1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
38 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
40 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
46 use ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
49 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
51 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT, OptionalField};
53 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner, Recipient};
54 use util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
55 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
56 use util::{byte_utils, events};
57 use util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
58 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
59 use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
60 use util::errors::APIError;
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
67 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
72 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
73 use std::time::Instant;
74 use util::crypto::sign;
76 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
78 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
79 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
80 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
82 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
83 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
84 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
85 // before we forward it.
87 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
88 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
89 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
90 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
91 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
93 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
94 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
96 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
97 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a "real" SCID, an
98 /// outbound SCID alias, or a phantom node SCID.
99 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
102 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
103 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
104 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
107 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
108 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
113 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
114 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
115 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
116 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
117 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
118 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
121 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
122 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
123 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
124 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
127 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
128 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
129 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
130 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
131 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
134 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
136 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
138 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
139 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
140 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
143 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
144 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
146 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
150 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
154 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
155 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
156 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
157 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
158 short_channel_id: u64,
160 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
161 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
163 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
164 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
169 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
171 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
172 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
173 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
175 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
176 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
179 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
180 struct ClaimableHTLC {
181 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
183 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
185 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
187 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
191 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
192 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
193 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
194 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
196 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
197 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
202 impl Readable for PaymentId {
203 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
204 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
208 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
209 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
210 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
211 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
212 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
215 session_priv: SecretKey,
216 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
217 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
218 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
219 payment_id: PaymentId,
220 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
221 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
224 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
225 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
226 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
228 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
230 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
232 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
235 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
236 payment_id.hash(hasher);
237 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
238 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
239 payment_params.hash(hasher);
244 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
247 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
248 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
250 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
251 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
252 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
253 payment_secret: None,
254 payment_params: None,
259 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
260 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
262 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
270 struct ReceiveError {
276 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
277 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
279 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
284 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
286 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
287 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
288 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
289 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
290 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
292 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
293 err: msgs::LightningError,
294 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
295 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
297 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
299 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
301 err: LightningError {
303 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
304 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
311 shutdown_finish: None,
315 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
317 err: LightningError {
319 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
322 shutdown_finish: None,
326 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
327 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
330 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
332 err: LightningError {
334 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
335 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
341 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
342 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
346 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
349 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
351 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
352 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
356 log_level: Level::Warn,
359 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
361 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
363 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
365 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
366 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
372 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
374 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
375 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
383 shutdown_finish: None,
388 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
389 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
390 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
391 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
392 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
394 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
395 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
396 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
397 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
398 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
399 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
400 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
402 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
406 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
407 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
408 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
409 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) to the real channel id. Outbound SCID aliases are added
410 /// here once the channel is available for normal use, with SCIDs being added once the funding
411 /// transaction is confirmed at the channel's required confirmation depth.
412 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
413 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
415 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
416 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
417 /// and via the classic SCID.
419 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
420 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
421 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
422 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
423 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
424 /// failed/claimed by the user.
426 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
427 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
429 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
430 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
431 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
432 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
435 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
436 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
437 /// quite some time lag.
438 enum BackgroundEvent {
439 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
440 /// commitment transaction.
441 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
444 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
445 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
447 latest_features: InitFeatures,
450 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
451 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
453 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
456 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
457 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
458 struct PendingInboundPayment {
459 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
460 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
461 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
462 /// this payment being removed.
464 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
465 user_payment_id: u64,
466 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
467 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
468 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
471 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
472 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
473 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
475 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
478 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
479 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
480 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
481 pending_amt_msat: u64,
482 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
483 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
484 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
486 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
487 starting_block_height: u32,
489 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
490 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
491 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
493 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
494 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
496 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
497 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
498 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
499 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
500 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
502 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
504 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
505 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
509 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
510 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
512 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
516 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
518 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
522 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
524 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
528 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
530 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
535 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
537 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
538 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
539 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
540 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
544 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
545 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
546 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
547 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
548 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
549 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
550 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
553 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
554 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
557 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
558 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
559 let our_payment_hash;
560 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
561 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
562 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
564 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
565 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
566 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
570 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
574 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
575 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
576 let remove_res = match self {
577 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
578 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
579 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
580 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
581 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
585 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
586 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
587 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
588 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
589 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
590 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
597 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
598 let insert_res = match self {
599 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
600 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
601 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
603 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
604 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
607 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
608 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
609 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
610 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
611 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
618 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
620 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
621 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
622 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
623 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
630 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
631 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
632 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
633 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
634 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
635 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
636 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
638 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
639 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
641 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
642 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
643 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
644 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
645 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
646 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
647 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
648 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
650 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
651 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
653 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
654 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
656 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
657 /// to individual Channels.
659 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
660 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
661 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
662 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
664 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
665 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
666 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
667 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
668 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
669 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
670 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
672 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
673 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
674 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
675 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
678 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
679 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
680 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
681 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
682 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
684 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
685 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
686 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
687 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
688 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
689 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
690 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
691 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
692 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
693 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
696 default_configuration: UserConfig,
697 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
703 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
705 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
706 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
708 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
709 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
710 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
711 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
713 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
714 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
715 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
716 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
717 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
718 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
720 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
721 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
722 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
723 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
724 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
725 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
726 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
727 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
729 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
731 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
732 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
734 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
735 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
736 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
737 /// active channel list on load.
738 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
740 our_network_key: SecretKey,
741 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
743 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
745 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
746 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
747 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
749 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
750 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
752 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
753 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
754 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
756 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
757 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
758 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
759 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
761 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
762 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
763 /// are currently open with that peer.
764 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
765 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
768 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
769 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
771 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
772 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
773 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
774 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
775 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
776 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
777 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
778 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
779 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
781 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
788 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
790 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
791 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
792 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
793 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
794 pub struct ChainParameters {
795 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
796 pub network: Network,
798 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
800 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
801 pub best_block: BestBlock,
804 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
810 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
811 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
812 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
813 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
814 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
815 /// updates are ready for persistence).
817 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
818 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
819 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
820 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
821 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
823 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
824 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
827 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
828 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
829 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
832 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
833 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
835 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
836 persistence_notifier: notifier,
837 should_persist: persist_check,
838 _read_guard: read_guard,
843 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
845 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
846 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
851 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
852 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
854 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
856 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
857 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
858 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
859 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
860 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
862 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
863 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
865 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
867 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
868 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
869 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
870 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
871 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
872 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
873 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
875 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
876 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
878 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
879 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
880 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
881 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
883 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
884 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
885 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
886 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
887 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
888 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
891 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
893 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
894 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
897 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
899 /// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
900 /// pending HTLCs in flight.
901 pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
903 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
904 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
906 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
907 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
908 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
909 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
910 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
911 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
912 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
913 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
914 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
915 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
916 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
919 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
920 /// to better separate parameters.
921 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
922 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
923 /// The node_id of our counterparty
924 pub node_id: PublicKey,
925 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
926 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
927 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
928 pub features: InitFeatures,
929 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
930 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
931 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
933 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
935 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
936 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
937 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
938 /// payments to us through this channel.
939 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
940 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
941 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
942 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
943 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
944 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
945 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
948 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
949 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
950 pub struct ChannelDetails {
951 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
952 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
953 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
954 /// lifetime of the channel.
955 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
956 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
957 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
958 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
959 /// our counterparty already.
961 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
962 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
963 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
964 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
966 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
967 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
968 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
969 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
971 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
972 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
974 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
975 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
977 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
978 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
979 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
980 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
981 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
982 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
983 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
984 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
985 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
988 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
990 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
991 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
992 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
993 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
994 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
995 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
996 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
998 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
999 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1001 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1002 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1003 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1004 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1005 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1006 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1007 /// this value on chain.
1009 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1011 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1013 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1014 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1015 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
1016 pub user_channel_id: u64,
1017 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1018 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1019 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1021 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1022 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1023 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1024 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1026 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1027 pub balance_msat: u64,
1028 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1029 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1030 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1031 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1033 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1035 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1036 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1037 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1038 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1039 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1040 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1041 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1042 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1044 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1045 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1046 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1047 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1048 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1049 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1050 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1052 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1053 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1054 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1055 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1056 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1057 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1058 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1059 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1060 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1062 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1064 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1065 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1066 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1067 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1068 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1069 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1070 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1071 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1072 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1074 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1075 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1076 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1077 pub is_outbound: bool,
1078 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1079 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1080 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1081 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1082 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1084 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1085 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1086 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1087 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1089 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1090 pub is_usable: bool,
1091 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1092 pub is_public: bool,
1093 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1094 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1095 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1096 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1097 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1098 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1100 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1101 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1104 impl ChannelDetails {
1105 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1106 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1107 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1109 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1110 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1111 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1112 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1115 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1116 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1117 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1119 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1120 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1121 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1122 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1126 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1127 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1128 /// states for more.
1129 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1130 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1131 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1132 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
1133 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
1134 ParameterError(APIError),
1135 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1136 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
1137 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
1138 /// payment in full.
1140 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1142 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1143 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1144 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1145 /// paths than the ones selected).
1146 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
1147 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1148 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1149 /// in over-/re-payment.
1151 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1152 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
1153 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
1155 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
1156 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
1157 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
1158 /// with the latest update_id.
1160 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1161 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1162 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1163 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1164 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1165 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1166 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1167 payment_id: PaymentId,
1171 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1173 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1175 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1176 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1177 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1178 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1180 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1181 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1182 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1185 macro_rules! handle_error {
1186 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1189 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1190 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1192 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1193 // entering the macro.
1194 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1195 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1198 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1200 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1201 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1202 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1203 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1207 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1208 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1209 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1210 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1215 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1216 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1218 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1219 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1220 action: err.action.clone()
1224 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1225 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1228 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1235 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1236 ($self: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1237 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1238 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1240 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1241 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1242 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1243 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1244 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1246 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1247 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1249 $short_to_id.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1253 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1254 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1255 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1257 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1258 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1260 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1261 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1263 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1264 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1265 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $channel);
1266 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1267 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1268 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1270 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
1271 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1272 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $channel);
1273 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
1274 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1275 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1281 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1282 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1286 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1288 $entry.remove_entry();
1296 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1297 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1301 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1303 $entry.remove_entry();
1311 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1312 ($self: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1314 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1315 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel_state.short_to_id, channel);
1321 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1322 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1324 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1325 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1326 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $chan);
1327 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1328 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1329 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1330 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1331 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1332 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1333 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1334 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1335 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1336 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1337 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1340 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1341 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1342 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1343 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1344 match $action_type {
1345 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1346 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1348 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1349 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1351 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1352 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1353 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1354 if !$resend_commitment {
1355 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1358 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1360 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1361 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1365 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1366 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1368 $entry.remove_entry();
1372 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1373 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1374 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1376 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1377 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1379 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1380 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1382 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1383 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1385 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1386 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1390 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1391 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1392 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1394 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1395 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1399 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1400 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1401 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1402 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1403 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1406 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1411 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1412 ($short_to_id: expr, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {
1413 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1414 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1415 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1417 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1418 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1419 let outbound_alias_insert = $short_to_id.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), $channel.channel_id());
1420 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == $channel.channel_id(),
1421 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1422 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1423 let scid_insert = $short_to_id.insert(real_scid, $channel.channel_id());
1424 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == $channel.channel_id(),
1425 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1430 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1431 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1432 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1433 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $channel_ready: expr, $announcement_sigs: expr) => { {
1434 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1436 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1437 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1438 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1440 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1441 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1442 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or($channel_entry.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
1443 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1446 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1447 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a channel_ready if there have been
1448 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1449 // associated with a channel_ready would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1450 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1451 // channel_ready until it's been updated, so we can't have a channel_ready and a
1452 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1453 assert!($channel_ready.is_none());
1454 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a channel_ready or a
1455 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a channel_ready, we
1456 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1457 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1460 if let Some(msg) = $channel_ready {
1461 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the channel_ready fly
1462 // before it should be allowed to.
1463 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1464 send_channel_ready!($channel_state.short_to_id, $channel_state.pending_msg_events, $channel_entry.get(), msg);
1466 if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs {
1467 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1468 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1473 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1474 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1475 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1476 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1477 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1478 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1479 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1480 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1481 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1482 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1483 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1484 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1485 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1486 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1487 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1488 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1489 let mut order = $order;
1491 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1493 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1497 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1498 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1499 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1500 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1505 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1506 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1507 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1508 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1509 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1514 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1518 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1523 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1524 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1525 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1530 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1531 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1532 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1533 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1534 assert!(res.is_ok());
1537 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1541 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1542 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1543 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1545 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1547 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1548 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1553 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1554 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1555 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1556 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1557 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1560 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1562 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1563 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1565 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1567 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1568 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1569 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1570 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1571 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1572 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1573 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1574 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1576 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1577 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1578 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1582 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1584 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1585 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1586 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1587 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1588 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1589 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1591 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1592 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1593 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1595 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1596 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1599 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1600 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1602 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1603 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1605 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1607 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1608 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1609 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1610 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1618 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1619 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1620 &self.default_configuration
1623 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1624 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1625 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1628 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1629 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1631 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1633 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1637 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1642 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1644 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1645 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1646 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1647 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1648 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1651 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1652 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1654 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1655 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1656 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1658 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1659 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1660 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1661 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1662 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1663 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1665 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1666 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1667 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1668 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1669 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1670 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1674 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1675 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1676 Some(peer_state) => {
1677 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1678 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1679 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1680 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1681 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1682 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1683 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1687 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1692 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1695 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1697 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1698 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1699 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1701 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1702 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1703 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1704 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1706 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1708 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1711 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1713 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1714 node_id: their_network_key,
1717 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1720 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1721 let mut res = Vec::new();
1723 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1724 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1725 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1726 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1727 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1728 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1729 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1730 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1731 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1732 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1733 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1734 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1735 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1736 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1737 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1738 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1739 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1740 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1741 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1742 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1743 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1745 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1746 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1747 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1748 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1749 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1750 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1751 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1752 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1753 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1754 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1755 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1756 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1757 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1758 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1759 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1760 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1761 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1762 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1763 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1764 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1765 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1766 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1767 config: Some(channel.config()),
1771 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1772 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1773 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1774 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1780 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1781 /// more information.
1782 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1783 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1786 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1787 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1789 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1790 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1793 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1794 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1795 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1796 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1797 // really wanted anyway.
1798 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1801 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1802 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1803 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1804 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1805 Some(transaction) => {
1806 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1810 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1811 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1812 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1813 reason: closure_reason
1817 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1818 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1820 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1821 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1822 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1823 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1824 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1825 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1826 if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){
1827 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
1829 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1830 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1831 Some(peer_state) => {
1832 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1833 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1834 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1836 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1838 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1840 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1841 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1842 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1843 let (result, is_permanent) =
1844 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1846 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
1852 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1853 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1857 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1858 let channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
1859 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1860 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1864 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1868 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1872 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1873 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1876 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1880 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1881 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1882 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1884 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1885 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1887 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1888 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1889 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1890 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1892 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1894 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1895 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1896 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1897 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1898 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1901 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1902 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1903 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1905 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1906 /// the channel being closed or not:
1907 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1908 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1909 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1910 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1911 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1912 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1913 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1915 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1917 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1918 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1919 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1920 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1921 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1925 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1926 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1927 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1928 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1929 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1931 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1932 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1933 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1934 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1935 // ignore the result here.
1936 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1940 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1941 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1942 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1944 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1945 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1946 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1947 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *peer_node_id {
1948 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1950 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1951 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1953 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1955 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan)
1957 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1960 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1961 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1962 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1963 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1964 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1969 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1972 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1973 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
1974 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
1976 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1977 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1978 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None) {
1979 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1980 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1981 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1982 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1983 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1984 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1994 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1995 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1996 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1997 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1998 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2002 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2003 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2005 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2006 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2007 return Err(ReceiveError {
2008 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2010 err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec()
2013 // final_expiry_too_soon
2014 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2015 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2016 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2017 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2018 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2019 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2020 return Err(ReceiveError {
2022 err_data: Vec::new(),
2023 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2026 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2027 return Err(ReceiveError {
2029 err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(),
2030 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2034 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2035 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => {
2036 return Err(ReceiveError {
2037 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2038 err_data: Vec::new(),
2039 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2042 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2043 return Err(ReceiveError {
2044 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2045 err_data: Vec::new(),
2046 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2049 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2050 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2051 return Err(ReceiveError {
2052 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2053 err_data: Vec::new(),
2054 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2056 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2057 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2059 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2060 phantom_shared_secret,
2062 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2063 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2064 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2065 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2066 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2067 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2068 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2069 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2070 return Err(ReceiveError {
2071 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2072 err_data: Vec::new(),
2073 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2077 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2079 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2082 return Err(ReceiveError {
2083 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2084 err_data: Vec::new(),
2085 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2090 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2093 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2094 amt_to_forward: amt_msat,
2095 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2099 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
2100 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2101 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2103 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2104 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2105 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2106 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2107 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2108 failure_code: $err_code,
2109 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2114 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2115 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2118 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes();
2120 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2121 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2122 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2123 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2124 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2125 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2126 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2127 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2130 let mut channel_state = None;
2131 macro_rules! return_err {
2132 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2134 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2135 if channel_state.is_none() {
2136 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2138 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2139 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2140 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2141 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2142 })), channel_state.unwrap());
2147 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2149 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2150 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2152 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2153 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2157 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2158 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2160 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2162 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2163 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2164 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2165 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2166 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2168 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2171 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2172 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2174 let blinding_factor = {
2175 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
2176 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
2177 sha.input(&shared_secret);
2178 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
2181 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
2183 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
2185 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2188 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2189 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2192 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2193 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2194 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2195 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2196 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2200 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2201 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2202 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2205 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2206 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2207 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2208 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2213 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2214 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2215 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2216 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2217 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2218 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2219 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2220 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2221 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2222 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2223 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2225 if fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id) {
2228 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2231 Some(id) => Some(id.clone()),
2233 let (chan_update_opt, forwardee_cltv_expiry_delta) = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2234 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
2235 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2236 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2237 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2238 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2239 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2241 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2242 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2243 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2244 // we don't have the channel here.
2245 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2247 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2249 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2250 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2251 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2252 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2253 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2254 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2255 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2257 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2258 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2260 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
2261 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
2262 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
2263 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
2264 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, chan_update_opt));
2266 (chan_update_opt, chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta())
2267 } else { (None, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA) };
2269 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + forwardee_cltv_expiry_delta as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2270 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, chan_update_opt));
2272 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2273 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2274 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2275 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2276 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2277 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2279 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2280 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2282 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2283 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2284 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2285 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2286 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2287 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2288 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2289 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2290 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2291 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2297 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2298 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2299 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2300 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2302 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2303 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2305 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2306 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2307 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2309 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2310 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2311 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2313 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2318 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
2321 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2322 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2323 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2325 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2326 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2327 if !chan.should_announce() {
2328 return Err(LightningError {
2329 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2330 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2333 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2334 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2336 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2337 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2340 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2341 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2342 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2343 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2344 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2345 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2346 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2347 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2348 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2352 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2354 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2355 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2356 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2358 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2359 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2361 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2362 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2363 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2364 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2365 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2366 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2367 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2368 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2371 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2372 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2374 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2380 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2381 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2382 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2383 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2384 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2385 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2387 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2388 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2389 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2390 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2391 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2393 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2395 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2397 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2398 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2400 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2401 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2402 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2403 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2404 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2405 err: "Payment already completed"
2410 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2411 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2412 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2415 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2417 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2418 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2419 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2420 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2421 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2422 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2423 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2424 total_msat: total_value,
2426 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2430 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2431 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2433 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2434 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2436 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2437 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2439 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2440 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2442 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2443 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2445 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2446 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2447 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2448 channel_state, chan)
2450 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2451 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2452 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2453 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2454 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2455 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2456 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2457 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2458 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2459 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2461 insert_outbound_payment!();
2463 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2464 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2465 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2466 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2467 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2468 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2469 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2470 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2476 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2478 } else { unreachable!(); }
2482 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2483 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2485 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2490 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2492 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2493 /// fields for more info.
2495 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2496 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2497 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2498 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2499 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2500 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2502 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2504 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2505 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2506 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2508 /// In general, a path may raise:
2509 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2510 /// node public key) is specified.
2511 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2512 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2514 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2515 /// relevant updates.
2517 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2518 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2519 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2521 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2522 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2523 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2524 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2526 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2527 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2528 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2529 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2530 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2533 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2534 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2535 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2537 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2538 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2540 let mut total_value = 0;
2541 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2542 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2543 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2544 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2545 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2546 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2547 continue 'path_check;
2549 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2550 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2551 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2552 continue 'path_check;
2555 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2556 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2558 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2559 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2561 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2562 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2563 total_value = amt_msat;
2566 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2567 let mut results = Vec::new();
2568 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2569 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2571 let mut has_ok = false;
2572 let mut has_err = false;
2573 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2574 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2575 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2576 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2577 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2578 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2579 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2583 } else if res.is_err() {
2584 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2585 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2588 if has_err && has_ok {
2589 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2592 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2593 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2594 Some(RouteParameters {
2595 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2596 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2597 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2603 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2604 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2605 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2606 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2612 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2614 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2615 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2616 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2617 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2618 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2620 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2621 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2622 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2623 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2624 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2625 if path.len() == 0 {
2626 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2627 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2632 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2633 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2634 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2636 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2637 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2639 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2640 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2641 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2642 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2645 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2647 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2648 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2649 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2652 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2653 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2654 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2657 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2658 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2659 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2664 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2665 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2669 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2672 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2674 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2675 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2676 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2677 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2679 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2680 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2681 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2683 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2684 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2685 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2686 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2687 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2689 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2690 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2691 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2692 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2693 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2695 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2703 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2704 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2705 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2706 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2707 /// never reach the recipient.
2709 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2711 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2712 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2714 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2716 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2717 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2718 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2720 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2722 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2723 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2724 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2729 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2730 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2731 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2732 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2733 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2735 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2737 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2739 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2740 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2741 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2742 } else { unreachable!(); })
2745 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2747 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2748 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2751 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2752 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2757 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2758 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2759 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2762 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2763 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2764 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2766 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2774 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2775 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2776 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2780 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2782 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2783 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2785 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2786 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2788 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2789 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2790 /// keys per-channel).
2792 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2793 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2794 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2796 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2797 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2798 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2800 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2801 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2802 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2803 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2805 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2806 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2807 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2808 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2812 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2813 let mut output_index = None;
2814 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2815 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2816 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2817 if output_index.is_some() {
2818 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2819 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2822 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2823 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2824 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2827 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2830 if output_index.is_none() {
2831 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2832 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2835 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2840 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2841 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2842 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2844 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2847 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2848 // smaller than 500:
2849 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2851 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2852 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2853 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2854 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2855 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2856 /// our network addresses.
2858 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2859 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2861 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2862 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2863 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2864 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2866 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2868 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2869 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2870 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2872 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2873 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2876 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2877 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2878 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2880 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2881 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2882 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2883 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2884 rgb, alias, addresses,
2885 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2886 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2888 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2889 let node_announce_sig = sign(&self.secp_ctx, &msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2891 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2892 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2894 let mut announced_chans = false;
2895 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2896 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
2897 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2899 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2904 announced_chans = true;
2906 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached channel_ready, check the
2907 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2908 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2912 if announced_chans {
2913 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2914 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2915 signature: node_announce_sig,
2916 contents: announcement
2922 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2924 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2925 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2926 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2927 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2929 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2930 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2932 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2933 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2935 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2937 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2938 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2939 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2940 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2941 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2942 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2943 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2944 pub fn update_channel_config(
2945 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2946 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2947 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2948 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2949 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2953 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2954 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2957 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2958 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2959 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2960 let channel_counterparty_node_id = channel_state.by_id.get(channel_id)
2961 .ok_or(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2962 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found", log_bytes!(*channel_id)),
2964 .get_counterparty_node_id();
2965 if channel_counterparty_node_id != *counterparty_node_id {
2966 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2967 err: "counterparty node id mismatch".to_owned(),
2971 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2972 let channel = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2973 if !channel.update_config(config) {
2976 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2977 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2978 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2979 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2980 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2989 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2991 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2992 /// Will likely generate further events.
2993 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2994 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2996 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2997 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2998 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
2999 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3001 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3002 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3004 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
3005 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3006 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
3007 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3009 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3010 match forward_info {
3011 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3012 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3013 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3014 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3015 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3017 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3018 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3019 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3020 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3021 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3022 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3023 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3025 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3026 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data }
3032 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3033 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3034 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id) {
3035 let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
3036 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3038 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3039 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3040 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3041 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3042 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3044 fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3046 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3047 fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3051 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3052 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3053 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3054 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => fail_forward!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3060 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3063 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3066 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3067 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3068 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3069 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3070 // problem, not ours.
3077 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3078 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3079 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3080 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3081 match forward_info {
3082 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3083 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3085 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3086 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3087 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3088 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3089 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3090 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3091 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3092 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3093 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3094 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3096 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3098 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3099 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3101 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3103 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3104 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3105 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data }
3111 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3113 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3114 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3115 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3116 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3117 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3118 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3119 // this channel currently :/.
3125 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3126 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3128 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3129 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3130 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3132 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3133 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3135 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3137 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3138 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3139 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3142 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3144 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3145 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3146 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3147 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3148 // messages when we can.
3149 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3150 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3151 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3158 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3159 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3162 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3163 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3164 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3165 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3166 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3167 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3169 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3170 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3171 let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan);
3172 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3173 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3175 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
3177 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3181 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3182 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3185 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3186 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3187 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3188 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3189 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3190 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3191 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3192 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3193 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3195 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3203 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3204 match forward_info {
3205 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3206 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
3207 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3208 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3209 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3210 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3211 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3213 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3214 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3216 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3219 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3220 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3221 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3222 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3223 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3224 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3225 phantom_shared_secret,
3227 value: amt_to_forward,
3229 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { amt_to_forward },
3234 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3236 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3237 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3238 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3240 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3241 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3242 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3243 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3244 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3245 phantom_shared_secret,
3247 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
3252 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3253 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3254 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3256 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3257 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3258 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3261 let (_, htlcs) = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3262 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3263 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3264 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3265 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3266 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3270 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3271 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3272 total_value += htlc.value;
3273 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3274 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3275 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3276 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3277 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3278 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3280 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3282 _ => unreachable!(),
3285 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3286 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3287 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3288 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3289 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3290 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3291 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3294 amount_msat: total_value,
3296 payment_received_generated = true;
3298 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3299 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3301 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3303 payment_received_generated
3307 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3308 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3309 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3310 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3311 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3312 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3313 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3314 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3315 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3316 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3317 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3318 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3319 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3320 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3322 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3326 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3328 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3329 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3330 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3331 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3332 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3333 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3335 amount_msat: amt_to_forward,
3339 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3340 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3341 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3347 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3348 if payment_data.is_none() {
3349 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3350 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3353 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3354 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3355 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3356 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3357 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3358 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3359 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3360 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3362 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3363 if payment_received_generated {
3364 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3370 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3371 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3379 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3380 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
3382 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3384 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3385 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3388 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3389 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3390 events.append(&mut new_events);
3393 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3395 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3396 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3398 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3399 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3400 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3401 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3402 if background_events.is_empty() {
3406 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3408 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3409 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3410 // monitor updating completing.
3411 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3418 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3419 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3420 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3421 self.process_background_events();
3424 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3425 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3426 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3427 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3428 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3429 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3430 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3432 if !chan.is_live() {
3433 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3434 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3435 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3437 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3438 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3440 let mut retain_channel = true;
3441 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3444 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3445 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3449 let ret_err = match res {
3450 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3451 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3452 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
3453 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3456 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3457 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3458 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3459 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3460 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3461 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3462 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3463 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3473 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3477 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3478 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3479 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3480 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3481 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3482 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3483 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3485 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3487 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3489 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3490 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3491 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3492 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3493 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3494 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3495 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3497 handle_errors.push(err);
3507 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3509 /// This currently includes:
3510 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3511 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3512 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3514 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3515 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3517 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3518 /// estimate fetches.
3519 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3520 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3521 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3522 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3524 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3526 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3527 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3529 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3530 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3531 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3532 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3533 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3534 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3535 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3536 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3538 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3540 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3542 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3543 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3544 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3545 if needs_close { return false; }
3548 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3549 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3550 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3551 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3552 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3553 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3554 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3555 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3559 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3560 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3562 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3563 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3564 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3568 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3569 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3574 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3579 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3580 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3581 // This should be unreachable
3582 debug_assert!(false);
3585 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3586 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3587 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3588 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3590 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3591 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3592 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3594 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.into_iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.prev_hop.clone(), payment_hash.clone())));
3602 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3603 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0), &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 23, data: Vec::new() });
3606 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3607 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3613 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3614 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3615 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3617 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3618 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3619 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentReceived`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3620 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3622 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3623 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3624 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3625 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3626 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3627 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3629 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3630 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3631 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3632 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3633 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3634 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3635 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3636 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3637 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3638 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3639 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3644 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3645 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3647 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3649 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3650 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3651 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3652 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3653 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3654 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3655 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3657 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3659 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3660 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3662 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3667 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3668 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3669 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3670 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3671 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3672 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3673 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3674 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3675 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3677 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3678 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3679 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3680 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3682 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3683 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3684 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3685 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3686 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3690 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3691 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3692 // be surfaced to the user.
3693 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3694 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3695 _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3697 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3699 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3700 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3701 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3702 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3703 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3705 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3707 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3708 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3709 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3711 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payment_params, .. } => {
3712 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3713 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3714 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3715 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3716 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3717 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3718 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3719 Some(RouteParameters {
3720 payment_params: payment_params_data,
3721 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3722 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3725 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3726 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3727 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3729 rejected_by_dest: false,
3730 network_update: None,
3731 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3733 short_channel_id: None,
3740 if payment.get().abandoned() && payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3741 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3743 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3749 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3756 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3757 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3758 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3759 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3760 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3761 /// still-available channels.
3762 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3763 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3764 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3765 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3768 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3769 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3770 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3772 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3773 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3774 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3775 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3776 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3777 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3778 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3779 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3780 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3783 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3784 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3787 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3788 all_paths_failed = true;
3789 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3790 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3792 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3798 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3801 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3802 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3803 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3804 Some(RouteParameters {
3805 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
3806 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3807 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3810 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3812 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3813 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3815 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3817 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3818 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3819 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3820 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3821 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3822 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3823 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3824 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3831 error_code: onion_error_code,
3833 error_data: onion_error_data
3836 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3842 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3843 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3844 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as find_route
3845 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3847 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3848 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3849 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3850 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3851 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3852 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3853 network_update: None,
3856 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3859 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3861 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3865 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3866 pending_events.push(path_failure);
3867 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
3869 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3870 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3871 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3872 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3873 if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
3874 let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3875 let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
3876 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
3878 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3879 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3882 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3883 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3884 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3888 let mut forward_event = None;
3889 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3890 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3892 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3893 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3894 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3896 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3897 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3900 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3901 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3902 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3903 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3904 time_forwardable: time
3911 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
3912 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3914 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3915 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3916 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3918 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3919 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3920 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3921 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3923 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
3924 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3925 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3926 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3927 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3928 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
3929 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3930 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3932 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3934 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3935 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3936 if let Some((payment_purpose, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3937 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3939 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3940 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3941 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3942 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3944 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3945 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3946 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3947 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3948 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3950 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3951 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
3952 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3953 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3954 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3958 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
3959 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
3960 debug_assert!(false);
3964 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
3965 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
3966 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
3967 // that there's one payment here and move on.
3968 if sources.len() != 1 {
3969 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
3970 debug_assert!(false);
3976 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
3978 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
3979 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
3982 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
3983 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
3984 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
3988 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3989 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3990 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3992 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3993 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3994 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3995 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3996 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3997 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3998 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
4000 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
4001 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
4002 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4003 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4004 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4005 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4006 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
4007 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4009 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
4010 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
4011 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
4012 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
4013 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
4014 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
4016 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
4021 if claimed_any_htlcs {
4022 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4024 purpose: payment_purpose,
4025 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
4029 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
4030 // which were generated.
4031 channel_state.take();
4033 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4034 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4035 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4040 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
4041 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4042 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
4043 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4044 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4046 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
4050 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4051 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
4052 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
4053 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
4054 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4055 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
4056 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4057 payment_preimage, e);
4058 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
4059 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4060 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
4061 Some(htlc_value_msat)
4064 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
4065 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
4066 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4067 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4068 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4069 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4070 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4071 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
4072 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4073 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4079 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
4081 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
4084 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
4085 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4086 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4087 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4088 payment_preimage, e);
4090 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4091 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4093 chan.remove_entry();
4095 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
4098 } else { unreachable!(); }
4101 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4102 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4103 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4104 for source in sources.drain(..) {
4105 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
4106 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4107 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4108 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4109 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
4110 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
4111 pending_events.push(
4112 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4114 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
4119 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4127 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4129 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4130 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4131 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4132 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4133 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4134 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4135 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4136 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4137 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4138 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
4139 pending_events.push(
4140 events::Event::PaymentSent {
4141 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4147 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
4151 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
4152 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
4153 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
4155 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
4156 // irrevocably fulfilled.
4157 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4158 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4159 pending_events.push(
4160 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4168 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4173 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4176 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4177 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4178 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4179 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4180 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4181 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4182 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4185 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4186 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4187 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4188 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4189 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4192 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4193 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4194 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4195 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
4196 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4197 payment_preimage, e);
4199 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4200 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4201 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4202 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4205 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4206 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4207 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4208 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4212 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4213 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4214 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4217 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4218 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4219 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4221 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4223 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4233 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4234 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4235 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4238 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4239 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4241 let chan_restoration_res;
4242 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
4243 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4244 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4245 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4246 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4247 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4249 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4253 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4254 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4255 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4256 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4257 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4258 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4260 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4261 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4262 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4267 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4268 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4269 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4271 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
4273 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4274 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4275 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4276 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4280 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4282 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4283 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4286 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4287 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4288 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4290 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4291 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4292 /// used to accept such channels.
4294 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4295 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4296 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4297 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4300 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4301 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4303 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4304 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4305 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4307 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4308 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4310 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4311 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4313 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4314 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4316 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4317 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4318 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4319 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4322 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4323 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4325 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4326 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4327 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4328 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4329 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4330 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4332 if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() {
4333 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
4336 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4337 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4338 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4339 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4340 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4341 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4344 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4345 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, channel);
4346 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4349 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4350 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4351 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4354 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4355 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4361 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4362 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4363 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4366 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4367 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4370 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4371 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4372 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration,
4373 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4376 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4377 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4381 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4382 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4383 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4384 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4385 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4386 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4388 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4389 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4390 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4391 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4393 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4394 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4395 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(0),
4398 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4399 pending_events.push(
4400 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4401 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4402 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4403 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4404 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4405 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4410 entry.insert(channel);
4416 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4417 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4418 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4419 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4420 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4421 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4422 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4423 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4425 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
4426 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4428 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4431 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4432 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4433 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4434 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4435 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4437 user_channel_id: user_id,
4442 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4443 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4444 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4445 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4446 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4447 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4448 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4449 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4450 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4452 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
4454 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4457 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4458 // lock before watch_channel
4459 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4461 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
4462 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4463 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4464 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4465 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4466 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
4467 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
4468 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4469 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
4470 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4471 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4473 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
4474 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4475 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4476 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4477 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4478 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4479 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4483 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4484 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4485 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4486 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4487 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4489 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4490 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4491 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4494 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4495 send_channel_ready!(channel_state.short_to_id, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4503 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4505 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4506 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4507 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4508 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4509 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4510 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4511 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4513 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4514 Ok(update) => update,
4515 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4517 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4518 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4519 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4520 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4521 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4522 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4523 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4524 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4529 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4530 send_channel_ready!(channel_state.short_to_id, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4534 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4537 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4538 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4542 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4543 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4544 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4545 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4546 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4547 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4548 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4550 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4551 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4552 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4553 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4554 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4555 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4556 msg: announcement_sigs,
4558 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4559 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4560 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4561 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4562 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4563 // announcement_signatures.
4564 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4565 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4566 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4567 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4574 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4578 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4579 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4580 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4581 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4582 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4584 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4585 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4586 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4587 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4590 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4591 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4592 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4593 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4596 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4597 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4599 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4600 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4601 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4602 let (result, is_permanent) =
4603 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4605 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
4611 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4612 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4613 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4620 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4623 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4624 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4627 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4631 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4632 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4633 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4634 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4635 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4636 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4637 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4638 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4640 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4641 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4642 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4643 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4648 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4649 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4650 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4651 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4652 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4653 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry)))
4654 } else { (tx, None) }
4656 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4659 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4660 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4661 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4663 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4664 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4665 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4666 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4670 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4675 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4676 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4677 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4678 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4680 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4681 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4682 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4683 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4685 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4686 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4688 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4689 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4690 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4691 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4694 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4695 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4696 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4697 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4698 match pending_forward_info {
4699 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4700 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4701 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4702 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, real_code, &error_data)
4704 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4706 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4707 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4708 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4711 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4713 _ => pending_forward_info
4716 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4718 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4723 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4724 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4725 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4726 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4727 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4728 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4729 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4730 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4732 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4734 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4737 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4741 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4742 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4743 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4744 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4745 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4746 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4747 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4749 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4751 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4756 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4757 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4758 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4759 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4760 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4761 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4762 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4764 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4765 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4766 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4768 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4771 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4775 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4776 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4777 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4778 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4779 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4780 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4781 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4783 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4784 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4785 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4786 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4787 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4788 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4789 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4794 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4795 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4797 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4798 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4799 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4801 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4802 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4803 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4804 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4805 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4806 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4807 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4808 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4810 commitment_signed: msg,
4816 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4821 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4822 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4823 let mut forward_event = None;
4824 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4825 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4826 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4827 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4829 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4830 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4831 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4832 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4833 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4835 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4836 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4837 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4839 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4840 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4841 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4846 match forward_event {
4848 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4849 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4850 time_forwardable: time
4858 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4859 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4861 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4862 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4863 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4864 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4865 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4866 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4868 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4869 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4870 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4871 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4872 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4873 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4874 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4875 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4876 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4877 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4878 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4880 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4881 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4882 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
4883 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4884 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4886 } else { unreachable!(); }
4889 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4890 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4891 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4895 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4896 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4897 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4898 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
4899 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4901 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4904 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
4906 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4907 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4909 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4910 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4912 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4913 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4920 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4921 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4922 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4923 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4924 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4925 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4926 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4928 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4930 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4935 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4936 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4937 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4939 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4940 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4941 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4942 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4944 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4945 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4948 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4949 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
4950 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4951 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4952 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4953 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4956 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4961 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4962 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4963 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4964 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4965 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4966 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4968 // It's not a local channel
4969 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4972 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4973 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4974 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4975 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4976 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4977 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4978 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4979 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4981 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4983 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4984 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4985 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4986 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4988 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
4991 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
4993 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4996 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4997 let chan_restoration_res;
4998 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
4999 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5000 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5002 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5003 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5004 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5005 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5007 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5008 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5009 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5010 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5011 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5012 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
5013 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), channel_state, chan);
5014 let mut channel_update = None;
5015 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5016 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5017 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5020 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5021 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5022 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5023 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5024 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5025 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5026 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5031 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5032 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(
5033 self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5034 responses.mon_update, Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5035 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5036 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5038 (responses.holding_cell_failed_htlcs, need_lnd_workaround)
5040 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5043 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
5044 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5046 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5047 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5052 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5053 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5054 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5055 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5056 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5057 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5058 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5059 match monitor_event {
5060 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5061 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5062 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5063 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5065 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5066 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
5069 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5070 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5071 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5072 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5073 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5074 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5075 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5076 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
5077 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5078 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5079 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5083 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5084 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5086 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5088 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5089 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5090 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5091 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5092 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5097 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5098 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
5104 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5105 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5108 has_pending_monitor_events
5111 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5112 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5113 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5115 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5116 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5119 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5120 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5121 /// update was applied.
5123 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
5124 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
5125 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
5126 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
5127 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5128 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5129 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5130 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5132 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5133 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5134 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5135 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5136 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5138 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5139 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5140 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5141 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5143 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5145 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5148 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5149 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
5150 has_monitor_update = true;
5151 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5152 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5153 if close_channel { return false; }
5155 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5156 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5157 updates: commitment_update,
5164 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
5165 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5166 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5173 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5174 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5175 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5178 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5179 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5185 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5186 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5187 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5188 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5189 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5190 let mut has_update = false;
5192 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5193 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5194 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5195 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5196 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5198 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5199 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5200 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5201 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5203 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5204 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5207 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5208 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5209 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5210 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5211 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5216 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5218 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5219 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5220 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
5226 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
5227 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5234 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5235 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5241 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5242 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5244 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5245 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5246 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5247 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5248 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5249 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5250 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5251 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5252 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5253 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5254 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5255 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5256 assert!(should_broadcast);
5257 } else { unreachable!(); }
5258 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5260 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5264 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5265 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5267 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5268 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5271 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5273 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5274 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5275 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5276 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5277 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5278 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5279 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5280 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5281 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5282 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5283 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5284 // never fail a payment too early.
5285 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5287 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5290 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5295 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5298 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5299 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5301 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5302 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5303 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5305 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5307 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5308 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5312 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5313 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5315 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5317 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5318 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5319 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5320 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5321 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5322 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5325 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5326 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5328 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5331 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5333 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5335 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5336 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5337 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5338 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5339 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5342 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5343 /// stored external to LDK.
5345 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5346 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5347 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5349 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5350 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5353 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5354 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5355 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5356 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5358 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5359 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5360 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5361 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5362 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5364 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5365 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5366 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5367 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5368 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5370 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5371 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5373 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5374 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5378 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5379 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5381 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5383 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5384 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5385 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5386 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5389 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5390 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5392 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5395 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5397 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5399 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5400 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5403 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5404 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5406 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5407 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5408 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5411 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5412 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5414 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5415 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5416 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5417 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5419 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block.height(), &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5420 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5421 match channel_state.short_to_id.entry(scid_candidate) {
5422 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => continue,
5423 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return scid_candidate
5428 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5430 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5431 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5433 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5434 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5435 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5439 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5440 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5441 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5442 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
5443 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5448 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5449 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5453 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5454 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5458 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5459 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5460 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5461 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5462 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5465 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5466 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5467 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5468 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5470 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5471 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5472 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5473 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5476 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5477 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5479 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5480 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5483 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5484 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5485 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5487 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5488 events.replace(pending_events);
5497 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5499 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5500 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5501 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5502 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5505 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5507 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5508 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5510 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
5511 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
5512 /// restarting from an old state.
5513 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5514 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5515 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5517 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5518 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5519 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5520 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5523 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5524 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5525 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5528 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
5529 handler.handle_event(&event);
5537 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5539 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5540 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5541 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5542 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5545 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5547 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5548 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5549 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5550 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5551 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5554 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5555 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5558 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5559 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5560 let new_height = height - 1;
5562 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5563 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5564 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5565 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5566 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5567 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5570 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5574 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5576 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5577 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5578 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5579 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5582 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5583 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5584 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5585 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5587 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5588 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5590 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5591 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5592 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5594 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5595 if height < last_best_block_height {
5596 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5597 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5601 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5602 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5603 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5604 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5606 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5607 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5609 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5611 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5613 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5615 macro_rules! max_time {
5616 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5618 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5619 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5620 // having an explicit local time source.
5621 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5622 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5623 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5624 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5625 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5631 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
5632 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5633 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5634 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5635 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5638 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5639 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5640 outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
5641 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
5642 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
5643 if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
5644 log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
5645 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
5646 payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
5654 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
5655 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5656 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
5657 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5658 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
5659 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
5665 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5666 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5667 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5668 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5669 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5670 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5671 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5672 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5677 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5679 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5680 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5681 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5682 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5685 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5686 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5688 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5689 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5690 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5691 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5692 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5694 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5695 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5697 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5698 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5699 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5700 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5701 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5702 let res = f(channel);
5703 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5704 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5705 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5706 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5710 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5711 send_channel_ready!(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5712 if channel.is_usable() {
5713 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5714 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5715 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5716 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5721 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5724 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5725 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5726 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5727 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5728 msg: announcement_sigs,
5730 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5731 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
5732 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5734 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5735 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5736 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5741 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
5742 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5743 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
5744 // to the short_to_id map here. Note that we check whether we can relay
5745 // using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e. enforce option_scid_alias
5746 // then), and if the funding tx is ever un-confirmed we force-close the
5747 // channel, ensuring short_to_id is always consistent.
5748 let scid_insert = short_to_id.insert(real_scid, channel.channel_id());
5749 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == channel.channel_id(),
5750 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
5751 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
5754 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5755 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, channel);
5756 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5757 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5758 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5759 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5760 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5764 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5765 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5766 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5767 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5768 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5769 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5770 data: reason_message,
5778 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5779 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
5780 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5781 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5782 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5783 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5784 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5785 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5786 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
5787 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
5788 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5789 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
5790 data: htlc_msat_height_data
5795 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5800 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5802 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5803 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
5807 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5808 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5809 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5812 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5813 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5814 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5815 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5818 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5819 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5821 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5822 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5825 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5826 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5827 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
5828 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
5829 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5833 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5834 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5835 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5836 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5840 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
5841 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5842 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5843 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5844 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5845 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5848 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5849 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5850 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5853 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5854 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5855 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5858 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5859 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5860 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5863 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5864 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5865 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5868 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
5869 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5870 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5873 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5874 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5875 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5878 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5879 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5880 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5883 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5884 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5885 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5888 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5889 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5890 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5893 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5894 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5895 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5898 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5899 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5900 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5903 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5904 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5905 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5908 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5909 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5910 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5913 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5914 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5915 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5918 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5919 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5920 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5923 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5924 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5925 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5928 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5933 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5934 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5935 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5938 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5939 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5940 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5941 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5943 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5944 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5945 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5946 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5947 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
5948 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
5949 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5950 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5951 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5952 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5953 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
5954 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5957 no_channels_remain = false;
5962 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5964 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5965 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5966 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5967 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5968 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5969 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5970 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5971 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5972 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5973 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5974 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5975 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5976 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5977 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5978 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5979 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5980 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5981 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5982 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5983 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
5987 if no_channels_remain {
5988 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
5991 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5992 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5996 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
5997 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5999 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6002 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6003 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6004 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6005 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6006 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6009 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6010 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6015 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6016 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6017 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6018 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6019 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6020 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6021 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6022 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6023 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6027 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6028 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6029 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6035 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6038 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6039 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6041 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6042 for chan in self.list_channels() {
6043 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
6044 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6045 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data));
6050 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6051 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6052 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6053 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6056 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6057 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6058 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6066 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6067 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data));
6072 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
6073 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
6074 struct PersistenceNotifier {
6075 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
6076 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
6077 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
6080 impl PersistenceNotifier {
6083 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
6089 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
6090 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
6095 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
6096 let result = *guard;
6104 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6105 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6106 let current_time = Instant::now();
6108 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
6109 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
6114 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
6115 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
6116 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
6117 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
6118 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
6120 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
6121 let result = *guard;
6122 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
6126 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
6127 None => return result,
6133 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
6135 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
6136 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6137 *persistence_lock = true;
6138 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
6143 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6144 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6146 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6147 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6148 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6149 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6152 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6153 (2, node_id, required),
6154 (4, features, required),
6155 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6156 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6157 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6158 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6161 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelDetails, {
6162 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6163 (2, channel_id, required),
6164 (3, channel_type, option),
6165 (4, counterparty, required),
6166 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6167 (6, funding_txo, option),
6168 (7, config, option),
6169 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6170 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6171 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6172 (14, user_channel_id, required),
6173 (16, balance_msat, required),
6174 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6175 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6176 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6177 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap())),
6178 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6179 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6180 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6181 (26, is_outbound, required),
6182 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6183 (30, is_usable, required),
6184 (32, is_public, required),
6185 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6186 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6189 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6190 (2, channels, vec_type),
6191 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6192 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6195 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6197 (0, onion_packet, required),
6198 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6201 (0, payment_data, required),
6202 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6203 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6205 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6206 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6207 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6211 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6212 (0, routing, required),
6213 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6214 (4, payment_hash, required),
6215 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
6216 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
6220 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6221 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6223 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6225 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6226 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6227 reason.write(writer)?;
6229 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6230 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6233 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6234 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6235 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6236 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6243 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6244 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6245 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6248 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6249 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6250 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6251 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6255 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6256 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6257 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6258 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6259 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6262 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6263 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6264 // messages contained in the variants.
6265 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6266 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6267 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6269 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6270 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6271 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6272 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6273 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6276 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6277 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6278 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6279 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6280 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6282 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6287 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6292 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6293 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6294 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6295 (2, outpoint, required),
6296 (4, htlc_id, required),
6297 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6300 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6301 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6302 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6303 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6304 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6306 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6307 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6308 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6309 (2, self.value, required),
6310 (4, payment_data, option),
6311 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6312 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6318 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6319 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6320 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6322 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6323 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6324 let mut total_msat = None;
6325 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6326 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6327 (0, prev_hop, required),
6328 (1, total_msat, option),
6329 (2, value, required),
6330 (4, payment_data, option),
6331 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6332 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6334 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6336 if payment_data.is_some() {
6337 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6339 if total_msat.is_none() {
6340 total_msat = Some(value);
6342 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6345 if total_msat.is_none() {
6346 if payment_data.is_none() {
6347 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6349 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6351 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6355 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6358 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6365 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6366 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6367 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6370 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6371 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6372 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6373 let mut payment_id = None;
6374 let mut payment_secret = None;
6375 let mut payment_params = None;
6376 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6377 (0, session_priv, required),
6378 (1, payment_id, option),
6379 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6380 (3, payment_secret, option),
6381 (4, path, vec_type),
6382 (5, payment_params, option),
6384 if payment_id.is_none() {
6385 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6387 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6389 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6390 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6391 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
6392 path: path.unwrap(),
6393 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6398 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6399 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6404 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6405 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
6407 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6409 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6410 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6411 (0, session_priv, required),
6412 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6413 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6414 (3, payment_secret, option),
6415 (4, path, vec_type),
6416 (5, payment_params, option),
6419 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6421 field.write(writer)?;
6428 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6429 (0, LightningError) => {
6433 (0, failure_code, required),
6434 (2, data, vec_type),
6438 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6440 (0, forward_info, required),
6441 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6442 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6443 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6446 (0, htlc_id, required),
6447 (2, err_packet, required),
6451 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6452 (0, payment_secret, required),
6453 (2, expiry_time, required),
6454 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6455 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6456 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6459 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6461 (0, session_privs, required),
6464 (0, session_privs, required),
6465 (1, payment_hash, option),
6468 (0, session_privs, required),
6469 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6470 (2, payment_hash, required),
6471 (4, payment_secret, option),
6472 (6, total_msat, required),
6473 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6474 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6477 (0, session_privs, required),
6478 (2, payment_hash, required),
6482 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6483 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6484 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6485 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6486 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6489 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6490 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6492 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6494 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6496 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6497 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6498 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6501 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6502 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6503 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6504 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6505 unfunded_channels += 1;
6508 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6509 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6510 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6511 channel.write(writer)?;
6515 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6516 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
6517 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6518 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6519 for forward in pending_forwards {
6520 forward.write(writer)?;
6524 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
6525 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6526 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6527 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6528 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6529 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6530 htlc.write(writer)?;
6532 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
6535 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6536 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6537 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6538 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6539 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6540 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6543 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6544 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6545 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6546 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6547 for event in events.iter() {
6548 event.write(writer)?;
6551 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6552 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6553 for event in background_events.iter() {
6555 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6557 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6558 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6563 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6564 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6566 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6567 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6568 hash.write(writer)?;
6569 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6572 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6573 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6574 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6575 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6576 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6579 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6580 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6582 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6583 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6584 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6585 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6588 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6589 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6593 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6594 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6595 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6597 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6598 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6599 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6604 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6605 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6606 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6607 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6608 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6609 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
6616 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6618 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6620 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6621 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6622 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6623 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6624 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6625 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6626 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6627 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6628 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6629 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6630 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6631 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6632 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6634 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6635 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6637 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6638 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6640 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6641 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6642 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6643 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6644 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6645 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6647 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6648 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6649 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6650 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6651 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6652 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6655 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6656 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6658 pub keys_manager: K,
6660 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6662 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6663 pub fee_estimator: F,
6664 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6666 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6667 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6668 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6669 pub chain_monitor: M,
6671 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6672 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6673 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6674 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6675 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6676 /// deserialization.
6678 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6679 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6680 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6682 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6683 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6685 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6686 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6687 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6688 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6690 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6693 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6694 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
6697 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6698 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6699 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6700 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6701 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6702 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6705 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6706 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6707 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6708 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6709 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
6711 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
6712 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6717 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6718 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6719 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6720 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
6721 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6722 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6723 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6724 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6727 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6728 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6729 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
6733 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6734 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
6735 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6736 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6737 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6738 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6741 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6742 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6744 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6745 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6746 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6748 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6750 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6751 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6752 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6753 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6754 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
6755 for _ in 0..channel_count {
6756 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
6757 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6758 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
6759 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
6760 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6761 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6762 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6763 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6764 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
6765 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
6766 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6767 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6768 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6769 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6770 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6771 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6772 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6773 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6774 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6775 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6776 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6777 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
6778 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
6779 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
6780 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6781 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6782 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
6783 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
6784 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6785 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6786 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6787 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6788 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
6791 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6792 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6793 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
6795 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
6798 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6799 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6800 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6801 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6802 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6803 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6807 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
6808 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
6809 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
6810 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6814 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
6815 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6816 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6817 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
6818 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6819 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6820 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
6821 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
6822 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6824 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
6827 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6828 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6829 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
6830 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6831 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6832 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
6833 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
6834 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
6836 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
6839 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6840 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
6841 for _ in 0..peer_count {
6842 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6843 let peer_state = PeerState {
6844 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
6846 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
6849 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6850 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
6851 for _ in 0..event_count {
6852 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
6853 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
6857 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
6858 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
6859 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
6860 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
6861 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
6862 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
6863 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6864 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
6868 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6869 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
6870 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
6871 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6872 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
6873 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6877 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6878 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6880 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6881 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6882 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6883 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6884 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6888 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6889 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6890 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6891 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6892 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6893 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6894 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
6896 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
6897 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6901 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
6902 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
6903 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
6904 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
6905 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6906 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
6907 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6908 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
6909 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
6910 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
6911 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
6912 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
6914 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
6915 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6918 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
6919 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
6920 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
6921 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
6922 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
6923 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
6925 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
6927 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
6928 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
6929 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
6930 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
6931 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
6932 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
6933 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
6935 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
6936 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
6937 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
6938 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
6939 if path.is_empty() {
6940 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
6941 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6943 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
6944 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
6945 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
6946 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
6947 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6948 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
6949 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
6950 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6952 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6953 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
6954 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
6955 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
6956 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
6958 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
6959 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
6960 total_msat: path_amt,
6961 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
6963 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
6964 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
6973 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
6974 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
6976 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
6977 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
6978 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
6979 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6981 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
6982 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
6985 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
6986 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
6987 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
6988 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
6989 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6991 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
6992 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
6993 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
6994 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
6995 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
6996 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
6997 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
6998 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
7000 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7001 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7005 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7007 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7009 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7010 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7012 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7016 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7017 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7019 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7020 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7023 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
7025 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7027 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
7028 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7029 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7030 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7031 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7035 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7036 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
7037 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7038 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7040 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7041 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
7042 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7044 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7045 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7046 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7047 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7048 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7049 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7051 if chan.is_usable() {
7052 if short_to_id.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), *chan_id).is_some() {
7053 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7054 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7055 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7056 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7061 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7062 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7063 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7064 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7065 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7066 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7067 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7069 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7070 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7071 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7072 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7074 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7075 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7076 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7077 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7079 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7080 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7081 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7082 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7084 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7085 if let Some(channel) = by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7086 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7088 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7089 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &args.fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7092 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7094 purpose: payment_purpose,
7095 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7101 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7103 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
7104 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7105 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7107 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7109 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
7114 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7116 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7117 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7118 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7120 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7121 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7127 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
7128 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7130 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7132 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7133 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7134 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7135 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
7137 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
7138 logger: args.logger,
7139 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7142 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7143 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
7146 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7147 //connection or two.
7149 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7155 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7156 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7157 use core::time::Duration;
7158 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7159 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7160 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
7161 use ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment;
7162 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
7163 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7165 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7166 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7167 use util::errors::APIError;
7168 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
7169 use util::test_utils;
7170 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
7172 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
7174 fn test_wait_timeout() {
7175 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
7177 use core::sync::atomic::AtomicBool;
7180 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
7181 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
7183 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
7184 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
7185 thread::spawn(move || {
7187 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
7188 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7189 *persistence_lock = true;
7192 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
7198 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
7199 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
7201 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
7204 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
7209 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
7211 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
7214 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
7221 fn test_notify_limits() {
7222 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7223 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7224 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7225 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7226 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7227 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7229 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7230 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7231 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7232 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7233 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7235 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7237 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7238 // to connect messages with new values
7239 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7240 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7241 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7242 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7244 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7245 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7246 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7247 // ... but the last node should not.
7248 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7249 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7250 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7251 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7253 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7254 // about the channel.
7255 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7256 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7257 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7259 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7261 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7262 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7263 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7264 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7265 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7266 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7268 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7269 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7270 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7272 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7273 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7274 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7275 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7276 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7277 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7279 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7280 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7281 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7282 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7283 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7284 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7285 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7286 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7288 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7289 // the channel info has updated.
7290 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7291 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7292 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7293 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7294 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7295 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7299 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7300 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7302 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7303 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7304 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7305 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7306 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7308 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7309 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7310 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7311 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7312 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7313 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7314 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7315 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7316 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7317 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7318 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7320 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7321 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7322 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7323 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7324 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7325 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7326 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7327 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7328 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7329 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7330 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7331 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7332 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7333 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7334 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7335 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7336 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7337 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7338 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7339 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7340 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7341 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7343 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7344 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7345 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7346 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7347 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7348 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7350 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7351 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7352 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7353 // lightning messages manually.
7354 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7355 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7356 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7358 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7359 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7360 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7361 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7362 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7363 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7364 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7365 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7366 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7367 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7368 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7369 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7370 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7371 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7372 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7373 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7374 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7375 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7376 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7377 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7378 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7379 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7380 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7381 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7382 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7384 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7385 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7386 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7387 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7389 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7390 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7391 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7392 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7394 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7397 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7398 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7399 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7400 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7402 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7405 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7406 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7407 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7408 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7410 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7415 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7416 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7417 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7418 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7419 // fails as expected.
7420 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7421 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7422 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7423 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7424 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7425 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7426 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7428 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7429 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7430 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7432 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7433 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7434 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7435 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7436 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7438 let route = find_route(
7439 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(),
7440 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7442 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7443 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7444 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7445 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7446 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7447 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7448 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7449 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7450 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7451 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7452 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7453 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7454 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7455 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7456 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7457 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7458 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7459 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7460 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7461 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7462 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7464 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7465 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7467 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7468 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7469 let route = find_route(
7470 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(),
7471 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7473 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7474 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7475 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7476 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7477 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7478 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7479 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7481 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7482 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7483 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7484 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7485 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7486 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7487 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7488 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7489 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7490 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7491 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7492 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7493 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7494 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7495 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7496 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7497 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7498 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7499 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7500 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7501 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7502 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7503 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7505 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7506 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7510 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7511 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7512 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7513 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7514 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7515 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7516 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7518 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7519 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7520 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7521 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7523 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7524 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7525 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7526 final_value_msat: 10000,
7527 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7529 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7530 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7531 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7532 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7533 let route = find_route(
7534 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph.read_only(),
7535 Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), nodes[0].logger, &scorer,
7539 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7540 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7541 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7542 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7544 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7545 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7546 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7547 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7548 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7549 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7550 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7552 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7556 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7557 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7558 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7559 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7560 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7561 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7563 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7564 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7565 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7566 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7568 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7569 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7570 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7571 final_value_msat: 10000,
7572 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7574 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7575 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7576 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7577 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7578 let route = find_route(
7579 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph.read_only(),
7580 Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), nodes[0].logger, &scorer,
7584 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7585 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7586 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7587 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7588 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7590 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7591 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7592 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7593 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7594 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7595 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7596 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7598 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7602 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7603 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7604 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7605 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7606 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7608 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7609 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7610 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7611 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7613 // Marshall an MPP route.
7614 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7615 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7616 route.paths.push(path);
7617 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7618 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7619 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7620 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7621 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7622 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7624 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
7625 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7626 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7627 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7632 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7633 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7634 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7635 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7636 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7637 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7639 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7640 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7642 total_msat: 100_000,
7645 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7646 // payment verification fails as expected.
7647 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7648 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7649 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7650 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7652 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7656 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7657 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7661 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
7664 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
7665 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
7666 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
7667 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
7668 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7669 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
7670 use routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
7671 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
7672 use util::test_utils;
7673 use util::config::UserConfig;
7674 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
7676 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7677 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7678 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
7680 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
7684 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
7685 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
7686 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
7687 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
7688 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
7689 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
7690 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
7695 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
7696 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
7699 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
7700 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
7701 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
7703 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
7704 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7706 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7707 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7709 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
7710 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
7712 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7713 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
7714 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
7715 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
7716 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7718 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7720 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
7722 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7723 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
7724 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
7725 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
7726 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7728 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7730 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
7732 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7733 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7734 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7735 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7736 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7739 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
7740 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7741 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
7743 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7744 } else { panic!(); }
7746 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7747 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7749 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
7752 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7755 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
7756 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
7758 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7759 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7760 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
7761 match msg_events[0] {
7762 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
7763 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
7764 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
7768 match msg_events[1] {
7769 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7773 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
7775 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
7776 macro_rules! send_payment {
7777 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
7778 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
7779 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
7780 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7781 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7782 let seed = [3u8; 32];
7783 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
7784 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7785 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
7786 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7788 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
7789 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
7791 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
7792 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
7794 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7795 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
7796 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7797 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
7798 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7799 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7800 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7801 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7803 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
7804 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
7805 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7806 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
7808 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
7809 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
7810 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7811 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7812 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
7814 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
7817 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
7818 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7819 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7820 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7822 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
7827 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
7828 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);