1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 pub use ln::channel::CounterpartyForwardingInfo;
46 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
47 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
50 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
52 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
53 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
54 use util::config::UserConfig;
55 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
56 use util::{byte_utils, events};
57 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
58 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
59 use util::logger::Logger;
60 use util::errors::APIError;
63 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
64 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
65 use std::sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
66 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
67 use std::time::Duration;
68 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
69 use std::time::Instant;
70 use std::marker::{Sync, Send};
72 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
94 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
98 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
99 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
103 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
104 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
105 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
106 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
107 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
108 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
109 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
112 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
113 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
114 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
115 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
118 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
119 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
120 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
121 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
122 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
125 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
127 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
129 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
130 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
131 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
133 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
135 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
139 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
143 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
144 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
145 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
146 short_channel_id: u64,
148 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
150 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
151 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
155 struct ClaimableHTLC {
156 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
158 /// Filled in when the HTLC was received with a payment_secret packet, which contains a
159 /// total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
160 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
161 /// are part of the same payment.
162 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
166 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
167 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
168 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
169 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
172 session_priv: SecretKey,
173 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
174 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
175 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
180 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
181 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
183 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
184 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
189 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
190 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
192 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
200 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
201 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
202 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
203 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
204 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
205 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
206 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
207 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
208 /// payment_secret type, use to authenticate sender to the receiver and tie MPP HTLCs together
209 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
210 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
211 pub struct PaymentSecret(pub [u8;32]);
213 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
215 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
216 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
217 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
218 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
219 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
221 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
222 err: msgs::LightningError,
223 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
225 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
227 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
229 err: LightningError {
231 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
232 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
238 shutdown_finish: None,
242 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
244 err: LightningError {
246 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
248 shutdown_finish: None,
252 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
253 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
256 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
258 err: LightningError {
260 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
261 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
267 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
271 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
274 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
276 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
278 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
280 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
281 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
287 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
289 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
290 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
297 shutdown_finish: None,
302 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
303 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
304 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
305 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
306 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
308 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
309 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
310 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
311 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
312 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
313 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
314 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
316 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
320 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
321 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
322 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
323 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
324 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
325 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
326 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
327 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
328 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
329 /// (payment_hash, payment_secret) -> Vec<HTLCs> for tracking HTLCs that
330 /// were to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
331 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
332 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
334 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<(PaymentHash, Option<PaymentSecret>), Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
335 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
336 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
337 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
340 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
341 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
342 /// quite some time lag.
343 enum BackgroundEvent {
344 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
345 /// commitment transaction.
346 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
349 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
350 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
352 latest_features: InitFeatures,
355 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
356 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
358 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
359 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
360 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
361 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
362 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
363 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
364 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
365 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
367 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
368 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
369 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
370 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
371 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
372 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
373 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
374 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
375 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
377 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
378 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
380 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
381 /// to individual Channels.
383 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
384 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
385 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
386 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
388 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
389 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
390 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
391 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
392 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
393 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
394 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
396 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
397 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
398 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
399 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
402 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
403 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
404 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
405 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
406 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
408 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
409 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
410 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
411 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
412 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
413 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
414 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
415 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
416 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
417 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
420 default_configuration: UserConfig,
421 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
427 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
429 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
430 last_block_hash: RwLock<BlockHash>,
431 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
433 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
434 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
435 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
436 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
437 our_network_key: SecretKey,
438 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
440 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
441 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
442 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
444 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
445 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
446 /// are currently open with that peer.
447 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
448 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
450 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
452 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
453 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
454 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
455 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
456 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
457 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
458 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the PersistenceNotifier
459 /// the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
460 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
462 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
469 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
471 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
472 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
473 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
474 pub struct ChainParameters {
475 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
476 pub network: Network,
478 /// The hash of the latest block successfully connected.
479 pub latest_hash: BlockHash,
481 /// The height of the latest block successfully connected.
483 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
484 pub latest_height: usize,
487 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
488 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
489 /// `await_persistable_update` that new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
490 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
491 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
492 /// updates are ready for persistence).
493 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> {
494 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
495 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
496 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
499 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> {
500 fn new(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> Self {
501 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
504 persistence_notifier: notifier,
505 _read_guard: read_guard,
510 impl<'a> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> {
512 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
516 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
517 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
519 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
521 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
522 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
523 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
524 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
525 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
527 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
528 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly six hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
530 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
532 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
533 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
534 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
535 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
536 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
537 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 6;
538 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
540 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
541 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
542 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
543 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
544 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
545 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
548 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
550 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
551 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
554 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
556 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
558 pub struct ChannelDetails {
559 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
560 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
561 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
562 /// lifetime of the channel.
563 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
564 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
565 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
566 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
567 /// The node_id of our counterparty
568 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
569 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
570 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
571 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
572 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
573 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
574 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
575 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
577 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
578 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
579 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
580 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
581 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
582 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
583 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
584 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
585 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
586 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
587 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
588 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
589 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
592 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
593 /// payments to us through this channel.
594 pub counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
597 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
598 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
600 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
601 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
602 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
603 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
604 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
605 ParameterError(APIError),
606 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
607 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
608 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
611 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
613 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
614 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
615 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
616 /// paths than the ones selected).
617 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
618 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
619 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
620 /// in over-/re-payment.
622 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
623 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
624 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
626 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
627 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
628 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
629 /// with the latest update_id.
630 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
633 macro_rules! handle_error {
634 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
637 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
638 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
640 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
641 // entering the macro.
642 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
645 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
647 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
648 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
649 if let Some(update) = update_option {
650 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
656 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
657 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
659 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
660 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
661 action: err.action.clone()
665 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
666 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
669 // Return error in case higher-API need one
676 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
677 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
680 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
681 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
683 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
684 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
685 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
686 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
687 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
689 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
691 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
696 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
697 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
700 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
701 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
703 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
704 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
705 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
706 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
707 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
709 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
711 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg)) => {
712 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
713 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
714 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
715 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
717 let shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown(false);
718 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
724 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
725 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
726 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
728 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
730 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
731 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
732 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
733 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
734 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
736 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
737 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
738 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
739 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
740 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
741 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
742 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
743 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
744 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
745 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
748 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
749 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
750 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
751 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
753 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
754 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
756 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
757 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
759 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
760 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
761 if !$resend_commitment {
762 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
765 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
767 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
768 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$entry.key()))
774 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
775 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
776 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
778 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
779 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
783 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
784 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
785 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
786 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
787 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
790 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
795 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
796 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
797 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
798 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
799 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
802 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
804 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
805 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
807 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
809 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
811 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
812 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
813 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
814 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
815 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
816 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
819 default_configuration: config.clone(),
820 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
821 fee_estimator: fee_est,
825 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(params.latest_height),
826 last_block_hash: RwLock::new(params.latest_hash),
828 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
829 by_id: HashMap::new(),
830 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
831 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
832 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
833 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
835 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
836 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
839 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
841 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
843 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
844 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
845 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
846 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
854 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
855 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
856 &self.default_configuration
859 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
861 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady events to allow
862 /// tracking of which events correspond with which create_channel call. Note that the
863 /// user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for
864 /// user_id here. user_id has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and
865 /// otherwise ignored.
867 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
868 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
870 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
871 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
872 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
873 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
874 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
877 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
878 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?;
879 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
881 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
882 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
883 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
885 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
886 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
887 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
888 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
889 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
891 panic!("RNG is bad???");
894 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
896 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
897 node_id: their_network_key,
903 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
904 let mut res = Vec::new();
906 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
907 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
908 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
909 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
910 res.push(ChannelDetails {
911 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
912 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
913 remote_network_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
914 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
915 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
916 inbound_capacity_msat,
917 outbound_capacity_msat,
918 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
919 is_live: channel.is_live(),
920 counterparty_forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
924 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
925 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
926 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
927 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
933 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
934 /// more information.
935 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
936 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
939 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
940 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
942 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
943 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
944 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
945 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
946 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
947 // really wanted anyway.
948 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
951 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
952 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
953 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
955 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
956 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
957 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
959 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
960 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
961 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
962 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
963 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
964 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
965 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
966 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
969 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
970 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
971 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
973 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
974 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
976 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
979 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
980 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
982 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
983 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
988 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
989 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
990 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
999 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1000 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1001 log_trace!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1002 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1003 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1005 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1006 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1007 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1008 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1009 // ignore the result here.
1010 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1014 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1016 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1017 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1018 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1019 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1020 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1021 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1024 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1025 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1027 chan.remove_entry().1
1029 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1032 log_trace!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1033 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1034 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1035 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1036 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1041 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1044 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1045 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1046 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1047 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1048 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None) {
1049 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1050 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1051 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1052 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1053 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1054 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1064 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1065 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1066 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1067 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1068 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1072 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1073 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1074 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1076 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1077 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1078 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1079 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1080 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1081 failure_code: $err_code,
1082 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1087 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1088 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1091 let shared_secret = {
1092 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1093 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1096 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1098 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1099 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1100 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1101 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1102 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1103 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1104 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1105 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1108 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1109 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1110 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1111 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1112 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1115 let mut channel_state = None;
1116 macro_rules! return_err {
1117 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1119 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1120 if channel_state.is_none() {
1121 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1123 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1124 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1125 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1126 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1127 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1132 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1133 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1134 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
1135 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1137 let error_code = match err {
1138 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1139 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1140 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1141 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1142 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1144 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1147 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1148 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1149 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1156 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1159 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1160 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1161 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1162 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1163 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1164 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1165 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1166 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1167 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1168 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1169 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1170 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1174 // final_expiry_too_soon
1175 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure we have at least
1176 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1177 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown payment hash, our payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward
1178 // before our onchain logic triggers a channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational).
1179 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1180 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1182 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1183 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1184 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1186 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1187 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1188 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1191 let payment_data = match next_hop_data.format {
1192 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => None,
1193 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1194 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data } => payment_data,
1197 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1198 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1199 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1200 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1202 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1203 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1205 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1207 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1208 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1209 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1210 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1213 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1214 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1215 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1217 // Check two things:
1218 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1219 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1220 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1222 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1224 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1225 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1226 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1228 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1230 let blinding_factor = {
1231 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1232 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1233 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1234 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1237 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1239 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1241 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1244 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1245 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1248 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1249 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1250 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1251 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1252 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1256 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1257 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1258 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1261 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1262 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1263 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1264 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1268 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1269 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1270 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1271 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1272 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1273 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1274 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1275 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1276 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1277 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1279 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1281 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1282 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1284 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1285 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1286 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1287 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1288 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1289 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1290 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1292 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1293 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1295 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1296 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1297 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1299 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1300 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1302 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1303 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1304 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1305 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1306 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1308 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1309 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1311 // In theory, we would be safe against unitentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1312 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longuer delay.
1313 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1314 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1320 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1321 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1322 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1323 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1325 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1326 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1328 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1329 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1330 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1332 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1334 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1339 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1342 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1343 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1344 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1345 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1346 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1350 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1352 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1353 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1355 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1356 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1357 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
1358 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1359 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1360 fee_base_msat: chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator),
1361 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1362 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1365 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1366 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1368 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1374 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1375 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1376 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1377 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1378 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1380 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1381 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1382 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height)?;
1383 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1384 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1386 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1388 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1390 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1391 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1392 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1393 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1394 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1397 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1398 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1400 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1401 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1403 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1404 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1406 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1408 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1409 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1410 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1412 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1413 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1414 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1415 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1416 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1417 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1418 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1419 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1420 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1423 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1424 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1425 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1426 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1427 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1428 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1429 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1437 } else { unreachable!(); }
1441 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1442 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1444 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1449 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1451 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1452 /// fields for more info.
1454 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1455 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1456 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1457 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1458 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1459 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1461 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1463 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1464 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1465 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1467 /// In general, a path may raise:
1468 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1469 /// node public key) is specified.
1470 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1471 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1473 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1474 /// relevant updates.
1476 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1477 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1478 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1480 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1481 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1482 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1483 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1485 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1486 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1487 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1488 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1489 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1490 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1492 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1493 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1494 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1495 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1496 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1498 let mut total_value = 0;
1499 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1500 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
1501 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1502 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1503 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1504 continue 'path_check;
1506 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1507 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1508 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1509 continue 'path_check;
1512 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1513 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
1515 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
1516 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
1519 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1520 let mut results = Vec::new();
1521 for path in route.paths.iter() {
1522 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height));
1524 let mut has_ok = false;
1525 let mut has_err = false;
1526 for res in results.iter() {
1527 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
1528 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
1529 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
1530 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
1537 if has_err && has_ok {
1538 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
1540 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
1546 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1548 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
1549 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
1551 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1553 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
1554 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
1555 /// keys per-channel).
1557 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
1558 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
1559 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
1561 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
1562 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
1563 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
1564 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1565 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1567 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
1568 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
1569 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1570 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
1576 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1578 let mut output_index = None;
1579 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
1580 for (idx, outp) in funding_transaction.output.iter().enumerate() {
1581 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
1582 if output_index.is_some() {
1583 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1584 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
1587 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
1588 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1589 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
1592 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
1595 if output_index.is_none() {
1596 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1597 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
1600 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: funding_transaction.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
1602 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
1603 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1604 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
1605 } else { unreachable!(); })
1608 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
1610 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
1611 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1614 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
1615 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
1620 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1621 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1622 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1625 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1626 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1627 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1629 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1636 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1637 if !chan.should_announce() {
1638 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1642 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1644 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1646 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1647 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1649 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1650 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1651 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1652 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1653 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1658 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
1659 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
1660 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
1662 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::std::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
1665 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
1666 // smaller than 500:
1667 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
1669 /// Generates a signed node_announcement from the given arguments and creates a
1670 /// BroadcastNodeAnnouncement event. Note that such messages will be ignored unless peers have
1671 /// seen a channel_announcement from us (ie unless we have public channels open).
1673 /// RGB is a node "color" and alias is a printable human-readable string to describe this node
1674 /// to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
1676 /// addresses represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node accepts
1677 /// incoming connections. These will be broadcast to the network, publicly tying these
1678 /// addresses together. If you wish to preserve user privacy, addresses should likely contain
1679 /// only Tor Onion addresses.
1681 /// Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500).
1682 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
1683 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1685 if addresses.len() > 500 {
1686 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
1689 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1690 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1691 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
1692 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
1693 rgb, alias, addresses,
1694 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1695 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1697 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1699 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1700 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
1701 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
1702 signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key),
1703 contents: announcement
1708 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1710 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1711 /// Will likely generate further events.
1712 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1713 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1715 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1716 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1717 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1719 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1720 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1722 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1723 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1724 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1725 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1727 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1728 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1729 match forward_info {
1730 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
1731 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1732 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1733 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1734 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1735 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1736 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1738 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
1739 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
1742 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1743 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1744 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1745 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1746 // problem, not ours.
1753 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1754 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1755 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1756 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1757 match forward_info {
1758 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1759 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1761 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
1762 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1763 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1764 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1765 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1766 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1767 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1768 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1770 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
1772 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1773 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
1775 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1777 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1778 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
1779 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
1785 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1787 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1788 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1789 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1790 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1791 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1792 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1793 // this channel currently :/.
1799 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1800 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
1802 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1803 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1804 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1806 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1807 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1809 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1811 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1812 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1813 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1816 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1818 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1819 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1820 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1821 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1822 // messages when we can.
1823 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1824 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1825 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1832 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1833 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
1836 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1837 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1838 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1839 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1840 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1841 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1843 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1844 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1845 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1846 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1847 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1849 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1851 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1853 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
1857 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1858 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1861 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1862 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
1863 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1864 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1865 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1866 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1867 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1869 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1877 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1878 match forward_info {
1879 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1880 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry },
1881 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
1882 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1883 let prev_hop = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1884 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1885 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1886 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1887 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1890 let mut total_value = 0;
1891 let payment_secret_opt =
1892 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data { Some(data.payment_secret.clone()) } else { None };
1893 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry((payment_hash, payment_secret_opt))
1894 .or_insert(Vec::new());
1895 htlcs.push(ClaimableHTLC {
1897 value: amt_to_forward,
1898 payment_data: payment_data.clone(),
1899 cltv_expiry: incoming_cltv_expiry,
1901 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data {
1902 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1903 total_value += htlc.value;
1904 if htlc.payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat != data.total_msat {
1905 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
1907 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
1909 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > data.total_msat {
1910 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1911 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
1912 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
1913 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(
1914 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire)
1918 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1919 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
1920 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1921 htlc_id: htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
1922 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
1924 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
1927 } else if total_value == data.total_msat {
1928 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1930 payment_secret: Some(data.payment_secret),
1935 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1937 payment_secret: None,
1938 amt: amt_to_forward,
1942 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1943 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
1945 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1946 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1954 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1955 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
1958 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1959 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
1962 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1963 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1964 events.append(&mut new_events);
1967 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
1969 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
1970 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
1972 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
1973 fn process_background_events(&self) {
1974 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
1975 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
1976 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
1978 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
1979 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
1980 // monitor updating completing.
1981 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
1987 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1988 pub(crate) fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
1989 self.process_background_events();
1992 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
1993 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
1994 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
1996 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
1998 /// Note that in some rare cases this may generate a `chain::Watch::update_channel` call.
1999 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
2000 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2001 self.process_background_events();
2003 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2004 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2005 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
2006 if chan.is_disabled_staged() && !chan.is_live() {
2007 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2008 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2013 } else if chan.is_disabled_staged() && chan.is_live() {
2015 } else if chan.is_disabled_marked() {
2016 chan.to_disabled_staged();
2021 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
2022 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
2023 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
2024 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
2025 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
2026 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> bool {
2027 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2029 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2030 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(*payment_hash, *payment_secret));
2031 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2032 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2033 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2034 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2035 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2036 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32,
2038 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2039 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
2040 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2046 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
2047 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
2048 // be surfaced to the user.
2049 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
2050 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
2052 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
2053 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
2054 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2055 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
2056 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(&chan_entry.get()) {
2057 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
2059 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2062 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2064 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2065 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
2066 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
2068 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
2069 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2070 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2072 rejected_by_dest: false,
2084 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
2085 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
2086 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
2087 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
2088 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
2089 /// still-available channels.
2090 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
2091 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
2092 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
2093 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
2096 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
2097 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
2098 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2100 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, .. } => {
2101 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2102 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2103 match &onion_error {
2104 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
2106 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2108 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2109 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
2110 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
2111 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
2112 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
2113 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2114 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
2119 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2120 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2121 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2122 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
2124 error_code: onion_error_code,
2126 error_data: onion_error_data
2130 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2136 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
2137 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
2138 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
2139 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
2141 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
2142 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
2143 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2144 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2145 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2146 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
2148 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
2150 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
2156 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2157 let err_packet = match onion_error {
2158 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
2159 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
2160 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
2161 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
2163 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
2164 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2165 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
2169 let mut forward_event = None;
2170 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2171 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
2173 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
2174 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2175 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
2177 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2178 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
2181 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2182 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
2183 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2184 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2185 time_forwardable: time
2192 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
2193 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
2194 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
2196 /// You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
2197 /// available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
2198 /// reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
2199 /// payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
2200 /// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
2201 /// motivated attackers.
2203 /// Note that the privacy concerns in (b) are not relevant in payments with a payment_secret
2204 /// set. Thus, for such payments we will claim any payments which do not under-pay.
2206 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
2207 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
2208 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2210 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2212 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2213 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(payment_hash, *payment_secret));
2214 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2215 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
2217 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
2218 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
2219 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
2220 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
2222 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
2223 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
2224 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
2225 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
2226 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
2229 let (is_mpp, mut valid_mpp) = if let &Some(ref data) = &sources[0].payment_data {
2230 assert!(payment_secret.is_some());
2231 (true, data.total_msat >= expected_amount)
2233 assert!(payment_secret.is_none());
2237 for htlc in sources.iter() {
2238 if !is_mpp || !valid_mpp { break; }
2239 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2244 let mut errs = Vec::new();
2245 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
2246 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2247 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2248 if (is_mpp && !valid_mpp) || (!is_mpp && (htlc.value < expected_amount || htlc.value > expected_amount * 2)) {
2249 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2250 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2251 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32,
2253 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2254 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
2255 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2257 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
2259 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.1.err.action {
2260 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
2261 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
2262 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", e.1.err.err);
2263 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
2264 } else { errs.push(e); }
2266 Err(None) if is_mpp => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
2268 log_warn!(self.logger, "Channel we expected to claim an HTLC from was closed.");
2270 Ok(()) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
2275 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
2276 // which were generated.
2277 channel_state.take();
2279 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
2280 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2281 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2288 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(), Option<(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)>> {
2289 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
2290 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
2291 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2292 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2298 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
2299 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2300 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
2301 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
2302 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_option {
2303 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2304 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2305 assert!(msgs.is_none());
2307 return Err(Some((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err())));
2311 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
2312 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2313 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2314 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2315 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2316 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
2317 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2318 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2327 // TODO: Do something with e?
2328 // This should only occur if we are claiming an HTLC at the same time as the
2329 // HTLC is being failed (eg because a block is being connected and this caused
2330 // an HTLC to time out). This should, of course, only occur if the user is the
2331 // one doing the claiming (as it being a part of a peer claim would imply we're
2332 // about to lose funds) and only if the lock in claim_funds was dropped as a
2333 // previous HTLC was failed (thus not for an MPP payment).
2334 debug_assert!(false, "This shouldn't be reachable except in absurdly rare cases between monitor updates and HTLC timeouts: {:?}", e);
2338 } else { unreachable!(); }
2341 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
2343 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
2344 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2345 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2346 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
2350 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
2351 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
2352 if let Err((counterparty_node_id, err)) = match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage) {
2355 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2356 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
2357 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2358 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2361 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
2362 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
2363 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
2364 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
2365 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
2366 payment_preimage, e);
2370 Err(Some(res)) => Err(res),
2372 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2373 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2374 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2380 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
2381 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2382 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
2385 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
2386 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
2389 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
2390 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
2392 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
2393 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
2394 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
2395 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
2397 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
2398 /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
2399 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
2400 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
2401 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
2402 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
2403 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
2404 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
2405 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
2406 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2408 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
2409 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
2410 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
2411 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
2414 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2415 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2416 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2417 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2418 let channel = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
2422 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
2426 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
2427 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2428 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), funding_txo.clone(), pending_forwards));
2430 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
2432 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
2433 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
2434 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2435 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2440 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
2441 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
2442 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2443 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2444 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2449 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2453 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2458 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
2459 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
2461 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2462 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2463 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2466 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2467 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2468 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2469 msg: announcement_sigs,
2472 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2476 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
2478 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
2479 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2481 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
2483 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
2484 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
2488 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2489 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
2490 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
2493 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
2494 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
2495 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2496 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2497 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
2498 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
2499 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2500 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
2501 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2502 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
2504 entry.insert(channel);
2510 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2511 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
2512 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2513 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2514 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
2515 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2516 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2517 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2519 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
2520 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2522 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2525 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2526 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
2527 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
2528 channel_value_satoshis: value,
2530 user_channel_id: user_id,
2535 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2536 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
2537 let last_block_hash = *self.last_block_hash.read().unwrap();
2538 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2539 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2540 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
2541 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2542 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2543 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2545 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, last_block_hash, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
2547 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2550 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
2551 // lock before watch_channel
2552 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
2554 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
2555 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
2556 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
2557 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
2558 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
2559 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
2560 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
2561 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
2562 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
2563 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
2564 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
2566 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
2567 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
2568 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
2569 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
2570 // until we have persisted our monitor.
2571 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2575 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2576 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2577 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
2578 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2579 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
2581 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2582 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
2583 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2592 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2594 let last_block_hash = *self.last_block_hash.read().unwrap();
2595 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2596 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2597 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2598 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2599 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2600 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2602 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, last_block_hash, &self.logger) {
2603 Ok(update) => update,
2604 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2606 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2607 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2611 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2614 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
2618 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2619 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2620 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2621 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2622 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2623 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2624 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2626 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2627 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2628 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2629 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2630 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2631 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2632 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2633 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2634 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2635 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2636 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2637 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2638 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2639 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2640 msg: announcement_sigs,
2645 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2649 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2650 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2651 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2652 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2654 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2655 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2656 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2657 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2659 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2660 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2661 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2662 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2666 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2667 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2668 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2672 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2673 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2674 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2676 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2677 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2679 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2682 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2683 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2685 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2686 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2687 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2688 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2696 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2697 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2698 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2699 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2700 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2701 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2702 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2703 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2705 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2706 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2707 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2708 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2713 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2714 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2715 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2716 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2717 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2718 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2719 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2721 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2722 } else { (tx, None) }
2724 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2727 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2728 log_trace!(self.logger, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
2729 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2731 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2732 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2733 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2734 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2742 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2743 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2744 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2745 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2747 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2748 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2749 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2750 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2752 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2753 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2755 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2756 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2757 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2758 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2761 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
2762 // Ensure error_code has the UPDATE flag set, since by default we send a
2763 // channel update along as part of failing the HTLC.
2764 assert!((error_code & 0x1000) != 0);
2765 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2766 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2767 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2768 match pending_forward_info {
2769 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2770 let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(chan) {
2771 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
2772 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2773 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2774 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
2775 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
2779 // The only case where we'd be unable to
2780 // successfully get a channel update is if the
2781 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
2782 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
2783 // payments over the channel back to themselves
2784 // (cause no one else should know the short_id
2785 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
2786 // no problem just calling this
2787 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
2788 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2790 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2791 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2792 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2795 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
2797 _ => pending_forward_info
2800 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2802 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2807 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2808 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2810 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2811 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2812 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2813 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2814 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2816 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2818 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2821 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2825 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2826 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2827 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2828 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2829 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2830 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2831 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2833 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2835 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2840 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2841 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2842 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2843 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2844 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2845 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2846 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2848 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2849 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
2850 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2852 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2855 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2859 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2860 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2861 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2862 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2863 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2864 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2865 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2867 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
2868 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
2869 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2870 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
2871 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
2872 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
2873 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
2878 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2879 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2880 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2882 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2883 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2884 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2886 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2887 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2888 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2889 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2890 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2891 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2892 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2893 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2895 commitment_signed: msg,
2899 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2900 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2901 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2907 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2912 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2913 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2914 let mut forward_event = None;
2915 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2916 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2917 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2918 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
2920 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2921 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
2922 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
2923 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
2925 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2926 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
2927 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2929 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2930 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
2931 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2936 match forward_event {
2938 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2939 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2940 time_forwardable: time
2948 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2949 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2951 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2952 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2953 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2954 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2955 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2956 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2958 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2959 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
2960 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2961 htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
2962 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2963 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2964 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2965 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
2967 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
2969 } else { unreachable!(); }
2972 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2973 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2974 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2978 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2979 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2980 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2984 break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
2986 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2989 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
2991 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
2992 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2993 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2995 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
3002 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3003 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3004 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3005 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3006 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3007 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3008 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3010 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
3012 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3017 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3018 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3019 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3021 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3022 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3023 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3024 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3026 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
3027 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
3030 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
3031 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
3032 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
3034 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
3035 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
3037 let their_node_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 };
3038 let their_bitcoin_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 };
3039 match (self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, their_node_key),
3040 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, their_bitcoin_key)) {
3042 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature: {:?}. Maybe using different node_secret for transport and routing msg? UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}", e, &announcement, their_node_key));
3043 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3046 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature: {:?}. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})", e, &announcement, their_bitcoin_key));
3047 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3053 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
3055 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
3056 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
3057 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
3058 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
3059 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
3060 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
3061 contents: announcement,
3063 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
3066 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3071 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3072 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3073 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3074 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
3075 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3077 // It's not a local channel
3081 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3082 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3083 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3084 // TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
3085 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), chan_id));
3087 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
3089 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
3094 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3095 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3096 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3098 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3099 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3100 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3101 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3103 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
3104 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
3105 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
3106 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3107 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, mut order, shutdown) =
3108 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3109 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
3110 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3111 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
3112 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
3113 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
3114 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
3115 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3117 if commitment_update.is_none() {
3118 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
3120 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
3121 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
3124 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
3125 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
3126 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3130 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
3131 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
3132 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3133 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3138 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
3139 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3140 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3141 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3147 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
3151 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
3156 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3157 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3158 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3164 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3168 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
3169 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
3170 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
3171 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
3172 /// (C-not exported) Cause its doc(hidden) anyway
3174 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3175 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3176 let counterparty_node_id;
3177 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3178 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3179 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3181 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3182 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("Failed to find corresponding channel for id {}", channel_id.to_hex())}),
3183 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3184 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
3185 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel".to_owned()});
3187 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3188 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
3190 if !chan.get().is_live() {
3191 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3193 counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3194 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
3195 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
3197 if let Err(_e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3200 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3201 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3202 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3203 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3204 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3205 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3206 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3207 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3217 match handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id) {
3218 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3219 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
3223 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`.
3224 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) {
3225 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3227 for monitor_event in self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events() {
3228 match monitor_event {
3229 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
3230 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
3231 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
3232 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
3234 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
3235 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3238 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => {
3239 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3240 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3241 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3242 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3243 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3244 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
3245 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3246 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3248 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
3249 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3250 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3254 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3255 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3256 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
3257 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
3266 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3267 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3271 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
3272 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
3274 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
3275 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3276 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
3277 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
3278 // reorganized out of the main chain.
3279 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
3280 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
3281 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
3282 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
3283 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
3284 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
3285 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
3286 assert!(should_broadcast);
3287 } else { unreachable!(); }
3288 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
3290 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3295 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3296 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3297 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3298 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3299 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3302 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
3303 //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query
3304 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3305 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
3307 let mut ret = Vec::new();
3308 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3309 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
3314 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3315 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3316 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3317 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3318 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3321 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
3322 //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query
3323 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3324 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
3326 let mut ret = Vec::new();
3327 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3328 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
3333 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3335 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3336 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3337 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3338 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3341 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
3342 assert_eq!(*self.last_block_hash.read().unwrap(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
3343 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
3344 assert_eq!(self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, height as u64 - 1,
3345 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
3346 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
3347 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, height, &txdata);
3348 self.update_best_block(&block.header, height);
3351 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3352 assert_eq!(*self.last_block_hash.read().unwrap(), header.block_hash(),
3353 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
3355 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3356 let new_height = self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32 - 1;
3357 assert_eq!(new_height, height - 1,
3358 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
3359 *self.last_block_hash.write().unwrap() = header.prev_blockhash;
3361 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.update_best_block(new_height, header.time));
3365 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3366 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3367 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3368 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3369 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3372 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
3373 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
3375 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
3376 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
3377 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3378 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3379 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3381 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3382 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3384 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3385 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3386 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3387 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3388 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
3389 let res = f(channel);
3390 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
3391 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
3392 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3393 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3394 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
3398 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
3399 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
3400 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3401 msg: funding_locked,
3403 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
3404 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3405 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3406 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3407 msg: announcement_sigs,
3410 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3412 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
3414 } else if let Err(e) = res {
3415 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3416 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3418 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
3419 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
3420 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
3421 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
3422 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3426 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3427 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3428 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
3435 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
3436 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|&(ref payment_hash, _), htlcs| {
3437 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3438 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
3439 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
3440 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
3441 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
3442 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
3443 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3444 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
3445 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3446 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
3447 data: htlc_msat_height_data
3452 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
3457 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
3459 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
3460 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
3464 /// Updates channel state to take note of transactions which were confirmed in the given block
3465 /// at the given height.
3467 /// Note that you must still call (or have called) [`update_best_block`] with the block
3468 /// information which is included here.
3470 /// This method may be called before or after [`update_best_block`] for a given block's
3471 /// transaction data and may be called multiple times with additional transaction data for a
3474 /// This method may be called for a previous block after an [`update_best_block`] call has
3475 /// been made for a later block, however it must *not* be called with transaction data from a
3476 /// block which is no longer in the best chain (ie where [`update_best_block`] has already
3477 /// been informed about a blockchain reorganization which no longer includes the block which
3478 /// corresponds to `header`).
3480 /// [`update_best_block`]: `Self::update_best_block`
3481 pub fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData) {
3482 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3483 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3484 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3486 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3487 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
3489 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3490 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
3493 /// Updates channel state with the current best blockchain tip. You should attempt to call this
3494 /// quickly after a new block becomes available, however if multiple new blocks become
3495 /// available at the same time, only a single `update_best_block()` call needs to be made.
3497 /// This method should also be called immediately after any block disconnections, once at the
3498 /// reorganization fork point, and once with the new chain tip. Calling this method at the
3499 /// blockchain reorganization fork point ensures we learn when a funding transaction which was
3500 /// previously confirmed is reorganized out of the blockchain, ensuring we do not continue to
3501 /// accept payments which cannot be enforced on-chain.
3503 /// In both the block-connection and block-disconnection case, this method may be called either
3504 /// once per block connected or disconnected, or simply at the fork point and new tip(s),
3505 /// skipping any intermediary blocks.
3506 pub fn update_best_block(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3507 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3508 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3509 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3511 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3512 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
3514 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3516 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
3517 *self.last_block_hash.write().unwrap() = block_hash;
3519 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.update_best_block(height, header.time));
3522 // Update last_node_announcement_serial to be the max of its current value and the
3523 // block timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
3524 // having an explicit local time source.
3525 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully update
3526 // last_node_announcement_serial or decide we don't need to.
3527 let old_serial = self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire);
3528 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
3529 if self.last_node_announcement_serial.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
3535 /// Gets the set of txids which should be monitored for their confirmation state.
3537 /// If you're providing information about reorganizations via [`transaction_unconfirmed`], this
3538 /// is the set of transactions which you may need to call [`transaction_unconfirmed`] for.
3540 /// This may be useful to poll to determine the set of transactions which must be registered
3541 /// with an Electrum server or for which an Electrum server needs to be polled to determine
3542 /// transaction confirmation state.
3544 /// This may update after any [`transactions_confirmed`] or [`block_connected`] call.
3546 /// Note that this is NOT the set of transactions which must be included in calls to
3547 /// [`transactions_confirmed`] if they are confirmed, but a small subset of it.
3549 /// [`transactions_confirmed`]: Self::transactions_confirmed
3550 /// [`transaction_unconfirmed`]: Self::transaction_unconfirmed
3551 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
3552 pub fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
3553 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3554 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
3555 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
3556 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
3557 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
3563 /// Marks a transaction as having been reorganized out of the blockchain.
3565 /// If a transaction is included in [`get_relevant_txids`], and is no longer in the main branch
3566 /// of the blockchain, this function should be called to indicate that the transaction should
3567 /// be considered reorganized out.
3569 /// Once this is called, the given transaction will no longer appear on [`get_relevant_txids`],
3570 /// though this may be called repeatedly for a given transaction without issue.
3572 /// Note that if the transaction is confirmed on the main chain in a different block (indicated
3573 /// via a call to [`transactions_confirmed`]), it may re-appear in [`get_relevant_txids`], thus
3574 /// be very wary of race-conditions wherein the final state of a transaction indicated via
3575 /// these APIs is not the same as its state on the blockchain.
3577 /// [`transactions_confirmed`]: Self::transactions_confirmed
3578 /// [`get_relevant_txids`]: Self::get_relevant_txids
3579 pub fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
3580 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3581 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
3582 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
3583 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
3584 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed().map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
3585 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3586 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3590 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
3591 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
3592 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
3594 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
3595 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
3596 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
3597 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
3600 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
3601 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
3603 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
3604 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
3607 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3608 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
3609 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
3610 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
3611 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
3616 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send>
3617 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3618 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3619 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3620 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3621 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3624 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
3625 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3626 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3629 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
3630 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3631 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3634 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
3635 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3636 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3639 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
3640 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3641 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3644 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
3645 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3646 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3649 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
3650 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3651 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3654 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
3655 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3656 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3659 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
3660 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3661 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3664 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
3665 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3666 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3669 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
3670 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3671 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3674 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
3675 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3676 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3679 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
3680 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3681 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3684 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
3685 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3686 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3689 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
3690 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3691 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3694 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
3695 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3696 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3699 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3700 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3701 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3704 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
3705 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3706 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3709 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
3710 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3711 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3712 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
3713 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
3715 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3716 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3717 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3718 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3719 if no_connection_possible {
3720 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3721 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3722 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3723 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3724 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3726 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
3727 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3728 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3738 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3739 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3740 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3741 // Note that currently on channel reestablish we assert that there are no
3742 // holding cell add-HTLCs, so if in the future we stop removing uncommitted HTLCs
3743 // on peer disconnect here, there will need to be corresponding changes in
3744 // reestablish logic.
3745 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
3746 chan.to_disabled_marked();
3747 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
3748 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3749 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
3751 if chan.is_shutdown() {
3752 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3753 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3757 no_channels_remain = false;
3763 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
3765 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3766 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3767 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3768 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3769 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3770 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3771 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3772 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3773 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3774 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3775 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3776 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3777 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3778 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
3779 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3780 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
3781 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
3782 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
3783 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
3787 if no_channels_remain {
3788 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
3791 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3792 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3794 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
3795 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
3796 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
3801 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
3802 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3804 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3807 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3808 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
3809 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3810 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
3811 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
3814 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
3815 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
3820 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3821 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3822 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3823 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3824 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3825 if !chan.have_received_message() {
3826 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
3827 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
3828 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
3832 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
3833 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3834 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
3840 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
3843 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
3844 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3846 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
3847 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3848 if chan.remote_network_id == *counterparty_node_id {
3849 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
3850 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
3854 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
3855 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
3860 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
3861 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
3862 struct PersistenceNotifier {
3863 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
3864 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
3865 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
3868 impl PersistenceNotifier {
3871 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
3877 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
3878 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
3879 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
3880 let result = *guard;
3888 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
3889 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
3890 let current_time = Instant::now();
3892 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
3893 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
3894 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
3895 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
3896 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
3897 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
3898 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
3900 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
3901 let result = *guard;
3902 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
3906 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
3907 None => return result,
3913 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
3915 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
3916 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
3917 *persistence_lock = true;
3918 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
3923 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3924 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3926 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3927 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3928 match &self.routing {
3929 &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id } => {
3931 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
3932 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3934 &PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { ref payment_data, ref incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3936 payment_data.write(writer)?;
3937 incoming_cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3940 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
3941 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3942 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
3943 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
3948 impl Readable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3949 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
3950 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3951 routing: match Readable::read(reader)? {
3952 0u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3953 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3954 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3956 1u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
3957 payment_data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3958 incoming_cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
3960 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3962 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
3963 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3964 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
3965 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
3970 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3971 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3973 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
3975 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3977 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
3979 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3986 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3987 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
3988 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3989 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3990 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3991 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3996 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3997 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3999 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
4001 forward_info.write(writer)?;
4003 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
4005 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
4012 impl Readable for PendingHTLCStatus {
4013 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
4014 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4015 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4016 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4017 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4022 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
4026 incoming_packet_shared_secret
4029 impl_writeable!(ClaimableHTLC, 0, {
4036 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
4037 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4039 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
4041 hop_data.write(writer)?;
4043 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
4045 path.write(writer)?;
4046 session_priv.write(writer)?;
4047 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
4054 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
4055 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
4056 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4057 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4058 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
4059 path: Readable::read(reader)?,
4060 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
4061 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4063 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4068 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
4069 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4071 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
4075 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
4077 failure_code.write(writer)?;
4078 data.write(writer)?;
4085 impl Readable for HTLCFailReason {
4086 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
4087 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4088 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
4089 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4090 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
4091 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
4093 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4098 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
4099 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4101 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_funding_outpoint, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
4103 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4104 prev_funding_outpoint.write(writer)?;
4105 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4106 forward_info.write(writer)?;
4108 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4110 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4111 err_packet.write(writer)?;
4118 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
4119 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
4120 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4121 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
4122 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4123 prev_funding_outpoint: Readable::read(reader)?,
4124 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4125 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
4127 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
4128 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4129 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4131 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4136 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4137 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4138 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4139 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4140 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4143 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4144 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
4146 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4147 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4149 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
4150 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4151 self.last_block_hash.read().unwrap().write(writer)?;
4153 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4154 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
4155 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4156 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4157 unfunded_channels += 1;
4160 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
4161 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4162 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4163 channel.write(writer)?;
4167 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4168 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
4169 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4170 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4171 for forward in pending_forwards {
4172 forward.write(writer)?;
4176 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4177 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
4178 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4179 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4180 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
4181 htlc.write(writer)?;
4185 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4186 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4187 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4188 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4189 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4190 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
4193 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4194 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4195 for event in events.iter() {
4196 event.write(writer)?;
4199 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
4200 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4201 for event in background_events.iter() {
4203 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
4205 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
4206 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
4211 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4217 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
4219 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
4221 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
4222 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling:
4223 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)
4224 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
4225 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
4226 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints the same
4227 /// way you would handle a `chain::Filter` call using ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and
4228 /// ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
4229 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
4230 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
4231 /// 6) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
4233 /// Note that the ordering of #4-6 is not of importance, however all three must occur before you
4234 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized ChannelManager.
4236 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
4237 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
4238 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
4239 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
4240 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
4241 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
4242 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4243 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4244 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4245 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4246 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4249 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
4250 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
4252 pub keys_manager: K,
4254 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4256 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
4257 pub fee_estimator: F,
4258 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4260 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
4261 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
4262 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
4263 pub chain_monitor: M,
4265 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
4266 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
4267 /// force-closed during deserialization.
4268 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
4269 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
4270 /// deserialization.
4272 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
4273 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
4274 pub default_config: UserConfig,
4276 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
4277 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
4279 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
4280 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
4281 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
4282 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
4284 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
4287 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
4288 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
4291 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4292 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4293 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4294 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4295 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4296 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4299 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
4300 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
4301 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
4302 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
4303 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
4305 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
4306 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
4311 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
4312 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
4313 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4314 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
4315 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4316 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4317 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4318 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4321 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4322 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
4323 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
4327 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4328 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
4329 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4330 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4331 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4332 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4335 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4336 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4337 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4338 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
4339 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
4342 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4343 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4344 let last_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4346 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4348 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4349 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4350 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4351 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4352 for _ in 0..channel_count {
4353 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
4354 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
4355 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
4356 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
4357 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4358 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4359 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4360 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4361 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
4362 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4363 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4364 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4365 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4366 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4367 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
4368 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
4369 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
4370 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4372 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4373 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
4375 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
4378 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4382 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
4383 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
4384 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4388 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
4389 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4390 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4391 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
4392 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4393 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4394 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
4395 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
4396 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4398 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
4401 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4402 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4403 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
4404 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4405 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4406 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
4407 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
4408 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4410 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
4413 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4414 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
4415 for _ in 0..peer_count {
4416 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4417 let peer_state = PeerState {
4418 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
4420 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
4423 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4424 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
4425 for _ in 0..event_count {
4426 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
4427 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
4432 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4433 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
4434 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
4435 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4436 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
4437 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4441 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4443 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4444 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4446 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
4448 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
4449 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
4450 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
4452 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
4453 last_block_hash: RwLock::new(last_block_hash),
4455 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
4460 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
4462 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
4463 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
4466 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
4468 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
4470 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
4471 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
4472 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
4473 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
4475 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
4476 logger: args.logger,
4477 default_configuration: args.default_config,
4480 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4481 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4484 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
4485 //connection or two.
4487 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
4493 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
4495 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
4497 use std::time::Duration;
4500 fn test_wait_timeout() {
4501 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
4502 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
4504 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
4505 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
4506 thread::spawn(move || {
4508 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
4509 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4510 *persistence_lock = true;
4513 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
4519 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
4520 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
4522 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
4525 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
4530 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
4532 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
4535 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
4542 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
4545 use chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor;
4546 use chain::channelmonitor::Persist;
4547 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
4548 use ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
4549 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
4550 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
4551 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
4552 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
4553 use routing::router::get_route;
4554 use util::test_utils;
4555 use util::config::UserConfig;
4556 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
4558 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4559 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4560 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
4562 use std::sync::Mutex;
4566 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
4567 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
4568 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
4569 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
4570 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
4571 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
4572 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
4577 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
4578 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
4581 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
4582 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
4583 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
4585 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
4586 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
4588 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())};
4589 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 };
4591 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
4592 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
4594 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
4595 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
4596 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
4597 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
4598 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
4600 latest_hash: genesis_hash,
4603 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
4605 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
4606 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
4607 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
4608 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
4609 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
4611 latest_hash: genesis_hash,
4614 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
4616 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
4617 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4618 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4621 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
4622 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
4623 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
4625 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4626 } else { panic!(); }
4628 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4629 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4631 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
4634 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4637 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
4638 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
4640 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4641 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4643 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
4645 macro_rules! send_payment {
4646 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
4647 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
4648 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), None, Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a).unwrap();
4650 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
4651 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
4653 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap();
4654 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
4655 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4656 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
4657 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
4658 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
4659 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
4660 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4662 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
4663 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
4664 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage, &None, 10_000));
4666 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
4667 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
4668 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
4669 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4670 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
4672 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
4675 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
4676 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
4677 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
4678 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4680 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
4685 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
4686 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);