1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
47 pub use crate::ln::channel::{InboundHTLCDetails, InboundHTLCStateDetails, OutboundHTLCDetails, OutboundHTLCStateDetails};
48 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
49 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
50 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
51 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
52 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundHTLCErr, NextPacketDetails};
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
55 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
56 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
59 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
60 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
61 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, ExplicitSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder, UnsignedBolt12Invoice};
62 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
63 use crate::offers::invoice_request::{DerivedPayerId, InvoiceRequestBuilder};
64 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
65 use crate::offers::offer::{Offer, OfferBuilder};
66 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
67 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
68 use crate::onion_message::messenger::{Destination, MessageRouter, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
69 use crate::onion_message::offers::{OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler};
70 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
71 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
72 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
73 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
74 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
75 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
76 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
77 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
78 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
79 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
81 crate::offers::offer::DerivedMetadata,
82 crate::routing::router::DefaultRouter,
83 crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph,
84 crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters},
85 crate::sign::KeysManager,
89 crate::offers::offer::OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
90 crate::offers::refund::RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
93 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
96 use crate::prelude::*;
98 use core::cell::RefCell;
100 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
101 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
102 use core::time::Duration;
103 use core::ops::Deref;
105 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
106 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
107 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
109 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
111 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
112 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
113 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
115 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
116 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
117 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
118 // before we forward it.
120 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
121 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
122 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
123 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
124 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
126 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
129 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
130 /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
132 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
133 /// do with the HTLC.
134 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
135 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
137 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
138 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
139 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
140 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
141 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
142 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
144 /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
146 /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
147 /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
149 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
150 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
151 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
152 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
153 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
155 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
156 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
157 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
158 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
159 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
161 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
162 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
163 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
164 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
166 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
167 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
169 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
170 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
171 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
172 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
173 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
174 requires_blinded_error: bool,
176 /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
177 /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
178 /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
180 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
181 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
183 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
184 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
185 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
186 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
187 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
188 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
189 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
191 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
192 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
193 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
194 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
196 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
197 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
198 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
200 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
201 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
202 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
203 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
204 requires_blinded_error: bool,
208 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
209 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
210 pub struct BlindedForward {
211 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
212 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
213 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
214 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
215 /// If needed, this determines how this HTLC should be failed backwards, based on whether we are
216 /// the introduction node.
217 pub failure: BlindedFailure,
220 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
221 // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
222 fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
224 Self::Forward { blinded: Some(BlindedForward { failure, .. }), .. } => Some(*failure),
225 Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
226 Self::ReceiveKeysend { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
232 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
234 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
235 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
236 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
237 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
238 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
239 /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
241 /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
242 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
243 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
244 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
245 /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
247 /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
249 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
250 /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
251 /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
253 /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
254 /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
255 /// it along another path).
257 /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
258 /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
259 /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
260 /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
261 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
262 /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
263 /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
264 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
265 /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
267 /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
270 /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
272 /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
274 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
277 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
278 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
279 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
280 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
283 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
284 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
285 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
286 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
287 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
290 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
291 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
292 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
294 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
295 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
296 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
299 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
300 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
302 prev_channel_id: ChannelId,
303 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
304 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
307 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
308 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
309 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
312 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
317 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
321 /// Whether this blinded HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node or a blinded node,
322 /// which determines the failure message that should be used.
323 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
324 pub enum BlindedFailure {
325 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node, and thus should be failed with
326 /// [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
327 FromIntroductionNode,
328 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by a blinded node within the path, and thus should be
329 /// failed with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
333 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
334 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
335 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
336 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
337 short_channel_id: u64,
338 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
340 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
341 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
342 blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
343 channel_id: ChannelId,
345 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
346 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
351 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
353 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
354 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
355 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
357 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
358 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
361 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
362 struct ClaimableHTLC {
363 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
365 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
367 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
368 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
369 sender_intended_value: u64,
370 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
372 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
373 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
374 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
375 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
377 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
378 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
381 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
382 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
383 events::ClaimedHTLC {
384 channel_id: val.prev_hop.channel_id,
385 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
386 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
387 value_msat: val.value,
388 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
393 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
394 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
396 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
397 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
398 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
401 /// Number of bytes in the id.
402 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
405 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
406 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
411 impl Readable for PaymentId {
412 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
413 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
418 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
419 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
420 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
424 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
426 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
427 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
428 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
430 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
431 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
436 impl Readable for InterceptId {
437 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
438 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
443 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
444 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
445 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
446 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
447 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
450 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
452 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
453 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
454 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
456 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
457 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
461 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
462 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
463 (0, short_channel_id, required),
464 (2, htlc_id, required),
466 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
467 (0, session_priv, required),
472 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
473 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
474 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
475 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
476 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
479 session_priv: SecretKey,
480 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
481 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
482 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
483 payment_id: PaymentId,
486 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
487 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
488 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
490 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
492 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
494 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
497 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
498 payment_id.hash(hasher);
499 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
505 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
507 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
508 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
509 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
510 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
511 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
512 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
516 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
517 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
518 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
519 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
520 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
521 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
523 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
529 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
530 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
532 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
533 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
534 pub enum FailureCode {
535 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
536 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
537 TemporaryNodeFailure,
538 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
539 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
540 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
541 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
542 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
543 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
544 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
545 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
546 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
547 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
549 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
550 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
551 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
554 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
555 fn into(self) -> u16 {
557 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
558 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
559 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
560 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
565 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
566 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
567 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
568 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
569 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
571 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
572 err: msgs::LightningError,
573 closes_channel: bool,
574 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
576 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
578 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
580 err: LightningError {
582 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
583 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
589 closes_channel: false,
590 shutdown_finish: None,
594 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
595 Self { err, closes_channel: false, shutdown_finish: None }
598 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
599 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
600 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
601 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
602 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
603 // commitment upon reconnecting.
604 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
606 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
609 err: LightningError { err, action },
610 closes_channel: true,
611 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
615 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
618 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
620 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
621 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
625 log_level: Level::Warn,
628 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
630 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
632 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
634 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
635 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
642 closes_channel: false,
643 shutdown_finish: None,
647 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
652 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
653 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
654 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
655 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
656 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
658 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
659 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
660 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
661 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
662 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
663 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
664 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
666 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
670 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
671 struct ClaimingPayment {
673 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
674 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
675 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
676 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
678 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
679 (0, amount_msat, required),
680 (2, payment_purpose, required),
681 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
682 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
683 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
686 struct ClaimablePayment {
687 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
688 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
689 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
692 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
693 struct ClaimablePayments {
694 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
695 /// failed/claimed by the user.
697 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
698 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
700 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
701 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
702 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
704 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
705 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
706 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
707 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
710 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
711 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
712 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
713 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
715 enum BackgroundEvent {
716 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
717 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
718 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
719 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
721 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
722 /// are regenerated on startup.
723 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
724 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
725 /// channel to continue normal operation.
727 /// In general this should be used rather than
728 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
729 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
730 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
732 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
733 /// are regenerated on startup.
734 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
735 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
736 funding_txo: OutPoint,
737 channel_id: ChannelId,
738 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
740 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
741 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
743 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
744 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
745 channel_id: ChannelId,
750 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
751 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
752 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
753 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
754 /// event can be generated.
755 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
756 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
757 /// operation of another channel.
759 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
760 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
761 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
762 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
764 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
765 event: events::Event,
766 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
768 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
769 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
770 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
772 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
773 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
774 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
775 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
776 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
778 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
779 /// stored for later processing.
780 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
781 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
782 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
783 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
784 downstream_channel_id: ChannelId,
788 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
789 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
790 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
791 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
792 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
793 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
794 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
795 (4, blocking_action, required),
796 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, downstream_funding_outpoint will be
797 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
798 (5, downstream_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(downstream_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
800 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
801 (0, event, upgradable_required),
802 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
803 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
804 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
805 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
806 // downgrades to prior versions.
807 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
811 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
812 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
813 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
814 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
815 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
816 channel_id: ChannelId,
819 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
820 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
821 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
822 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
823 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, channel_funding_outpoint will be
824 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
825 (3, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(channel_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
829 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
830 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
831 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
832 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
833 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
834 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
836 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
837 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
838 channel_id: ChannelId,
839 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
844 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
845 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
846 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
847 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
848 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
853 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
854 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
858 /// State we hold per-peer.
859 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
860 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
862 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
863 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
864 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
866 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
867 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
868 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
869 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
870 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
871 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
872 latest_features: InitFeatures,
873 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
874 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
875 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
876 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
877 /// user but which have not yet completed.
879 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
880 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
881 /// for a missing channel.
882 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
883 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
884 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
886 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
887 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
888 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
889 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
891 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
892 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
893 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
894 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
895 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
896 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
897 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
898 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
899 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
900 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
901 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
902 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
903 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
904 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
905 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
909 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
910 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
911 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
912 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
913 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
914 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
917 !self.channel_by_id.iter().any(|(_, phase)|
919 ChannelPhase::Funded(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => true,
920 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => false,
922 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => true,
924 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => false,
927 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
928 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
931 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
932 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
933 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
936 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
937 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
938 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
939 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
943 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
944 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
945 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
946 /// The original OpenChannel message.
947 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
948 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
949 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
952 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
953 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
954 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
956 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
957 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
959 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
962 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
963 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
964 struct PendingInboundPayment {
965 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
966 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
967 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
968 /// this payment being removed.
970 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
971 user_payment_id: u64,
972 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
973 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
974 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
977 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
978 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
979 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
980 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
981 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
982 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
983 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
984 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
986 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
987 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
988 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
996 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
999 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
1000 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1001 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
1006 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
1007 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
1008 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
1009 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
1010 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
1011 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
1012 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
1013 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
1014 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
1016 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
1017 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
1018 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
1027 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
1030 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
1031 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1032 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
1037 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
1039 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
1041 pub trait AChannelManager {
1042 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
1043 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1044 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1045 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1046 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1047 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1048 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1049 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1050 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1051 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1052 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1053 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1054 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1055 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1056 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1057 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1058 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
1059 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1060 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1061 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1062 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1063 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1064 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1065 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1066 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1067 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1068 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1069 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1070 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1071 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1072 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1073 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1074 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1075 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1076 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1077 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1080 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1081 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1083 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1084 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1085 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1086 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1087 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1088 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1092 type Watch = M::Target;
1094 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1096 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1098 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1100 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1101 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1103 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1105 type Router = R::Target;
1107 type Logger = L::Target;
1109 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1112 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
1113 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
1115 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
1116 /// to individual Channels.
1118 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1119 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1120 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1121 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1123 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1124 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1125 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1126 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1127 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1128 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1129 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1130 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1131 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1133 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1134 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1135 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1137 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1138 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1139 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1140 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1141 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1143 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1144 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1145 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1146 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1148 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1149 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1150 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1152 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1153 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1154 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1155 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1156 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1158 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1159 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1160 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1161 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1162 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1163 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1164 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1165 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1168 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1169 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1170 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1171 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1172 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1176 // `pending_offers_messages`
1178 // `total_consistency_lock`
1180 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1182 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1184 // |__`per_peer_state`
1186 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1188 // |__`claimable_payments`
1190 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1194 // |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1196 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1198 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1202 // |__`pending_events`
1204 // |__`pending_background_events`
1206 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1208 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1209 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1210 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1211 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1212 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1213 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1217 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1218 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1219 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1225 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1227 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1229 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1230 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1232 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1233 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1234 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1235 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1237 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1238 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1240 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1241 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1242 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1243 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1244 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1245 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1246 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1247 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1249 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1251 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1252 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1254 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1256 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1257 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1258 /// and via the classic SCID.
1260 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1261 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1263 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1265 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1267 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1268 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1269 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1271 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1272 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1274 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1275 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1277 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1278 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1280 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1281 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1282 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1283 /// active channel list on load.
1285 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1286 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1288 /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1290 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1291 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1292 /// the handling of the events.
1294 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1295 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1298 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1299 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1300 /// would break backwards compatability.
1301 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1302 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1303 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1305 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1307 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1309 pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1311 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1313 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1314 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1315 /// confirmation depth.
1317 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1318 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1319 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1321 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1323 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1325 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1327 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1329 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1331 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1332 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1333 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1335 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1336 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1338 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1339 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1340 /// keeping additional state.
1341 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1343 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1344 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1345 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1346 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1348 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1349 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1351 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1352 /// are currently open with that peer.
1354 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1355 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1358 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1360 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1361 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1362 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1363 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1364 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1366 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1367 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1368 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1369 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1370 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1372 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1373 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1375 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1376 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1377 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1378 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1379 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1381 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1382 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1384 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1385 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1386 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1387 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1388 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1390 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1392 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1394 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1395 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1396 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1397 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1398 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1399 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1400 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1401 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1402 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1403 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1404 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1406 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1407 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1408 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1410 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1412 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1413 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1415 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1419 signer_provider: SP,
1424 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1426 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1427 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1428 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1429 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1430 pub struct ChainParameters {
1431 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1432 pub network: Network,
1434 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1436 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1437 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1440 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1444 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1445 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1448 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1449 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1450 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1451 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1452 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1453 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1455 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1456 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1457 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1458 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1459 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1460 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1462 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1463 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1466 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1467 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1468 /// events to handle.
1470 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1471 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1473 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1474 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1477 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1478 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1479 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1480 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1482 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1483 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1484 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1485 should_persist: move || {
1486 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1487 // processing and return that.
1488 let notify = persist_check();
1489 match (notify, force_notify) {
1490 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1491 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1492 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1493 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1494 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1497 _read_guard: read_guard,
1501 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1502 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1503 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1504 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1505 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1506 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1508 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1509 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1510 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1511 should_persist: persist_check,
1512 _read_guard: read_guard,
1517 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1518 fn drop(&mut self) {
1519 match (self.should_persist)() {
1520 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1521 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1522 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1524 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1525 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1526 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1531 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1532 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1534 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1536 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1537 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1538 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1539 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1540 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1542 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1543 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1545 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1547 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1548 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1549 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1550 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1551 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1552 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1553 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1554 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1555 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1556 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1557 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1558 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1559 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1561 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1562 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1564 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1565 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1566 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1567 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1569 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1570 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1571 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1572 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1573 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1574 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1576 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1578 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1579 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1581 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1583 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1584 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1586 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1587 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1588 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1590 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1591 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1592 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1594 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1595 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1596 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1597 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1599 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1600 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1601 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1603 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1604 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1605 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1607 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1608 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1609 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1610 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1611 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1612 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1613 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1614 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1615 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1616 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1617 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1620 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1621 /// to better separate parameters.
1622 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1623 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1624 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1625 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1626 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1627 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1628 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1629 pub features: InitFeatures,
1630 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1631 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1632 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1634 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1636 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1637 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1638 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1639 /// payments to us through this channel.
1640 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1641 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1642 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1643 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1644 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1645 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1646 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1649 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1650 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1651 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1652 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1653 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1654 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1655 /// lifetime of the channel.
1656 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1657 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1658 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1659 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1660 /// our counterparty already.
1661 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1662 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1664 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1665 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1666 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1667 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1669 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1670 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1672 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1673 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1675 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1676 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1677 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1678 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1679 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1680 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1681 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1682 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1683 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1686 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1688 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1689 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1690 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1691 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1692 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1693 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1694 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1696 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1697 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1699 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1700 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1701 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1702 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1703 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1704 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1705 /// this value on chain.
1707 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1709 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1711 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1712 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1713 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1714 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1715 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1716 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1717 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1719 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1720 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1721 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1722 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1723 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1724 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1726 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1727 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1728 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1729 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1730 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1732 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1733 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1734 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1735 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1737 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1738 pub balance_msat: u64,
1739 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1740 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1741 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1742 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1744 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1746 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1747 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1748 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1749 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1750 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1751 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1752 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1753 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1755 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1756 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1757 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1758 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1759 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1760 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1761 /// route which is valid.
1762 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1763 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1764 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1765 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1766 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1767 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1769 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1770 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1771 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1772 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1773 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1774 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1775 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1776 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1777 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1779 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1781 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1782 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1783 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1784 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1785 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1787 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1788 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1789 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1790 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1791 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1792 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1793 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1795 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1796 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1797 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1798 pub is_outbound: bool,
1799 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1800 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1801 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1802 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1803 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1805 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1806 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1807 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1808 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1809 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1810 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1811 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1813 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1814 pub is_usable: bool,
1815 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1816 pub is_public: bool,
1817 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1818 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1819 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1820 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1821 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1822 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1824 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1825 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1826 /// Pending inbound HTLCs.
1828 /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
1829 pub pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCDetails>,
1830 /// Pending outbound HTLCs.
1832 /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
1833 pub pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails>,
1836 impl ChannelDetails {
1837 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1838 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1839 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1841 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1842 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1843 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1844 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1847 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1848 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1849 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1851 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1852 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1853 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1854 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1857 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1858 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1859 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1862 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1863 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1865 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1866 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1867 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1869 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1870 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1871 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1872 features: latest_features,
1873 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1874 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1875 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1876 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1877 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1878 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1879 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1880 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1881 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1882 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1884 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1885 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1886 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1887 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1888 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1889 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1890 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1891 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1892 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1893 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1894 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1895 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1896 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1897 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1898 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1899 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1900 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1901 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1902 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1903 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1904 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1905 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1906 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1907 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1908 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1909 config: Some(context.config()),
1910 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1911 pending_inbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(),
1912 pending_outbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(),
1917 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1918 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1919 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1920 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1921 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1922 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1923 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1924 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1925 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1927 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1929 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1930 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1932 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1933 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1934 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1935 /// to drop the channel.
1939 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1940 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1941 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1942 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1943 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1945 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1946 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1947 payment_id: PaymentId,
1949 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1951 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1952 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1953 payment_id: PaymentId,
1954 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1956 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1957 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1958 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1961 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1962 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1963 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1965 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1966 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1967 payment_id: PaymentId,
1968 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1969 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1970 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1972 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1973 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1974 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1976 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1977 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1978 payment_id: PaymentId,
1979 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1980 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1984 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1986 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1988 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1989 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1990 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1991 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1993 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1994 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1995 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1998 macro_rules! handle_error {
1999 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
2000 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
2001 // entering the macro.
2002 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2003 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2007 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish, .. }) => {
2008 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
2010 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
2011 let counterparty_node_id = shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id;
2012 let channel_id = shutdown_res.channel_id;
2013 let logger = WithContext::from(
2014 &$self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
2016 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel: {}", err.err);
2018 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
2019 if let Some(update) = update_option {
2020 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2025 log_error!($self.logger, "Got non-closing error: {}", err.err);
2028 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
2030 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2031 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
2032 action: err.action.clone()
2036 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
2037 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2038 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
2039 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2040 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
2044 // Return error in case higher-API need one
2051 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2052 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2053 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
2054 $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
2056 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2057 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2058 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2060 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2061 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2062 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2063 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2064 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2066 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2067 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2069 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2073 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2074 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2075 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2077 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2078 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2080 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2081 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2083 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2084 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
2085 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2086 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2087 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
2088 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason);
2090 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $channel_update);
2095 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2096 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2098 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2099 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2101 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2102 match $channel_phase {
2103 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2104 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2106 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2107 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2109 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2110 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2112 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
2113 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(channel) => {
2114 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2116 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
2117 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
2118 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2124 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2125 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2129 let key = *$entry.key();
2130 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2132 $entry.remove_entry();
2140 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2141 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2145 let key = *$entry.key();
2146 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2148 $entry.remove_entry();
2156 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2157 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2159 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2160 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2166 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2167 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2168 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2169 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2170 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2172 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2173 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2174 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2175 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2176 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2177 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2178 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2179 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2180 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2181 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2186 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2187 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2188 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2189 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2190 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2191 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2192 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2193 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2194 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2195 channel_type: Some($channel.context.get_channel_type().clone()),
2197 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2202 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2203 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2204 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2205 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2206 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2207 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2208 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2209 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2210 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2212 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2217 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2218 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2219 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2220 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2221 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2222 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height);
2223 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2224 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2225 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2226 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2227 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2228 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2230 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2231 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2232 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2238 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2239 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2241 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2242 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2243 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2244 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2245 updates.announcement_sigs);
2246 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2247 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2250 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2251 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2252 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2253 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2255 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2256 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2257 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2258 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2259 let mut batch_completed = false;
2260 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2261 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2262 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2263 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2265 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2266 channel_state.2 = true;
2268 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2270 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2272 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2275 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2276 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2277 if batch_completed {
2278 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2279 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2280 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2281 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2282 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2283 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2284 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2285 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2286 chan.set_batch_ready();
2287 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2288 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2292 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2293 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2294 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2299 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2301 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2302 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2304 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2305 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2306 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2307 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2312 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2313 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2314 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2315 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2317 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2318 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2319 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
2320 panic!("{}", err_str);
2322 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2323 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2324 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2327 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2333 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2334 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2335 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2337 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2338 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2339 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2340 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2341 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2342 // filter for uniqueness here.
2343 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2344 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2345 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2346 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2348 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2349 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2351 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2352 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2353 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2359 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2360 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2361 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2362 while !processed_all_events {
2363 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2370 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2371 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2372 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2374 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2375 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2376 result = $self.process_background_events();
2378 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2379 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2380 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2381 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2385 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2386 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2387 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2388 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2391 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2393 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2394 $event_to_handle = event;
2396 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2397 post_event_actions.push(action);
2402 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2403 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2404 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2405 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2406 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2407 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2410 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2411 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2412 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2413 processed_all_events = false;
2417 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2418 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2419 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2421 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2422 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2423 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2429 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2431 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2432 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2433 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2434 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2435 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2436 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2440 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2442 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2444 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2445 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2447 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2449 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2450 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2451 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2454 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2455 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2456 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2458 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2459 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2460 current_timestamp: u32,
2462 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2463 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2464 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2465 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2467 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2468 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2469 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2474 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2476 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(new_hash_set()),
2477 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2478 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2479 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2480 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: new_hash_map(), pending_claiming_payments: new_hash_map() }),
2481 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2482 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2483 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
2485 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2488 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2489 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2491 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2493 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2495 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
2497 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2498 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2499 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2500 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2501 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2502 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2503 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2504 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2506 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2516 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2517 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2518 &self.default_configuration
2521 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2522 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2523 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2526 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2527 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2529 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2531 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2535 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2540 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2542 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2543 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2544 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2545 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2546 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2548 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2549 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2551 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2552 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2553 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2555 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2556 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2557 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2559 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2560 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2562 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2563 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2564 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2565 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2566 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2567 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2569 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2570 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2571 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2572 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2573 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2574 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2577 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2578 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2579 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2581 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2583 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2584 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2586 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2588 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2589 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2590 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2595 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2596 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2597 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2598 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2599 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2600 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height, outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2604 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2609 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2611 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2612 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2613 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2615 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2617 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2620 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2623 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2624 node_id: their_network_key,
2627 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2630 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2631 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2632 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2633 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2634 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2635 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2636 // the same channel.
2637 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2639 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2640 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2641 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2642 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2643 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2644 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2645 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2646 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2647 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2651 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2652 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2653 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2661 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2662 /// more information.
2663 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2664 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2665 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2666 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2667 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2668 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2669 // the same channel.
2670 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2672 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2673 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2674 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2675 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2676 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2677 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2678 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2679 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2687 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2688 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2690 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2691 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2693 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2694 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2695 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2696 // really wanted anyway.
2697 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2700 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2701 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2702 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2703 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2705 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2706 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2707 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2708 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2709 let context_to_details = |context| {
2710 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2712 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2714 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2715 .map(context_to_details)
2721 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2722 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2724 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2725 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2726 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2728 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2729 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2730 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2731 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2732 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2733 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2735 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2736 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2737 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2739 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2740 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2741 payment_id: *payment_id,
2742 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2743 total_msat: *total_msat,
2746 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2747 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2749 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2750 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2752 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2757 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2758 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2760 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
2761 let mut shutdown_result = None;
2764 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2766 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2767 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2769 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2770 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2772 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2773 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2774 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2775 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2776 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2777 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2778 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2779 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2781 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2782 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2783 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2784 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2785 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2789 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2790 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2792 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2793 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2794 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2795 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2798 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2799 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
2802 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2803 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2805 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
2806 channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
2813 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2814 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2815 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2816 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2819 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2820 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2826 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2827 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2828 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2830 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2831 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2833 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2834 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2835 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2836 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2838 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2840 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2841 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2842 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2845 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2846 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2847 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2848 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2849 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2850 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2853 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2854 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2855 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2857 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2858 /// the channel being closed or not:
2859 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2860 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2861 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2862 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2863 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2864 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2865 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2867 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2868 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2869 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2870 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2872 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2874 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2875 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2876 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2879 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2880 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2881 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2882 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2883 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2886 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2887 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2888 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2889 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2890 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2893 let logger = WithContext::from(
2894 &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
2897 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel due to {} with {} HTLCs to fail",
2898 shutdown_res.closure_reason, shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
2899 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
2900 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2901 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2902 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2903 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2905 if let Some((_, funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
2906 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2907 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2908 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2909 // ignore the result here.
2910 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2912 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2913 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2914 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2915 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2916 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2917 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2918 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2919 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2920 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2921 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2922 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2923 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure));
2926 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2929 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2930 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2935 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2936 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2937 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id,
2938 user_channel_id: shutdown_res.user_channel_id,
2939 reason: shutdown_res.closure_reason,
2940 counterparty_node_id: Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id),
2941 channel_capacity_sats: Some(shutdown_res.channel_capacity_satoshis),
2942 channel_funding_txo: shutdown_res.channel_funding_txo,
2945 if let Some(transaction) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_funding_tx {
2946 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2947 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id, transaction
2951 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2952 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2956 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2957 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2958 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2959 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2960 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2961 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2962 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2963 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2964 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2965 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2966 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2968 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2970 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
2971 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2972 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2973 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2974 mem::drop(peer_state);
2975 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2977 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2978 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast, closure_reason));
2979 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2981 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2982 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
2983 // Unfunded channel has no update
2984 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2986 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
2987 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
2988 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => {
2989 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
2990 // Unfunded channel has no update
2991 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2994 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2995 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2996 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2997 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2999 (None, *peer_node_id)
3001 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
3004 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
3005 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
3006 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
3007 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3008 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
3009 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
3010 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
3011 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3012 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3018 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
3021 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3022 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3023 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
3024 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
3025 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3026 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3027 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3028 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
3029 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3030 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3031 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
3032 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
3043 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
3044 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
3045 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
3047 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3048 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3049 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
3052 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
3053 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
3054 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
3056 /// You can always broadcast the latest local transaction(s) via
3057 /// [`ChannelMonitor::broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
3058 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3059 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3060 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
3063 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
3064 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3065 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
3066 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3067 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3071 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3072 /// local transaction(s).
3073 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
3074 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3075 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3079 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3080 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3082 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3084 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3085 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3088 let is_intro_node_forward = match next_hop {
3089 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3090 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward {
3091 intro_node_blinding_point: Some(_), ..
3097 macro_rules! return_err {
3098 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3101 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
3102 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg
3104 // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3105 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3106 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3107 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3108 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3109 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3110 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3114 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_forward {
3115 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3116 } else { ($err_code, $data) };
3117 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3118 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3119 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3120 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3121 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3127 let NextPacketDetails {
3128 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_scid, outgoing_cltv_value
3129 } = match next_packet_details_opt {
3130 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3131 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3132 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3135 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3136 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3137 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3138 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3139 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3140 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3141 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3142 // phantom or an intercept.
3143 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3144 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3145 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3149 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3152 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3154 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3155 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3156 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3157 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3158 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3160 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3161 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3162 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3163 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3166 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3167 // have no consistency guarantees.
3168 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3172 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3173 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3174 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3175 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3176 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3178 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3179 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3180 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3181 // we don't have the channel here.
3182 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3184 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3186 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3187 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3188 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3189 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3190 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3191 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3192 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3193 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3194 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3195 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3196 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3198 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3201 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3202 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3204 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3205 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3212 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
3214 if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3215 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3217 if code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() {
3218 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3219 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3220 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3221 break Some((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None))
3223 let chan_update_opt = if code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None };
3224 break Some((err_msg, code, chan_update_opt));
3230 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3231 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3232 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3233 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3235 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3236 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3238 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3239 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3240 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3242 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3243 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3244 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3245 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3246 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3247 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3248 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3252 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3254 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_pubkey)))
3257 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3258 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3259 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3260 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3261 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3262 macro_rules! return_err {
3263 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3265 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
3266 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3267 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3268 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3269 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3270 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3271 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3272 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3273 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3277 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3278 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3279 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3280 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3281 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3287 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3289 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3290 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3291 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3292 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3295 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3296 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3297 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3298 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3299 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3301 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3304 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3305 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3306 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3307 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3308 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3314 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3315 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3316 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3318 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3319 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3320 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3322 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3323 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3324 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3325 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3326 return Err(LightningError {
3327 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3328 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3331 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3332 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3334 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3335 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3336 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3339 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3340 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3341 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3342 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3344 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3345 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3346 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3348 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3349 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3350 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3351 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3352 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3353 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3354 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3358 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3361 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3362 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3363 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3364 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3366 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3367 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3368 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3369 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3370 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3373 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3374 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3376 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3377 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3378 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3379 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3380 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3381 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3382 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3383 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3385 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3386 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3387 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3389 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3391 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3398 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3399 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3400 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3401 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3406 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3407 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3408 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3411 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3412 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3413 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3414 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3416 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3417 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3418 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3420 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3421 log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3425 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3426 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3428 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3429 log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3430 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
3432 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3435 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
3437 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3438 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3440 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3441 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3442 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3443 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3444 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3445 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3446 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3447 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3448 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3449 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3451 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3452 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3453 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3454 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3456 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3457 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3459 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
3460 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3461 Some(monitor_update) => {
3462 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3464 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3465 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3466 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3467 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3468 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3469 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3470 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3478 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3481 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3482 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3483 // `channel_by_id` map.
3484 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3485 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3489 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3490 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3492 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3497 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3499 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3500 /// fields for more info.
3502 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3503 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3505 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3507 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3508 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3509 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3510 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3511 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3513 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3514 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3515 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3516 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3517 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3519 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3520 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3521 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3522 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3524 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3526 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3527 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3528 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3530 /// In general, a path may raise:
3531 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3532 /// node public key) is specified.
3533 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3534 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3535 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3536 /// relevant updates.
3538 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3539 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3540 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3542 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3543 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3544 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3545 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3546 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3547 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3548 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3549 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3550 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3551 self.pending_outbound_payments
3552 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3553 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3554 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3557 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3558 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3559 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3560 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3561 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3562 self.pending_outbound_payments
3563 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3564 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3565 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3566 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3570 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3571 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3572 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3573 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3574 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3575 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3579 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3580 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3581 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3585 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3586 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3589 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3590 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3591 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3592 self.pending_outbound_payments
3593 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3594 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3595 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3596 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3597 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3601 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3602 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3603 /// retries are exhausted.
3605 /// # Event Generation
3607 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3608 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3610 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3611 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3612 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3614 /// # Requested Invoices
3616 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3617 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3618 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3619 /// once the invoice has been received.
3621 /// # Restart Behavior
3623 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3624 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3625 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3627 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3628 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3629 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3630 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3633 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3634 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3635 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3636 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3637 /// never reach the recipient.
3639 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3640 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3642 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3643 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3645 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3646 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3647 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3648 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3649 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3650 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3651 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3654 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3655 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3657 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3660 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3661 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3662 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3663 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3664 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3665 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3666 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3667 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3670 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3671 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3672 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3673 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3674 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3675 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3676 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3677 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3678 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3681 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3684 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3685 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3688 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3689 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3691 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3692 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3693 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3694 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3695 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3696 let payment_params =
3697 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3699 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3701 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3704 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3705 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3707 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3708 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3709 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3710 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3712 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3713 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3714 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3715 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3716 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3717 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3718 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3719 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3720 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3721 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3723 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3724 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3725 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3726 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3730 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3732 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3733 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3736 let mut used_liquidity_map = hash_map_with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3738 let mut res = Vec::new();
3740 for mut path in route.paths {
3741 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3742 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3743 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3744 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3745 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3748 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3751 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3752 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3754 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3756 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3757 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3762 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3765 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3770 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3771 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3772 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3774 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3775 let used_liquidity =
3776 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3778 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3779 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3781 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3784 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3789 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3790 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3791 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3798 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3799 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3800 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3801 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3802 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3803 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3804 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3805 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3806 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3808 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3809 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3811 let (mut chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3812 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
3813 funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3815 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3816 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger)
3817 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3818 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3819 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
3820 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason);
3821 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None))
3822 } else { unreachable!(); });
3824 Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
3825 Err((chan, err)) => {
3826 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3827 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3828 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3829 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3830 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3836 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3837 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3839 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3840 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3843 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3844 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3845 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3849 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
3850 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3851 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3855 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3856 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3857 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3859 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3860 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3861 match outpoint_to_peer.entry(funding_txo) {
3862 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); },
3863 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(o) => {
3865 "An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}",
3866 funding_txo, o.get()
3868 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer);
3869 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3870 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3871 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.clone() };
3872 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
3873 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err });
3876 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
3883 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3884 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3885 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3889 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3891 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3892 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3894 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3895 /// across the p2p network.
3897 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3898 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3900 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3901 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3902 /// keys per-channel).
3904 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3905 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3906 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3908 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3909 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3910 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3912 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3913 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3914 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3915 /// for more details.
3917 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3918 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3919 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3920 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3923 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3925 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3926 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3928 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
3929 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3930 /// signature for each channel.
3932 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3933 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3934 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3935 let mut result = Ok(());
3937 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3938 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3939 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3940 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3941 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3946 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3947 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3948 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3952 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3953 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3954 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3955 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3956 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3957 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
3958 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
3959 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
3961 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3962 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3967 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3968 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3969 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3970 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3974 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3975 match states.entry(txid) {
3976 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3977 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3978 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3982 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3985 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
3986 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3987 temporary_channel_id,
3988 counterparty_node_id,
3989 funding_transaction.clone(),
3992 let mut output_index = None;
3993 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3994 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3995 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3996 if output_index.is_some() {
3997 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3998 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
4001 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
4004 if output_index.is_none() {
4005 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4006 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
4009 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
4010 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
4011 // TODO(dual_funding): We only do batch funding for V1 channels at the moment, but we'll probably
4012 // need to fix this somehow to not rely on using the outpoint for the channel ID if we
4013 // want to support V2 batching here as well.
4014 funding_batch_state.push((ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint), *counterparty_node_id, false));
4020 if let Err(ref e) = result {
4021 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
4022 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
4023 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
4024 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
4025 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
4026 .into_iter().flatten()
4027 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
4029 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
4030 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
4032 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
4034 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4035 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
4036 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4037 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4038 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
4040 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
4041 let closure_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() };
4042 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
4046 mem::drop(funding_batch_states);
4047 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
4048 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4054 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4056 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4057 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4058 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4059 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4061 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4062 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4064 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4065 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4067 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4069 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4070 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4071 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4072 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4073 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4074 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4075 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4076 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4077 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4078 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4079 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4080 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4081 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4085 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4086 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4087 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4088 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4089 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4090 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4091 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4092 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4093 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4094 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4098 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4099 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4100 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4101 config.apply(config_update);
4102 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4105 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4106 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4107 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4108 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4109 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4110 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4117 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4118 debug_assert!(false);
4119 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4121 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4122 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4129 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4131 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4132 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4133 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4134 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4136 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4137 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4139 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4140 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4142 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4144 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4145 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4146 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4147 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4148 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4149 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4150 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4151 pub fn update_channel_config(
4152 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4153 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4154 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4157 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4158 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4160 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4161 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4163 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4164 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4165 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4166 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4167 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4169 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4170 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4171 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4174 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4177 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4178 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4179 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4180 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4181 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4182 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4183 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4185 let next_hop_scid = {
4186 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4187 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4188 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4189 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4190 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4191 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4192 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4193 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4194 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4195 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4198 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4200 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4201 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4202 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4205 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4206 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4207 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
4208 log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4209 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4216 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4217 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4218 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4221 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4222 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4223 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4224 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4227 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4229 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4230 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4231 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4232 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4233 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4236 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4237 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4238 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4239 payment.prev_channel_id,
4240 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4241 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4243 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4247 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4248 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4250 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4253 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4254 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4255 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4257 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4258 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4259 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4262 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4263 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4264 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4265 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4266 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4267 channel_id: payment.prev_channel_id,
4268 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4269 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4270 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4271 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4274 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4275 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4276 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4277 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4282 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4284 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4285 /// Will likely generate further events.
4286 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4287 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4289 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4290 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4291 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4293 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
4294 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4296 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4297 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4298 let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
4299 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4301 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4302 match forward_info {
4303 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4304 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4305 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4306 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4307 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4310 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4311 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4312 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_channel_id));
4313 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4315 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4316 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4317 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4318 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4319 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4320 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4321 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4322 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4323 blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
4326 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4327 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4329 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4332 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4333 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4339 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4340 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4342 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4346 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4347 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4349 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4353 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4354 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4355 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4356 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4357 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4358 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4359 payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
4362 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4363 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4364 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4365 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4366 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4368 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4370 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4371 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4375 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4376 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4377 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4378 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4379 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4380 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4382 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4383 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4389 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4392 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4395 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4396 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4397 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4398 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4399 // problem, not ours.
4405 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4406 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4407 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4409 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4413 forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
4414 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4415 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4416 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4417 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4420 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4421 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4422 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4423 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4424 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4425 let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
4426 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4427 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4428 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4429 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4430 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4431 onion_packet, blinded, ..
4432 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4435 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4436 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4437 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4438 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4439 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4440 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4441 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4442 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4443 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4444 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4445 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|b| b.failure),
4447 let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
4448 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
4449 Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
4450 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4451 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
4452 &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
4455 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4456 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4457 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
4460 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4461 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4463 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4465 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4466 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4467 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4468 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4474 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4475 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4477 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4478 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4479 Some((chan.queue_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger), htlc_id))
4481 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4482 log_trace!(logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4483 let res = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(
4484 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &&logger
4486 Some((res, htlc_id))
4489 if let Some((queue_fail_htlc_res, htlc_id)) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4490 if let Err(e) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4491 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4492 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4494 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_{{malformed_}}htlc() were not met");
4496 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4497 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4498 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4504 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4508 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4509 match forward_info {
4510 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4511 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4512 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4513 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4514 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4517 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
4518 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4519 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
4520 payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret,
4521 custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
4523 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4524 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4525 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4526 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4527 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4529 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
4530 payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata,
4531 incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
4533 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4534 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4538 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4539 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4542 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4545 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4546 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4547 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4548 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4549 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4550 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4551 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4552 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4553 phantom_shared_secret,
4556 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4557 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4558 // if routing nodes overpay
4559 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4560 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4562 total_value_received: None,
4563 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4566 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4569 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4571 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4572 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4573 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4574 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4575 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4576 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes(),
4578 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4579 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4580 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4581 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4582 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4583 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4584 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4585 phantom_shared_secret,
4588 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4589 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4591 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4594 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4595 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4596 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4597 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4598 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4601 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4602 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4603 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4604 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4605 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4606 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4608 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4609 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4610 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4612 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4613 .entry(payment_hash)
4614 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4615 .or_insert_with(|| {
4616 committed_to_claimable = true;
4618 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4621 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4622 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4623 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4624 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4626 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4627 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4628 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4630 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4631 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4632 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4635 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4637 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4638 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4639 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4640 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4641 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4642 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4643 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4644 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4645 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4646 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4648 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4650 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4651 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4652 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4653 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4654 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4655 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4657 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4658 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4659 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4660 committed_to_claimable = true;
4662 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4663 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4664 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4665 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4666 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4667 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4668 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4669 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4670 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4674 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4675 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4676 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4677 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4678 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4680 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4682 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4683 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4685 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4686 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4687 committed_to_claimable = true;
4690 payment_claimable_generated
4694 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4695 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4696 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4697 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4698 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4699 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4700 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4701 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4702 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4703 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4704 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4705 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4706 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4707 Ok(result) => result,
4709 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4710 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4713 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4714 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4715 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4716 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4717 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4718 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4721 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4722 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4723 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4725 check_total_value!(purpose);
4727 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4728 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4729 check_total_value!(purpose);
4733 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4734 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4735 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4736 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4738 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4739 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4740 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4741 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4742 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4743 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4744 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4745 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4747 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4748 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4749 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4751 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4752 if payment_claimable_generated {
4753 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4759 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4760 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4768 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4769 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4770 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4771 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4773 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4774 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4776 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4778 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4779 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4780 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4782 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4784 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4785 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4786 events.append(&mut new_events);
4789 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4791 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4792 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4793 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4795 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4797 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4798 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4799 if background_events.is_empty() {
4800 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4803 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4805 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, _channel_id, update)) => {
4806 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4807 // monitor updating completing.
4808 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4810 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update } => {
4811 let mut updated_chan = false;
4813 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4814 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4815 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4816 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4817 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4818 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4819 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4820 updated_chan = true;
4821 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4822 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4824 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4827 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4832 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4833 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4836 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4837 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4838 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4839 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4840 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4841 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4842 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4844 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4845 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4846 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4847 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4848 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4854 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4857 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4858 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4859 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4860 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4861 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4864 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4865 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4867 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4869 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4870 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4871 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4873 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4874 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4875 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4876 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4878 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4879 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4881 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
4882 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4886 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4887 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4888 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4889 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4890 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4891 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4892 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4894 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4895 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4897 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4898 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4899 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4900 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4901 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4902 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4904 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4909 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4910 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4918 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4920 /// This currently includes:
4921 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4922 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4923 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4925 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4926 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4927 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4928 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4929 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4930 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4931 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4932 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
4934 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4935 /// estimate fetches.
4937 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4938 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4939 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4940 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4941 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4943 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4944 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4946 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4947 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4948 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4949 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4951 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4952 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4953 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4954 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4955 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4956 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4958 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4959 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4960 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
4962 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4963 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4964 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
4965 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4966 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4967 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4968 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4969 channel_id: *chan_id,
4970 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4981 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4982 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4983 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4984 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4985 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4986 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4987 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4989 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4990 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4995 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4996 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4998 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4999 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
5000 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
5001 if needs_close { return false; }
5004 match chan.channel_update_status() {
5005 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
5006 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
5007 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
5008 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
5009 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
5010 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
5011 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
5013 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5014 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
5015 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5016 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5020 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5022 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
5025 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
5027 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5028 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
5029 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5030 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5034 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5036 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
5042 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5044 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
5045 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5046 log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
5047 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
5048 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5049 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5050 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
5051 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
5052 channel_id: *chan_id,
5053 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
5061 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5062 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5063 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5065 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5066 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5067 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5069 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
5070 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
5071 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5072 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5074 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
5075 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
5076 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5077 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5082 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5083 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5084 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
5085 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5086 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5087 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5088 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5089 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5090 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5096 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5098 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5099 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5104 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5105 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5106 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5107 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5108 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5109 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5110 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5111 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5112 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5113 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5114 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5115 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5116 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5117 // have no channels to the peer.
5118 let remove_entry = {
5119 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5120 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5123 entry.remove_entry();
5126 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5131 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5132 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5133 // This should be unreachable
5134 debug_assert!(false);
5137 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5138 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5139 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5140 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5141 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5142 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5143 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5146 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5147 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5148 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5150 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5151 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5158 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5159 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5160 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5161 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5162 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5165 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5166 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5169 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5170 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5173 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5174 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5175 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5176 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5177 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5178 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5179 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5182 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5183 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5186 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5187 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5188 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5189 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5190 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5197 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5198 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5199 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5201 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5202 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5203 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5204 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5206 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5207 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5208 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5209 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5210 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5211 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5214 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5215 /// reason for the failure.
5217 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5218 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5219 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5221 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5222 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5223 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5224 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5225 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5226 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5227 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5232 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5233 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5234 match failure_code {
5235 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5236 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5237 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5238 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5239 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
5240 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5242 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5243 let fail_data = match data {
5244 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5247 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5252 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5253 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5255 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5257 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5258 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5259 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5260 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5261 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5262 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5263 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5265 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5267 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5268 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5270 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5275 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5276 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5277 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5278 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5279 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5280 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5281 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5282 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5283 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5284 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5286 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5287 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5288 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5289 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5291 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5292 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5293 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5294 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5295 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5299 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5300 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5301 // be surfaced to the user.
5302 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5303 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5304 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5306 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5307 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5308 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5309 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5310 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5311 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5312 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5313 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5314 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5316 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5317 debug_assert!(false);
5318 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5321 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5323 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5326 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5327 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5328 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5329 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5333 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5334 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5335 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5336 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5337 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5338 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5339 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5340 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5341 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5342 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5345 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5346 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5347 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5350 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5351 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5352 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5354 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5355 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5356 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5357 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5358 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5360 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5361 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5362 ref phantom_shared_secret, outpoint: _, ref blinded_failure, ref channel_id, ..
5365 WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(*channel_id)),
5366 "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
5367 if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
5369 let failure = match blinded_failure {
5370 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
5371 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
5372 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5373 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5375 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5377 Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
5378 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
5380 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
5381 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
5385 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5386 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5388 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5392 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5393 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5394 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5395 push_forward_ev = true;
5397 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5398 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5399 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
5401 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5402 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
5405 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5406 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5407 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5408 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5409 prev_channel_id: *channel_id,
5410 failed_next_destination: destination,
5416 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5417 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5419 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5420 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5421 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5422 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5424 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5425 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5426 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5427 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5429 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5430 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5431 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5433 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5434 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5435 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5436 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5437 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5438 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5439 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5440 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5441 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5444 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5445 /// even type numbers.
5449 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5450 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5452 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5453 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5454 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5457 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5458 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
5460 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5463 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5464 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5465 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5466 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5467 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5468 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5469 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5470 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5475 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5476 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5477 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5478 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5479 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5481 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5482 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5483 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5487 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5488 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5489 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5490 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5491 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5492 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5493 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5494 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5495 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5496 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5497 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5506 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5508 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5509 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5510 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5511 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5512 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5513 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5514 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5515 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5516 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5517 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5518 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5519 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5520 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5521 debug_assert!(false);
5525 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5527 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5528 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5529 debug_assert!(false);
5533 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5534 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5536 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5537 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5538 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5539 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5542 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5543 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5544 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5545 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5549 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5550 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
5551 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5552 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5553 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5554 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5555 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5558 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5559 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5560 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5561 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
5562 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5563 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5568 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5569 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5570 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
5571 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5572 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5573 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5574 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5576 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5579 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5580 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5581 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5582 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5586 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5587 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5588 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5589 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5591 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5592 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5593 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5594 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5596 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5597 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5598 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5599 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5602 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5603 let chan_id = prev_hop.channel_id;
5604 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5605 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5609 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5610 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5611 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5614 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5615 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5616 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5617 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5618 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5619 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5620 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5621 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
5624 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5625 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5626 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5628 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5631 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5632 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5634 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5635 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5636 // monitor update as a background event.
5637 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5638 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5639 counterparty_node_id,
5640 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5641 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
5642 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5646 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5647 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5652 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5654 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5656 let (node_id, _funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker) =
5657 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5658 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5659 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5660 blocking_action: blocker, downstream_channel_id: channel_id,
5662 (node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)
5664 debug_assert!(false,
5665 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5668 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5669 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5670 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5671 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5672 .get_mut(&channel_id)
5674 let mut found_blocker = false;
5675 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5676 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5677 // which case we need to only remove the one
5678 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5679 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5680 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5681 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5683 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5686 debug_assert!(false);
5695 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5696 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5697 counterparty_node_id: None,
5698 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5701 channel_id: Some(prev_hop.channel_id),
5705 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5706 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5707 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5708 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5709 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5710 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5711 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5712 // again on restart.
5713 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.channel_id)),
5714 "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5715 payment_preimage, update_res);
5718 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5719 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5721 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5722 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5723 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5724 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5725 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5726 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5727 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5728 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5729 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5730 prev_hop.outpoint, prev_hop.channel_id, preimage_update,
5733 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5734 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5735 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5736 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5737 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5738 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5742 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5743 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5746 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5747 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
5748 startup_replay: bool, next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
5749 next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint, next_channel_id: ChannelId, next_user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
5752 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5753 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5754 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5755 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5756 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5758 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5759 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint, channel_id: next_channel_id,
5760 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5762 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5763 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5766 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5767 let prev_channel_id = hop_data.channel_id;
5768 let prev_user_channel_id = hop_data.user_channel_id;
5769 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5770 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5771 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5772 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5773 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5774 let chan_to_release =
5775 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5776 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, next_channel_id, completed_blocker))
5778 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5779 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5780 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5781 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5786 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5787 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5788 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5789 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5790 // in the background.
5791 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5792 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5793 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5794 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5796 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5797 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5798 funding_txo, update, ..
5800 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5801 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5802 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5803 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5805 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5811 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5812 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5813 (funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)
5815 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5816 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5818 monitor_update.updates[0],
5819 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5824 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5825 // immediately once we get going.
5826 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5829 *channel_id == prev_channel_id,
5831 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5834 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5835 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5836 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5837 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5838 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5839 downstream_channel_id: other_chan.2,
5840 blocking_action: other_chan.3,
5844 let total_fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5845 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5846 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5849 debug_assert!(skimmed_fee_msat <= total_fee_earned_msat,
5850 "skimmed_fee_msat must always be included in total_fee_earned_msat");
5851 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5852 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5853 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
5854 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
5855 prev_user_channel_id,
5856 next_user_channel_id,
5857 total_fee_earned_msat,
5859 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5860 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5862 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5866 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5867 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5868 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5874 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5875 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5876 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5879 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5880 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5881 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5882 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5884 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5886 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5887 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5888 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5890 payment_purpose: purpose,
5893 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5895 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5899 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5901 sender_intended_total_msat,
5905 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5906 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5908 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5909 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5910 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, Some(blocker));
5913 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5914 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, downstream_channel_id, blocking_action,
5916 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5917 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5918 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5919 downstream_channel_id,
5920 Some(blocking_action),
5927 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5928 /// update completion.
5929 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5930 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5931 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5932 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5933 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5934 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5935 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5936 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5937 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5938 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5939 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5940 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5941 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5942 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5944 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5946 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5947 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5948 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5949 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5952 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5953 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5955 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5956 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5957 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5962 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5963 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5964 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5965 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5970 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5971 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5972 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5973 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5974 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5979 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5983 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5989 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5990 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5991 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5995 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5996 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5997 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6003 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, channel_id: &ChannelId, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
6004 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6006 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
6007 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6009 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6010 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
6011 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6012 match outpoint_to_peer.get(funding_txo) {
6013 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6018 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6019 let mut peer_state_lock;
6020 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
6021 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
6022 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6023 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6025 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
6028 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
6029 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
6030 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6031 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6032 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
6035 let remaining_in_flight =
6036 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
6037 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
6040 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
6041 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
6042 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
6043 remaining_in_flight);
6044 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
6047 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
6050 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
6052 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
6053 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
6056 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6057 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6058 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6060 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
6061 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
6062 /// used to accept such channels.
6064 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6065 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6066 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6067 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
6070 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
6071 /// it as confirmed immediately.
6073 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6074 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6075 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6077 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
6078 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
6080 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
6081 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
6083 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
6084 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
6086 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6087 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6088 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6089 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
6092 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6094 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id));
6095 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6097 let peers_without_funded_channels =
6098 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
6099 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6100 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6102 let err_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6103 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6105 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6107 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6108 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6109 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
6111 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
6112 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
6113 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6115 let res = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6116 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6117 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6118 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6119 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6120 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6121 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|err| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(err, *temporary_channel_id))
6124 let err_str = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned();
6125 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6127 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6133 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6134 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6135 match handle_error!(self, Result::<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>::Err(err), *counterparty_node_id) {
6136 Ok(_) => unreachable!("`handle_error` only returns Err as we've passed in an Err"),
6138 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err });
6142 Ok(mut channel) => {
6144 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
6145 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
6146 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
6147 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6148 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6149 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6150 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
6153 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6154 let err_str = "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned();
6155 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6157 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6159 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6160 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6161 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6162 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6163 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6164 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6165 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6166 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6169 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6170 let err_str = "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned();
6171 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6173 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6177 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6178 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6179 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6181 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6182 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6183 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6186 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6193 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6194 /// or 0-conf channels.
6196 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6197 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6198 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6199 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6200 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6201 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6203 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6204 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6205 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6206 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6207 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6208 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6209 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6213 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6216 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6217 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6219 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6220 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6222 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6223 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6224 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6225 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6226 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6228 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6231 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6232 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6233 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6236 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
6237 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
6238 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
6239 // Only inbound V2 channels that are not 0conf and that we do not contribute to will be
6240 // included in the unfunded count.
6241 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6242 chan.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis == 0 {
6243 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6246 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6247 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6250 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
6251 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
6252 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
6253 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6258 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6261 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6262 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6263 // likely to be lost on restart!
6264 if msg.common_fields.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6265 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(),
6266 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6269 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6270 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(),
6271 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6274 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6275 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6276 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6277 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6278 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6280 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6281 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6283 debug_assert!(false);
6284 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6285 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
6286 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6288 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6289 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6291 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6292 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6293 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6294 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6295 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6296 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6298 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6299 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6300 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6303 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6304 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6305 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6306 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6307 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6310 let channel_id = msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id;
6311 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6313 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6314 "temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(),
6315 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6318 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6319 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6320 let channel_type = channel::channel_type_from_open_channel(
6321 &msg.common_fields, &peer_state.latest_features, &self.channel_type_features()
6323 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
6325 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6326 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6327 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6328 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6329 funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
6330 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6333 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6334 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6335 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6340 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6341 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6342 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6343 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6344 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6345 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6346 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6349 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
6354 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6355 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6356 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6357 "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(),
6358 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6360 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6361 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6362 "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(),
6363 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6366 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6367 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6369 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6370 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6371 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6373 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6377 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6378 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6379 // likely to be lost on restart!
6380 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6381 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6382 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6384 debug_assert!(false);
6385 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
6387 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6388 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6389 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id) {
6390 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6391 match phase.get_mut() {
6392 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6393 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6394 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6397 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
6401 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id))
6404 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6405 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6406 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id,
6407 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6408 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6410 user_channel_id: user_id,
6415 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6416 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6418 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6419 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6421 debug_assert!(false);
6422 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6425 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6426 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6427 let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6428 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6429 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6430 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
6431 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
6433 Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
6434 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6435 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6436 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6437 debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
6438 // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
6439 // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
6440 // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
6441 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6445 Some(mut phase) => {
6446 let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6447 let err = ChannelError::Close(err_msg);
6448 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6450 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6453 let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
6455 macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
6456 // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
6457 // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
6458 // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
6459 // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
6460 // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
6462 let err = ChannelError::Close($err.to_owned());
6463 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
6464 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
6467 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
6468 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6469 fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
6471 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6472 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6473 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
6474 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6475 fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
6477 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6478 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6479 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6480 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6481 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
6483 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6484 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6485 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6486 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6487 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
6488 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6489 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6494 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6495 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6496 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6498 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6502 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6503 log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6504 fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
6512 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6513 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6514 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6515 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6517 debug_assert!(false);
6518 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6521 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6522 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6523 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6524 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
6525 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
6526 let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
6527 let logger = WithContext::from(
6529 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
6530 Some(chan.context.channel_id())
6533 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
6535 Ok((mut chan, monitor)) => {
6536 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6537 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
6538 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
6539 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
6540 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
6541 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
6542 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6543 } else { unreachable!(); }
6546 let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
6547 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no
6548 // updates should be made on it. Previously, full_stack_target
6549 // found an (unreachable) panic when the monitor update contained
6550 // within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
6551 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.channel_id);
6552 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6556 debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
6557 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
6558 // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
6559 // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
6560 // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6561 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6565 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6568 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6572 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6573 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6574 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6575 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6576 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6578 debug_assert!(false);
6579 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6581 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6582 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6583 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6584 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6585 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6586 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6587 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6588 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6589 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6590 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6591 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6592 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6593 msg: announcement_sigs,
6595 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6596 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6597 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6598 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6599 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6600 // announcement_signatures.
6601 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6602 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6603 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6604 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6611 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6612 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6617 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6618 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6621 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6622 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6627 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6628 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6629 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6631 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6632 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6634 debug_assert!(false);
6635 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6637 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6638 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6639 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6640 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6642 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6643 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6644 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6645 log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6647 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6650 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6651 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6652 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6653 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6655 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6656 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6657 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6658 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6659 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6660 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6664 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6665 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6666 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6667 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6670 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6671 let context = phase.context_mut();
6672 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
6673 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6674 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6675 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
6677 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
6678 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
6679 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
6680 let context = phase.context_mut();
6681 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6682 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6683 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
6687 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6690 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6691 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6692 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6693 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6695 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6696 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6702 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6703 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6704 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6706 debug_assert!(false);
6707 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6709 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
6710 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6711 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6712 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6713 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6714 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6715 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6716 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
6717 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6718 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6719 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6724 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6725 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6726 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6727 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6728 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6729 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
6730 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
6732 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6733 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6736 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6739 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6740 let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
6741 log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6742 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6744 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6745 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6746 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6747 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6748 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6753 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6754 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6755 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6760 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6761 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6762 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6763 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6765 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6766 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6767 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6768 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6770 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6771 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6773 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
6774 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6775 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6777 debug_assert!(false);
6778 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6780 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6781 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6782 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6783 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6784 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6785 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6786 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6787 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
6788 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
6789 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
6791 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6793 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6794 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
6795 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
6796 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6797 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6798 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6799 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
6800 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
6804 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6805 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6806 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6807 match pending_forward_info {
6808 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
6809 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
6811 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
6812 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
6813 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6814 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6815 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6817 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6818 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6819 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6820 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6821 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6824 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6826 _ => pending_forward_info
6829 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6830 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6832 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6833 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6836 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6841 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6843 let next_user_channel_id;
6844 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value, skimmed_fee_msat) = {
6845 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6846 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6848 debug_assert!(false);
6849 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6851 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6852 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6853 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6854 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6855 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6856 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6857 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6858 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6860 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6862 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6863 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6864 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6866 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6867 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6868 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6869 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6870 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6871 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6872 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6873 next_user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
6876 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6877 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6880 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6883 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(),
6884 Some(forwarded_htlc_value), skimmed_fee_msat, false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id),
6885 funding_txo, msg.channel_id, Some(next_user_channel_id),
6891 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6892 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6893 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6894 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6895 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6897 debug_assert!(false);
6898 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6900 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6901 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6902 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6903 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6904 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6905 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6907 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6908 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6911 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6916 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6917 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6918 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6919 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6920 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6922 debug_assert!(false);
6923 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6925 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6926 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6927 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6928 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6929 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6930 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6931 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6933 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6934 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6936 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6937 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6941 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6945 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6946 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6947 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6949 debug_assert!(false);
6950 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6952 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6953 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6954 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6955 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6956 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6957 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6958 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6959 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6960 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6961 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6962 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6966 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6967 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6970 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6975 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6976 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6977 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6978 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6979 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6980 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6981 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6982 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6983 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6984 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6985 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6987 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6988 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6990 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6991 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6992 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6993 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6994 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6995 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6997 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6998 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6999 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
7001 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
7002 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7003 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
7004 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7005 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
7006 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
7007 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
7008 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
7009 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
7012 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7013 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
7015 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7016 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_channel_id));
7017 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
7018 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7019 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
7020 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
7021 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
7022 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
7023 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
7024 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7025 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7026 blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
7029 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
7030 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
7031 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
7036 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
7037 // payments are being processed.
7038 if forward_htlcs_empty {
7039 push_forward_event = true;
7041 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7042 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
7049 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
7050 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
7053 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
7054 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7055 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
7057 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
7061 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
7062 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7063 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7064 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
7065 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
7067 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
7068 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
7069 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
7070 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
7071 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
7072 // real by taking more time.
7073 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
7074 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7075 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
7080 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
7081 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
7082 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
7083 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
7084 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7085 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
7086 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
7088 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7089 .get(&channel_id).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
7090 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
7091 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7092 channel_funding_outpoint,
7094 counterparty_node_id,
7099 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7100 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7101 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
7103 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7104 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7105 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7106 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7108 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
7109 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7110 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7116 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7117 let htlcs_to_fail = {
7118 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7119 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7121 debug_assert!(false);
7122 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7123 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
7124 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7125 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7126 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7127 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7128 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7129 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7130 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
7131 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
7132 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo, msg.channel_id,
7133 *counterparty_node_id)
7135 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7136 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
7137 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7138 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
7139 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
7140 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
7141 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7145 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7146 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7149 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7152 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7156 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7157 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7158 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7160 debug_assert!(false);
7161 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7163 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7164 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7165 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7166 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7167 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7168 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7169 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7171 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7172 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7175 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7180 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7181 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7182 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7184 debug_assert!(false);
7185 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7187 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7188 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7189 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7190 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7191 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7192 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
7193 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
7196 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7197 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
7198 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height,
7199 msg, &self.default_configuration
7200 ), chan_phase_entry),
7201 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7202 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7203 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
7206 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7207 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7210 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7215 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
7216 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7217 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7218 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
7220 // It's not a local channel
7221 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7224 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7225 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
7226 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
7227 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7229 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7230 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7231 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
7232 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7233 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7234 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7235 if chan.context.should_announce() {
7236 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
7237 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
7238 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
7239 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7241 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
7243 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
7244 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
7245 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
7246 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7248 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7249 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
7250 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7251 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
7254 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7258 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7259 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7262 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7264 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
7267 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7269 let need_lnd_workaround = {
7270 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7272 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7274 debug_assert!(false);
7275 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7276 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7280 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
7281 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7282 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7283 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7284 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7285 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7286 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7287 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7288 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7289 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7290 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7291 msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7292 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7293 let mut channel_update = None;
7294 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7295 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7296 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7299 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7300 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7301 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7302 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7303 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7304 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7305 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7310 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7311 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7312 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7313 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7314 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7315 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7319 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7320 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7323 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7324 log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7326 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7327 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7328 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7329 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7330 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7331 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7333 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7334 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7335 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7336 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7337 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7338 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7339 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7340 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7341 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7342 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7343 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7344 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7345 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7346 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7347 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7348 next_funding_txid: None,
7351 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7352 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7353 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7359 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
7360 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
7361 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
7362 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7365 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7366 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7371 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7372 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7373 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7375 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7376 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7377 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7378 for (funding_outpoint, channel_id, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7379 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7380 match monitor_event {
7381 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7382 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(channel_id));
7383 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7384 log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7385 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage,
7386 htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), None, true,
7387 false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
7389 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7390 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id };
7391 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7392 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7395 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) | MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. } => {
7396 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7397 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7399 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7400 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
7401 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7402 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
7405 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7406 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7407 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7408 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7409 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7410 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7411 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
7412 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7413 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { reason, .. } = monitor_event {
7416 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
7418 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason.clone()));
7419 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7420 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7424 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7425 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7426 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7427 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: reason.to_string() })
7435 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update_id } => {
7436 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, &channel_id, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7442 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7443 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7446 has_pending_monitor_events
7449 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7450 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7451 /// update events as a separate process method here.
7453 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7454 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7455 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7458 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7459 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7460 /// update was applied.
7461 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7462 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7463 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7465 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7466 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7467 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7468 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7470 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7471 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7473 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7474 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7475 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7476 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7478 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7479 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7480 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7481 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
7482 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7483 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7485 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7486 has_monitor_update = true;
7488 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7489 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7490 continue 'peer_loop;
7499 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7500 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7501 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7507 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
7508 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
7510 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
7511 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
7513 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
7514 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7515 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
7516 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7518 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
7519 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7521 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7522 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
7523 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
7524 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
7529 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
7530 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7535 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
7536 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
7539 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7540 if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
7541 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
7547 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
7551 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7552 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
7553 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7554 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7555 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7556 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
7557 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7561 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7562 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7563 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7564 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7565 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7571 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7572 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7573 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7574 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7575 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7576 let mut has_update = false;
7577 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7579 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7581 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7582 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7583 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7584 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7585 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7587 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7588 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7589 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
7590 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
7591 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7593 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7594 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7597 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7598 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
7599 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
7601 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7602 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7603 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7604 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7605 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7610 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7611 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7612 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7618 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7619 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7624 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7630 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7631 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7634 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7635 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7641 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7642 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7644 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7645 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7646 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7647 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7648 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7649 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7650 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7651 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7652 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7653 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
7654 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7655 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7656 assert!(should_broadcast);
7657 } else { unreachable!(); }
7658 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7659 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7660 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update, channel_id,
7663 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7668 macro_rules! create_offer_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
7669 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7670 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7671 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7675 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer.
7676 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7677 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7678 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7679 /// order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7681 /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
7685 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7690 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
7692 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7694 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7695 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7696 pub fn create_offer_builder(
7697 &$self, description: String
7698 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7699 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
7700 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
7701 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
7702 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
7704 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7705 let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
7706 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
7708 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
7715 macro_rules! create_refund_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
7716 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7717 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7721 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7722 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7724 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7725 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7726 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7729 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7730 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7731 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7733 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7734 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7738 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund.
7739 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7740 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7741 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7742 /// order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7744 /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
7748 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7749 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7754 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7755 /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
7756 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
7758 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7760 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7761 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7762 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7763 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7764 pub fn create_refund_builder(
7765 &$self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7766 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7767 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7768 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
7769 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
7770 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
7771 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
7773 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7774 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7775 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7777 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
7778 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7781 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop($self);
7783 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7784 $self.pending_outbound_payments
7785 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7786 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7788 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7794 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7796 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
7797 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7798 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7799 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7800 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7801 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7805 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
7806 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>);
7807 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
7808 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>);
7811 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
7813 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
7815 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7816 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7817 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7819 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7820 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7821 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7822 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7823 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7824 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7825 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7827 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7828 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7832 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7833 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7836 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7837 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7838 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7842 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7843 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7844 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7845 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7849 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
7850 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
7851 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7856 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7857 /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
7858 /// - the offer is for an unsupported chain, or
7859 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
7862 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7863 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7864 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7865 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7866 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7867 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7868 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7869 pub fn pay_for_offer(
7870 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7871 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7872 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7873 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7874 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7875 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7876 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7878 let builder: InvoiceRequestBuilder<DerivedPayerId, secp256k1::All> = offer
7879 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7881 let builder = builder.chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7883 let builder = match quantity {
7885 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7887 let builder = match amount_msats {
7889 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7891 let builder = match payer_note {
7893 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7895 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7896 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7898 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7900 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7901 self.pending_outbound_payments
7902 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7903 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7905 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7907 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7908 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7909 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7910 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7911 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7914 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7916 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7917 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7918 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7919 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7920 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7921 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7922 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7923 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7924 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7926 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7933 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7936 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7937 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7938 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7942 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
7943 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
7944 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
7945 /// received and no retries will be made.
7950 /// - the refund is for an unsupported chain, or
7951 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply path for
7954 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7955 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7956 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7957 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7958 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7960 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
7961 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
7963 if refund.chain() != self.chain_hash {
7964 return Err(Bolt12SemanticError::UnsupportedChain);
7967 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7969 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
7970 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
7971 let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(amount_msats, payment_secret)
7972 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7974 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
7975 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
7976 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
7978 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
7979 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
7980 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
7982 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
7983 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
7984 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
7986 let builder: InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey> = builder.into();
7987 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
7988 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
7989 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7991 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7992 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
7993 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7994 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
7995 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
7998 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8000 for path in refund.paths() {
8001 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8002 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
8003 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8004 Some(reply_path.clone()),
8006 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8012 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
8016 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
8019 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
8020 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
8022 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
8023 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
8024 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
8025 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
8027 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
8029 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8030 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8034 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8035 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8037 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8039 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8040 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8042 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
8043 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8044 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
8045 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
8046 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
8047 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
8048 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
8049 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
8050 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
8051 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8052 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
8055 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
8056 /// stored external to LDK.
8058 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
8059 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
8060 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
8062 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
8063 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
8066 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
8067 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
8068 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
8069 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
8071 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
8072 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
8073 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
8074 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
8075 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
8077 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
8078 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
8079 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
8080 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
8081 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
8083 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
8084 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
8086 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8087 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8091 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8092 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8094 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8096 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8097 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8099 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8100 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8101 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
8102 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
8103 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
8104 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8105 min_final_cltv_expiry)
8108 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
8109 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
8111 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8112 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
8113 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
8116 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
8118 /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
8119 fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
8120 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
8121 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8123 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
8125 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.lock().unwrap().latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
8126 .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
8127 .collect::<Vec<_>>();
8130 .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, secp_ctx)
8131 .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
8134 /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
8135 /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
8136 fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
8137 &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
8138 ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
8139 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8141 let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
8142 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
8143 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
8144 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
8145 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
8147 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
8149 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
8152 self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
8153 payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, secp_ctx
8157 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
8158 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
8160 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8161 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8162 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8163 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8165 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8166 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8167 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
8168 Some(_) => continue,
8169 None => return scid_candidate
8174 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
8176 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8177 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
8179 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
8180 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
8181 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
8185 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
8186 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
8187 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
8189 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
8190 /// times to get a unique scid.
8191 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8192 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8193 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8195 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8196 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8197 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
8198 return scid_candidate
8202 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
8203 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
8204 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
8205 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
8207 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8208 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8209 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8210 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8211 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
8212 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
8214 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8215 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
8216 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
8225 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8226 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
8227 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8228 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
8229 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
8233 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
8234 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
8235 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8236 events.push_back((event, None));
8240 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
8241 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8242 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
8246 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
8247 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
8251 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
8252 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
8255 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
8256 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
8257 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
8258 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
8259 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
8260 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId,
8261 mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
8263 let logger = WithContext::from(
8264 &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
8267 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8268 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8269 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8270 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
8271 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
8272 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
8273 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8274 .get_mut(&channel_id)
8276 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
8280 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
8281 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) {
8282 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
8283 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
8284 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
8285 log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
8290 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(
8292 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8293 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
8294 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
8295 log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
8297 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
8298 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8299 if further_update_exists {
8300 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
8305 log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
8312 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
8313 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8319 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
8320 for action in actions {
8322 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
8323 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id
8325 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
8331 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
8332 /// using the given event handler.
8334 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
8335 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
8339 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
8343 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8345 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8346 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8347 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8348 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8349 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8350 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8354 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
8355 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
8356 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
8357 /// is always placed next to each other.
8359 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
8360 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
8361 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
8362 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
8364 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
8365 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
8366 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
8367 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
8368 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8369 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8370 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8372 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
8373 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
8374 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
8375 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8378 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
8379 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8381 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
8382 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8385 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
8386 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8387 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8388 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8389 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8390 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
8391 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8395 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
8396 events.replace(pending_events);
8405 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8407 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8408 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8409 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8410 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8411 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8412 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8416 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
8418 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
8419 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
8420 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
8422 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
8426 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8428 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8429 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8430 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8431 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8432 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8433 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8437 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8439 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8440 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.prev_blockhash,
8441 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
8442 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height - 1,
8443 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8446 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8447 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8450 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8451 let _persistence_guard =
8452 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8453 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8454 let new_height = height - 1;
8456 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
8457 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.block_hash(),
8458 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
8459 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height,
8460 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
8461 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
8464 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8468 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8470 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8471 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8472 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8473 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8474 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8475 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8479 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8480 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8481 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8482 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8484 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8485 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8487 let _persistence_guard =
8488 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8489 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8490 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
8491 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8493 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8494 if height < last_best_block_height {
8495 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8496 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8500 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8501 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8502 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8503 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8505 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8506 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8508 let _persistence_guard =
8509 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8510 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8511 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8513 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8515 macro_rules! max_time {
8516 ($timestamp: expr) => {
8518 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8519 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8520 // having an explicit local time source.
8521 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8522 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8523 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8524 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8525 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8531 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8532 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8533 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8534 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8538 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8539 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8540 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8541 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8542 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8543 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8544 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8545 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
8546 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
8547 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
8548 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
8555 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8556 let _persistence_guard =
8557 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8558 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8559 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8560 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8561 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8562 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8563 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8564 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8569 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8571 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8572 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8573 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8574 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8575 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8576 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8580 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8581 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8583 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8584 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8585 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8586 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8587 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8589 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8590 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8592 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8593 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8594 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8595 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8596 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8597 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8599 // Retain unfunded channels.
8600 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8601 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
8602 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
8603 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => true,
8604 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8605 let res = f(channel);
8606 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8607 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8608 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8609 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8610 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8612 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
8613 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8614 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8615 if channel.context.is_usable() {
8616 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8617 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8618 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8619 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8624 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8629 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8630 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8633 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8634 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8635 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8636 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8637 msg: announcement_sigs,
8639 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8640 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8641 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8643 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8644 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8645 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8650 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8651 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8652 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8653 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8654 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8655 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8656 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8657 // is always consistent.
8658 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8659 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8660 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8661 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8662 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8665 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8666 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8667 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8668 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8669 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8670 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
8671 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8672 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8676 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8677 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8678 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8679 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8680 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8681 data: reason_message,
8694 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8695 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8696 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8697 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8698 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8699 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8700 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8701 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8702 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8703 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8705 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8706 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8707 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8711 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8714 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8715 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8716 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8717 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8718 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8719 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8720 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8721 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8722 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8723 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8724 channel_id: htlc.prev_channel_id,
8725 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
8728 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8729 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8730 _ => unreachable!(),
8732 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8733 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8734 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8735 let logger = WithContext::from(
8736 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_channel_id)
8738 log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8744 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8746 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8747 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8751 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8752 /// may have events that need processing.
8754 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8755 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8757 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8758 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8759 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8760 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8763 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8764 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8765 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8768 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8769 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8770 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8773 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8774 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8775 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8776 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8779 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8780 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8781 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8782 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8785 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8786 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8788 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8789 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8790 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8791 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8792 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8795 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8796 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8797 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8798 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8801 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8802 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8803 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8804 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8807 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8808 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8809 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8810 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8813 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8814 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8815 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8816 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8820 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8821 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8823 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8824 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8825 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8826 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8827 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8828 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8832 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8833 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8834 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8835 // change to the contents.
8836 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8837 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8838 let persist = match &res {
8839 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8840 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8841 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8843 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8845 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8850 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8851 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8852 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8853 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8856 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8857 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8858 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8859 // change to the contents.
8860 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8861 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8862 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8866 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8867 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8868 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8869 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8872 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8873 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8874 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8877 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8878 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8879 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8882 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8883 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8884 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8885 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8886 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8887 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8888 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8889 let persist = match &res {
8890 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8891 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8893 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8898 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
8899 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8900 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
8901 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8904 fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
8905 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8906 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
8907 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8910 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
8911 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8912 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
8913 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8916 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
8917 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8918 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
8919 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8922 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8923 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8924 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8927 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8928 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8929 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8932 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8933 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8934 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8935 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8936 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8937 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8938 let persist = match &res {
8939 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8940 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8941 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8943 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8948 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8949 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8950 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8953 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8954 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8955 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8956 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8957 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8958 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8959 let persist = match &res {
8960 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8961 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8962 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8964 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8969 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8970 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8971 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8972 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8973 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8974 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8975 let persist = match &res {
8976 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8977 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8978 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8980 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8985 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8986 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8987 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8990 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8991 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8992 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8995 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8996 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8997 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8998 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8999 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9000 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9001 let persist = match &res {
9002 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9003 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9004 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9006 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9011 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
9012 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9013 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9016 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
9017 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9018 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
9021 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9026 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
9027 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9028 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9029 let persist = match &res {
9030 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9031 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9032 Ok(persist) => *persist,
9034 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9039 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
9040 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9041 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
9042 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9043 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9046 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
9047 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
9048 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
9050 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9051 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9052 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9053 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9054 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9055 let context = match phase {
9056 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9057 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9058 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
9059 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
9064 // We retain UnfundedOutboundV1 channel for some time in case
9065 // peer unexpectedly disconnects, and intends to reconnect again.
9066 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
9069 // Unfunded inbound channels will always be removed.
9070 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
9073 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9074 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9077 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9078 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
9082 // Clean up for removal.
9083 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
9084 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer));
9087 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9088 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9089 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9090 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
9092 // V1 Channel Establishment
9093 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
9094 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
9095 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
9096 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
9097 // V2 Channel Establishment
9098 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9099 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9100 // Common Channel Establishment
9101 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
9102 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
9104 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
9106 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
9107 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
9108 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
9109 // Interactive Transaction Construction
9110 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
9111 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
9112 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
9113 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
9114 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
9115 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
9116 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
9117 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
9118 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
9119 // Channel Operations
9120 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
9121 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
9122 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
9123 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
9124 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
9125 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
9127 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
9128 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9129 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
9130 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9131 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
9132 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
9133 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
9134 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
9135 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
9138 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
9139 peer_state.is_connected = false;
9140 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
9141 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
9144 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
9146 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
9148 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
9149 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
9153 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
9154 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
9155 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
9156 log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9160 let mut res = Ok(());
9162 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9163 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
9164 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
9165 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
9166 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
9167 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
9168 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
9171 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9172 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
9173 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
9174 if inbound_peer_limited {
9176 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9178 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
9179 channel_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9180 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9181 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
9182 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
9183 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9184 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
9185 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9189 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
9190 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
9191 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
9193 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9194 if inbound_peer_limited &&
9195 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
9196 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
9199 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9202 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
9203 peer_state.is_connected = true;
9208 log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9210 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9211 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9212 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9213 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9214 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9216 for (_, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9218 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9219 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9220 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
9221 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9222 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
9226 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
9227 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9228 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9229 msg: chan.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash),
9233 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
9234 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9235 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9236 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
9237 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9238 msg: chan.get_open_channel_v2(self.chain_hash),
9242 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
9243 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
9244 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
9245 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
9246 debug_assert!(false);
9249 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
9250 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9251 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
9252 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
9253 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
9254 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
9255 debug_assert!(false);
9261 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9262 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
9267 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
9268 match &msg.data as &str {
9269 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
9270 "link failed to shutdown" =>
9272 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
9273 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
9274 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
9275 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
9276 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
9277 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
9278 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
9279 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9280 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9282 || -> NotifyOption {
9283 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9284 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9285 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
9286 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9287 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
9288 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
9289 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
9290 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9294 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9295 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9296 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
9297 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
9298 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
9299 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
9301 log_level: Level::Trace,
9304 // This can happen in a fairly tight loop, so we absolutely cannot trigger
9305 // a `ChannelManager` write here.
9306 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9308 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents
9317 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9319 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9320 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
9321 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9322 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9323 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9324 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9325 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9326 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9327 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9328 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9329 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
9331 for channel_id in channel_ids {
9332 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9333 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9337 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
9338 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9339 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9340 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9341 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9342 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9343 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
9344 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan)) => {
9345 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9346 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9347 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9353 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9354 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan)) => {
9355 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9356 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
9357 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9363 None | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) => (),
9364 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9365 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_)) => (),
9369 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9370 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9374 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9375 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9378 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
9379 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9382 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
9383 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
9386 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
9387 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9388 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9389 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9392 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
9393 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9394 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9395 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9398 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
9399 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9400 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9401 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9404 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
9405 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9406 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9407 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9410 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
9411 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9412 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9413 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9416 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
9417 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9418 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9419 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9422 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
9423 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9424 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9425 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9428 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
9429 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9430 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9431 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9434 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
9435 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9436 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9437 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9441 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9442 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9444 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9445 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9446 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9447 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9448 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9449 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9453 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
9454 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9455 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
9458 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
9459 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
9462 Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
9463 Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9465 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9466 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
9468 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
9469 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9473 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
9474 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
9475 Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
9477 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
9479 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
9480 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9484 let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
9485 amount_msats, payment_secret
9487 Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
9489 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
9490 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9494 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9495 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9496 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9499 if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
9500 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
9501 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
9502 payment_paths, payment_hash
9504 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9505 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
9506 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9508 let builder: Result<InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey>, _> =
9509 builder.map(|b| b.into());
9510 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
9511 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9512 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9515 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
9516 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
9517 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9518 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
9519 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9521 let builder: Result<InvoiceBuilder<ExplicitSigningPubkey>, _> =
9522 builder.map(|b| b.into());
9523 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
9524 .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
9525 .and_then(|invoice| {
9527 let mut invoice = invoice;
9528 match invoice.sign(|invoice: &UnsignedBolt12Invoice|
9529 self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)
9531 Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9532 Err(SignError::Signing) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9533 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
9535 Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9536 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
9541 Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
9542 Err(error) => Some(error),
9546 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
9547 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9549 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
9551 Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
9552 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
9555 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
9556 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
9557 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
9564 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
9565 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
9571 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
9572 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
9576 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9577 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9578 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
9579 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
9580 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9584 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9585 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9587 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9588 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9589 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9590 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9591 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9594 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9595 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9596 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9597 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9600 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9601 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9602 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9603 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9606 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9607 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9608 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9609 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9612 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9613 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9614 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9615 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9616 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9617 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9618 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9619 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9620 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9621 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9622 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9623 features.set_payment_secret_required();
9624 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9625 features.set_wumbo_optional();
9626 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9627 features.set_channel_type_optional();
9628 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9629 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9630 features.set_route_blinding_optional();
9631 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9632 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9637 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9638 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9640 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9641 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9642 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9643 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9646 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9647 (2, node_id, required),
9648 (4, features, required),
9649 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9650 (8, forwarding_info, option),
9651 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9652 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9655 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9656 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9657 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9658 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9659 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9660 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9661 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9662 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9663 (2, self.channel_id, required),
9664 (3, self.channel_type, option),
9665 (4, self.counterparty, required),
9666 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9667 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9668 (7, self.config, option),
9669 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9670 (9, self.confirmations, option),
9671 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9672 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9673 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9674 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9675 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9676 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9677 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9678 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9679 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9680 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9681 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9682 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9683 (30, self.is_usable, required),
9684 (32, self.is_public, required),
9685 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9686 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9687 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9688 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9689 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9690 (43, self.pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9691 (45, self.pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9697 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9698 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9699 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9700 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9701 (2, channel_id, required),
9702 (3, channel_type, option),
9703 (4, counterparty, required),
9704 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9705 (6, funding_txo, option),
9706 (7, config, option),
9707 (8, short_channel_id, option),
9708 (9, confirmations, option),
9709 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9710 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9711 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9712 (16, balance_msat, required),
9713 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9714 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9715 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9716 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9717 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9718 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9719 (22, confirmations_required, option),
9720 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9721 (26, is_outbound, required),
9722 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9723 (30, is_usable, required),
9724 (32, is_public, required),
9725 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9726 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9727 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9728 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9729 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9730 (43, pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9731 (45, pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9734 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9735 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9736 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9737 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9738 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9742 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9744 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9745 outbound_scid_alias,
9749 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9750 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9752 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9753 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9754 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9755 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9756 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9757 confirmations_required,
9759 force_close_spend_delay,
9760 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9761 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9762 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9763 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9764 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9765 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9766 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9767 channel_shutdown_state,
9768 pending_inbound_htlcs: pending_inbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
9769 pending_outbound_htlcs: pending_outbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
9774 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9775 (2, channels, required_vec),
9776 (4, phantom_scid, required),
9777 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9780 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
9781 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
9782 (1, failure, (default_value, BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)),
9785 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9787 (0, onion_packet, required),
9788 (1, blinded, option),
9789 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9792 (0, payment_data, required),
9793 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9794 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9795 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9796 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9797 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
9799 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9800 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9801 (1, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
9802 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9803 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9804 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9805 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9809 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9810 (0, routing, required),
9811 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9812 (4, payment_hash, required),
9813 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9814 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9815 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9816 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9820 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9821 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9823 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9825 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9826 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9827 reason.write(writer)?;
9829 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9830 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9833 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9834 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9835 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9836 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9843 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9844 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9845 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9848 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9849 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9850 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9851 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9855 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9856 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9857 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9858 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9859 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9862 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9863 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9864 // messages contained in the variants.
9865 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9866 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9867 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9869 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9870 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9871 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9872 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9873 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9876 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9877 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9878 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9879 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9880 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9882 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9887 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9892 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
9893 (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
9894 (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
9897 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9898 (0, short_channel_id, required),
9899 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9900 (2, outpoint, required),
9901 (3, blinded_failure, option),
9902 (4, htlc_id, required),
9903 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9904 (7, user_channel_id, option),
9905 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 2 above, outpoint will be
9906 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9907 (9, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
9910 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9911 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9912 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9913 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9914 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9916 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9917 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9918 (1, self.total_msat, required),
9919 (2, self.value, required),
9920 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9921 (4, payment_data, option),
9922 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9923 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9924 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9925 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9931 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9932 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9933 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9934 (0, prev_hop, required),
9935 (1, total_msat, option),
9936 (2, value_ser, required),
9937 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9938 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9939 (5, total_value_received, option),
9940 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9941 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9942 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9944 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9945 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9946 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9948 if payment_data.is_some() {
9949 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9951 if total_msat.is_none() {
9952 total_msat = Some(value);
9954 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
9957 if total_msat.is_none() {
9958 if payment_data.is_none() {
9959 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9961 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
9963 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
9967 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
9970 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
9971 total_value_received,
9972 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
9974 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
9975 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
9980 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
9981 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9982 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9985 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
9986 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
9987 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
9988 let mut payment_id = None;
9989 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
9990 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
9991 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9992 (0, session_priv, required),
9993 (1, payment_id, option),
9994 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9995 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
9996 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
9997 (6, blinded_tail, option),
9999 if payment_id.is_none() {
10000 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
10002 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
10004 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
10005 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
10006 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10008 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
10009 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
10010 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
10011 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10015 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
10016 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
10017 first_hop_htlc_msat,
10019 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
10022 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
10023 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10028 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
10029 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
10031 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
10032 0u8.write(writer)?;
10033 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
10034 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10035 (0, session_priv, required),
10036 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
10037 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10038 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
10039 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
10040 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
10041 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
10044 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
10045 1u8.write(writer)?;
10046 field.write(writer)?;
10053 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
10054 (0, forward_info, required),
10055 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
10056 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
10057 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
10058 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
10059 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 6 above, prev_funding_outpoint will be
10060 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10061 (7, prev_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(prev_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10064 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10065 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10066 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
10068 Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
10072 Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
10073 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10074 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10075 (0, htlc_id, required),
10076 (2, err_packet, required),
10079 Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
10080 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
10081 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
10082 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
10083 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10084 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
10085 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10086 (0, htlc_id, required),
10087 (1, failure_code, required),
10088 (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
10089 (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
10097 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10098 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10099 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
10101 0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
10103 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
10104 (0, htlc_id, required),
10105 (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
10106 (2, err_packet, required),
10107 (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
10109 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
10110 Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
10111 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10113 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
10117 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10118 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
10122 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10127 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
10128 (0, payment_secret, required),
10129 (2, expiry_time, required),
10130 (4, user_payment_id, required),
10131 (6, payment_preimage, required),
10132 (8, min_value_msat, required),
10135 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10137 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10138 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10139 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10140 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10141 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10142 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10146 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10147 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
10149 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10151 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
10153 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
10154 best_block.height.write(writer)?;
10155 best_block.block_hash.write(writer)?;
10158 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
10160 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10161 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
10162 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10163 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10164 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10165 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10166 serializable_peer_count += 1;
10169 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
10170 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
10174 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
10176 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10177 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10178 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10179 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
10180 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
10181 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
10184 channel.write(writer)?;
10190 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10191 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10192 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
10193 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
10194 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10195 for forward in pending_forwards {
10196 forward.write(writer)?;
10201 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
10203 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10204 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
10205 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10207 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
10208 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
10209 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10210 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
10211 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
10212 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10213 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
10214 htlc.write(writer)?;
10216 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
10217 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
10220 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
10221 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
10222 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10223 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
10224 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
10225 // per_peer_state lock at all.
10226 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
10229 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
10230 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10231 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
10232 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
10233 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
10235 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10236 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
10237 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
10238 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
10239 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
10240 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
10241 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
10246 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
10247 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
10248 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
10249 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
10250 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
10251 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
10252 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
10253 // well save the space and not write any events here.
10254 0u64.write(writer)?;
10256 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10257 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
10258 event.write(writer)?;
10262 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
10263 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
10264 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
10265 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
10266 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
10267 0u64.write(writer)?;
10269 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
10270 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
10271 // likely to be identical.
10272 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10273 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10275 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10276 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
10277 hash.write(writer)?;
10278 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
10281 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
10282 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
10283 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10284 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
10285 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
10288 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
10289 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10291 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10292 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10293 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
10294 session_priv.write(writer)?;
10297 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
10298 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
10299 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
10300 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
10304 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
10305 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = new_hash_map();
10306 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10308 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10309 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10310 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
10316 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
10317 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10318 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
10319 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
10322 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
10323 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
10324 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
10325 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
10326 pending_claiming_payments = None;
10329 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10330 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10331 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
10332 if !updates.is_empty() {
10333 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(new_hash_map()); }
10334 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
10339 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10340 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
10341 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10342 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
10343 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10344 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
10345 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10346 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
10347 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
10348 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
10349 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10350 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
10351 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10358 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10359 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10360 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
10361 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
10364 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
10365 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
10366 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
10367 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
10368 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
10369 // check that the event is sane here.
10370 let event_encoded = event.encode();
10371 let event_read: Option<Event> =
10372 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
10373 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
10379 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10380 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10381 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10382 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
10383 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
10384 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
10387 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
10388 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
10389 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
10390 events.push_back((ev, action));
10391 } else if action.is_some() {
10392 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10399 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
10400 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
10401 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
10402 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
10403 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
10404 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
10407 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
10409 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
10411 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10412 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
10413 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
10414 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
10415 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
10416 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
10417 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
10418 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
10419 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10420 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
10421 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
10422 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
10423 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
10425 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
10426 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
10428 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
10429 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
10431 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
10432 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
10433 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
10434 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
10435 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
10436 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
10438 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
10439 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10441 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10442 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10443 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10444 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10445 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10446 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10450 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
10451 pub entropy_source: ES,
10453 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
10454 pub node_signer: NS,
10456 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
10457 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
10459 pub signer_provider: SP,
10461 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10463 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
10464 pub fee_estimator: F,
10465 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10467 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
10468 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
10469 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
10470 pub chain_monitor: M,
10472 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
10473 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
10474 /// force-closed during deserialization.
10475 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
10476 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
10477 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
10479 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
10481 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
10482 /// deserialization.
10484 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
10485 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
10486 pub default_config: UserConfig,
10488 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
10489 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
10491 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
10492 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
10493 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
10494 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
10496 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
10499 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
10500 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
10503 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10504 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10506 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10507 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10508 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10509 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10510 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10511 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10515 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
10516 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
10517 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
10518 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
10519 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
10521 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
10522 channel_monitors: hash_map_from_iter(
10523 channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) })
10529 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
10530 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
10531 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10532 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
10534 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10535 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10536 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10537 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10538 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10539 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10543 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10544 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
10545 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
10549 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10550 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
10552 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10553 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10554 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10555 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10556 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10557 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10561 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10562 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10564 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10565 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10566 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10568 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
10570 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10571 let mut funding_txo_set = hash_set_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10572 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10573 let mut outpoint_to_peer = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10574 let mut short_to_chan_info = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10575 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
10576 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
10577 let mut funding_txo_to_channel_id = hash_map_with_capacity(channel_count as usize);
10578 for _ in 0..channel_count {
10579 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
10580 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
10582 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10583 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10584 funding_txo_to_channel_id.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.channel_id());
10585 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
10586 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
10587 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
10588 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
10589 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
10590 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10591 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
10592 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
10593 log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
10594 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10595 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
10596 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
10598 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
10599 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
10600 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
10602 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
10603 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
10604 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10606 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
10607 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
10608 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10610 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
10611 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
10612 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10614 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
10615 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10616 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update
10619 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
10620 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10621 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10622 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10623 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
10624 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10625 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10626 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
10628 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
10629 let mut found_htlc = false;
10630 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10631 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
10634 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
10635 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
10636 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
10637 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
10638 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
10639 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
10640 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
10642 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
10643 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
10644 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10648 log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
10649 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
10650 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10651 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
10652 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10654 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
10655 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
10657 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
10658 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10659 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
10660 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10662 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10663 let mut by_id_map = new_hash_map();
10664 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10665 entry.insert(by_id_map);
10669 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10670 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10671 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10672 // safely discard the channel.
10673 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
10674 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10675 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10676 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10677 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10678 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10679 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10680 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
10683 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10684 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10685 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10686 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10687 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10688 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10692 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10693 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10694 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10695 let channel_id = monitor.channel_id();
10696 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10698 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10699 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10700 counterparty_node_id: None,
10701 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10702 channel_id: Some(monitor.channel_id()),
10704 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update)));
10708 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10709 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10710 let mut forward_htlcs = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10711 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10712 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10713 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10714 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10715 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10716 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10718 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10721 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10722 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10723 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10724 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10725 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10726 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10727 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10728 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10730 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10733 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10736 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
10737 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10738 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10739 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10740 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10741 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10742 is_connected: false,
10746 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10747 let mut per_peer_state = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10748 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10749 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10750 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(new_hash_map());
10751 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10752 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10753 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10756 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10757 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10758 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10759 for _ in 0..event_count {
10760 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10761 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10766 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10767 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10768 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10770 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10771 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10772 // on-startup monitor updates.
10773 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10774 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10776 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10780 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10781 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10783 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10784 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10785 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10786 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10787 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10791 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10792 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10793 hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10794 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10795 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10796 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10797 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv]),
10799 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10800 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10804 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10805 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10806 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10807 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(new_hash_map());
10808 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10809 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10810 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10811 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10812 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10813 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(new_hash_map());
10814 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10815 let mut events_override = None;
10816 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10817 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10818 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10819 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10820 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10821 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10822 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10823 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10824 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10825 (8, events_override, option),
10826 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10827 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10828 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10829 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10831 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10832 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10835 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10836 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10839 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10840 pending_events_read = events;
10843 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10844 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10847 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10848 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10849 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10850 let mut outbounds = new_hash_map();
10851 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10852 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10854 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10856 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10857 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10858 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10861 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10862 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10863 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10864 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10865 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10867 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10868 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10869 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10871 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10872 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10873 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10874 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10875 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10877 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10878 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10879 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10880 log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10881 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$monitor.channel_id());
10882 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10883 pending_background_events.push(
10884 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10885 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10886 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10887 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
10888 update: update.clone(),
10891 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10892 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10893 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10894 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10895 pending_background_events.push(
10896 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10897 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10898 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
10901 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10902 log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10903 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10905 max_in_flight_update_id
10909 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10910 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10911 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10912 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10913 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10914 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10916 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10918 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10919 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10920 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10921 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10922 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10923 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10924 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10925 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10926 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
10929 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10930 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10931 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10932 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10933 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10934 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10935 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10936 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10937 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10938 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10939 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10942 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10943 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10944 debug_assert!(false);
10945 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10950 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
10951 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
10952 let channel_id = funding_txo_to_channel_id.get(&funding_txo).copied();
10953 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), channel_id);
10954 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
10955 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
10956 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
10957 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
10958 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
10959 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(new_hash_map()))
10961 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10962 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
10963 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
10965 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10966 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.", if let Some(channel_id) =
10967 channel_id { channel_id.to_string() } else { format!("with outpoint {}", funding_txo) } );
10968 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10969 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10970 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10971 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10972 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10977 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
10978 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
10980 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
10981 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
10982 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
10983 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
10986 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
10987 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
10988 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
10989 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
10990 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
10991 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
10992 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
10994 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10995 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
10996 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
10997 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10998 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
10999 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
11000 if path.hops.is_empty() {
11001 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
11002 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11005 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
11006 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
11007 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
11008 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
11009 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11010 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
11011 log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
11012 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
11014 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11015 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
11016 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
11017 retry_strategy: None,
11018 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
11019 payment_params: None,
11020 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv_bytes]),
11021 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
11022 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11023 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11024 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11025 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11026 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
11027 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
11028 total_msat: path_amt,
11029 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
11030 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11032 log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
11033 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
11038 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11039 match htlc_source {
11040 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
11041 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
11042 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
11043 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
11045 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
11046 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
11047 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
11048 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
11049 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
11050 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
11051 forwards.retain(|forward| {
11052 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
11053 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11054 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11055 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11060 !forwards.is_empty()
11062 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
11063 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11064 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11065 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11066 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
11067 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
11068 intercepted_id != ev_id
11075 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
11076 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
11077 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
11078 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
11079 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
11080 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
11081 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
11082 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
11083 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
11084 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
11085 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
11087 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
11088 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
11089 channel_id: monitor.channel_id(),
11090 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
11092 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
11093 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
11094 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
11101 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
11102 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
11104 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
11106 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
11107 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
11108 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
11109 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
11110 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
11111 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
11112 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
11113 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
11114 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11115 monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor.channel_id()))
11118 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
11119 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
11120 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
11121 // channel still live case here.
11125 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
11126 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
11131 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
11132 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
11133 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
11134 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
11135 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
11136 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
11137 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
11138 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
11142 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
11143 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
11145 let mut claimable_payments = hash_map_with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
11146 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
11147 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
11148 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11150 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
11151 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
11152 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11154 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
11155 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
11157 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11158 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
11160 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11163 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
11164 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11165 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
11167 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11171 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
11172 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
11173 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
11174 if htlcs.is_empty() {
11175 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11177 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
11178 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
11179 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
11180 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
11181 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
11182 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
11183 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
11184 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
11186 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
11187 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11191 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
11193 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11195 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
11196 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
11198 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11199 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
11204 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
11205 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11207 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
11209 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
11211 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
11212 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
11213 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
11214 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11218 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = new_hash_set();
11219 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11220 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11221 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11222 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
11223 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11224 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
11225 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
11226 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
11228 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
11229 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
11230 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
11232 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
11233 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
11234 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11235 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11236 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11237 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11239 if chan.context.is_usable() {
11240 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
11241 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11242 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11243 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11244 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11248 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11249 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11250 debug_assert!(false);
11251 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11256 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
11258 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11259 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
11260 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
11261 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
11262 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
11263 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
11264 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
11265 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
11266 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
11267 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
11268 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
11270 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
11271 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
11273 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
11274 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
11275 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
11276 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
11278 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
11279 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
11280 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
11281 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
11283 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
11284 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
11285 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
11286 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
11288 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
11289 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11290 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
11291 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11292 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11293 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
11294 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
11295 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
11298 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11299 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
11302 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
11305 purpose: payment.purpose,
11306 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
11307 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
11308 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
11314 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
11315 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
11316 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
11317 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
11318 for action in actions.iter() {
11319 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
11320 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
11321 Some((blocked_node_id, _blocked_channel_outpoint, blocked_channel_id, blocking_action)), ..
11323 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(blocked_node_id) {
11325 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
11326 blocked_channel_id);
11327 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
11328 .entry(*blocked_channel_id)
11329 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
11331 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
11332 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
11333 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
11334 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
11338 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
11339 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
11343 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
11345 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
11346 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11350 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
11352 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
11353 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
11354 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
11355 router: args.router,
11357 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
11359 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
11360 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
11361 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
11362 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
11364 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
11365 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
11366 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
11367 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
11368 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
11369 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
11371 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
11373 our_network_pubkey,
11376 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
11378 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
11380 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
11381 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
11382 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
11383 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
11384 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
11386 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
11387 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
11389 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
11391 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
11393 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
11394 node_signer: args.node_signer,
11395 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
11397 logger: args.logger,
11398 default_configuration: args.default_config,
11401 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
11402 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
11403 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
11404 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
11405 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
11408 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding, downstream_channel_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
11409 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
11410 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
11411 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
11412 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value), None,
11413 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding,
11414 downstream_channel_id, None
11418 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
11419 //connection or two.
11421 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
11427 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
11428 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11429 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
11430 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
11431 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
11432 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
11433 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
11434 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
11435 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
11436 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
11437 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
11438 use crate::prelude::*;
11439 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
11440 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
11441 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
11442 use crate::util::test_utils;
11443 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
11444 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
11447 fn test_notify_limits() {
11448 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
11449 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
11450 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11451 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11452 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
11453 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11455 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
11456 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
11457 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11458 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11459 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11461 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11463 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
11464 // to connect messages with new values
11465 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11466 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11467 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11468 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11469 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11470 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11472 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
11473 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11474 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11475 // ... but the last node should not.
11476 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11477 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
11478 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11479 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11481 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
11482 // about the channel.
11483 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11484 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11485 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11487 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
11489 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11490 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11491 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11492 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11493 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11494 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11496 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
11497 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11498 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11500 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
11501 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
11502 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
11503 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
11504 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
11505 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
11507 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
11508 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
11509 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11510 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11511 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11512 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11513 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11514 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11516 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
11517 // the channel info has updated.
11518 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11519 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11520 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11521 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11522 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11523 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11527 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
11528 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
11530 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11531 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11532 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11533 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11534 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11536 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
11537 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
11538 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
11539 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
11541 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11542 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
11543 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
11544 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
11545 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
11546 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
11547 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
11548 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
11549 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11550 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11551 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11552 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
11554 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
11555 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11556 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11557 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11558 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11559 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11560 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11561 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11562 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11563 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11564 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11565 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11566 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
11567 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11568 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11569 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11570 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11571 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11572 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11573 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11574 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11575 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11576 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
11578 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
11579 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
11580 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
11581 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11582 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11583 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11584 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
11586 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
11587 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
11588 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
11589 // lightning messages manually.
11590 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11591 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
11592 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
11594 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11595 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11596 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
11597 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
11598 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11599 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11600 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
11601 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11602 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11603 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
11604 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11605 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11606 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11607 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11608 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11609 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11610 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
11611 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11612 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11613 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
11614 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11615 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11616 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11617 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11618 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
11619 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11621 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
11622 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
11623 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11624 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
11626 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11627 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11628 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11629 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11631 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11634 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11635 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11636 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11637 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11639 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11644 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
11645 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
11646 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
11649 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
11650 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
11651 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
11652 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
11653 // fails as expected.
11654 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
11655 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
11656 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
11657 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
11658 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
11659 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
11660 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11661 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11662 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11663 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
11664 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11665 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11666 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11667 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11668 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11670 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
11671 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
11672 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
11674 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11675 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11676 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
11677 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
11678 let route = find_route(
11679 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11680 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11682 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11683 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11684 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11685 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11686 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11687 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11688 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11689 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11690 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11691 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11692 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
11693 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
11694 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11695 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11696 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11697 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11698 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11699 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11700 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11701 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11702 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11703 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11704 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11705 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11707 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11708 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11710 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11711 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11712 let route = find_route(
11713 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11714 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11716 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11717 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11718 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11719 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11720 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11721 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11722 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11723 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11725 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11726 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11727 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11728 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11729 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11730 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11731 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11732 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11733 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11734 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11735 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11736 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11737 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11738 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11739 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11740 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11741 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11742 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11743 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11744 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11745 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11746 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11747 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11748 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11750 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11751 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11753 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11754 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11755 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11756 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11757 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11758 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11759 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11760 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11761 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11762 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11764 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11765 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11766 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11769 let route = find_route(
11770 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11771 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11773 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11774 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11775 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11776 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11777 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11778 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11779 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11780 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11781 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11782 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11783 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11784 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11785 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11786 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11787 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11788 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11789 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11790 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11791 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11792 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11793 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11794 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11795 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11797 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11798 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11802 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11803 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11804 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11805 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11806 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11807 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11808 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11810 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11811 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11813 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11814 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11815 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11816 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11817 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11818 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11819 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11820 let route = find_route(
11821 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11822 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11825 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11826 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11827 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11828 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11829 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11830 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11831 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11833 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11834 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11835 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11836 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11837 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11838 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11839 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11841 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11845 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11846 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11847 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11848 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11849 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11850 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11851 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11852 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11853 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11855 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11856 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11858 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11859 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11860 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11861 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11862 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11863 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11864 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11865 let route = find_route(
11866 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11867 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11870 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11871 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11872 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
11873 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11874 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11875 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11876 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11877 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11878 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11880 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11881 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11882 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11883 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11884 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11885 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11886 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11888 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11892 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11893 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11894 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11895 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11896 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11898 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11899 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11900 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11901 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11903 // Marshall an MPP route.
11904 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11905 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11906 route.paths.push(path);
11907 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11908 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11909 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11910 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11911 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11912 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11914 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11915 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11917 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11918 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11920 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11925 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11926 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11927 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11928 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11929 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11931 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11933 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11934 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11936 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11937 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
11938 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11939 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11942 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
11943 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
11944 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11945 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
11946 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
11947 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
11950 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
11953 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
11954 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
11959 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
11960 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
11961 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11962 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11963 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11964 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11966 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
11967 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11969 total_msat: 100_000,
11972 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
11973 // payment verification fails as expected.
11974 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
11975 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
11976 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
11977 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
11979 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
11983 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
11984 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
11988 fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
11989 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
11990 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
11991 // the channel is successfully closed.
11992 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11993 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11994 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11995 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11997 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11998 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11999 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
12000 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12001 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12003 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
12004 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
12006 // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
12007 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
12008 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12009 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12012 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12014 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
12015 // as it has the funding transaction.
12016 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12017 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12018 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12021 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12023 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12025 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
12027 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12028 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12029 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12031 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12034 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
12035 // soon as it has the funding transaction.
12036 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12037 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12038 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12040 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12041 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12042 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
12043 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12044 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12045 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
12046 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
12047 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
12049 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12050 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
12051 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12052 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
12054 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12055 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
12057 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
12058 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
12059 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
12060 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
12061 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12062 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12063 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12067 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
12068 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
12069 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
12070 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
12071 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12072 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12073 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12076 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
12078 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
12079 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
12080 // closing transaction).
12081 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
12082 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
12083 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12085 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
12086 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
12087 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12088 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12089 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12092 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12094 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
12096 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
12097 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
12098 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12100 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12102 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
12103 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
12106 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
12107 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
12108 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12111 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
12112 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
12113 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12116 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
12117 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
12118 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12121 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
12122 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
12123 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12126 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
12128 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
12129 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
12131 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
12132 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
12134 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
12135 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
12140 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
12141 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
12142 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
12143 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
12144 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12145 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12146 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
12147 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12150 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
12151 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
12152 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
12154 // Test the API functions.
12155 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
12157 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
12159 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12161 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12163 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12165 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
12167 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
12171 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
12172 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
12173 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
12174 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
12175 // the given `channel_id`.
12176 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12177 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12178 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
12179 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12181 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12184 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
12186 // Test the API functions.
12187 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
12189 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12191 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12193 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12195 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12197 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12201 fn test_connection_limiting() {
12202 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
12203 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12204 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12205 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12206 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12208 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12210 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12211 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12213 let mut funding_tx = None;
12214 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12215 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12216 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12219 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12220 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
12221 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
12222 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
12223 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12225 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
12226 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12227 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12229 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12231 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
12232 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12233 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12235 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12238 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
12239 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(
12240 &nodes[0].keys_manager);
12241 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12242 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12243 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12245 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
12246 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
12248 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
12249 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
12250 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12251 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12252 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
12253 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12254 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12257 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12258 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12259 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12260 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12261 }, true).unwrap_err();
12263 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
12264 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
12265 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12266 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12267 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
12268 for ev in chan_closed_events {
12269 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
12271 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12272 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12274 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12275 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12276 }, true).unwrap_err();
12278 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
12279 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12280 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12281 }, false).unwrap();
12282 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12284 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
12285 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
12287 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
12288 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12289 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
12290 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
12291 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12293 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12294 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12295 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12297 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
12298 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12299 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
12301 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
12302 // "protected" and can connect again.
12303 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
12304 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12305 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12307 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12309 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
12311 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12312 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12316 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
12317 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
12318 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12319 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12320 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12321 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12323 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12325 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12326 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12328 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12329 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12330 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12331 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12334 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
12336 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12337 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12338 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12340 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
12341 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12342 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12344 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
12345 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12346 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12347 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12351 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
12352 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12353 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12354 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12355 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12356 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
12357 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12358 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
12359 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12361 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12363 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12364 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12366 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
12367 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12368 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12369 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12370 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12371 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12374 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12375 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12377 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12378 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12380 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12382 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
12383 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12386 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
12387 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12388 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12389 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12390 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12392 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12393 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12395 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12396 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
12397 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
12398 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
12402 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12404 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12405 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12407 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
12408 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12409 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12411 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12412 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12414 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12416 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12420 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
12421 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12422 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12423 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12424 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12425 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
12426 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
12427 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12428 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12429 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12430 payment_metadata: None,
12431 keysend_preimage: None,
12432 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12433 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12435 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12437 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
12438 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
12439 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
12440 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundHTLCErr { err_code, .. }) =
12441 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12442 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12443 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
12445 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
12446 } else { panic!(); }
12448 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
12449 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
12450 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12451 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12452 payment_metadata: None,
12453 keysend_preimage: None,
12454 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12455 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12457 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12459 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
12460 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12461 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12462 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
12466 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
12467 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12468 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12469 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12470 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12472 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
12473 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12474 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12475 cltv_expiry_height: 22,
12476 payment_metadata: None,
12477 keysend_preimage: None,
12478 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12479 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
12481 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12482 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
12483 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
12485 // Should not return an error as this condition:
12486 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
12487 // is not satisfied.
12488 assert!(result.is_ok());
12492 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
12493 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12494 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12495 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12496 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12498 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
12499 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12501 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12502 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12503 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
12504 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
12505 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12507 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12508 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12510 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12511 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12512 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12513 match &msg_events[0] {
12514 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
12515 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12517 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
12518 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
12519 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
12522 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12525 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12526 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12528 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
12529 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
12530 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12532 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12536 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
12537 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
12538 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
12539 // the channel without the anchors feature.
12540 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12541 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12542 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
12543 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12544 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12545 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
12546 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12548 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
12549 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12550 assert!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12552 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12553 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12555 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12556 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12558 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12561 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12562 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
12564 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12565 assert!(!open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12567 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
12568 // not have generated any events.
12569 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12573 fn test_update_channel_config() {
12574 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12575 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12576 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12577 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12578 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12579 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12580 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
12582 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12583 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12584 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12586 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
12587 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12588 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
12589 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12590 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12592 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12593 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12596 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
12597 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12598 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12600 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
12601 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12602 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
12603 ..Default::default()
12605 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12606 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12607 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12609 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12610 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12613 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
12614 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12615 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12616 ..Default::default()
12618 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12619 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
12620 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12621 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12623 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12624 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12627 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
12628 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
12629 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
12630 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
12631 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
12634 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12635 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12636 ..Default::default()
12638 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
12641 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
12642 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
12643 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12644 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12648 fn test_payment_display() {
12649 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12650 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12651 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
12652 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12653 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12654 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12658 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
12659 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12660 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12661 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12662 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12663 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12665 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
12666 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12667 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12668 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12669 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12670 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
12671 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
12672 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12674 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12675 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12676 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12679 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
12680 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
12682 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12683 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12685 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12686 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12687 }, false).unwrap();
12688 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
12689 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
12690 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
12692 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
12694 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
12695 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12696 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12697 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12698 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12699 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12700 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12701 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12702 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12703 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12704 } else { panic!() };
12705 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12706 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12707 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12708 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12710 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12712 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12713 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12714 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12719 fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
12720 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
12721 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12722 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12725 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12726 let deserialized_chanmgr;
12727 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
12729 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12730 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
12732 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12733 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
12736 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12737 if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
12738 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12740 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12744 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12745 if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
12746 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12748 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12753 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
12754 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
12755 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
12756 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
12758 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12759 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
12760 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
12762 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
12764 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12765 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
12766 let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
12767 assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
12769 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
12770 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
12772 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
12778 use crate::chain::Listen;
12779 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12780 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12781 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12782 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12783 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12784 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12785 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12786 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12787 use crate::util::test_utils;
12788 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12790 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
12791 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12792 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12793 use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxOut};
12795 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12797 use criterion::Criterion;
12799 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12800 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12801 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12802 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12803 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12804 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12805 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12807 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12808 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12810 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12811 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12813 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12815 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12818 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12819 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12822 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12823 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12824 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12826 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12827 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12829 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12830 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12831 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12832 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12833 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &logger_a, &scorer);
12835 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12836 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12837 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12839 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12840 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12841 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12842 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12844 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12845 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12846 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12848 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12849 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12850 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12851 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12852 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12854 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12855 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12856 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12858 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12859 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12861 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12862 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12863 }, false).unwrap();
12864 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12865 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12866 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12869 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12870 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12871 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12873 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12874 } else { panic!(); }
12876 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12877 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12878 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12879 match events_b[0] {
12880 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12881 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12883 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12886 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12887 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12888 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12889 match events_a[0] {
12890 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12891 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12893 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12896 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
12898 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash, 42, vec![tx]);
12899 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
12900 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
12902 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12903 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12904 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12905 match msg_events[0] {
12906 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
12907 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
12908 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12912 match msg_events[1] {
12913 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12917 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12918 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12919 match events_a[0] {
12920 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12921 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12923 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12926 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12927 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12928 match events_b[0] {
12929 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12930 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12932 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12935 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
12936 macro_rules! send_payment {
12937 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
12938 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
12939 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
12940 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
12941 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
12942 payment_count += 1;
12943 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
12944 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
12946 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
12947 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
12948 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
12949 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
12950 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
12951 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12952 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
12953 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
12954 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12955 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12956 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12958 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
12959 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
12960 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12961 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
12963 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
12964 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
12965 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
12966 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12967 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
12969 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
12972 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
12973 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12974 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12975 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12977 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
12981 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
12982 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
12983 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);