1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
47 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 use routing::router::{Payee, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
50 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
52 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT, OptionalField};
53 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
54 use util::config::UserConfig;
55 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
56 use util::{byte_utils, events};
57 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
58 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
59 use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
60 use util::errors::APIError;
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
66 use io::{Cursor, Read};
67 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
72 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
73 use std::time::Instant;
76 use alloc::string::ToString;
77 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
78 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
79 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
80 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
81 use chain::keysinterface::{KeyMaterial, KeysInterface, Sign};
82 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
83 use ln::channelmanager::APIError;
85 use ln::msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
86 use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
87 use util::logger::Logger;
89 use core::convert::TryInto;
92 const IV_LEN: usize = 16;
93 const METADATA_LEN: usize = 16;
94 const METADATA_KEY_LEN: usize = 32;
95 const AMT_MSAT_LEN: usize = 8;
96 // Used to shift the payment type bits to take up the top 3 bits of the metadata bytes, or to
97 // retrieve said payment type bits.
98 const METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET: usize = 5;
100 /// A set of keys that were HKDF-expanded from an initial call to
101 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`].
103 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material
104 pub(super) struct ExpandedKey {
105 /// The key used to encrypt the bytes containing the payment metadata (i.e. the amount and
106 /// expiry, included for payment verification on decryption).
107 metadata_key: [u8; 32],
108 /// The key used to authenticate an LDK-provided payment hash and metadata as previously
109 /// registered with LDK.
110 ldk_pmt_hash_key: [u8; 32],
111 /// The key used to authenticate a user-provided payment hash and metadata as previously
112 /// registered with LDK.
113 user_pmt_hash_key: [u8; 32],
117 pub(super) fn new(key_material: &KeyMaterial) -> ExpandedKey {
118 hkdf_extract_expand(b"LDK Inbound Payment Key Expansion", &key_material)
128 fn from_bits(bits: u8) -> Result<Method, u8> {
130 bits if bits == Method::LdkPaymentHash as u8 => Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash),
131 bits if bits == Method::UserPaymentHash as u8 => Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash),
132 unknown => Err(unknown),
137 pub(super) fn create<Signer: Sign, K: Deref>(keys: &ExpandedKey, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, keys_manager: &K, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()>
138 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>
140 let metadata_bytes = construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat, Method::LdkPaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, highest_seen_timestamp)?;
142 let mut iv_bytes = [0 as u8; IV_LEN];
143 let rand_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
144 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&rand_bytes[..IV_LEN]);
146 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.ldk_pmt_hash_key);
147 hmac.input(&iv_bytes);
148 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes);
149 let payment_preimage_bytes = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
151 let ldk_pmt_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_bytes).into_inner());
152 let payment_secret = construct_payment_secret(&iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, &keys.metadata_key);
153 Ok((ldk_pmt_hash, payment_secret))
156 pub(super) fn create_from_hash(keys: &ExpandedKey, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, payment_hash: PaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
157 let metadata_bytes = construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat, Method::UserPaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, highest_seen_timestamp)?;
159 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.user_pmt_hash_key);
160 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes);
161 hmac.input(&payment_hash.0);
162 let hmac_bytes = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
164 let mut iv_bytes = [0 as u8; IV_LEN];
165 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&hmac_bytes[..IV_LEN]);
167 Ok(construct_payment_secret(&iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, &keys.metadata_key))
170 fn construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat: Option<u64>, payment_type: Method, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<[u8; METADATA_LEN], ()> {
171 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
175 let mut min_amt_msat_bytes: [u8; AMT_MSAT_LEN] = match min_value_msat {
176 Some(amt) => amt.to_be_bytes(),
177 None => [0; AMT_MSAT_LEN],
179 min_amt_msat_bytes[0] |= (payment_type as u8) << METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET;
181 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time - it's updated when
182 // we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in a header. It should never be more
183 // than two hours in the future. Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we
184 // absolutely never fail a payment too early.
185 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date timestamps.
186 let expiry_bytes = (highest_seen_timestamp + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200).to_be_bytes();
188 let mut metadata_bytes: [u8; METADATA_LEN] = [0; METADATA_LEN];
189 metadata_bytes[..AMT_MSAT_LEN].copy_from_slice(&min_amt_msat_bytes);
190 metadata_bytes[AMT_MSAT_LEN..].copy_from_slice(&expiry_bytes);
195 fn construct_payment_secret(iv_bytes: &[u8; IV_LEN], metadata_bytes: &[u8; METADATA_LEN], metadata_key: &[u8; METADATA_KEY_LEN]) -> PaymentSecret {
196 let mut payment_secret_bytes: [u8; 32] = [0; 32];
197 let (iv_slice, encrypted_metadata_slice) = payment_secret_bytes.split_at_mut(IV_LEN);
198 iv_slice.copy_from_slice(iv_bytes);
200 let chacha_block = ChaCha20::get_single_block(metadata_key, iv_bytes);
201 for i in 0..METADATA_LEN {
202 encrypted_metadata_slice[i] = chacha_block[i] ^ metadata_bytes[i];
204 PaymentSecret(payment_secret_bytes)
207 /// Check that an inbound payment's `payment_data` field is sane.
209 /// LDK does not store any data for pending inbound payments. Instead, we construct our payment
210 /// secret (and, if supplied by LDK, our payment preimage) to include encrypted metadata about the
213 /// The metadata is constructed as:
214 /// payment method (3 bits) || payment amount (8 bytes - 3 bits) || expiry (8 bytes)
215 /// and encrypted using a key derived from [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`].
217 /// Then on payment receipt, we verify in this method that the payment preimage and payment secret
218 /// match what was constructed.
220 /// [`create_inbound_payment`] and [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] are called by the user to
221 /// construct the payment secret and/or payment hash that this method is verifying. If the former
222 /// method is called, then the payment method bits mentioned above are represented internally as
223 /// [`Method::LdkPaymentHash`]. If the latter, [`Method::UserPaymentHash`].
225 /// For the former method, the payment preimage is constructed as an HMAC of payment metadata and
226 /// random bytes. Because the payment secret is also encoded with these random bytes and metadata
227 /// (with the metadata encrypted with a block cipher), we're able to authenticate the preimage on
230 /// For the latter, the payment secret instead contains an HMAC of the user-provided payment hash
231 /// and payment metadata (encrypted with a block cipher), allowing us to authenticate the payment
232 /// hash and metadata on payment receipt.
234 /// See [`ExpandedKey`] docs for more info on the individual keys used.
236 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material
237 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment
238 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
239 pub(super) fn verify<L: Deref>(payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData, highest_seen_timestamp: u64, keys: &ExpandedKey, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<PaymentPreimage>, ()>
240 where L::Target: Logger
242 let (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes) = decrypt_metadata(payment_data.payment_secret, keys);
244 let payment_type_res = Method::from_bits((metadata_bytes[0] & 0b1110_0000) >> METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET);
245 let mut amt_msat_bytes = [0; AMT_MSAT_LEN];
246 amt_msat_bytes.copy_from_slice(&metadata_bytes[..AMT_MSAT_LEN]);
247 // Zero out the bits reserved to indicate the payment type.
248 amt_msat_bytes[0] &= 0b00011111;
249 let min_amt_msat: u64 = u64::from_be_bytes(amt_msat_bytes.into());
250 let expiry = u64::from_be_bytes(metadata_bytes[AMT_MSAT_LEN..].try_into().unwrap());
252 // Make sure to check to check the HMAC before doing the other checks below, to mitigate timing
254 let mut payment_preimage = None;
255 match payment_type_res {
256 Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash) => {
257 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.user_pmt_hash_key);
258 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes[..]);
259 hmac.input(&payment_hash.0);
260 if !fixed_time_eq(&iv_bytes, &Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner().split_at_mut(IV_LEN).0) {
261 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash {}: unexpected payment_secret", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
265 Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash) => {
266 match derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash, &iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, keys) {
267 Ok(preimage) => payment_preimage = Some(preimage),
268 Err(bad_preimage_bytes) => {
269 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} due to mismatching preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(bad_preimage_bytes));
274 Err(unknown_bits) => {
275 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment hash {} due to unknown payment type {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), unknown_bits);
280 if payment_data.total_msat < min_amt_msat {
281 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} due to total_msat {} being less than the minimum amount of {} msat", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, min_amt_msat);
285 if expiry < highest_seen_timestamp {
286 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {}: expired payment", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
293 pub(super) fn get_payment_preimage(payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret, keys: &ExpandedKey) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
294 let (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes) = decrypt_metadata(payment_secret, keys);
296 match Method::from_bits((metadata_bytes[0] & 0b1110_0000) >> METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET) {
297 Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash) => {
298 derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash, &iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, keys)
299 .map_err(|bad_preimage_bytes| APIError::APIMisuseError {
300 err: format!("Payment hash {} did not match decoded preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(bad_preimage_bytes))
303 Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash) => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
304 err: "Expected payment type to be LdkPaymentHash, instead got UserPaymentHash".to_string()
306 Err(other) => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Unknown payment type: {}", other) }),
310 fn decrypt_metadata(payment_secret: PaymentSecret, keys: &ExpandedKey) -> ([u8; IV_LEN], [u8; METADATA_LEN]) {
311 let mut iv_bytes = [0; IV_LEN];
312 let (iv_slice, encrypted_metadata_bytes) = payment_secret.0.split_at(IV_LEN);
313 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(iv_slice);
315 let chacha_block = ChaCha20::get_single_block(&keys.metadata_key, &iv_bytes);
316 let mut metadata_bytes: [u8; METADATA_LEN] = [0; METADATA_LEN];
317 for i in 0..METADATA_LEN {
318 metadata_bytes[i] = chacha_block[i] ^ encrypted_metadata_bytes[i];
321 (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes)
324 // Errors if the payment preimage doesn't match `payment_hash`. Returns the bad preimage bytes in
326 fn derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash: PaymentHash, iv_bytes: &[u8; IV_LEN], metadata_bytes: &[u8; METADATA_LEN], keys: &ExpandedKey) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, [u8; 32]> {
327 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.ldk_pmt_hash_key);
328 hmac.input(iv_bytes);
329 hmac.input(metadata_bytes);
330 let decoded_payment_preimage = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
331 if !fixed_time_eq(&payment_hash.0, &Sha256::hash(&decoded_payment_preimage).into_inner()) {
332 return Err(decoded_payment_preimage);
334 return Ok(PaymentPreimage(decoded_payment_preimage))
337 fn hkdf_extract_expand(salt: &[u8], ikm: &KeyMaterial) -> ExpandedKey {
338 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(salt);
340 let prk = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
341 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&prk[..]);
343 let metadata_key = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
345 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&prk[..]);
346 hmac.input(&metadata_key);
348 let ldk_pmt_hash_key = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
350 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&prk[..]);
351 hmac.input(&ldk_pmt_hash_key);
353 let user_pmt_hash_key = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
363 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
365 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
366 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
367 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
369 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
370 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
371 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
372 // before we forward it.
374 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
375 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
376 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
377 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
378 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
380 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
381 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
383 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
384 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
387 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
388 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
391 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
392 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
396 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
397 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
398 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
399 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
400 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
401 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
402 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
405 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
406 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
407 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
408 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
411 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
412 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
413 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
414 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
415 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
418 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
420 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
422 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
423 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
424 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
426 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
428 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
432 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
436 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
437 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
438 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
439 short_channel_id: u64,
441 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
443 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
444 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
449 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
450 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
451 /// are part of the same payment.
452 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
453 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
454 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
457 struct ClaimableHTLC {
458 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
461 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
464 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
465 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
466 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
467 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
469 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
470 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
475 impl Readable for PaymentId {
476 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
477 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
481 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
482 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
483 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
484 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
485 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
488 session_priv: SecretKey,
489 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
490 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
491 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
492 payment_id: PaymentId,
493 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
494 payee: Option<Payee>,
497 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
498 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
499 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
501 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
503 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
505 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payee } => {
508 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
509 payment_id.hash(hasher);
510 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
511 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
519 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
520 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
522 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
523 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
524 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
525 payment_secret: None,
531 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
532 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
534 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
542 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
543 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
545 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
550 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
552 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
553 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
554 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
555 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
556 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
558 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
559 err: msgs::LightningError,
560 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
561 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
563 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
565 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
567 err: LightningError {
569 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
570 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
577 shutdown_finish: None,
581 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
583 err: LightningError {
585 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
588 shutdown_finish: None,
592 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
593 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
596 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
598 err: LightningError {
600 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
601 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
607 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
608 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
612 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
615 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
617 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
619 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
621 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
623 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
625 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
626 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
632 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
634 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
635 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
643 shutdown_finish: None,
648 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
649 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
650 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
651 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
652 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
654 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
655 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
656 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
657 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
658 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
659 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
660 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
662 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
666 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
667 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
668 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
669 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
670 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
671 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
672 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
673 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
674 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
675 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
676 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
677 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
679 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
680 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
681 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
682 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
685 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
686 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
687 /// quite some time lag.
688 enum BackgroundEvent {
689 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
690 /// commitment transaction.
691 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
694 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
695 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
697 latest_features: InitFeatures,
700 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
701 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
703 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
706 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
707 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
708 struct PendingInboundPayment {
709 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
710 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
711 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
712 /// this payment being removed.
714 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
715 user_payment_id: u64,
716 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
717 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
718 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
721 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
722 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
723 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
725 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
728 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
729 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
730 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
731 pending_amt_msat: u64,
732 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
733 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
734 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
736 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
737 starting_block_height: u32,
739 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
740 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
741 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
743 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
744 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
746 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
747 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
748 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
749 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
750 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
752 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
754 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
755 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
759 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
760 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
762 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
766 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
768 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
772 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
774 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
778 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
780 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
785 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
787 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
788 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
789 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
790 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
794 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
795 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
796 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
797 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
798 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
799 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
800 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
803 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
804 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
807 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
808 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
809 let our_payment_hash;
810 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
811 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
812 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
814 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
815 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
816 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
820 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
824 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
825 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
826 let remove_res = match self {
827 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
828 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
829 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
830 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
831 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
835 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
836 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
837 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
838 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
839 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
840 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
847 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
848 let insert_res = match self {
849 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
850 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
851 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
853 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
854 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
857 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
858 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
859 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
860 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
861 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
868 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
870 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
871 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
872 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
873 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
880 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
881 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
882 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
883 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
884 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
885 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
886 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
887 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
889 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
890 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
891 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
892 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
893 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
894 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
895 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
896 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
897 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
899 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
900 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
902 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
903 /// to individual Channels.
905 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
906 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
907 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
908 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
910 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
911 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
912 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
913 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
914 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
915 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
916 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
918 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
919 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
920 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
921 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
924 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
925 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
926 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
927 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
928 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
930 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
931 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
932 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
933 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
934 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
935 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
936 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
937 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
938 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
939 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
942 default_configuration: UserConfig,
943 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
949 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
951 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
952 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
954 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
955 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
956 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
957 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
959 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
960 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
961 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
962 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
963 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
964 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
966 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
967 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
968 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
969 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
970 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
971 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
972 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
973 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
975 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
977 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
978 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
980 our_network_key: SecretKey,
981 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
983 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
985 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
986 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
987 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
989 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
990 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
991 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
992 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
994 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
995 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
996 /// are currently open with that peer.
997 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
998 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
1001 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
1002 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
1004 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
1005 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1006 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1007 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1008 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1009 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1010 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1011 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1012 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1014 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
1021 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1023 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1024 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1025 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1026 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1027 pub struct ChainParameters {
1028 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1029 pub network: Network,
1031 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1033 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1034 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1037 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1043 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1044 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1045 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1046 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1047 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1048 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1050 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1051 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1052 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1053 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1054 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
1056 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1057 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1060 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1061 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1062 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1065 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1066 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1068 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1069 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1070 should_persist: persist_check,
1071 _read_guard: read_guard,
1076 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1077 fn drop(&mut self) {
1078 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1079 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1084 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1085 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1087 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1089 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1090 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1091 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1092 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1093 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1095 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1096 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1098 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1100 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1101 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1102 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1103 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1104 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1105 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1106 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
1108 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1109 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
1111 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1112 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1113 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1114 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
1116 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1117 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1118 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1119 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1120 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1121 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1124 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1126 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1127 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1130 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1132 /// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
1133 /// pending HTLCs in flight.
1134 pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
1136 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1137 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1138 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1139 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1140 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1141 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1142 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1143 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1144 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1145 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1146 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1149 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1150 /// to better separate parameters.
1151 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1152 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1153 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1154 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1155 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1156 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1157 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1158 pub features: InitFeatures,
1159 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1160 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1161 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1163 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1165 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1166 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1167 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1168 /// payments to us through this channel.
1169 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1172 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1173 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1174 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1175 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1176 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1177 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1178 /// lifetime of the channel.
1179 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1180 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1181 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1182 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1183 /// our counterparty already.
1185 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1186 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1187 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1188 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1189 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1190 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1191 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1192 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1193 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1194 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1195 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1196 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1197 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1198 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1199 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1200 /// this value on chain.
1202 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1204 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1206 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1207 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1208 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
1209 pub user_channel_id: u64,
1210 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1211 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1212 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1214 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1215 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1216 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1217 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1219 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1220 pub balance_msat: u64,
1221 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1222 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1223 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1224 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1226 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1228 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1229 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1230 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1231 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1232 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1233 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1234 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1235 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1236 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1238 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1239 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1240 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1241 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1242 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1243 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1244 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1245 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1246 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1248 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1250 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1251 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1252 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1253 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1254 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1255 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1256 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1257 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1258 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1260 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1261 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1262 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1263 pub is_outbound: bool,
1264 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
1265 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
1266 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1267 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1268 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1270 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1271 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
1272 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
1273 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1275 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
1276 pub is_usable: bool,
1277 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1278 pub is_public: bool,
1281 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1282 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1283 /// states for more.
1284 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1285 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1286 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1287 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
1288 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
1289 ParameterError(APIError),
1290 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1291 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
1292 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
1293 /// payment in full.
1295 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1297 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1298 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1299 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1300 /// paths than the ones selected).
1301 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
1302 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1303 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1304 /// in over-/re-payment.
1306 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1307 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
1308 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
1310 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
1311 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
1312 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
1313 /// with the latest update_id.
1315 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1316 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1317 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1318 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1319 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1320 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1321 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1322 payment_id: PaymentId,
1326 macro_rules! handle_error {
1327 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1330 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1331 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1333 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1334 // entering the macro.
1335 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1336 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1339 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1341 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1342 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1343 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1344 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1348 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1349 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1350 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1351 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1356 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1357 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1359 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1360 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1361 action: err.action.clone()
1365 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1366 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1369 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1376 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1377 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1378 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1380 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1381 //TODO: Once warning messages are merged, we should send a `warning` message to our
1383 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1385 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1386 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1388 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1389 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1390 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1391 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1393 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1394 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1395 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1397 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
1398 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1399 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1400 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1402 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
1403 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1404 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1410 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1411 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1415 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1417 $entry.remove_entry();
1425 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1426 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1430 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1432 $entry.remove_entry();
1440 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1441 ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1443 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1444 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1445 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1452 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1453 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1454 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1456 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1458 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1459 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1460 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1461 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1463 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1464 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1465 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1466 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1467 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1468 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1469 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1470 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1471 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1472 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1473 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1476 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1477 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1478 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1479 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1480 match $action_type {
1481 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1482 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1484 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1485 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1487 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1488 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1489 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1490 if !$resend_commitment {
1491 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1494 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1496 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1497 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1501 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1502 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1504 $entry.remove_entry();
1508 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1509 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1513 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1514 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1515 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1517 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1518 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1522 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1523 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1524 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1525 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1526 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1529 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1534 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1535 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1536 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1537 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr, $announcement_sigs: expr) => { {
1538 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1539 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1541 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1542 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1544 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1545 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1546 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1547 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1550 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1551 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1552 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1553 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1554 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1555 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1556 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1557 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1558 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1559 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1560 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1561 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1564 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1565 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1566 // before it should be allowed to.
1567 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1568 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1569 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1572 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
1574 if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs {
1575 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1576 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1581 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1582 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1583 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1584 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1585 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1586 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1587 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1588 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1589 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1590 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1591 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1592 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1593 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1594 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1595 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1596 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1597 let mut order = $order;
1599 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1601 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1605 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1606 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1607 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1608 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1613 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1614 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1615 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1616 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1617 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1622 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1626 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1631 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1632 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1633 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1638 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1639 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1640 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1641 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1642 assert!(res.is_ok());
1645 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1649 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1650 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1651 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1653 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1655 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1656 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1661 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1662 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1663 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1664 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1665 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1668 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1670 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1671 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1673 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1675 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1677 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1678 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1679 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1680 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1681 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1682 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1683 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1684 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1686 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1687 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1688 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1692 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1694 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1695 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1696 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1697 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1698 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1699 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1701 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1702 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1704 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1705 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1708 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1710 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1711 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1713 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1715 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1716 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1717 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1718 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1726 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1727 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1728 &self.default_configuration
1731 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1733 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1734 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1735 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1736 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1737 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1740 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1741 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1743 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1744 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1745 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1747 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1748 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1749 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1750 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1751 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1752 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1754 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1755 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1756 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1757 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1758 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1759 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1763 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1764 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1765 Some(peer_state) => {
1766 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1767 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1768 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1769 Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features,
1770 channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height())?
1772 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1775 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1777 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1778 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1779 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1781 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1782 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1783 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1784 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1785 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1786 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1788 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1791 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1793 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1794 node_id: their_network_key,
1797 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1800 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1801 let mut res = Vec::new();
1803 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1804 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1805 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1806 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1807 let balance_msat = channel.get_balance_msat();
1808 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1809 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1810 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1811 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1812 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1813 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1814 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1815 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1816 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1818 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1819 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1820 inbound_scid_alias: channel.get_latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1821 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1822 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1824 inbound_capacity_msat,
1825 outbound_capacity_msat,
1826 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1827 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1828 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1829 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1830 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1831 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1832 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1836 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1837 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1838 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1839 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1845 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1846 /// more information.
1847 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1848 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1851 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1852 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1854 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1855 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1857 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1858 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1859 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1860 // really wanted anyway.
1861 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1864 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1865 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1866 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1867 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1868 Some(transaction) => {
1869 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1873 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1874 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1875 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1876 reason: closure_reason
1880 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1881 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1883 let counterparty_node_id;
1884 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1885 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1886 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1887 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1888 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1889 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1890 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1891 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1892 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1893 Some(peer_state) => {
1894 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1895 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1896 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1898 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1900 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1902 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1903 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1904 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1905 let (result, is_permanent) =
1906 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
1908 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1914 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1915 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1919 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1920 let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1921 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1922 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1926 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1930 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1934 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1935 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1938 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1942 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1943 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1944 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1946 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1947 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1949 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1950 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1951 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1952 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1954 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1956 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1957 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1958 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1959 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1960 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
1963 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1964 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1965 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1967 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1968 /// the channel being closed or not:
1969 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1970 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1971 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1972 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1973 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1974 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1975 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1977 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1979 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1980 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1981 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1982 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1983 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1987 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1988 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1989 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1990 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1991 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1993 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1994 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1995 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1996 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1997 // ignore the result here.
1998 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2002 /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2003 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2004 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2006 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2007 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2008 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2009 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
2010 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
2011 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2014 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2015 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2017 if peer_node_id.is_some() {
2018 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2019 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
2022 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2024 chan.remove_entry().1
2026 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2029 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2030 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
2031 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2032 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2033 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2038 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2041 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
2042 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
2043 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2044 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2045 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
2046 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2047 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2048 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2049 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2050 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2051 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2061 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2062 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2063 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
2064 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2065 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2069 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
2070 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2071 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2073 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2074 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2075 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2076 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2077 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2078 failure_code: $err_code,
2079 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2084 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2085 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2088 let shared_secret = {
2089 let mut arr = [0; 32];
2090 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
2093 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
2095 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2096 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2097 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2098 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2099 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2100 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2101 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2102 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2105 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
2106 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
2107 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
2108 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
2109 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
2112 let mut channel_state = None;
2113 macro_rules! return_err {
2114 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2116 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2117 if channel_state.is_none() {
2118 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2120 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2121 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2122 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2123 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2124 })), channel_state.unwrap());
2129 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
2130 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
2131 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac): (msgs::OnionHopData, _) = {
2132 match <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
2134 let error_code = match err {
2135 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
2136 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
2137 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
2138 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
2139 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
2141 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
2144 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
2145 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
2146 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2153 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
2156 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
2157 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
2158 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
2159 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
2160 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
2161 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
2162 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
2163 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
2164 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
2165 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
2166 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
2167 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
2171 // final_expiry_too_soon
2172 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2173 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2174 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2175 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2176 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2177 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2178 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
2180 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
2181 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
2182 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
2184 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2185 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
2186 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
2189 let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
2190 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
2191 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
2192 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2193 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2194 return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
2195 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2196 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2198 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2200 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2201 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2202 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2203 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2204 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2205 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2206 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2207 if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
2208 return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
2211 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2213 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2216 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
2221 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2222 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2223 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2224 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2226 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2228 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2229 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2230 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2231 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2234 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
2235 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
2236 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2238 // Check two things:
2239 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
2240 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
2241 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
2243 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
2245 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
2246 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
2247 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
2249 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2251 let blinding_factor = {
2252 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
2253 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
2254 sha.input(&shared_secret);
2255 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
2258 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
2260 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
2262 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2265 hop_data: new_packet_data,
2266 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2269 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2270 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2271 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2272 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2273 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2277 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2278 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2279 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2282 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2283 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2284 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2285 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2289 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2290 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2291 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2292 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2293 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2294 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2295 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2296 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2297 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
2298 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2299 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2301 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2304 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
2306 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2307 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2308 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2309 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2310 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2313 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2314 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2315 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2316 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2317 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2318 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2319 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2321 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2322 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2324 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
2325 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
2326 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
2327 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
2328 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2330 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2331 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2333 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2334 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2335 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2336 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2337 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2338 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2340 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2341 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2343 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2344 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2345 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2346 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2347 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2348 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2349 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2350 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2351 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2352 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2358 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2359 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2360 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2361 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
2363 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2364 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
2366 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2367 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2368 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
2370 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2372 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
2377 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
2380 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2381 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2382 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2384 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2385 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2386 if !chan.should_announce() {
2387 return Err(LightningError {
2388 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2389 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2392 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2393 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2396 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2397 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2398 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2399 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2400 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2401 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2402 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2403 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2404 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2408 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2410 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2411 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2413 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2414 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2415 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2416 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2417 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2418 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2419 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2420 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2423 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2424 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2426 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2432 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2433 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payee: &Option<Payee>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2434 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2435 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2436 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2437 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2439 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2440 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2441 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2442 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2443 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2445 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2447 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2449 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2450 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2452 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2453 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2454 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2455 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2456 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2457 err: "Payment already completed"
2462 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2463 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2464 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2467 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2469 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2470 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2471 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2472 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2473 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2474 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2475 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2476 total_msat: total_value,
2478 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2482 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2483 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2485 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2486 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2488 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2489 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2491 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2492 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2494 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2495 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2497 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2498 payee: payee.clone(),
2499 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2500 channel_state, chan)
2502 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2503 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2504 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2505 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2506 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2507 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2508 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2509 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2510 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2511 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2513 insert_outbound_payment!();
2515 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2516 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2517 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2518 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2519 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2520 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2521 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2522 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2528 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2530 } else { unreachable!(); }
2534 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2535 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2537 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2542 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2544 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2545 /// fields for more info.
2547 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2548 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2549 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2550 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2551 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2552 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2554 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2556 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2557 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2558 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2560 /// In general, a path may raise:
2561 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2562 /// node public key) is specified.
2563 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2564 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2566 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2567 /// relevant updates.
2569 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2570 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2571 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2573 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2574 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2575 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2576 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2578 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2579 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2580 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2581 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2582 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2585 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2586 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2587 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2589 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2590 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2591 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2592 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2593 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2595 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2596 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2598 let mut total_value = 0;
2599 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2600 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2601 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2602 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2603 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2604 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2605 continue 'path_check;
2607 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2608 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2609 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2610 continue 'path_check;
2613 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2614 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2616 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2617 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2619 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2620 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2621 total_value = amt_msat;
2624 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2625 let mut results = Vec::new();
2626 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2627 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payee, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2629 let mut has_ok = false;
2630 let mut has_err = false;
2631 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2632 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2633 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2634 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2635 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2636 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2637 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2641 } else if res.is_err() {
2642 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2643 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2646 if has_err && has_ok {
2647 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2650 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2651 if let Some(payee) = &route.payee {
2652 Some(RouteParameters {
2653 payee: payee.clone(),
2654 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2655 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2661 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2662 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2663 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2664 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2670 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2672 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2673 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2674 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2675 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2676 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2678 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2679 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2680 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2681 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2682 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2683 if path.len() == 0 {
2684 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2685 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2690 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2691 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2692 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2694 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2695 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2697 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2698 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2699 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2700 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2703 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2705 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2706 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2707 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2710 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2711 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2712 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2715 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2716 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2717 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2722 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2723 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2727 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2730 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2732 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2733 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2734 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2735 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2737 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2738 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2739 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2741 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2742 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2743 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2744 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2745 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2747 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2748 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2749 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2750 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2751 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2753 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2761 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2762 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2763 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2764 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2765 /// never reach the recipient.
2767 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2769 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2770 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2772 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2774 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2775 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2776 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2778 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2780 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2781 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2782 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2787 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2788 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2789 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2790 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2792 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2794 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2796 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2797 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2798 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2799 } else { unreachable!(); })
2802 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2804 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2805 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2808 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2809 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2814 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2815 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2816 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2819 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2820 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2821 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2823 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2831 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2832 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2833 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2837 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2839 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2840 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2842 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2843 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2845 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2846 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2847 /// keys per-channel).
2849 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2850 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2851 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2853 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2854 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2855 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2857 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2858 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2859 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2860 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2862 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2863 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2864 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2865 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2869 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2870 let mut output_index = None;
2871 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2872 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2873 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2874 if output_index.is_some() {
2875 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2876 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2879 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2880 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2881 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2884 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2887 if output_index.is_none() {
2888 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2889 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2892 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2897 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2898 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2899 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2901 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2904 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2905 // smaller than 500:
2906 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2908 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2909 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2910 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2911 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2912 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2913 /// our network addresses.
2915 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2916 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2918 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2919 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2920 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2921 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2923 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2925 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2926 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2927 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2929 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2930 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2933 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2934 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2935 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2937 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2938 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2939 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2940 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2941 rgb, alias, addresses,
2942 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2943 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2945 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2946 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2948 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2949 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2951 let mut announced_chans = false;
2952 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2953 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
2954 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2956 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2961 announced_chans = true;
2963 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2964 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2965 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2969 if announced_chans {
2970 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2971 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2972 signature: node_announce_sig,
2973 contents: announcement
2979 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2981 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2982 /// Will likely generate further events.
2983 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2984 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2986 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2987 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2988 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2990 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2991 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2993 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2994 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2995 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2996 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2998 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2999 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3000 match forward_info {
3001 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
3002 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3003 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3004 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3005 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3006 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3007 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3009 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
3010 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
3013 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3014 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3015 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3016 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3017 // problem, not ours.
3024 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3025 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3026 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3027 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3028 match forward_info {
3029 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3030 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3032 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3033 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3034 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3035 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3036 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3037 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3038 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3039 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3041 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3043 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3044 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3046 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3048 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
3049 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3050 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
3056 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3058 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3059 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3060 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3061 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3062 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3063 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3064 // this channel currently :/.
3070 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3071 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3073 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3074 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3075 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3077 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3078 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3080 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3082 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3083 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3084 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3087 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3089 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3090 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3091 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3092 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3093 // messages when we can.
3094 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3095 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3096 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3103 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3104 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3107 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3108 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3109 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3110 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3111 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3112 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3114 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3115 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3116 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
3117 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3118 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3120 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3121 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3123 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
3125 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3129 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3130 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3133 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3134 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3135 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3136 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3137 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3138 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3139 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3140 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3141 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3143 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3151 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3152 match forward_info {
3153 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3154 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
3155 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3156 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
3157 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3158 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
3159 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3160 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
3162 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3165 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3166 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3167 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3168 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3169 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3170 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3172 value: amt_to_forward,
3177 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3179 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3180 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3181 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3183 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3184 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3185 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3186 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3187 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3189 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
3194 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3195 ($payment_data_total_msat: expr, $payment_secret: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3196 let mut total_value = 0;
3197 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3198 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3199 .or_insert(Vec::new());
3200 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3201 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3202 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3203 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3207 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3208 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3209 total_value += htlc.value;
3210 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3211 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
3212 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != $payment_data_total_msat {
3213 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3214 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data_total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
3215 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3217 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3219 _ => unreachable!(),
3222 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data_total_msat {
3223 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3224 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data_total_msat);
3225 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3228 } else if total_value == $payment_data_total_msat {
3229 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3231 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3232 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3233 payment_secret: $payment_secret,
3237 payment_received_generated = true;
3239 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3240 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3243 payment_received_generated
3247 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3248 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3249 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3250 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3251 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3252 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3253 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3254 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3255 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3256 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3257 OnionPayload::Invoice(ref payment_data) => {
3258 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, payment_data.clone(), self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3259 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3261 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3265 let payment_data_total_msat = payment_data.total_msat;
3266 let payment_secret = payment_data.payment_secret.clone();
3267 check_total_value!(payment_data_total_msat, payment_secret, payment_preimage);
3269 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3270 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3271 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3272 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
3273 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3275 amt: amt_to_forward,
3276 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
3279 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3280 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3281 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3287 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3289 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3292 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3293 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3296 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3297 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3298 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3299 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3300 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3301 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3302 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3304 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data.total_msat, payment_data.payment_secret, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3305 if payment_received_generated {
3306 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3312 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3313 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3321 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3322 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
3325 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3326 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3329 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3330 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3331 events.append(&mut new_events);
3334 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3336 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3337 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3339 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3340 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3341 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3342 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3343 if background_events.is_empty() {
3347 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3349 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3350 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3351 // monitor updating completing.
3352 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3359 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3360 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3361 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3362 self.process_background_events();
3365 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3366 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3367 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3368 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3369 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3370 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3371 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3373 if !chan.is_live() {
3374 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3375 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3376 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3378 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3379 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3381 let mut retain_channel = true;
3382 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3385 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3386 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3390 let ret_err = match res {
3391 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3392 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3393 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_id);
3394 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3397 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3398 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3399 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3400 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3401 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3402 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3403 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3404 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3414 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3418 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3419 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3420 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3421 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3422 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3423 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3424 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3426 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3428 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3430 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3431 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3432 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3433 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3434 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3435 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3436 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3438 handle_errors.push(err);
3448 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3450 /// This currently includes:
3451 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3452 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3453 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3456 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3457 /// estimate fetches.
3458 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3459 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3460 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3461 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3463 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3465 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3467 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3468 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3469 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3470 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3471 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3472 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3473 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3474 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3476 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3478 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3480 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3481 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3482 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3483 if needs_close { return false; }
3486 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3487 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3488 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3489 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3490 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3491 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3492 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3493 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3497 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3498 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3500 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3501 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3502 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3506 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3507 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3516 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3517 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3523 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3524 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3525 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3526 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
3527 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
3528 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
3529 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3531 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3532 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3533 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3534 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3535 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3536 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3537 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3538 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3539 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3540 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3541 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3547 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3548 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3549 // be surfaced to the user.
3550 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3551 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3553 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3554 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3555 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3556 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3557 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
3558 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
3560 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3563 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3565 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3566 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3567 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3569 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payee, .. } => {
3570 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3571 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3572 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3573 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3574 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3575 let retry = if let Some(payee_data) = payee {
3576 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3577 Some(RouteParameters {
3579 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3580 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3583 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3584 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3585 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3587 rejected_by_dest: false,
3588 network_update: None,
3589 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3591 short_channel_id: None,
3598 if payment.get().abandoned() && payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3599 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3601 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3607 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3614 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3615 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3616 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3617 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3618 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3619 /// still-available channels.
3620 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3621 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3622 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3623 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3626 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3627 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3628 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3630 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payee, .. } => {
3631 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3632 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3633 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3634 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3635 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3636 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3637 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3638 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3641 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3642 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3645 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3646 all_paths_failed = true;
3647 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3648 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3650 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3656 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3659 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3660 let retry = if let Some(payee_data) = payee {
3661 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3662 Some(RouteParameters {
3663 payee: payee_data.clone(),
3664 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3665 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3668 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3670 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3671 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3673 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3675 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3676 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3677 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3678 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3679 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3680 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3681 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3682 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3689 error_code: onion_error_code,
3691 error_data: onion_error_data
3694 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3700 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3701 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3702 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
3703 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3705 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3706 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3707 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3708 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3709 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3710 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3711 network_update: None,
3714 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3717 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3719 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3723 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3724 pending_events.push(path_failure);
3725 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
3727 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3728 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3729 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3730 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3731 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3732 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3734 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3735 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3736 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3740 let mut forward_event = None;
3741 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3742 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3744 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3745 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3746 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3748 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3749 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3752 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3753 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3754 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3755 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3756 time_forwardable: time
3763 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
3764 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3766 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3767 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3768 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3769 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3771 /// Returns whether any HTLCs were claimed, and thus if any new [`MessageSendEvent`]s are now
3772 /// pending for processing via [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`].
3774 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
3775 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3776 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3777 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
3778 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3779 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3781 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3783 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3784 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3785 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3786 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3788 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3789 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3790 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3791 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3793 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3794 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3795 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3796 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3797 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3799 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3800 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3801 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3807 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3808 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3809 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3811 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3812 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3813 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3814 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3815 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3816 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3817 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3819 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3820 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3821 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3822 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3823 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3824 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3825 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3826 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3828 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3829 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3830 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3831 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3832 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3833 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3835 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3840 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3841 // which were generated.
3842 channel_state.take();
3844 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3845 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3846 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3853 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3854 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3855 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3856 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3857 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3859 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3863 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3864 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3865 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3866 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3867 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3868 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3869 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3870 payment_preimage, e);
3871 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3872 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3873 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3874 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3877 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3878 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3879 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3880 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3881 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3882 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3883 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3884 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3885 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3886 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3892 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3894 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3897 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3898 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3899 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3900 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3901 payment_preimage, e);
3903 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3904 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3906 chan.remove_entry();
3908 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3911 } else { unreachable!(); }
3914 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
3915 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3916 for source in sources.drain(..) {
3917 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
3918 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3919 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3920 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3921 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3922 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
3923 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
3924 pending_events.push(
3925 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
3927 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
3932 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3940 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
3942 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3943 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3944 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3945 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3946 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3947 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3948 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3949 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3950 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3951 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
3952 pending_events.push(
3953 events::Event::PaymentSent {
3954 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3960 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
3964 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
3965 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
3966 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
3968 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
3969 // irrevocably fulfilled.
3970 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3971 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
3972 pending_events.push(
3973 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
3981 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3986 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
3989 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
3990 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
3991 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
3992 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
3993 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
3994 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
3995 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
3998 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
3999 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4000 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4001 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4002 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4005 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4006 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4007 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4008 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
4009 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4010 payment_preimage, e);
4012 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4013 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4014 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4015 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4018 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4019 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4020 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4021 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4025 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4026 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4027 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4030 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4031 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4033 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4041 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4042 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4043 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4046 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4047 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4049 let chan_restoration_res;
4050 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
4051 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4052 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4053 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4054 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4055 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4057 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4061 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4062 let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4063 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4064 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4065 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4066 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4068 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4069 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4070 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
4073 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked, updates.announcement_sigs);
4074 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4075 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4077 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
4079 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4080 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4081 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4082 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4086 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4087 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4088 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4091 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4092 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4095 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4096 &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger)
4097 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
4098 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4099 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4100 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4101 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
4102 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4103 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4104 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4105 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
4107 entry.insert(channel);
4113 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4114 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4115 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4116 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4117 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4118 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4119 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4120 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4122 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
4123 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4125 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4128 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4129 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4130 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4131 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4133 user_channel_id: user_id,
4138 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4139 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
4140 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4141 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4142 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4143 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4144 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4145 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4146 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4148 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
4150 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4153 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4154 // lock before watch_channel
4155 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4157 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
4158 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4159 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4160 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4161 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4162 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
4163 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
4164 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4165 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
4166 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4167 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4169 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
4170 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4171 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4172 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
4173 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4174 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4178 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4179 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4180 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4181 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4182 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4184 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4185 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4186 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4195 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4197 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4198 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4199 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4200 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4201 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4202 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4203 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4205 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4206 Ok(update) => update,
4207 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4209 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4210 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
4211 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4212 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4213 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4214 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4215 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4216 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4223 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4226 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4227 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4231 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4232 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4233 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4234 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4235 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4236 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4237 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4239 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4240 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4241 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4242 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4243 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4244 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4245 msg: announcement_sigs,
4247 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4248 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4249 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4250 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4251 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4252 // announcement_signatures.
4253 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4254 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4255 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4256 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4261 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4265 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4266 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4267 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4268 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4269 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4271 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4272 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4273 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4274 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4277 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4278 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4279 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4280 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4283 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4284 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4286 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4287 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4288 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4289 let (result, is_permanent) =
4290 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
4292 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
4298 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4299 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4300 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4307 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4310 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4311 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4314 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4318 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4319 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4320 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4321 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4322 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4323 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4324 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4325 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4327 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4328 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4329 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4330 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4335 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4336 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4337 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4338 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4339 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4340 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
4341 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4343 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
4344 } else { (tx, None) }
4346 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4349 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4350 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4351 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4353 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4354 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4355 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4356 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4360 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4365 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4366 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4367 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4368 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4370 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4371 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4372 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4373 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4375 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4376 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4378 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4379 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4380 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4381 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4384 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4385 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4386 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4387 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4388 match pending_forward_info {
4389 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4390 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4391 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
4392 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
4393 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
4394 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
4395 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
4396 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
4400 // The only case where we'd be unable to
4401 // successfully get a channel update is if the
4402 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
4403 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
4404 // payments over the channel back to themselves
4405 // (because no one else should know the short_id
4406 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
4407 // no problem just calling this
4408 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
4409 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
4412 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4414 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4415 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4416 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4419 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4421 _ => pending_forward_info
4424 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4426 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4431 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4432 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4433 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4434 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4435 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4436 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4437 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4438 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4440 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4442 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4445 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
4449 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4450 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4451 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4452 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4453 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4454 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4455 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4457 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4459 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4464 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4465 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4466 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4467 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4468 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4469 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4470 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4472 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4473 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4474 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4476 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4479 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4483 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4484 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4485 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4486 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4487 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4488 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4489 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4491 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4492 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4493 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4494 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4495 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4496 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4497 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4502 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4503 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4505 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4506 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4507 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4509 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4510 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4511 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4512 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4513 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4514 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4515 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4516 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4518 commitment_signed: msg,
4524 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4529 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4530 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4531 let mut forward_event = None;
4532 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4533 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4534 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4535 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4537 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4538 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4539 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4540 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4541 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4543 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4544 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4545 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4547 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4548 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4549 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4554 match forward_event {
4556 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4557 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4558 time_forwardable: time
4566 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4567 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4569 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4570 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4571 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4572 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4573 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4574 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4576 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4577 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4578 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4579 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4580 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4581 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4582 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4583 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4584 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4585 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4586 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4588 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4589 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4590 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(),
4591 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4592 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4594 } else { unreachable!(); }
4597 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4598 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4599 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4603 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4604 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4605 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4606 .expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"),
4607 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4609 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4612 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
4614 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4615 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4617 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4618 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4620 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4621 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4628 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4629 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4630 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4631 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4632 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4633 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4634 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4636 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4638 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4643 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4644 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4645 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4647 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4648 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4649 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4650 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4652 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4653 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4656 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4657 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
4658 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4659 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4660 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4661 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4664 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4669 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4670 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4671 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4672 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4673 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4674 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4676 // It's not a local channel
4677 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4680 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4681 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4682 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4683 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4684 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4685 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4686 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4687 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4689 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4691 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4692 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4693 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4694 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4696 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
4699 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
4701 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4704 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4705 let chan_restoration_res;
4706 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
4707 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4708 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4710 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4711 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4712 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4713 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4715 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4716 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4717 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4718 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4719 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
4720 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
4721 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), channel_state, chan);
4722 let mut channel_update = None;
4723 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown {
4724 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4725 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4728 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4729 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4730 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4731 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4732 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4733 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4734 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4737 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4738 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(
4739 self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
4740 responses.mon_update, Vec::new(), None, responses.funding_locked, responses.announcement_sigs);
4741 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4742 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4744 (responses.holding_cell_failed_htlcs, need_lnd_workaround)
4746 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4749 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4750 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
4752 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4753 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
4758 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
4759 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
4760 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4761 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
4762 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
4763 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
4764 match monitor_event {
4765 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
4766 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
4767 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
4768 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
4770 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
4771 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4774 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
4775 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
4776 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4777 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4778 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4779 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4780 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4781 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
4782 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4783 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4785 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
4786 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4787 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4791 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
4792 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
4794 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
4796 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
4797 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4798 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4799 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4800 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4805 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
4806 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
4811 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4812 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4815 has_pending_monitor_events
4818 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
4819 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
4820 /// update events as a separate process method here.
4821 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
4822 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
4823 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
4826 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
4827 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
4828 /// update was applied.
4830 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
4831 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
4832 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
4833 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
4834 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
4835 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
4836 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4837 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
4839 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4840 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4841 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4842 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4843 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4845 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4846 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
4847 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4848 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
4849 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
4851 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
4852 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4853 has_monitor_update = true;
4854 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
4855 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
4856 if close_channel { return false; }
4858 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4859 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4860 updates: commitment_update,
4867 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4868 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4869 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
4876 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
4877 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4878 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
4881 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4882 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4888 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
4889 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
4890 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
4891 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
4892 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
4893 let mut has_update = false;
4895 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4896 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4897 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4898 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4899 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4901 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4902 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
4903 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
4904 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4906 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4907 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
4910 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
4911 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
4912 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
4913 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4914 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4917 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4918 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4923 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4925 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
4926 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4932 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4933 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4940 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4941 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4947 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
4948 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
4950 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
4951 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4952 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
4953 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
4954 // reorganized out of the main chain.
4955 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
4956 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
4957 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
4958 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
4959 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
4960 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
4961 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
4962 assert!(should_broadcast);
4963 } else { unreachable!(); }
4964 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
4966 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4970 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4971 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
4973 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4974 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
4977 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4979 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4980 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4981 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4982 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4983 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
4984 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
4985 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
4986 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
4987 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
4988 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
4989 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
4990 // never fail a payment too early.
4991 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
4993 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
4996 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5001 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5004 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5005 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5007 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5008 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5009 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5011 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5013 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5014 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5018 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5019 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5021 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5023 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5024 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5025 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5026 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5027 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5028 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5031 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5032 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5035 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5037 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5039 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5040 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5041 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5042 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5043 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5046 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5047 /// stored external to LDK.
5049 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5050 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5051 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5053 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5054 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5057 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5058 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5059 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5060 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5062 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5063 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5064 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5065 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5066 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5068 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5069 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5070 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5071 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5072 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5074 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5076 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5077 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5079 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5080 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5084 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5085 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5087 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5089 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5090 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5091 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5092 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5095 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5096 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5099 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5101 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5103 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5104 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5107 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5108 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5110 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5111 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5112 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5115 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
5116 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5117 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5118 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
5119 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5124 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5125 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5129 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5130 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5134 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5135 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5136 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5137 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5138 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5141 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5142 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5143 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5144 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5146 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5147 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5148 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5149 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5152 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5153 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5155 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5156 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5159 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5160 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5161 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5163 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5164 events.replace(pending_events);
5173 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5175 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5176 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5177 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5178 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5181 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5183 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5184 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5186 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
5187 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
5188 /// restarting from an old state.
5189 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5190 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5191 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5193 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5194 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5195 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5196 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5199 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5200 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5201 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5204 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
5205 handler.handle_event(&event);
5213 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5215 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5216 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5217 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5218 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5221 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
5223 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5224 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
5225 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5226 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5227 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5230 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
5231 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
5232 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
5235 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5236 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5237 let new_height = height - 1;
5239 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5240 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5241 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5242 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5243 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5244 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5247 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5251 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5253 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5254 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5255 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5256 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5259 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5260 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5261 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5262 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5264 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5265 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5267 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5268 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5269 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5272 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5273 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5274 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5275 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5277 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5278 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5280 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5282 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5284 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5286 macro_rules! max_time {
5287 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5289 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5290 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5291 // having an explicit local time source.
5292 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5293 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5294 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5295 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5296 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5302 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
5303 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5304 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5305 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5306 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5309 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5310 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5311 outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
5312 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
5313 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
5314 if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
5315 log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
5316 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
5317 payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
5325 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
5326 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5327 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
5328 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5329 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
5330 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
5336 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5337 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5338 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5339 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5340 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5341 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5342 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5343 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5348 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5350 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5351 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5352 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5353 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5356 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5357 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5359 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5360 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5361 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5362 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5363 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5365 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5366 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5368 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5369 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5370 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5371 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5372 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5373 let res = f(channel);
5374 if let Ok((funding_locked_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5375 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5376 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
5377 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5378 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
5382 if let Some(funding_locked) = funding_locked_opt {
5383 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
5384 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5385 msg: funding_locked,
5387 if channel.is_usable() {
5388 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5389 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5390 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5391 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
5394 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5396 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
5398 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5399 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5400 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5401 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5402 msg: announcement_sigs,
5404 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5405 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
5406 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5408 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5409 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5410 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5415 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5416 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5417 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5419 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5420 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5421 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5422 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5423 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5427 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5428 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5429 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5430 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5431 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5432 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5433 data: reason_message,
5441 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5442 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
5443 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5444 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5445 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5446 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5447 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5448 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5449 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
5450 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
5451 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5452 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
5453 data: htlc_msat_height_data
5458 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5463 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5465 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5466 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
5470 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5471 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5472 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5475 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5476 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5477 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5478 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5481 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5482 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5484 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5485 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5488 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5489 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5490 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
5491 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
5492 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5496 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5497 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5498 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5499 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5503 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
5504 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5505 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5506 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5507 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5508 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5511 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5512 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5513 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5516 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5517 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5518 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5521 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5522 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5523 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5526 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5527 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5528 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5531 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
5532 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5533 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5536 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5537 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5538 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5541 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5542 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5543 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5546 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5547 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5548 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5551 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5552 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5553 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5556 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5557 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5558 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5561 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5562 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5563 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5566 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5567 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5568 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5571 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5572 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5573 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5576 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5577 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5578 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5581 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5582 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5583 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5586 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5587 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5588 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5591 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5596 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5597 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5598 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5601 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5602 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5603 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5604 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5606 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5607 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5608 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5609 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5610 if no_connection_possible {
5611 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5612 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5613 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5614 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5615 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5617 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
5618 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5619 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5623 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5630 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5631 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5632 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5633 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5634 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5635 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5636 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5638 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5641 no_channels_remain = false;
5647 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5649 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5650 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5651 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5652 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5653 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5654 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5655 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5656 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5657 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5658 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5659 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5660 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5661 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5662 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5663 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5664 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5665 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5666 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5667 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5671 if no_channels_remain {
5672 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
5675 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5676 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5680 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
5681 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5683 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5686 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5687 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
5688 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5689 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
5690 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
5693 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
5694 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
5699 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5700 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5701 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5702 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5703 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5704 if !chan.have_received_message() {
5705 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
5706 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
5707 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
5711 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
5712 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5713 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
5719 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
5722 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
5723 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5725 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
5726 for chan in self.list_channels() {
5727 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
5728 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5729 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5733 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5734 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5739 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
5740 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
5741 struct PersistenceNotifier {
5742 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
5743 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
5744 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
5747 impl PersistenceNotifier {
5750 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
5756 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5757 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5762 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
5763 let result = *guard;
5771 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5772 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5773 let current_time = Instant::now();
5775 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5776 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5781 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
5782 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
5783 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
5784 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
5785 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
5787 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
5788 let result = *guard;
5789 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
5793 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
5794 None => return result,
5800 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
5802 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
5803 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5804 *persistence_lock = true;
5805 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
5810 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5811 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5813 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
5815 (0, onion_packet, required),
5816 (2, short_channel_id, required),
5819 (0, payment_data, required),
5820 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5822 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
5823 (0, payment_preimage, required),
5824 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5828 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
5829 (0, routing, required),
5830 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
5831 (4, payment_hash, required),
5832 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
5833 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
5837 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5838 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5840 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
5842 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5843 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5844 reason.write(writer)?;
5846 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5847 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
5850 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5851 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5852 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
5853 failure_code.write(writer)?;
5860 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5861 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5862 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5865 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5866 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5867 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5868 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
5872 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5873 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5874 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5875 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
5876 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
5879 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
5880 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
5881 // messages contained in the variants.
5882 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
5883 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
5884 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
5886 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5887 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5888 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5889 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5890 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
5893 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5894 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5895 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5896 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5897 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
5899 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5904 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
5909 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
5910 (0, short_channel_id, required),
5911 (2, outpoint, required),
5912 (4, htlc_id, required),
5913 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
5916 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
5917 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5918 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
5919 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
5922 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
5923 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
5924 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
5929 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
5930 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
5931 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
5937 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
5938 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5939 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5941 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
5942 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
5943 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5947 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
5948 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
5949 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
5951 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
5953 if payment_data.is_some() {
5954 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5956 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
5959 if payment_data.is_none() {
5960 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5962 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
5966 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
5974 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
5975 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5976 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5979 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5980 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
5981 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
5982 let mut payment_id = None;
5983 let mut payment_secret = None;
5984 let mut payee = None;
5985 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5986 (0, session_priv, required),
5987 (1, payment_id, option),
5988 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5989 (3, payment_secret, option),
5990 (4, path, vec_type),
5993 if payment_id.is_none() {
5994 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
5996 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
5998 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
5999 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6000 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
6001 path: path.unwrap(),
6002 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6007 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6008 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6013 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6014 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
6016 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payee } => {
6018 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6019 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6020 (0, session_priv, required),
6021 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6022 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6023 (3, payment_secret, option),
6024 (4, path, vec_type),
6028 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6030 field.write(writer)?;
6037 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6038 (0, LightningError) => {
6042 (0, failure_code, required),
6043 (2, data, vec_type),
6047 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6049 (0, forward_info, required),
6050 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6051 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6052 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6055 (0, htlc_id, required),
6056 (2, err_packet, required),
6060 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6061 (0, payment_secret, required),
6062 (2, expiry_time, required),
6063 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6064 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6065 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6068 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6070 (0, session_privs, required),
6073 (0, session_privs, required),
6074 (1, payment_hash, option),
6077 (0, session_privs, required),
6078 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6079 (2, payment_hash, required),
6080 (4, payment_secret, option),
6081 (6, total_msat, required),
6082 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6083 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6086 (0, session_privs, required),
6087 (2, payment_hash, required),
6091 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6092 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6093 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6094 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6095 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6098 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6099 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6101 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6103 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6105 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6106 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6107 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6110 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6111 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6112 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6113 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6114 unfunded_channels += 1;
6117 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6118 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6119 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6120 channel.write(writer)?;
6124 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6125 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
6126 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6127 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6128 for forward in pending_forwards {
6129 forward.write(writer)?;
6133 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6134 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6135 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6136 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6137 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6138 htlc.write(writer)?;
6142 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6143 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6144 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6145 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6146 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6147 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6150 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6151 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6152 for event in events.iter() {
6153 event.write(writer)?;
6156 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6157 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6158 for event in background_events.iter() {
6160 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6162 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6163 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6168 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6169 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6171 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6172 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6173 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6174 hash.write(writer)?;
6175 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6178 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6179 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6180 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6181 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6182 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6183 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6186 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6187 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6189 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6190 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6191 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6192 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6195 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6196 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6200 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6201 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6202 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6204 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6205 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6206 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6211 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6212 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6213 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6220 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6222 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6224 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6225 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6226 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6227 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6228 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6229 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6230 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6231 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6232 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6233 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6234 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6235 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6236 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6238 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6239 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6241 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6242 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6244 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6245 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6246 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6247 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6248 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6249 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6251 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6252 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6253 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6254 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6255 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6256 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6259 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6260 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6262 pub keys_manager: K,
6264 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6266 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6267 pub fee_estimator: F,
6268 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6270 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6271 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6272 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6273 pub chain_monitor: M,
6275 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6276 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6277 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6278 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6279 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6280 /// deserialization.
6282 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6283 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6284 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6286 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6287 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6289 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6290 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6291 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6292 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6294 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6297 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6298 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
6301 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6302 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6303 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6304 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6305 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6306 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6309 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6310 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6311 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6312 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6313 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
6315 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
6316 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6321 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6322 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6323 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6324 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
6325 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6326 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6327 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6328 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6331 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6332 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6333 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
6337 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6338 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
6339 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6340 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6341 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6342 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6345 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6346 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6348 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6349 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6350 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6352 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6354 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6355 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6356 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6357 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6358 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
6359 for _ in 0..channel_count {
6360 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
6361 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6362 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
6363 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
6364 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6365 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6366 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6367 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6368 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
6369 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
6370 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6371 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6372 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6373 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6374 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6375 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
6376 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6377 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6378 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6379 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6380 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6381 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
6382 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
6383 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
6384 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6385 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6386 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
6387 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
6388 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6389 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6390 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6391 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6392 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
6395 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6396 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6397 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
6399 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
6402 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6403 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6404 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6405 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6406 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
6407 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6411 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
6412 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
6413 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
6414 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6418 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
6419 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6420 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6421 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
6422 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6423 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6424 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
6425 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
6426 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6428 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
6431 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6432 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6433 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
6434 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6435 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6436 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
6437 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
6438 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6440 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
6443 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6444 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
6445 for _ in 0..peer_count {
6446 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6447 let peer_state = PeerState {
6448 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
6450 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
6453 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6454 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
6455 for _ in 0..event_count {
6456 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
6457 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
6461 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
6462 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
6463 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
6464 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
6465 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
6466 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
6467 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6468 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
6472 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6473 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
6474 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
6475 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6476 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
6477 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6481 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6482 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6484 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6485 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6486 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6487 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6488 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6492 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6493 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6494 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6495 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6496 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6497 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6498 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
6500 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
6501 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6505 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
6506 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
6507 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
6508 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6509 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
6510 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
6512 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
6513 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
6514 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
6515 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
6516 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
6517 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
6519 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
6521 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
6522 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
6523 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
6524 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
6525 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
6526 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
6527 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
6529 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors {
6530 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
6531 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
6532 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
6533 if path.is_empty() {
6534 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
6535 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6537 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
6538 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
6539 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
6540 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
6541 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6542 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
6543 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
6544 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6546 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6547 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
6548 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
6549 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
6550 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
6552 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
6553 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
6554 total_msat: path_amt,
6555 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
6557 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
6558 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
6567 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6568 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6570 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
6571 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
6574 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
6575 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
6576 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
6578 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
6579 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
6580 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
6582 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
6584 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
6589 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6591 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
6592 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
6593 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
6595 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
6596 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
6599 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
6600 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
6602 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
6604 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
6605 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
6606 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
6607 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
6609 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
6610 logger: args.logger,
6611 default_configuration: args.default_config,
6614 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6615 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
6618 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
6619 //connection or two.
6621 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
6627 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6628 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6629 use core::time::Duration;
6630 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
6631 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
6632 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
6633 use ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment;
6634 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
6635 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6637 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
6638 use routing::router::{Payee, RouteParameters, find_route};
6639 use util::errors::APIError;
6640 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
6641 use util::test_utils;
6643 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
6645 fn test_wait_timeout() {
6646 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
6648 use core::sync::atomic::AtomicBool;
6651 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
6652 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
6654 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
6655 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
6656 thread::spawn(move || {
6658 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
6659 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6660 *persistence_lock = true;
6663 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
6669 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
6670 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
6672 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
6675 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6680 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
6682 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
6685 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6692 fn test_notify_limits() {
6693 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
6694 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
6695 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6696 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6697 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6698 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6700 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
6701 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
6702 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6703 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6704 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6706 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6708 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
6709 // to connect messages with new values
6710 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6711 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6712 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6713 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6715 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
6716 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6717 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6718 // ... but the last node should not.
6719 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6720 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
6721 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6722 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6724 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
6725 // about the channel.
6726 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6727 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6728 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6730 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
6732 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6733 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6734 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6735 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6736 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6737 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6739 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
6740 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6741 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6743 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
6744 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
6745 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
6746 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
6747 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
6748 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
6750 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
6751 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
6752 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6753 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6754 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6755 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6756 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6757 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6759 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
6760 // the channel info has updated.
6761 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6762 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6763 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6764 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6765 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6766 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6770 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
6771 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
6773 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6774 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6775 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6776 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6777 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6779 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
6780 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
6781 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
6782 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
6783 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
6784 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
6785 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6786 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6787 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6788 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6789 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
6791 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
6792 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6793 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6794 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6795 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6796 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6797 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6798 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6799 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6800 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6801 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6802 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6803 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6804 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6805 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6806 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6807 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6808 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6809 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6810 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6811 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6812 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
6814 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
6815 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6816 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6817 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6818 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6819 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
6821 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
6822 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
6823 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
6824 // lightning messages manually.
6825 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6826 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6827 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6828 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6829 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
6830 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6831 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6832 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
6833 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6834 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6835 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
6836 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6837 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6838 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6839 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6840 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6841 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6842 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
6843 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6844 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6845 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
6846 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6847 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6848 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6849 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6850 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
6851 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6853 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
6854 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
6855 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6856 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
6858 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
6859 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
6860 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
6861 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
6863 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6866 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
6867 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
6868 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
6869 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
6871 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6874 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
6875 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
6876 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
6877 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
6879 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6884 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
6885 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
6886 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
6887 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
6888 // fails as expected.
6889 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6890 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6891 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6892 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6893 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6894 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6896 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
6897 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
6898 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
6900 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
6901 let params = RouteParameters {
6902 payee: Payee::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
6903 final_value_msat: 100_000,
6904 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
6906 let route = find_route(
6907 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), ¶ms, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
6908 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6910 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6911 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6912 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6913 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6914 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6915 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6916 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6917 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6918 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6919 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6920 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6921 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6922 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6923 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6924 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6925 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6926 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6927 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6928 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6929 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6930 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6932 // Finally, claim the original payment.
6933 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6935 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
6936 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6937 let route = find_route(
6938 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), ¶ms, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
6939 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6941 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6942 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6943 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6944 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6945 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
6946 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
6947 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
6949 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
6950 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6951 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6952 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6953 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6954 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6955 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6956 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6957 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6958 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6959 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6960 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6961 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6962 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6963 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6964 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6965 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6966 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6967 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6968 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6969 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6970 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6971 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6973 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
6974 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6978 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
6979 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
6980 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
6981 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6982 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6983 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6984 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6986 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6987 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6988 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6989 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6991 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6992 let params = RouteParameters {
6993 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
6994 final_value_msat: 10000,
6995 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
6997 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
6998 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
6999 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7000 let route = find_route(
7001 &payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7002 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
7005 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7006 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7007 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7008 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7010 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7011 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7012 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7013 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7014 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7015 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7016 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7018 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7022 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7023 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7024 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7025 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7026 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7027 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7029 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7030 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7031 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7032 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7034 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7035 let params = RouteParameters {
7036 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7037 final_value_msat: 10000,
7038 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7040 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7041 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7042 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7043 let route = find_route(
7044 &payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7045 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
7048 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7049 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7050 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7051 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7052 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7054 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7055 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7056 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7057 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7058 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7059 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7060 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7062 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7066 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7067 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7068 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7069 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7070 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7072 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7073 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7074 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7075 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7077 // Marshall an MPP route.
7078 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7079 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7080 route.paths.push(path);
7081 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7082 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7083 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7084 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7085 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7086 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7088 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
7089 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7090 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7091 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7096 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7097 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7098 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7099 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7100 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7101 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7103 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7104 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7106 total_msat: 100_000,
7109 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7110 // payment verification fails as expected.
7111 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7112 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7113 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, payment_data.clone(), nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7114 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7116 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7120 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7121 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7125 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
7128 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
7129 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
7130 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
7131 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
7132 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7133 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
7134 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
7135 use routing::router::{Payee, get_route};
7136 use routing::scoring::Scorer;
7137 use util::test_utils;
7138 use util::config::UserConfig;
7139 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
7141 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7142 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7143 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
7145 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
7149 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
7150 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
7151 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
7152 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
7153 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
7154 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
7155 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
7160 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
7161 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
7164 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
7165 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
7166 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
7168 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
7169 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7171 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7172 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7174 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
7175 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
7177 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7178 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
7179 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
7180 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
7181 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7183 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7185 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
7187 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7188 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
7189 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
7190 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
7191 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7193 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7195 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
7197 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7198 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7199 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7200 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7201 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7204 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
7205 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7206 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
7208 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7209 } else { panic!(); }
7211 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7212 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7214 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
7217 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7220 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
7221 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
7223 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7224 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7225 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
7226 match msg_events[0] {
7227 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
7228 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
7229 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
7233 match msg_events[1] {
7234 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7238 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
7240 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
7241 macro_rules! send_payment {
7242 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
7243 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
7244 let payee = Payee::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
7245 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7246 let scorer = Scorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7247 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payee, &dummy_graph,
7248 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer).unwrap();
7250 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
7251 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
7253 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
7254 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
7256 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7257 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
7258 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7259 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
7260 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7261 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7262 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7263 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7265 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
7266 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
7267 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7269 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
7270 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
7271 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7272 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7273 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
7275 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
7278 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
7279 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7280 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7281 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7283 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
7288 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
7289 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);