1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
47 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
50 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
52 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
53 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
54 use util::config::UserConfig;
55 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
56 use util::{byte_utils, events};
57 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
58 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
59 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
60 use util::errors::APIError;
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
66 use io::{Cursor, Read};
67 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
70 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
71 use std::time::Instant;
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
94 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
98 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
99 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
102 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
103 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
107 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
108 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
109 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
110 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
111 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
112 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
113 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
116 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
117 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
118 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
119 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
122 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
125 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
126 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
129 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
131 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
133 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
134 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
135 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
137 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
139 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
143 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
147 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
148 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
149 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
150 short_channel_id: u64,
152 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
154 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
155 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
160 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
161 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
162 /// are part of the same payment.
163 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
164 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
165 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
168 struct ClaimableHTLC {
169 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
172 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
175 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
176 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
177 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
179 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
180 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
185 impl Readable for PaymentId {
186 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
187 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
191 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
192 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
193 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
194 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
195 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
198 session_priv: SecretKey,
199 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
200 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
201 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
202 payment_id: PaymentId,
203 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
206 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
207 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
208 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
210 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
212 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
214 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
217 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
218 payment_id.hash(hasher);
219 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
220 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
227 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
228 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
230 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
231 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
232 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
233 payment_secret: None,
238 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
239 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
241 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
249 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
250 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
252 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
257 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
259 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
260 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
261 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
262 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
263 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
265 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
266 err: msgs::LightningError,
267 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
268 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
270 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
272 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
274 err: LightningError {
276 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
277 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
284 shutdown_finish: None,
288 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
290 err: LightningError {
292 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
295 shutdown_finish: None,
299 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
300 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
303 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
305 err: LightningError {
307 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
308 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
314 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
315 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
319 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
322 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
324 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
326 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
328 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
330 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
332 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
333 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
339 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
341 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
342 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
350 shutdown_finish: None,
355 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
356 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
357 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
358 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
359 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
361 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
362 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
363 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
364 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
365 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
366 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
367 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
369 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
373 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
374 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
375 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
376 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
377 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
378 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
379 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
380 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
381 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
382 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
383 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
384 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
386 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
387 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
388 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
389 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
392 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
393 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
394 /// quite some time lag.
395 enum BackgroundEvent {
396 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
397 /// commitment transaction.
398 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
401 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
402 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
404 latest_features: InitFeatures,
407 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
408 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
410 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
412 struct PendingInboundPayment {
413 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
414 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
415 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
416 /// this payment being removed.
418 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
419 user_payment_id: u64,
420 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
421 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
422 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
425 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
426 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
427 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
429 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
432 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
433 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
434 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
435 pending_amt_msat: u64,
436 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
438 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
439 starting_block_height: u32,
441 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
442 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
443 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
445 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
449 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
450 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
452 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
456 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
458 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
463 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
464 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
465 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
466 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
467 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
468 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs }
471 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs };
474 /// panics if part_amt_msat is None and !self.is_fulfilled
475 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], part_amt_msat: Option<u64>) -> bool {
476 let remove_res = match self {
477 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
478 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
479 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs } => {
480 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
484 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, .. } = self {
485 *pending_amt_msat -= part_amt_msat.expect("We must only not provide an amount if the payment was already fulfilled");
491 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], part_amt_msat: u64) -> bool {
492 let insert_res = match self {
493 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
494 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
495 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
497 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false
500 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, .. } = self {
501 *pending_amt_msat += part_amt_msat;
507 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
509 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
510 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
511 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs } => {
518 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
519 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
520 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
521 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
522 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
523 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
524 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
525 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
527 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
528 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
529 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
530 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
531 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
532 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
533 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
534 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
535 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
537 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
538 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
540 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
541 /// to individual Channels.
543 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
544 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
545 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
546 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
548 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
549 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
550 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
551 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
552 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
553 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
554 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
556 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
557 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
558 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
559 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
562 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
563 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
564 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
565 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
566 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
568 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
569 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
570 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
571 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
572 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
573 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
574 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
575 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
576 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
577 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
580 default_configuration: UserConfig,
581 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
587 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
589 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
590 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
592 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
593 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
594 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
595 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
597 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
598 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
599 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
600 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
601 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
602 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
604 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
605 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
606 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
607 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
608 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
609 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
610 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
611 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
613 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
615 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
616 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
618 our_network_key: SecretKey,
619 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
621 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
622 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
623 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
625 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
626 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
627 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
628 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
630 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
631 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
632 /// are currently open with that peer.
633 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
634 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
637 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
638 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
640 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
641 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
642 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
643 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
644 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
645 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
646 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
647 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
648 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
650 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
657 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
659 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
660 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
661 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
662 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
663 pub struct ChainParameters {
664 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
665 pub network: Network,
667 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
669 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
670 pub best_block: BestBlock,
673 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
679 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
680 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
681 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
682 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
683 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
684 /// updates are ready for persistence).
686 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
687 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
688 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
689 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
690 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
692 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
693 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
696 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
697 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
698 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
701 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
702 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
704 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
705 persistence_notifier: notifier,
706 should_persist: persist_check,
707 _read_guard: read_guard,
712 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
714 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
715 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
720 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
721 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
723 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
725 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
726 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
727 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
728 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
729 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
731 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
732 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
734 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
736 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
737 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
738 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
739 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
740 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
741 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
742 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
744 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
745 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
747 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
748 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
749 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
750 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
752 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
753 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
754 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
755 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
756 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
757 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
760 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
762 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
763 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
766 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
768 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
769 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
770 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
771 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
772 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
773 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
774 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
775 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
776 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
777 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
778 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
781 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
782 /// to better separate parameters.
783 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
784 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
785 /// The node_id of our counterparty
786 pub node_id: PublicKey,
787 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
788 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
789 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
790 pub features: InitFeatures,
791 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
792 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
793 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
795 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
797 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
798 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
799 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
800 /// payments to us through this channel.
801 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
804 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
805 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
806 pub struct ChannelDetails {
807 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
808 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
809 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
810 /// lifetime of the channel.
811 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
812 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
813 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
814 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
815 /// our counterparty already.
817 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
818 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
819 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
820 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
821 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
822 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
823 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
824 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
825 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
826 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
827 /// this value on chain.
829 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
831 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
833 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
834 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
835 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
836 pub user_channel_id: u64,
837 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
838 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
839 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
840 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
842 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
843 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
844 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
845 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
846 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
847 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
848 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
849 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
850 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
852 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
853 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
854 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
855 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
856 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
857 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
858 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
859 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
860 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
862 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
864 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
865 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
866 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
867 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
868 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
869 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
870 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
871 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
872 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
874 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
875 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
876 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
877 pub is_outbound: bool,
878 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
879 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
880 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
881 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
882 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
884 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
885 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
886 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
887 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
889 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
891 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
895 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
896 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
898 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
899 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
900 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
901 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
902 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
903 ParameterError(APIError),
904 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
905 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
906 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
909 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
911 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
912 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
913 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
914 /// paths than the ones selected).
915 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
916 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
917 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
918 /// in over-/re-payment.
920 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
921 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
922 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
924 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
925 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
926 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
927 /// with the latest update_id.
928 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
931 macro_rules! handle_error {
932 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
935 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
936 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
938 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
939 // entering the macro.
940 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
941 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
944 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
946 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
947 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
948 if let Some(update) = update_option {
949 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
953 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
954 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
955 channel_id, user_channel_id,
956 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
961 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
962 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
964 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
965 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
966 action: err.action.clone()
970 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
971 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
974 // Return error in case higher-API need one
981 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
982 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
983 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
985 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
986 //TODO: Once warning messages are merged, we should send a `warning` message to our
988 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
990 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
991 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
993 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
994 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
995 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
996 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
998 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
999 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1000 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1002 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
1003 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1004 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1005 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1007 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
1008 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1009 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1015 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1016 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1020 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1022 $entry.remove_entry();
1030 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1031 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1035 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1037 $entry.remove_entry();
1045 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1046 ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1048 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1049 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1050 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1057 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1058 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1059 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1061 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1063 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1064 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1065 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1066 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1068 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1069 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1070 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1071 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1072 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1073 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1074 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1075 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1076 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1077 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1078 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1081 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1082 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1083 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1084 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1085 match $action_type {
1086 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1087 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1089 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1090 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1092 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1093 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1094 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1095 if !$resend_commitment {
1096 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1099 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1101 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1102 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1106 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1107 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1109 $entry.remove_entry();
1113 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1114 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new());
1118 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1119 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1120 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1122 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1123 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1127 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1128 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1129 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1130 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1131 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1134 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1139 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1140 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1141 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1142 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
1143 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1144 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1146 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1147 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1149 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1150 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1151 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1152 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1155 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1156 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1157 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1158 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1159 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1160 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1161 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1162 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1163 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1164 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1165 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1166 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1169 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1170 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1171 // before it should be allowed to.
1172 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1173 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1174 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1177 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
1178 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1179 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1180 msg: announcement_sigs,
1183 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
1186 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1187 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1188 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1189 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1190 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1191 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1192 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1193 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1194 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1195 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1196 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1197 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1198 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1199 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1200 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1201 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1202 let mut order = $order;
1204 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1206 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1210 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1211 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1212 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1213 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1218 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1219 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1220 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1221 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1222 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1227 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1231 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1236 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1237 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1238 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1243 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1244 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1245 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1246 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1247 assert!(res.is_ok());
1250 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1254 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1255 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1256 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1258 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1260 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1261 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1266 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1267 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1268 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1269 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1270 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1273 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1275 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1276 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1278 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1280 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1282 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1283 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1284 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1285 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1286 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1287 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1290 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1291 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1292 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1296 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1298 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1299 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1300 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1301 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1302 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1303 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1305 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1306 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1308 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1309 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1312 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1313 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1315 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1317 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1318 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1319 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1320 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1328 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1329 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1330 &self.default_configuration
1333 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1335 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1336 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1337 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1338 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1339 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1342 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1343 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1345 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1346 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1347 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1349 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1350 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1351 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1352 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1353 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1354 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1356 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1357 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1358 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1359 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1360 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1361 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1365 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1366 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1367 Some(peer_state) => {
1368 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1369 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1370 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1371 Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config)?
1373 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1376 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1378 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1379 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1380 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1382 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1383 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1384 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1385 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1386 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1387 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1389 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1392 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1394 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1395 node_id: their_network_key,
1398 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1401 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1402 let mut res = Vec::new();
1404 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1405 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1406 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1407 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1408 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1409 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1410 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1411 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1412 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1413 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1414 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1415 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1416 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1418 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1419 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1420 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1421 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1422 inbound_capacity_msat,
1423 outbound_capacity_msat,
1424 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1425 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1426 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1427 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1428 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1429 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1430 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1434 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1435 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1436 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1437 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1443 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1444 /// more information.
1445 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1446 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1449 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1450 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1452 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1453 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1455 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1456 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1457 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1458 // really wanted anyway.
1459 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1462 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1463 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1464 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1465 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1466 Some(transaction) => {
1467 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1471 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1472 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1473 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1474 reason: closure_reason
1478 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1479 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1481 let counterparty_node_id;
1482 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1483 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1484 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1485 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1486 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1487 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1488 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1489 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1490 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1491 Some(peer_state) => {
1492 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1493 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1494 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1496 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1498 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1500 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1501 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1502 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1503 let (result, is_permanent) =
1504 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
1506 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1512 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1513 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1517 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1518 let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1519 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1520 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1524 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1528 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1532 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1533 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1536 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1540 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1541 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1542 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1544 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1545 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1547 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1548 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1549 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1550 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1552 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1554 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1555 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1556 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1557 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1558 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
1561 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1562 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1563 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1565 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1566 /// the channel being closed or not:
1567 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1568 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1569 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1570 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1571 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1572 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1573 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1575 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1577 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1578 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1579 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1580 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1581 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1585 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1586 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1587 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1588 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1589 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1591 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1592 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1593 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1594 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1595 // ignore the result here.
1596 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1600 /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1601 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1602 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1604 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1605 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1606 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1607 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1608 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1609 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1612 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1613 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1615 if peer_node_id.is_some() {
1616 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1617 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1620 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1622 chan.remove_entry().1
1624 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1627 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1628 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1629 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1630 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1631 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1636 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1639 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1640 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1641 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1642 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1643 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
1644 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1645 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1646 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1647 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1648 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1649 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1659 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1660 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1661 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1662 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1663 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1667 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1668 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1669 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1671 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1672 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1673 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1674 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1675 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1676 failure_code: $err_code,
1677 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1682 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1683 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1686 let shared_secret = {
1687 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1688 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1691 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1693 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1694 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1695 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1696 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1697 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1698 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1699 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1700 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1703 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1704 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1705 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1706 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1707 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1710 let mut channel_state = None;
1711 macro_rules! return_err {
1712 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1714 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1715 if channel_state.is_none() {
1716 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1718 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1719 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1720 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1721 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1722 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1727 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1728 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1729 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac): (msgs::OnionHopData, _) = {
1730 match <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1732 let error_code = match err {
1733 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1734 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1735 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1736 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1737 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1739 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1742 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1743 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1744 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1751 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1754 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1755 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1756 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1757 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1758 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1759 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1760 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1761 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1762 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1763 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1764 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1765 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1769 // final_expiry_too_soon
1770 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1771 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1772 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1773 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1774 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1775 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1776 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1778 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1779 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1780 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1782 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1783 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1784 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1787 let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
1788 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
1789 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1790 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1791 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1792 return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1793 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1794 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1796 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1798 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1799 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1800 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1801 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1802 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1803 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1804 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1805 if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
1806 return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1809 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
1811 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1814 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1819 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1820 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1821 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1822 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1824 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1826 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1827 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1828 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1829 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1832 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1833 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1834 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1836 // Check two things:
1837 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1838 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1839 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1841 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1843 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1844 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1845 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1847 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1849 let blinding_factor = {
1850 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1851 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1852 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1853 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1856 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1858 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1860 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1863 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1864 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1867 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1868 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1869 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1870 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1871 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1875 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1876 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1877 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1880 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1881 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1882 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1883 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1887 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1888 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1889 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1890 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1891 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1892 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1893 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1894 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1895 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1896 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1897 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1899 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1902 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1904 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
1905 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
1906 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
1907 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
1908 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1911 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1912 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1913 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1914 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1915 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1916 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1917 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1919 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1920 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1922 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
1923 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
1924 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
1925 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1926 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1928 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1929 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1931 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1932 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1933 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1934 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1935 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1937 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1938 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1940 // In theory, we would be safe against unintentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1941 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longer delay.
1942 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1943 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1949 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1950 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1951 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1952 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1954 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1955 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1957 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1958 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1959 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1961 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1963 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1968 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1971 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
1972 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
1973 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
1975 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1976 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1977 if !chan.should_announce() {
1978 return Err(LightningError {
1979 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
1980 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
1983 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1984 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
1987 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
1988 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
1989 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
1990 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
1991 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1992 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1993 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1994 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1995 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1999 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2001 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2002 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2004 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2005 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2006 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2007 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2008 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2009 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2010 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2011 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2014 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2015 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2017 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2023 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2024 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2025 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2026 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2027 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2028 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2030 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2031 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2032 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2033 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2034 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2036 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2038 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2040 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2041 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2043 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2044 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2045 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2046 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2047 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2048 err: "Payment already completed"
2053 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2054 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2055 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2058 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2059 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2061 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2062 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2064 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2065 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2067 let send_res = break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2068 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2070 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2071 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2073 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2074 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2075 channel_state, chan);
2077 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2078 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2079 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2080 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2081 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2082 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2083 total_msat: total_value,
2085 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path.last().unwrap().fee_msat));
2089 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2090 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2091 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2092 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2093 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2094 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2095 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2096 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2097 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2100 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2101 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2102 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2103 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2104 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2105 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2106 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2107 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2115 } else { unreachable!(); }
2119 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2120 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2122 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2127 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2129 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2130 /// fields for more info.
2132 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2133 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2134 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2135 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2136 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2137 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2139 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2141 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2142 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2143 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2145 /// In general, a path may raise:
2146 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2147 /// node public key) is specified.
2148 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2149 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2151 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2152 /// relevant updates.
2154 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2155 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2156 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2158 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2159 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2160 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2161 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2163 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2164 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2165 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2166 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2167 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2170 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2171 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2172 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2174 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2175 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2176 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2177 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2178 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2180 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2181 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2183 let mut total_value = 0;
2184 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2185 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2186 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2187 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2188 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2189 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2190 continue 'path_check;
2192 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2193 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2194 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2195 continue 'path_check;
2198 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2199 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2201 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2202 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2204 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2205 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2206 total_value = amt_msat;
2209 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2210 let mut results = Vec::new();
2211 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2212 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2214 let mut has_ok = false;
2215 let mut has_err = false;
2216 for res in results.iter() {
2217 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2218 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2219 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2220 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2227 if has_err && has_ok {
2228 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
2230 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2236 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2238 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2239 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2240 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, or if the payment
2241 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success).
2243 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2244 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2245 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2246 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2247 if path.len() == 0 {
2248 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2249 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2254 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2255 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2256 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2258 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2259 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2261 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2262 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2263 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2264 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2267 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2269 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2270 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2271 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2274 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2275 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError {
2276 err: "Payment already completed"
2281 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2282 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2286 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2289 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2290 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2291 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2292 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2293 /// never reach the recipient.
2295 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2297 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2298 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2300 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2302 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2303 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2304 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2306 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2308 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2309 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2310 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2315 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2316 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2317 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2318 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2320 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2322 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2324 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2325 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2326 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2327 } else { unreachable!(); })
2330 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2332 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2333 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2336 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2337 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2342 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2343 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2344 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2347 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2348 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2349 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2351 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2359 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2360 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2361 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2365 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2367 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2368 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2370 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
2372 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2373 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2374 /// keys per-channel).
2376 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2377 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2378 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2380 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2381 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2382 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2384 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2385 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2386 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2388 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2389 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2390 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2391 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2395 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2396 let mut output_index = None;
2397 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2398 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2399 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2400 if output_index.is_some() {
2401 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2402 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2405 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2406 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2407 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2410 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2413 if output_index.is_none() {
2414 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2415 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2418 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2422 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
2423 if !chan.should_announce() {
2424 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2428 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2430 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
2432 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2433 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2435 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2436 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
2437 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
2438 node_signature: our_node_sig,
2439 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
2444 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2445 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2446 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2448 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2451 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2452 // smaller than 500:
2453 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2455 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2456 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2457 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2458 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2459 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2460 /// our network addresses.
2462 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2463 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2465 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2466 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2467 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2468 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2470 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2472 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2473 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2474 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2476 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2477 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2480 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2481 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2482 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2484 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2485 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2486 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2487 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2488 rgb, alias, addresses,
2489 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2490 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2492 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2493 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2495 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2496 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2498 let mut announced_chans = false;
2499 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2500 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2501 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2503 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2508 announced_chans = true;
2510 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2511 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2512 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2516 if announced_chans {
2517 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2518 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2519 signature: node_announce_sig,
2520 contents: announcement
2526 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2528 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2529 /// Will likely generate further events.
2530 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2531 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2533 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2534 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2535 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2537 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2538 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2540 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2541 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2542 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2543 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2545 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2546 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2547 match forward_info {
2548 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2549 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2550 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2551 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2552 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2553 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2554 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2556 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
2557 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
2560 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2561 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2562 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2563 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2564 // problem, not ours.
2571 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2572 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2573 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2574 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2575 match forward_info {
2576 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2577 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2579 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2580 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2581 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2582 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2583 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2584 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2585 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2586 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2588 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
2590 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2591 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2593 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2595 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
2596 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2597 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
2603 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2605 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2606 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2607 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2608 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2609 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2610 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2611 // this channel currently :/.
2617 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2618 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2620 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2621 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
2622 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
2624 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2625 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
2627 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
2629 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2630 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2631 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2634 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2636 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2637 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
2638 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
2639 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
2640 // messages when we can.
2641 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
2642 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
2643 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
2650 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
2651 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
2654 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
2655 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
2656 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2657 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
2658 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
2659 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
2661 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2662 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
2663 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
2664 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2665 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2667 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
2668 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
2670 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
2672 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
2676 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2677 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
2680 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
2681 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2682 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2683 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2684 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2685 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
2686 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2687 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
2688 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2690 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
2698 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2699 match forward_info {
2700 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2701 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
2702 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2703 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
2704 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2705 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
2706 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2707 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
2709 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2712 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
2713 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
2714 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2715 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2716 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2717 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2719 value: amt_to_forward,
2724 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2726 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
2727 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2728 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
2730 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2731 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2732 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2733 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
2734 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
2736 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
2741 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
2742 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
2743 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
2744 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
2745 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
2746 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
2747 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2748 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
2749 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2750 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2751 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => {
2752 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2753 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2755 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
2756 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
2757 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2758 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
2759 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2761 amt: amt_to_forward,
2762 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
2765 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2766 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2767 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2773 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
2775 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2778 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2779 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2782 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
2783 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2784 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2785 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
2786 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2787 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2788 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2790 let mut total_value = 0;
2791 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2792 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2793 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
2794 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
2795 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2796 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2800 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2801 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2802 total_value += htlc.value;
2803 match &htlc.onion_payload {
2804 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
2805 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2806 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2807 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
2808 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2810 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2812 _ => unreachable!(),
2815 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2816 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2817 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2818 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2821 } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2822 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2824 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
2825 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
2826 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
2827 user_payment_id: inbound_payment.get().user_payment_id,
2831 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
2832 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
2834 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
2836 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2837 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
2844 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2845 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
2853 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
2854 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
2857 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2858 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2861 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
2862 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2863 events.append(&mut new_events);
2866 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2868 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2869 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2871 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2872 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
2873 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2874 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2875 if background_events.is_empty() {
2879 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2881 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2882 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2883 // monitor updating completing.
2884 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2891 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2892 /// Process background events, for functional testing
2893 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2894 self.process_background_events();
2897 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
2898 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
2899 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
2900 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
2901 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2902 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2903 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2905 if !chan.is_live() {
2906 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
2907 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2908 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2910 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2911 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2913 let mut retain_channel = true;
2914 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
2917 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
2918 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
2922 let ret_err = match res {
2923 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
2924 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2925 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_id);
2926 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
2929 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2930 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2931 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2932 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2933 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2934 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2935 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2936 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2946 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
2950 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
2951 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
2952 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
2953 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
2954 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
2955 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2956 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2958 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
2960 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2962 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2963 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2964 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2965 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2966 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
2967 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
2968 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2970 handle_errors.push(err);
2980 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
2982 /// This currently includes:
2983 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
2984 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
2985 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
2988 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
2989 /// estimate fetches.
2990 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
2991 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2992 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2993 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2995 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
2997 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2999 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3000 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3001 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3002 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3003 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3004 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3005 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3006 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3008 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3010 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3012 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3013 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3014 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3015 if needs_close { return false; }
3018 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3019 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3020 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3021 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3022 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3023 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3024 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3025 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3029 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3030 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3032 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3033 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3034 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3038 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3039 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3048 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3049 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3055 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3056 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3057 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3058 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
3059 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
3060 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
3061 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3063 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3064 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3065 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3066 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3067 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3068 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3069 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3070 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3071 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3072 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3073 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3079 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3080 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3081 // be surfaced to the user.
3082 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3083 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3085 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3086 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3087 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3088 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3089 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
3090 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
3092 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3095 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3097 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3098 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3099 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3101 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3102 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3103 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3104 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3105 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3106 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(path.last().unwrap().fee_msat)) &&
3107 !payment.get().is_fulfilled()
3109 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3110 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3112 rejected_by_dest: false,
3113 network_update: None,
3114 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3116 short_channel_id: None,
3125 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3132 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3133 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3134 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3135 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3136 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3137 /// still-available channels.
3138 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3139 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3140 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3141 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3144 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3145 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3146 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3148 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, .. } => {
3149 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3150 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3151 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3152 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3153 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3154 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(path.last().unwrap().fee_msat)) {
3155 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3158 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3159 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3162 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3163 all_paths_failed = true;
3166 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3169 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3170 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3171 match &onion_error {
3172 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3174 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3176 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3177 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3178 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3179 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3180 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3181 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3182 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3183 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3189 error_code: onion_error_code,
3191 error_data: onion_error_data
3195 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3201 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3202 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3203 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
3204 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3206 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3207 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3208 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3209 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3210 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3211 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3212 network_update: None,
3215 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3217 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3219 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3225 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3226 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3227 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3228 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3229 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3230 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3232 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3233 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3234 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3238 let mut forward_event = None;
3239 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3240 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3242 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3243 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3244 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3246 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3247 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3250 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3251 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3252 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3253 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3254 time_forwardable: time
3261 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
3262 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
3263 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
3265 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3266 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3267 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3268 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3270 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
3272 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3273 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3274 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3275 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3277 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3279 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3280 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3281 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3282 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3284 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3285 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3286 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3287 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3289 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3290 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3291 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3292 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3293 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3295 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3296 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3297 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3303 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3304 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3305 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3307 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3308 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3309 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3310 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3311 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3312 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3313 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3315 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3316 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3317 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3318 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3319 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3320 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3321 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3322 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3324 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3325 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3326 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3327 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3328 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3329 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3331 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3336 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3337 // which were generated.
3338 channel_state.take();
3340 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3341 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3342 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3349 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3350 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3351 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3352 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3353 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3355 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3359 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3360 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3361 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3362 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3363 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3364 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3365 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3366 payment_preimage, e);
3367 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3368 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3369 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3370 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3373 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3374 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3375 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3376 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3377 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3378 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3379 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3380 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3381 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3382 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3388 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3390 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3393 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3394 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3395 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3396 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3397 payment_preimage, e);
3399 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3400 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3402 chan.remove_entry();
3404 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3407 } else { unreachable!(); }
3410 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
3411 for source in sources.drain(..) {
3412 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, .. } = source {
3413 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3414 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3415 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3416 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3417 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
3418 payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None);
3419 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3427 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
3429 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3430 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3431 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3432 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3433 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3434 let found_payment = if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3435 let found_payment = !payment.get().is_fulfilled();
3436 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
3438 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
3439 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
3440 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
3442 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
3443 // irrevocably fulfilled.
3444 payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(path.last().unwrap().fee_msat));
3445 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3452 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3453 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3454 events::Event::PaymentSent {
3456 payment_hash: payment_hash
3460 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
3463 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
3464 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
3465 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
3466 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
3467 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
3468 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
3469 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
3472 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
3473 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3474 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
3475 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3476 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3479 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
3480 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
3481 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
3482 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
3483 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3484 payment_preimage, e);
3486 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
3487 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
3488 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
3489 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
3492 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3493 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
3494 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3495 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
3499 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
3500 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
3501 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
3504 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3505 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
3507 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
3515 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
3516 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3517 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
3520 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
3521 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3523 let chan_restoration_res;
3524 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
3525 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3526 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3527 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
3528 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
3529 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
3531 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
3535 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
3536 let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
3537 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
3538 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
3539 // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
3540 // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
3541 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3542 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3543 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
3546 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked);
3547 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3548 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3550 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
3552 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3553 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
3554 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3555 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3559 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3560 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
3561 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
3564 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
3565 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
3566 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3567 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3568 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
3569 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
3570 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3571 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
3572 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3573 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
3575 entry.insert(channel);
3581 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3582 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
3583 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3584 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3585 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
3586 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3587 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3588 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3590 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
3591 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
3593 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3596 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3597 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
3598 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
3599 channel_value_satoshis: value,
3601 user_channel_id: user_id,
3606 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3607 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
3608 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3609 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3610 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3611 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
3612 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3613 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3614 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3616 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
3618 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3621 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
3622 // lock before watch_channel
3623 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
3625 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
3626 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
3627 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
3628 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
3629 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
3630 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
3631 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
3632 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
3633 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
3634 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
3635 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
3637 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
3638 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
3639 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
3640 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
3641 // until we have persisted our monitor.
3642 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3646 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3647 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3648 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
3649 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3650 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
3652 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3653 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
3654 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3663 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3665 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3666 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3667 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3668 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3669 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3670 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3671 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3673 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
3674 Ok(update) => update,
3675 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3677 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
3678 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
3679 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
3680 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
3681 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
3682 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
3683 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
3684 shutdown_finish.0.take();
3691 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3694 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
3695 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
3699 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3700 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3701 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3702 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3703 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3704 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3705 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3707 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3708 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
3709 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3710 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
3711 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
3712 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
3713 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
3714 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
3715 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
3716 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
3717 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
3718 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
3719 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3720 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3721 msg: announcement_sigs,
3723 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3724 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3725 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3726 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3731 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3735 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3736 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
3737 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
3738 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3739 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3741 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3742 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3743 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3744 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3747 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
3748 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
3749 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
3750 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
3753 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3754 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
3756 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3757 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
3758 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3759 let (result, is_permanent) =
3760 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
3762 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
3768 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3769 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3770 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3777 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3780 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
3781 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3784 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
3788 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3789 let (tx, chan_option) = {
3790 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3791 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3792 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3793 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3794 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3795 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3797 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3798 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3799 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3800 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3805 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
3806 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
3807 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
3808 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
3809 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
3810 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3811 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3813 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3814 } else { (tx, None) }
3816 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3819 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
3820 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
3821 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
3823 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3824 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3825 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3826 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3830 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
3835 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3836 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
3837 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
3838 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
3840 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
3841 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
3842 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
3843 //but we should prevent it anyway.
3845 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
3846 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3848 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3849 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3850 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3851 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3854 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
3855 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
3856 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
3857 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
3858 match pending_forward_info {
3859 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3860 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
3861 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
3862 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
3863 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
3864 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
3865 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
3866 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
3870 // The only case where we'd be unable to
3871 // successfully get a channel update is if the
3872 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
3873 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
3874 // payments over the channel back to themselves
3875 // (because no one else should know the short_id
3876 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
3877 // no problem just calling this
3878 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
3879 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
3882 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
3884 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3885 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3886 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3889 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
3891 _ => pending_forward_info
3894 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3896 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3901 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3902 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3903 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
3904 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3905 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3906 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3907 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3908 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3910 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
3912 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3915 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
3919 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3920 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3921 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3922 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3923 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3924 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3925 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3927 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
3929 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3934 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3935 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3936 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3937 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3938 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3939 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3940 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3942 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
3943 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
3944 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3946 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
3949 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3953 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3954 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3955 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3956 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3957 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3958 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3959 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3961 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
3962 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
3963 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3964 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
3965 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
3966 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
3967 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
3972 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3973 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
3975 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3976 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3977 msg: revoke_and_ack,
3979 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
3980 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3981 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3982 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3983 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3984 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3985 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3986 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3988 commitment_signed: msg,
3994 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3999 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4000 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4001 let mut forward_event = None;
4002 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4003 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4004 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4005 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4007 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4008 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4009 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4010 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4011 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4013 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4014 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4015 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4017 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4018 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4019 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4024 match forward_event {
4026 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4027 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4028 time_forwardable: time
4036 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4037 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4039 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4040 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4041 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4042 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4043 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4044 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4046 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4047 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4048 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4049 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4050 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4051 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4052 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4053 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4054 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4055 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4056 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4058 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4059 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4060 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(),
4061 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4062 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4064 } else { unreachable!(); }
4067 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4068 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4069 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4073 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4074 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4075 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4076 .expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"),
4077 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4079 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4082 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
4084 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4085 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4087 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4088 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4090 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4091 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4098 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4099 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4100 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4101 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4102 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4103 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4104 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4106 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4108 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4113 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4114 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4115 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4117 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4118 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4119 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4120 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4122 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4123 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4126 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4127 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4128 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4129 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4130 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4133 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4138 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4139 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4140 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4141 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4142 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4143 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4145 // It's not a local channel
4146 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4149 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4150 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4151 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4152 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4153 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4154 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4155 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4156 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4158 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4160 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4161 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4162 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4163 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4165 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
4168 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
4170 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4173 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4174 let chan_restoration_res;
4175 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
4176 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4177 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4179 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4180 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4181 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4182 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4184 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4185 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4186 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4187 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4188 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
4189 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4190 let mut channel_update = None;
4191 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4192 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4193 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4196 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4197 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4198 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4199 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4200 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4201 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4202 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4205 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4206 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
4207 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4208 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4210 (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
4212 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4215 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4216 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
4218 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4219 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
4224 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
4225 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
4226 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4227 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
4228 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
4229 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
4230 match monitor_event {
4231 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
4232 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
4233 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
4234 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
4236 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
4237 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4240 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
4241 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
4242 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4243 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4244 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4245 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4246 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4247 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
4248 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4249 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4251 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
4252 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4253 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4257 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
4258 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
4260 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
4262 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
4263 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4264 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4265 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4266 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4271 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
4272 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
4277 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4278 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4281 has_pending_monitor_events
4284 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
4285 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
4286 /// update events as a separate process method here.
4287 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
4288 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
4289 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
4292 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
4293 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
4294 /// update was applied.
4296 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
4297 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
4298 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
4299 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
4300 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
4301 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
4302 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4303 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
4305 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4306 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4307 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4308 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4309 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4311 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4312 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
4313 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4314 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
4315 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
4317 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
4318 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4319 has_monitor_update = true;
4320 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
4321 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
4322 if close_channel { return false; }
4324 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4325 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4326 updates: commitment_update,
4333 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4334 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4335 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
4342 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
4343 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4344 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
4347 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4348 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4354 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
4355 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
4356 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
4357 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
4358 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
4359 let mut has_update = false;
4361 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4362 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4363 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4364 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4365 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4367 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4368 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
4369 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
4370 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4372 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4373 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
4376 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
4377 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
4378 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
4379 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4380 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4383 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4384 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4389 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4391 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
4392 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4398 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4399 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4406 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4407 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4413 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
4414 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
4416 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
4417 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4418 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
4419 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
4420 // reorganized out of the main chain.
4421 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
4422 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
4423 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
4424 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
4425 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
4426 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
4427 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
4428 assert!(should_broadcast);
4429 } else { unreachable!(); }
4430 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
4432 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4436 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4437 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
4439 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4441 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4442 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4443 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4444 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4445 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
4446 payment_secret, min_value_msat, user_payment_id, payment_preimage,
4447 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
4448 // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
4449 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
4450 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
4451 // never fail a payment too early.
4452 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
4454 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
4457 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
4462 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
4465 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
4466 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
4468 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
4469 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
4470 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
4472 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
4474 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
4475 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4476 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
4477 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4478 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
4479 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4480 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4483 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
4484 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
4487 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
4488 /// stored external to LDK.
4490 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
4491 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
4492 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
4494 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
4495 /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
4497 /// `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`] events to
4498 /// allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and
4499 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply
4500 /// copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events
4501 /// with invoice metadata stored elsewhere.
4503 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
4504 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
4505 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
4506 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
4508 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
4509 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
4510 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
4511 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
4512 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
4514 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
4515 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
4516 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
4517 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
4518 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
4520 /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
4521 /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
4522 /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
4524 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
4526 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
4527 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
4529 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4530 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4531 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id
4532 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4533 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
4536 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
4537 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
4538 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4539 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
4540 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
4545 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
4546 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
4550 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4551 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4552 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4553 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4554 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4557 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
4558 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4559 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4560 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4562 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4563 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4564 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4565 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4568 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4569 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4571 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
4572 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4575 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
4576 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4577 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
4579 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4580 events.replace(pending_events);
4589 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4591 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4592 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4593 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4594 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4597 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
4599 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
4600 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
4602 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
4603 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
4604 /// restarting from an old state.
4605 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
4606 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4607 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4609 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4610 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4611 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4612 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4615 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
4616 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4617 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4620 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
4621 handler.handle_event(&event);
4629 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4631 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4632 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4633 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4634 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4637 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
4639 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4640 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
4641 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
4642 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
4643 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
4646 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
4647 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
4648 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
4651 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4652 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4653 let new_height = height - 1;
4655 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
4656 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
4657 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
4658 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
4659 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
4660 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
4663 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
4667 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4669 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4670 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4671 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4672 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4675 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4676 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4677 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4678 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4680 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4681 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
4683 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4684 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
4687 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4688 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4689 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4690 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4692 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4693 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
4695 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4697 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
4699 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
4701 macro_rules! max_time {
4702 ($timestamp: expr) => {
4704 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
4705 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
4706 // having an explicit local time source.
4707 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
4708 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
4709 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
4710 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
4711 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
4717 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
4718 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
4719 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4720 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
4721 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
4724 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4725 outbounds.retain(|_, payment| {
4726 const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
4727 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
4728 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, .. } = payment {
4729 return *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS > height
4735 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
4736 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4737 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
4738 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
4739 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
4740 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
4746 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
4747 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4748 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
4749 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
4750 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
4751 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
4752 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4753 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4758 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4760 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4761 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4762 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4763 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4766 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
4767 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
4769 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
4770 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
4771 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4772 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4773 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4775 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4776 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4778 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4779 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4780 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4781 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4782 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
4783 let res = f(channel);
4784 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
4785 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
4786 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
4787 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4788 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
4792 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
4793 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
4794 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4795 msg: funding_locked,
4797 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
4798 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4799 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4800 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4801 msg: announcement_sigs,
4803 } else if channel.is_usable() {
4804 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4805 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4806 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4807 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
4810 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4812 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
4814 } else if let Err(e) = res {
4815 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4816 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4818 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
4819 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
4820 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
4821 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
4822 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4826 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4827 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4828 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4829 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
4836 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
4837 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
4838 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4839 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
4840 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
4841 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
4842 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
4843 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
4844 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4845 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
4846 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4847 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
4848 data: htlc_msat_height_data
4853 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
4858 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
4860 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
4861 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
4865 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
4866 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
4867 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4869 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
4870 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4871 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4872 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
4875 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
4876 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4878 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
4879 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
4882 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4883 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
4884 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
4885 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
4886 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4890 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
4891 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
4892 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
4893 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
4897 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
4898 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4899 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4900 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4901 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4902 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4905 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
4906 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4907 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4910 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
4911 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4912 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4915 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
4916 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4917 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4920 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
4921 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4922 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4925 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
4926 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4927 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4930 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
4931 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4932 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4935 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
4936 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4937 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4940 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
4941 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4942 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4945 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
4946 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4947 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4950 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
4951 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4952 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4955 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
4956 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4957 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4960 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
4961 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4962 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4965 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
4966 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4967 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4970 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
4971 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4972 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4975 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
4976 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4977 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4980 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
4981 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4982 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
4985 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
4990 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
4991 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4992 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4995 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
4996 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4997 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4998 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5000 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5001 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5002 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5003 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5004 if no_connection_possible {
5005 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5006 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5007 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5008 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5009 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5011 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
5012 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5013 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5017 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5024 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5025 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5026 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5027 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5028 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5029 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5030 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5032 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5035 no_channels_remain = false;
5041 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5043 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5044 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5045 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5046 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5047 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5048 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5049 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5050 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5051 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5052 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5053 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5054 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5055 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5056 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5057 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5058 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5059 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5060 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5061 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5065 if no_channels_remain {
5066 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
5069 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5070 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5074 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
5075 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5077 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5080 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5081 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
5082 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5083 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
5084 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
5087 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
5088 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
5093 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5094 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5095 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5096 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5097 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5098 if !chan.have_received_message() {
5099 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
5100 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
5101 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
5105 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
5106 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5107 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
5113 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
5116 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
5117 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5119 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
5120 for chan in self.list_channels() {
5121 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
5122 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5123 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5127 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5128 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5133 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
5134 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
5135 struct PersistenceNotifier {
5136 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
5137 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
5138 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
5141 impl PersistenceNotifier {
5144 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
5150 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5151 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5156 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
5157 let result = *guard;
5165 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
5166 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5167 let current_time = Instant::now();
5169 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5170 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5175 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
5176 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
5177 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
5178 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
5179 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
5181 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
5182 let result = *guard;
5183 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
5187 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
5188 None => return result,
5194 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
5196 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
5197 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5198 *persistence_lock = true;
5199 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
5204 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5205 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5207 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
5209 (0, onion_packet, required),
5210 (2, short_channel_id, required),
5213 (0, payment_data, required),
5214 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5216 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
5217 (0, payment_preimage, required),
5218 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5222 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
5223 (0, routing, required),
5224 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
5225 (4, payment_hash, required),
5226 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
5227 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
5231 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5232 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5234 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
5236 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5237 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5238 reason.write(writer)?;
5240 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5241 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
5244 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5245 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5246 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
5247 failure_code.write(writer)?;
5254 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5255 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5256 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5259 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5260 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5261 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5262 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
5266 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5267 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5268 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5269 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
5270 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
5273 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
5274 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
5275 // messages contained in the variants.
5276 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
5277 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
5278 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
5280 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5281 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5282 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5283 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5284 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
5287 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5288 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5289 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5290 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5291 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
5293 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5298 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
5303 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
5304 (0, short_channel_id, required),
5305 (2, outpoint, required),
5306 (4, htlc_id, required),
5307 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
5310 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
5311 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5312 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
5313 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
5316 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
5317 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
5318 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
5323 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
5324 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
5325 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
5331 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
5332 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5333 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5335 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
5336 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
5337 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5341 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
5342 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
5343 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
5345 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
5347 if payment_data.is_some() {
5348 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5350 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
5353 if payment_data.is_none() {
5354 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5356 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
5360 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
5368 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
5369 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5370 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5373 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5374 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
5375 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
5376 let mut payment_id = None;
5377 let mut payment_secret = None;
5378 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5379 (0, session_priv, required),
5380 (1, payment_id, option),
5381 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5382 (3, payment_secret, option),
5383 (4, path, vec_type),
5385 if payment_id.is_none() {
5386 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
5388 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
5390 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
5391 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
5392 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
5393 path: path.unwrap(),
5394 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
5398 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
5399 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5404 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
5405 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
5407 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret } => {
5409 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
5410 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5411 (0, session_priv, required),
5412 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
5413 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5414 (3, payment_secret, option),
5415 (4, path, vec_type),
5418 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
5420 field.write(writer)?;
5427 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
5428 (0, LightningError) => {
5432 (0, failure_code, required),
5433 (2, data, vec_type),
5437 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
5439 (0, forward_info, required),
5440 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
5441 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
5442 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
5445 (0, htlc_id, required),
5446 (2, err_packet, required),
5450 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
5451 (0, payment_secret, required),
5452 (2, expiry_time, required),
5453 (4, user_payment_id, required),
5454 (6, payment_preimage, required),
5455 (8, min_value_msat, required),
5458 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
5460 (0, session_privs, required),
5463 (0, session_privs, required),
5466 (0, session_privs, required),
5467 (2, payment_hash, required),
5468 (4, payment_secret, option),
5469 (6, total_msat, required),
5470 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
5471 (10, starting_block_height, required),
5475 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5476 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5477 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5478 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5479 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5482 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5483 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
5485 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5487 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
5489 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5490 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
5491 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
5494 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5495 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
5496 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5497 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5498 unfunded_channels += 1;
5501 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
5502 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5503 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5504 channel.write(writer)?;
5508 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5509 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
5510 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
5511 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5512 for forward in pending_forwards {
5513 forward.write(writer)?;
5517 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5518 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
5519 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5520 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5521 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
5522 htlc.write(writer)?;
5526 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5527 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5528 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5529 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
5530 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5531 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
5534 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5535 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5536 for event in events.iter() {
5537 event.write(writer)?;
5540 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5541 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5542 for event in background_events.iter() {
5544 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
5546 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
5547 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
5552 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5553 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5555 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5556 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5557 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
5558 hash.write(writer)?;
5559 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
5562 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5563 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
5564 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
5565 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5566 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() {
5567 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
5570 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
5571 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5573 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
5574 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
5575 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
5576 session_priv.write(writer)?;
5579 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
5583 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
5584 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
5585 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5587 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
5588 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
5589 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
5594 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5595 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
5596 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
5603 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
5605 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
5607 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
5608 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
5609 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
5610 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
5611 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
5612 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
5613 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
5614 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
5615 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
5616 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
5617 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
5618 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
5619 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
5621 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
5622 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
5624 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
5625 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
5627 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
5628 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
5629 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
5630 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
5631 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
5632 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
5634 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
5635 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5636 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5637 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5638 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5639 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5642 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
5643 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
5645 pub keys_manager: K,
5647 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5649 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
5650 pub fee_estimator: F,
5651 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5653 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
5654 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
5655 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
5656 pub chain_monitor: M,
5658 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
5659 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
5660 /// force-closed during deserialization.
5661 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
5662 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
5663 /// deserialization.
5665 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
5666 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
5667 pub default_config: UserConfig,
5669 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
5670 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
5672 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
5673 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
5674 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
5675 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
5677 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
5680 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
5681 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
5684 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5685 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5686 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5687 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5688 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5689 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5692 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
5693 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
5694 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
5695 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
5696 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
5698 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
5699 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
5704 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
5705 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
5706 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5707 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
5708 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5709 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5710 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5711 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5714 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5715 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
5716 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
5720 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5721 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
5722 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5723 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5724 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5725 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5728 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5729 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5731 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5732 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5733 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5735 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5737 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5738 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5739 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5740 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5741 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
5742 for _ in 0..channel_count {
5743 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
5744 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
5745 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
5746 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
5747 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5748 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5749 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5750 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5751 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
5752 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
5753 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5754 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5755 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5756 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5757 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5758 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5759 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5760 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5761 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5762 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5763 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5764 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
5765 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
5766 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
5767 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5768 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5769 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
5770 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
5771 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5772 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
5773 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5774 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
5775 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
5778 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5779 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
5781 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
5784 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5785 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5786 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5787 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5788 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5789 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5793 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
5794 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
5795 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5799 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
5800 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5801 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5802 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
5803 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5804 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5805 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
5806 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
5807 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5809 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
5812 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5813 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5814 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
5815 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5816 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5817 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
5818 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
5819 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5821 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
5824 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5825 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
5826 for _ in 0..peer_count {
5827 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5828 let peer_state = PeerState {
5829 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
5831 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
5834 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5835 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
5836 for _ in 0..event_count {
5837 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
5838 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
5842 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
5843 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
5844 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
5845 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
5846 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
5847 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
5848 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5849 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
5853 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5854 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
5855 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
5856 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5857 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
5858 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5862 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5863 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5865 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5866 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
5867 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
5868 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
5869 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5873 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5874 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
5875 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
5876 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
5877 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
5878 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
5879 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
5881 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
5882 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5886 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
5887 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
5888 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
5889 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5890 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
5891 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
5893 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
5894 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
5895 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
5896 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
5897 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
5898 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
5900 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
5902 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
5903 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
5904 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
5905 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
5906 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
5907 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
5908 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
5910 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors {
5911 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
5912 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
5913 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
5914 if path.is_empty() {
5915 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
5916 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5918 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
5919 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
5920 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
5921 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
5922 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5923 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, path_amt);
5924 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
5925 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5927 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5928 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
5929 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
5930 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
5932 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
5933 total_msat: path_amt,
5934 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
5936 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
5937 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
5946 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5947 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5949 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
5950 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
5953 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
5955 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
5956 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
5957 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
5959 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
5961 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
5966 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
5968 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
5969 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
5971 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
5972 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
5975 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
5976 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
5978 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
5980 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
5981 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
5982 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
5983 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
5985 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
5986 logger: args.logger,
5987 default_configuration: args.default_config,
5990 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5991 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
5994 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
5995 //connection or two.
5997 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
6003 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6004 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6005 use core::time::Duration;
6006 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
6007 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
6008 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
6009 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6011 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
6012 use routing::router::{get_keysend_route, get_route};
6013 use routing::scorer::Scorer;
6014 use util::errors::APIError;
6015 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
6016 use util::test_utils;
6018 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
6020 fn test_wait_timeout() {
6021 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
6023 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
6026 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
6027 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
6029 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
6030 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
6031 thread::spawn(move || {
6033 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
6034 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6035 *persistence_lock = true;
6038 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
6044 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
6045 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
6047 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
6050 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6055 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
6057 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
6060 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6067 fn test_notify_limits() {
6068 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
6069 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
6070 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6071 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6072 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6073 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6075 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
6076 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
6077 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6078 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6079 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6081 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6083 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
6084 // to connect messages with new values
6085 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6086 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6087 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6088 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6090 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
6091 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6092 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6093 // ... but the last node should not.
6094 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6095 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
6096 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6097 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6099 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
6100 // about the channel.
6101 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6102 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6103 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6105 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
6107 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6108 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6109 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6110 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6111 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6112 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6114 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
6115 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6116 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6118 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
6119 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
6120 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
6121 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
6122 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
6123 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
6125 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
6126 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
6127 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6128 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6129 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6130 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6131 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6132 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6134 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
6135 // the channel info has updated.
6136 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6137 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6138 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6139 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6140 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6141 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6145 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
6146 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
6148 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6149 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6150 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6151 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6152 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6154 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
6155 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
6156 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
6157 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
6158 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
6159 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
6160 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6161 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6162 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6163 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6164 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
6166 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
6167 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6168 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6169 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6170 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6171 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6172 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6173 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6174 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6175 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6176 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6177 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6178 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6179 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6180 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6181 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6182 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6183 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6184 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6185 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6186 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6187 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
6189 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
6190 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6191 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6192 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6193 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6194 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
6196 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
6197 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
6198 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
6199 // lightning messages manually.
6200 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6201 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6202 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6203 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6204 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
6205 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6206 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6207 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
6208 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6209 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6210 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
6211 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6212 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6213 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6214 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6215 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6216 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6217 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
6218 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6219 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6220 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
6221 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6222 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6223 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6224 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6225 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
6226 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6228 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate 1 event upon the first path's success. No
6229 // further events will be generated for subsequence path successes.
6230 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6232 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash } => {
6233 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
6234 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
6236 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6241 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
6242 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
6243 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
6244 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
6245 // fails as expected.
6246 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6247 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6248 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6249 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6250 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6251 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6252 let scorer = Scorer::new(0);
6254 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
6255 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
6256 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
6258 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
6259 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger, &scorer).unwrap();
6260 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6261 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6262 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6263 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6264 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6265 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6266 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6267 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6268 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6269 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6270 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6271 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6272 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6273 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6274 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6275 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6276 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6277 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6278 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6279 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6280 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6282 // Finally, claim the original payment.
6283 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6285 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
6286 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6287 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger, &scorer).unwrap();
6288 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6289 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6290 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6291 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6292 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
6293 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
6294 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
6296 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
6297 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6298 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6299 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6300 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6301 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6302 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6303 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6304 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6305 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6306 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6307 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6308 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6309 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6310 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6311 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6312 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6313 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6314 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6315 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6316 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6317 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6318 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6320 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
6321 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6325 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
6326 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
6327 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
6328 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6329 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6330 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6331 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6333 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6334 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6335 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6336 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6338 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6339 let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
6340 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
6341 let scorer = Scorer::new(0);
6342 let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
6343 Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
6344 nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
6346 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6347 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
6348 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
6349 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6351 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6352 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6353 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6354 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6355 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6356 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6357 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6359 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
6363 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
6364 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
6365 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6366 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6367 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6368 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6370 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6371 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6372 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6373 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6375 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6376 let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
6377 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
6378 let scorer = Scorer::new(0);
6379 let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
6380 Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
6381 nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
6383 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6384 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6385 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
6386 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
6387 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6389 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6390 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6391 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6392 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6393 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6394 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6395 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6397 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
6401 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
6402 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
6403 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
6404 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
6405 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6407 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6408 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6409 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6410 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6412 // Marshall an MPP route.
6413 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
6414 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
6415 route.paths.push(path);
6416 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6417 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
6418 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
6419 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
6420 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
6421 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
6423 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
6424 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
6425 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
6426 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
6431 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
6434 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
6435 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
6436 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
6437 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
6438 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6439 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
6440 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
6441 use routing::router::get_route;
6442 use routing::scorer::Scorer;
6443 use util::test_utils;
6444 use util::config::UserConfig;
6445 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
6447 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6448 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6449 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
6451 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
6455 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
6456 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
6457 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
6458 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
6459 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
6460 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
6461 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
6466 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
6467 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
6470 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
6471 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
6472 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
6474 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
6475 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
6477 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
6478 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
6480 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
6481 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
6483 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
6484 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
6485 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
6486 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
6487 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
6489 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
6491 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
6493 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
6494 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
6495 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
6496 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
6497 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
6499 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
6501 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
6503 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6504 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6505 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
6506 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6507 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6510 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
6511 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
6512 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
6514 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
6515 } else { panic!(); }
6517 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6518 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6520 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
6523 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
6526 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
6527 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
6529 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6530 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6531 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
6532 match msg_events[0] {
6533 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
6534 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
6535 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
6539 match msg_events[1] {
6540 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6544 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
6546 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
6547 macro_rules! send_payment {
6548 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
6549 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
6550 let scorer = Scorer::new(0);
6551 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()),
6552 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer).unwrap();
6554 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
6555 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
6557 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
6558 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
6560 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6561 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
6562 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6563 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
6564 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6565 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6566 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6567 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6569 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
6570 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
6571 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6573 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
6574 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
6575 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6576 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6577 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6579 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
6582 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
6583 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6584 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6585 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6587 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
6592 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
6593 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);