1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
26 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
40 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
43 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
44 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
46 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
48 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
49 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
50 use util::config::UserConfig;
51 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
52 use util::{byte_utils, events};
53 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
54 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
55 use util::logger::Logger;
56 use util::errors::APIError;
59 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
60 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
61 use std::sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
62 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
63 use std::time::Duration;
64 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
65 use std::time::Instant;
66 use std::marker::{Sync, Send};
68 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
70 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
72 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
73 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
74 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
76 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
77 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
78 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
79 // before we forward it.
81 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
82 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
83 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
84 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
85 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
87 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
88 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
90 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
91 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
94 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
95 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
99 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
100 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
101 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
102 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
103 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
104 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
105 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
108 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
109 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
110 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
111 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
114 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
115 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
116 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
117 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
118 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
121 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
123 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
125 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
126 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
127 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
129 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
131 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
135 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
139 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
140 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
141 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
142 short_channel_id: u64,
144 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
146 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
147 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
151 struct ClaimableHTLC {
152 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
154 /// Filled in when the HTLC was received with a payment_secret packet, which contains a
155 /// total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
156 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
157 /// are part of the same payment.
158 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
162 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
163 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
164 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
165 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
168 session_priv: SecretKey,
169 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
170 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
171 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
176 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
177 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
179 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
180 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
185 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
186 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
188 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
196 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
197 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
198 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
199 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
200 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
201 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
202 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
203 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
204 /// payment_secret type, use to authenticate sender to the receiver and tie MPP HTLCs together
205 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
206 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
207 pub struct PaymentSecret(pub [u8;32]);
209 type ShutdownResult = (Option<OutPoint>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
211 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
212 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
213 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
214 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
215 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
217 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
218 err: msgs::LightningError,
219 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
221 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
223 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
225 err: LightningError {
227 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
228 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
234 shutdown_finish: None,
238 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
240 err: LightningError {
242 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
244 shutdown_finish: None,
248 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
249 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
252 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
254 err: LightningError {
256 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
257 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
263 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
267 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
270 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
272 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
274 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
276 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
277 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
283 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
285 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
286 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
293 shutdown_finish: None,
298 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
299 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
300 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
301 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
302 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
304 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
305 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
306 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
307 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
308 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
309 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
310 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
312 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
316 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
317 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
318 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
319 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
320 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
321 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
322 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
323 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
324 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
325 /// (payment_hash, payment_secret) -> Vec<HTLCs> for tracking HTLCs that
326 /// were to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
327 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
328 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
330 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<(PaymentHash, Option<PaymentSecret>), Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
331 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
332 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
333 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
336 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
337 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
339 latest_features: InitFeatures,
342 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
343 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
345 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
346 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
347 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
348 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
349 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
350 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
351 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
352 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = Arc<ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>>;
354 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
355 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
356 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
357 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
358 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
359 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
360 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
361 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
362 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
364 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
365 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
367 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
368 /// to individual Channels.
370 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
371 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
372 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
373 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
375 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
376 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
377 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
378 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
379 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
380 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
381 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
383 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
384 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
385 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
386 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
389 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
390 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
391 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
392 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
393 /// timer_chan_freshness_every_min roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
395 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
396 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
397 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
398 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
399 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
400 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
401 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
402 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
403 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
404 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
407 default_configuration: UserConfig,
408 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
414 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
416 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
417 last_block_hash: Mutex<BlockHash>,
418 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
420 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
421 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
422 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
423 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
424 our_network_key: SecretKey,
426 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
427 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
428 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
430 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
431 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
432 /// are currently open with that peer.
433 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
434 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
436 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
438 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
439 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
440 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
441 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
442 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
443 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the PersistenceNotifier
444 /// the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
445 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
447 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
454 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
455 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `wait_timeout`/`wait` that new updates are available for
456 /// persistence. Therefore, this struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and,
457 /// upon going out of scope, sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released
458 /// indicates that the updates are ready for persistence).
459 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> {
460 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
461 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
462 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
465 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> {
466 fn new(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> Self {
467 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
470 persistence_notifier: notifier,
471 _read_guard: read_guard,
476 impl<'a> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> {
478 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
482 /// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when
483 /// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
484 pub(crate) const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
485 /// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
486 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7;
488 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
489 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
490 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
491 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
492 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
493 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
494 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
496 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
497 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
498 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
499 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
500 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
501 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
504 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
506 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
507 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
510 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
512 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
514 pub struct ChannelDetails {
515 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
516 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
517 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
518 /// lifetime of the channel.
519 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
520 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
521 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
522 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
523 /// The node_id of our counterparty
524 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
525 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
526 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
527 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
528 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
529 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
530 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
531 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
533 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
534 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
535 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
536 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
537 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
538 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
539 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
540 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
541 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
542 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
543 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
544 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
545 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
549 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
550 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
552 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
553 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
554 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
555 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
556 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
557 ParameterError(APIError),
558 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
559 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
560 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
563 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
565 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
566 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
567 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
568 /// paths than the ones selected).
569 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
570 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
571 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
572 /// in over-/re-payment.
574 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
575 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
576 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
578 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
579 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
580 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
581 /// with the latest update_id.
582 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
585 macro_rules! handle_error {
586 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
589 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
590 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
592 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
593 // entering the macro.
594 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
597 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
599 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
600 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
601 if let Some(update) = update_option {
602 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
608 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
609 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
611 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
612 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
613 action: err.action.clone()
617 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
618 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
621 // Return error in case higher-API need one
628 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
629 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
632 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
633 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
635 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
636 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
637 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
638 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
639 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
641 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
643 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
648 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
649 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
652 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
653 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
655 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
656 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
657 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
658 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
659 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
661 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
663 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg)) => {
664 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
665 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
666 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
667 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
669 let shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown(false);
670 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
676 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
677 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
678 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
680 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
682 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
683 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
684 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
685 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
686 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
688 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
689 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
690 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
691 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
692 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
693 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
694 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
695 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
696 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
697 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
700 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
701 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
702 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
703 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
705 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
706 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
708 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
709 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
711 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
712 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
713 if !$resend_commitment {
714 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
717 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
719 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
720 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$entry.key()))
726 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
727 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
728 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
730 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
731 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
735 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
736 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
737 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
738 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
739 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
742 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
747 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
748 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
749 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
750 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
751 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
754 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
756 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
757 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
759 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
761 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
763 /// Users must provide the current blockchain height from which to track onchain channel
764 /// funding outpoints and send payments with reliable timelocks.
766 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
767 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods.
768 pub fn new(network: Network, fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, current_blockchain_height: usize) -> Self {
769 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
772 default_configuration: config.clone(),
773 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.block_hash(),
774 fee_estimator: fee_est,
778 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(current_blockchain_height),
779 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
782 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
783 by_id: HashMap::new(),
784 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
785 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
786 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
787 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
789 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
791 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
793 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
795 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
796 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
797 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
805 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
807 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
808 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
809 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
810 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
812 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
813 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
815 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
816 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
817 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
818 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
819 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
822 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
823 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?;
824 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
826 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
827 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
828 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
830 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
831 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
832 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
833 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
834 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
836 panic!("RNG is bad???");
839 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
841 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
842 node_id: their_network_key,
848 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
849 let mut res = Vec::new();
851 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
852 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
853 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
854 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
855 res.push(ChannelDetails {
856 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
857 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
858 remote_network_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
859 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
860 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
861 inbound_capacity_msat,
862 outbound_capacity_msat,
863 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
864 is_live: channel.is_live(),
868 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
869 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
870 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
871 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
877 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
878 /// more information.
879 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
880 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
883 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
884 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
886 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
887 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
888 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
889 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
890 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
891 // really wanted anyway.
892 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
895 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
896 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
897 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
899 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
900 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
901 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
903 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
904 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
905 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
906 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
907 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
908 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
909 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
910 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
913 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
914 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
915 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
917 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
918 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
920 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
923 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
924 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
926 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
927 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
932 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
933 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
934 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
943 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
944 let (funding_txo_option, monitor_update, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
945 log_trace!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
946 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
947 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
949 if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_option {
950 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
951 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
952 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
953 // ignore the result here.
954 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
958 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
960 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
961 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
962 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
963 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
964 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
965 // Error or Ok here doesn't matter - the result is only exposed publicly
966 // when peer_node_id is None anyway.
970 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
971 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
973 chan.remove_entry().1
975 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
978 log_trace!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
979 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
980 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
981 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
982 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
990 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
991 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
992 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
993 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
994 self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None)
997 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
998 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
999 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1000 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1001 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1005 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1006 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1007 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1009 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1010 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1011 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1012 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1013 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1014 failure_code: $err_code,
1015 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1020 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1021 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1024 let shared_secret = {
1025 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1026 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1029 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1031 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1032 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1033 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1034 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1035 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1036 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1037 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1038 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1041 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1042 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1043 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1044 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1045 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1048 let mut channel_state = None;
1049 macro_rules! return_err {
1050 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1052 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1053 if channel_state.is_none() {
1054 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1056 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1057 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1058 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1059 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1060 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1065 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1066 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1067 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
1068 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1070 let error_code = match err {
1071 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1072 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1073 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1074 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1075 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1077 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1080 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1081 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1082 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1089 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1092 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1093 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1094 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1095 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1096 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1097 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1098 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1099 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1100 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1101 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1102 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1103 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1107 // final_expiry_too_soon
1108 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure we have at least
1109 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1110 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown payment hash, our payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward
1111 // before our onchain logic triggers a channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational).
1112 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1113 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1115 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1116 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1117 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1119 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1120 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1121 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1124 let payment_data = match next_hop_data.format {
1125 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => None,
1126 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1127 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data } => payment_data,
1130 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1131 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1132 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1133 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1135 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1136 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1138 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1140 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1141 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1142 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1143 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1146 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1147 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1148 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1150 // Check two things:
1151 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1152 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1153 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1155 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1157 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1158 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1159 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1161 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1163 let blinding_factor = {
1164 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1165 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1166 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1167 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1170 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1172 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1174 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1177 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1178 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1181 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1182 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1183 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1184 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1185 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1189 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1190 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1191 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1194 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1195 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1196 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1197 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1201 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1202 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1203 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1204 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1205 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1206 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1207 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1208 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1209 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1210 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1212 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1214 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1215 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1217 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1218 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1219 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1220 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1221 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1222 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1223 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1225 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1226 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1228 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1229 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1230 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1232 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1233 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1235 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1236 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1237 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1238 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1239 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1241 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1242 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1244 // In theory, we would be safe against unitentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1245 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longuer delay.
1246 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1247 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1253 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1254 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1255 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1256 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1258 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1259 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1261 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1262 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1263 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1265 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1267 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1272 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1275 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1276 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1277 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1278 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1279 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1283 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1285 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1286 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1288 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1289 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1290 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1291 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1292 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1293 fee_base_msat: chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator),
1294 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1295 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1298 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1299 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1301 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1307 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1308 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1309 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1310 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1311 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1313 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1314 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1315 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height)?;
1316 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1317 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1319 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1321 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1323 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1324 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1325 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1326 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1327 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1330 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1331 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1333 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1334 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1336 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1337 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1339 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1341 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1342 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1343 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1345 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1346 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1347 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1348 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1349 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1350 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1351 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1352 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1353 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1356 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1357 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1358 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1359 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1360 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1361 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1362 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1370 } else { unreachable!(); }
1374 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1375 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1377 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1382 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1384 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1385 /// fields for more info.
1387 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1388 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1389 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1390 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1391 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1392 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1394 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1396 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1397 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1398 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1400 /// In general, a path may raise:
1401 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1402 /// node public key) is specified.
1403 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1404 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1406 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1407 /// relevant updates.
1409 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1410 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1411 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1413 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1414 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1415 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1416 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1418 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1419 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1420 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1421 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1422 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1423 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1425 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1426 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1427 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1428 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1429 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1431 let mut total_value = 0;
1432 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1433 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
1434 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1435 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1436 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1437 continue 'path_check;
1439 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1440 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1441 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1442 continue 'path_check;
1445 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1446 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
1448 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
1449 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
1452 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1453 let mut results = Vec::new();
1454 for path in route.paths.iter() {
1455 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height));
1457 let mut has_ok = false;
1458 let mut has_err = false;
1459 for res in results.iter() {
1460 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
1461 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
1462 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
1463 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
1470 if has_err && has_ok {
1471 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
1473 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
1479 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1481 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1482 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1484 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1486 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1487 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1488 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1489 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1492 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1494 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo, &self.logger)
1495 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1496 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
1497 } else { unreachable!(); })
1502 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
1503 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1506 Err(_) => { return; }
1510 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1511 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1512 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1515 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1516 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1517 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1519 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1525 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1526 if !chan.should_announce() {
1527 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1531 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1533 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1535 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1536 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1538 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1539 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1540 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1541 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1542 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1547 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
1548 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
1549 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
1551 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::std::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
1554 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
1555 // smaller than 500:
1556 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
1558 /// Generates a signed node_announcement from the given arguments and creates a
1559 /// BroadcastNodeAnnouncement event. Note that such messages will be ignored unless peers have
1560 /// seen a channel_announcement from us (ie unless we have public channels open).
1562 /// RGB is a node "color" and alias is a printable human-readable string to describe this node
1563 /// to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
1565 /// addresses represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node accepts
1566 /// incoming connections. These will be broadcast to the network, publicly tying these
1567 /// addresses together. If you wish to preserve user privacy, addresses should likely contain
1568 /// only Tor Onion addresses.
1570 /// Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500).
1571 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
1572 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1574 if addresses.len() > 500 {
1575 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
1578 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1579 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1580 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
1581 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
1582 rgb, alias, addresses,
1583 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1584 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1586 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1588 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1589 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
1590 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
1591 signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key),
1592 contents: announcement
1597 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1599 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1600 /// Will likely generate further events.
1601 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1602 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1604 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1605 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1606 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1608 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1609 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1611 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1612 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1613 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1614 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1616 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1617 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1618 match forward_info {
1619 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
1620 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1621 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1622 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1623 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1624 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1625 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1627 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
1628 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
1631 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1632 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1633 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1634 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1635 // problem, not ours.
1642 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1643 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1644 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1645 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1646 match forward_info {
1647 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1648 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1650 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
1651 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1652 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1653 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1654 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1655 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1656 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1657 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1659 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
1661 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1662 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
1664 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1666 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1667 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
1668 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
1674 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1676 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1677 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1678 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1679 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1680 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1681 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1682 // this channel currently :/.
1688 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1689 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
1691 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1692 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1693 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1695 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1696 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1698 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1700 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1701 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1702 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1705 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1707 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1708 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1709 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1710 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1711 // messages when we can.
1712 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1713 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1714 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1721 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1722 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
1725 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1726 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1727 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1728 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1729 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1730 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1732 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1733 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1734 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1735 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1736 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1738 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1740 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1742 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
1746 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1747 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1750 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1751 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
1752 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1753 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1754 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1755 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1756 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1758 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1766 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1767 match forward_info {
1768 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1769 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry },
1770 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
1771 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1772 let prev_hop = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1773 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1774 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1775 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1776 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1779 let mut total_value = 0;
1780 let payment_secret_opt =
1781 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data { Some(data.payment_secret.clone()) } else { None };
1782 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry((payment_hash, payment_secret_opt))
1783 .or_insert(Vec::new());
1784 htlcs.push(ClaimableHTLC {
1786 value: amt_to_forward,
1787 payment_data: payment_data.clone(),
1788 cltv_expiry: incoming_cltv_expiry,
1790 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data {
1791 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1792 total_value += htlc.value;
1793 if htlc.payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat != data.total_msat {
1794 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
1796 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
1798 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > data.total_msat {
1799 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1800 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
1801 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
1802 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(
1803 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire)
1807 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1808 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
1809 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1810 htlc_id: htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
1811 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
1813 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
1816 } else if total_value == data.total_msat {
1817 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1819 payment_secret: Some(data.payment_secret),
1824 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1826 payment_secret: None,
1827 amt: amt_to_forward,
1831 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1832 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
1834 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1835 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1843 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1844 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
1847 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1848 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
1851 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1852 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1853 events.append(&mut new_events);
1856 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
1857 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
1858 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
1860 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
1861 pub fn timer_chan_freshness_every_min(&self) {
1862 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1863 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1864 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1865 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
1866 if chan.is_disabled_staged() && !chan.is_live() {
1867 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1868 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1873 } else if chan.is_disabled_staged() && chan.is_live() {
1875 } else if chan.is_disabled_marked() {
1876 chan.to_disabled_staged();
1881 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1882 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
1883 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
1884 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
1885 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
1886 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> bool {
1887 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1889 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1890 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(*payment_hash, *payment_secret));
1891 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1892 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
1893 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1894 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
1895 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
1896 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32,
1898 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1899 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
1900 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
1906 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
1907 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
1908 // be surfaced to the user.
1909 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
1910 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
1912 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
1913 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
1914 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
1915 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
1916 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(&chan_entry.get()) {
1917 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
1919 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
1922 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
1924 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1925 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
1926 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
1928 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1929 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1930 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1932 rejected_by_dest: false,
1944 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1945 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1946 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1947 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1948 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1949 /// still-available channels.
1950 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1951 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
1952 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
1953 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
1956 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, .. } => {
1957 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1958 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1959 match &onion_error {
1960 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
1962 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1964 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1965 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1966 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1967 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1968 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1969 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1970 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1975 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1976 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1977 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1978 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1980 error_code: onion_error_code,
1982 error_data: onion_error_data
1986 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1992 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1993 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1994 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
1995 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1997 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1998 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1999 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2000 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2001 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2002 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
2004 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
2006 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
2012 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2013 let err_packet = match onion_error {
2014 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
2015 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
2016 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
2017 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
2019 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
2020 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2021 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
2025 let mut forward_event = None;
2026 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2027 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
2029 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
2030 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2031 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
2033 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2034 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
2037 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2038 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
2039 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2040 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2041 time_forwardable: time
2048 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
2049 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
2050 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
2052 /// You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
2053 /// available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
2054 /// reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
2055 /// payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
2056 /// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
2057 /// motivated attackers.
2059 /// Note that the privacy concerns in (b) are not relevant in payments with a payment_secret
2060 /// set. Thus, for such payments we will claim any payments which do not under-pay.
2062 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
2063 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
2064 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2066 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2068 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2069 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(payment_hash, *payment_secret));
2070 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2071 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
2073 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
2074 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
2075 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
2076 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
2078 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
2079 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
2080 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
2081 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
2082 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
2085 let (is_mpp, mut valid_mpp) = if let &Some(ref data) = &sources[0].payment_data {
2086 assert!(payment_secret.is_some());
2087 (true, data.total_msat >= expected_amount)
2089 assert!(payment_secret.is_none());
2093 for htlc in sources.iter() {
2094 if !is_mpp || !valid_mpp { break; }
2095 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2100 let mut errs = Vec::new();
2101 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
2102 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2103 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2104 if (is_mpp && !valid_mpp) || (!is_mpp && (htlc.value < expected_amount || htlc.value > expected_amount * 2)) {
2105 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2106 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2107 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32,
2109 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2110 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
2111 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2113 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
2115 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.1.err.action {
2116 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
2117 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
2118 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", e.1.err.err);
2119 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
2120 } else { errs.push(e); }
2122 Err(None) if is_mpp => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
2124 log_warn!(self.logger, "Channel we expected to claim an HTLC from was closed.");
2126 Ok(()) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
2131 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
2132 // which were generated.
2133 channel_state.take();
2135 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
2136 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2137 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2144 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(), Option<(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)>> {
2145 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
2146 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
2147 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2148 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2154 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
2155 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2156 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
2157 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
2158 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_option {
2159 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2160 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2161 assert!(msgs.is_none());
2163 return Err(Some((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err())));
2167 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
2168 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2169 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2170 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2171 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2172 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
2173 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2174 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2183 // TODO: Do something with e?
2184 // This should only occur if we are claiming an HTLC at the same time as the
2185 // HTLC is being failed (eg because a block is being connected and this caused
2186 // an HTLC to time out). This should, of course, only occur if the user is the
2187 // one doing the claiming (as it being a part of a peer claim would imply we're
2188 // about to lose funds) and only if the lock in claim_funds was dropped as a
2189 // previous HTLC was failed (thus not for an MPP payment).
2190 debug_assert!(false, "This shouldn't be reachable except in absurdly rare cases between monitor updates and HTLC timeouts: {:?}", e);
2194 } else { unreachable!(); }
2197 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
2199 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
2200 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2201 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2202 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
2206 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
2207 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
2208 if let Err((counterparty_node_id, err)) = match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage) {
2211 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2212 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
2213 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2214 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2217 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
2218 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
2219 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
2220 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
2221 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
2222 payment_preimage, e);
2226 Err(Some(res)) => Err(res),
2228 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2229 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2230 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2236 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
2237 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2238 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
2241 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
2242 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
2245 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
2246 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
2248 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
2249 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
2250 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
2251 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
2253 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
2254 /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
2255 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
2256 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
2257 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
2258 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
2259 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
2260 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
2261 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
2262 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2264 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
2265 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
2266 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
2267 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
2270 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2271 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2272 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2273 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2274 let channel = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
2278 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
2282 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
2283 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2284 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), funding_txo.clone(), pending_forwards));
2286 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
2288 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
2289 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
2290 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2291 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2296 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
2297 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
2298 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2299 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2300 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2305 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2309 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2314 if needs_broadcast_safe {
2315 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2316 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
2317 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
2320 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2321 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2322 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2325 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2326 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2327 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2328 msg: announcement_sigs,
2331 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2335 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
2337 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
2338 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2340 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
2342 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
2343 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
2347 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2348 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
2349 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
2352 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
2353 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
2354 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2355 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2356 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
2357 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
2358 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2359 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
2360 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2361 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
2363 entry.insert(channel);
2369 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2370 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
2371 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2372 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2373 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
2374 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2375 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2376 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2378 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
2379 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2381 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2384 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2385 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
2386 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
2387 channel_value_satoshis: value,
2389 user_channel_id: user_id,
2394 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2395 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
2396 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2397 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2398 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
2399 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2400 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2401 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2403 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
2405 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2408 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
2409 // lock before watch_channel
2410 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
2412 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
2413 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
2414 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
2415 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
2416 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
2417 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
2418 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
2419 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
2420 let (_funding_txo_option, _monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
2421 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
2422 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
2424 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
2425 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
2426 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
2427 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
2428 // until we have persisted our monitor.
2429 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2433 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2434 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2435 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
2436 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2437 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
2439 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2440 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
2441 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2450 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2451 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
2452 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2453 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2454 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2455 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2456 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2457 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2459 let monitor = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
2460 Ok(update) => update,
2461 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2463 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2464 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2466 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2468 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2471 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2472 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2474 user_channel_id: user_id,
2479 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2480 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2481 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2482 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2483 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2484 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2485 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2487 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2488 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2489 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2490 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2491 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2492 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2493 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2494 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2495 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2496 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2497 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2498 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2499 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2500 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2501 msg: announcement_sigs,
2506 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2510 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2511 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2512 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2513 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2515 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2516 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2517 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2518 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2520 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2521 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2522 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2523 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2527 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2528 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2529 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2533 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2534 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2535 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2537 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2538 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2540 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2543 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2544 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2546 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2547 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2548 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2549 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2557 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2558 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2559 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2560 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2561 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2562 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2563 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2564 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2566 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2567 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2568 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2569 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2574 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2575 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2576 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2577 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2578 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2579 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2580 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2582 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2583 } else { (tx, None) }
2585 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2588 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2589 log_trace!(self.logger, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
2590 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2592 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2593 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2594 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2595 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2603 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2604 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2605 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2606 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2608 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2609 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2610 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2611 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2613 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2614 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2616 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2617 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2618 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2619 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2622 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
2623 // Ensure error_code has the UPDATE flag set, since by default we send a
2624 // channel update along as part of failing the HTLC.
2625 assert!((error_code & 0x1000) != 0);
2626 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2627 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2628 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2629 match pending_forward_info {
2630 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2631 let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(chan) {
2632 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
2633 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2634 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2635 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
2636 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
2640 // The only case where we'd be unable to
2641 // successfully get a channel update is if the
2642 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
2643 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
2644 // payments over the channel back to themselves
2645 // (cause no one else should know the short_id
2646 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
2647 // no problem just calling this
2648 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
2649 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2651 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2652 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2653 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2656 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
2658 _ => pending_forward_info
2661 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2663 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2668 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2669 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2671 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2672 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2673 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2674 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2675 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2677 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2679 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2682 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2686 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2687 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2688 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2689 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2690 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2691 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2692 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2694 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2696 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2701 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2702 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2703 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2704 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2705 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2706 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2707 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2709 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2710 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
2711 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2713 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2716 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2720 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2721 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2722 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2723 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2724 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2725 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2726 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2728 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
2729 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
2730 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2731 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
2732 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
2733 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
2734 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
2739 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2740 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2741 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2743 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2744 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2745 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2747 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2748 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2749 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2750 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2751 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2752 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2753 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2754 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2756 commitment_signed: msg,
2760 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2761 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2762 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2768 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2773 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2774 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2775 let mut forward_event = None;
2776 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2777 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2778 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2779 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
2781 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2782 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
2783 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
2784 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
2786 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2787 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
2788 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2790 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2791 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
2792 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2797 match forward_event {
2799 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2800 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2801 time_forwardable: time
2809 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2810 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2812 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2813 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2814 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2815 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2816 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2817 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2819 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2820 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
2821 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2822 htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
2823 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2824 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2825 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2826 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
2828 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
2830 } else { unreachable!(); }
2833 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2834 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2835 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2839 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2840 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2841 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2845 break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
2847 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2850 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
2852 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
2853 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2854 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2856 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
2863 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2864 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2865 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2866 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2867 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2868 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2869 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2871 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2873 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2878 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2879 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2880 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2882 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2883 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2884 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2885 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2887 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2888 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
2891 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2892 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2893 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2895 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2896 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2898 let their_node_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 };
2899 let their_bitcoin_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 };
2900 match (self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, their_node_key),
2901 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, their_bitcoin_key)) {
2903 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature: {:?}. Maybe using different node_secret for transport and routing msg? UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}", e, &announcement, their_node_key));
2904 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2907 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature: {:?}. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})", e, &announcement, their_bitcoin_key));
2908 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2914 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2916 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2917 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2918 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2919 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2920 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2921 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2922 contents: announcement,
2924 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2927 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2932 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2933 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2934 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2936 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2937 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2938 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2939 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2941 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
2942 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
2943 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
2944 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
2945 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, mut order, shutdown) =
2946 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2947 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
2948 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2949 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2950 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2951 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2952 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2953 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2955 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2956 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2958 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
2959 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2962 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2963 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2964 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2968 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2969 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2970 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2971 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2976 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2977 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2978 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2979 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2985 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2989 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2994 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2995 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2996 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3002 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3006 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
3007 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
3008 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
3009 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
3010 /// (C-not exported) Cause its doc(hidden) anyway
3012 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3013 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3014 let counterparty_node_id;
3015 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3016 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3017 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3019 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3020 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("Failed to find corresponding channel for id {}", channel_id.to_hex())}),
3021 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3022 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
3023 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel".to_owned()});
3025 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3026 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
3028 if !chan.get().is_live() {
3029 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3031 counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3032 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
3033 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
3035 if let Err(_e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3038 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3039 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3040 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3041 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3042 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3043 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3044 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3045 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3055 match handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id) {
3056 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3057 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
3061 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`.
3062 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) {
3063 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3065 for monitor_event in self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events() {
3066 match monitor_event {
3067 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
3068 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
3069 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
3070 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
3072 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
3073 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3076 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => {
3077 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3078 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3079 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3080 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3081 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3082 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
3083 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3084 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3086 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
3087 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3088 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3098 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3099 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3104 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3105 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3106 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3107 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3108 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3111 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
3112 //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query
3113 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3114 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
3116 let mut ret = Vec::new();
3117 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3118 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
3123 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3124 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3125 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3126 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3127 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3130 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
3131 //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query
3132 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3133 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
3135 let mut ret = Vec::new();
3136 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3137 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
3142 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3144 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3145 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3146 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3147 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3150 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
3151 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
3152 ChannelManager::block_connected(self, &block.header, &txdata, height);
3155 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, _height: u32) {
3156 ChannelManager::block_disconnected(self, header);
3160 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3161 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3162 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3163 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3164 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3167 /// Updates channel state based on transactions seen in a connected block.
3168 pub fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3169 let header_hash = header.block_hash();
3170 log_trace!(self.logger, "Block {} at height {} connected", header_hash, height);
3171 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3172 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3173 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3175 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3176 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3177 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3178 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3179 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
3180 let res = channel.block_connected(header, txdata, height);
3181 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
3182 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
3183 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3184 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3185 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
3189 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
3190 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
3191 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3192 msg: funding_locked,
3194 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
3195 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3196 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3197 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3198 msg: announcement_sigs,
3201 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3203 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
3205 } else if let Err(e) = res {
3206 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3207 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3208 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
3212 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
3213 for &(_, tx) in txdata.iter() {
3214 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
3215 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
3216 log_trace!(self.logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3217 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3218 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3220 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
3221 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
3222 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
3223 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
3224 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
3225 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3237 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|&(ref payment_hash, _), htlcs| {
3238 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3239 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
3240 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
3241 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
3242 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
3243 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
3244 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3245 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
3246 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3247 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
3248 data: htlc_msat_height_data
3253 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
3256 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3257 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3260 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
3261 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
3263 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
3264 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
3266 // Update last_node_announcement_serial to be the max of its current value and the
3267 // block timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
3268 // having an explicit local time source.
3269 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully update
3270 // last_node_announcement_serial or decide we don't need to.
3271 let old_serial = self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire);
3272 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
3273 if self.last_node_announcement_serial.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
3279 /// Updates channel state based on a disconnected block.
3281 /// If necessary, the channel may be force-closed without letting the counterparty participate
3282 /// in the shutdown.
3283 pub fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
3284 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3285 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3287 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3288 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3289 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3290 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3291 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
3292 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
3293 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
3294 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3296 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown(true));
3297 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
3298 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3308 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3309 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3311 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
3312 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.block_hash();
3315 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
3316 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on `wait_timeout` is
3317 /// guaranteed to be woken up.
3318 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
3319 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
3320 pub fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
3321 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
3324 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on `wait` is
3325 /// guaranteed to be woken up.
3326 pub fn wait(&self) {
3327 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
3330 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3331 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
3332 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
3333 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
3334 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
3339 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send>
3340 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3341 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3342 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3343 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3344 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3347 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
3348 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3349 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3352 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
3353 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3354 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3357 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
3358 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3359 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3362 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
3363 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3364 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3367 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
3368 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3369 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3372 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
3373 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3374 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3377 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
3378 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3379 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3382 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
3383 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3384 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3387 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
3388 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3389 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3392 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
3393 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3394 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3397 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
3398 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3399 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3402 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
3403 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3404 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3407 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
3408 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3409 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3412 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
3413 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3414 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3417 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
3418 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3419 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3422 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
3423 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3424 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3427 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
3428 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3429 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3430 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
3431 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
3433 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3434 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3435 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3436 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3437 if no_connection_possible {
3438 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3439 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3440 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3441 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3442 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3444 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
3445 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3446 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3456 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3457 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3458 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3459 // Note that currently on channel reestablish we assert that there are no
3460 // holding cell add-HTLCs, so if in the future we stop removing uncommitted HTLCs
3461 // on peer disconnect here, there will need to be corresponding changes in
3462 // reestablish logic.
3463 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
3464 chan.to_disabled_marked();
3465 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
3466 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3467 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
3469 if chan.is_shutdown() {
3470 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3471 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3475 no_channels_remain = false;
3481 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
3483 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3484 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3485 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3486 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3487 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3488 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3489 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3490 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3491 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3492 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3493 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3494 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3495 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3496 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
3497 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3498 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
3499 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
3500 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
3504 if no_channels_remain {
3505 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
3508 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3509 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3511 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
3512 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
3513 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
3518 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
3519 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3521 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3524 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3525 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
3526 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3527 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
3528 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
3531 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
3532 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
3537 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3538 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3539 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3540 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3541 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3542 if !chan.have_received_message() {
3543 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
3544 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
3545 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
3549 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
3550 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3551 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
3557 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
3560 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
3561 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3563 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
3564 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3565 if chan.remote_network_id == *counterparty_node_id {
3566 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
3567 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
3571 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
3572 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
3577 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
3578 /// disk/backups, through `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
3579 struct PersistenceNotifier {
3580 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
3581 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
3582 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
3585 impl PersistenceNotifier {
3588 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
3594 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
3595 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
3596 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
3597 let result = *guard;
3605 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
3606 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
3607 let current_time = Instant::now();
3609 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
3610 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
3611 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
3612 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
3613 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
3614 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
3615 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
3617 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
3618 let result = *guard;
3619 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
3623 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
3624 None => return result,
3630 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
3632 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
3633 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
3634 *persistence_lock = true;
3635 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
3640 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3641 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3643 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3644 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3645 match &self.routing {
3646 &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id } => {
3648 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
3649 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3651 &PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { ref payment_data, ref incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3653 payment_data.write(writer)?;
3654 incoming_cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3657 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
3658 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3659 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
3660 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
3665 impl Readable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3666 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
3667 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3668 routing: match Readable::read(reader)? {
3669 0u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3670 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3671 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3673 1u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
3674 payment_data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3675 incoming_cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
3677 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3679 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
3680 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3681 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
3682 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
3687 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3688 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3690 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
3692 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3694 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
3696 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3703 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3704 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
3705 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3706 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3707 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3708 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3713 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3714 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3716 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
3718 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3720 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
3722 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3729 impl Readable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3730 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3731 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3732 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3733 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3734 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3739 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3743 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3746 impl_writeable!(ClaimableHTLC, 0, {
3753 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3754 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3756 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3758 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3760 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3762 path.write(writer)?;
3763 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3764 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3771 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
3772 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3773 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3774 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3775 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3776 path: Readable::read(reader)?,
3777 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3778 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3780 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3785 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3786 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3788 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3792 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3794 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3795 data.write(writer)?;
3802 impl Readable for HTLCFailReason {
3803 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3804 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3805 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3806 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3807 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3808 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3810 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3815 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3816 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3818 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_funding_outpoint, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
3820 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3821 prev_funding_outpoint.write(writer)?;
3822 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3823 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3825 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3827 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3828 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3835 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3836 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
3837 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3838 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
3839 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3840 prev_funding_outpoint: Readable::read(reader)?,
3841 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3842 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
3844 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
3845 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3846 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3848 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3853 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3854 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3855 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3856 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3857 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3860 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3861 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3863 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3864 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3866 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3867 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3868 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3870 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3871 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3872 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3873 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3874 unfunded_channels += 1;
3877 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3878 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3879 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3880 channel.write(writer)?;
3884 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3885 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3886 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3887 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3888 for forward in pending_forwards {
3889 forward.write(writer)?;
3893 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3894 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3895 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3896 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3897 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
3898 htlc.write(writer)?;
3902 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3903 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3904 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3905 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
3906 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3907 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
3910 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3911 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3912 for event in events.iter() {
3913 event.write(writer)?;
3916 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3922 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3924 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3926 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3927 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3928 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3929 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3930 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3931 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3932 /// ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3933 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3934 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
3935 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3936 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
3937 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3938 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3939 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3940 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3943 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3944 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
3946 pub keys_manager: K,
3948 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3950 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3951 pub fee_estimator: F,
3952 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3954 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3955 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3956 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3957 pub chain_monitor: M,
3959 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3960 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3961 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3962 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
3963 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3964 /// deserialization.
3966 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3967 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3968 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3970 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3971 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3973 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3974 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
3975 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3976 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3978 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3981 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
3982 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
3985 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
3986 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3987 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3988 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3989 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3990 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3993 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
3994 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
3995 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
3996 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
3997 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
3999 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
4000 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
4005 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
4006 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
4007 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4008 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
4009 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4010 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4011 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4012 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4015 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4016 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
4017 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
4021 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4022 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
4023 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4024 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4025 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4026 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4029 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4030 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4031 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4032 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
4033 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
4036 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4037 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4038 let last_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4040 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4042 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4043 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4044 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4045 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4046 for _ in 0..channel_count {
4047 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
4048 if channel.last_block_connected != Default::default() && channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
4049 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4052 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
4053 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
4054 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
4055 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4056 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4057 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4058 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4059 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
4060 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4061 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4062 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4063 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4064 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4065 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
4066 let (_, _, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
4067 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
4068 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4070 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4071 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
4073 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
4076 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4080 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
4081 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
4082 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4086 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
4087 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4088 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4089 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
4090 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4091 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4092 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
4093 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
4094 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4096 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
4099 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4100 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4101 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
4102 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4103 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4104 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
4105 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
4106 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4108 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
4111 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4112 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
4113 for _ in 0..peer_count {
4114 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4115 let peer_state = PeerState {
4116 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
4118 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
4121 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4122 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
4123 for _ in 0..event_count {
4124 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
4125 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
4130 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4132 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
4134 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
4135 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
4136 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
4138 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
4139 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
4140 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
4142 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
4147 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
4149 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
4151 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
4153 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
4155 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
4156 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
4157 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
4159 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
4160 logger: args.logger,
4161 default_configuration: args.default_config,
4164 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4165 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4168 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
4169 //connection or two.
4171 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
4177 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
4179 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
4181 use std::time::Duration;
4184 fn test_wait_timeout() {
4185 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
4186 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
4188 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
4189 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
4190 thread::spawn(move || {
4192 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
4193 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4194 *persistence_lock = true;
4197 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
4203 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
4204 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
4206 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
4209 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
4214 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
4216 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
4219 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {