1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
38 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
40 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
46 use ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
49 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
51 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT, OptionalField};
53 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner, Recipient};
54 use util::config::UserConfig;
55 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
56 use util::{byte_utils, events};
57 use util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
58 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
59 use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
60 use util::errors::APIError;
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
67 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
72 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
73 use std::time::Instant;
74 use util::crypto::sign;
76 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
78 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
79 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
80 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
82 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
83 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
84 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
85 // before we forward it.
87 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
88 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
89 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
90 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
91 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
93 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
94 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
96 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
97 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a "real" SCID, an
98 /// outbound SCID alias, or a phantom node SCID.
99 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
102 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
103 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
104 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
107 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
108 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
113 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
114 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
115 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
116 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
117 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
118 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
121 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
122 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
123 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
124 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
127 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
128 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
129 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
130 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
131 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
134 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
136 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
138 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
139 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
140 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
143 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
144 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
146 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
150 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
154 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
155 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
156 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
157 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
158 short_channel_id: u64,
160 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
161 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
163 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
164 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
169 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
171 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
172 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
173 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
175 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
176 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
179 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
180 struct ClaimableHTLC {
181 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
183 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
185 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
187 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
191 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
192 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
193 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
194 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
196 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
197 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
202 impl Readable for PaymentId {
203 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
204 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
208 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
209 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
210 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
211 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
212 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
215 session_priv: SecretKey,
216 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
217 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
218 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
219 payment_id: PaymentId,
220 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
221 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
224 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
225 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
226 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
228 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
230 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
232 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
235 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
236 payment_id.hash(hasher);
237 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
238 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
239 payment_params.hash(hasher);
244 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
247 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
248 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
250 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
251 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
252 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
253 payment_secret: None,
254 payment_params: None,
259 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
260 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
262 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
270 struct ReceiveError {
276 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
277 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
279 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
284 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
286 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
287 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
288 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
289 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
290 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
292 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
293 err: msgs::LightningError,
294 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
295 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
297 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
299 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
301 err: LightningError {
303 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
304 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
311 shutdown_finish: None,
315 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
317 err: LightningError {
319 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
322 shutdown_finish: None,
326 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
327 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
330 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
332 err: LightningError {
334 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
335 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
341 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
342 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
346 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
349 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
351 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
352 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
356 log_level: Level::Warn,
359 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
361 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
363 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
365 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
366 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
372 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
374 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
375 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
383 shutdown_finish: None,
388 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
389 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
390 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
391 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
392 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
394 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
395 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
396 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
397 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
398 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
399 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
400 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
402 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
406 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
407 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
408 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
409 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) to the real channel id. Outbound SCID aliases are added
410 /// here once the channel is available for normal use, with SCIDs being added once the funding
411 /// transaction is confirmed at the channel's required confirmation depth.
412 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
413 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
415 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
416 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
417 /// and via the classic SCID.
419 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
420 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
421 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
422 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
423 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
424 /// failed/claimed by the user.
426 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
427 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
429 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
430 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
431 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
432 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
435 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
436 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
437 /// quite some time lag.
438 enum BackgroundEvent {
439 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
440 /// commitment transaction.
441 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
444 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
445 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
447 latest_features: InitFeatures,
450 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
451 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
453 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
456 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
457 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
458 struct PendingInboundPayment {
459 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
460 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
461 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
462 /// this payment being removed.
464 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
465 user_payment_id: u64,
466 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
467 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
468 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
471 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
472 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
473 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
475 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
478 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
479 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
480 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
481 pending_amt_msat: u64,
482 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
483 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
484 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
486 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
487 starting_block_height: u32,
489 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
490 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
491 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
493 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
494 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
496 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
497 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
498 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
499 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
500 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
502 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
504 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
505 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
509 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
510 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
512 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
516 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
518 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
522 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
524 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
528 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
530 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
535 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
537 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
538 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
539 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
540 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
544 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
545 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
546 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
547 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
548 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
549 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
550 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
553 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
554 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
557 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
558 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
559 let our_payment_hash;
560 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
561 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
562 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
564 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
565 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
566 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
570 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
574 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
575 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
576 let remove_res = match self {
577 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
578 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
579 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
580 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
581 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
585 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
586 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
587 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
588 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
589 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
590 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
597 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
598 let insert_res = match self {
599 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
600 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
601 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
603 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
604 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
607 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
608 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
609 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
610 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
611 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
618 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
620 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
621 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
622 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
623 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
630 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
631 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
632 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
633 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
634 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
635 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
636 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
638 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
639 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
641 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
642 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
643 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
644 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
645 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
646 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
647 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
648 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
650 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
651 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
653 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
654 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
656 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
657 /// to individual Channels.
659 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
660 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
661 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
662 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
664 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
665 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
666 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
667 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
668 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
669 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
670 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
672 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
673 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
674 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
675 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
678 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
679 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
680 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
681 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
682 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
684 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
685 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
686 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
687 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
688 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
689 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
690 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
691 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
692 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
693 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
696 default_configuration: UserConfig,
697 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
703 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
705 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
706 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
708 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
709 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
710 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
711 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
713 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
714 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
715 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
716 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
717 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
718 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
720 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
721 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
722 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
723 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
724 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
725 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
726 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
727 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
729 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
731 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
732 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
734 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
735 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
736 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
737 /// active channel list on load.
738 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
740 our_network_key: SecretKey,
741 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
743 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
745 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
746 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
747 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
749 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
750 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
752 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
753 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
754 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
756 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
757 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
758 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
759 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
761 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
762 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
763 /// are currently open with that peer.
764 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
765 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
768 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
769 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
771 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
772 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
773 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
774 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
775 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
776 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
777 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
778 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
779 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
781 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
788 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
790 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
791 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
792 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
793 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
794 pub struct ChainParameters {
795 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
796 pub network: Network,
798 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
800 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
801 pub best_block: BestBlock,
804 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
810 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
811 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
812 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
813 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
814 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
815 /// updates are ready for persistence).
817 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
818 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
819 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
820 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
821 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
823 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
824 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
827 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
828 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
829 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
832 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
833 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
835 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
836 persistence_notifier: notifier,
837 should_persist: persist_check,
838 _read_guard: read_guard,
843 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
845 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
846 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
851 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
852 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
854 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
856 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
857 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
858 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
859 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
860 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
862 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
863 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
865 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
867 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
868 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
869 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
870 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
871 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
872 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
873 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
875 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
876 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
878 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
879 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
880 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
881 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
883 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
884 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
885 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
886 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
887 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
888 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
891 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
893 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
894 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
897 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
899 /// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
900 /// pending HTLCs in flight.
901 pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
903 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
904 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
906 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
907 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
908 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
909 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
910 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
911 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
912 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
913 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
914 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
915 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
916 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
919 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
920 /// to better separate parameters.
921 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
922 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
923 /// The node_id of our counterparty
924 pub node_id: PublicKey,
925 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
926 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
927 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
928 pub features: InitFeatures,
929 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
930 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
931 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
933 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
935 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
936 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
937 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
938 /// payments to us through this channel.
939 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
940 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
941 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
942 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
943 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
944 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
945 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
948 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
949 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
950 pub struct ChannelDetails {
951 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
952 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
953 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
954 /// lifetime of the channel.
955 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
956 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
957 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
958 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
959 /// our counterparty already.
961 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
962 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
963 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
964 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
966 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
967 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
968 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
969 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
971 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
972 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
974 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
975 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
977 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
978 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
979 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
980 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
981 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
982 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
983 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
984 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
985 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
988 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
990 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
991 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
992 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
993 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
994 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
995 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
996 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
998 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
999 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1001 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1002 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1003 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1004 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1005 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1006 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1007 /// this value on chain.
1009 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1011 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1013 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1014 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1015 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
1016 pub user_channel_id: u64,
1017 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1018 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1019 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1021 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1022 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1023 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1024 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1026 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1027 pub balance_msat: u64,
1028 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1029 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1030 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1031 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1033 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1035 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1036 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1037 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1038 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1039 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1040 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1041 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1042 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1044 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1045 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1046 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1047 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1048 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1049 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1050 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1052 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1053 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1054 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1055 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1056 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1057 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1058 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1059 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1060 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1062 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1064 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1065 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1066 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1067 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1068 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1069 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1070 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1071 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1072 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1074 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1075 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1076 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1077 pub is_outbound: bool,
1078 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1079 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1080 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1081 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1082 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1084 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1085 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1086 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1087 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1089 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1090 pub is_usable: bool,
1091 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1092 pub is_public: bool,
1093 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1094 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1095 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1096 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1097 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1100 impl ChannelDetails {
1101 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1102 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1103 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1105 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1106 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1107 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1108 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1111 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1112 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1113 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1115 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1116 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1117 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1118 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1122 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1123 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1124 /// states for more.
1125 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1126 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1127 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1128 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
1129 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
1130 ParameterError(APIError),
1131 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1132 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
1133 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
1134 /// payment in full.
1136 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1138 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1139 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1140 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1141 /// paths than the ones selected).
1142 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
1143 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1144 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1145 /// in over-/re-payment.
1147 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1148 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
1149 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
1151 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
1152 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
1153 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
1154 /// with the latest update_id.
1156 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1157 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1158 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1159 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1160 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1161 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1162 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1163 payment_id: PaymentId,
1167 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1169 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1171 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1172 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1173 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1174 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1176 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1177 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1178 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1181 macro_rules! handle_error {
1182 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1185 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1186 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1188 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1189 // entering the macro.
1190 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1191 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1194 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1196 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1197 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1198 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1199 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1203 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1204 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1205 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1206 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1211 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1212 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1214 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1215 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1216 action: err.action.clone()
1220 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1221 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1224 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1231 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1232 ($self: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1233 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1234 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1236 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1237 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1238 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1239 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1240 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1242 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1243 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1245 $short_to_id.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1249 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1250 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1251 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1253 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1254 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1256 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1257 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1259 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1260 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1261 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $channel);
1262 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1263 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1264 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1266 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
1267 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1268 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $channel);
1269 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
1270 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1271 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1277 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1278 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1282 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1284 $entry.remove_entry();
1292 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1293 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1297 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1299 $entry.remove_entry();
1307 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1308 ($self: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1310 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1311 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel_state.short_to_id, channel);
1317 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1318 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1320 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1321 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1322 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $chan);
1323 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1324 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1325 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1326 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1327 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1328 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1329 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1330 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1331 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1332 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1333 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1336 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1337 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1338 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1339 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1340 match $action_type {
1341 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1342 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1344 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1345 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1347 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1348 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1349 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1350 if !$resend_commitment {
1351 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1354 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1356 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1357 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1361 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1362 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1364 $entry.remove_entry();
1368 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1369 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1370 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1372 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1373 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1375 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1376 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1378 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1379 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1381 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1382 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1386 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1387 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1388 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1390 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1391 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1395 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1396 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1397 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1398 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1399 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1402 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1407 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1408 ($short_to_id: expr, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {
1409 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1410 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1411 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1413 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1414 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1415 let outbound_alias_insert = $short_to_id.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), $channel.channel_id());
1416 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == $channel.channel_id(),
1417 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1418 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1419 let scid_insert = $short_to_id.insert(real_scid, $channel.channel_id());
1420 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == $channel.channel_id(),
1421 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1426 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1427 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1428 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1429 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $channel_ready: expr, $announcement_sigs: expr) => { {
1430 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1432 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1433 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1434 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1436 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1437 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1438 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or($channel_entry.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
1439 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1442 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1443 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a channel_ready if there have been
1444 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1445 // associated with a channel_ready would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1446 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1447 // channel_ready until it's been updated, so we can't have a channel_ready and a
1448 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1449 assert!($channel_ready.is_none());
1450 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a channel_ready or a
1451 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a channel_ready, we
1452 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1453 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1456 if let Some(msg) = $channel_ready {
1457 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the channel_ready fly
1458 // before it should be allowed to.
1459 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1460 send_channel_ready!($channel_state.short_to_id, $channel_state.pending_msg_events, $channel_entry.get(), msg);
1462 if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs {
1463 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1464 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1469 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1470 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1471 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1472 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1473 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1474 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1475 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1476 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1477 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1478 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1479 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1480 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1481 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1482 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1483 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1484 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1485 let mut order = $order;
1487 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1489 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1493 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1494 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1495 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1496 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1501 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1502 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1503 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1504 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1505 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1510 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1514 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1519 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1520 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1521 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1526 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1527 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1528 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1529 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1530 assert!(res.is_ok());
1533 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1537 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1538 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1539 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1541 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1543 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1544 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1549 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1550 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1551 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1552 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1553 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1556 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1558 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1559 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1561 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1563 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1564 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1565 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1566 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1567 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1568 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1569 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1570 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1572 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1573 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1574 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1578 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1580 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1581 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1582 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1583 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1584 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1585 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1587 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1588 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1589 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1591 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1592 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1595 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1596 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1598 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1599 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1601 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1603 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1604 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1605 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1606 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1614 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1615 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1616 &self.default_configuration
1619 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1620 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1621 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1624 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1625 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1627 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1629 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1633 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1638 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1640 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1641 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1642 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1643 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1644 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1647 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1648 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1650 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1651 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1652 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1654 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1655 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1656 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1657 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1658 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1659 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1661 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1662 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1663 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1664 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1665 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1666 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1670 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1671 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1672 Some(peer_state) => {
1673 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1674 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1675 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1676 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1677 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1678 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1679 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1683 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1688 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1691 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1693 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1694 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1695 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1697 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1698 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1699 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1700 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1702 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1704 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1707 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1709 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1710 node_id: their_network_key,
1713 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1716 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1717 let mut res = Vec::new();
1719 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1720 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1721 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1722 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1723 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1724 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1725 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1726 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1727 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1728 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1729 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1730 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1731 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1732 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1733 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1734 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1735 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1736 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1737 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1738 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1739 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1741 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1742 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1743 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1744 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1745 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1746 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1747 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1748 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1749 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1750 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1751 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1752 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1753 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1754 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1755 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1756 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1757 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1758 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1759 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1760 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1761 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1762 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat()
1766 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1767 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1768 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1769 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1775 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1776 /// more information.
1777 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1778 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1781 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1782 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1784 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1785 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1788 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1789 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1790 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1791 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1792 // really wanted anyway.
1793 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1796 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1797 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1798 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1799 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1800 Some(transaction) => {
1801 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1805 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1806 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1807 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1808 reason: closure_reason
1812 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1813 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1815 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1816 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1817 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1818 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1819 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1820 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1821 if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){
1822 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
1824 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1825 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1826 Some(peer_state) => {
1827 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1828 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1829 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1831 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1833 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1835 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1836 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1837 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1838 let (result, is_permanent) =
1839 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1841 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
1847 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1848 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1852 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1853 let channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
1854 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1855 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1859 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1863 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1867 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1868 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1871 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1875 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1876 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1877 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1879 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1880 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1882 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1883 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1884 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1885 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1887 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1889 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1890 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1891 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1892 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1893 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1896 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1897 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1898 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1900 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1901 /// the channel being closed or not:
1902 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1903 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1904 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1905 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1906 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1907 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1908 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1910 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1912 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1913 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1914 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1915 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1916 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1920 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1921 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1922 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1923 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1924 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1926 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1927 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1928 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1929 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1930 // ignore the result here.
1931 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1935 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1936 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1937 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1939 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1940 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1941 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1942 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *peer_node_id {
1943 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1945 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1946 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1948 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1950 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan)
1952 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1955 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1956 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1957 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1958 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1959 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1964 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1967 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1968 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
1969 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
1971 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1972 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1973 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None) {
1974 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1975 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1976 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1977 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1978 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1979 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1989 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1990 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1991 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1992 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1993 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
1997 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
1998 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2000 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2001 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2002 return Err(ReceiveError {
2003 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2005 err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec()
2008 // final_expiry_too_soon
2009 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2010 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2011 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2012 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2013 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2014 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2015 return Err(ReceiveError {
2017 err_data: Vec::new(),
2018 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2021 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2022 return Err(ReceiveError {
2024 err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(),
2025 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2029 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2030 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => {
2031 return Err(ReceiveError {
2032 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2033 err_data: Vec::new(),
2034 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2037 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2038 return Err(ReceiveError {
2039 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2040 err_data: Vec::new(),
2041 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2044 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2045 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2046 return Err(ReceiveError {
2047 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2048 err_data: Vec::new(),
2049 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2051 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2052 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2054 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2055 phantom_shared_secret,
2057 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2058 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2059 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2060 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2061 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2062 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2063 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2064 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2065 return Err(ReceiveError {
2066 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2067 err_data: Vec::new(),
2068 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2072 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2074 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2077 return Err(ReceiveError {
2078 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2079 err_data: Vec::new(),
2080 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2085 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2088 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2089 amt_to_forward: amt_msat,
2090 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2094 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
2095 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2096 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2098 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2099 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2100 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2101 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2102 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2103 failure_code: $err_code,
2104 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2109 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2110 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2113 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes();
2115 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2116 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2117 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2118 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2119 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2120 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2121 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2122 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2125 let mut channel_state = None;
2126 macro_rules! return_err {
2127 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2129 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2130 if channel_state.is_none() {
2131 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2133 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2134 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2135 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2136 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2137 })), channel_state.unwrap());
2142 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2144 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2145 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2147 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2148 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2152 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2153 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2155 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2157 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2158 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2159 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2160 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2161 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2163 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2166 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2167 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2168 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2170 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2171 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2172 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2175 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2176 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2177 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2178 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2179 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2183 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2184 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2185 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2188 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2189 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2190 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2191 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2196 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2197 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2198 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2199 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2200 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2201 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2202 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2203 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2204 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2205 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2206 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2208 if fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id) {
2211 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2214 Some(id) => Some(id.clone()),
2216 let (chan_update_opt, forwardee_cltv_expiry_delta) = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2217 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
2218 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2219 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2220 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2221 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2222 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2224 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2225 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2226 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2227 // we don't have the channel here.
2228 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2230 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2232 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2233 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2234 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2235 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2236 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2237 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2238 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2240 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2241 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2243 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
2244 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
2245 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
2246 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
2247 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, chan_update_opt));
2249 (chan_update_opt, chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta())
2250 } else { (None, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA) };
2252 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + forwardee_cltv_expiry_delta as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2253 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, chan_update_opt));
2255 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2256 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2257 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2258 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2259 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2260 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2262 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2263 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2265 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2266 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2267 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2268 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2269 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2270 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2271 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2272 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2273 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2274 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2280 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2281 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2282 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2283 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2285 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2286 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2288 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2289 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2290 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2292 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2293 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2294 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2296 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2301 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
2304 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2305 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2306 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2308 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2309 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2310 if !chan.should_announce() {
2311 return Err(LightningError {
2312 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2313 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2316 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2317 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2319 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2320 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2323 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2324 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2325 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2326 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2327 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2328 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2329 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2330 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2331 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2335 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2337 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2338 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2339 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2341 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2342 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2344 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2345 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2346 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2347 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2348 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2349 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2350 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2351 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2354 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2355 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2357 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2363 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2364 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2365 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2366 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2367 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2368 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2370 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2371 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2372 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2373 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2374 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2376 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2378 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2380 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2381 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2383 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2384 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2385 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2386 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2387 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2388 err: "Payment already completed"
2393 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2394 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2395 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2398 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2400 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2401 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2402 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2403 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2404 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2405 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2406 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2407 total_msat: total_value,
2409 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2413 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2414 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2416 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2417 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2419 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2420 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2422 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2423 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2425 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2426 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2428 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2429 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2430 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2431 channel_state, chan)
2433 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2434 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2435 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2436 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2437 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2438 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2439 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2440 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2441 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2442 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2444 insert_outbound_payment!();
2446 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2447 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2448 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2449 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2450 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2451 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2452 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2453 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2459 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2461 } else { unreachable!(); }
2465 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2466 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2468 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2473 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2475 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2476 /// fields for more info.
2478 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2479 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2480 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2481 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2482 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2483 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2485 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2487 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2488 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2489 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2491 /// In general, a path may raise:
2492 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2493 /// node public key) is specified.
2494 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2495 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2497 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2498 /// relevant updates.
2500 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2501 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2502 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2504 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2505 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2506 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2507 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2509 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2510 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2511 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2512 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2513 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2516 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2517 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2518 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2520 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2521 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2522 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2523 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2524 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2526 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2527 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2529 let mut total_value = 0;
2530 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2531 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2532 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2533 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2534 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2535 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2536 continue 'path_check;
2538 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2539 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2540 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2541 continue 'path_check;
2544 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2545 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2547 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2548 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2550 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2551 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2552 total_value = amt_msat;
2555 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2556 let mut results = Vec::new();
2557 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2558 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2560 let mut has_ok = false;
2561 let mut has_err = false;
2562 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2563 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2564 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2565 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2566 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2567 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2568 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2572 } else if res.is_err() {
2573 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2574 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2577 if has_err && has_ok {
2578 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2581 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2582 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2583 Some(RouteParameters {
2584 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2585 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2586 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2592 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2593 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2594 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2595 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2601 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2603 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2604 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2605 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2606 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2607 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2609 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2610 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2611 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2612 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2613 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2614 if path.len() == 0 {
2615 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2616 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2621 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2622 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2623 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2625 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2626 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2628 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2629 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2630 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2631 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2634 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2636 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2637 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2638 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2641 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2642 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2643 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2646 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2647 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2648 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2653 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2654 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2658 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2661 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2663 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2664 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2665 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2666 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2668 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2669 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2670 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2672 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2673 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2674 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2675 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2676 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2678 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2679 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2680 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2681 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2682 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2684 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2692 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2693 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2694 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2695 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2696 /// never reach the recipient.
2698 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2700 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2701 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2703 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2705 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2706 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2707 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2709 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2711 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2712 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2713 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2718 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2719 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2720 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2721 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2722 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2724 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2726 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2728 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2729 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2730 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2731 } else { unreachable!(); })
2734 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2736 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2737 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2740 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2741 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2746 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2747 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2748 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2751 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2752 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2753 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2755 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2763 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2764 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2765 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2769 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2771 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2772 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2774 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2775 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2777 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2778 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2779 /// keys per-channel).
2781 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2782 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2783 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2785 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2786 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2787 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2789 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2790 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2791 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2792 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2794 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2795 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2796 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2797 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2801 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2802 let mut output_index = None;
2803 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2804 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2805 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2806 if output_index.is_some() {
2807 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2808 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2811 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2812 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2813 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2816 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2819 if output_index.is_none() {
2820 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2821 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2824 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2829 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2830 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2831 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2833 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2836 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2837 // smaller than 500:
2838 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2840 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2841 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2842 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2843 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2844 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2845 /// our network addresses.
2847 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2848 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2850 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2851 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2852 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2853 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2855 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2857 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2858 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2859 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2861 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2862 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2865 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2866 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2867 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2869 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2870 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2871 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2872 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2873 rgb, alias, addresses,
2874 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2875 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2877 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2878 let node_announce_sig = sign(&self.secp_ctx, &msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2880 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2881 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2883 let mut announced_chans = false;
2884 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2885 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
2886 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2888 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2893 announced_chans = true;
2895 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached channel_ready, check the
2896 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2897 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2901 if announced_chans {
2902 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2903 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2904 signature: node_announce_sig,
2905 contents: announcement
2911 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2913 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2914 /// Will likely generate further events.
2915 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2916 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2918 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2919 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2920 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
2921 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2923 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2924 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2926 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2927 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2928 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2929 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2931 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2932 match forward_info {
2933 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2934 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2935 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2936 macro_rules! fail_forward {
2937 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
2939 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2940 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2941 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2942 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2943 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2944 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2945 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
2947 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2948 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data }
2954 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
2955 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
2956 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id) {
2957 let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
2958 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
2960 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2961 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
2962 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
2963 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
2964 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
2966 fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
2968 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2969 fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
2973 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
2974 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
2975 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
2976 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => fail_forward!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
2982 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
2985 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
2988 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2989 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2990 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2991 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2992 // problem, not ours.
2999 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3000 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3001 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3002 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3003 match forward_info {
3004 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3005 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3007 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3008 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3009 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3010 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3011 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3012 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3013 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3014 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3015 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3016 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3018 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3020 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3021 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3023 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3025 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3026 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3027 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data }
3033 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3035 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3036 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3037 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3038 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3039 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3040 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3041 // this channel currently :/.
3047 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3048 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3050 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3051 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3052 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3054 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3055 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3057 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3059 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3060 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3061 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3064 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3066 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3067 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3068 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3069 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3070 // messages when we can.
3071 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3072 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3073 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3080 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3081 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3084 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3085 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3086 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3087 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3088 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3089 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3091 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3092 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3093 let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan);
3094 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3095 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3097 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
3099 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3103 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3104 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3107 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3108 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3109 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3110 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3111 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3112 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3113 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3114 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3115 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3117 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3125 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3126 match forward_info {
3127 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3128 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
3129 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3130 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3131 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3132 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3133 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3135 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3136 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3138 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3141 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3142 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3143 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3144 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3145 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3146 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3147 phantom_shared_secret,
3149 value: amt_to_forward,
3151 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { amt_to_forward },
3156 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3158 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3159 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3160 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3162 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3163 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3164 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3165 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3166 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3167 phantom_shared_secret,
3169 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
3174 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3175 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3176 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3178 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3179 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3180 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3183 let (_, htlcs) = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3184 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3185 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3186 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3187 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3188 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3192 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3193 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3194 total_value += htlc.value;
3195 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3196 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3197 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3198 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3199 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3200 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3202 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3204 _ => unreachable!(),
3207 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3208 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3209 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3210 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3211 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3212 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3213 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3216 amount_msat: total_value,
3218 payment_received_generated = true;
3220 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3221 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3223 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3225 payment_received_generated
3229 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3230 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3231 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3232 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3233 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3234 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3235 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3236 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3237 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3238 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3239 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3240 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3241 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3242 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3244 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3248 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3250 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3251 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3252 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3253 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3254 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3255 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3257 amount_msat: amt_to_forward,
3261 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3262 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3263 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3269 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3270 if payment_data.is_none() {
3271 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3272 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3275 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3276 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3277 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3278 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3279 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3280 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3281 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3282 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3284 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3285 if payment_received_generated {
3286 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3292 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3293 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3301 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3302 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
3304 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3306 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3307 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3310 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3311 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3312 events.append(&mut new_events);
3315 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3317 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3318 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3320 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3321 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3322 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3323 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3324 if background_events.is_empty() {
3328 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3330 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3331 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3332 // monitor updating completing.
3333 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3340 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3341 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3342 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3343 self.process_background_events();
3346 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3347 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3348 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3349 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3350 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3351 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3352 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3354 if !chan.is_live() {
3355 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3356 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3357 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3359 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3360 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3362 let mut retain_channel = true;
3363 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3366 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3367 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3371 let ret_err = match res {
3372 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3373 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3374 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
3375 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3378 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3379 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3380 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3381 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3382 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3383 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3384 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3385 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3395 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3399 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3400 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3401 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3402 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3403 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3404 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3405 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3407 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3409 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3411 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3412 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3413 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3414 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3415 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3416 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3417 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3419 handle_errors.push(err);
3429 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3431 /// This currently includes:
3432 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3433 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3434 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3437 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3438 /// estimate fetches.
3439 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3440 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3441 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3442 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3444 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3446 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3447 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3449 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3450 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3451 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3452 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3453 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3454 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3455 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3456 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3458 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3460 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3462 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3463 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3464 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3465 if needs_close { return false; }
3468 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3469 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3470 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3471 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3472 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3473 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3474 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3475 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3479 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3480 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3482 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3483 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3484 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3488 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3489 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3497 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3498 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3499 // This should be unreachable
3500 debug_assert!(false);
3503 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3504 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3505 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3506 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3508 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3509 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3510 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3512 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.into_iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.prev_hop.clone(), payment_hash.clone())));
3520 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3521 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0), &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 23, data: Vec::new() });
3524 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3525 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3531 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3532 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3533 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3535 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3536 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3537 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentReceived`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3538 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3540 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3541 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3542 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3543 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3544 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3545 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3547 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3548 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3549 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3550 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3551 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3552 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3553 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3554 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3555 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3556 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3557 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3562 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3563 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3565 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3567 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3568 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3569 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3570 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3571 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3572 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3573 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3575 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3577 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3578 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3580 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3585 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3586 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3587 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3588 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3589 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3590 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3591 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3592 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3593 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3595 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3596 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3597 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3598 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3600 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3601 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3602 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3603 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3604 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3608 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3609 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3610 // be surfaced to the user.
3611 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3612 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3614 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3615 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3616 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3617 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3618 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3620 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3622 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3623 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3624 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3626 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payment_params, .. } => {
3627 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3628 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3629 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3630 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3631 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3632 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3633 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3634 Some(RouteParameters {
3635 payment_params: payment_params_data,
3636 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3637 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3640 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3641 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3642 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3644 rejected_by_dest: false,
3645 network_update: None,
3646 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3648 short_channel_id: None,
3655 if payment.get().abandoned() && payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3656 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3658 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3664 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3671 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3672 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3673 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3674 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3675 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3676 /// still-available channels.
3677 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3678 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3679 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3680 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3683 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3684 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3685 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3687 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3688 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3689 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3690 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3691 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3692 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3693 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3694 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3695 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3698 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3699 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3702 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3703 all_paths_failed = true;
3704 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3705 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3707 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3713 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3716 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3717 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3718 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3719 Some(RouteParameters {
3720 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
3721 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3722 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3725 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3727 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3728 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3730 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3732 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3733 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3734 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3735 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3736 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3737 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3738 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3739 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3746 error_code: onion_error_code,
3748 error_data: onion_error_data
3751 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3757 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3758 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3759 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as find_route
3760 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3762 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3763 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3764 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3765 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3766 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3767 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3768 network_update: None,
3771 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3774 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3776 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3780 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3781 pending_events.push(path_failure);
3782 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
3784 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3785 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3786 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3787 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3788 if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
3789 let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3790 let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
3791 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
3793 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3794 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3797 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3798 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3799 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3803 let mut forward_event = None;
3804 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3805 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3807 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3808 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3809 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3811 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3812 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3815 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3816 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3817 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3818 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3819 time_forwardable: time
3826 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
3827 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3829 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3830 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3831 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3833 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3834 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3835 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3836 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3838 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
3839 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3840 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3841 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3842 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3843 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
3844 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3845 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3847 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3849 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3850 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3851 if let Some((payment_purpose, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3852 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3854 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3855 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3856 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3857 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3859 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3860 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3861 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3862 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3863 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3865 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3866 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
3867 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3868 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3869 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3873 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
3874 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
3875 debug_assert!(false);
3879 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
3880 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
3881 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
3882 // that there's one payment here and move on.
3883 if sources.len() != 1 {
3884 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
3885 debug_assert!(false);
3891 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
3893 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
3894 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
3897 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
3898 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
3899 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
3903 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3904 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3905 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3907 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3908 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3909 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3910 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3911 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3912 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3913 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3915 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3916 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3917 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3918 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3919 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3920 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3921 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3922 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3924 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3925 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3926 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3927 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3928 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3929 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3931 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3936 if claimed_any_htlcs {
3937 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
3939 purpose: payment_purpose,
3940 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
3944 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3945 // which were generated.
3946 channel_state.take();
3948 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3949 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3950 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3955 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3956 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3957 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3958 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3959 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3961 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3965 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3966 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3967 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3968 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3969 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3970 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3971 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3972 payment_preimage, e);
3973 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3974 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3975 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3976 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3979 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3980 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3981 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3982 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3983 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3984 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3985 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3986 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3987 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3988 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3994 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3996 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3999 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
4000 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4001 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4002 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4003 payment_preimage, e);
4005 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4006 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4008 chan.remove_entry();
4010 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
4013 } else { unreachable!(); }
4016 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4017 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4018 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4019 for source in sources.drain(..) {
4020 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
4021 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4022 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4023 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4024 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
4025 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
4026 pending_events.push(
4027 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4029 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
4034 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4042 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4044 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4045 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4046 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4047 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4048 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4049 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4050 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4051 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4052 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4053 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
4054 pending_events.push(
4055 events::Event::PaymentSent {
4056 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4062 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
4066 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
4067 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
4068 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
4070 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
4071 // irrevocably fulfilled.
4072 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4073 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4074 pending_events.push(
4075 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4083 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4088 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4091 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4092 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4093 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4094 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4095 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4096 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4097 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4100 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4101 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4102 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4103 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4104 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4107 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4108 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4109 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4110 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
4111 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4112 payment_preimage, e);
4114 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4115 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4116 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4117 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4120 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4121 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4122 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4123 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4127 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4128 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4129 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4132 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4133 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4134 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4136 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4138 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4148 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4149 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4150 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4153 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4154 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4156 let chan_restoration_res;
4157 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
4158 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4159 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4160 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4161 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4162 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4164 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4168 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4169 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4170 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4171 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4172 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4173 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4175 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4176 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4177 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4182 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4183 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4184 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4186 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
4188 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4189 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4190 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4191 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4195 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4197 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4198 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4201 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4202 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4203 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4205 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4206 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4207 /// used to accept such channels.
4209 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4210 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4211 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4212 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4215 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4216 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4218 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4219 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4220 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4222 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4223 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4225 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4226 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4228 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4229 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4231 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4232 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4233 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4234 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4237 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4238 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4240 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4241 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4242 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4243 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4244 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4245 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4247 if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() {
4248 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
4251 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4252 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4253 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4254 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4255 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4256 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4259 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4260 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, channel);
4261 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4264 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4265 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4266 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4269 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4270 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4276 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4277 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4278 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4281 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4282 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4285 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4286 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4287 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration,
4288 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4291 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4292 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4296 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4297 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4298 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4299 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4300 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4301 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4303 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4304 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4305 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4306 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4308 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4309 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4310 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(0),
4313 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4314 pending_events.push(
4315 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4316 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4317 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4318 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4319 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4320 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4325 entry.insert(channel);
4331 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4332 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4333 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4334 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4335 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4336 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4337 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4338 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4340 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.peer_channel_config_limits, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
4341 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4343 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4346 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4347 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4348 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4349 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4350 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4352 user_channel_id: user_id,
4357 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4358 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4359 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4360 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4361 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4362 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4363 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4364 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4365 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4367 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
4369 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4372 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4373 // lock before watch_channel
4374 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4376 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
4377 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4378 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4379 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4380 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4381 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
4382 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
4383 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4384 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
4385 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4386 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4388 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
4389 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4390 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4391 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4392 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4393 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4394 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4398 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4399 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4400 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4401 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4402 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4404 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4405 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4406 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4409 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4410 send_channel_ready!(channel_state.short_to_id, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4418 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4420 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4421 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4422 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4423 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4424 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4425 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4426 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4428 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4429 Ok(update) => update,
4430 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4432 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4433 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4434 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4435 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4436 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4437 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4438 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4439 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4444 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4445 send_channel_ready!(channel_state.short_to_id, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4449 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4452 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4453 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4457 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4458 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4459 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4460 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4461 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4462 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4463 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4465 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4466 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4467 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4468 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4469 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4470 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4471 msg: announcement_sigs,
4473 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4474 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4475 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4476 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4477 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4478 // announcement_signatures.
4479 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4480 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4481 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4482 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4489 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4493 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4494 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4495 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4496 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4497 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4499 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4500 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4501 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4502 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4505 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4506 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4507 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4508 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4511 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4512 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4514 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4515 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4516 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4517 let (result, is_permanent) =
4518 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4520 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
4526 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4527 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4528 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4535 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4538 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4539 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4542 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4546 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4547 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4548 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4549 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4550 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4551 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4552 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4553 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4555 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4556 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4557 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4558 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4563 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4564 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4565 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4566 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4567 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4568 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry)))
4569 } else { (tx, None) }
4571 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4574 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4575 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4576 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4578 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4579 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4580 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4581 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4585 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4590 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4591 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4592 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4593 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4595 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4596 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4597 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4598 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4600 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4601 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4603 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4604 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4605 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4606 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4609 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4610 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4611 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4612 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4613 match pending_forward_info {
4614 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4615 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4616 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4617 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, real_code, &error_data)
4619 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4621 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4622 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4623 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4626 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4628 _ => pending_forward_info
4631 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4633 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4638 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4639 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4640 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4641 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4642 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4643 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4644 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4645 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4647 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4649 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4652 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4656 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4657 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4658 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4659 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4660 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4661 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4662 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4664 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4666 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4671 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4672 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4673 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4674 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4675 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4676 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4677 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4679 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4680 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4681 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4683 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4686 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4690 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4691 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4692 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4693 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4694 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4695 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4696 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4698 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4699 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4700 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4701 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4702 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4703 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4704 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4709 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4710 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4712 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4713 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4714 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4716 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4717 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4718 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4719 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4720 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4721 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4722 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4723 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4725 commitment_signed: msg,
4731 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4736 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4737 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4738 let mut forward_event = None;
4739 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4740 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4741 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4742 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4744 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4745 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4746 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4747 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4748 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4750 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4751 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4752 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4754 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4755 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4756 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4761 match forward_event {
4763 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4764 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4765 time_forwardable: time
4773 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4774 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4776 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4777 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4778 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4779 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4780 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4781 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4783 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4784 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4785 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4786 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4787 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4788 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4789 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4790 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4791 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4792 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4793 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4795 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4796 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4797 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
4798 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4799 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4801 } else { unreachable!(); }
4804 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4805 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4806 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4810 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4811 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4812 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4813 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
4814 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4816 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4819 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
4821 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4822 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4824 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4825 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4827 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4828 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4835 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4836 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4837 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4838 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4839 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4840 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4841 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4843 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4845 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4850 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4851 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4852 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4854 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4855 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4856 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4857 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4859 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4860 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4863 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4864 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
4865 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4866 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4867 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4868 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4871 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4876 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4877 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4878 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4879 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4880 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4881 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4883 // It's not a local channel
4884 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4887 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4888 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4889 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4890 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4891 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4892 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4893 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4894 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4896 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4898 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4899 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4900 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4901 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4903 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
4906 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
4908 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4911 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4912 let chan_restoration_res;
4913 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
4914 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4915 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4917 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4918 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4919 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4920 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4922 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4923 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4924 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4925 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4926 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
4927 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
4928 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), channel_state, chan);
4929 let mut channel_update = None;
4930 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
4931 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4932 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4935 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4936 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4937 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4938 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4939 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4940 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4941 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4946 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4947 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(
4948 self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
4949 responses.mon_update, Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
4950 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4951 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4953 (responses.holding_cell_failed_htlcs, need_lnd_workaround)
4955 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4958 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4959 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
4961 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4962 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
4967 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
4968 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
4969 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4970 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
4971 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
4972 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
4973 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
4974 match monitor_event {
4975 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
4976 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
4977 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
4978 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4980 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
4981 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4984 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
4985 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
4986 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4987 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4988 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4989 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4990 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
4991 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
4992 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
4993 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4994 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4998 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
4999 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5001 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5003 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5004 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5005 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5006 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5007 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5012 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5013 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
5019 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5020 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5023 has_pending_monitor_events
5026 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5027 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5028 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5030 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5031 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5034 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5035 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5036 /// update was applied.
5038 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
5039 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
5040 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
5041 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
5042 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5043 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5044 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5045 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5047 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5048 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5049 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5050 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5051 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5053 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5054 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5055 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5056 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5057 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
5059 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5060 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
5061 has_monitor_update = true;
5062 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5063 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5064 if close_channel { return false; }
5066 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5067 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5068 updates: commitment_update,
5075 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
5076 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5077 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5084 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5085 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5086 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
5089 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5090 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5096 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5097 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5098 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5099 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5100 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5101 let mut has_update = false;
5103 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5104 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5105 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5106 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5107 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5109 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5110 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5111 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5112 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5114 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5115 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5118 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5119 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5120 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5121 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5122 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5127 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5129 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5130 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5131 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
5137 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
5138 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5145 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5146 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5152 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5153 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5155 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5156 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5157 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5158 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5159 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5160 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5161 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5162 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5163 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5164 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5165 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5166 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5167 assert!(should_broadcast);
5168 } else { unreachable!(); }
5169 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5171 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5175 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5176 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5178 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5179 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5182 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5184 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5185 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5186 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5187 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5188 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5189 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5190 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5191 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5192 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5193 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5194 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5195 // never fail a payment too early.
5196 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5198 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5201 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5206 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5209 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5210 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5212 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5213 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5214 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5216 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5218 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5219 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5223 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5224 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5226 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5228 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5229 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5230 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5231 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5232 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5233 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5236 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5237 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5239 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5242 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5244 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5246 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5247 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5248 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5249 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5250 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5253 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5254 /// stored external to LDK.
5256 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5257 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5258 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5260 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5261 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5264 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5265 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5266 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5267 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5269 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5270 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5271 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5272 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5273 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5275 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5276 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5277 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5278 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5279 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5281 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5282 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5284 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5285 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5289 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5290 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5292 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5294 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5295 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5296 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5297 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5300 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5301 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5303 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5306 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5308 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5310 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5311 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5314 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5315 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5317 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5318 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5319 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5322 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5323 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5325 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5326 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5327 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5328 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5330 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block.height(), &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5331 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5332 match channel_state.short_to_id.entry(scid_candidate) {
5333 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => continue,
5334 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return scid_candidate
5339 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5341 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5342 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5344 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5345 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5346 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5350 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5351 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5352 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5353 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
5354 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5359 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5360 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5364 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5365 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5369 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5370 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5371 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5372 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5373 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5376 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5377 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5378 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5379 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5381 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5382 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5383 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5384 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5387 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5388 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5390 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5391 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5394 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5395 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5396 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5398 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5399 events.replace(pending_events);
5408 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5410 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5411 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5412 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5413 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5416 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5418 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5419 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5421 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
5422 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
5423 /// restarting from an old state.
5424 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5425 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5426 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5428 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5429 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5430 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5431 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5434 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5435 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5436 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5439 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
5440 handler.handle_event(&event);
5448 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5450 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5451 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5452 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5453 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5456 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5458 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5459 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5460 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5461 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5462 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5465 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5466 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5469 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5470 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5471 let new_height = height - 1;
5473 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5474 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5475 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5476 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5477 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5478 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5481 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5485 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5487 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5488 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5489 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5490 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5493 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5494 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5495 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5496 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5498 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5499 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5501 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5502 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5503 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5505 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5506 if height < last_best_block_height {
5507 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5508 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5512 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5513 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5514 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5515 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5517 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5518 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5520 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5522 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5524 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5526 macro_rules! max_time {
5527 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5529 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5530 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5531 // having an explicit local time source.
5532 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5533 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5534 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5535 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5536 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5542 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
5543 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5544 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5545 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5546 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5549 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5550 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5551 outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
5552 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
5553 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
5554 if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
5555 log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
5556 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
5557 payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
5565 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
5566 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5567 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
5568 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5569 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
5570 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
5576 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5577 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5578 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5579 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5580 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5581 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5582 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5583 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5588 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5590 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5591 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5592 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5593 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5596 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5597 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5599 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5600 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5601 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5602 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5603 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5605 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5606 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5608 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5609 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5610 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5611 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5612 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5613 let res = f(channel);
5614 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5615 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5616 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5617 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5621 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5622 send_channel_ready!(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5623 if channel.is_usable() {
5624 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5625 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5626 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5627 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5632 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5635 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5636 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5637 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5638 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5639 msg: announcement_sigs,
5641 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5642 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
5643 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5645 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5646 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5647 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5652 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
5653 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5654 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
5655 // to the short_to_id map here. Note that we check whether we can relay
5656 // using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e. enforce option_scid_alias
5657 // then), and if the funding tx is ever un-confirmed we force-close the
5658 // channel, ensuring short_to_id is always consistent.
5659 let scid_insert = short_to_id.insert(real_scid, channel.channel_id());
5660 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == channel.channel_id(),
5661 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
5662 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
5665 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5666 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, channel);
5667 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5668 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5669 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5670 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5671 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5675 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5676 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5677 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5678 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5679 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5680 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5681 data: reason_message,
5689 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5690 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
5691 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5692 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5693 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5694 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5695 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5696 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5697 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
5698 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
5699 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5700 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
5701 data: htlc_msat_height_data
5706 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5711 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5713 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5714 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
5718 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5719 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5720 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5723 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5724 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5725 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5726 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5729 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5730 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5732 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5733 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5736 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5737 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5738 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
5739 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
5740 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5744 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5745 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5746 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5747 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5751 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
5752 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5753 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5754 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5755 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5756 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5759 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5760 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5761 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5764 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5765 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5766 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5769 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5770 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5771 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5774 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5775 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5776 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5779 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
5780 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5781 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5784 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5785 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5786 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5789 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5790 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5791 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5794 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5795 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5796 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5799 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5800 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5801 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5804 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5805 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5806 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5809 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5810 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5811 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5814 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5815 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5816 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5819 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5820 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5821 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5824 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5825 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5826 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5829 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5830 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5831 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5834 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5835 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5836 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5839 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5844 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5845 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5846 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5849 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5850 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5851 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5852 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5854 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5855 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5856 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5857 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5858 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
5859 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
5860 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5861 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5862 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5863 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5864 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
5865 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5868 no_channels_remain = false;
5873 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5875 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5876 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5877 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5878 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5879 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5880 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5881 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5882 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5883 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5884 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5885 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5886 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5887 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5888 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5889 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5890 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5891 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5892 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5893 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5894 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
5898 if no_channels_remain {
5899 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
5902 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5903 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5907 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
5908 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5910 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5913 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5914 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
5915 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5916 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
5917 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
5920 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
5921 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
5926 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5927 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5928 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5929 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5930 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5931 if !chan.have_received_message() {
5932 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
5933 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
5934 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
5938 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
5939 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5940 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
5946 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
5949 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
5950 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5952 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
5953 for chan in self.list_channels() {
5954 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
5955 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5956 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data));
5961 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
5962 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5963 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
5964 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5967 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
5968 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
5969 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5977 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5978 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data));
5983 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
5984 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
5985 struct PersistenceNotifier {
5986 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
5987 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
5988 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
5991 impl PersistenceNotifier {
5994 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
6000 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
6001 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
6006 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
6007 let result = *guard;
6015 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6016 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6017 let current_time = Instant::now();
6019 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
6020 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
6025 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
6026 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
6027 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
6028 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
6029 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
6031 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
6032 let result = *guard;
6033 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
6037 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
6038 None => return result,
6044 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
6046 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
6047 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6048 *persistence_lock = true;
6049 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
6054 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6055 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6057 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6058 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6059 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6060 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6063 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6064 (2, node_id, required),
6065 (4, features, required),
6066 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6067 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6068 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6069 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6072 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelDetails, {
6073 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6074 (2, channel_id, required),
6075 (3, channel_type, option),
6076 (4, counterparty, required),
6077 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6078 (6, funding_txo, option),
6079 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6080 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6081 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6082 (14, user_channel_id, required),
6083 (16, balance_msat, required),
6084 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6085 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6086 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6087 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap())),
6088 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6089 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6090 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6091 (26, is_outbound, required),
6092 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6093 (30, is_usable, required),
6094 (32, is_public, required),
6095 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6096 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6099 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6100 (2, channels, vec_type),
6101 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6102 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6105 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6107 (0, onion_packet, required),
6108 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6111 (0, payment_data, required),
6112 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6113 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6115 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6116 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6117 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6121 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6122 (0, routing, required),
6123 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6124 (4, payment_hash, required),
6125 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
6126 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
6130 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6131 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6133 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6135 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6136 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6137 reason.write(writer)?;
6139 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6140 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6143 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6144 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6145 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6146 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6153 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6154 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6155 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6158 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6159 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6160 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6161 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6165 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6166 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6167 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6168 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6169 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6172 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6173 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6174 // messages contained in the variants.
6175 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6176 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6177 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6179 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6180 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6181 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6182 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6183 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6186 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6187 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6188 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6189 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6190 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6192 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6197 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6202 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6203 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6204 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6205 (2, outpoint, required),
6206 (4, htlc_id, required),
6207 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6210 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6211 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6212 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6213 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6214 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6216 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6217 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6218 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6219 (2, self.value, required),
6220 (4, payment_data, option),
6221 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6222 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6228 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6229 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6230 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6232 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6233 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6234 let mut total_msat = None;
6235 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6236 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6237 (0, prev_hop, required),
6238 (1, total_msat, option),
6239 (2, value, required),
6240 (4, payment_data, option),
6241 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6242 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6244 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6246 if payment_data.is_some() {
6247 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6249 if total_msat.is_none() {
6250 total_msat = Some(value);
6252 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6255 if total_msat.is_none() {
6256 if payment_data.is_none() {
6257 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6259 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6261 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6265 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6268 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6275 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6276 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6277 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6280 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6281 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6282 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6283 let mut payment_id = None;
6284 let mut payment_secret = None;
6285 let mut payment_params = None;
6286 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6287 (0, session_priv, required),
6288 (1, payment_id, option),
6289 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6290 (3, payment_secret, option),
6291 (4, path, vec_type),
6292 (5, payment_params, option),
6294 if payment_id.is_none() {
6295 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6297 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6299 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6300 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6301 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
6302 path: path.unwrap(),
6303 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6308 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6309 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6314 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6315 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
6317 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6319 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6320 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6321 (0, session_priv, required),
6322 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6323 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6324 (3, payment_secret, option),
6325 (4, path, vec_type),
6326 (5, payment_params, option),
6329 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6331 field.write(writer)?;
6338 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6339 (0, LightningError) => {
6343 (0, failure_code, required),
6344 (2, data, vec_type),
6348 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6350 (0, forward_info, required),
6351 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6352 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6353 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6356 (0, htlc_id, required),
6357 (2, err_packet, required),
6361 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6362 (0, payment_secret, required),
6363 (2, expiry_time, required),
6364 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6365 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6366 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6369 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6371 (0, session_privs, required),
6374 (0, session_privs, required),
6375 (1, payment_hash, option),
6378 (0, session_privs, required),
6379 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6380 (2, payment_hash, required),
6381 (4, payment_secret, option),
6382 (6, total_msat, required),
6383 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6384 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6387 (0, session_privs, required),
6388 (2, payment_hash, required),
6392 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6393 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6394 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6395 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6396 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6399 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6400 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6402 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6404 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6406 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6407 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6408 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6411 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6412 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6413 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6414 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6415 unfunded_channels += 1;
6418 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6419 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6420 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6421 channel.write(writer)?;
6425 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6426 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
6427 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6428 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6429 for forward in pending_forwards {
6430 forward.write(writer)?;
6434 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
6435 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6436 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6437 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6438 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6439 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6440 htlc.write(writer)?;
6442 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
6445 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6446 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6447 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6448 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6449 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6450 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6453 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6454 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6455 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6456 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6457 for event in events.iter() {
6458 event.write(writer)?;
6461 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6462 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6463 for event in background_events.iter() {
6465 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6467 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6468 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6473 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6474 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6476 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6477 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6478 hash.write(writer)?;
6479 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6482 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6483 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6484 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6485 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6486 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6489 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6490 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6492 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6493 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6494 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6495 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6498 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6499 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6503 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6504 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6505 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6507 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6508 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6509 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6514 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6515 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6516 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6517 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6518 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6519 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
6526 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6528 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6530 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6531 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6532 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6533 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6534 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6535 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6536 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6537 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6538 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6539 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6540 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6541 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6542 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6544 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6545 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6547 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6548 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6550 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6551 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6552 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6553 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6554 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6555 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6557 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6558 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6559 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6560 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6561 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6562 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6565 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6566 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6568 pub keys_manager: K,
6570 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6572 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6573 pub fee_estimator: F,
6574 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6576 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6577 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6578 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6579 pub chain_monitor: M,
6581 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6582 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6583 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6584 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6585 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6586 /// deserialization.
6588 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6589 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6590 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6592 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6593 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6595 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6596 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6597 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6598 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6600 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6603 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6604 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
6607 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6608 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6609 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6610 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6611 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6612 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6615 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6616 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6617 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6618 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6619 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
6621 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
6622 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6627 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6628 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6629 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6630 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
6631 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6632 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6633 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6634 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6637 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6638 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6639 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
6643 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6644 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
6645 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6646 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6647 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6648 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6651 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6652 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6654 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6655 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6656 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6658 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6660 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6661 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6662 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6663 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6664 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
6665 for _ in 0..channel_count {
6666 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
6667 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6668 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
6669 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
6670 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6671 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6672 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6673 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6674 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
6675 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
6676 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6677 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6678 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6679 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6680 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6681 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6682 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6683 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6684 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6685 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6686 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6687 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
6688 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
6689 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
6690 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6691 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6692 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
6693 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
6694 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6695 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6696 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6697 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6698 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
6701 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6702 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6703 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
6705 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
6708 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6709 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6710 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6711 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6712 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6713 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6717 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
6718 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
6719 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
6720 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6724 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
6725 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6726 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6727 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
6728 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6729 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6730 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
6731 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
6732 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6734 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
6737 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6738 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6739 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
6740 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6741 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6742 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
6743 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
6744 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
6746 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
6749 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6750 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
6751 for _ in 0..peer_count {
6752 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6753 let peer_state = PeerState {
6754 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
6756 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
6759 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6760 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
6761 for _ in 0..event_count {
6762 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
6763 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
6767 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
6768 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
6769 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
6770 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
6771 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
6772 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
6773 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6774 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
6778 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6779 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
6780 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
6781 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6782 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
6783 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6787 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6788 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6790 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6791 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6792 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6793 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6794 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6798 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6799 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6800 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6801 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6802 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6803 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6804 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
6806 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
6807 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6811 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
6812 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
6813 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
6814 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
6815 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6816 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
6817 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6818 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
6819 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
6820 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
6821 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
6822 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
6824 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
6825 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6828 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
6829 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
6830 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
6831 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
6832 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
6833 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
6835 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
6837 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
6838 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
6839 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
6840 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
6841 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
6842 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
6843 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
6845 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
6846 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
6847 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
6848 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
6849 if path.is_empty() {
6850 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
6851 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6853 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
6854 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
6855 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
6856 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
6857 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6858 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
6859 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
6860 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6862 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6863 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
6864 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
6865 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
6866 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
6868 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
6869 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
6870 total_msat: path_amt,
6871 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
6873 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
6874 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
6883 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
6884 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
6886 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
6887 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
6888 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
6889 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6891 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
6892 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
6895 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
6896 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
6897 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
6898 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
6899 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6901 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
6902 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
6903 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
6904 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
6905 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
6906 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
6907 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
6908 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
6910 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
6911 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6915 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
6917 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
6919 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
6920 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
6922 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
6926 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6927 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6929 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
6930 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
6933 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
6935 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6937 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
6938 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
6939 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
6940 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
6941 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6945 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
6946 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
6947 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
6948 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
6950 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
6951 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
6952 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
6954 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6955 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
6956 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
6957 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
6958 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
6959 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6961 if chan.is_usable() {
6962 if short_to_id.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), *chan_id).is_some() {
6963 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
6964 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
6965 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
6966 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6971 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
6972 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
6973 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
6974 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
6975 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
6976 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
6977 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
6979 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
6980 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
6981 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
6982 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
6984 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
6985 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
6986 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
6987 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
6989 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
6990 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
6991 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
6992 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
6994 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
6995 if let Some(channel) = by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
6996 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
6998 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
6999 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &args.fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7002 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7004 purpose: payment_purpose,
7005 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7011 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7013 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
7014 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7015 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7017 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7019 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
7024 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7026 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7027 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7028 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7030 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7031 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7037 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
7038 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7040 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7042 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7043 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7044 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7045 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
7047 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
7048 logger: args.logger,
7049 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7052 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7053 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
7056 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7057 //connection or two.
7059 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7065 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7066 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7067 use core::time::Duration;
7068 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7069 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7070 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
7071 use ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment;
7072 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
7073 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7075 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7076 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7077 use util::errors::APIError;
7078 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
7079 use util::test_utils;
7080 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
7082 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
7084 fn test_wait_timeout() {
7085 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
7087 use core::sync::atomic::AtomicBool;
7090 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
7091 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
7093 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
7094 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
7095 thread::spawn(move || {
7097 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
7098 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7099 *persistence_lock = true;
7102 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
7108 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
7109 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
7111 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
7114 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
7119 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
7121 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
7124 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
7131 fn test_notify_limits() {
7132 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7133 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7134 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7135 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7136 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7137 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7139 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7140 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7141 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7142 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7143 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7145 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7147 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7148 // to connect messages with new values
7149 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7150 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7151 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7152 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7154 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7155 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7156 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7157 // ... but the last node should not.
7158 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7159 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7160 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7161 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7163 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7164 // about the channel.
7165 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7166 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7167 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7169 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7171 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7172 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7173 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7174 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7175 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7176 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7178 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7179 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7180 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7182 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7183 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7184 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7185 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7186 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7187 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7189 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7190 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7191 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7192 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7193 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7194 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7195 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7196 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7198 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7199 // the channel info has updated.
7200 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7201 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7202 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7203 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7204 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7205 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7209 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7210 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7212 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7213 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7214 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7215 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7216 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7218 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7219 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7220 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7221 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7222 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7223 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7224 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7225 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7226 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7227 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7228 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7230 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7231 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7232 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7233 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7234 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7235 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7236 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7237 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7238 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7239 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7240 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7241 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7242 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7243 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7244 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7245 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7246 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7247 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7248 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7249 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7250 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7251 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7253 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7254 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7255 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7256 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7257 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7258 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7260 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7261 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7262 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7263 // lightning messages manually.
7264 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7265 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7266 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7268 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7269 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7270 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7271 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7272 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7273 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7274 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7275 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7276 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7277 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7278 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7279 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7280 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7281 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7282 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7283 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7284 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7285 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7286 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7287 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7288 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7289 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7290 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7291 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7292 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7294 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7295 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7296 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7297 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7299 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7300 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7301 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7302 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7304 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7307 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7308 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7309 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7310 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7312 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7315 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7316 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7317 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7318 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7320 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7325 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7326 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7327 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7328 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7329 // fails as expected.
7330 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7331 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7332 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7333 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7334 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7335 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7336 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7338 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7339 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7340 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7342 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7343 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7344 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7345 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7346 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7348 let route = find_route(
7349 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7350 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7352 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7353 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7354 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7355 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7356 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7357 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7358 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7359 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7360 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7361 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7362 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7363 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7364 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7365 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7366 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7367 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7368 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7369 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7370 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7371 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7372 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7374 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7375 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7377 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7378 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7379 let route = find_route(
7380 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7381 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7383 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7384 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7385 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7386 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7387 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7388 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7389 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7391 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7392 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7393 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7394 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7395 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7396 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7397 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7398 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7399 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7400 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7401 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7402 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7403 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7404 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7405 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7406 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7407 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7408 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7409 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7410 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7411 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7412 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7413 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7415 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7416 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7420 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7421 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7422 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7423 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7424 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7425 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7426 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7428 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7429 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7430 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7431 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7433 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7434 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7435 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7436 final_value_msat: 10000,
7437 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7439 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7440 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7441 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7442 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7443 let route = find_route(
7444 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7445 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7448 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7449 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7450 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7451 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7453 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7454 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7455 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7456 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7457 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7458 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7459 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7461 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7465 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7466 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7467 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7468 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7469 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7470 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7472 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7473 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7474 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7475 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7477 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7478 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7479 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7480 final_value_msat: 10000,
7481 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7483 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7484 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7485 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7486 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7487 let route = find_route(
7488 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7489 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7492 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7493 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7494 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7495 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7496 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7498 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7499 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7500 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7501 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7502 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7503 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7504 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7506 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7510 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7511 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7512 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7513 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7514 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7516 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7517 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7518 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7519 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7521 // Marshall an MPP route.
7522 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7523 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7524 route.paths.push(path);
7525 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7526 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7527 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7528 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7529 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7530 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7532 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
7533 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7534 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7535 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7540 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7541 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7542 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7543 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7544 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7545 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7547 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7548 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7550 total_msat: 100_000,
7553 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7554 // payment verification fails as expected.
7555 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7556 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7557 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7558 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7560 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7564 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7565 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7569 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
7572 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
7573 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
7574 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
7575 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
7576 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7577 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
7578 use routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
7579 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
7580 use util::test_utils;
7581 use util::config::UserConfig;
7582 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
7584 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7585 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7586 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
7588 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
7592 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
7593 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
7594 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
7595 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
7596 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
7597 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
7598 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
7603 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
7604 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
7607 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
7608 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
7609 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
7611 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
7612 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7614 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7615 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7617 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
7618 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
7620 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7621 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
7622 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
7623 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
7624 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7626 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7628 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
7630 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7631 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
7632 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
7633 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
7634 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7636 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7638 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
7640 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7641 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7642 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7643 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7644 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7647 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
7648 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7649 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
7651 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7652 } else { panic!(); }
7654 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7655 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7657 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
7660 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7663 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
7664 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
7666 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7667 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7668 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
7669 match msg_events[0] {
7670 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
7671 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
7672 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
7676 match msg_events[1] {
7677 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7681 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
7683 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
7684 macro_rules! send_payment {
7685 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
7686 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
7687 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
7688 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7689 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7690 let seed = [3u8; 32];
7691 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
7692 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7693 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
7694 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7696 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
7697 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
7699 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
7700 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
7702 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7703 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
7704 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7705 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
7706 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7707 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7708 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7709 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7711 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
7712 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
7713 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7714 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
7716 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
7717 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
7718 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7719 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7720 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
7722 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
7725 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
7726 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7727 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7728 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7730 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
7735 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
7736 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);