;
3162 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
3163 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3164 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3165 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3166 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3167 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3168 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3170 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3175 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3176 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3178 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
3180 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3181 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3182 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3184 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3186 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3187 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3194 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCForwardInfo {
3195 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
3196 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3197 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
3198 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3199 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3200 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
3202 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
3203 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3204 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3206 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3211 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable, M: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
3212 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3213 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3215 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3216 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3218 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3219 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3220 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3222 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3223 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3224 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3225 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3226 unfunded_channels += 1;
3229 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3230 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3231 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3232 channel.write(writer)?;
3236 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3237 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3238 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3239 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3240 for forward in pending_forwards {
3241 forward.write(writer)?;
3245 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3246 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3247 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3248 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3249 for &(recvd_amt, ref previous_hop) in previous_hops.iter() {
3250 recvd_amt.write(writer)?;
3251 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
3255 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3256 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3257 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3258 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
3259 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3260 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
3263 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3269 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3271 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3273 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3274 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3275 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3276 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3277 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3278 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3279 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3280 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3281 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3282 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3283 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface.
3284 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
3285 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3286 /// deserialization.
3287 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>,
3289 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3291 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3292 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
3293 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3295 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3296 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3297 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3300 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3301 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3302 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3303 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
3304 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3305 /// deserialization.
3306 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3307 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3308 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3309 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3311 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3312 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3314 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3315 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
3316 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3317 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3319 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3321 pub channel_monitors: &'a mut HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor>,
3324 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable<R>, M: Deref> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M>) where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
3325 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3326 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3327 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3328 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3329 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3332 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3333 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3334 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3336 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3338 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3339 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3340 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3341 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3342 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3343 let mut channel: Channel<ChanSigner> = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3344 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3345 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3348 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3349 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3350 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
3351 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3352 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3353 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3354 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3355 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3356 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3358 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3359 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3361 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3364 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3368 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
3369 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3370 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3374 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3375 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3376 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3377 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3378 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3379 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3380 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3381 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3383 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3386 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3387 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3388 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3389 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3390 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3391 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3392 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3393 previous_hops.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3395 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3398 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3399 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, 128));
3400 for _ in 0..peer_count {
3401 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3402 let peer_state = PeerState {
3403 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
3405 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
3408 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3410 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3412 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3413 monitor: args.monitor,
3414 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3416 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3417 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3418 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3420 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3425 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3427 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3429 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
3431 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
3433 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3434 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3435 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3436 logger: args.logger,
3437 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3440 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3441 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3442 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3443 //connection or two.
3446 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))