1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
18 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
21 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
22 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
25 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
26 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
27 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
29 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,FeeEstimator};
30 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
31 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
32 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
33 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
34 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
37 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
38 use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemoryChannelKeys};
39 use util::config::UserConfig;
40 use util::{byte_utils, events};
41 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
42 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
43 use util::logger::Logger;
44 use util::errors::APIError;
47 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
48 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
49 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
50 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
51 use std::time::Duration;
52 use std::marker::{Sync, Send};
54 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
58 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
59 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
60 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
62 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
63 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
64 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
65 // before we forward it.
67 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
68 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
69 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
70 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
71 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
73 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
74 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
76 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
77 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
80 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
81 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
85 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
86 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
87 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
88 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
89 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
90 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
91 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
94 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
95 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
96 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
97 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
100 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
101 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
102 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
103 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
104 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
107 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
109 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
111 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
115 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
119 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
120 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
121 pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
122 short_channel_id: u64,
124 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
127 struct ClaimableHTLC {
128 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
130 /// Filled in when the HTLC was received with a payment_secret packet, which contains a
131 /// total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
132 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
133 /// are part of the same payment.
134 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
138 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
139 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
140 pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
141 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
144 session_priv: SecretKey,
145 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
146 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
147 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
152 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
153 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
155 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
156 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
161 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
162 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
164 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
172 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
173 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
174 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
175 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
176 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
177 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
178 /// payment_secret type, use to authenticate sender to the receiver and tie MPP HTLCs together
179 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
180 pub struct PaymentSecret(pub [u8;32]);
182 type ShutdownResult = (Option<OutPoint>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
184 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
185 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
186 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
187 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
188 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
190 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
191 err: msgs::LightningError,
192 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
194 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
196 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
198 err: LightningError {
200 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
201 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
207 shutdown_finish: None,
211 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
213 err: LightningError {
215 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
217 shutdown_finish: None,
221 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
222 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
225 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
227 err: LightningError {
229 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
230 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
236 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
240 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
243 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
245 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
247 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
249 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
250 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
256 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
258 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
259 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
266 shutdown_finish: None,
271 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
272 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
273 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
274 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
275 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
277 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
278 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
279 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
280 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
281 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
282 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
283 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
285 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
289 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
290 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
291 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<ChanSigner>>,
292 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
293 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
294 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
295 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
296 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
297 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
298 /// (payment_hash, payment_secret) -> Vec<HTLCs> for tracking HTLCs that
299 /// were to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
300 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
301 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
303 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<(PaymentHash, Option<PaymentSecret>), Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
304 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
305 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
306 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
309 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
310 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
312 latest_features: InitFeatures,
315 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
316 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
318 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
319 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
320 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
321 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
322 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
323 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
324 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
325 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = Arc<ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>>;
327 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
328 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
329 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
330 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
331 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
332 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
333 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
334 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
335 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
337 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
338 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
340 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
341 /// to individual Channels.
343 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
344 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
345 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
346 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
348 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
349 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
350 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_/update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
351 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
352 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
353 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
354 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
356 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
357 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
358 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
359 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
362 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
363 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
364 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
365 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
366 /// timer_chan_freshness_every_min roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
368 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
369 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
370 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
371 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
372 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
373 pub struct ChannelManager<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
374 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<Keys=ChanSigner>,
375 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
376 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
377 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
380 default_configuration: UserConfig,
381 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
387 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
389 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
390 last_block_hash: Mutex<BlockHash>,
391 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
394 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
396 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
397 our_network_key: SecretKey,
399 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
400 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
401 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
403 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
404 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
405 /// are currently open with that peer.
406 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
407 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
409 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
411 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
412 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
413 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
414 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
415 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
422 /// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when
423 /// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
424 pub(crate) const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
425 /// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
426 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7;
428 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
429 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
430 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
431 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
432 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
433 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
434 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
436 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
437 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
438 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
439 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
440 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
441 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
444 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
446 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
447 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
450 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
452 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
453 pub struct ChannelDetails {
454 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
455 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
456 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
457 /// lifetime of the channel.
458 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
459 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
460 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
461 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
462 /// The node_id of our counterparty
463 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
464 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
465 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
466 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
467 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
468 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
469 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
470 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
472 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
473 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
474 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
475 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
476 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
477 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
478 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
479 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
480 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
481 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
482 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
483 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
484 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
488 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
489 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
492 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
493 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
494 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
495 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
496 ParameterError(APIError),
497 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
498 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
499 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
502 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
504 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
505 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
506 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
507 /// paths than the ones selected).
508 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
509 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
510 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
511 /// in over-/re-payment.
513 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
514 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
515 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
517 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
518 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
519 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
520 /// with the latest update_id.
521 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
524 macro_rules! handle_error {
525 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
528 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
529 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
531 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
532 // entering the macro.
533 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
536 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
538 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
539 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
540 if let Some(update) = update_option {
541 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
547 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
548 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
550 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
551 node_id: $their_node_id,
552 action: err.action.clone()
556 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
557 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
560 // Return error in case higher-API need one
567 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
568 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
571 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
572 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
574 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
575 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
576 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
577 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
578 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
580 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
582 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
587 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
588 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
591 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
592 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
594 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
595 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
596 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
597 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
598 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
600 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
602 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg)) => {
603 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
604 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
605 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
606 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
608 let shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown(false);
609 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
615 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
616 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
617 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
619 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
621 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
622 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
623 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
624 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
625 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
627 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
628 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
629 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
630 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
631 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
632 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
633 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
634 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
635 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
636 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
639 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
640 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
641 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
642 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
644 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
645 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
647 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
648 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
650 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
651 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
652 if !$resend_commitment {
653 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
656 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
658 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
659 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$entry.key()))
665 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
666 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
667 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
669 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
670 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
674 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
675 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
676 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
677 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
678 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
681 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
686 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
687 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<Keys=ChanSigner>,
688 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
689 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
690 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
693 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
695 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
696 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
698 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
700 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
702 /// Users must provide the current blockchain height from which to track onchain channel
703 /// funding outpoints and send payments with reliable timelocks.
705 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
706 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods.
707 /// However, rather than calling these methods directly, the user should register
708 /// the ChannelManager as a listener to the BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's
709 /// `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify all registered listeners in one
711 pub fn new(network: Network, fee_est: F, monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, current_blockchain_height: usize) -> Self {
712 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
715 default_configuration: config.clone(),
716 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
717 fee_estimator: fee_est,
721 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(current_blockchain_height),
722 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
725 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
726 by_id: HashMap::new(),
727 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
728 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
729 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
730 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
732 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
734 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
736 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
738 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
739 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
747 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
749 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
750 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
751 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
752 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
754 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
755 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
757 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
758 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
759 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
760 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
761 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
764 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
765 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?;
766 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
768 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
769 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
770 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
771 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
772 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
773 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
775 panic!("RNG is bad???");
778 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
780 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
781 node_id: their_network_key,
787 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<ChanSigner>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
788 let mut res = Vec::new();
790 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
791 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
792 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
793 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
794 res.push(ChannelDetails {
795 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
796 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
797 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
798 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
799 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
800 inbound_capacity_msat,
801 outbound_capacity_msat,
802 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
803 is_live: channel.is_live(),
807 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
808 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
809 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
810 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
816 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
817 /// more information.
818 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
819 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
822 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
823 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
825 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
826 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
827 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
828 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
829 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
830 // really wanted anyway.
831 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
834 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
835 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
836 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
838 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
839 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
840 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
842 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
843 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
844 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
845 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
846 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
847 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
848 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
849 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
852 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
853 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
854 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
856 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
857 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
859 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
862 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
863 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
865 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
866 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
871 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
872 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
873 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
882 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
883 let (funding_txo_option, monitor_update, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
884 log_trace!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
885 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
886 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
888 if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_option {
889 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
890 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
891 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
892 // ignore the result here.
893 let _ = self.monitor.update_monitor(funding_txo, monitor_update);
897 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
898 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
899 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
900 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
903 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
904 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
905 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
906 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
907 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
914 log_trace!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
915 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
916 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
917 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
918 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
924 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
925 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
926 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
927 for chan in self.list_channels() {
928 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
932 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>) {
933 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
934 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
936 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
937 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
938 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
939 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
940 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
941 failure_code: $err_code,
942 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
947 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
948 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
951 let shared_secret = {
952 let mut arr = [0; 32];
953 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
956 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
958 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
959 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
960 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
961 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
962 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
963 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
964 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
965 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
968 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
969 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
970 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
971 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
972 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
975 let mut channel_state = None;
976 macro_rules! return_err {
977 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
979 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
980 if channel_state.is_none() {
981 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
983 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
984 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
985 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
986 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
987 })), channel_state.unwrap());
992 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
993 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
994 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
995 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
997 let error_code = match err {
998 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
999 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1000 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1001 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1002 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1004 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1007 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1008 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1009 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1016 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1019 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1020 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1021 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1022 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1023 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1024 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1025 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1026 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1027 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1028 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1029 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1030 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1034 // final_expiry_too_soon
1035 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure we have at least
1036 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1037 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown payment hash, our payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward
1038 // before our onchain logic triggers a channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational).
1039 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1040 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1042 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1043 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1044 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1046 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1047 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1048 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1051 let payment_data = match next_hop_data.format {
1052 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => None,
1053 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1054 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data } => payment_data,
1057 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1058 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1059 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1060 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1062 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1063 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1065 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1067 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1068 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1069 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1070 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1073 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1074 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1075 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1077 // Check two things:
1078 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1079 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1080 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1082 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1084 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1085 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1086 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1088 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1090 let blinding_factor = {
1091 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1092 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1093 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1094 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1097 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1099 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1101 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1104 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1105 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1108 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1109 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1110 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1111 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1112 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1116 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1117 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1118 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1119 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1121 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1122 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1123 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1124 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1128 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1129 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1130 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1131 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1132 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1133 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1134 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1135 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1136 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1137 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1139 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1141 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1142 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1144 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1145 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1146 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1147 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1148 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1149 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1150 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1152 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1153 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1155 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1156 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1157 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1159 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1160 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1162 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1163 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1164 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1165 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1166 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1168 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1169 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1171 // In theory, we would be safe against unitentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1172 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longuer delay.
1173 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1174 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1180 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1181 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1182 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1183 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1185 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1186 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1188 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1189 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
1191 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1193 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1198 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1201 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1202 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1203 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1204 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1205 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1209 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1211 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1212 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1213 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1214 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1215 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1216 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1217 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1218 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator),
1219 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1220 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1223 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1224 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1226 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1232 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1233 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1234 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1235 let (session_priv, prng_seed) = self.keys_manager.get_onion_rand();
1237 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1238 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1239 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height)?;
1240 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1241 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1243 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1245 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1247 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1248 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1249 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1250 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1251 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1254 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1255 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1257 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1258 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1260 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1261 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1263 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1265 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1266 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1267 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1269 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1270 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1271 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1272 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1273 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1274 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1275 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1276 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1277 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1280 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1281 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1282 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1283 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1284 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1285 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1286 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1294 } else { unreachable!(); }
1298 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1299 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1301 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1306 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1308 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1309 /// fields for more info.
1311 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1312 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1313 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1314 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1315 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1316 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1318 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1320 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1321 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1322 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1324 /// In general, a path may raise:
1325 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1326 /// node public key) is specified.
1327 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1328 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1330 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1331 /// relevant updates.
1333 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1334 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1335 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1337 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1338 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1339 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1340 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1342 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1343 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1344 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1345 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1346 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1347 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1349 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1350 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1351 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1352 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1353 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1355 let mut total_value = 0;
1356 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1357 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
1358 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1359 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1360 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1361 continue 'path_check;
1363 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1364 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1365 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1366 continue 'path_check;
1369 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1370 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
1372 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
1373 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
1376 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1377 let mut results = Vec::new();
1378 for path in route.paths.iter() {
1379 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height));
1381 let mut has_ok = false;
1382 let mut has_err = false;
1383 for res in results.iter() {
1384 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
1385 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
1386 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
1387 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
1394 if has_err && has_ok {
1395 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
1397 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
1403 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1405 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1406 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1408 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1410 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1411 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1412 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1413 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1416 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1418 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo, &self.logger)
1419 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1420 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
1421 } else { unreachable!(); })
1426 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id()) {
1427 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1430 Err(_) => { return; }
1434 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1435 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1436 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1439 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1440 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1441 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1443 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1449 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1450 if !chan.should_announce() {
1451 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1455 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1457 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1459 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1460 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1462 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1463 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1464 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1465 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1466 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1471 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
1472 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
1473 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
1475 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::std::u16::MAX as u32 / (msgs::NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
1478 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
1479 // smaller than 500:
1480 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
1482 /// Generates a signed node_announcement from the given arguments and creates a
1483 /// BroadcastNodeAnnouncement event. Note that such messages will be ignored unless peers have
1484 /// seen a channel_announcement from us (ie unless we have public channels open).
1486 /// RGB is a node "color" and alias is a printable human-readable string to describe this node
1487 /// to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
1489 /// addresses represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node accepts
1490 /// incoming connections. These will be broadcast to the network, publicly tying these
1491 /// addresses together. If you wish to preserve user privacy, addresses should likely contain
1492 /// only Tor Onion addresses.
1494 /// Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500).
1495 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: Vec<msgs::NetAddress>) {
1496 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1498 if addresses.len() > 500 {
1499 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
1502 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1503 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1504 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
1505 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
1506 rgb, alias, addresses,
1507 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1508 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1510 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1512 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1513 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
1514 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
1515 signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key),
1516 contents: announcement
1521 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1523 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1524 /// Will likely generate further events.
1525 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1526 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1528 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1529 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1530 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1532 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1533 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1535 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1536 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1537 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1538 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1540 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1541 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1542 match forward_info {
1543 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1544 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1545 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1546 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1547 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1549 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
1550 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
1553 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1554 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1555 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1556 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1557 // problem, not ours.
1564 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1565 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1566 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1567 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1568 match forward_info {
1569 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1570 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1572 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value }, } => {
1573 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1574 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1575 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1576 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1577 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1579 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
1581 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1582 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
1584 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1586 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1587 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
1588 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
1594 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1596 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1597 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1598 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1599 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1600 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1601 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1602 // this channel currently :/.
1608 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1609 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
1611 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1612 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1613 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1615 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1616 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1618 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1620 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1621 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1622 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1625 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1627 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1628 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1629 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1630 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1631 // messages when we can.
1632 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1633 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1634 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1641 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1642 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
1645 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1646 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1647 let their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
1648 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1649 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1650 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1652 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1653 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1654 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1655 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1656 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1658 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1660 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1662 handle_errors.push((their_node_id, err));
1666 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1667 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1670 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1671 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1672 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1673 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1674 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1675 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1676 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1678 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1686 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1687 match forward_info {
1688 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1689 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry },
1690 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. }, } => {
1691 let prev_hop = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1692 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1693 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1694 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1697 let mut total_value = 0;
1698 let payment_secret_opt =
1699 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data { Some(data.payment_secret.clone()) } else { None };
1700 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry((payment_hash, payment_secret_opt))
1701 .or_insert(Vec::new());
1702 htlcs.push(ClaimableHTLC {
1704 value: amt_to_forward,
1705 payment_data: payment_data.clone(),
1706 cltv_expiry: incoming_cltv_expiry,
1708 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data {
1709 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1710 total_value += htlc.value;
1711 if htlc.payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat != data.total_msat {
1712 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
1714 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
1716 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > data.total_msat {
1717 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1718 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
1719 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
1720 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(
1721 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire)
1725 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1726 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
1727 htlc_id: htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
1728 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
1730 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
1733 } else if total_value == data.total_msat {
1734 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1735 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1736 payment_secret: Some(data.payment_secret),
1741 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1742 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1743 payment_secret: None,
1744 amt: amt_to_forward,
1748 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1749 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
1751 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1752 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1760 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1761 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
1764 for (their_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1765 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id);
1768 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1769 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1770 events.append(&mut new_events);
1773 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
1774 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
1775 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
1777 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
1778 pub fn timer_chan_freshness_every_min(&self) {
1779 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1780 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1781 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1782 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
1783 if chan.is_disabled_staged() && !chan.is_live() {
1784 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1785 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1790 } else if chan.is_disabled_staged() && chan.is_live() {
1792 } else if chan.is_disabled_marked() {
1793 chan.to_disabled_staged();
1798 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1799 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
1800 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
1801 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
1802 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
1803 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> bool {
1804 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1806 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1807 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(*payment_hash, *payment_secret));
1808 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1809 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
1810 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1811 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
1812 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
1813 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32,
1815 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1816 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
1817 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
1823 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1824 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1825 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1826 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1827 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1828 /// still-available channels.
1829 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1830 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
1831 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
1832 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
1835 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, .. } => {
1836 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1837 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1838 match &onion_error {
1839 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
1841 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1843 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1844 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1845 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1846 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1847 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1848 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1849 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1854 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1855 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1856 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1857 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1859 error_code: onion_error_code,
1861 error_data: onion_error_data
1865 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1871 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1872 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1873 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
1874 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1876 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1877 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1878 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1879 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1880 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1881 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
1883 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1885 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
1891 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1892 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1893 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1894 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1895 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1896 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1898 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
1899 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1900 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1904 let mut forward_event = None;
1905 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1906 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
1908 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
1909 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1910 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
1912 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1913 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
1916 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1917 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
1918 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1919 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1920 time_forwardable: time
1927 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1928 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1929 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1931 /// You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
1932 /// available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
1933 /// reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
1934 /// payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
1935 /// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
1936 /// motivated attackers.
1938 /// Note that the privacy concerns in (b) are not relevant in payments with a payment_secret
1939 /// set. Thus, for such payments we will claim any payments which do not under-pay.
1941 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1942 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
1943 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1945 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1947 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1948 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(payment_hash, *payment_secret));
1949 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1950 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
1952 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
1953 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
1954 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
1955 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
1957 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
1958 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
1959 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
1960 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
1961 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
1964 let (is_mpp, mut valid_mpp) = if let &Some(ref data) = &sources[0].payment_data {
1965 assert!(payment_secret.is_some());
1966 (true, data.total_msat >= expected_amount)
1968 assert!(payment_secret.is_none());
1972 for htlc in sources.iter() {
1973 if !is_mpp || !valid_mpp { break; }
1974 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
1979 let mut errs = Vec::new();
1980 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
1981 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
1982 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1983 if (is_mpp && !valid_mpp) || (!is_mpp && (htlc.value < expected_amount || htlc.value > expected_amount * 2)) {
1984 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
1985 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
1986 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32,
1988 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1989 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
1990 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
1992 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
1994 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.1.err.action {
1995 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
1996 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
1997 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", e.1.err.err);
1998 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
1999 } else { errs.push(e); }
2001 Err(None) if is_mpp => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
2003 log_warn!(self.logger, "Channel we expected to claim an HTLC from was closed.");
2005 Ok(()) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
2010 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
2011 // which were generated.
2012 channel_state.take();
2014 for (their_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
2015 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2016 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, their_node_id);
2023 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(), Option<(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)>> {
2024 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
2025 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
2026 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2027 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2033 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
2034 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2035 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
2036 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
2037 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_option {
2038 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2039 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2040 assert!(msgs.is_none());
2042 return Err(Some((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err())));
2046 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
2047 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2048 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2049 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2050 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2051 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
2052 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2053 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2062 // TODO: Do something with e?
2063 // This should only occur if we are claiming an HTLC at the same time as the
2064 // HTLC is being failed (eg because a block is being connected and this caused
2065 // an HTLC to time out). This should, of course, only occur if the user is the
2066 // one doing the claiming (as it being a part of a peer claim would imply we're
2067 // about to lose funds) and only if the lock in claim_funds was dropped as a
2068 // previous HTLC was failed (thus not for an MPP payment).
2069 debug_assert!(false, "This shouldn't be reachable except in absurdly rare cases between monitor updates and HTLC timeouts: {:?}", e);
2073 } else { unreachable!(); }
2076 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
2078 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
2079 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2080 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2081 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
2085 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
2086 if let Err((their_node_id, err)) = match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage) {
2089 // TODO: There is probably a channel monitor somewhere that needs to
2090 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
2091 // why it's missing.
2094 Err(Some(res)) => Err(res),
2096 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2097 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2098 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, their_node_id);
2104 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
2105 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2106 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
2109 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
2110 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
2113 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
2114 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
2116 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
2117 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
2118 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
2119 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
2121 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
2122 /// 1) You register a ManyChannelMonitor with this ChannelManager,
2123 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
2124 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
2125 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
2126 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
2127 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
2128 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
2129 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
2130 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2132 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
2133 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
2134 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
2135 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
2138 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2139 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2140 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2141 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2142 let channel = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
2146 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
2150 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
2151 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2152 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
2154 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
2156 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
2157 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
2158 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2159 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2164 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
2165 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
2166 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2167 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2168 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2173 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2177 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2182 if needs_broadcast_safe {
2183 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2184 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
2185 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
2188 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2189 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2190 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2193 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2194 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2195 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2196 msg: announcement_sigs,
2199 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2203 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
2205 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
2206 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2208 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
2210 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
2211 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
2215 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2216 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
2217 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
2220 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
2221 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
2222 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2223 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2224 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
2225 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
2226 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2227 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
2228 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2229 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
2231 entry.insert(channel);
2237 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2238 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
2239 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2240 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2241 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
2242 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2243 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2244 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2246 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
2247 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2249 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2252 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2253 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
2254 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
2255 channel_value_satoshis: value,
2256 output_script: output_script,
2257 user_channel_id: user_id,
2262 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2263 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), mut chan) = {
2264 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2265 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2266 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
2267 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2268 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2269 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2271 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
2273 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2276 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
2277 // lock before add_monitor
2278 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_update) {
2280 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
2281 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
2282 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
2283 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
2284 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
2285 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), None));
2287 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
2288 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
2289 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
2290 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
2291 // until we have persisted our monitor.
2292 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2296 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2297 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2298 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
2299 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2300 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
2302 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2303 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
2304 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2313 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2314 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
2315 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2316 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2317 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2318 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2319 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2320 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2322 let monitor = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
2323 Ok(update) => update,
2324 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2326 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2327 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2329 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2331 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2334 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2335 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2336 funding_txo: funding_txo,
2337 user_channel_id: user_id,
2342 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2343 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2344 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2345 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2346 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2347 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2348 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2350 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2351 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2352 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2353 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2354 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2355 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2356 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2357 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2358 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2359 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2360 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2361 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2362 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2363 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2364 msg: announcement_sigs,
2369 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2373 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2374 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2375 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2376 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2378 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2379 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2380 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2381 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2383 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2384 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2385 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2386 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2390 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2391 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2392 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2396 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2397 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2398 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2400 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2401 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2403 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2406 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2407 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2409 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2410 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2411 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2412 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2420 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2421 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2422 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2423 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2424 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2425 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2426 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2427 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2429 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2430 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2431 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2432 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2437 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2438 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2439 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2440 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2441 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2442 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2443 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2445 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2446 } else { (tx, None) }
2448 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2451 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2452 log_trace!(self.logger, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
2453 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2455 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2456 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2457 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2458 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2466 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2467 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2468 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2469 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2471 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2472 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2473 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2474 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2476 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2477 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2479 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2480 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2481 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2482 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2485 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
2486 // Ensure error_code has the UPDATE flag set, since by default we send a
2487 // channel update along as part of failing the HTLC.
2488 assert!((error_code & 0x1000) != 0);
2489 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2490 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2491 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2492 match pending_forward_info {
2493 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2494 let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(chan) {
2495 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
2496 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2497 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(upd.contents.flags));
2498 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
2502 // The only case where we'd be unable to
2503 // successfully get a channel update is if the
2504 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
2505 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
2506 // payments over the channel back to themselves
2507 // (cause no one else should know the short_id
2508 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
2509 // no problem just calling this
2510 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
2511 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2513 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2514 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2515 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2518 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
2520 _ => pending_forward_info
2523 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2525 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2530 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2531 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2533 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2534 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2535 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2536 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2537 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2539 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2541 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2544 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2548 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2549 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2550 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2551 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2552 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2553 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2554 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2556 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2558 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2563 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2564 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2565 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2566 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2567 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2568 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2569 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2571 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2572 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
2573 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2575 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2578 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2582 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2583 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2584 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2585 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2586 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2587 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2588 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2590 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
2591 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
2592 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2593 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
2594 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
2595 let _ = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
2596 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
2601 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2602 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2603 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2605 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2606 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2607 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2609 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2610 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2611 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2612 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2613 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2614 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2615 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2616 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2618 commitment_signed: msg,
2622 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2623 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2624 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2630 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2635 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2636 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2637 let mut forward_event = None;
2638 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2639 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2640 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2641 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
2643 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2644 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
2645 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
2646 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
2648 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2649 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2651 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2652 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2657 match forward_event {
2659 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2660 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2661 time_forwardable: time
2669 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2670 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2671 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2672 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2673 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2674 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2675 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2676 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2678 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2679 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
2680 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2681 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2682 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2683 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2684 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
2686 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2689 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2690 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2691 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2695 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2696 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2697 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2701 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2703 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2706 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2707 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2709 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2714 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2715 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2716 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2717 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2718 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2719 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2720 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2722 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2724 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2729 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2730 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2731 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2733 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2734 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2735 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2736 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2738 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2739 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
2742 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2743 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2744 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2746 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2747 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2749 let their_node_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 };
2750 let their_bitcoin_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 };
2751 match (self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, their_node_key),
2752 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, their_bitcoin_key)) {
2754 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature: {:?}. Maybe using different node_secret for transport and routing msg? UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}", e, &announcement, their_node_key));
2755 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2758 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature: {:?}. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})", e, &announcement, their_bitcoin_key));
2759 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2765 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2767 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2768 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2769 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2770 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2771 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2772 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2773 contents: announcement,
2775 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2778 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2783 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2784 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2785 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2787 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2788 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2789 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2790 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2792 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, mut order, shutdown) =
2793 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2794 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
2795 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2796 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2797 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2798 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2799 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2800 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2802 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2803 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2805 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
2806 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2809 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2810 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2811 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2815 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2816 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2817 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2818 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2823 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2824 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2825 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2826 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2832 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2836 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2841 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2842 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2843 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2849 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2853 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2854 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2855 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2856 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2858 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2859 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2861 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2862 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2863 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2865 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2866 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("Failed to find corresponding channel for id {}", channel_id.to_hex())}),
2867 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2868 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2869 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel".to_owned()});
2871 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2872 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2874 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2875 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2877 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2878 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
2879 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
2881 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2884 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2885 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2886 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2887 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2888 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2889 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2890 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2891 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2901 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id) {
2902 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2903 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
2908 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
2909 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<Keys=ChanSigner>,
2910 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2911 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
2912 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2915 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2916 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2917 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2918 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2920 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2921 for htlc_update in self.monitor.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() {
2922 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2923 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2924 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2926 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2927 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2932 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2933 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2934 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2939 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
2940 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<Keys=ChanSigner>,
2941 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2942 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
2943 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2946 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2947 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2948 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2949 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2951 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2952 for htlc_update in self.monitor.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() {
2953 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2954 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2955 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2957 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2958 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2963 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2964 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2965 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2970 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send>
2971 ChainListener for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
2972 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<Keys=ChanSigner>,
2973 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2974 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
2975 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2978 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[usize]) {
2979 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2980 log_trace!(self.logger, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2981 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2982 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2983 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
2985 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2986 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2987 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2988 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2989 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2990 let res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2991 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
2992 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
2993 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2994 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2995 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
2999 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
3000 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
3001 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
3002 msg: funding_locked,
3004 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
3005 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3006 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3007 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
3008 msg: announcement_sigs,
3011 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3013 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
3015 } else if let Err(e) = res {
3016 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3017 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
3018 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
3022 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
3023 for tx in txn_matched {
3024 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
3025 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
3026 log_trace!(self.logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3027 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3028 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3030 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
3031 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
3032 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
3033 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
3034 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
3035 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3044 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height, &self.logger) {
3045 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3046 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3048 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
3049 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
3050 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
3051 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(false));
3052 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
3053 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3062 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|&(ref payment_hash, _), htlcs| {
3063 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3064 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
3065 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
3066 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
3067 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
3068 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
3069 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3070 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
3071 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3072 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
3073 data: htlc_msat_height_data
3078 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
3081 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3082 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3085 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
3086 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
3088 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
3089 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
3091 // Update last_node_announcement_serial to be the max of its current value and the
3092 // block timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
3093 // having an explicit local time source.
3094 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully update
3095 // last_node_announcement_serial or decide we don't need to.
3096 let old_serial = self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire);
3097 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
3098 if self.last_node_announcement_serial.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
3104 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
3105 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, _: u32) {
3106 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3107 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3109 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3110 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3111 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3112 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3113 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
3114 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
3115 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
3116 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3118 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown(true));
3119 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
3120 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3130 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3131 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3133 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
3134 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
3138 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send>
3139 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
3140 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3141 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3142 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3143 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3146 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
3147 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3148 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg), *their_node_id);
3151 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
3152 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3153 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg), *their_node_id);
3156 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
3157 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3158 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3161 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
3162 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3163 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3166 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
3167 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3168 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3171 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
3172 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3173 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3176 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
3177 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3178 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3181 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
3182 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3183 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3186 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
3187 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3188 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3191 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
3192 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3193 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3196 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
3197 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3198 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3201 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
3202 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3203 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3206 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
3207 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3208 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3211 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
3212 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3213 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3216 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
3217 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3218 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3221 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
3222 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3223 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3226 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
3227 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3228 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3229 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
3230 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
3232 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3233 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3234 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3235 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3236 if no_connection_possible {
3237 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
3238 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3239 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
3240 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3241 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3243 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
3244 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3245 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3255 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
3256 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3257 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
3258 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
3259 chan.to_disabled_marked();
3260 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
3261 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3262 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
3264 if chan.is_shutdown() {
3265 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3266 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3270 no_channels_remain = false;
3276 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
3278 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3279 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3280 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3281 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3282 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3283 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3284 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3285 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3286 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3287 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3288 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3289 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3290 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3291 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
3292 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3293 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
3297 if no_channels_remain {
3298 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(their_node_id);
3301 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3302 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3304 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
3305 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
3306 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
3311 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
3312 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
3314 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3317 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3318 match peer_state_lock.entry(their_node_id.clone()) {
3319 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3320 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
3321 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
3324 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
3325 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
3330 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3331 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3332 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3333 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3334 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
3335 if !chan.have_received_message() {
3336 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
3337 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
3338 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
3342 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
3343 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
3344 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
3350 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
3353 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
3354 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3356 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
3357 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3358 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
3359 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
3363 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
3368 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3369 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3371 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3372 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3373 match &self.routing {
3374 &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id } => {
3376 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
3377 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3379 &PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { ref payment_data, ref incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3381 payment_data.write(writer)?;
3382 incoming_cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3385 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
3386 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3387 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
3388 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
3393 impl Readable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3394 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
3395 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3396 routing: match Readable::read(reader)? {
3397 0u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3398 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3399 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3401 1u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
3402 payment_data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3403 incoming_cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
3405 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3407 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
3408 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3409 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
3410 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
3415 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3416 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3418 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
3420 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3422 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
3424 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3431 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3432 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
3433 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3434 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3435 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3436 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3441 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3442 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3444 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
3446 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3448 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
3450 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3457 impl Readable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3458 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3459 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3460 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3461 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3462 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3467 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3470 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3473 impl_writeable!(ClaimableHTLC, 0, {
3480 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3481 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3483 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3485 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3487 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3489 path.write(writer)?;
3490 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3491 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3498 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
3499 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3500 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3501 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3502 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3503 path: Readable::read(reader)?,
3504 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3505 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3507 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3512 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3513 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3515 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3519 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3521 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3522 data.write(writer)?;
3529 impl Readable for HTLCFailReason {
3530 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3531 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3532 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3533 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3534 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3535 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3537 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3542 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3543 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3545 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
3547 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3548 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3549 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3551 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3553 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3554 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3561 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3562 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
3563 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3564 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
3565 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3566 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3567 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
3569 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
3570 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3571 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3573 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3578 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
3579 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3580 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3581 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3582 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3585 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3586 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3588 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3589 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3591 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3592 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3593 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3595 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3596 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3597 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3598 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3599 unfunded_channels += 1;
3602 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3603 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3604 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3605 channel.write(writer)?;
3609 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3610 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3611 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3612 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3613 for forward in pending_forwards {
3614 forward.write(writer)?;
3618 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3619 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3620 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3621 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3622 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
3623 htlc.write(writer)?;
3627 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3628 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3629 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3630 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
3631 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3632 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
3635 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3636 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3637 for event in events.iter() {
3638 event.write(writer)?;
3641 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3647 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3649 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3651 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3652 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3653 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3654 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3655 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3656 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3657 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3658 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3659 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3660 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3661 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface.
3662 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner: 'a + ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
3663 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3664 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3665 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3666 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3670 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3671 /// deserialization.
3672 pub keys_manager: K,
3674 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3676 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3677 pub fee_estimator: F,
3678 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3680 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3681 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3682 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3685 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3686 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3687 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3688 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
3689 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3690 /// deserialization.
3692 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3693 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3694 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3696 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3697 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3699 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3700 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
3701 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3702 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3704 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3706 pub channel_monitors: &'a mut HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>,
3709 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
3710 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
3711 impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
3712 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>>)
3713 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3714 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3715 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3716 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3719 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3720 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
3721 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
3725 impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
3726 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>)
3727 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3728 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3729 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3730 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3733 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3734 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3735 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3736 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3737 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3740 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3741 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3742 let last_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3744 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3746 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3747 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3748 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3749 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3750 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3751 let mut channel: Channel<ChanSigner> = Readable::read(reader)?;
3752 if channel.last_block_connected != Default::default() && channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3753 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3756 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3757 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3758 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
3759 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3760 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3761 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() ||
3762 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
3763 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
3764 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3765 } else if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3766 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3767 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() ||
3768 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
3769 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
3770 let (_, _, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
3771 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
3772 monitor.broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
3774 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3775 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3777 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3780 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3784 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
3785 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3786 monitor.broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
3790 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
3791 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3792 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3793 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3794 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3795 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3796 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
3797 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3798 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3800 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3803 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3804 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3805 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3806 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3807 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3808 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
3809 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3810 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3812 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3815 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3816 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
3817 for _ in 0..peer_count {
3818 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3819 let peer_state = PeerState {
3820 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
3822 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
3825 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3826 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
3827 for _ in 0..event_count {
3828 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
3829 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
3834 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3836 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3838 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3839 monitor: args.monitor,
3840 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3842 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3843 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3844 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3846 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3851 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3853 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3855 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
3857 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
3859 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
3860 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3861 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3862 logger: args.logger,
3863 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3866 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3867 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3870 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3871 //connection or two.
3873 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))