1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 pub use ln::channel::CounterpartyForwardingInfo;
46 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
47 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
50 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
52 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
53 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
54 use util::config::UserConfig;
55 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
56 use util::{byte_utils, events};
57 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
58 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
59 use util::logger::Logger;
60 use util::errors::APIError;
63 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
64 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
65 use std::sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
66 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
67 use std::time::Duration;
68 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
69 use std::time::Instant;
70 use std::marker::{Sync, Send};
72 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
94 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
98 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
99 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
103 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
104 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
105 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
106 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
107 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
108 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
109 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
112 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
113 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
114 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
115 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
118 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
119 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
120 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
121 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
122 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
125 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
127 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
129 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
130 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
131 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
133 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
135 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
139 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
143 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
144 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
145 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
146 short_channel_id: u64,
148 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
150 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
151 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
155 struct ClaimableHTLC {
156 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
158 /// Filled in when the HTLC was received with a payment_secret packet, which contains a
159 /// total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
160 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
161 /// are part of the same payment.
162 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
166 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
167 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
168 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
169 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
172 session_priv: SecretKey,
173 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
174 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
175 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
180 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
181 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
183 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
184 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
189 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
190 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
192 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
200 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
201 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
202 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
203 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
204 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
205 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
206 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
207 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
208 /// payment_secret type, use to authenticate sender to the receiver and tie MPP HTLCs together
209 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
210 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
211 pub struct PaymentSecret(pub [u8;32]);
213 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
215 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
216 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
217 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
218 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
219 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
221 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
222 err: msgs::LightningError,
223 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
225 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
227 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
229 err: LightningError {
231 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
232 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
238 shutdown_finish: None,
242 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
244 err: LightningError {
246 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
248 shutdown_finish: None,
252 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
253 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
256 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
258 err: LightningError {
260 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
261 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
267 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
271 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
274 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
276 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
278 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
280 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
281 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
287 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
289 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
290 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
297 shutdown_finish: None,
302 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
303 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
304 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
305 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
306 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
308 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
309 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
310 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
311 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
312 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
313 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
314 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
316 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
320 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
321 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
322 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
323 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
324 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
325 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
326 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
327 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
328 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
329 /// (payment_hash, payment_secret) -> Vec<HTLCs> for tracking HTLCs that
330 /// were to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
331 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
332 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
334 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<(PaymentHash, Option<PaymentSecret>), Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
335 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
336 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
337 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
340 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
341 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
342 /// quite some time lag.
343 enum BackgroundEvent {
344 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
345 /// commitment transaction.
346 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
349 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
350 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
352 latest_features: InitFeatures,
355 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
356 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
358 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
359 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
360 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
361 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
362 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
363 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
364 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
365 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
367 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
368 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
369 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
370 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
371 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
372 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
373 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
374 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
375 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
377 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
378 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
380 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
381 /// to individual Channels.
383 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
384 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
385 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
386 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
388 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
389 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
390 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
391 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
392 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
393 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
394 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
396 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
397 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
398 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
399 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
402 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
403 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
404 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
405 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
406 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
408 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
409 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
410 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
411 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
412 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
413 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
414 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
415 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
416 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
417 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
420 default_configuration: UserConfig,
421 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
427 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
429 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
430 last_block_hash: RwLock<BlockHash>,
431 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
433 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
434 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
435 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
436 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
437 our_network_key: SecretKey,
438 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
440 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
441 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
442 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
444 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
445 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
446 /// are currently open with that peer.
447 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
448 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
450 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
452 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
453 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
454 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
455 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
456 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
457 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
458 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the PersistenceNotifier
459 /// the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
460 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
462 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
469 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
471 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
472 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
473 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
474 pub struct ChainParameters {
475 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
476 pub network: Network,
478 /// The hash of the latest block successfully connected.
479 pub latest_hash: BlockHash,
481 /// The height of the latest block successfully connected.
483 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
484 pub latest_height: usize,
487 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
488 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
489 /// `await_persistable_update` that new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
490 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
491 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
492 /// updates are ready for persistence).
493 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> {
494 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
495 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
496 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
499 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> {
500 fn new(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> Self {
501 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
504 persistence_notifier: notifier,
505 _read_guard: read_guard,
510 impl<'a> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> {
512 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
516 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
517 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
519 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
521 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
522 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
523 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
524 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
525 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
527 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
528 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly six hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
530 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
532 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
533 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
534 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
535 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
536 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
537 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 6;
538 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
540 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
541 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
542 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
543 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
544 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
545 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
548 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
550 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
551 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
554 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
556 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
558 pub struct ChannelDetails {
559 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
560 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
561 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
562 /// lifetime of the channel.
563 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
564 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
565 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
566 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
567 /// The node_id of our counterparty
568 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
569 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
570 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
571 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
572 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
573 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
574 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
575 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
577 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
578 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
579 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
580 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
581 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
582 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
583 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
584 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
585 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
586 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
587 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
588 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
589 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
592 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
593 /// payments to us through this channel.
594 pub counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
597 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
598 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
600 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
601 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
602 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
603 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
604 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
605 ParameterError(APIError),
606 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
607 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
608 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
611 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
613 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
614 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
615 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
616 /// paths than the ones selected).
617 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
618 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
619 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
620 /// in over-/re-payment.
622 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
623 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
624 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
626 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
627 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
628 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
629 /// with the latest update_id.
630 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
633 macro_rules! handle_error {
634 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
637 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
638 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
640 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
641 // entering the macro.
642 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
645 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
647 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
648 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
649 if let Some(update) = update_option {
650 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
656 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
657 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
659 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
660 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
661 action: err.action.clone()
665 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
666 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
669 // Return error in case higher-API need one
676 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
677 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
680 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
681 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
683 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
684 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
685 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
686 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
687 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
689 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
691 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
696 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
697 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
700 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
701 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
703 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
704 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
705 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
706 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
707 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
709 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
711 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg)) => {
712 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
713 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
714 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
715 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
717 let shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown(false);
718 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
724 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
725 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
726 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
728 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
730 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
731 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
732 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
733 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
734 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
736 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
737 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
738 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
739 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
740 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
741 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
742 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
743 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
744 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
745 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
748 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
749 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
750 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
751 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
753 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
754 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
756 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
757 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
759 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
760 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
761 if !$resend_commitment {
762 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
765 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
767 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
768 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$entry.key()))
774 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
775 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
776 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
778 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
779 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
783 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
784 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
785 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
786 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
787 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
790 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
795 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
796 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
797 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
798 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
799 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
802 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
804 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
805 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
807 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
809 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
811 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
812 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
813 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
814 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
815 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
816 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
819 default_configuration: config.clone(),
820 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
821 fee_estimator: fee_est,
825 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(params.latest_height),
826 last_block_hash: RwLock::new(params.latest_hash),
828 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
829 by_id: HashMap::new(),
830 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
831 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
832 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
833 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
835 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
836 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
839 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
841 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
843 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
844 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
845 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
846 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
854 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
856 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady events to allow
857 /// tracking of which events correspond with which create_channel call. Note that the
858 /// user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for
859 /// user_id here. user_id has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and
860 /// otherwise ignored.
862 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
863 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
865 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
866 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
867 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
868 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
869 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
872 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
873 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?;
874 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
876 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
877 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
878 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
880 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
881 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
882 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
883 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
884 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
886 panic!("RNG is bad???");
889 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
891 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
892 node_id: their_network_key,
898 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
899 let mut res = Vec::new();
901 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
902 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
903 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
904 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
905 res.push(ChannelDetails {
906 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
907 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
908 remote_network_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
909 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
910 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
911 inbound_capacity_msat,
912 outbound_capacity_msat,
913 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
914 is_live: channel.is_live(),
915 counterparty_forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
919 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
920 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
921 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
922 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
928 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
929 /// more information.
930 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
931 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
934 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
935 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
937 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
938 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
939 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
940 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
941 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
942 // really wanted anyway.
943 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
946 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
947 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
948 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
950 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
951 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
952 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
954 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
955 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
956 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
957 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
958 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
959 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
960 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
961 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
964 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
965 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
966 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
968 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
969 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
971 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
974 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
975 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
977 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
978 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
983 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
984 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
985 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
994 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
995 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
996 log_trace!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
997 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
998 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1000 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1001 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1002 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1003 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1004 // ignore the result here.
1005 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1009 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1011 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1012 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1013 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1014 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1015 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1016 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1019 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1020 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1022 chan.remove_entry().1
1024 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1027 log_trace!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1028 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1029 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1030 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1031 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1036 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1039 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1040 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1041 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1042 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1043 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None) {
1044 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1045 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1046 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1047 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1048 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1049 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1059 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1060 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1061 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1062 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1063 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1067 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1068 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1069 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1071 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1072 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1073 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1074 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1075 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1076 failure_code: $err_code,
1077 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1082 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1083 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1086 let shared_secret = {
1087 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1088 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1091 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1093 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1094 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1095 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1096 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1097 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1098 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1099 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1100 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1103 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1104 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1105 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1106 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1107 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1110 let mut channel_state = None;
1111 macro_rules! return_err {
1112 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1114 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1115 if channel_state.is_none() {
1116 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1118 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1119 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1120 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1121 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1122 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1127 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1128 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1129 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
1130 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1132 let error_code = match err {
1133 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1134 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1135 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1136 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1137 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1139 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1142 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1143 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1144 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1151 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1154 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1155 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1156 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1157 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1158 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1159 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1160 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1161 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1162 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1163 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1164 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1165 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1169 // final_expiry_too_soon
1170 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure we have at least
1171 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1172 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown payment hash, our payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward
1173 // before our onchain logic triggers a channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational).
1174 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1175 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1177 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1178 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1179 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1181 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1182 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1183 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1186 let payment_data = match next_hop_data.format {
1187 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => None,
1188 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1189 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data } => payment_data,
1192 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1193 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1194 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1195 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1197 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1198 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1200 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1202 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1203 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1204 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1205 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1208 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1209 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1210 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1212 // Check two things:
1213 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1214 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1215 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1217 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1219 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1220 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1221 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1223 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1225 let blinding_factor = {
1226 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1227 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1228 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1229 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1232 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1234 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1236 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1239 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1240 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1243 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1244 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1245 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1246 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1247 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1251 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1252 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1253 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1256 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1257 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1258 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1259 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1263 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1264 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1265 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1266 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1267 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1268 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1269 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1270 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1271 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1272 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1274 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1276 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1277 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1279 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1280 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1281 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1282 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1283 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1284 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1285 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1287 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1288 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1290 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1291 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1292 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1294 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1295 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1297 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1298 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1299 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1300 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1301 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1303 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1304 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1306 // In theory, we would be safe against unitentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1307 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longuer delay.
1308 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1309 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1315 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1316 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1317 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1318 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1320 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1321 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1323 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1324 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1325 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1327 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1329 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1334 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1337 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1338 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1339 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1340 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1341 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1345 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1347 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1348 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1350 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1351 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1352 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
1353 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1354 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1355 fee_base_msat: chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator),
1356 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1357 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1360 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1361 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1363 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1369 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1370 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1371 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1372 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1373 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1375 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1376 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1377 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height)?;
1378 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1379 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1381 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1383 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1385 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1386 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1387 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1388 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1389 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1392 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1393 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1395 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1396 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1398 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1399 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1401 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1403 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1404 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1405 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1407 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1408 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1409 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1410 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1411 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1412 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1413 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1414 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1415 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1418 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1419 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1420 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1421 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1422 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1423 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1424 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1432 } else { unreachable!(); }
1436 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1437 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1439 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1444 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1446 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1447 /// fields for more info.
1449 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1450 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1451 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1452 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1453 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1454 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1456 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1458 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1459 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1460 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1462 /// In general, a path may raise:
1463 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1464 /// node public key) is specified.
1465 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1466 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1468 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1469 /// relevant updates.
1471 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1472 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1473 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1475 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1476 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1477 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1478 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1480 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1481 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1482 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1483 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1484 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1485 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1487 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1488 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1489 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1490 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1491 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1493 let mut total_value = 0;
1494 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1495 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
1496 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1497 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1498 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1499 continue 'path_check;
1501 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1502 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1503 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1504 continue 'path_check;
1507 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1508 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
1510 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
1511 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
1514 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1515 let mut results = Vec::new();
1516 for path in route.paths.iter() {
1517 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height));
1519 let mut has_ok = false;
1520 let mut has_err = false;
1521 for res in results.iter() {
1522 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
1523 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
1524 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
1525 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
1532 if has_err && has_ok {
1533 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
1535 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
1541 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1543 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
1544 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
1546 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1548 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
1549 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
1550 /// keys per-channel).
1552 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
1553 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
1554 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
1556 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
1557 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
1558 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
1559 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1560 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1562 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
1563 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
1564 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1565 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
1571 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1573 let mut output_index = None;
1574 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
1575 for (idx, outp) in funding_transaction.output.iter().enumerate() {
1576 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
1577 if output_index.is_some() {
1578 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1579 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
1582 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
1583 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1584 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
1587 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
1590 if output_index.is_none() {
1591 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1592 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
1595 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: funding_transaction.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
1597 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
1598 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1599 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
1600 } else { unreachable!(); })
1603 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
1605 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
1606 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1609 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
1610 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
1615 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1616 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1617 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1620 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1621 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1622 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1624 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1631 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1632 if !chan.should_announce() {
1633 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1637 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1639 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1641 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1642 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1644 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1645 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1646 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1647 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1648 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1653 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
1654 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
1655 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
1657 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::std::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
1660 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
1661 // smaller than 500:
1662 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
1664 /// Generates a signed node_announcement from the given arguments and creates a
1665 /// BroadcastNodeAnnouncement event. Note that such messages will be ignored unless peers have
1666 /// seen a channel_announcement from us (ie unless we have public channels open).
1668 /// RGB is a node "color" and alias is a printable human-readable string to describe this node
1669 /// to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
1671 /// addresses represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node accepts
1672 /// incoming connections. These will be broadcast to the network, publicly tying these
1673 /// addresses together. If you wish to preserve user privacy, addresses should likely contain
1674 /// only Tor Onion addresses.
1676 /// Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500).
1677 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
1678 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1680 if addresses.len() > 500 {
1681 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
1684 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1685 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1686 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
1687 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
1688 rgb, alias, addresses,
1689 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1690 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1692 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1694 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1695 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
1696 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
1697 signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key),
1698 contents: announcement
1703 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1705 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1706 /// Will likely generate further events.
1707 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1708 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1710 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1711 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1712 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1714 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1715 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1717 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1718 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1719 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1720 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1722 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1723 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1724 match forward_info {
1725 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
1726 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1727 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1728 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1729 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1730 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1731 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1733 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
1734 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
1737 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1738 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1739 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1740 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1741 // problem, not ours.
1748 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1749 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1750 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1751 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1752 match forward_info {
1753 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1754 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1756 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
1757 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1758 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1759 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1760 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1761 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1762 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1763 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1765 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
1767 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1768 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
1770 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1772 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1773 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
1774 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
1780 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1782 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1783 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1784 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1785 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1786 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1787 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1788 // this channel currently :/.
1794 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1795 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
1797 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1798 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1799 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1801 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1802 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1804 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1806 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1807 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1808 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1811 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1813 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1814 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1815 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1816 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1817 // messages when we can.
1818 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1819 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1820 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1827 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1828 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
1831 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1832 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1833 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1834 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1835 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1836 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1838 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1839 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1840 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1841 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1842 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1844 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1846 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1848 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
1852 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1853 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1856 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1857 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
1858 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1859 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1860 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1861 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1862 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1864 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1872 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1873 match forward_info {
1874 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1875 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry },
1876 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
1877 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1878 let prev_hop = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1879 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1880 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1881 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1882 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1885 let mut total_value = 0;
1886 let payment_secret_opt =
1887 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data { Some(data.payment_secret.clone()) } else { None };
1888 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry((payment_hash, payment_secret_opt))
1889 .or_insert(Vec::new());
1890 htlcs.push(ClaimableHTLC {
1892 value: amt_to_forward,
1893 payment_data: payment_data.clone(),
1894 cltv_expiry: incoming_cltv_expiry,
1896 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data {
1897 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1898 total_value += htlc.value;
1899 if htlc.payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat != data.total_msat {
1900 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
1902 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
1904 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > data.total_msat {
1905 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1906 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
1907 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
1908 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(
1909 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire)
1913 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1914 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
1915 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1916 htlc_id: htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
1917 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
1919 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
1922 } else if total_value == data.total_msat {
1923 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1925 payment_secret: Some(data.payment_secret),
1930 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1932 payment_secret: None,
1933 amt: amt_to_forward,
1937 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1938 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
1940 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1941 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1949 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1950 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
1953 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1954 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
1957 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1958 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1959 events.append(&mut new_events);
1962 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
1964 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
1965 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
1967 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
1968 fn process_background_events(&self) {
1969 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
1970 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
1971 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
1973 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
1974 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
1975 // monitor updating completing.
1976 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
1982 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1983 pub(crate) fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
1984 self.process_background_events();
1987 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
1988 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
1989 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
1991 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
1993 /// Note that in some rare cases this may generate a `chain::Watch::update_channel` call.
1994 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
1995 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1996 self.process_background_events();
1998 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1999 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2000 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
2001 if chan.is_disabled_staged() && !chan.is_live() {
2002 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2003 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2008 } else if chan.is_disabled_staged() && chan.is_live() {
2010 } else if chan.is_disabled_marked() {
2011 chan.to_disabled_staged();
2016 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
2017 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
2018 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
2019 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
2020 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
2021 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> bool {
2022 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2024 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2025 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(*payment_hash, *payment_secret));
2026 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2027 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2028 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2029 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2030 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2031 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32,
2033 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2034 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
2035 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2041 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
2042 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
2043 // be surfaced to the user.
2044 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
2045 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
2047 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
2048 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
2049 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2050 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
2051 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(&chan_entry.get()) {
2052 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
2054 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2057 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2059 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2060 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
2061 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
2063 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
2064 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2065 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2067 rejected_by_dest: false,
2079 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
2080 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
2081 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
2082 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
2083 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
2084 /// still-available channels.
2085 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
2086 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
2087 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
2088 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
2091 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
2092 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
2093 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2095 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, .. } => {
2096 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2097 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2098 match &onion_error {
2099 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
2101 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2103 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2104 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
2105 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
2106 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
2107 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
2108 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2109 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
2114 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2115 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2116 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2117 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
2119 error_code: onion_error_code,
2121 error_data: onion_error_data
2125 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2131 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
2132 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
2133 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
2134 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
2136 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
2137 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
2138 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2139 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2140 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2141 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
2143 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
2145 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
2151 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2152 let err_packet = match onion_error {
2153 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
2154 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
2155 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
2156 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
2158 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
2159 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2160 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
2164 let mut forward_event = None;
2165 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2166 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
2168 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
2169 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2170 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
2172 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2173 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
2176 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2177 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
2178 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2179 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2180 time_forwardable: time
2187 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
2188 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
2189 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
2191 /// You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
2192 /// available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
2193 /// reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
2194 /// payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
2195 /// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
2196 /// motivated attackers.
2198 /// Note that the privacy concerns in (b) are not relevant in payments with a payment_secret
2199 /// set. Thus, for such payments we will claim any payments which do not under-pay.
2201 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
2202 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
2203 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2205 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2207 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2208 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(payment_hash, *payment_secret));
2209 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2210 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
2212 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
2213 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
2214 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
2215 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
2217 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
2218 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
2219 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
2220 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
2221 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
2224 let (is_mpp, mut valid_mpp) = if let &Some(ref data) = &sources[0].payment_data {
2225 assert!(payment_secret.is_some());
2226 (true, data.total_msat >= expected_amount)
2228 assert!(payment_secret.is_none());
2232 for htlc in sources.iter() {
2233 if !is_mpp || !valid_mpp { break; }
2234 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2239 let mut errs = Vec::new();
2240 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
2241 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2242 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2243 if (is_mpp && !valid_mpp) || (!is_mpp && (htlc.value < expected_amount || htlc.value > expected_amount * 2)) {
2244 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2245 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2246 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32,
2248 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2249 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
2250 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2252 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
2254 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.1.err.action {
2255 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
2256 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
2257 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", e.1.err.err);
2258 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
2259 } else { errs.push(e); }
2261 Err(None) if is_mpp => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
2263 log_warn!(self.logger, "Channel we expected to claim an HTLC from was closed.");
2265 Ok(()) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
2270 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
2271 // which were generated.
2272 channel_state.take();
2274 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
2275 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2276 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2283 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(), Option<(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)>> {
2284 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
2285 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
2286 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2287 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2293 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
2294 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2295 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
2296 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
2297 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_option {
2298 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2299 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2300 assert!(msgs.is_none());
2302 return Err(Some((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err())));
2306 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
2307 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2308 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2309 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2310 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2311 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
2312 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2313 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2322 // TODO: Do something with e?
2323 // This should only occur if we are claiming an HTLC at the same time as the
2324 // HTLC is being failed (eg because a block is being connected and this caused
2325 // an HTLC to time out). This should, of course, only occur if the user is the
2326 // one doing the claiming (as it being a part of a peer claim would imply we're
2327 // about to lose funds) and only if the lock in claim_funds was dropped as a
2328 // previous HTLC was failed (thus not for an MPP payment).
2329 debug_assert!(false, "This shouldn't be reachable except in absurdly rare cases between monitor updates and HTLC timeouts: {:?}", e);
2333 } else { unreachable!(); }
2336 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
2338 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
2339 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2340 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2341 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
2345 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
2346 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
2347 if let Err((counterparty_node_id, err)) = match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage) {
2350 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2351 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
2352 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2353 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2356 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
2357 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
2358 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
2359 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
2360 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
2361 payment_preimage, e);
2365 Err(Some(res)) => Err(res),
2367 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2368 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2369 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2375 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
2376 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2377 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
2380 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
2381 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
2384 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
2385 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
2387 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
2388 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
2389 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
2390 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
2392 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
2393 /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
2394 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
2395 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
2396 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
2397 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
2398 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
2399 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
2400 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
2401 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2403 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
2404 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
2405 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
2406 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
2409 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2410 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2411 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2412 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2413 let channel = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
2417 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
2421 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
2422 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2423 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), funding_txo.clone(), pending_forwards));
2425 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
2427 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
2428 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
2429 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2430 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2435 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
2436 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
2437 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2438 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2439 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2444 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2448 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2453 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
2454 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
2456 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2457 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2458 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2461 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2462 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2463 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2464 msg: announcement_sigs,
2467 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2471 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
2473 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
2474 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2476 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
2478 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
2479 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
2483 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2484 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
2485 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
2488 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
2489 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
2490 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2491 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2492 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
2493 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
2494 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2495 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
2496 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2497 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
2499 entry.insert(channel);
2505 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2506 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
2507 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2508 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2509 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
2510 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2511 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2512 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2514 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
2515 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2517 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2520 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2521 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
2522 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
2523 channel_value_satoshis: value,
2525 user_channel_id: user_id,
2530 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2531 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
2532 let last_block_hash = *self.last_block_hash.read().unwrap();
2533 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2534 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2535 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
2536 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2537 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2538 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2540 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, last_block_hash, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
2542 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2545 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
2546 // lock before watch_channel
2547 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
2549 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
2550 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
2551 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
2552 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
2553 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
2554 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
2555 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
2556 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
2557 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
2558 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
2559 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
2561 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
2562 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
2563 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
2564 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
2565 // until we have persisted our monitor.
2566 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2570 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2571 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2572 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
2573 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2574 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
2576 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2577 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
2578 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2587 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2589 let last_block_hash = *self.last_block_hash.read().unwrap();
2590 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2591 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2592 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2593 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2594 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2595 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2597 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, last_block_hash, &self.logger) {
2598 Ok(update) => update,
2599 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2601 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2602 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2606 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2609 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
2613 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2614 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2615 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2616 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2617 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2618 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2619 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2621 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2622 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2623 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2624 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2625 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2626 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2627 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2628 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2629 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2630 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2631 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2632 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2633 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2634 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2635 msg: announcement_sigs,
2640 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2644 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2645 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2646 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2647 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2649 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2650 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2651 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2652 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2654 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2655 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2656 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2657 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2661 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2662 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2663 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2667 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2668 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2669 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2671 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2672 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2674 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2677 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2678 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2680 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2681 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2682 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2683 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2691 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2692 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2693 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2694 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2695 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2696 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2697 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2698 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2700 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2701 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2702 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2703 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2708 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2709 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2710 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2711 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2712 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2713 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2714 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2716 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2717 } else { (tx, None) }
2719 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2722 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2723 log_trace!(self.logger, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
2724 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2726 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2727 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2728 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2729 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2737 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2738 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2739 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2740 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2742 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2743 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2744 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2745 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2747 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2748 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2750 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2751 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2752 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2753 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2756 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
2757 // Ensure error_code has the UPDATE flag set, since by default we send a
2758 // channel update along as part of failing the HTLC.
2759 assert!((error_code & 0x1000) != 0);
2760 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2761 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2762 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2763 match pending_forward_info {
2764 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2765 let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(chan) {
2766 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
2767 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2768 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2769 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
2770 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
2774 // The only case where we'd be unable to
2775 // successfully get a channel update is if the
2776 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
2777 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
2778 // payments over the channel back to themselves
2779 // (cause no one else should know the short_id
2780 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
2781 // no problem just calling this
2782 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
2783 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2785 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2786 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2787 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2790 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
2792 _ => pending_forward_info
2795 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2797 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2802 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2803 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2805 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2806 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2807 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2808 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2809 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2811 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2813 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2816 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2820 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2821 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2822 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2823 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2824 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2825 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2826 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2828 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2830 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2835 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2836 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2837 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2838 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2839 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2840 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2841 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2843 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2844 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
2845 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2847 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2850 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2854 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2855 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2856 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2857 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2858 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2859 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2860 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2862 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
2863 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
2864 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2865 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
2866 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
2867 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
2868 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
2873 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2874 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2875 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2877 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2878 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2879 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2881 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2882 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2883 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2884 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2885 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2886 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2887 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2888 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2890 commitment_signed: msg,
2894 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2895 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2896 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2902 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2907 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2908 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2909 let mut forward_event = None;
2910 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2911 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2912 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2913 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
2915 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2916 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
2917 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
2918 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
2920 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2921 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
2922 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2924 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2925 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
2926 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2931 match forward_event {
2933 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2934 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2935 time_forwardable: time
2943 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2944 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2946 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2947 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2948 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2949 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2950 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2951 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2953 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2954 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
2955 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2956 htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
2957 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2958 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2959 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2960 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
2962 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
2964 } else { unreachable!(); }
2967 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2968 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2969 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2973 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2974 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2975 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2979 break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
2981 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2984 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
2986 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
2987 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2988 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2990 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
2997 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2998 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2999 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3000 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3001 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3002 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3003 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3005 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
3007 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3012 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3013 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3014 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3016 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3017 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3018 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3019 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3021 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
3022 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
3025 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
3026 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
3027 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
3029 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
3030 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
3032 let their_node_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 };
3033 let their_bitcoin_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 };
3034 match (self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, their_node_key),
3035 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, their_bitcoin_key)) {
3037 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature: {:?}. Maybe using different node_secret for transport and routing msg? UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}", e, &announcement, their_node_key));
3038 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3041 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature: {:?}. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})", e, &announcement, their_bitcoin_key));
3042 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3048 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
3050 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
3051 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
3052 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
3053 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
3054 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
3055 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
3056 contents: announcement,
3058 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
3061 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3066 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3067 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3068 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3069 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
3070 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3072 // It's not a local channel
3076 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3077 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3078 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3079 // TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
3080 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), chan_id));
3082 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
3084 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
3089 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3090 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3091 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3093 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3094 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3095 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3096 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3098 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
3099 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
3100 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
3101 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3102 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, mut order, shutdown) =
3103 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3104 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
3105 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3106 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
3107 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
3108 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
3109 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
3110 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3112 if commitment_update.is_none() {
3113 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
3115 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
3116 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
3119 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
3120 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
3121 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3125 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
3126 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
3127 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3128 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3133 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
3134 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3135 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3136 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3142 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
3146 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
3151 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3152 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3153 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3159 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3163 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
3164 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
3165 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
3166 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
3167 /// (C-not exported) Cause its doc(hidden) anyway
3169 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3170 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3171 let counterparty_node_id;
3172 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3173 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3174 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3176 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3177 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("Failed to find corresponding channel for id {}", channel_id.to_hex())}),
3178 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3179 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
3180 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel".to_owned()});
3182 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3183 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
3185 if !chan.get().is_live() {
3186 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3188 counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3189 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
3190 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
3192 if let Err(_e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3195 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3196 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3197 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3198 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3199 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3200 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3201 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3202 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3212 match handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id) {
3213 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3214 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
3218 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`.
3219 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) {
3220 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3222 for monitor_event in self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events() {
3223 match monitor_event {
3224 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
3225 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
3226 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
3227 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
3229 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
3230 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3233 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => {
3234 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3235 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3236 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3237 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3238 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3239 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
3240 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3241 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3243 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
3244 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3245 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3249 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3250 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3251 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
3252 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
3261 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3262 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3266 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
3267 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
3269 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
3270 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3271 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
3272 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
3273 // reorganized out of the main chain.
3274 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
3275 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
3276 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
3277 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
3278 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
3279 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
3280 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
3281 assert!(should_broadcast);
3282 } else { unreachable!(); }
3283 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
3285 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3290 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3291 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3292 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3293 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3294 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3297 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
3298 //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query
3299 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3300 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
3302 let mut ret = Vec::new();
3303 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3304 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
3309 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3310 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3311 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3312 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3313 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3316 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
3317 //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query
3318 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3319 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
3321 let mut ret = Vec::new();
3322 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3323 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
3328 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3330 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3331 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3332 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3333 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3336 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
3337 assert_eq!(*self.last_block_hash.read().unwrap(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
3338 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
3339 assert_eq!(self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, height as u64 - 1,
3340 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
3341 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
3342 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, height, &txdata);
3343 self.update_best_block(&block.header, height);
3346 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3347 assert_eq!(*self.last_block_hash.read().unwrap(), header.block_hash(),
3348 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
3350 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3351 let new_height = self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32 - 1;
3352 assert_eq!(new_height, height - 1,
3353 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
3354 *self.last_block_hash.write().unwrap() = header.prev_blockhash;
3356 self.do_chain_event(new_height, |channel| channel.update_best_block(new_height, header.time));
3360 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3361 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3362 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3363 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3364 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3367 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
3368 (&self, height: u32, f: FN) {
3369 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3370 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3371 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3373 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3374 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3376 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3377 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3378 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3379 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3380 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
3381 let res = f(channel);
3382 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
3383 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
3384 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3385 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3386 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
3390 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
3391 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
3392 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3393 msg: funding_locked,
3395 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
3396 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3397 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3398 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3399 msg: announcement_sigs,
3402 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3404 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
3406 } else if let Err(e) = res {
3407 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3408 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3410 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
3411 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
3412 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
3413 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
3414 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3418 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3419 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3420 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
3427 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|&(ref payment_hash, _), htlcs| {
3428 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3429 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
3430 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
3431 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
3432 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
3433 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
3434 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3435 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
3436 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3437 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
3438 data: htlc_msat_height_data
3443 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
3447 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
3449 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
3450 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
3454 /// Updates channel state to take note of transactions which were confirmed in the given block
3455 /// at the given height.
3457 /// Note that you must still call (or have called) [`update_best_block`] with the block
3458 /// information which is included here.
3460 /// This method may be called before or after [`update_best_block`] for a given block's
3461 /// transaction data and may be called multiple times with additional transaction data for a
3464 /// This method may be called for a previous block after an [`update_best_block`] call has
3465 /// been made for a later block, however it must *not* be called with transaction data from a
3466 /// block which is no longer in the best chain (ie where [`update_best_block`] has already
3467 /// been informed about a blockchain reorganization which no longer includes the block which
3468 /// corresponds to `header`).
3470 /// [`update_best_block`]: `Self::update_best_block`
3471 pub fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData) {
3472 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3473 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3474 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3476 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3477 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
3479 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3480 self.do_chain_event(height, |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
3483 /// Updates channel state with the current best blockchain tip. You should attempt to call this
3484 /// quickly after a new block becomes available, however if multiple new blocks become
3485 /// available at the same time, only a single `update_best_block()` call needs to be made.
3487 /// This method should also be called immediately after any block disconnections, once at the
3488 /// reorganization fork point, and once with the new chain tip. Calling this method at the
3489 /// blockchain reorganization fork point ensures we learn when a funding transaction which was
3490 /// previously confirmed is reorganized out of the blockchain, ensuring we do not continue to
3491 /// accept payments which cannot be enforced on-chain.
3493 /// In both the block-connection and block-disconnection case, this method may be called either
3494 /// once per block connected or disconnected, or simply at the fork point and new tip(s),
3495 /// skipping any intermediary blocks.
3496 pub fn update_best_block(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3497 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3498 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3499 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3501 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3502 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
3504 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3506 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
3507 *self.last_block_hash.write().unwrap() = block_hash;
3509 self.do_chain_event(height, |channel| channel.update_best_block(height, header.time));
3512 // Update last_node_announcement_serial to be the max of its current value and the
3513 // block timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
3514 // having an explicit local time source.
3515 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully update
3516 // last_node_announcement_serial or decide we don't need to.
3517 let old_serial = self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire);
3518 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
3519 if self.last_node_announcement_serial.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
3525 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
3526 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
3527 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
3529 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
3530 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
3531 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
3532 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
3535 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
3536 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
3538 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
3539 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
3542 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3543 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
3544 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
3545 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
3546 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
3551 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send>
3552 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3553 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3554 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3555 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3556 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3559 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
3560 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3561 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3564 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
3565 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3566 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3569 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
3570 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3571 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3574 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
3575 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3576 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3579 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
3580 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3581 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3584 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
3585 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3586 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3589 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
3590 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3591 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3594 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
3595 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3596 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3599 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
3600 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3601 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3604 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
3605 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3606 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3609 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
3610 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3611 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3614 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
3615 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3616 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3619 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
3620 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3621 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3624 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
3625 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3626 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3629 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
3630 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3631 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3634 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3635 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3636 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3639 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
3640 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3641 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3644 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
3645 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3646 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3647 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
3648 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
3650 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3651 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3652 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3653 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3654 if no_connection_possible {
3655 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3656 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3657 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3658 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3659 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3661 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
3662 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3663 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3673 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3674 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3675 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3676 // Note that currently on channel reestablish we assert that there are no
3677 // holding cell add-HTLCs, so if in the future we stop removing uncommitted HTLCs
3678 // on peer disconnect here, there will need to be corresponding changes in
3679 // reestablish logic.
3680 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
3681 chan.to_disabled_marked();
3682 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
3683 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3684 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
3686 if chan.is_shutdown() {
3687 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3688 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3692 no_channels_remain = false;
3698 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
3700 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3701 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3702 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3703 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3704 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3705 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3706 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3707 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3708 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3709 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3710 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3711 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3712 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3713 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
3714 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3715 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
3716 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
3717 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
3718 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
3722 if no_channels_remain {
3723 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
3726 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3727 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3729 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
3730 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
3731 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
3736 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
3737 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3739 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3742 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3743 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
3744 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3745 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
3746 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
3749 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
3750 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
3755 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3756 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3757 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3758 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3759 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3760 if !chan.have_received_message() {
3761 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
3762 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
3763 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
3767 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
3768 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3769 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
3775 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
3778 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
3779 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3781 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
3782 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3783 if chan.remote_network_id == *counterparty_node_id {
3784 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
3785 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
3789 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
3790 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
3795 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
3796 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
3797 struct PersistenceNotifier {
3798 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
3799 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
3800 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
3803 impl PersistenceNotifier {
3806 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
3812 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
3813 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
3814 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
3815 let result = *guard;
3823 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
3824 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
3825 let current_time = Instant::now();
3827 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
3828 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
3829 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
3830 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
3831 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
3832 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
3833 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
3835 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
3836 let result = *guard;
3837 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
3841 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
3842 None => return result,
3848 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
3850 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
3851 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
3852 *persistence_lock = true;
3853 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
3858 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3859 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3861 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3862 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3863 match &self.routing {
3864 &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id } => {
3866 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
3867 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3869 &PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { ref payment_data, ref incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3871 payment_data.write(writer)?;
3872 incoming_cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3875 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
3876 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3877 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
3878 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
3883 impl Readable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3884 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
3885 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3886 routing: match Readable::read(reader)? {
3887 0u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3888 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3889 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3891 1u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
3892 payment_data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3893 incoming_cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
3895 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3897 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
3898 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3899 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
3900 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
3905 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3906 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3908 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
3910 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3912 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
3914 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3921 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3922 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
3923 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3924 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3925 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3926 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3931 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3932 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3934 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
3936 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3938 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
3940 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3947 impl Readable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3948 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3949 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3950 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3951 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3952 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3957 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3961 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3964 impl_writeable!(ClaimableHTLC, 0, {
3971 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3972 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3974 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3976 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3978 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3980 path.write(writer)?;
3981 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3982 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3989 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
3990 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3991 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3992 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3993 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3994 path: Readable::read(reader)?,
3995 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3996 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3998 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4003 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
4004 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4006 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
4010 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
4012 failure_code.write(writer)?;
4013 data.write(writer)?;
4020 impl Readable for HTLCFailReason {
4021 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
4022 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4023 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
4024 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4025 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
4026 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
4028 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4033 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
4034 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4036 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_funding_outpoint, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
4038 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4039 prev_funding_outpoint.write(writer)?;
4040 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4041 forward_info.write(writer)?;
4043 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4045 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4046 err_packet.write(writer)?;
4053 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
4054 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
4055 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4056 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
4057 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4058 prev_funding_outpoint: Readable::read(reader)?,
4059 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4060 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
4062 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
4063 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4064 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4066 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4071 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4072 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4073 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4074 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4075 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4078 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4079 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
4081 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4082 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4084 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
4085 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4086 self.last_block_hash.read().unwrap().write(writer)?;
4088 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4089 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
4090 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4091 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4092 unfunded_channels += 1;
4095 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
4096 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4097 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4098 channel.write(writer)?;
4102 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4103 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
4104 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4105 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4106 for forward in pending_forwards {
4107 forward.write(writer)?;
4111 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4112 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
4113 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4114 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4115 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
4116 htlc.write(writer)?;
4120 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4121 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4122 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4123 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4124 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4125 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
4128 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4129 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4130 for event in events.iter() {
4131 event.write(writer)?;
4134 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
4135 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4136 for event in background_events.iter() {
4138 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
4140 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
4141 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
4146 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4152 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
4154 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
4156 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
4157 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling:
4158 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)
4159 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
4160 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
4161 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints the same
4162 /// way you would handle a `chain::Filter` call using ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and
4163 /// ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
4164 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
4165 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
4166 /// 6) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
4168 /// Note that the ordering of #4-6 is not of importance, however all three must occur before you
4169 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized ChannelManager.
4171 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
4172 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
4173 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
4174 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
4175 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
4176 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
4177 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4178 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4179 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4180 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4181 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4184 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
4185 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
4187 pub keys_manager: K,
4189 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4191 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
4192 pub fee_estimator: F,
4193 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4195 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
4196 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
4197 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
4198 pub chain_monitor: M,
4200 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
4201 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
4202 /// force-closed during deserialization.
4203 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
4204 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
4205 /// deserialization.
4207 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
4208 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
4209 pub default_config: UserConfig,
4211 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
4212 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
4214 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
4215 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
4216 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
4217 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
4219 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
4222 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
4223 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
4226 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4227 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4228 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4229 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4230 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4231 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4234 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
4235 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
4236 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
4237 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
4238 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
4240 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
4241 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
4246 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
4247 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
4248 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4249 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
4250 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4251 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4252 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4253 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4256 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4257 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
4258 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
4262 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4263 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
4264 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4265 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4266 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4267 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4270 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4271 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4272 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4273 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
4274 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
4277 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4278 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4279 let last_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4281 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4283 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4284 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4285 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4286 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4287 for _ in 0..channel_count {
4288 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
4289 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
4290 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
4291 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
4292 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4293 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4294 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4295 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4296 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
4297 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4298 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4299 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4300 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4301 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4302 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
4303 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
4304 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
4305 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4307 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4308 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
4310 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
4313 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4317 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
4318 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
4319 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4323 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
4324 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4325 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4326 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
4327 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4328 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4329 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
4330 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
4331 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4333 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
4336 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4337 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4338 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
4339 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4340 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4341 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
4342 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
4343 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4345 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
4348 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4349 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
4350 for _ in 0..peer_count {
4351 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4352 let peer_state = PeerState {
4353 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
4355 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
4358 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4359 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
4360 for _ in 0..event_count {
4361 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
4362 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
4367 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4368 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
4369 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
4370 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4371 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
4372 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4376 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4378 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4379 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4381 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
4383 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
4384 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
4385 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
4387 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
4388 last_block_hash: RwLock::new(last_block_hash),
4390 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
4395 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
4397 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
4398 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
4401 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
4403 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
4405 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
4406 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
4407 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
4408 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
4410 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
4411 logger: args.logger,
4412 default_configuration: args.default_config,
4415 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4416 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4419 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
4420 //connection or two.
4422 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
4428 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
4430 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
4432 use std::time::Duration;
4435 fn test_wait_timeout() {
4436 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
4437 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
4439 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
4440 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
4441 thread::spawn(move || {
4443 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
4444 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4445 *persistence_lock = true;
4448 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
4454 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
4455 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
4457 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
4460 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
4465 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
4467 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
4470 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
4477 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
4480 use chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor;
4481 use chain::channelmonitor::Persist;
4482 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
4483 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
4484 use ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
4485 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
4486 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
4487 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
4488 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
4489 use routing::router::get_route;
4490 use util::test_utils;
4491 use util::config::UserConfig;
4492 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
4494 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4495 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4496 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
4498 use std::sync::Mutex;
4502 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
4503 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
4504 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
4505 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
4506 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
4507 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
4508 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
4513 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
4514 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
4517 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
4518 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
4519 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
4521 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
4522 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
4524 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())};
4525 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 };
4527 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
4528 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
4530 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
4531 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
4532 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
4533 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
4534 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
4536 latest_hash: genesis_hash,
4539 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
4541 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
4542 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
4543 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
4544 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
4545 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
4547 latest_hash: genesis_hash,
4550 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
4552 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
4553 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4554 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4557 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
4558 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
4559 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
4561 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
4562 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_outpoint);
4563 } else { panic!(); }
4565 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4566 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4568 get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingBroadcastSafe);
4571 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4574 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
4575 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
4577 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4578 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4580 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
4582 macro_rules! send_payment {
4583 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
4584 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
4585 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), None, Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a).unwrap();
4587 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
4588 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
4590 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap();
4591 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
4592 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4593 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
4594 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
4595 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
4596 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
4597 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4599 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
4600 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
4601 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage, &None, 10_000));
4603 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
4604 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
4605 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
4606 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4607 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
4609 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
4612 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
4613 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
4614 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
4615 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4617 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
4622 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
4623 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);