1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash};
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
113 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
114 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
117 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
118 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
119 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
120 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
121 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
122 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
123 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
129 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
130 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
131 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
133 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
134 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
135 /// may overshoot this in either case)
136 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
137 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
138 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
139 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
140 pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
143 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
144 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
145 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
146 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
149 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
150 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
151 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
152 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
153 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
156 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
157 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
159 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
160 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
161 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
164 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
165 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
167 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
168 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
171 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
172 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
175 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
179 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
180 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
181 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
182 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
183 short_channel_id: u64,
185 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
186 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
188 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
189 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
194 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
196 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
197 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
198 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
200 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
201 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
204 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
205 struct ClaimableHTLC {
206 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
208 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
210 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
211 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
212 sender_intended_value: u64,
213 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
215 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
216 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
217 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
218 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
220 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
221 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
224 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
226 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
227 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
228 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
230 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
231 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
236 impl Readable for PaymentId {
237 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
238 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
243 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
245 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
246 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
247 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
249 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
250 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
255 impl Readable for InterceptId {
256 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
257 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
262 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
263 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
264 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
265 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
266 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
269 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
271 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
272 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
273 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
275 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
276 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
280 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
281 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
282 (0, short_channel_id, required),
283 (2, htlc_id, required),
285 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
286 (0, session_priv, required),
291 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
292 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
293 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
294 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
295 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
298 session_priv: SecretKey,
299 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
300 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
301 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
302 payment_id: PaymentId,
305 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
306 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
307 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
309 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
311 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
313 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
316 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
317 payment_id.hash(hasher);
318 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
324 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
326 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
327 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
328 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
329 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
330 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
331 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
335 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
336 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
337 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
338 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
339 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
340 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
342 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
348 struct InboundOnionErr {
354 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
355 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
357 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
358 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
359 pub enum FailureCode {
360 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
361 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
362 TemporaryNodeFailure,
363 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
364 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
365 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
366 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
367 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
368 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
369 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
370 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
371 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
372 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
374 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
375 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
376 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
379 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
380 fn into(self) -> u16 {
382 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
383 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
384 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
385 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
390 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
391 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
392 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
393 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
394 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
396 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
397 err: msgs::LightningError,
398 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
399 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
401 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
403 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
405 err: LightningError {
407 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
408 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
415 shutdown_finish: None,
419 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
420 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
423 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
425 err: LightningError {
427 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
428 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
434 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
435 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
439 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
442 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
444 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
445 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
449 log_level: Level::Warn,
452 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
454 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
456 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
458 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
459 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
467 shutdown_finish: None,
472 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
473 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
474 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
475 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
476 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
478 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
479 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
480 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
481 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
482 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
483 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
484 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
486 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
490 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
491 struct ClaimingPayment {
493 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
494 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
496 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
497 (0, amount_msat, required),
498 (2, payment_purpose, required),
499 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
502 struct ClaimablePayment {
503 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
504 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
505 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
508 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
509 struct ClaimablePayments {
510 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
511 /// failed/claimed by the user.
513 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
514 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
516 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
517 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
518 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
520 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
521 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
522 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
523 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
526 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
527 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
528 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
529 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
530 enum BackgroundEvent {
531 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
532 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
533 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
534 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
536 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
537 /// are regenerated on startup.
538 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
539 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
540 /// channel to continue normal operation.
542 /// In general this should be used rather than
543 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
544 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
545 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
547 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
548 /// are regenerated on startup.
549 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
550 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
551 funding_txo: OutPoint,
552 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
554 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
555 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
557 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
558 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
559 channel_id: [u8; 32],
564 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
565 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
566 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
567 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
568 /// event can be generated.
569 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
570 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
571 /// operation of another channel.
573 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
574 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
575 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
576 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
578 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
579 event: events::Event,
580 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
584 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
585 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
586 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
587 (0, event, upgradable_required),
588 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
589 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
590 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
591 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
592 // downgrades to prior versions.
593 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
597 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
598 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
599 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
600 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
601 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
604 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
605 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
606 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
607 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
611 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
612 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
613 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
614 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
615 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
616 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
618 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
619 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
620 channel_id: [u8; 32],
621 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
626 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
628 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
629 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
630 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
631 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
636 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
637 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
641 /// State we hold per-peer.
642 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
643 /// `channel_id` -> `Channel`.
645 /// Holds all funded channels where the peer is the counterparty.
646 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
647 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `OutboundV1Channel`.
649 /// Holds all outbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an outbound channel has
650 /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
652 pub(super) outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], OutboundV1Channel<Signer>>,
653 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundV1Channel`.
655 /// Holds all inbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an inbound channel has
656 /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
658 pub(super) inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], InboundV1Channel<Signer>>,
659 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
660 latest_features: InitFeatures,
661 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
662 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
663 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
664 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
665 /// user but which have not yet completed.
667 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
668 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
669 /// for a missing channel.
670 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
671 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
672 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
674 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
675 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
676 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
677 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
679 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
680 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
681 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
682 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
683 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
684 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
685 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
686 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
687 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
688 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
689 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
690 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
691 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
692 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
693 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
697 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
698 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
699 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
700 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
701 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
702 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
705 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
706 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
709 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
710 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
711 self.channel_by_id.len() +
712 self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.len() +
713 self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.len()
716 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
717 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
718 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
719 self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
720 self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
724 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
725 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
727 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
730 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
731 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
732 struct PendingInboundPayment {
733 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
734 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
735 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
736 /// this payment being removed.
738 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
739 user_payment_id: u64,
740 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
741 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
742 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
745 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
746 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
747 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
748 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
749 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
750 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
751 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
752 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
754 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
755 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
763 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
765 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
766 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
767 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
772 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
773 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
774 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
775 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
776 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
777 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
778 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
779 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
780 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
782 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
783 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
792 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
794 &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
795 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
796 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
801 macro_rules! define_test_pub_trait { ($vis: vis) => {
802 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
803 $vis trait AChannelManager {
804 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
805 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
806 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
807 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
808 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
809 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
810 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
811 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
812 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
813 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
814 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
815 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
816 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
817 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
818 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
819 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
820 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
821 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
824 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
825 define_test_pub_trait!(pub);
826 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
827 define_test_pub_trait!(pub(crate));
828 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
829 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
831 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
832 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
833 ES::Target: EntropySource,
834 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
835 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
836 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
840 type Watch = M::Target;
842 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
844 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
846 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
848 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
849 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
851 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
853 type Router = R::Target;
855 type Logger = L::Target;
857 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
860 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
861 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
863 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
864 /// to individual Channels.
866 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
867 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
868 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
869 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
871 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
872 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
873 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
874 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
875 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
876 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
877 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
879 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
880 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
881 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
883 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
884 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
885 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
886 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
887 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
889 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
890 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
891 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
892 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
894 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
895 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
896 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
898 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
899 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
900 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
901 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
902 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
904 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
905 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
906 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
907 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
908 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
909 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
910 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
911 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
914 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
915 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
916 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
917 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
918 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
922 // `total_consistency_lock`
924 // |__`forward_htlcs`
926 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
928 // |__`per_peer_state`
930 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
932 // | |__`claimable_payments`
934 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
940 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
942 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
946 // | |__`pending_events`
948 // | |__`pending_background_events`
950 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
952 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
953 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
954 ES::Target: EntropySource,
955 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
956 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
957 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
961 default_configuration: UserConfig,
962 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
963 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
969 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
971 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
973 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
974 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
976 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
977 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
978 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
979 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
981 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
982 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
984 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
985 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
986 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
987 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
988 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
989 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
990 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
991 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
993 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
995 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
996 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
998 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1000 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1001 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1002 /// and via the classic SCID.
1004 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1005 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1007 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1009 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1011 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1012 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1013 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1015 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1016 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1018 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1019 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1021 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1022 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1024 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1025 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1026 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1027 /// active channel list on load.
1029 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1030 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1032 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1034 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1035 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1036 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1038 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1039 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1040 /// the handling of the events.
1042 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1043 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1046 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1047 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1048 /// would break backwards compatability.
1049 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1050 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1051 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1053 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1054 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
1056 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1058 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1059 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1060 /// confirmation depth.
1062 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1063 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1064 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1066 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1068 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
1070 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
1072 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1074 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1076 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1077 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1078 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1080 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1081 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1083 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1084 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1085 /// keeping additional state.
1086 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1088 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1089 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1090 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1091 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1093 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1094 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1096 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1097 /// are currently open with that peer.
1099 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1100 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1103 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1105 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1106 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1107 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1108 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1109 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1111 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1112 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1113 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1114 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1115 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1117 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1118 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1120 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1121 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1122 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1123 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1125 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1126 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1127 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1128 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1129 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1131 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1133 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1135 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1136 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1137 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1138 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1139 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1140 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1141 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1142 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1143 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1145 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1147 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
1151 signer_provider: SP,
1156 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1158 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1159 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1160 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1161 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1162 pub struct ChainParameters {
1163 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1164 pub network: Network,
1166 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1168 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1169 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1172 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1179 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1180 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1181 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1182 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1183 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1184 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1186 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1187 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1188 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1189 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1190 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1192 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1193 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1196 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1197 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1198 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1199 let _ = cm.get_cm().process_background_events(); // We always persist
1201 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1202 persistence_notifier: &cm.get_cm().persistence_notifier,
1203 should_persist: || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist },
1204 _read_guard: read_guard,
1209 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1210 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first.
1211 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1212 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1214 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1215 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1216 should_persist: persist_check,
1217 _read_guard: read_guard,
1222 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1223 fn drop(&mut self) {
1224 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1225 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1230 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1231 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1233 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1235 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1236 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1237 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1238 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1239 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1241 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1242 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1244 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1246 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1247 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1248 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1249 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1250 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1251 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1252 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1253 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1254 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1255 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1256 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1257 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1258 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1260 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1261 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1263 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1264 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1265 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1266 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1268 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1269 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1270 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1271 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1272 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1273 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1276 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1278 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1279 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1282 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1284 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1285 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1287 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1288 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1289 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1290 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1292 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1293 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1294 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1296 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1297 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1298 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1300 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1301 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1302 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1303 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1305 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1306 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1307 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1309 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1310 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1311 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1313 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1314 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1315 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1316 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1317 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1318 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1319 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1320 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1321 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1322 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1323 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1326 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1327 /// to better separate parameters.
1328 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1329 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1330 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1331 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1332 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1333 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1334 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1335 pub features: InitFeatures,
1336 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1337 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1338 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1340 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1342 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1343 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1344 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1345 /// payments to us through this channel.
1346 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1347 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1348 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1349 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1350 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1351 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1352 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1355 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1356 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1357 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1358 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1359 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1360 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1361 /// lifetime of the channel.
1362 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1363 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1364 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1365 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1366 /// our counterparty already.
1368 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1369 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1370 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1371 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1373 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1374 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1375 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1376 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1378 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1379 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1381 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1382 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1384 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1385 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1386 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1387 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1388 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1389 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1390 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1391 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1392 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1395 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1397 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1398 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1399 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1400 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1401 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1402 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1403 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1405 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1406 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1408 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1409 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1410 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1411 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1412 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1413 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1414 /// this value on chain.
1416 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1418 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1420 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1421 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1422 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1423 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1425 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1426 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1427 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1429 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1430 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1431 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1432 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1433 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1435 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1436 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1437 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1438 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1440 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1441 pub balance_msat: u64,
1442 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1443 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1444 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1445 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1447 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1449 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1450 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1451 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1452 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1453 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1454 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1455 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1456 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1458 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1459 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1460 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1461 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1462 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1463 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1464 /// route which is valid.
1465 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1466 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1467 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1468 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1469 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1470 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1472 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1473 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1474 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1475 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1476 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1477 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1478 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1479 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1480 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1482 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1484 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1485 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1486 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1487 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1488 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1490 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1491 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1492 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1493 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1494 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1495 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1496 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1498 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1499 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1500 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1501 pub is_outbound: bool,
1502 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1503 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1504 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1505 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1506 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1508 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1509 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1510 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1511 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1512 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1513 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1514 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1516 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1517 pub is_usable: bool,
1518 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1519 pub is_public: bool,
1520 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1521 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1522 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1523 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1524 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1525 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1527 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1528 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1531 impl ChannelDetails {
1532 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1533 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1534 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1536 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1537 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1538 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1539 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1542 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1543 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1544 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1546 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1547 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1548 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1549 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1552 fn from_channel_context<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, F: Deref>(
1553 context: &ChannelContext<Signer>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1554 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1556 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1558 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1559 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1560 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1562 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1563 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1564 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1565 features: latest_features,
1566 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1567 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1568 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1569 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1570 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1571 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1572 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1573 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1574 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1575 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1577 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1578 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1579 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1580 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1581 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1582 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1583 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1584 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1585 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1586 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1587 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1588 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1589 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1590 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1591 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1592 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1593 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1594 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1595 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1596 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1597 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1598 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1599 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1600 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1601 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1602 config: Some(context.config()),
1603 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1608 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1609 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1610 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1611 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1612 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1613 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1614 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1615 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1616 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1618 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1620 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1621 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1623 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1624 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1625 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1626 /// to drop the channel.
1630 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1631 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1632 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1633 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1634 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1636 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1638 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1639 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1640 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1643 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1644 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1645 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1647 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1648 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1649 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1651 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1652 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1653 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1655 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1656 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1660 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1662 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1664 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1665 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1666 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1667 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1669 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1670 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1671 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1674 macro_rules! handle_error {
1675 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1676 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1677 // entering the macro.
1678 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1679 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1683 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1684 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1686 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1687 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1688 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1689 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1693 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1694 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1695 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1696 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1701 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1702 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1704 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1705 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1706 action: err.action.clone()
1710 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1711 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1712 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1713 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1714 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1718 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1723 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1726 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1727 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1728 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1734 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1735 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1736 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1737 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1738 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1739 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1741 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1742 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1743 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1744 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1745 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1747 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1748 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1750 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1754 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1755 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1756 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1758 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1759 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1761 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1762 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1764 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1765 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1766 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel.context);
1767 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1768 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1769 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1773 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_context: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED) => {
1775 // We should only ever have `ChannelError::Close` when unfunded channels error.
1776 // In any case, just close the channel.
1777 ChannelError::Warn(msg) | ChannelError::Ignore(msg) | ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1778 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing unfunded channel {} due to an error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1779 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel_context);
1780 let shutdown_res = $channel_context.force_shutdown(false);
1781 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel_context.get_user_id(),
1782 shutdown_res, None))
1788 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1789 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1793 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1795 $entry.remove_entry();
1803 macro_rules! try_v1_outbound_chan_entry {
1804 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1808 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut().context, $entry.key(), UNFUNDED);
1810 $entry.remove_entry();
1818 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1819 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1823 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1825 $entry.remove_entry();
1833 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1834 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1836 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1837 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context);
1843 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1844 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1845 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1846 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1847 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1849 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1850 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1851 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1852 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1853 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1854 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1855 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
1856 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1857 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1858 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1863 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1864 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1865 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1866 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1867 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1868 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
1869 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1870 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1871 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1873 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1878 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1879 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1880 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1881 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1882 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1883 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1884 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1885 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1886 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
1888 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1893 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1894 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1895 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1896 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1897 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1898 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
1899 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
1900 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1901 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1902 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1903 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1905 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1906 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1907 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1913 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1914 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1916 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1917 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1918 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1919 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1920 updates.announcement_sigs);
1921 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1922 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1925 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
1926 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1927 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1929 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1931 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1932 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1934 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1935 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1936 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1937 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1942 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1943 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $remove: expr, $completed: expr) => { {
1944 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1945 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1946 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1947 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
1949 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1950 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1951 log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
1954 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1955 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1956 log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
1957 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$chan.context);
1958 let res = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1959 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.context.channel_id(),
1960 $chan.context.get_user_id(), $chan.context.force_shutdown(false),
1961 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1965 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1971 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $remove: expr) => {
1972 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
1973 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
1974 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
1976 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
1977 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1979 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1980 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
1981 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
1982 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
1983 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
1984 // filter for uniqueness here.
1985 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
1986 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
1987 in_flight_updates.push($update);
1988 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
1990 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
1991 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
1992 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
1994 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
1995 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
1996 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2000 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
2001 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $funding_txo, $update, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
2005 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2006 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2007 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2008 while !processed_all_events {
2009 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2013 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2016 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2017 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2018 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2020 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2021 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2022 if $self.process_background_events() == NotifyOption::DoPersist { result = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2024 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2025 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2026 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2027 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2031 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2032 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2033 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2034 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2037 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2039 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2040 $event_to_handle = event;
2042 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2043 post_event_actions.push(action);
2048 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2049 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2050 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2051 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2052 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2053 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2056 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2057 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2058 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2059 processed_all_events = false;
2062 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
2063 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
2069 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2071 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2072 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2073 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2074 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2075 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2076 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2080 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2082 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2084 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2085 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2087 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2089 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2090 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2091 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2094 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2095 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2096 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2098 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2099 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2100 current_timestamp: u32,
2102 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2103 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2104 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2105 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2107 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2108 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
2109 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2114 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2116 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2117 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2118 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2119 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2120 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2121 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2122 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2123 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2125 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2128 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2129 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2131 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2133 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2135 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2137 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2138 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2139 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2140 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2141 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2142 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2152 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2153 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2154 &self.default_configuration
2157 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2158 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2159 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2162 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2163 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2165 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2167 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2171 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2176 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2178 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2179 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2180 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2181 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2182 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2184 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2185 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2187 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2188 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2189 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2191 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2192 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2193 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2195 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2196 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2197 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2198 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2199 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2200 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2202 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2203 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2204 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2205 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
2206 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2207 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2210 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2211 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2212 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2214 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2216 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2217 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2219 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2221 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2222 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2223 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2224 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2225 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2226 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2230 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2235 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
2237 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2238 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2239 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2241 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2243 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2246 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
2249 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2250 node_id: their_network_key,
2253 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2256 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2257 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2258 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2259 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2260 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2261 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2262 // the same channel.
2263 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2265 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2266 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2267 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2268 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2269 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2270 // Only `Channels` in the channel_by_id map can be considered funded.
2271 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
2272 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2273 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2281 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2282 /// more information.
2283 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2284 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2285 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2286 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2287 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2288 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2289 // the same channel.
2290 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2292 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2293 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2294 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2295 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2296 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2297 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
2298 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2299 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2302 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2303 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2304 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2307 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2308 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2309 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2317 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2318 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2320 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2321 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2323 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2324 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2325 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2326 // really wanted anyway.
2327 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2330 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2331 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2332 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2333 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2335 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2336 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2337 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2338 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2339 let chan_context_to_details = |context| {
2340 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2342 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2344 .map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context)
2345 .chain(peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context))
2346 .chain(peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context))
2347 .map(chan_context_to_details)
2353 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2354 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2356 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2357 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2358 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2360 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2361 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2362 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2363 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2364 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2365 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2366 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2367 total_msat: *total_msat,
2370 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2371 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2373 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2374 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2376 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2381 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2382 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2383 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2384 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2385 Some(transaction) => {
2386 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2387 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2392 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2393 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2394 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2395 reason: closure_reason
2399 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2400 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2402 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2403 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2405 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2407 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2408 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2410 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2411 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2413 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2414 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2415 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
2416 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2417 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
2418 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2419 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2421 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2422 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2423 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2424 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2425 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2429 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2430 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2431 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2432 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
2435 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2436 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
2437 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2438 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2442 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2446 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (),
2449 // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2450 // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2452 // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2453 return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2454 // TODO(dunxen): This is still not ideal as we're doing some extra lookups.
2455 // Fix this with https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/2422
2458 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2459 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2460 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2461 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2464 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2468 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2469 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2470 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2472 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2473 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2475 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2476 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2477 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2478 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2480 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2482 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2483 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2484 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2487 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2488 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2489 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2490 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2491 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2492 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2495 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2496 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2497 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2499 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2500 /// the channel being closed or not:
2501 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2502 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2503 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2504 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2505 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2506 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2507 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2509 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2510 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2511 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2512 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2514 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2516 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2517 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2518 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2521 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2522 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2523 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2524 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2525 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2526 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2530 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2531 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2532 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2533 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2534 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2535 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2536 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2537 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2539 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2540 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2541 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2542 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2543 // ignore the result here.
2544 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2548 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2549 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2550 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2551 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2552 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2553 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2554 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2555 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2556 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2557 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2558 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2559 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2561 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2563 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2564 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2565 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2566 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2567 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2568 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2569 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2570 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2571 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2572 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2573 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2574 // Unfunded channel has no update
2575 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2576 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2577 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2578 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2579 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2580 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2581 // Unfunded channel has no update
2582 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2584 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2587 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2588 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2589 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2594 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2597 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2598 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2599 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2600 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2601 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2602 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2603 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2604 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2605 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2606 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2607 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2608 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2619 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2620 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2621 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2623 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2624 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2625 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2628 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2629 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2630 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2632 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2633 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2634 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2635 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2636 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2639 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2640 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2641 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2642 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2643 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2647 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2648 /// local transaction(s).
2649 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2650 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2651 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2655 fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
2656 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
2657 new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2658 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2659 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2660 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2661 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2663 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2664 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2668 let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
2669 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
2670 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
2671 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } =>
2672 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2673 msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
2674 err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
2675 err_data: Vec::new(),
2679 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2680 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2681 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2684 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2685 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2686 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2687 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
2688 outgoing_cltv_value,
2689 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2693 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2694 &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2695 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2696 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2697 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2698 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
2699 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
2700 payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
2702 (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
2704 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2705 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2706 err_data: Vec::new(),
2707 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2710 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2711 if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2712 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2713 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2715 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2718 // final_expiry_too_soon
2719 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2720 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2722 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2723 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2724 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2725 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2726 if (outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2727 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2728 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2729 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2730 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2731 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2732 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2735 if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
2736 (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
2737 amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
2739 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2741 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2742 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2746 let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2747 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2748 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2749 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2750 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2751 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2752 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2753 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2754 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2755 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2756 err_data: Vec::new(),
2757 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2760 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
2761 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2762 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2763 err_data: Vec::new(),
2764 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2767 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2771 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2774 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2775 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2778 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2779 phantom_shared_secret,
2783 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2784 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2785 err_data: Vec::new(),
2786 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2789 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2792 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2793 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2794 outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
2795 outgoing_cltv_value,
2796 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
2800 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
2801 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
2802 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
2803 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2804 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2806 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2807 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2808 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2809 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2810 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2811 failure_code: $err_code,
2817 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2818 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2821 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2822 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2823 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2825 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2826 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2827 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2828 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2829 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2830 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2831 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2832 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2834 macro_rules! return_err {
2835 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2837 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2838 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2839 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2840 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2841 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2842 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2848 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2850 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2851 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2853 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2854 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2857 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
2858 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
2859 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
2860 short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
2863 let next_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
2864 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
2865 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_pk))
2867 // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
2868 // inbound channel's state.
2869 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
2870 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } => {
2871 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
2875 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
2876 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
2877 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2878 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
2879 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2880 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2881 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2882 // phantom or an intercept.
2883 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2884 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2885 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)
2889 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2892 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2894 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2895 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2896 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2897 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2898 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2900 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2901 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2902 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2904 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2905 // have no consistency guarantees.
2906 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2910 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2911 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2912 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2913 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2914 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2916 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
2917 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2918 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2919 // we don't have the channel here.
2920 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2922 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
2924 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2925 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2926 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2927 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2928 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2929 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2930 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
2931 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
2932 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
2933 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
2934 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2936 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
2939 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2940 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2942 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
2943 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2947 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2948 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2949 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2950 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2952 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2959 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2960 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2961 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2962 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2963 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2964 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2966 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2967 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2969 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2970 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2971 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2972 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2973 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2974 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2975 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2976 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2977 if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2978 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2984 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2985 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2986 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2987 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2989 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2990 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2992 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2993 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2994 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2996 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2997 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2998 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2999 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3000 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3001 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3002 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3006 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3008 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
3011 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3012 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3013 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3014 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3015 macro_rules! return_err {
3016 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3018 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3019 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3020 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3021 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3022 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3023 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3029 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3031 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3032 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
3035 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3036 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3037 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3038 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3039 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3041 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3044 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3045 match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3046 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3047 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3048 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3054 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3055 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3056 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3058 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3059 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3060 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3062 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3063 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3064 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3065 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3066 return Err(LightningError {
3067 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3068 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3071 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3072 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3074 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3075 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3078 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3079 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3080 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3081 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3083 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3084 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3085 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3087 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3088 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3089 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3090 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3091 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3092 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3096 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3099 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3100 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3101 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3103 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3104 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3105 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3106 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3107 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3110 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3111 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
3113 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3114 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3115 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3116 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3117 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3118 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3119 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3120 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3122 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3123 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3124 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3126 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3128 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3135 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3136 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3137 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3138 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3143 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3144 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3145 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3148 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3149 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3151 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3152 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3153 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3155 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3156 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3157 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3159 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3160 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3162 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3163 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3164 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3165 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3168 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3169 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3170 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3171 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3172 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3173 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3174 if !chan.get().context.is_live() {
3175 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3177 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3178 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3179 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3181 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3182 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3184 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3185 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
3186 Some(monitor_update) => {
3187 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3188 Err(e) => break Err(e),
3190 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3191 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3192 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3193 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3194 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3195 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3196 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3204 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3205 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3206 // `channel_by_id` map.
3207 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3208 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3213 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3214 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3216 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3221 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3223 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3224 /// fields for more info.
3226 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3227 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3229 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3231 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3232 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3233 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3234 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3235 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3237 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3238 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3239 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3240 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3241 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3243 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3244 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3245 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3246 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3248 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3250 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3251 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3252 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3254 /// In general, a path may raise:
3255 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3256 /// node public key) is specified.
3257 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
3258 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
3260 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3261 /// relevant updates.
3263 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3264 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3265 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3267 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3268 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3269 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3270 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3271 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3272 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3273 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3274 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3275 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3276 self.pending_outbound_payments
3277 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3278 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3279 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3282 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3283 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3284 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3285 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3286 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3287 self.pending_outbound_payments
3288 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3289 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3290 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3291 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3295 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3296 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3297 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3298 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3299 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3300 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3304 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3305 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3306 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3310 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3311 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3315 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3316 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3317 /// retries are exhausted.
3319 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3320 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3322 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3323 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3324 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3326 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
3327 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
3329 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3330 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3331 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3332 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3333 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3336 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3337 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3338 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3339 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3340 /// never reach the recipient.
3342 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3343 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3345 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3346 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3348 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3349 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3350 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3351 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3352 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3353 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3354 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3357 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3358 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3360 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3363 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3364 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3365 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3366 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3367 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3368 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3369 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3370 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3373 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3374 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3375 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3376 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3377 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3378 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3379 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3380 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3381 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3384 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3387 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3388 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3391 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3392 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3393 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&OutboundV1Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3394 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
3395 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3396 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3397 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3398 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3400 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3401 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3402 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3404 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3406 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
3407 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3408 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3409 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3410 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3411 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None))
3412 } else { unreachable!(); });
3414 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3415 Err((chan, err)) => {
3416 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3417 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3419 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3420 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3421 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3427 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3429 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3430 log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3435 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3436 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3439 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3440 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3441 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3443 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3444 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3445 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3446 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3455 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3456 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3457 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3461 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3463 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3464 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3466 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3467 /// across the p2p network.
3469 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3470 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3472 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3473 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3474 /// keys per-channel).
3476 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3477 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3478 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3480 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3481 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3482 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3484 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3485 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3486 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3487 /// for more details.
3489 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3490 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3491 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3492 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3494 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3495 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3496 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3497 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3502 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3503 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3504 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3505 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3506 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3507 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3508 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3509 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3513 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3514 if tx.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3515 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3516 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3520 let mut output_index = None;
3521 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3522 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3523 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3524 if output_index.is_some() {
3525 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3526 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3529 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3532 if output_index.is_none() {
3533 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3534 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3537 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3541 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3543 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3544 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3545 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3546 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3548 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3549 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3551 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3552 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3554 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3556 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3557 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3558 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3559 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3560 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3561 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3562 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3563 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3564 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3565 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3566 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3567 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3568 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3572 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3573 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3574 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3575 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3576 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3577 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3578 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3579 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
3580 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3581 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3585 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3586 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3587 let mut config = channel.context.config();
3588 config.apply(config_update);
3589 if !channel.context.update_config(&config) {
3592 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3593 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3594 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3595 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3596 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3603 let context = if let Some(channel) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3604 &mut channel.context
3605 } else if let Some(channel) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3606 &mut channel.context
3608 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
3609 debug_assert!(false);
3610 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3612 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
3613 log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3616 let mut config = context.config();
3617 config.apply(config_update);
3618 // We update the config, but we MUST NOT broadcast a `channel_update` before `channel_ready`
3619 // which would be the case for pending inbound/outbound channels.
3620 context.update_config(&config);
3625 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3627 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3628 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3629 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3630 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3632 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3633 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3635 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3636 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3638 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3640 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3641 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3642 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3643 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3644 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3645 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3646 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3647 pub fn update_channel_config(
3648 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3649 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3650 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
3653 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3654 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3656 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3657 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3659 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3660 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3661 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3662 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3663 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3665 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3666 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
3667 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
3670 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3673 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3674 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3675 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
3676 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3677 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3678 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3679 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3681 let next_hop_scid = {
3682 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3683 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3684 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3685 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3686 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3687 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3689 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
3690 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3691 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3694 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
3696 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3697 err: format!("Funded channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}. Channel may still be opening.",
3698 log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3703 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3704 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3705 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3708 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3709 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3710 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3712 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3714 let skimmed_fee_msat =
3715 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
3716 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3717 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
3718 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3721 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3722 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3723 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3724 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3725 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3727 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3731 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3732 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3734 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3737 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3738 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3739 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3741 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3742 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3743 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3746 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3747 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3748 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3749 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3750 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3751 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3752 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3755 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3756 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3757 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3758 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3763 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3765 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3766 /// Will likely generate further events.
3767 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3768 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3770 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
3771 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3772 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3774 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3775 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3777 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3778 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3779 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3781 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3782 match forward_info {
3783 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3784 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3785 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3786 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3787 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
3790 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3791 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3792 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3794 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3795 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3796 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3797 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3798 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3799 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3802 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3803 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3805 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3808 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3809 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3815 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3816 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3818 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3822 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3823 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3825 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3829 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3830 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3831 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3832 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3833 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3835 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3836 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3837 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3838 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3839 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3841 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3843 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3844 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3848 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3849 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
3850 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3851 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
3853 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3854 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3860 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3863 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3866 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3867 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3868 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3869 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3870 // problem, not ours.
3876 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3877 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3879 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3883 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3884 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3885 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3886 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3889 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3890 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3891 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3892 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3893 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3896 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3897 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3898 match forward_info {
3899 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3900 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3901 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3902 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3903 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3906 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3907 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3908 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3909 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3910 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3911 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3912 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3913 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3915 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3916 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3917 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
3920 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3921 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3923 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3925 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3926 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3927 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3928 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3933 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3934 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3936 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3937 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3938 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3939 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3941 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3942 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3944 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3946 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3947 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3948 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3957 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3958 match forward_info {
3959 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3960 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3961 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3962 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
3963 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3966 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
3967 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
3968 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3969 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
3970 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
3971 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
3972 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
3974 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
3975 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
3976 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
3980 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
3981 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
3984 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3987 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3988 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3989 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3990 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3991 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3992 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3993 phantom_shared_secret,
3995 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
3996 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
3997 // if routing nodes overpay
3998 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
3999 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4001 total_value_received: None,
4002 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4005 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4008 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4010 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4011 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4012 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4013 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4014 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4015 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4017 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4018 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4019 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4020 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4021 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4022 phantom_shared_secret,
4024 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4025 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4027 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4030 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4031 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4032 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4033 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4034 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4037 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4038 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4039 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4040 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4041 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4042 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4044 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4045 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4046 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4048 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4049 .entry(payment_hash)
4050 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4051 .or_insert_with(|| {
4052 committed_to_claimable = true;
4054 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4057 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4058 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4059 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4060 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4062 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4063 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4064 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4066 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4067 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4068 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4071 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4073 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4074 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4075 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4076 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4077 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4078 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4079 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4080 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4081 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4082 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4084 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4086 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4087 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4088 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4089 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4090 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4091 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4092 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4093 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4094 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4095 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4096 committed_to_claimable = true;
4098 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4099 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4100 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4101 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4102 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4103 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4104 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4105 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4106 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4107 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4111 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4112 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4113 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4114 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4115 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4117 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4119 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4120 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4122 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4123 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4124 committed_to_claimable = true;
4127 payment_claimable_generated
4131 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4132 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4133 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4134 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4135 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4136 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4137 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4138 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4139 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4140 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4141 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4142 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4143 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4144 Ok(result) => result,
4146 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4147 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4150 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4151 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4152 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4153 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4154 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4155 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4158 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4159 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4160 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4162 check_total_value!(purpose);
4164 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4165 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4166 check_total_value!(purpose);
4170 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4171 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4172 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4173 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4175 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4176 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4177 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4178 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4179 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4180 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4181 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4182 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4184 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4185 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4186 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4188 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4189 if payment_claimable_generated {
4190 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4196 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4197 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4205 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4206 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4207 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4208 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4210 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4211 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4213 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4215 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4216 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4217 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4219 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4221 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4222 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4223 events.append(&mut new_events);
4226 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4228 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4229 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4230 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4232 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4234 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4235 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4236 if background_events.is_empty() {
4237 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4240 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4242 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4243 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4244 // monitor updating completing.
4245 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4247 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4248 let mut updated_chan = false;
4250 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4251 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4252 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4253 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4254 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4255 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4256 updated_chan = true;
4257 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4258 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
4260 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Ok(()),
4265 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4266 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4268 // TODO: If this channel has since closed, we're likely providing a payment
4269 // preimage update, which we must ensure is durable! We currently don't,
4270 // however, ensure that.
4272 log_error!(self.logger,
4273 "Failed to provide ChannelMonitorUpdate to closed channel! This likely lost us a payment preimage!");
4275 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4277 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4278 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4279 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4280 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4281 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4282 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4283 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4285 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4286 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4287 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4288 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4289 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4295 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4298 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4299 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4300 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4301 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4302 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4305 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4306 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
4307 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4308 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4309 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4310 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4311 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4313 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4314 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4315 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4316 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4318 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4319 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4321 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4322 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4326 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4327 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4328 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4329 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4330 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4331 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4332 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4334 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4335 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4337 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4338 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4339 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4340 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4341 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
4342 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4347 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4348 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4356 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4358 /// This currently includes:
4359 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4360 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4361 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4363 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4364 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4365 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4366 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4368 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4369 /// estimate fetches.
4371 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4372 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4373 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4374 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4375 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4377 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4378 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4380 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4381 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4382 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4384 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4385 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4386 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4387 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4388 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4389 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4390 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
4391 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4396 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4397 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4399 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4400 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
4401 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4402 if needs_close { return false; }
4405 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4406 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4407 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4408 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4409 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4410 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4411 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4412 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4414 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4415 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4416 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4417 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4421 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4423 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4426 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4428 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4429 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4430 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4431 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4435 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4437 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4443 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4445 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4446 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4447 counterparty_node_id, log_bytes!(*chan_id));
4448 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4449 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4450 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4451 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4452 channel_id: *chan_id,
4453 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4462 let process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4464 chan_context: &mut ChannelContext<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
4465 unfunded_chan_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4467 chan_context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4468 if unfunded_chan_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4469 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing pending outbound channel {} for not establishing in a timely manner", log_bytes!(&chan_id[..]));
4470 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan_context);
4471 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4472 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan_context.force_shutdown(false));
4478 peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context));
4479 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context));
4481 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4482 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4487 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4488 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4489 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4490 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4491 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4492 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4493 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4494 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4495 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4496 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4497 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4498 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4499 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4500 // have no channels to the peer.
4501 let remove_entry = {
4502 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4503 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4506 entry.remove_entry();
4509 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4514 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4515 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4516 // This should be unreachable
4517 debug_assert!(false);
4520 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4521 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4522 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4523 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4524 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4525 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4526 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4529 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4530 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4531 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4533 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4534 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4541 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4542 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4543 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4544 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4545 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4548 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4549 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4552 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
4554 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4555 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4556 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4557 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4558 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4565 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4566 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4567 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4569 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4570 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4571 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4572 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4574 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4575 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4576 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4577 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4578 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4579 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4582 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4583 /// reason for the failure.
4585 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4586 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4587 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4589 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4590 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4591 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4592 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4593 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4594 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4595 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4600 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4601 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4602 match failure_code {
4603 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4604 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4605 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4606 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4607 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4608 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
4610 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
4611 let fail_data = match data {
4612 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
4615 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
4620 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4621 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4623 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4625 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4626 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4627 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4628 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4629 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4630 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
4631 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4633 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
4635 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4636 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4638 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4643 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4644 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4645 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4646 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4647 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4648 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4649 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4650 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4651 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4652 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4654 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4655 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4656 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4657 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4659 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4660 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4661 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4662 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4663 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4667 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4668 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4669 // be surfaced to the user.
4670 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4671 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
4672 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4674 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4675 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4676 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4677 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4678 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4679 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4680 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
4681 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
4683 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4685 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4688 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4689 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4690 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4691 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4695 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4696 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4697 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4698 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4699 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4700 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4701 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4702 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4703 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4706 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4707 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4708 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4711 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4712 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4713 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4715 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4716 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4717 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4718 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4719 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4721 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
4722 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
4723 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4725 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4726 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4727 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4728 push_forward_ev = true;
4730 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4731 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4732 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4734 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4735 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4738 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4739 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4740 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4741 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4742 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4743 failed_next_destination: destination,
4749 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4750 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4752 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4753 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4754 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4755 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4757 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4758 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4759 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4760 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4762 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
4763 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
4764 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
4766 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4767 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4768 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4769 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4770 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4771 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4772 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
4773 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4774 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
4777 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
4778 /// even type numbers.
4782 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
4783 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
4785 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
4786 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4787 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
4790 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
4791 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4793 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4796 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4797 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4798 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4799 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4800 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4801 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4802 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4803 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4808 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4809 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4810 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id,
4812 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4813 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4814 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4815 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4818 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
4819 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
4820 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
4821 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
4822 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4823 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
4824 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4825 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
4826 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4827 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4828 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4837 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4839 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4840 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4841 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4842 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4843 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4844 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4845 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4846 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4847 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4848 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4849 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4850 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4851 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4852 debug_assert!(false);
4856 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4858 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4859 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4860 debug_assert!(false);
4864 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4865 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4867 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4868 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4869 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4870 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4873 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4874 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4875 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4876 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4880 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4881 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4882 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4883 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4885 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4886 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4887 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4888 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4889 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4894 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4895 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4896 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4897 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4898 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4899 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4900 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4902 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4905 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4906 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4907 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4908 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4912 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4913 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4914 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4915 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4917 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
4918 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
4919 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
4920 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
4923 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4924 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4925 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4926 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4930 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4931 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4932 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4935 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4936 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4937 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4938 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4939 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4940 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4942 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4943 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4944 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4945 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4946 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4949 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
4950 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4951 if let Err(e) = res {
4952 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4953 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4954 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4955 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4956 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4959 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
4960 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
4961 // monitor update as a background event.
4962 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
4963 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
4964 counterparty_node_id,
4965 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
4966 update: monitor_update.clone(),
4974 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4975 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4976 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4982 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4983 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4984 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4985 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4986 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4987 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4988 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4989 // again on restart.
4990 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4991 payment_preimage, update_res);
4994 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
4995 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
4997 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
4998 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
4999 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5000 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5001 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5002 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5003 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5004 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5005 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5006 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5009 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5010 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5011 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5012 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5013 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5014 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
5018 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5019 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5022 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
5024 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5025 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5026 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5027 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
5029 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5030 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5031 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5032 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
5033 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5034 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5035 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5038 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5039 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5041 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5042 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5043 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
5044 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5046 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: None,
5050 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5051 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5052 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5058 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5059 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5060 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5063 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5064 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5066 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5067 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5068 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
5069 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5070 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5074 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5075 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5077 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5078 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5079 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5086 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5087 /// update completion.
5088 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5089 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5090 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5091 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5092 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5093 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5094 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5095 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()),
5096 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5097 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5098 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5099 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5100 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5102 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5104 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5105 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5106 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5107 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5110 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5111 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5113 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5114 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5115 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5120 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5121 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5122 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5123 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5128 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5129 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5130 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5131 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5132 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5137 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5141 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5147 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5148 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5149 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5153 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5154 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5155 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5161 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5162 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5164 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5165 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5167 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5168 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5169 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5170 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5171 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5176 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5177 let mut peer_state_lock;
5178 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5179 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5180 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5181 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5183 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5186 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5187 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5188 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5189 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5190 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5193 let remaining_in_flight =
5194 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5195 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5198 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5199 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5200 remaining_in_flight);
5201 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5204 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5207 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5209 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5210 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5213 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5214 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5215 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5217 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5218 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5219 /// used to accept such channels.
5221 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5222 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5223 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5224 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5227 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5228 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5230 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5231 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5232 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5234 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5235 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5237 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5238 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5240 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5241 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5243 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5244 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5245 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5246 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5249 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5250 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5252 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5253 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5254 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5255 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5256 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5257 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5258 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5259 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5260 match peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
5261 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
5262 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_accept() {
5263 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
5266 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
5267 } else if channel.get().context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5268 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5269 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5270 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5271 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5274 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5275 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
5276 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5278 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5279 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5280 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5281 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5282 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5283 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5284 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5285 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5288 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5289 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
5290 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5294 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5295 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5296 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
5299 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
5300 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
5306 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5307 /// or 0-conf channels.
5309 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5310 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5311 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5312 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
5313 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5314 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5316 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5317 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5318 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5319 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5320 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5321 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5322 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5326 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5329 fn unfunded_channel_count(
5330 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
5332 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5333 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
5334 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5335 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5336 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
5337 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
5339 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5342 for (_, chan) in peer.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
5343 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
5344 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5347 num_unfunded_channels
5350 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5351 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
5352 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5355 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
5356 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5359 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
5360 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
5361 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
5362 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5364 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
5365 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
5366 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
5367 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
5368 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
5370 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5371 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5373 debug_assert!(false);
5374 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
5376 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5377 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5379 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5380 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5381 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5382 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
5383 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
5384 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
5386 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5387 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
5388 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5391 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5392 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
5393 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5394 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
5395 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5398 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5399 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
5400 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
5403 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
5404 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
5408 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
5409 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
5411 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
5412 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
5414 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
5415 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
5416 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
5417 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5419 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5420 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5422 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5423 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5424 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
5427 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5428 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
5429 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
5430 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5431 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
5432 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
5433 channel_type: channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
5436 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, channel);
5441 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5442 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
5443 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5444 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5446 debug_assert!(false);
5447 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5449 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5450 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5451 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5452 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5453 try_v1_outbound_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
5454 (chan.get().context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().context.get_user_id())
5456 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5459 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5460 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
5461 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
5462 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5463 channel_value_satoshis: value,
5465 user_channel_id: user_id,
5470 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5471 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5473 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5474 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5476 debug_assert!(false);
5477 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5480 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5481 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5482 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
5483 match peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5484 Some(inbound_chan) => {
5485 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
5487 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
5488 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
5489 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
5490 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
5491 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
5492 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
5493 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
5494 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
5495 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None));
5499 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5502 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
5503 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5504 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
5506 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5507 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
5508 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5509 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5510 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
5511 funding_msg.channel_id))
5513 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
5514 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5518 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
5519 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
5520 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
5521 // until we have persisted our monitor.
5522 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
5523 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
5524 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5528 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
5530 let chan = e.insert(chan);
5531 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
5532 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR,
5533 { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
5535 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
5536 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
5537 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
5538 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
5539 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
5540 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
5541 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
5542 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
5550 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5551 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5552 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5553 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5555 debug_assert!(false);
5556 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5559 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5560 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5561 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5562 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5563 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
5564 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
5565 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
5566 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
5567 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
5568 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
5569 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
5570 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
5571 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
5572 shutdown_finish.0.take();
5577 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5581 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5582 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5583 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5585 debug_assert!(false);
5586 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5588 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5589 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5590 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5591 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5592 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
5593 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
5594 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
5595 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5596 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5597 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5598 msg: announcement_sigs,
5600 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5601 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
5602 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
5603 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
5604 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
5605 // announcement_signatures.
5606 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5607 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5608 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5609 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5616 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5617 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
5622 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5626 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5627 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
5628 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
5629 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5630 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5632 debug_assert!(false);
5633 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5635 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5636 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5637 // TODO(dunxen): Fix this duplication when we switch to a single map with enums as per
5638 // https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/2422
5639 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5640 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", log_bytes!(&msg.channel_id[..]));
5641 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_entry.get().context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
5642 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5643 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
5645 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5646 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", log_bytes!(&msg.channel_id[..]));
5647 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_entry.get().context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
5648 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5649 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
5651 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5652 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
5653 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
5654 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
5655 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
5658 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5659 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
5660 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
5661 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
5663 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
5664 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
5665 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
5666 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
5667 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5668 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5673 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
5674 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5675 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
5676 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
5680 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5683 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5684 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5685 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5686 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5692 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5693 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5694 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5696 debug_assert!(false);
5697 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5699 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5700 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5701 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5702 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5703 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5704 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
5705 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5706 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5707 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5712 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5713 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5714 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5715 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5716 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5717 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5718 } else { (tx, None) }
5720 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5723 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5724 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5725 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
5727 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5728 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5729 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5730 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5731 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5735 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5740 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5741 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5742 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5743 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5745 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5746 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5747 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5748 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5750 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5751 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5752 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5754 debug_assert!(false);
5755 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5757 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5758 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5759 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5760 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5762 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
5763 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
5764 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
5765 chan.get().context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
5766 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
5768 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5769 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5770 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5771 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5772 match pending_forward_info {
5773 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5774 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5775 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5776 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
5778 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
5779 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
5780 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5781 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5782 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5785 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5787 _ => pending_forward_info
5790 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan);
5792 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5797 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5798 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5799 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5800 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5802 debug_assert!(false);
5803 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5805 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5806 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5807 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5808 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5809 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5811 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5814 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5818 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5819 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5820 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5822 debug_assert!(false);
5823 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5825 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5826 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5827 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5828 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5829 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
5831 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5836 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5837 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5838 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5840 debug_assert!(false);
5841 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5843 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5844 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5845 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5846 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5847 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5848 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5849 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5851 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
5854 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5858 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5859 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5860 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5862 debug_assert!(false);
5863 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5865 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5866 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5867 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5868 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5869 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5870 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5871 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5872 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5873 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
5876 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5881 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5882 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5883 let mut push_forward_event = false;
5884 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
5885 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5886 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5887 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5888 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5889 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5890 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5891 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5893 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5894 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5896 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5897 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5898 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5899 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5900 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5901 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5903 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5904 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5905 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5907 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5908 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5909 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5910 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5911 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5912 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5913 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5914 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5915 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5918 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5919 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5921 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5922 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5923 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5924 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5925 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5926 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5927 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5928 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5931 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5932 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5933 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5938 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5939 // payments are being processed.
5940 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5941 push_forward_event = true;
5943 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5944 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5951 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5952 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5955 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5956 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5957 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5959 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5963 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5964 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5965 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5966 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
5967 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
5969 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
5970 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
5971 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
5972 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
5973 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
5974 // real by taking more time.
5975 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
5976 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5977 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5982 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
5983 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
5984 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
5985 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
5986 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
5987 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
5988 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
5990 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5991 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
5992 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
5993 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5994 channel_funding_outpoint,
5995 counterparty_node_id,
6000 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6001 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
6002 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6003 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6005 debug_assert!(false);
6006 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6007 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6008 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6009 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6010 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6011 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
6012 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan);
6013 let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6014 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6015 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
6017 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
6019 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6022 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6026 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6027 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6028 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6030 debug_assert!(false);
6031 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6033 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6034 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6035 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6036 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6037 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
6039 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6044 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6045 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6046 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6048 debug_assert!(false);
6049 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6051 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6052 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6053 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6054 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6055 if !chan.get().context.is_usable() {
6056 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6059 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6060 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
6061 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6062 msg, &self.default_configuration
6064 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6065 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6066 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
6069 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6074 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
6075 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6076 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6077 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6079 // It's not a local channel
6080 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6083 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6084 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6085 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6086 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6088 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6089 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6090 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6091 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6092 if chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6093 if chan.get().context.should_announce() {
6094 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6095 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6096 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6097 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
6099 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6101 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6102 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6103 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6104 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
6106 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
6107 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
6110 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6112 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6115 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6117 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6118 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6120 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6122 debug_assert!(false);
6123 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6125 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6126 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6127 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6128 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6129 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
6130 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
6131 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
6132 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
6133 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
6134 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
6135 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
6136 let mut channel_update = None;
6137 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
6138 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6139 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6142 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
6143 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
6144 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
6145 // they have the latest channel parameters.
6146 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
6147 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6148 node_id: chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6153 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
6154 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
6155 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
6156 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
6157 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
6158 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
6162 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6166 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
6167 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
6170 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
6171 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
6176 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
6177 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
6178 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6180 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6181 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
6182 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
6183 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
6184 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
6185 match monitor_event {
6186 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
6187 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
6188 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
6189 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
6191 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
6192 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
6193 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6194 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6197 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
6198 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
6199 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
6200 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
6202 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6203 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
6204 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6205 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
6208 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
6209 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6210 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6211 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6212 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6213 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6214 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6215 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
6216 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
6217 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6218 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6222 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
6223 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
6225 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
6227 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, reason);
6228 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6229 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6230 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
6231 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
6238 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
6239 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
6245 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6246 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6249 has_pending_monitor_events
6252 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
6253 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
6254 /// update events as a separate process method here.
6256 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
6257 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6258 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
6261 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
6262 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
6263 /// update was applied.
6264 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
6265 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
6266 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6267 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
6269 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
6270 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
6271 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
6272 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
6274 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6275 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6277 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6278 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6279 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
6280 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6281 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6282 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
6283 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
6284 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
6285 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
6287 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
6288 has_monitor_update = true;
6290 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
6291 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6292 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
6293 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
6295 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
6297 continue 'peer_loop;
6306 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
6307 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6308 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
6311 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6312 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6318 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
6319 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
6320 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
6321 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
6322 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
6323 let mut has_update = false;
6325 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6327 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6328 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6329 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6330 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6331 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
6332 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
6333 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
6334 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
6336 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6337 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
6340 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
6341 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
6342 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
6343 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6344 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6349 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6351 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
6352 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6353 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6359 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
6360 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
6368 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6369 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6375 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
6376 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
6378 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
6379 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6380 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
6381 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
6382 // reorganized out of the main chain.
6383 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
6384 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
6385 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
6386 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
6387 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
6388 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
6389 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
6390 assert!(should_broadcast);
6391 } else { unreachable!(); }
6392 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6393 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6394 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
6397 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6401 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
6404 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
6405 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
6407 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
6408 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
6409 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
6410 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
6412 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
6414 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6415 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6419 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6420 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6422 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6424 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6425 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6427 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6428 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6429 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
6430 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
6431 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
6432 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6433 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
6434 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
6435 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
6436 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6437 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
6440 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
6441 /// stored external to LDK.
6443 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
6444 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
6445 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
6447 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
6448 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
6451 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
6452 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
6453 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
6454 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
6456 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
6457 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
6458 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
6459 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
6460 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
6462 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
6463 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
6464 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
6465 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
6466 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
6468 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
6469 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
6471 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6472 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6476 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6477 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6479 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6481 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6482 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6484 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6485 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6486 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
6487 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
6488 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
6489 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6490 min_final_cltv_expiry)
6493 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
6494 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
6496 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6497 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
6498 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
6501 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
6502 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
6504 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6505 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6506 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6507 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6509 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6510 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6511 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
6512 Some(_) => continue,
6513 None => return scid_candidate
6518 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
6520 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6521 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
6523 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
6524 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
6525 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
6529 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
6530 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
6531 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
6533 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
6534 /// times to get a unique scid.
6535 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6536 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6537 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6539 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6540 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6541 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
6542 return scid_candidate
6546 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
6547 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
6548 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
6549 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
6551 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6552 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6553 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6554 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6555 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6556 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
6557 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
6558 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
6567 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6568 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
6569 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6570 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
6571 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
6575 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
6576 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
6577 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6578 events.push_back((event, None));
6582 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
6583 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6584 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
6588 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
6589 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
6593 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
6594 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
6597 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
6598 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
6599 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
6600 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
6601 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
6602 let mut errors = Vec::new();
6604 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6605 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6606 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6607 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6609 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
6610 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
6611 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6612 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
6614 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
6618 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6619 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
6620 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
6621 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
6622 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
6623 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
6624 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6628 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6629 debug_assert_eq!(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
6630 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.get_mut().unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
6631 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
6632 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6633 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
6634 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
6636 errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
6638 if further_update_exists {
6639 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
6644 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
6645 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6649 log_debug!(self.logger,
6650 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
6651 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6655 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
6656 let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
6657 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6661 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
6662 for action in actions {
6664 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6665 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
6667 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
6673 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
6674 /// using the given event handler.
6676 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
6677 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
6681 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
6685 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6687 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6688 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6689 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6690 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6691 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6692 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6696 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
6697 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
6698 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
6699 /// is always placed next to each other.
6701 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
6702 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
6703 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
6704 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
6706 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
6707 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
6708 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
6709 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
6710 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6711 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6712 let mut result = self.process_background_events();
6714 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6715 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6716 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6717 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6720 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6721 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6723 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
6724 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6727 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
6728 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6729 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6730 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6731 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6732 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
6733 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
6737 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6738 events.replace(pending_events);
6747 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6749 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6750 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6751 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6752 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6753 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6754 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6758 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6760 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6761 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6762 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6764 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
6768 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6770 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6771 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6772 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6773 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6774 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6775 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6779 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6781 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6782 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6783 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6784 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6785 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6788 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6789 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6792 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6793 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6794 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6795 let new_height = height - 1;
6797 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6798 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6799 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6800 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6801 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6802 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6805 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6809 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6811 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6812 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6813 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6814 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6815 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6816 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6820 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6821 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6822 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6823 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6825 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6826 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6828 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6829 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6830 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
6831 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6833 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6834 if height < last_best_block_height {
6835 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6836 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6840 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6841 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6842 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6843 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6845 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6846 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6848 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6849 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6850 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6852 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6854 macro_rules! max_time {
6855 ($timestamp: expr) => {
6857 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6858 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6859 // having an explicit local time source.
6860 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6861 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6862 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6863 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6864 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6870 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6871 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6872 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6873 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6877 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6878 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
6879 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6880 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6881 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6882 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6883 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6884 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
6891 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6892 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6893 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6894 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6895 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
6896 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6897 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6898 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6899 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6904 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6906 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6907 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6908 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6909 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6910 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6911 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6915 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6916 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6918 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6919 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6920 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6921 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6922 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6924 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6925 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6927 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6928 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6929 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6930 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6931 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6932 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6933 let res = f(channel);
6934 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6935 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6936 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6937 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6938 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
6940 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6941 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6942 if channel.context.is_usable() {
6943 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6944 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6945 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6946 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6951 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6956 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6957 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6960 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6961 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6962 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6963 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6964 msg: announcement_sigs,
6966 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6967 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6968 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6970 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6971 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6972 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6977 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6978 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
6979 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6980 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6981 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6982 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6983 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6984 // is always consistent.
6985 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6986 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
6987 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
6988 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6989 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6992 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6993 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
6994 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6995 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6996 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
6997 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6998 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7002 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
7003 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
7004 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7005 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7006 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
7007 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
7008 data: reason_message,
7018 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7019 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
7020 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
7021 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
7022 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
7023 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
7024 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
7025 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7026 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7027 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
7029 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
7030 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
7031 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
7035 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
7038 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7039 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
7040 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7041 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7042 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
7043 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
7044 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7045 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7046 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
7049 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
7050 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7051 _ => unreachable!(),
7053 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
7054 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
7055 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
7056 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
7062 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
7064 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
7065 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
7069 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
7071 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
7072 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
7074 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
7075 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
7078 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7079 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
7080 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
7083 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
7084 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
7085 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
7086 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
7089 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7090 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7091 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7092 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7095 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7096 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7098 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7099 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7100 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7101 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7102 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
7105 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7106 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7107 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
7108 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
7111 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7112 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7113 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7114 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
7117 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7118 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7119 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
7120 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7124 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7125 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7127 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7128 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7129 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7130 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7131 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7132 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7136 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
7137 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7138 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7141 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
7142 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7143 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7144 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7147 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
7148 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7149 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7152 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
7153 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7154 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7155 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7158 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
7159 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7160 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7163 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
7164 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7165 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7168 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
7169 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7170 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7173 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
7174 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7175 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7178 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
7179 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7180 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7183 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
7184 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7185 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7188 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
7189 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7190 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7193 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
7194 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7195 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7198 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
7199 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7200 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7203 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
7204 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7205 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7208 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
7209 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7210 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7213 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
7214 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7215 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7218 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
7219 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7220 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7223 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
7224 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
7225 let force_persist = self.process_background_events();
7226 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
7227 if force_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { NotifyOption::DoPersist } else { persist }
7229 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
7234 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
7235 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7236 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7239 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
7240 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7241 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7242 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7244 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
7245 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7246 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7247 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7248 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7249 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7250 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7251 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
7252 if chan.is_shutdown() {
7253 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7254 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7259 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7260 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7261 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7264 peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7265 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7266 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7269 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
7271 // V1 Channel Establishment
7272 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
7273 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
7274 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
7275 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
7276 // V2 Channel Establishment
7277 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7278 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7279 // Common Channel Establishment
7280 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
7281 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
7282 // Interactive Transaction Construction
7283 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
7284 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
7285 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
7286 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
7287 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
7288 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
7289 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
7290 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
7291 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
7292 // Channel Operations
7293 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
7294 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
7295 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
7296 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
7297 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
7298 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
7300 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
7301 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7302 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
7303 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7304 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
7305 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
7306 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
7307 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
7308 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
7311 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
7312 peer_state.is_connected = false;
7313 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
7314 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
7317 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
7319 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7321 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7322 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
7326 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
7327 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
7328 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7332 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7334 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
7335 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
7336 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
7337 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
7338 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
7339 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
7342 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7343 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
7344 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7345 if inbound_peer_limited {
7348 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
7349 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7350 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7351 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7352 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
7353 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7354 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7355 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7356 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7360 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
7361 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
7362 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
7364 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7365 if inbound_peer_limited &&
7366 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
7367 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
7372 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
7373 peer_state.is_connected = true;
7378 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7380 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7381 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7382 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7383 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7384 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7386 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
7387 // (so won't be recovered after a crash) we don't need to bother closing unfunded channels and
7388 // clearing their maps here. Instead we can just send queue channel_reestablish messages for
7389 // channels in the channel_by_id map.
7390 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().for_each(|(_, chan)| {
7391 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7392 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7393 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
7397 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
7401 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
7402 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7404 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
7405 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
7406 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7407 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7408 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7409 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7410 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7411 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned()
7412 .chain(peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned())
7413 .chain(peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned()).collect()
7415 for channel_id in channel_ids {
7416 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7417 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7421 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
7422 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7423 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7424 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7425 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7426 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7427 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
7428 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
7429 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
7430 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7438 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7439 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7443 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7444 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7447 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
7448 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7451 fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
7452 Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&self.genesis_hash[..])])
7455 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
7456 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7457 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7458 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7461 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
7462 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7463 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7464 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7467 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
7468 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7469 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7470 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7473 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
7474 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7475 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7476 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7479 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
7480 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7481 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7482 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7485 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
7486 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7487 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7488 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7491 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
7492 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7493 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7494 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7497 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
7498 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7499 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7500 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7503 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
7504 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7505 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7506 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7510 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7511 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7512 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
7513 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
7514 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
7518 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7519 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7521 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7522 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7523 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7524 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7525 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7528 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7529 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7530 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
7531 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7534 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7535 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7536 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7537 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
7540 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7541 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7542 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
7543 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
7544 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
7545 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
7546 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
7547 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
7548 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
7549 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
7550 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
7551 features.set_payment_secret_required();
7552 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
7553 features.set_wumbo_optional();
7554 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
7555 features.set_channel_type_optional();
7556 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
7557 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
7558 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
7559 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
7564 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7565 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7567 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
7568 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
7569 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
7570 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
7573 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
7574 (2, node_id, required),
7575 (4, features, required),
7576 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
7577 (8, forwarding_info, option),
7578 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7579 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7582 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
7583 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7584 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7585 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7586 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
7587 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
7588 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7589 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
7590 (2, self.channel_id, required),
7591 (3, self.channel_type, option),
7592 (4, self.counterparty, required),
7593 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
7594 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
7595 (7, self.config, option),
7596 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
7597 (9, self.confirmations, option),
7598 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
7599 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7600 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7601 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
7602 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7603 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
7604 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7605 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
7606 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
7607 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
7608 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
7609 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
7610 (30, self.is_usable, required),
7611 (32, self.is_public, required),
7612 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7613 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7614 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7615 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7616 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
7622 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
7623 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7624 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7625 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
7626 (2, channel_id, required),
7627 (3, channel_type, option),
7628 (4, counterparty, required),
7629 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7630 (6, funding_txo, option),
7631 (7, config, option),
7632 (8, short_channel_id, option),
7633 (9, confirmations, option),
7634 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
7635 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7636 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7637 (16, balance_msat, required),
7638 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7639 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
7640 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
7641 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
7642 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7643 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
7644 (22, confirmations_required, option),
7645 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
7646 (26, is_outbound, required),
7647 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
7648 (30, is_usable, required),
7649 (32, is_public, required),
7650 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7651 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7652 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7653 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7654 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
7657 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7658 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7659 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
7660 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
7661 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
7665 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
7667 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
7668 outbound_scid_alias,
7672 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
7673 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
7675 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
7676 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7677 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
7678 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
7679 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7680 confirmations_required,
7682 force_close_spend_delay,
7683 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
7684 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
7685 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
7686 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
7687 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
7688 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
7689 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
7690 channel_shutdown_state,
7695 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
7696 (2, channels, required_vec),
7697 (4, phantom_scid, required),
7698 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
7701 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
7703 (0, onion_packet, required),
7704 (2, short_channel_id, required),
7707 (0, payment_data, required),
7708 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7709 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7710 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7711 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
7713 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
7714 (0, payment_preimage, required),
7715 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7716 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7717 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
7718 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
7722 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
7723 (0, routing, required),
7724 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
7725 (4, payment_hash, required),
7726 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
7727 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
7728 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
7729 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7733 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7734 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7736 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
7738 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7739 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7740 reason.write(writer)?;
7742 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7743 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
7746 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7747 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7748 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
7749 failure_code.write(writer)?;
7756 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7757 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7758 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7761 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7762 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7763 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7764 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
7768 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7769 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7770 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7771 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
7772 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
7775 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
7776 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
7777 // messages contained in the variants.
7778 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
7779 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
7780 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
7782 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7783 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7784 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7785 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7786 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
7789 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7790 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7791 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7792 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7793 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
7795 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7800 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
7805 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
7806 (0, short_channel_id, required),
7807 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7808 (2, outpoint, required),
7809 (4, htlc_id, required),
7810 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
7813 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
7814 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7815 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
7816 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
7817 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
7819 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7820 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
7821 (1, self.total_msat, required),
7822 (2, self.value, required),
7823 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
7824 (4, payment_data, option),
7825 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
7826 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
7827 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7828 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7834 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
7835 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7836 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7837 (0, prev_hop, required),
7838 (1, total_msat, option),
7839 (2, value_ser, required),
7840 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
7841 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
7842 (5, total_value_received, option),
7843 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
7844 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7845 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7847 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
7848 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
7849 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
7851 if payment_data.is_some() {
7852 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7854 if total_msat.is_none() {
7855 total_msat = Some(value);
7857 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
7860 if total_msat.is_none() {
7861 if payment_data.is_none() {
7862 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7864 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
7866 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
7870 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
7873 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
7874 total_value_received,
7875 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
7877 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
7878 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
7883 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
7884 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7885 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7888 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7889 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
7890 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
7891 let mut payment_id = None;
7892 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
7893 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
7894 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7895 (0, session_priv, required),
7896 (1, payment_id, option),
7897 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7898 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
7899 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
7900 (6, blinded_tail, option),
7902 if payment_id.is_none() {
7903 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
7905 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
7907 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
7908 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
7909 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7911 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
7912 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
7913 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
7914 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7918 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7919 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
7920 first_hop_htlc_msat,
7922 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
7925 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7926 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7931 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
7932 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
7934 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
7936 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
7937 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7938 (0, session_priv, required),
7939 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
7940 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7941 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
7942 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
7943 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
7944 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
7947 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
7949 field.write(writer)?;
7956 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
7957 (0, forward_info, required),
7958 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
7959 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
7960 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
7961 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
7964 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
7966 (0, htlc_id, required),
7967 (2, err_packet, required),
7972 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
7973 (0, payment_secret, required),
7974 (2, expiry_time, required),
7975 (4, user_payment_id, required),
7976 (6, payment_preimage, required),
7977 (8, min_value_msat, required),
7980 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7982 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7983 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7984 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7985 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7986 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7987 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7991 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7992 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
7994 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7996 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7998 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7999 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
8000 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
8003 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
8005 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8006 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
8007 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
8008 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8009 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8010 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8011 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8012 serializable_peer_count += 1;
8014 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
8015 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8016 if !channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8017 unfunded_channels += 1;
8022 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
8024 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8025 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8026 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8027 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8028 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8029 channel.write(writer)?;
8036 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8037 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8038 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
8039 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8040 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8041 for forward in pending_forwards {
8042 forward.write(writer)?;
8047 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8049 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8050 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
8051 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8053 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
8054 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
8055 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8056 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
8057 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8058 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8059 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
8060 htlc.write(writer)?;
8062 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
8063 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
8066 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
8067 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
8068 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8069 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
8070 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
8071 // per_peer_state lock at all.
8072 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
8075 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
8076 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8077 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
8078 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
8079 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
8081 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8082 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
8083 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
8084 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
8085 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
8086 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
8087 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
8092 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8093 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
8094 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
8095 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
8096 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
8097 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
8098 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
8099 // well save the space and not write any events here.
8100 0u64.write(writer)?;
8102 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8103 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
8104 event.write(writer)?;
8108 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
8109 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
8110 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
8111 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
8112 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
8113 0u64.write(writer)?;
8115 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
8116 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
8117 // likely to be identical.
8118 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8119 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8121 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8122 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
8123 hash.write(writer)?;
8124 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
8127 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
8128 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
8129 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8130 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
8131 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
8134 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
8135 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8137 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8138 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8139 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
8140 session_priv.write(writer)?;
8143 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
8144 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
8148 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
8149 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
8150 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8152 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8153 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8154 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
8160 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
8161 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8162 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
8163 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
8166 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
8167 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
8168 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
8169 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
8170 pending_claiming_payments = None;
8173 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
8174 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8175 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
8176 if !updates.is_empty() {
8177 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
8178 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
8183 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8184 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
8185 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8186 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
8187 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8188 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
8189 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8190 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
8191 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
8192 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
8193 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
8194 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
8195 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8202 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8203 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8204 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
8205 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
8208 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
8209 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
8210 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
8211 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
8212 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
8213 // check that the event is sane here.
8214 let event_encoded = event.encode();
8215 let event_read: Option<Event> =
8216 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
8217 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
8223 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8224 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8225 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8226 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
8227 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
8228 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
8231 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
8232 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
8233 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
8234 events.push_back((ev, action));
8235 } else if action.is_some() {
8236 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8243 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
8244 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
8245 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
8246 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
8247 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
8248 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
8251 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
8253 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
8255 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8256 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
8257 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
8258 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
8259 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
8260 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
8261 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
8262 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
8263 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8264 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
8265 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
8266 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
8267 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
8269 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
8270 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
8272 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
8273 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
8275 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
8276 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
8277 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
8278 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
8279 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
8280 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
8282 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
8283 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8285 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8286 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8287 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8288 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8289 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8290 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8294 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
8295 pub entropy_source: ES,
8297 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
8298 pub node_signer: NS,
8300 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
8301 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
8303 pub signer_provider: SP,
8305 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8307 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
8308 pub fee_estimator: F,
8309 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8311 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
8312 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
8313 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
8314 pub chain_monitor: M,
8316 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
8317 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
8318 /// force-closed during deserialization.
8319 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
8320 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
8321 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
8323 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
8325 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
8326 /// deserialization.
8328 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
8329 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
8330 pub default_config: UserConfig,
8332 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
8333 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
8335 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
8336 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
8337 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
8338 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
8340 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
8343 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
8344 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
8347 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8348 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8350 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8351 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8352 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8353 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8354 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8355 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8359 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
8360 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
8361 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
8362 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
8363 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
8365 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
8366 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
8371 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
8372 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
8373 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8374 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
8376 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8377 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8378 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8379 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8380 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8381 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8385 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8386 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
8387 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
8391 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8392 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
8394 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8395 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8396 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8397 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8398 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8399 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8403 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8404 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8406 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8407 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8408 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8410 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8412 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8413 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8414 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8415 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8416 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8417 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
8418 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
8419 for _ in 0..channel_count {
8420 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
8421 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
8423 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8424 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
8425 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
8426 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
8427 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
8428 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
8429 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
8430 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
8431 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
8432 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
8433 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
8434 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
8435 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
8436 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
8437 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8438 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
8441 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
8442 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8443 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8444 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8445 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
8447 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8448 let mut found_htlc = false;
8449 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8450 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
8453 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
8454 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
8455 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
8456 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
8457 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
8458 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
8459 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
8460 log_info!(args.logger,
8461 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
8462 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8463 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8467 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
8468 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
8469 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8470 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8471 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8473 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8474 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
8476 match peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
8477 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8478 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
8479 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8481 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8482 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
8483 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8484 entry.insert(by_id_map);
8488 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
8489 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
8490 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
8491 // safely discard the channel.
8492 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
8493 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8494 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8495 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8496 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
8499 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
8500 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8501 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8502 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8503 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8504 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8508 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8509 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
8510 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
8511 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8512 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
8513 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
8514 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
8516 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
8520 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
8521 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8522 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8523 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
8524 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8525 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8526 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
8527 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
8528 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
8530 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
8533 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8534 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8535 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
8536 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8537 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8538 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
8539 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
8540 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
8542 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
8545 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
8548 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8549 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8550 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
8551 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8552 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8553 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8554 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8555 is_connected: false,
8559 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8560 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
8561 for _ in 0..peer_count {
8562 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8563 let peer_chans = peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
8564 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
8565 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
8566 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
8569 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8570 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
8571 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
8572 for _ in 0..event_count {
8573 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
8574 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
8579 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8580 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
8581 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8583 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
8584 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
8585 // on-startup monitor updates.
8586 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
8587 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
8589 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8593 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
8594 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8596 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8597 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
8598 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
8599 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
8600 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8604 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8605 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
8606 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
8607 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
8608 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
8609 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
8610 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
8612 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
8613 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8617 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
8618 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
8619 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
8620 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
8621 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
8622 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8623 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8624 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
8625 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
8626 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
8627 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
8628 let mut events_override = None;
8629 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
8630 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8631 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
8632 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8633 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
8634 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8635 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
8636 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8637 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
8638 (8, events_override, option),
8639 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
8640 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
8641 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
8642 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8644 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
8645 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8648 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
8649 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8652 if let Some(events) = events_override {
8653 pending_events_read = events;
8656 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
8657 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
8660 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
8661 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
8662 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
8663 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
8664 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
8665 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
8667 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
8669 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
8670 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
8671 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
8674 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
8675 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
8676 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
8677 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
8678 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
8680 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
8681 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
8682 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
8684 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
8685 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
8686 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
8687 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
8688 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
8690 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
8691 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8692 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
8693 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
8694 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, log_bytes!($funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8695 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
8696 pending_background_events.push(
8697 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8698 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
8699 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
8700 update: update.clone(),
8703 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
8704 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
8705 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
8706 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
8707 pending_background_events.push(
8708 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
8709 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
8710 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
8713 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
8714 log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
8715 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8717 max_in_flight_update_id
8721 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
8722 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8723 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8724 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8725 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
8727 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8728 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
8729 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
8730 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
8731 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
8732 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
8733 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
8734 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
8735 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
8738 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
8739 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
8740 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
8741 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
8742 log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
8743 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
8744 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8745 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8746 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8747 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8748 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8753 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
8754 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
8755 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
8756 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
8757 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
8758 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
8759 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
8760 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
8762 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8763 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
8764 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
8766 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
8767 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
8768 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8769 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8770 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8771 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8772 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8773 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8778 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
8779 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
8781 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
8782 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
8783 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
8784 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
8787 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
8788 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
8789 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
8790 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
8791 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
8792 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
8793 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
8795 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8796 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
8797 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
8798 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
8799 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
8800 if path.hops.is_empty() {
8801 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
8802 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8805 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
8806 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
8807 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
8808 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
8809 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8810 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
8811 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
8812 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
8814 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8815 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
8816 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
8817 retry_strategy: None,
8818 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
8819 payment_params: None,
8820 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
8821 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
8822 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8823 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8824 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8825 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8826 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
8827 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
8828 total_msat: path_amt,
8829 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
8831 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
8832 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
8837 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8839 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
8840 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
8841 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
8842 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
8844 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
8845 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
8846 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
8847 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
8848 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
8849 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
8850 forwards.retain(|forward| {
8851 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
8852 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8853 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8854 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8859 !forwards.is_empty()
8861 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
8862 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8863 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8864 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8865 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
8866 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
8867 intercepted_id != ev_id
8874 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
8875 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
8876 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
8877 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
8878 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
8879 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
8880 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
8881 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
8882 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
8883 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
8884 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
8885 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
8886 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
8893 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
8894 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
8896 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
8898 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
8899 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
8900 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
8901 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
8902 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
8903 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
8904 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
8905 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
8906 monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()))
8909 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
8910 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
8911 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
8912 // channel still live case here.
8916 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
8917 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
8922 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
8923 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
8924 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
8925 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
8926 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
8927 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
8928 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
8929 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
8933 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
8934 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
8936 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
8937 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
8938 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8939 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8941 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
8942 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8943 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8945 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
8946 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
8948 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8949 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
8951 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8954 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
8955 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8956 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8958 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8962 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
8963 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
8964 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
8965 if htlcs.is_empty() {
8966 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8968 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
8969 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
8970 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
8971 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
8972 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
8973 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
8974 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
8975 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
8977 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8978 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8982 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
8984 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8986 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
8987 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
8989 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8990 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8995 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8996 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8998 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
9000 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9002 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
9003 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
9004 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
9005 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9009 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
9010 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
9011 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9012 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9013 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9014 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
9015 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
9017 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
9018 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
9019 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
9021 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
9022 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
9023 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9024 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9025 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9026 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9028 if chan.context.is_usable() {
9029 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
9030 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9031 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9032 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9033 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9039 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
9041 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9042 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
9043 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
9044 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
9045 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
9046 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
9047 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
9048 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
9049 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
9050 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
9051 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
9053 for claimable_htlc in payment.htlcs {
9054 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
9056 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
9057 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
9058 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
9059 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
9061 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
9062 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
9063 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
9064 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
9066 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
9067 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
9068 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
9069 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
9071 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
9072 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
9073 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
9074 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9075 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9076 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
9077 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
9080 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
9081 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
9084 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
9087 purpose: payment.purpose,
9088 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
9094 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
9095 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
9096 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
9097 for action in actions.iter() {
9098 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
9099 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
9100 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
9102 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
9103 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
9104 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
9105 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
9107 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
9108 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
9109 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
9110 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
9116 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
9118 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
9119 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9123 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
9125 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
9126 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
9127 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
9128 router: args.router,
9130 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
9132 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
9133 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
9134 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
9135 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
9137 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
9138 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
9139 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
9140 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
9141 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
9142 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
9144 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
9149 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
9151 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
9153 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
9154 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
9155 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
9156 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
9157 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
9158 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
9160 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
9161 node_signer: args.node_signer,
9162 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
9164 logger: args.logger,
9165 default_configuration: args.default_config,
9168 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
9169 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
9170 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
9171 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
9172 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
9175 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_chan_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
9176 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
9177 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
9178 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
9179 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
9180 downstream_closed, downstream_chan_id);
9183 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
9184 //connection or two.
9186 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
9192 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9193 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9194 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
9195 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
9196 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
9197 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
9198 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
9199 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9200 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
9201 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
9202 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
9203 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
9204 use crate::util::test_utils;
9205 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
9206 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
9209 fn test_notify_limits() {
9210 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
9211 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
9212 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9213 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9214 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9215 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9217 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
9218 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
9219 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9220 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9221 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9223 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9225 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
9226 // to connect messages with new values
9227 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9228 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9229 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9230 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9231 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9232 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9234 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
9235 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9236 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9237 // ... but the last node should not.
9238 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9239 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
9240 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9241 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9243 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
9244 // about the channel.
9245 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9246 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9247 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9249 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
9251 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9252 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9253 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9254 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9255 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9256 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9258 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
9259 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9260 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9262 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
9263 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
9264 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
9265 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
9266 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
9267 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
9269 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
9270 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
9271 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9272 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9273 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9274 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9275 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9276 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9278 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
9279 // the channel info has updated.
9280 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9281 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9282 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9283 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9284 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9285 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9289 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
9290 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
9292 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9293 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9294 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9295 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9296 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9298 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
9299 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9300 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
9301 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
9303 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9304 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
9305 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
9306 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
9307 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
9308 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
9309 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
9310 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9311 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9312 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9313 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9314 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
9316 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
9317 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9318 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9319 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9320 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9321 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9322 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9323 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9324 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9325 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9326 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9327 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9328 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9329 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9330 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9331 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9332 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9333 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9334 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9335 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9336 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9337 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9338 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
9340 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
9341 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9342 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9343 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9344 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9345 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9346 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
9348 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
9349 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
9350 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
9351 // lightning messages manually.
9352 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9353 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
9354 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9356 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9357 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9358 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
9359 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9360 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9361 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
9362 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9363 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9364 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
9365 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9366 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9367 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9368 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9369 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9370 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9371 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
9372 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9373 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9374 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
9375 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9376 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9377 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9378 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9379 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
9380 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9382 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
9383 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
9384 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9385 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
9387 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
9388 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
9389 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
9390 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
9392 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9395 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9396 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9397 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9398 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9400 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9403 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9404 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9405 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9406 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9408 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9413 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
9414 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
9415 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
9418 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
9419 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
9420 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
9421 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
9422 // fails as expected.
9423 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
9424 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
9425 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
9426 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
9427 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
9428 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
9429 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9430 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9431 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9432 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
9433 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9434 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9435 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9436 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9437 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9439 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
9440 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
9441 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
9443 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9444 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9445 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
9446 final_value_msat: 100_000,
9448 let route = find_route(
9449 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9450 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9452 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9453 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9454 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9455 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9456 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9457 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9458 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9459 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9460 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9461 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9462 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
9463 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
9464 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9465 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9466 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9467 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9468 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9469 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9470 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9471 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9472 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9473 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9474 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9475 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9477 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9478 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9480 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9481 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9482 let route = find_route(
9483 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9484 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9486 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9487 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9488 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9489 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9490 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9491 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9492 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9493 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9495 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
9496 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9497 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9498 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9499 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9500 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9501 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9502 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9503 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9504 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9505 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9506 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9507 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9508 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9509 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9510 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9511 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9512 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9513 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9514 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9515 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9516 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9517 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9518 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9520 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
9521 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9523 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9524 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
9525 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9526 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
9527 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9528 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9529 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9530 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9531 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9532 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9534 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9535 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9536 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
9537 final_value_msat: 100_000,
9539 let route = find_route(
9540 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9541 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9543 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
9544 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9545 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
9546 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9547 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9548 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9549 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9550 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9551 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9552 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9553 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9554 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9555 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9556 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9557 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9558 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9559 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9560 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9561 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9562 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9563 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9564 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9565 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9567 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9568 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9572 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
9573 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
9574 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
9575 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9576 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9577 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9578 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9580 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9581 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9583 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9584 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9585 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9586 final_value_msat: 10_000,
9588 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9589 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9590 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9591 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9592 let route = find_route(
9593 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9594 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9597 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9598 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
9599 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
9600 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9601 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
9602 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9603 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9605 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9606 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9607 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9608 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9609 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9610 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9611 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9613 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
9617 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
9618 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
9619 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
9620 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9621 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
9622 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9623 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9624 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9625 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9627 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9628 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9630 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9631 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9632 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9633 final_value_msat: 10_000,
9635 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9636 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9637 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9638 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9639 let route = find_route(
9640 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9641 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9644 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9645 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9646 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
9647 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
9648 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9649 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
9650 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
9651 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9652 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9654 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9655 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9656 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9657 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9658 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9659 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9660 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9662 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
9666 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
9667 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9668 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9669 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9670 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9672 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9673 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9674 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9675 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9677 // Marshall an MPP route.
9678 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
9679 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
9680 route.paths.push(path);
9681 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9682 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
9683 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
9684 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
9685 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
9686 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
9688 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9689 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
9691 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
9692 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
9694 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
9699 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
9700 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9701 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9702 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9703 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9705 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9707 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9708 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9710 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9711 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
9712 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9713 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9716 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
9717 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
9718 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9719 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
9720 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
9721 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
9724 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9727 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
9728 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
9733 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
9734 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
9735 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9736 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9737 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9738 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9740 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
9741 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
9743 total_msat: 100_000,
9746 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
9747 // payment verification fails as expected.
9748 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
9749 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
9750 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
9751 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
9753 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
9757 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
9758 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
9762 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
9763 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
9764 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
9765 // the channel is successfully closed.
9766 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9767 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9768 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9769 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9771 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9772 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9773 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9774 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9775 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9777 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9778 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
9780 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
9781 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
9782 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9783 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9786 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9788 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9789 // as it has the funding transaction.
9790 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9791 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9792 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9795 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9797 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9799 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9801 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9802 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9803 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9805 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9808 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9809 // as it has the funding transaction.
9810 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9811 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9812 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9814 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9815 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9816 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9817 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9818 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9819 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9820 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9821 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
9823 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9824 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9825 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9826 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
9828 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9829 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
9831 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
9832 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
9833 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
9834 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
9835 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9836 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9837 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9841 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
9842 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
9843 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
9844 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
9845 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9846 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9847 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9850 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9852 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
9853 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
9854 // closing transaction).
9855 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
9856 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
9857 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9859 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
9860 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
9861 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9862 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9863 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9866 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9868 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
9870 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
9871 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
9872 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9874 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9876 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
9877 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
9880 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9881 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
9882 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
9885 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9886 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
9887 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
9890 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
9892 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9893 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9895 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
9896 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9898 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
9899 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
9904 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
9905 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
9906 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
9907 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
9908 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9909 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
9910 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
9911 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
9914 let channel_id = [4; 32];
9915 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9916 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
9918 // Test the API functions.
9919 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
9921 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
9923 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9925 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9927 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9929 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
9931 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
9935 fn test_connection_limiting() {
9936 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
9937 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9938 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9939 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9940 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9942 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9944 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9945 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9947 let mut funding_tx = None;
9948 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9949 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9950 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9953 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9954 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9955 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
9956 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
9957 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9959 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9960 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9961 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9963 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9965 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9966 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9967 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9969 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9972 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
9973 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9974 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9975 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9976 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9978 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
9979 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
9981 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
9982 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
9983 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9984 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9985 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
9986 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9987 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9990 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9991 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9992 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9993 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9994 }, true).unwrap_err();
9996 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
9997 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
9998 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9999 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10000 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
10001 for ev in chan_closed_events {
10002 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
10004 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10005 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10007 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10008 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10009 }, true).unwrap_err();
10011 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
10012 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10013 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10014 }, false).unwrap();
10015 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10017 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
10018 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
10020 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
10021 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10022 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
10023 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
10024 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10026 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10027 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10028 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10030 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
10031 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10032 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
10034 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
10035 // "protected" and can connect again.
10036 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
10037 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10038 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10040 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10042 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
10044 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10045 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10049 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
10050 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
10051 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10052 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10053 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10054 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10056 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10058 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10059 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10061 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10062 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10063 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10064 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10067 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
10069 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10070 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10071 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10073 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
10074 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10075 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10077 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
10078 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10079 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10080 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10084 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
10085 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10086 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10087 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10088 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10089 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
10090 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10091 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
10092 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10094 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10096 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10097 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10099 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
10100 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10101 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10102 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10103 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10104 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10107 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10108 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10110 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10111 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10113 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10115 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
10116 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10119 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
10120 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10121 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10122 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10123 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10125 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10126 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10128 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10129 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
10130 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
10131 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
10135 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10137 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10138 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10140 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
10141 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10142 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10144 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10145 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10147 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10149 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10153 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
10154 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
10155 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
10156 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
10157 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10158 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
10159 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
10160 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
10162 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10163 payment_metadata: None,
10164 keysend_preimage: None,
10165 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10166 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10168 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
10170 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
10171 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
10172 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
10173 node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10174 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
10176 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
10177 } else { panic!(); }
10179 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
10180 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
10182 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10183 payment_metadata: None,
10184 keysend_preimage: None,
10185 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10186 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10188 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
10190 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10191 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
10195 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
10196 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10197 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10198 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10199 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10201 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
10202 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10204 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10205 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10206 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
10207 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
10208 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10210 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10211 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10213 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10214 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
10215 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10216 match &msg_events[0] {
10217 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
10218 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10220 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
10221 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
10222 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
10225 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10228 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10229 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10231 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
10232 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
10233 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10235 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10239 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
10240 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
10241 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
10242 // the channel without the anchors feature.
10243 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10244 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10245 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
10246 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10247 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10248 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
10249 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10251 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
10252 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10253 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10255 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10256 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10258 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10259 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10261 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10264 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10265 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
10267 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10268 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10270 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
10274 fn test_update_channel_config() {
10275 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10276 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10277 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
10278 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
10279 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10280 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10281 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
10283 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10284 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10285 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10287 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
10288 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10289 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
10290 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10291 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10293 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10294 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10297 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
10298 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10299 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10301 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
10302 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10303 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
10304 ..Default::default()
10306 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10307 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10308 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10310 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10311 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10314 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
10315 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10316 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10317 ..Default::default()
10319 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10320 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
10321 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10322 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10324 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10325 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10328 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
10329 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
10330 let bad_channel_id = [10; 32];
10331 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
10332 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
10335 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10336 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10337 ..Default::default()
10339 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
10342 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
10343 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
10344 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10345 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10351 use crate::chain::Listen;
10352 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
10353 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
10354 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
10355 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
10356 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10357 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
10358 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
10359 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
10360 use crate::util::test_utils;
10361 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
10363 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10364 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10365 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
10367 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
10369 use criterion::Criterion;
10371 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
10372 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
10373 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
10374 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
10375 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
10376 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
10377 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
10379 struct ANodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
10380 node: &'a Manager<'a, P>,
10382 impl<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'a, P> {
10383 type CM = Manager<'a, P>;
10385 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'a, P> { self.node }
10387 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
10390 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
10391 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
10394 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
10395 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
10396 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
10398 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
10399 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
10401 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
10402 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
10403 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10404 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
10405 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
10407 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
10408 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
10409 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
10411 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
10412 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
10413 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
10414 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10416 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10417 }, genesis_block.header.time);
10418 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
10420 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10421 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
10422 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
10423 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
10424 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10426 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10427 }, genesis_block.header.time);
10428 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
10430 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10431 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10433 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10434 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10435 }, false).unwrap();
10436 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10437 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10438 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10441 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
10442 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
10443 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
10445 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10446 } else { panic!(); }
10448 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10449 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10450 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10451 match events_b[0] {
10452 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10453 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10455 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10458 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10459 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10460 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10461 match events_a[0] {
10462 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10463 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10465 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10468 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
10470 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
10471 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
10472 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
10474 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10475 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10476 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
10477 match msg_events[0] {
10478 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
10479 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
10480 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10484 match msg_events[1] {
10485 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10489 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10490 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10491 match events_a[0] {
10492 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10493 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10495 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10498 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10499 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10500 match events_b[0] {
10501 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10502 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10504 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10507 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
10508 macro_rules! send_payment {
10509 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
10510 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
10511 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
10512 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
10513 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
10514 payment_count += 1;
10515 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
10516 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
10518 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
10519 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
10520 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
10521 }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
10522 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
10523 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10524 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
10525 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
10526 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10527 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10528 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10530 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
10531 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
10532 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10533 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
10535 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
10536 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
10537 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
10538 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10539 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
10541 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
10544 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
10545 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10546 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10547 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10549 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
10553 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
10554 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
10555 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);