1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash};
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
113 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
114 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
117 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
118 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
119 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
120 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
121 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
122 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
123 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
129 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
130 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
131 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
133 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
134 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
135 /// may overshoot this in either case)
136 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
137 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
138 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
139 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
140 pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
143 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
144 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
145 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
146 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
149 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
150 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
151 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
152 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
153 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
156 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
157 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
159 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
160 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
161 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
164 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
165 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
167 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
168 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
171 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
172 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
175 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
179 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
180 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
181 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
182 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
183 short_channel_id: u64,
184 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
186 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
187 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
189 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
190 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
195 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
197 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
198 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
199 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
201 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
202 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
205 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
206 struct ClaimableHTLC {
207 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
209 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
211 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
212 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
213 sender_intended_value: u64,
214 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
216 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
217 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
218 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
219 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
221 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
222 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
225 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
226 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
227 events::ClaimedHTLC {
228 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
229 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
230 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
231 value_msat: val.value,
236 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
237 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
239 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
240 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
241 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
244 /// Number of bytes in the id.
245 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
248 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
249 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
254 impl Readable for PaymentId {
255 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
256 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
261 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
262 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
263 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
267 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
269 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
270 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
271 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
273 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
274 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
279 impl Readable for InterceptId {
280 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
281 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
286 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
287 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
288 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
289 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
290 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
293 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
295 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
296 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
297 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
299 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
300 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
304 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
305 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
306 (0, short_channel_id, required),
307 (2, htlc_id, required),
309 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
310 (0, session_priv, required),
315 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
316 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
317 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
318 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
319 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
322 session_priv: SecretKey,
323 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
324 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
325 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
326 payment_id: PaymentId,
329 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
330 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
331 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
333 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
335 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
337 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
340 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
341 payment_id.hash(hasher);
342 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
348 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
350 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
351 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
352 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
353 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
354 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
355 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
359 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
360 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
361 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
362 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
363 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
364 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
366 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
372 struct InboundOnionErr {
378 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
379 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
381 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
382 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
383 pub enum FailureCode {
384 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
385 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
386 TemporaryNodeFailure,
387 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
388 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
389 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
390 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
391 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
392 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
393 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
394 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
395 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
396 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
398 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
399 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
400 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
403 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
404 fn into(self) -> u16 {
406 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
407 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
408 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
409 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
414 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
415 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
416 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
417 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
418 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
420 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
421 err: msgs::LightningError,
422 chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
423 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
424 channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
426 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
428 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
430 err: LightningError {
432 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
433 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
440 shutdown_finish: None,
441 channel_capacity: None,
445 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
446 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
449 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
451 err: LightningError {
453 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
454 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
460 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
461 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
462 channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
466 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
469 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
471 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
472 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
476 log_level: Level::Warn,
479 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
481 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
483 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
485 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
486 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
494 shutdown_finish: None,
495 channel_capacity: None,
500 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
501 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
502 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
503 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
504 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
506 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
507 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
508 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
509 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
510 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
511 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
512 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
514 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
518 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
519 struct ClaimingPayment {
521 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
522 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
523 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
524 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
526 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
527 (0, amount_msat, required),
528 (2, payment_purpose, required),
529 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
530 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
531 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
534 struct ClaimablePayment {
535 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
536 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
537 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
540 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
541 struct ClaimablePayments {
542 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
543 /// failed/claimed by the user.
545 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
546 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
548 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
549 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
550 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
552 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
553 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
554 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
555 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
558 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
559 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
560 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
561 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
562 enum BackgroundEvent {
563 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
564 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
565 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
566 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
568 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
569 /// are regenerated on startup.
570 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
571 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
572 /// channel to continue normal operation.
574 /// In general this should be used rather than
575 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
576 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
577 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
579 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
580 /// are regenerated on startup.
581 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
582 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
583 funding_txo: OutPoint,
584 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
586 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
587 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
589 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
590 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
591 channel_id: ChannelId,
596 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
597 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
598 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
599 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
600 /// event can be generated.
601 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
602 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
603 /// operation of another channel.
605 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
606 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
607 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
608 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
610 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
611 event: events::Event,
612 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
616 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
617 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
618 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
619 (0, event, upgradable_required),
620 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
621 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
622 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
623 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
624 // downgrades to prior versions.
625 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
629 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
630 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
631 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
632 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
633 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
636 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
637 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
638 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
639 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
643 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
644 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
645 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
646 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
647 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
648 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
650 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
651 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
652 channel_id: ChannelId,
653 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
658 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
659 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
660 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
661 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
662 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
667 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
668 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
672 /// State we hold per-peer.
673 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
674 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
676 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
677 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
678 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
680 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
681 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
682 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
683 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
684 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
685 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
686 latest_features: InitFeatures,
687 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
688 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
689 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
690 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
691 /// user but which have not yet completed.
693 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
694 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
695 /// for a missing channel.
696 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
697 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
698 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
700 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
701 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
702 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
703 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
705 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
706 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
707 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
708 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
709 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
710 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
711 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
712 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
713 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
714 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
715 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
716 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
717 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
718 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
719 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
723 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
724 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
725 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
726 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
727 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
728 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
731 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
732 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
733 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
736 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
737 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
738 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
741 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
742 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
743 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
744 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
748 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
749 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
750 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
751 /// The original OpenChannel message.
752 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
753 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
754 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
757 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
758 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
759 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
761 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
762 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
764 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
767 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
768 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
769 struct PendingInboundPayment {
770 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
771 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
772 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
773 /// this payment being removed.
775 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
776 user_payment_id: u64,
777 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
778 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
779 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
782 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
783 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
784 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
785 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
786 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
787 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
788 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
789 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
791 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
792 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
800 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
802 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
803 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
804 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
809 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
810 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
811 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
812 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
813 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
814 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
815 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
816 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
817 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
819 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
820 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
829 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
831 &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
832 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
833 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
838 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
839 pub trait AChannelManager {
840 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
841 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
842 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
843 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
844 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
845 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
846 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
847 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
848 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
849 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
850 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
851 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
852 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
853 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
854 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
855 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
856 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
857 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
858 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
859 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
860 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
861 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
862 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
863 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
864 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
865 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
866 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
867 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
868 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
869 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
870 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
871 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
872 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
873 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
874 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
875 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
878 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
879 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
881 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
882 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
883 ES::Target: EntropySource,
884 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
885 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
886 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
890 type Watch = M::Target;
892 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
894 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
896 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
898 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
899 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
901 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
903 type Router = R::Target;
905 type Logger = L::Target;
907 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
910 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
911 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
913 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
914 /// to individual Channels.
916 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
917 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
918 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
919 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
921 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
922 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
923 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
924 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
925 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
926 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
927 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
929 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
930 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
931 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
933 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
934 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
935 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
936 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
937 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
939 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
940 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
941 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
942 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
944 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
945 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
946 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
948 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
949 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
950 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
951 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
952 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
954 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
955 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
956 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
957 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
958 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
959 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
960 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
961 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
964 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
965 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
966 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
967 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
968 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
972 // `total_consistency_lock`
974 // |__`forward_htlcs`
976 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
978 // |__`per_peer_state`
980 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
982 // | |__`claimable_payments`
984 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
990 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
992 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
996 // | |__`pending_events`
998 // | |__`pending_background_events`
1000 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1002 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1003 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1004 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1005 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1006 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1007 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1011 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1012 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
1013 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1019 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1021 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1023 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1024 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1026 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1027 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1028 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1029 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1031 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1032 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1034 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1035 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1036 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1037 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1038 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1039 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1040 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1041 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1043 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1045 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1046 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1048 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1050 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1051 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1052 /// and via the classic SCID.
1054 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1055 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1057 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1059 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1061 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1062 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1063 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1065 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1066 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1068 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1069 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1071 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1072 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1074 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1075 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1076 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1077 /// active channel list on load.
1079 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1080 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1082 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1084 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1085 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1086 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1088 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1089 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1090 /// the handling of the events.
1092 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1093 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1096 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1097 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1098 /// would break backwards compatability.
1099 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1100 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1101 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1103 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1104 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
1106 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1108 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1109 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1110 /// confirmation depth.
1112 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1113 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1114 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1116 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1118 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1120 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1122 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1124 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1126 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1127 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1128 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1130 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1131 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1133 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1134 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1135 /// keeping additional state.
1136 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1138 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1139 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1140 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1141 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1143 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1144 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1146 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1147 /// are currently open with that peer.
1149 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1150 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1153 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1155 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1156 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1157 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1158 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1159 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1161 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1162 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1163 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1164 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1165 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1167 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1168 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1170 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1171 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1172 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1173 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1174 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1176 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1177 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1179 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1180 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1181 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1182 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1183 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1185 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1187 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1189 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1190 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1191 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1192 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1193 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1194 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1195 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1196 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1197 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1199 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1201 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
1205 signer_provider: SP,
1210 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1212 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1213 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1214 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1215 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1216 pub struct ChainParameters {
1217 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1218 pub network: Network,
1220 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1222 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1223 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1226 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1233 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1234 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1235 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1236 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1237 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1238 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1240 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1241 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1242 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1243 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1244 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1246 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1247 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1250 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1251 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1252 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1253 let _ = cm.get_cm().process_background_events(); // We always persist
1255 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1256 persistence_notifier: &cm.get_cm().persistence_notifier,
1257 should_persist: || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist },
1258 _read_guard: read_guard,
1263 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1264 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first.
1265 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1266 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1268 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1269 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1270 should_persist: persist_check,
1271 _read_guard: read_guard,
1276 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1277 fn drop(&mut self) {
1278 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1279 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1284 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1285 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1287 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1289 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1290 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1291 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1292 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1293 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1295 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1296 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1298 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1300 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1301 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1302 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1303 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1304 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1305 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1306 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1307 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1308 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1309 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1310 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1311 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1312 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1314 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1315 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1317 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1318 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1319 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1320 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1322 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1323 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1324 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1325 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1326 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1327 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1330 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1332 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1333 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1336 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1338 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1339 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1341 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1342 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1343 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1345 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1346 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1347 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1349 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1350 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1351 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1352 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1354 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1355 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1356 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1358 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1359 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1360 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1362 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1363 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1364 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1365 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1366 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1367 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1368 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1369 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1370 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1371 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1372 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1375 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1376 /// to better separate parameters.
1377 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1378 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1379 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1380 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1381 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1382 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1383 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1384 pub features: InitFeatures,
1385 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1386 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1387 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1389 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1391 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1392 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1393 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1394 /// payments to us through this channel.
1395 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1396 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1397 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1398 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1399 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1400 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1401 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1404 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1406 /// Balances of a channel are available through [`ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] and
1407 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`], calculated with respect to the corresponding on-chain
1410 /// [`ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances
1411 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1412 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1413 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1414 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1415 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1416 /// lifetime of the channel.
1417 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1418 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1419 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1420 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1421 /// our counterparty already.
1423 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1424 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1425 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1426 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1428 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1429 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1430 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1431 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1433 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1434 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1436 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1437 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1439 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1440 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1441 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1442 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1443 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1444 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1445 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1446 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1447 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1450 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1452 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1453 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1454 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1455 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1456 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1457 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1458 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1460 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1461 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1463 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1464 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1465 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1466 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1467 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1468 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1469 /// this value on chain.
1471 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1473 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1475 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1476 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1477 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1478 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1479 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1480 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1481 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1483 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1484 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1485 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1486 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1487 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1488 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1490 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1491 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1492 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1493 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1494 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1495 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1497 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1498 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1499 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1500 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1501 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1502 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1503 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1504 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1506 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`] and
1507 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1508 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1509 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1510 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1511 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1512 /// route which is valid.
1513 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1514 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1515 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1516 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1517 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1518 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1520 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1521 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1522 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1523 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1524 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1525 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1526 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1527 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1528 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1530 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1532 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1533 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1534 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1535 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1536 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1538 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1539 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1540 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1541 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1542 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1543 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1544 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1546 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1547 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1548 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1549 pub is_outbound: bool,
1550 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1551 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1552 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1553 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1554 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1556 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1557 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1558 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1559 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1560 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1561 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1562 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1564 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1565 pub is_usable: bool,
1566 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1567 pub is_public: bool,
1568 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1569 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1570 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1571 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1572 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1573 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1575 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1576 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1579 impl ChannelDetails {
1580 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1581 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1582 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1584 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1585 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1586 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1587 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1590 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1591 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1592 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1594 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1595 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1596 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1597 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1600 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1601 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1602 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1605 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1606 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1608 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1609 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1610 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1612 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1613 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1614 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1615 features: latest_features,
1616 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1617 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1618 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1619 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1620 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1621 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1622 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1623 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1624 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1625 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1627 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1628 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1629 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1630 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1631 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1632 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1633 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1634 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1635 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1636 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1637 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1638 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1639 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1640 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1641 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1642 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1643 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1644 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1645 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1646 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1647 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1648 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1649 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1650 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1651 config: Some(context.config()),
1652 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1657 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1658 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1659 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1660 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1661 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1662 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1663 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1664 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1665 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1667 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1669 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1670 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1672 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1673 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1674 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1675 /// to drop the channel.
1679 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1680 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1681 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1682 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1683 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1685 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1686 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1687 payment_id: PaymentId,
1689 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1691 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1692 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1693 payment_id: PaymentId,
1694 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1696 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1697 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1698 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1701 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1702 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1703 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1705 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1706 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1707 payment_id: PaymentId,
1708 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1709 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1710 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1712 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1713 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1714 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1716 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1717 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1718 payment_id: PaymentId,
1719 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1720 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1724 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1726 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1728 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1729 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1730 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1731 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1733 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1734 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1735 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1738 macro_rules! handle_error {
1739 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1740 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1741 // entering the macro.
1742 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1743 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1747 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1748 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1750 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1751 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1752 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1753 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1757 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1758 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1759 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1760 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1761 counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1762 channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1767 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1768 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1770 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1771 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1772 action: err.action.clone()
1776 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1777 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1778 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1779 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1780 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1784 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1789 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1792 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1793 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1794 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1800 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1801 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1802 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1803 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1804 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1805 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1807 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1808 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1809 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1810 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1811 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1813 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1814 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1816 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1820 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1821 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
1822 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
1824 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1825 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
1827 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1828 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
1830 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1831 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
1832 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
1833 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1834 let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
1835 let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
1837 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
1838 shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
1842 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1843 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
1845 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1846 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
1848 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1849 match $channel_phase {
1850 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
1851 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
1853 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
1854 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1856 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
1857 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1863 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
1864 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1868 let key = *$entry.key();
1869 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1871 $entry.remove_entry();
1879 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
1880 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1884 let key = *$entry.key();
1885 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1887 $entry.remove_entry();
1895 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
1896 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1898 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1899 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
1905 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1906 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1907 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1908 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1909 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1911 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1912 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1913 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1914 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1915 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1916 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1917 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
1918 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1919 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1920 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1925 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1926 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1927 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1928 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1929 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1930 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
1931 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1932 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1933 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1935 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1940 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1941 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1942 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1943 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1944 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1945 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1946 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1947 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1948 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
1950 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1955 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1956 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1957 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1958 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1959 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1960 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
1961 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
1962 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1963 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1964 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1965 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1967 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1968 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1969 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1975 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1976 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1978 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1979 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1980 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1981 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1982 updates.announcement_sigs);
1983 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1984 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1987 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
1988 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1989 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1991 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1993 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1994 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1996 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1997 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1998 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1999 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2004 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2005 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $remove: expr, $completed: expr) => { {
2006 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
2007 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
2008 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2009 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2011 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2012 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2013 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2016 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
2017 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
2018 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2019 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$chan.context);
2020 let res = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
2021 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.context.channel_id(),
2022 $chan.context.get_user_id(), $chan.context.force_shutdown(false),
2023 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok(), $chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
2027 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2033 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $remove: expr) => {
2034 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
2035 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
2036 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2038 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2039 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = $chan_entry.get_mut() {
2040 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
2041 $per_peer_state_lock, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, { $chan_entry.remove() })
2043 // We're not supposed to handle monitor updates for unfunded channels (they have no monitors to
2045 debug_assert!(false);
2046 let channel_id = *$chan_entry.key();
2047 let (_, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, ChannelError::Close(
2048 "Cannot update monitor for unfunded channels as they don't have monitors yet".into()),
2049 $chan_entry.get_mut(), &channel_id);
2050 $chan_entry.remove();
2054 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
2055 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2056 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2057 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2058 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2059 // filter for uniqueness here.
2060 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2061 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2062 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2063 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2065 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2066 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
2067 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
2069 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2070 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2071 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2075 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
2076 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = $chan_entry.get_mut() {
2077 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $funding_txo, $update, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
2078 $per_peer_state_lock, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { $chan_entry.remove() })
2080 // We're not supposed to handle monitor updates for unfunded channels (they have no monitors to
2082 debug_assert!(false);
2083 let channel_id = *$chan_entry.key();
2084 let (_, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, ChannelError::Close(
2085 "Cannot update monitor for unfunded channels as they don't have monitors yet".into()),
2086 $chan_entry.get_mut(), &channel_id);
2087 $chan_entry.remove();
2093 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2094 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2095 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2096 while !processed_all_events {
2097 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2101 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2104 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2105 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2106 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2108 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2109 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2110 if $self.process_background_events() == NotifyOption::DoPersist { result = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2112 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2113 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2114 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2115 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2119 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2120 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2121 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2122 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2125 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2127 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2128 $event_to_handle = event;
2130 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2131 post_event_actions.push(action);
2136 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2137 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2138 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2139 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2140 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2141 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2144 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2145 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2146 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2147 processed_all_events = false;
2150 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
2151 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
2157 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2159 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2160 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2161 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2162 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2163 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2164 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2168 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2170 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2172 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2173 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2175 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2177 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2178 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2179 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2182 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2183 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2184 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2186 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2187 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2188 current_timestamp: u32,
2190 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2191 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2192 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2193 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2195 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2196 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
2197 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2202 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2204 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2205 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2206 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2207 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2208 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2209 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2210 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2211 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2213 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2216 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2217 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2219 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2221 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2223 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2225 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2226 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2227 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2228 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2229 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2230 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2240 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2241 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2242 &self.default_configuration
2245 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2246 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2247 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2250 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2251 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2253 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2255 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2259 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2264 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2266 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2267 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2268 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2269 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2270 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2272 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2273 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2275 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2276 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2277 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2279 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2280 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2281 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2283 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2284 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2285 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2286 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2287 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2288 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2290 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2291 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2292 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2293 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2294 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2295 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2298 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2299 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2300 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2302 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2304 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2305 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2307 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2309 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2310 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2311 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2312 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2313 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2314 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2318 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2323 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
2325 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2326 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2327 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2329 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2331 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2334 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2337 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2338 node_id: their_network_key,
2341 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2344 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2345 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2346 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2347 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2348 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2349 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2350 // the same channel.
2351 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2353 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2354 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2355 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2356 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2357 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2358 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2359 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2360 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2361 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2365 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2366 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2367 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2375 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2376 /// more information.
2377 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2378 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2379 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2380 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2381 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2382 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2383 // the same channel.
2384 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2386 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2387 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2388 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2389 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2390 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2391 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2392 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2393 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2401 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2402 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2404 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2405 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2407 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2408 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2409 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2410 // really wanted anyway.
2411 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2414 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2415 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2416 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2417 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2419 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2420 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2421 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2422 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2423 let context_to_details = |context| {
2424 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2426 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2428 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2429 .map(context_to_details)
2435 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2436 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2438 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2439 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2440 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2442 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2443 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2444 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2445 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2446 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2447 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2449 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2450 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2451 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2453 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2454 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2455 payment_id: *payment_id,
2456 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2457 total_msat: *total_msat,
2460 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2461 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2463 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2464 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2466 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2471 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2472 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2473 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2474 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2475 Some(transaction) => {
2476 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2477 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2482 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2483 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2484 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2485 reason: closure_reason,
2486 counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2487 channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2491 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2492 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2494 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2495 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2497 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2499 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2500 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2502 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2503 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2505 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2506 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2507 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2508 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2509 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2510 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2511 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2512 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2514 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2515 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2516 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2517 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2518 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2522 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2523 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2524 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2525 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry).map(|_| ());
2528 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2529 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
2530 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2531 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2535 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2541 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (),
2544 // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2545 // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2547 // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2548 return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2551 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2552 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2553 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2554 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2557 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2561 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2562 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2563 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2565 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2566 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2568 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2569 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2570 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2571 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2573 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2575 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2576 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2577 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2580 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2581 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2582 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2583 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2584 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2585 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2588 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2589 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2590 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2592 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2593 /// the channel being closed or not:
2594 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2595 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2596 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2597 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2598 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2599 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2600 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2602 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2603 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2604 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2605 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2607 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2609 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2610 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2611 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2614 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2615 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2616 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2617 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2618 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2619 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2623 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2624 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2625 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2626 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2627 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2628 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2629 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2630 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2632 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2633 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2634 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2635 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2636 // ignore the result here.
2637 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2641 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2642 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2643 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2644 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2645 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2646 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2647 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2648 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2649 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2650 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2651 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2652 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2654 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2656 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2657 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2658 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
2659 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2661 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2662 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2663 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2665 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2666 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2667 // Unfunded channel has no update
2668 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2671 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2672 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2673 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2674 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2676 (None, *peer_node_id)
2678 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2681 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2682 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2683 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2688 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2691 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2692 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2693 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2694 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2695 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2696 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2697 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2698 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2699 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2700 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2701 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2702 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2713 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2714 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2715 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2717 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2718 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2719 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2722 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2723 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2724 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2726 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2727 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2728 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2729 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2730 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2733 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2734 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2735 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2736 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2737 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2741 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2742 /// local transaction(s).
2743 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2744 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2745 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2749 fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
2750 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
2751 new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2752 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2753 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2754 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2755 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2757 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2758 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2762 let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
2763 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
2764 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
2765 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } =>
2766 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2767 msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
2768 err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
2769 err_data: Vec::new(),
2773 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2774 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2775 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2778 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2779 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2780 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2781 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
2782 outgoing_cltv_value,
2783 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2787 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2788 &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2789 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2790 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2791 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2792 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
2793 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
2794 payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
2796 (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
2798 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2799 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2800 err_data: Vec::new(),
2801 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2804 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2805 if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2806 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2807 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2809 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2812 // final_expiry_too_soon
2813 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2814 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2816 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2817 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2818 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2819 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2820 if (outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2821 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2822 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2823 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2824 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2825 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2826 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2829 if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
2830 (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
2831 amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
2833 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2835 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2836 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2840 let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2841 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2842 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2843 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2844 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2845 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2846 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2847 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2848 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2849 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2850 err_data: Vec::new(),
2851 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2854 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
2855 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2856 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2857 err_data: Vec::new(),
2858 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2861 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2865 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2868 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2869 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2872 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2873 phantom_shared_secret,
2877 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2878 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2879 err_data: Vec::new(),
2880 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2883 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2886 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2887 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2888 outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
2889 outgoing_cltv_value,
2890 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
2894 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
2895 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
2896 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
2897 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2898 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2900 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2901 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2902 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2903 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2904 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2905 failure_code: $err_code,
2911 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2912 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2915 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2916 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2917 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2919 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2920 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2921 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2922 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2923 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2924 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2925 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2926 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2928 macro_rules! return_err {
2929 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2931 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2932 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2933 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2934 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2935 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2936 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2942 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2944 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2945 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2947 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2948 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2951 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
2952 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
2953 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
2954 short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
2957 let next_packet_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
2958 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
2959 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_packet_pk))
2961 // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
2962 // inbound channel's state.
2963 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
2964 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } => {
2965 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
2969 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
2970 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
2971 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2972 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
2973 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2974 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2975 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2976 // phantom or an intercept.
2977 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2978 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2979 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)
2983 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2986 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2988 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2989 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2990 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2991 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2992 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2994 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2995 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2996 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
2997 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3000 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3001 // have no consistency guarantees.
3002 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3006 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3007 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3008 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3009 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3010 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3012 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3013 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3014 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3015 // we don't have the channel here.
3016 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3018 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3020 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3021 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3022 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3023 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3024 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3025 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3026 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3027 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3028 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3029 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3030 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3032 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3035 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3036 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3038 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3039 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3043 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
3044 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3045 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3046 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3048 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
3055 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3056 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
3057 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
3058 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
3059 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
3060 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3062 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
3063 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
3065 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
3066 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
3067 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
3068 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
3069 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
3070 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
3071 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
3072 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
3073 if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
3074 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3080 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3081 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3082 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3083 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3085 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3086 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3088 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3089 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3090 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3092 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3093 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3094 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3095 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3096 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3097 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3098 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3102 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3104 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
3107 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3108 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3109 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3110 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3111 macro_rules! return_err {
3112 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3114 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3115 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3116 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3117 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3118 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3119 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3125 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3127 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3128 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
3131 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3132 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3133 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3134 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3135 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3137 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3140 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3141 match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3142 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3143 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3144 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3150 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3151 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3152 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3154 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3155 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3156 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3158 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3159 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3160 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3161 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3162 return Err(LightningError {
3163 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3164 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3167 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3168 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3170 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3171 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3174 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3175 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3176 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3177 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3179 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3180 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3181 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3183 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3184 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3185 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3186 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3187 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3188 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3192 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3195 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3196 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3197 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3199 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3200 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3201 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3202 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3203 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3206 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3207 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
3209 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3210 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3211 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3212 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3213 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3214 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3215 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3216 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3218 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3219 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3220 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3222 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3224 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3231 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3232 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3233 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3234 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3239 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3240 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3241 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3244 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3245 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3247 log_trace!(self.logger,
3248 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3249 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3250 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3251 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3253 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3254 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3255 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3257 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3258 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3260 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3261 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3262 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3263 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3266 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3267 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3268 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3269 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3270 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3271 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3272 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3273 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3274 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3275 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3277 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3278 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3279 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3281 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3282 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3284 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3285 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3286 Some(monitor_update) => {
3287 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry) {
3288 Err(e) => break Err(e),
3290 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3291 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3292 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3293 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3294 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3295 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3296 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3304 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3307 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3308 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3309 // `channel_by_id` map.
3310 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3311 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3316 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3317 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3319 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3324 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3326 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3327 /// fields for more info.
3329 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3330 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3332 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3334 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3335 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3336 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3337 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3338 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3340 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3341 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3342 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3343 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3344 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3346 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3347 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3348 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3349 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3351 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3353 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3354 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3355 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3357 /// In general, a path may raise:
3358 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3359 /// node public key) is specified.
3360 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
3361 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
3363 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3364 /// relevant updates.
3366 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3367 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3368 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3370 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3371 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3372 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3373 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3374 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3375 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3376 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3377 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3378 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3379 self.pending_outbound_payments
3380 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3381 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3382 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3385 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3386 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3387 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3388 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3389 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3390 self.pending_outbound_payments
3391 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3392 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3393 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3394 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3398 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3399 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3400 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3401 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3402 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3403 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3407 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3408 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3409 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3413 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3414 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3418 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3419 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3420 /// retries are exhausted.
3422 /// # Event Generation
3424 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3425 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3427 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3428 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3429 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3431 /// # Requested Invoices
3433 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`], abandoning the payment prior to receiving the
3434 /// invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`] and prevent any attempts at paying
3435 /// it once received. The other events may only be generated once the invoice has been received.
3437 /// # Restart Behavior
3439 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3440 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3441 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3443 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3444 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3445 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3446 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3449 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3450 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3451 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3452 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3453 /// never reach the recipient.
3455 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3456 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3458 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3459 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3461 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3462 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3463 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3464 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3465 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3466 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3467 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3470 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3471 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3473 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3476 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3477 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3478 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3479 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3480 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3481 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3482 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3483 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3486 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3487 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3488 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3489 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3490 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3491 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3492 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3493 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3494 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3497 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3500 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3501 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3504 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3505 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3507 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3508 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3509 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3510 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3511 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3512 let payment_params =
3513 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3515 let route_params = RouteParameters { payment_params, final_value_msat: amount_msat };
3517 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3520 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3521 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3523 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3524 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3525 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3526 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3528 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3529 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3530 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3531 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3532 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3533 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3534 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3535 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3536 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3537 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3539 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3540 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3541 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3542 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3546 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3548 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3549 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3552 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3554 let mut res = Vec::new();
3556 for mut path in route.paths {
3557 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3558 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3559 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3560 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3561 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3564 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3567 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3568 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3570 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3572 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3573 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3578 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3581 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3586 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3587 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3588 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3590 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3591 let used_liquidity =
3592 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3594 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3595 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3597 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3600 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3605 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3606 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3607 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3614 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3615 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3616 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3617 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
3618 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3619 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3620 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3621 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3623 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3624 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3625 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3626 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) => {
3627 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3629 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
3630 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3631 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3632 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3633 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3634 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3635 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3636 } else { unreachable!(); });
3638 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3639 Err((chan, err)) => {
3640 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3641 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3643 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3644 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3645 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3651 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3652 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3654 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3655 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3658 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3659 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3660 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3664 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3665 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3668 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3669 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3670 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3672 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3673 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3674 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3675 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3677 e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
3684 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3685 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3686 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3690 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3692 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3693 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3695 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3696 /// across the p2p network.
3698 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3699 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3701 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3702 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3703 /// keys per-channel).
3705 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3706 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3707 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3709 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3710 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3711 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3713 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3714 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3715 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3716 /// for more details.
3718 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3719 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3720 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3721 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3723 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3724 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3725 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3726 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3727 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3733 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3734 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3735 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3736 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3737 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3738 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3739 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3740 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3744 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3745 if tx.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3746 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3747 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3751 let mut output_index = None;
3752 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3753 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3754 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3755 if output_index.is_some() {
3756 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3757 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3760 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3763 if output_index.is_none() {
3764 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3765 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3768 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3772 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3774 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3775 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3776 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3777 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3779 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3780 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3782 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3783 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3785 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3787 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3788 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3789 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3790 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3791 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3792 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3793 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3794 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3795 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3796 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3797 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3798 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3799 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3803 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3804 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3805 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3806 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3807 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3808 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3809 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3810 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
3811 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3812 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3816 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3817 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3818 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
3819 config.apply(config_update);
3820 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
3823 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
3824 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3825 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3826 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3827 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3828 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3835 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
3836 debug_assert!(false);
3837 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3839 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
3840 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3847 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3849 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3850 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3851 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3852 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3854 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3855 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3857 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3858 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3860 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3862 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3863 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3864 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3865 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3866 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3867 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3868 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3869 pub fn update_channel_config(
3870 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
3871 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3872 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
3875 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3876 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3878 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3879 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3881 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3882 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3883 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3884 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3885 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3887 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3888 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
3889 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
3892 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3895 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3896 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3897 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
3898 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3899 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3900 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3901 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3903 let next_hop_scid = {
3904 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3905 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3906 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3907 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3908 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3909 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3910 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
3911 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
3912 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3913 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
3916 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
3918 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3919 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
3920 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
3922 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3923 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}.",
3924 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
3929 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3930 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3931 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3934 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3935 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3936 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3938 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3940 let skimmed_fee_msat =
3941 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
3942 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3943 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
3944 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3947 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3948 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3949 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3950 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3951 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3953 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3957 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3958 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3960 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3963 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3964 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3965 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3967 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3968 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3969 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3972 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3973 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3974 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3975 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
3976 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3977 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3978 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3979 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3982 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3983 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3984 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3985 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3990 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3992 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3993 /// Will likely generate further events.
3994 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3995 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3997 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
3998 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3999 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4001 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4002 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4004 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4005 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4006 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4008 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4009 match forward_info {
4010 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4011 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4012 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4013 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4014 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4017 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4018 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4019 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4021 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4022 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4023 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4024 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4025 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4026 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4027 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4030 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4031 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4033 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4036 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4037 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4043 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4044 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4046 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4050 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4051 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4053 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4057 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4058 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4059 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
4060 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4061 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
4063 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4064 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
4065 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4066 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4067 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4069 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4071 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4072 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4076 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4077 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4078 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4079 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
4081 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4082 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4088 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4091 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4094 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4095 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4096 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4097 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4098 // problem, not ours.
4104 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
4105 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
4107 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4111 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4112 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4113 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4114 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4117 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4118 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4119 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4120 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4121 match forward_info {
4122 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4123 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4124 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4125 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4126 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4129 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4130 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4131 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4132 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4133 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4134 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4135 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4136 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4137 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4139 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4140 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4141 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
4144 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4145 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4147 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4149 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4150 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4151 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4152 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4157 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4158 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4160 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4161 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4162 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
4163 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
4165 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4166 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4168 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4170 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4171 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4172 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4179 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4183 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4184 match forward_info {
4185 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4186 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4187 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4188 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4189 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4192 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4193 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4194 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4195 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4196 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4197 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4198 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4200 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4201 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4202 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4206 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4207 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4210 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4213 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4214 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4215 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4216 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4217 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4218 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4219 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4220 phantom_shared_secret,
4222 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4223 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4224 // if routing nodes overpay
4225 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4226 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4228 total_value_received: None,
4229 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4232 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4235 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4237 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4238 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4239 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4240 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4241 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4242 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4244 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4245 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4246 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4247 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4248 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4249 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4250 phantom_shared_secret,
4252 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4253 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4255 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4258 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4259 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4260 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4261 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4262 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4265 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4266 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4267 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4268 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4269 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4270 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4272 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4273 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4274 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4276 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4277 .entry(payment_hash)
4278 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4279 .or_insert_with(|| {
4280 committed_to_claimable = true;
4282 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4285 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4286 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4287 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4288 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4290 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4291 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4292 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4294 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4295 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4296 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4299 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4301 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4302 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4303 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4304 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4305 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4306 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4307 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4308 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4309 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4310 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4312 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4314 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4315 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4316 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4317 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4318 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4319 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4321 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4322 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4323 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4324 committed_to_claimable = true;
4326 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4327 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4328 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4329 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4330 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4331 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4332 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4333 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4334 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4335 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4339 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4340 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4341 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4342 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4343 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4345 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4347 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4348 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4350 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4351 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4352 committed_to_claimable = true;
4355 payment_claimable_generated
4359 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4360 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4361 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4362 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4363 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4364 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4365 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4366 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4367 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4368 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4369 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4370 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4371 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4372 Ok(result) => result,
4374 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4375 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4378 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4379 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4380 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4381 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4382 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4383 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4386 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4387 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4388 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4390 check_total_value!(purpose);
4392 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4393 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4394 check_total_value!(purpose);
4398 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4399 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4400 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4401 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4403 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4404 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4405 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4406 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4407 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4408 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4409 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4410 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4412 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4413 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4414 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4416 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4417 if payment_claimable_generated {
4418 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4424 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4425 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4433 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4434 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4435 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4436 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4438 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4439 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4441 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4443 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4444 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4445 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4447 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4449 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4450 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4451 events.append(&mut new_events);
4454 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4456 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4457 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4458 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4460 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4462 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4463 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4464 if background_events.is_empty() {
4465 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4468 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4470 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4471 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4472 // monitor updating completing.
4473 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4475 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4476 let mut updated_chan = false;
4478 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4479 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4480 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4481 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4482 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4483 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4484 updated_chan = true;
4485 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4486 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase).map(|_| ())
4488 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Ok(()),
4493 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4494 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4496 // TODO: If this channel has since closed, we're likely providing a payment
4497 // preimage update, which we must ensure is durable! We currently don't,
4498 // however, ensure that.
4500 log_error!(self.logger,
4501 "Failed to provide ChannelMonitorUpdate to closed channel! This likely lost us a payment preimage!");
4503 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4505 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4506 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4507 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4508 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4509 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4510 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4511 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4513 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4514 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4515 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4516 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4517 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4523 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4526 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4527 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4528 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4529 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4530 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4533 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4534 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
4535 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4536 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4537 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4538 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4539 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4541 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4542 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4543 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4544 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4546 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4547 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4549 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4550 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4554 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4555 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4556 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4557 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4558 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4559 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4560 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4562 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4563 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4565 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4566 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4567 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4568 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4569 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4570 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4572 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4577 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4578 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4586 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4588 /// This currently includes:
4589 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4590 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4591 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4593 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4594 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4595 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4596 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4598 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4599 /// estimate fetches.
4601 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4602 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4603 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4604 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4605 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4607 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4608 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4610 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4611 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4612 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4614 let process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4615 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4616 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4617 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4618 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4619 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4621 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4622 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4623 log_error!(self.logger,
4624 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4625 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4626 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4627 self.finish_force_close_channel(context.force_shutdown(false));
4628 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4629 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4630 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4631 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4632 channel_id: *chan_id,
4633 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4644 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4645 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4646 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4647 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4648 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4649 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4650 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4652 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4653 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4658 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4659 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4661 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4662 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4663 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4664 if needs_close { return false; }
4667 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4668 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4669 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4670 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4671 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4672 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4673 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4674 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4676 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4677 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4678 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4679 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4683 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4685 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4688 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4690 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4691 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4692 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4693 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4697 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4699 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4705 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4707 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4708 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4709 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4710 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4711 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4712 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4713 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4714 channel_id: *chan_id,
4715 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4723 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4724 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4725 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4727 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
4728 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4729 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4734 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4735 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4736 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
4737 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4738 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4739 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4740 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4741 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4747 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
4749 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4750 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4755 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4756 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4757 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4758 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4759 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4760 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4761 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4762 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4763 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4764 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4765 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4766 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4767 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4768 // have no channels to the peer.
4769 let remove_entry = {
4770 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4771 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4774 entry.remove_entry();
4777 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4782 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4783 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4784 // This should be unreachable
4785 debug_assert!(false);
4788 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4789 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4790 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4791 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4792 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4793 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4794 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4797 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4798 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4799 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4801 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4802 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4809 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4810 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4811 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4812 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4813 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4816 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4817 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4820 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(&self.pending_events);
4822 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4823 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4824 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4825 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4826 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4833 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4834 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4835 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4837 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4838 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4839 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4840 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4842 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4843 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4844 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4845 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4846 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4847 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4850 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4851 /// reason for the failure.
4853 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4854 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4855 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4857 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4858 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4859 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4860 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4861 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4862 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4863 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4868 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4869 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4870 match failure_code {
4871 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4872 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4873 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4874 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4875 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4876 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
4878 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
4879 let fail_data = match data {
4880 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
4883 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
4888 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4889 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4891 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4893 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4894 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4895 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4896 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4897 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4898 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
4899 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4901 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
4903 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4904 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4906 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4911 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4912 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4913 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4914 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4915 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4916 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4917 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4918 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4919 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4920 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4922 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4923 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4924 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4925 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4927 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4928 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4929 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4930 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4931 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4935 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4936 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4937 // be surfaced to the user.
4938 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4939 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
4940 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4942 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4943 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4944 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4945 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4946 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4947 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4948 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
4949 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
4950 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
4952 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
4953 debug_assert!(false);
4954 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4957 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4959 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4962 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4963 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4964 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4965 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4969 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4970 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4971 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4972 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4973 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4974 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4975 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4976 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4977 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4980 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4981 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4982 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4985 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4986 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4987 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4989 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4990 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4991 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4992 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4993 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4995 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => {
4996 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error);
4997 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4999 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5000 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5001 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5002 push_forward_ev = true;
5004 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5005 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5006 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
5008 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5009 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
5012 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5013 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5014 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5015 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5016 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5017 failed_next_destination: destination,
5023 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5024 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5026 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5027 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5028 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5029 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5031 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5032 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5033 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5034 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5036 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5037 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5038 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5040 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5041 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5042 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5043 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5044 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5045 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5046 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5047 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5048 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5051 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5052 /// even type numbers.
5056 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5057 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5059 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5060 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5061 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5064 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5065 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5067 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5070 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5071 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5072 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5073 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5074 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5075 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5076 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5077 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5082 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5083 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5084 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5085 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5086 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5088 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5089 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5090 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5094 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5095 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5096 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5097 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5098 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5099 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5100 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5101 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5102 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5103 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5104 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5113 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5115 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5116 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5117 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5118 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5119 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5120 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5121 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5122 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5123 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5124 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5125 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5126 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5127 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5128 debug_assert!(false);
5132 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5134 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5135 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5136 debug_assert!(false);
5140 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5141 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5143 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5144 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5145 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5146 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5149 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5150 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5151 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5152 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5156 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5157 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5158 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5159 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
5161 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5162 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5163 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5164 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5165 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5170 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5171 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5172 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5173 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5174 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5175 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5176 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5178 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5181 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5182 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5183 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5184 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5188 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5189 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5190 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5191 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5193 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5194 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5195 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5196 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5199 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5200 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5201 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5202 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5206 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5207 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5208 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5211 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5212 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5213 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5214 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5215 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5216 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5217 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
5219 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
5220 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
5221 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5223 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5226 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5227 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry);
5228 if let Err(e) = res {
5229 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
5230 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
5231 // update over and over again until morale improves.
5232 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
5233 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
5236 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5237 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5238 // monitor update as a background event.
5239 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5240 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5241 counterparty_node_id,
5242 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5243 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5252 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5253 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5254 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5260 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5261 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5262 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5263 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5264 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5265 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5266 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5267 // again on restart.
5268 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5269 payment_preimage, update_res);
5272 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5273 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5275 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5276 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5277 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5278 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5279 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5280 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5281 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5282 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5283 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5284 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5287 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5288 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5289 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5290 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5291 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5292 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
5296 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5297 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5300 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5301 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
5302 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5305 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5306 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5307 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5308 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5309 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5311 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5312 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5313 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5315 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5316 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5319 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5320 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5321 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5322 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5323 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
5324 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5325 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5326 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5329 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5330 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5332 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5333 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5334 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5335 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5337 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
5338 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5339 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5341 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5342 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5343 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5344 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5351 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5352 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5353 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5359 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5360 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5361 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5364 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5365 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5367 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5368 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5369 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5371 payment_purpose: purpose,
5374 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5376 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5380 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5382 sender_intended_total_msat,
5386 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5387 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5389 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5390 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5391 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5398 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5399 /// update completion.
5400 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5401 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5402 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5403 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5404 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5405 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5406 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5407 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5408 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5409 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5410 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5411 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5412 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5414 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5416 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5417 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5418 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5419 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5422 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5423 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5425 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5426 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5427 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5432 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5433 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5434 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5435 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5440 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5441 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5442 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5443 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5444 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5449 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5453 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5459 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5460 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5461 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5465 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5466 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5467 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5473 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5474 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5476 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5477 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5479 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5480 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5481 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5482 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5483 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5488 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5489 let mut peer_state_lock;
5490 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5491 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5492 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5493 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5495 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5498 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5499 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5500 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5501 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5502 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5505 let remaining_in_flight =
5506 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5507 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5510 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5511 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5512 remaining_in_flight);
5513 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5516 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5519 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5521 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5522 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5525 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5526 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5527 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5529 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5530 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5531 /// used to accept such channels.
5533 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5534 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5535 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5536 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5539 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5540 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5542 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5543 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5544 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5546 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5547 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5549 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5550 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5552 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5553 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5555 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5556 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5557 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5558 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5561 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5562 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5564 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5565 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5566 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5567 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5568 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5569 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5570 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5571 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5573 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5574 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5575 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5577 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5578 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5579 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5580 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5581 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5582 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5583 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5585 _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5589 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5590 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5591 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5592 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5593 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5594 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5595 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5598 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5599 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5601 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5602 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5603 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5604 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5605 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5606 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5607 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5608 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5611 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5612 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5616 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
5617 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5618 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5620 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5621 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5622 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5625 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
5630 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5631 /// or 0-conf channels.
5633 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5634 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5635 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5636 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
5637 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5638 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5640 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5641 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5642 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5643 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5644 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5645 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5646 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5650 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5653 fn unfunded_channel_count(
5654 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
5656 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5657 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
5659 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5660 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5661 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5662 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
5663 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
5665 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5668 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5669 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
5670 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5673 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
5674 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
5679 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
5682 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5683 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
5684 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5687 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
5688 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5691 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
5692 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
5693 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
5694 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
5695 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
5697 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5698 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5700 debug_assert!(false);
5701 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
5703 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5704 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5706 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5707 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5708 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5709 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
5710 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
5711 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
5713 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5714 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
5715 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5718 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5719 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
5720 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5721 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
5722 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5725 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
5726 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
5728 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5731 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
5732 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
5733 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5734 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
5735 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
5736 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5737 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
5738 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
5739 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
5741 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
5742 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
5743 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
5748 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
5749 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
5750 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
5751 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
5752 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5753 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
5754 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
5757 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
5762 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
5763 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
5764 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5766 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5767 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5770 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5771 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5773 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5774 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5775 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5777 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
5781 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5782 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
5783 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5784 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5786 debug_assert!(false);
5787 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5789 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5790 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5791 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5792 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
5793 match phase.get_mut() {
5794 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5795 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
5796 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
5799 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
5803 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5806 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5807 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
5808 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
5809 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5810 channel_value_satoshis: value,
5812 user_channel_id: user_id,
5817 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5818 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5820 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5821 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5823 debug_assert!(false);
5824 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5827 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5828 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5829 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
5830 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5831 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
5832 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
5834 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
5835 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
5836 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
5837 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
5838 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
5839 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
5840 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
5841 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
5842 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
5846 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) => {
5847 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
5849 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5852 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
5853 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5854 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
5856 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5857 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
5858 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5859 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5860 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
5861 funding_msg.channel_id))
5863 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
5864 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5868 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
5869 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
5870 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
5871 // until we have persisted our monitor.
5872 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
5873 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
5874 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5878 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
5880 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
5881 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
5882 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR,
5883 { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
5885 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
5886 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
5887 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
5888 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
5889 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
5890 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
5891 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
5892 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
5897 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
5903 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5904 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5905 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5906 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5908 debug_assert!(false);
5909 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5912 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5913 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5914 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5915 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
5916 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5917 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => {
5918 let monitor = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
5919 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
5920 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
5921 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry, INITIAL_MONITOR);
5922 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
5923 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
5924 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
5925 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
5926 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
5927 shutdown_finish.0.take();
5933 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5937 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5941 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5942 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5943 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5945 debug_assert!(false);
5946 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5948 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5949 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5950 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5951 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
5952 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5953 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
5954 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
5955 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
5956 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
5957 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5958 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5959 msg: announcement_sigs,
5961 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
5962 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
5963 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
5964 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
5965 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
5966 // announcement_signatures.
5967 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
5968 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
5969 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5970 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5977 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5978 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
5983 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
5984 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
5987 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
5988 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5993 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5994 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
5995 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
5996 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5997 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5999 debug_assert!(false);
6000 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6002 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6003 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6004 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6005 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6007 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6008 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6009 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6011 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6014 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6015 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6016 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6017 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6019 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6020 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6021 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6022 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6023 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6024 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6028 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6029 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6030 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6031 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry).map(|_| ());
6035 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6036 let context = phase.context_mut();
6037 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6038 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
6039 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6040 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
6045 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6048 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6049 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6050 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6051 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6057 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6058 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6059 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6061 debug_assert!(false);
6062 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6064 let (tx, chan_option) = {
6065 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6066 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6067 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6068 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6069 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6070 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6071 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6072 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6073 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6078 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6079 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6080 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6081 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6082 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6083 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)))
6084 } else { (tx, None) }
6086 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6087 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6090 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6093 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6094 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6095 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6097 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6098 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6099 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6100 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6101 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6105 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6110 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6111 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6112 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6113 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6115 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6116 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6117 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6118 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6120 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
6121 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6122 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6124 debug_assert!(false);
6125 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6127 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6128 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6129 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6130 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6131 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6132 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6133 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6134 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
6135 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
6136 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6138 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6139 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6140 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6141 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6142 match pending_forward_info {
6143 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
6144 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6145 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6146 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6148 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6149 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6150 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6151 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6152 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6155 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6157 _ => pending_forward_info
6160 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6162 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6163 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6166 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6171 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6173 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6174 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6175 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6177 debug_assert!(false);
6178 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6180 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6181 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6182 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6183 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6184 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6185 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6186 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6187 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6188 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6189 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6191 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6192 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6193 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6194 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6195 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6196 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6197 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6200 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6201 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6204 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6207 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6211 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6212 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6213 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6215 debug_assert!(false);
6216 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6218 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6219 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6220 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6221 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6222 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6223 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6225 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6226 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6229 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6234 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6235 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6236 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6238 debug_assert!(false);
6239 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6241 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6242 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6243 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6244 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6245 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6246 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6247 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6249 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6250 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6252 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6253 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6257 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6261 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6262 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6263 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6265 debug_assert!(false);
6266 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6268 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6269 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6270 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6271 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6272 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6273 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6274 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6275 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6276 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6277 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry).map(|_| ())
6280 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6281 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6284 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6289 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6290 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6291 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6292 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6293 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6294 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6295 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6296 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6297 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6298 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6299 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6301 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6302 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6304 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6305 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6306 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6307 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6308 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6309 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6311 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6312 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6313 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
6315 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
6316 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6317 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6318 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6319 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6320 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6321 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6322 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6323 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6326 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6327 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6329 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6330 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6331 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6332 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6333 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6334 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6335 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6336 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6337 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6340 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6341 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6342 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6347 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6348 // payments are being processed.
6349 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6350 push_forward_event = true;
6352 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6353 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6360 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6361 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6364 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6365 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6366 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6368 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6372 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6373 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6374 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6375 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6376 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6378 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6379 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6380 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6381 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6382 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6383 // real by taking more time.
6384 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6385 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6386 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6391 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6392 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6393 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6394 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6395 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6396 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6397 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6399 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6400 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6401 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6402 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6403 channel_funding_outpoint,
6404 counterparty_node_id,
6409 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6410 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6411 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6413 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6414 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6415 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6416 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6418 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6419 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6420 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6426 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6427 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
6428 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6429 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6431 debug_assert!(false);
6432 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6433 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6434 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6435 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6436 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6437 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6438 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6439 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6440 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6441 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6442 *counterparty_node_id)
6444 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6445 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6446 let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6447 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6448 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6449 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6450 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry).map(|_| ())
6452 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
6454 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6455 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6458 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6461 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6465 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6466 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6467 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6469 debug_assert!(false);
6470 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6472 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6473 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6474 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6475 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6476 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6477 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6479 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6480 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6483 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6488 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6489 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6490 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6492 debug_assert!(false);
6493 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6495 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6496 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6497 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6498 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6499 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6500 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
6501 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6504 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6505 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
6506 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6507 msg, &self.default_configuration
6508 ), chan_phase_entry),
6509 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6510 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6511 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
6514 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6515 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6518 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6523 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
6524 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6525 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6526 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6528 // It's not a local channel
6529 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6532 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6533 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6534 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6535 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6537 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6538 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6539 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6540 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6541 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6542 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6543 if chan.context.should_announce() {
6544 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6545 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6546 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6547 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
6549 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6551 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6552 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6553 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6554 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
6556 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", chan_id);
6557 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6560 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6561 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6564 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6566 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6569 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6571 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6572 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6574 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6576 debug_assert!(false);
6577 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6579 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6580 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6581 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6582 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6583 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6584 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
6585 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
6586 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
6587 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
6588 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
6589 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
6590 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
6591 let mut channel_update = None;
6592 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
6593 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6594 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6597 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6598 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
6599 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
6600 // they have the latest channel parameters.
6601 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6602 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6603 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6608 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
6609 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
6610 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
6611 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
6612 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
6613 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
6617 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6618 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6621 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6625 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
6626 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
6629 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
6630 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
6635 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
6636 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
6637 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6639 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6640 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
6641 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
6642 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
6643 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
6644 match monitor_event {
6645 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
6646 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
6647 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
6648 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
6650 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
6651 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
6652 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6653 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6656 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
6657 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
6658 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
6659 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
6661 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6662 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
6663 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6664 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
6667 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
6668 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6669 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6670 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6671 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6672 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6673 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6674 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
6675 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
6676 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6677 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6681 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
6682 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
6684 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
6686 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, reason);
6687 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6688 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6689 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
6690 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
6698 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
6699 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
6705 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6706 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6709 has_pending_monitor_events
6712 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
6713 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
6714 /// update events as a separate process method here.
6716 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
6717 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6718 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
6721 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
6722 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
6723 /// update was applied.
6724 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
6725 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
6726 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6727 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
6729 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
6730 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
6731 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
6732 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
6734 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6735 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6737 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6738 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6739 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
6740 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
6742 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6743 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6744 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
6745 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
6746 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
6747 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
6749 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
6750 has_monitor_update = true;
6752 let channel_id: ChannelId = *channel_id;
6753 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6754 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
6755 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
6757 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
6759 continue 'peer_loop;
6768 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
6769 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6770 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
6773 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6774 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6780 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
6781 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
6782 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
6783 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
6784 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
6785 let mut has_update = false;
6787 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6789 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6790 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6791 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6792 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6793 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
6795 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6796 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
6797 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
6798 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
6800 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6801 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
6804 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
6805 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
6806 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
6807 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6808 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6813 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6815 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
6816 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6817 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6823 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
6824 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
6829 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
6835 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6836 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6842 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
6843 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
6845 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
6846 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6847 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
6848 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
6849 // reorganized out of the main chain.
6850 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
6851 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
6852 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
6853 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
6854 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
6855 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
6856 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
6857 assert!(should_broadcast);
6858 } else { unreachable!(); }
6859 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6860 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6861 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
6864 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6868 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
6871 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
6872 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
6874 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
6875 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
6876 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
6877 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
6879 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
6881 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6882 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6886 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6887 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6889 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6891 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6892 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6894 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6895 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6896 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
6897 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
6898 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
6899 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6900 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
6901 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
6902 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
6903 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6904 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
6907 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
6908 /// stored external to LDK.
6910 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
6911 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
6912 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
6914 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
6915 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
6918 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
6919 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
6920 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
6921 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
6923 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
6924 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
6925 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
6926 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
6927 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
6929 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
6930 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
6931 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
6932 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
6933 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
6935 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
6936 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
6938 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6939 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6943 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6944 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6946 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6948 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6949 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6951 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6952 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6953 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
6954 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
6955 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
6956 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6957 min_final_cltv_expiry)
6960 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
6961 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
6963 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6964 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
6965 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
6968 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
6969 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
6971 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6972 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6973 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6974 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6976 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6977 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6978 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
6979 Some(_) => continue,
6980 None => return scid_candidate
6985 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
6987 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6988 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
6990 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
6991 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
6992 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
6996 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
6997 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
6998 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
7000 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
7001 /// times to get a unique scid.
7002 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7003 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7004 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7006 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7007 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7008 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
7009 return scid_candidate
7013 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
7014 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
7015 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
7016 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
7018 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7019 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7020 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7021 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7022 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
7023 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7025 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7026 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
7027 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
7036 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7037 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
7038 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7039 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
7040 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
7044 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
7045 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
7046 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7047 events.push_back((event, None));
7051 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
7052 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7053 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
7057 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
7058 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
7062 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
7063 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
7066 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
7067 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
7068 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
7069 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
7070 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
7071 let mut errors = Vec::new();
7073 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7074 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7075 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7076 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7078 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
7079 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
7080 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7081 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
7083 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
7087 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7088 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
7089 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
7090 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
7091 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
7092 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
7093 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7097 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7098 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7099 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
7100 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
7101 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
7102 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7103 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
7104 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry)
7106 errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
7108 if further_update_exists {
7109 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
7114 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
7115 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7120 log_debug!(self.logger,
7121 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
7122 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7126 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
7127 let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
7128 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
7132 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
7133 for action in actions {
7135 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7136 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
7138 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
7144 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
7145 /// using the given event handler.
7147 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
7148 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
7152 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
7156 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7158 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7159 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7160 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7161 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7162 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7163 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7167 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
7168 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
7169 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
7170 /// is always placed next to each other.
7172 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
7173 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
7174 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
7175 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
7177 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
7178 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
7179 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
7180 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
7181 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7182 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
7183 let mut result = self.process_background_events();
7185 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
7186 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
7187 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
7188 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7191 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
7192 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7194 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
7195 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7198 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
7199 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7200 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7201 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7202 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7203 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
7204 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7208 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
7209 events.replace(pending_events);
7218 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7220 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7221 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7222 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7223 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7224 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7225 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7229 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
7231 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
7232 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
7233 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
7235 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
7239 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7241 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7242 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7243 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7244 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7245 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7246 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7250 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7252 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7253 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
7254 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
7255 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
7256 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
7259 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
7260 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
7263 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
7264 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
7265 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7266 let new_height = height - 1;
7268 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
7269 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
7270 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
7271 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
7272 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
7273 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
7276 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7280 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7282 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7283 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7284 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7285 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7286 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7287 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7291 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7292 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7293 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7294 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7296 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7297 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
7299 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
7300 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7301 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
7302 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
7304 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7305 if height < last_best_block_height {
7306 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7307 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7311 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
7312 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7313 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7314 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7316 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7317 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
7319 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
7320 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7321 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
7323 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7325 macro_rules! max_time {
7326 ($timestamp: expr) => {
7328 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
7329 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
7330 // having an explicit local time source.
7331 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
7332 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
7333 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7334 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
7335 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
7341 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
7342 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7343 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
7344 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
7348 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
7349 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
7350 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
7351 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7352 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7353 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
7354 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
7355 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
7362 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
7363 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
7364 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7365 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
7366 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
7367 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
7368 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
7369 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7370 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7375 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7377 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7378 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7379 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7380 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7381 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7382 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7386 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
7387 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
7389 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
7390 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
7391 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7392 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7393 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7395 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7396 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
7398 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7399 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7400 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7401 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7402 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7403 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
7405 // Retain unfunded channels.
7406 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
7407 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
7408 let res = f(channel);
7409 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
7410 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
7411 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
7412 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
7413 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
7415 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
7416 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
7417 if channel.context.is_usable() {
7418 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7419 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
7420 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7421 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7426 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7431 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7432 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
7435 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
7436 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7437 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
7438 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7439 msg: announcement_sigs,
7441 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7442 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
7443 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7445 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7446 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7447 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
7452 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
7453 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
7454 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
7455 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
7456 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
7457 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
7458 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
7459 // is always consistent.
7460 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
7461 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
7462 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
7463 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
7464 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
7467 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
7468 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
7469 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
7470 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
7471 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
7472 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
7473 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7477 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
7478 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
7479 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7480 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7481 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
7482 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
7483 data: reason_message,
7495 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7496 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
7497 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
7498 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
7499 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
7500 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
7501 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
7502 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7503 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7504 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
7506 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
7507 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
7508 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
7512 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
7515 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7516 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
7517 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7518 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7519 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
7520 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
7521 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
7522 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7523 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7524 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
7527 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
7528 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7529 _ => unreachable!(),
7531 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
7532 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
7533 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
7534 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
7540 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
7542 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
7543 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
7547 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
7549 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
7550 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
7552 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
7553 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
7556 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7557 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
7558 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
7561 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
7562 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
7563 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
7564 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
7567 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7568 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7569 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7570 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7573 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7574 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7576 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7577 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7578 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7579 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7580 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
7583 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7584 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7585 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
7586 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
7589 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7590 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7591 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7592 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
7595 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7596 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7597 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
7598 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7602 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7603 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7605 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7606 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7607 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7608 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7609 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7610 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7614 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
7615 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7616 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7619 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
7620 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7621 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7622 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7625 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
7626 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7627 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7630 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
7631 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7632 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7633 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7636 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
7637 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7638 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7641 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
7642 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7643 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7646 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
7647 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7648 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7651 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
7652 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7653 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7656 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
7657 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7658 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7661 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
7662 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7663 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7666 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
7667 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7668 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7671 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
7672 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7673 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7676 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
7677 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7678 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7681 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
7682 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7683 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7686 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
7687 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7688 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7691 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
7692 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7693 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7696 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
7697 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7698 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7701 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
7702 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
7703 let force_persist = self.process_background_events();
7704 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
7705 if force_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { NotifyOption::DoPersist } else { persist }
7707 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
7712 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
7713 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7714 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7717 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
7718 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7719 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7720 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7722 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
7723 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7724 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7725 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7726 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7727 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7728 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
7729 let context = match phase {
7730 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7731 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
7732 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
7733 if !chan.is_shutdown() {
7738 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
7739 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7742 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
7746 // Clean up for removal.
7747 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
7748 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7751 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
7752 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
7753 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
7754 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
7756 // V1 Channel Establishment
7757 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
7758 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
7759 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
7760 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
7761 // V2 Channel Establishment
7762 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7763 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7764 // Common Channel Establishment
7765 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
7766 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
7767 // Interactive Transaction Construction
7768 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
7769 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
7770 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
7771 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
7772 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
7773 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
7774 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
7775 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
7776 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
7777 // Channel Operations
7778 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
7779 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
7780 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
7781 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
7782 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
7783 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
7785 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
7786 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7787 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
7788 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7789 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
7790 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
7791 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
7792 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
7793 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
7796 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
7797 peer_state.is_connected = false;
7798 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
7799 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
7802 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
7804 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7806 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7807 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
7811 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
7812 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
7813 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7817 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7819 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
7820 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
7821 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
7822 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
7823 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
7824 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
7827 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7828 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
7829 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7830 if inbound_peer_limited {
7833 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
7834 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7835 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7836 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
7837 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7838 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7839 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7840 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7844 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
7845 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
7846 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
7848 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7849 if inbound_peer_limited &&
7850 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
7851 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
7856 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
7857 peer_state.is_connected = true;
7862 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7864 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7865 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7866 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7867 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7868 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7870 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
7871 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
7872 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
7873 // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
7874 // worry about closing and removing them.
7875 debug_assert!(false);
7879 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7880 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7881 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
7885 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
7889 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
7890 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7892 match &msg.data as &str {
7893 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
7894 "link failed to shutdown" =>
7896 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
7897 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
7898 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
7899 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
7900 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
7901 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
7902 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
7903 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
7904 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7905 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7906 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7907 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7908 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
7909 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
7910 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7911 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7915 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7916 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7917 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
7918 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
7919 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7920 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
7922 log_level: Level::Trace,
7932 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
7933 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
7934 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7935 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7936 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7937 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7938 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7939 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
7940 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
7941 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
7942 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
7944 for channel_id in channel_ids {
7945 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7946 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7950 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
7951 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7952 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7953 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7954 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7955 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7956 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
7957 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
7958 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
7959 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7967 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7968 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7972 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7973 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7976 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
7977 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7980 fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
7981 Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&self.genesis_hash[..])])
7984 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
7985 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7986 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7987 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7990 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
7991 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7992 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7993 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7996 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
7997 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7998 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7999 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8002 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
8003 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8004 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8005 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8008 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
8009 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8010 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8011 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8014 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
8015 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8016 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8017 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8020 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
8021 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8022 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8023 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8026 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
8027 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8028 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8029 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8032 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
8033 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8034 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8035 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8039 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8040 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8041 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
8042 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
8043 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
8047 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8048 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8050 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8051 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8052 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8053 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8054 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
8057 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8058 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8059 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
8060 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
8063 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8064 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8065 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8066 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
8069 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8070 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8071 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
8072 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
8073 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
8074 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
8075 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
8076 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
8077 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
8078 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
8079 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
8080 features.set_payment_secret_required();
8081 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
8082 features.set_wumbo_optional();
8083 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
8084 features.set_channel_type_optional();
8085 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
8086 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
8087 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
8088 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
8093 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
8094 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
8096 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
8097 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
8098 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
8099 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
8102 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
8103 (2, node_id, required),
8104 (4, features, required),
8105 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
8106 (8, forwarding_info, option),
8107 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8108 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8111 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
8112 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8113 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8114 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
8115 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
8116 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
8117 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8118 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
8119 (2, self.channel_id, required),
8120 (3, self.channel_type, option),
8121 (4, self.counterparty, required),
8122 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
8123 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
8124 (7, self.config, option),
8125 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
8126 (9, self.confirmations, option),
8127 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
8128 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
8129 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
8130 (16, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required), // Forwards compatibility for removed balance_msat field.
8131 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
8132 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
8133 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
8134 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
8135 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
8136 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
8137 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
8138 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
8139 (30, self.is_usable, required),
8140 (32, self.is_public, required),
8141 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8142 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8143 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
8144 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
8145 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
8151 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
8152 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8153 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8154 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
8155 (2, channel_id, required),
8156 (3, channel_type, option),
8157 (4, counterparty, required),
8158 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
8159 (6, funding_txo, option),
8160 (7, config, option),
8161 (8, short_channel_id, option),
8162 (9, confirmations, option),
8163 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
8164 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
8165 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
8166 (16, _balance_msat, option), // Backwards compatibility for removed balance_msat field.
8167 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
8168 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
8169 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
8170 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
8171 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
8172 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
8173 (22, confirmations_required, option),
8174 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
8175 (26, is_outbound, required),
8176 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
8177 (30, is_usable, required),
8178 (32, is_public, required),
8179 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8180 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8181 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
8182 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
8183 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
8186 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8187 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
8188 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
8189 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
8190 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
8192 let _balance_msat: Option<u64> = _balance_msat;
8196 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
8198 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
8199 outbound_scid_alias,
8203 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
8204 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
8206 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
8207 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
8208 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
8209 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
8210 confirmations_required,
8212 force_close_spend_delay,
8213 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
8214 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
8215 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
8216 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
8217 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
8218 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
8219 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8220 channel_shutdown_state,
8225 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
8226 (2, channels, required_vec),
8227 (4, phantom_scid, required),
8228 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
8231 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
8233 (0, onion_packet, required),
8234 (2, short_channel_id, required),
8237 (0, payment_data, required),
8238 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
8239 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
8240 (3, payment_metadata, option),
8241 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
8243 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
8244 (0, payment_preimage, required),
8245 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
8246 (3, payment_metadata, option),
8247 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
8248 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
8252 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
8253 (0, routing, required),
8254 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
8255 (4, payment_hash, required),
8256 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
8257 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
8258 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
8259 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8263 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
8264 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8266 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
8268 channel_id.write(writer)?;
8269 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8270 reason.write(writer)?;
8272 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
8273 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
8276 channel_id.write(writer)?;
8277 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8278 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
8279 failure_code.write(writer)?;
8286 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
8287 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8288 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8291 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
8292 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8293 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8294 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
8298 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
8299 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8300 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8301 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
8302 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
8305 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
8306 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
8307 // messages contained in the variants.
8308 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
8309 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
8310 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
8312 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
8313 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
8314 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
8315 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
8316 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
8319 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
8320 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
8321 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
8322 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
8323 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
8325 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
8330 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
8335 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
8336 (0, short_channel_id, required),
8337 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
8338 (2, outpoint, required),
8339 (4, htlc_id, required),
8340 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
8341 (7, user_channel_id, option),
8344 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
8345 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8346 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
8347 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
8348 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
8350 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8351 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
8352 (1, self.total_msat, required),
8353 (2, self.value, required),
8354 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
8355 (4, payment_data, option),
8356 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
8357 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
8358 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8359 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8365 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
8366 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8367 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8368 (0, prev_hop, required),
8369 (1, total_msat, option),
8370 (2, value_ser, required),
8371 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
8372 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
8373 (5, total_value_received, option),
8374 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
8375 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8376 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8378 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
8379 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
8380 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
8382 if payment_data.is_some() {
8383 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8385 if total_msat.is_none() {
8386 total_msat = Some(value);
8388 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
8391 if total_msat.is_none() {
8392 if payment_data.is_none() {
8393 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8395 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
8397 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
8401 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
8404 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
8405 total_value_received,
8406 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
8408 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
8409 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
8414 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
8415 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8416 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8419 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
8420 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
8421 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
8422 let mut payment_id = None;
8423 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
8424 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
8425 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8426 (0, session_priv, required),
8427 (1, payment_id, option),
8428 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8429 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
8430 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
8431 (6, blinded_tail, option),
8433 if payment_id.is_none() {
8434 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
8436 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
8438 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
8439 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
8440 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8442 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
8443 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
8444 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
8445 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8449 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8450 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
8451 first_hop_htlc_msat,
8453 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
8456 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
8457 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
8462 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
8463 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
8465 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
8467 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
8468 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8469 (0, session_priv, required),
8470 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
8471 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8472 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
8473 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
8474 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
8475 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
8478 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
8480 field.write(writer)?;
8487 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
8488 (0, forward_info, required),
8489 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
8490 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
8491 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
8492 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
8495 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
8497 (0, htlc_id, required),
8498 (2, err_packet, required),
8503 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
8504 (0, payment_secret, required),
8505 (2, expiry_time, required),
8506 (4, user_payment_id, required),
8507 (6, payment_preimage, required),
8508 (8, min_value_msat, required),
8511 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8513 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8514 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8515 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8516 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8517 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8518 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8522 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8523 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
8525 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8527 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
8529 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8530 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
8531 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
8534 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
8536 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8537 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
8538 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8539 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8540 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8541 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8542 serializable_peer_count += 1;
8545 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
8546 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_initiated() } else { false }
8550 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
8552 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8553 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8554 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8555 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
8556 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
8557 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() { Some(channel) } else { None }
8560 channel.write(writer)?;
8566 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8567 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8568 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
8569 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8570 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8571 for forward in pending_forwards {
8572 forward.write(writer)?;
8577 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8579 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8580 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
8581 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8583 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
8584 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
8585 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8586 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
8587 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8588 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8589 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
8590 htlc.write(writer)?;
8592 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
8593 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
8596 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
8597 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
8598 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8599 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
8600 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
8601 // per_peer_state lock at all.
8602 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
8605 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
8606 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8607 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
8608 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
8609 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
8611 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8612 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
8613 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
8614 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
8615 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
8616 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
8617 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
8622 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8623 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
8624 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
8625 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
8626 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
8627 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
8628 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
8629 // well save the space and not write any events here.
8630 0u64.write(writer)?;
8632 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8633 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
8634 event.write(writer)?;
8638 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
8639 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
8640 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
8641 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
8642 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
8643 0u64.write(writer)?;
8645 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
8646 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
8647 // likely to be identical.
8648 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8649 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8651 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8652 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
8653 hash.write(writer)?;
8654 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
8657 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
8658 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
8659 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8660 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
8661 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
8664 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
8665 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8667 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8668 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8669 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
8670 session_priv.write(writer)?;
8673 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
8674 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
8675 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
8676 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
8680 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
8681 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
8682 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8684 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8685 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8686 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
8692 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
8693 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8694 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
8695 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
8698 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
8699 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
8700 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
8701 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
8702 pending_claiming_payments = None;
8705 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
8706 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8707 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
8708 if !updates.is_empty() {
8709 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
8710 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
8715 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8716 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
8717 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8718 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
8719 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8720 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
8721 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8722 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
8723 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
8724 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
8725 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
8726 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
8727 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8734 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8735 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8736 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
8737 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
8740 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
8741 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
8742 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
8743 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
8744 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
8745 // check that the event is sane here.
8746 let event_encoded = event.encode();
8747 let event_read: Option<Event> =
8748 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
8749 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
8755 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8756 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8757 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8758 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
8759 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
8760 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
8763 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
8764 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
8765 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
8766 events.push_back((ev, action));
8767 } else if action.is_some() {
8768 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8775 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
8776 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
8777 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
8778 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
8779 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
8780 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
8783 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
8785 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
8787 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8788 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
8789 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
8790 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
8791 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
8792 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
8793 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
8794 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
8795 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8796 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
8797 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
8798 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
8799 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
8801 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
8802 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
8804 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
8805 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
8807 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
8808 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
8809 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
8810 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
8811 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
8812 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
8814 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
8815 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8817 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8818 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8819 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8820 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8821 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8822 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8826 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
8827 pub entropy_source: ES,
8829 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
8830 pub node_signer: NS,
8832 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
8833 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
8835 pub signer_provider: SP,
8837 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8839 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
8840 pub fee_estimator: F,
8841 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8843 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
8844 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
8845 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
8846 pub chain_monitor: M,
8848 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
8849 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
8850 /// force-closed during deserialization.
8851 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
8852 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
8853 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
8855 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
8857 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
8858 /// deserialization.
8860 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
8861 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
8862 pub default_config: UserConfig,
8864 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
8865 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
8867 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
8868 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
8869 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
8870 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
8872 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
8875 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
8876 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
8879 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8880 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8882 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8883 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8884 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8885 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8886 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8887 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8891 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
8892 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
8893 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
8894 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
8895 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
8897 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
8898 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
8903 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
8904 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
8905 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8906 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
8908 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8909 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8910 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8911 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8912 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8913 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8917 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8918 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
8919 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
8923 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8924 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
8926 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8927 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8928 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8929 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8930 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8931 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8935 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8936 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8938 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8939 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8940 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8942 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8944 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8945 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8946 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8947 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8948 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8949 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
8950 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
8951 for _ in 0..channel_count {
8952 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
8953 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
8955 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8956 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
8957 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
8958 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
8959 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
8960 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
8961 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
8962 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
8963 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
8964 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
8965 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
8966 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
8967 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
8969 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
8970 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
8971 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
8973 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
8974 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
8975 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
8977 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
8978 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
8979 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
8981 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
8982 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
8983 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8984 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
8987 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
8988 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8989 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8990 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8991 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
8992 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
8993 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
8995 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8996 let mut found_htlc = false;
8997 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8998 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
9001 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
9002 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
9003 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
9004 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
9005 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
9006 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
9007 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
9008 log_info!(args.logger,
9009 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
9010 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
9011 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9015 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
9016 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
9017 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
9018 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
9019 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9021 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
9022 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
9024 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
9025 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
9026 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
9027 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
9029 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
9030 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
9031 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
9032 entry.insert(by_id_map);
9036 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
9037 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
9038 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
9039 // safely discard the channel.
9040 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
9041 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
9042 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9043 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
9044 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
9045 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9046 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
9049 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
9050 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9051 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9052 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9053 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9054 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9058 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9059 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
9060 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
9061 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9062 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
9063 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
9064 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
9066 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
9070 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
9071 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9072 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
9073 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
9074 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
9075 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9076 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
9077 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
9078 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
9080 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
9083 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9084 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
9085 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
9086 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9087 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9088 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
9089 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
9090 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
9092 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
9095 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
9098 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
9099 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
9100 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
9101 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9102 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
9103 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9104 is_connected: false,
9108 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9109 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
9110 for _ in 0..peer_count {
9111 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
9112 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
9113 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
9114 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
9115 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
9118 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9119 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
9120 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
9121 for _ in 0..event_count {
9122 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
9123 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
9128 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9129 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
9130 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
9132 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
9133 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
9134 // on-startup monitor updates.
9135 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
9136 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
9138 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9142 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
9143 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9145 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9146 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
9147 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
9148 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
9149 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9153 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9154 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
9155 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
9156 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
9157 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
9158 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
9159 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
9161 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
9162 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9166 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
9167 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
9168 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
9169 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
9170 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
9171 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9172 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9173 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
9174 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
9175 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
9176 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
9177 let mut events_override = None;
9178 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9179 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9180 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
9181 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9182 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
9183 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9184 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
9185 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9186 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
9187 (8, events_override, option),
9188 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
9189 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9190 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
9191 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9193 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
9194 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9197 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
9198 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9201 if let Some(events) = events_override {
9202 pending_events_read = events;
9205 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
9206 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
9209 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
9210 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
9211 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
9212 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
9213 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
9214 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
9216 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
9218 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
9219 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
9220 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
9223 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
9224 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
9225 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
9226 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
9227 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
9229 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
9230 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
9231 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
9233 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
9234 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
9235 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
9236 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
9237 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
9239 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
9240 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
9241 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
9242 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
9243 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9244 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
9245 pending_background_events.push(
9246 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
9247 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
9248 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
9249 update: update.clone(),
9252 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
9253 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
9254 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
9255 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
9256 pending_background_events.push(
9257 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
9258 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
9259 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
9262 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
9263 log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
9264 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9266 max_in_flight_update_id
9270 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
9271 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
9272 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9273 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
9274 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
9275 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
9277 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9278 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
9279 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
9280 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
9281 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
9282 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
9283 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
9284 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
9285 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
9288 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
9289 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
9290 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
9291 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
9292 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
9293 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
9294 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9295 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9296 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9297 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9298 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9301 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
9302 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
9303 debug_assert!(false);
9304 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9309 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
9310 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
9311 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
9312 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
9313 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
9314 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
9315 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
9316 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
9318 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9319 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
9320 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
9322 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
9323 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
9324 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9325 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9326 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9327 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9328 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9329 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9334 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
9335 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
9337 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
9338 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
9339 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
9340 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
9343 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
9344 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
9345 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
9346 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
9347 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
9348 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
9349 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
9351 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9352 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9353 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
9354 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
9355 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
9356 if path.hops.is_empty() {
9357 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
9358 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9361 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
9362 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
9363 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
9364 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
9365 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
9366 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
9367 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
9368 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), &htlc.payment_hash);
9370 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
9371 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
9372 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
9373 retry_strategy: None,
9374 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
9375 payment_params: None,
9376 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
9377 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
9378 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9379 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9380 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9381 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9382 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
9383 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
9384 total_msat: path_amt,
9385 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
9387 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
9388 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
9393 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
9395 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
9396 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
9397 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
9398 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
9400 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
9401 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
9402 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
9403 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
9404 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
9405 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
9406 forwards.retain(|forward| {
9407 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
9408 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9409 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9410 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9415 !forwards.is_empty()
9417 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
9418 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9419 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9420 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9421 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
9422 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
9423 intercepted_id != ev_id
9430 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
9431 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
9432 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
9433 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
9434 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
9435 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
9436 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
9437 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
9438 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
9439 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
9440 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
9442 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
9443 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
9444 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
9446 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
9447 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
9448 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
9455 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
9456 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
9458 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
9460 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
9461 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
9462 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
9463 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
9464 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
9465 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
9466 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
9467 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
9468 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9469 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
9472 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
9473 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
9474 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
9475 // channel still live case here.
9479 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
9480 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
9485 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
9486 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
9487 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
9488 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
9489 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
9490 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
9491 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
9492 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
9496 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
9497 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
9499 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
9500 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
9501 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9502 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9504 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
9505 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9506 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9508 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
9509 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
9511 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9512 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
9514 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9517 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
9518 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9519 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9521 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9525 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
9526 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
9527 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
9528 if htlcs.is_empty() {
9529 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9531 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
9532 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
9533 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
9534 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
9535 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
9536 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
9537 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
9538 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
9540 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
9541 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9545 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
9547 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9549 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
9550 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
9552 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9553 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9558 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9559 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9561 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
9563 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9565 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
9566 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
9567 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
9568 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9572 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
9573 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
9574 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9575 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9576 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9577 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
9578 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
9579 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
9581 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
9582 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
9583 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
9585 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
9586 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
9587 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9588 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9589 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9590 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9592 if chan.context.is_usable() {
9593 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
9594 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9595 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9596 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9597 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9601 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
9602 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
9603 debug_assert!(false);
9604 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9609 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
9611 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9612 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
9613 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
9614 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
9615 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
9616 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
9617 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
9618 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
9619 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
9620 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
9621 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
9623 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
9624 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
9626 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
9627 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
9628 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
9629 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
9631 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
9632 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
9633 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
9634 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
9636 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
9637 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
9638 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
9639 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
9641 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
9642 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
9643 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
9644 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9645 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9646 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
9647 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
9650 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
9651 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
9654 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
9657 purpose: payment.purpose,
9658 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
9659 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
9660 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
9666 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
9667 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
9668 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
9669 for action in actions.iter() {
9670 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
9671 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
9672 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
9674 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
9675 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
9676 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
9677 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
9679 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
9680 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
9681 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
9682 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
9688 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
9690 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
9691 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9695 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
9697 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
9698 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
9699 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
9700 router: args.router,
9702 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
9704 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
9705 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
9706 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
9707 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
9709 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
9710 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
9711 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
9712 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
9713 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
9714 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
9716 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
9721 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
9723 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
9725 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
9726 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
9727 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
9728 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
9729 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
9730 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
9732 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
9733 node_signer: args.node_signer,
9734 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
9736 logger: args.logger,
9737 default_configuration: args.default_config,
9740 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
9741 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
9742 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
9743 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
9744 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
9747 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
9748 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
9749 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
9750 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
9751 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
9752 downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
9755 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
9756 //connection or two.
9758 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
9764 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9765 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9766 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
9767 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
9768 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
9769 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
9770 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
9771 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
9772 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9773 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
9774 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
9775 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
9776 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
9777 use crate::util::test_utils;
9778 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
9779 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
9782 fn test_notify_limits() {
9783 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
9784 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
9785 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9786 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9787 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9788 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9790 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
9791 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
9792 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9793 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9794 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9796 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9798 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
9799 // to connect messages with new values
9800 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9801 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9802 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9803 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9804 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9805 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9807 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
9808 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9809 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9810 // ... but the last node should not.
9811 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9812 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
9813 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9814 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9816 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
9817 // about the channel.
9818 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9819 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9820 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9822 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
9824 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9825 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9826 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9827 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9828 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9829 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9831 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
9832 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9833 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9835 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
9836 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
9837 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
9838 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
9839 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
9840 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
9842 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
9843 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
9844 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9845 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9846 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9847 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9848 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9849 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9851 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
9852 // the channel info has updated.
9853 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9854 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9855 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9856 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9857 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9858 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9862 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
9863 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
9865 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9866 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9867 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9868 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9869 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9871 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
9872 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9873 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
9874 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
9876 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9877 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
9878 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
9879 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
9880 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
9881 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
9882 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
9883 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9884 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9885 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9886 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9887 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
9889 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
9890 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9891 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9892 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9893 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9894 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9895 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9896 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9897 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9898 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9899 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9900 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9901 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9902 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9903 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9904 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9905 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9906 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9907 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9908 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9909 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9910 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9911 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
9913 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
9914 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9915 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9916 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9917 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9918 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9919 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
9921 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
9922 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
9923 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
9924 // lightning messages manually.
9925 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9926 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
9927 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9929 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9930 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9931 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
9932 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
9933 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9934 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9935 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
9936 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9937 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9938 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
9939 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9940 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9941 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9942 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9943 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9944 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9945 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
9946 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9947 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9948 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
9949 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9950 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9951 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9952 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9953 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
9954 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9956 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
9957 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
9958 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9959 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9961 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9962 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9963 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9964 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9966 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9969 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9970 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9971 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9972 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9974 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9979 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
9980 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
9981 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
9984 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
9985 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
9986 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
9987 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
9988 // fails as expected.
9989 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
9990 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
9991 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
9992 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
9993 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
9994 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
9995 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9996 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9997 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9998 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
9999 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
10000 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10001 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10002 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10003 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10005 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
10006 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
10007 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
10009 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
10010 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10011 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
10012 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
10013 let route = find_route(
10014 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10015 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
10017 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10018 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10019 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10020 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10021 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10022 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10023 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10024 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10025 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10026 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10027 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
10028 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
10029 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10030 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10031 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10032 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10033 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10034 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10035 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10036 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10037 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10038 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10039 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10040 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10042 // Finally, claim the original payment.
10043 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10045 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
10046 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10047 let route = find_route(
10048 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10049 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
10051 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10052 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10053 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10054 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10055 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10056 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
10057 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
10058 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
10060 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
10061 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
10062 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10063 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10064 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10065 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10066 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10067 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10068 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10069 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10070 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10071 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10072 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10073 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10074 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10075 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10076 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10077 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10078 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10079 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10080 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10081 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10082 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10083 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10085 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
10086 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10088 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
10089 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
10090 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10091 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
10092 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10093 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10094 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10095 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
10096 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
10097 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
10099 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
10100 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10101 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
10104 let route = find_route(
10105 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10106 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
10108 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
10109 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10110 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
10111 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10112 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10113 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10114 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10115 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10116 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10117 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10118 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10119 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10120 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10121 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10122 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10123 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10124 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10125 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10126 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10127 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10128 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10129 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10130 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10132 // Finally, claim the original payment.
10133 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10137 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
10138 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
10139 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
10140 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10141 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10142 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10143 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10145 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
10146 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10148 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10149 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10150 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
10151 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
10152 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
10153 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10154 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10155 let route = find_route(
10156 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
10157 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
10160 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10161 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
10162 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
10163 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
10164 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
10165 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
10166 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10168 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10169 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
10170 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10171 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
10172 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10173 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10174 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
10176 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
10180 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
10181 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
10182 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
10183 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10184 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
10185 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10186 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10187 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
10188 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10190 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
10191 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10193 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10194 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10195 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
10196 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
10197 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
10198 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10199 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10200 let route = find_route(
10201 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
10202 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
10205 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10206 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
10207 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
10208 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
10209 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
10210 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
10211 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
10212 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
10213 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10215 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10216 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
10217 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10218 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
10219 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10220 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10221 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
10223 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
10227 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
10228 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
10229 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
10230 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
10231 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10233 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10234 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10235 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10236 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10238 // Marshall an MPP route.
10239 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
10240 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
10241 route.paths.push(path);
10242 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10243 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
10244 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
10245 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
10246 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
10247 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
10249 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10250 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
10252 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
10253 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
10255 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
10260 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
10261 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10262 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10263 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10264 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10266 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10268 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10269 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10271 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10272 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
10273 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10274 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10277 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
10278 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
10279 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10280 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
10281 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
10282 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
10285 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10288 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
10289 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
10294 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
10295 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
10296 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10297 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10298 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10299 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10301 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
10302 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10304 total_msat: 100_000,
10307 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
10308 // payment verification fails as expected.
10309 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
10310 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
10311 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
10312 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
10314 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
10318 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
10319 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
10323 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
10324 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
10325 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
10326 // the channel is successfully closed.
10327 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10328 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10329 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10330 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10332 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10333 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10334 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
10335 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10336 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
10338 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
10339 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().into_inner());
10341 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
10342 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
10343 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10344 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10347 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10349 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
10350 // as it has the funding transaction.
10351 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10352 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10353 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10356 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10358 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10360 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10362 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10363 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10364 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10366 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10369 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
10370 // as it has the funding transaction.
10371 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10372 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10373 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10375 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10376 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10377 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10378 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10379 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10380 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
10381 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
10382 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
10384 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10385 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
10386 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10387 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
10389 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10390 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
10392 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
10393 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
10394 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
10395 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
10396 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10397 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10398 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10402 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
10403 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
10404 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
10405 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
10406 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10407 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10408 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10411 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
10413 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
10414 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
10415 // closing transaction).
10416 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
10417 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
10418 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10420 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
10421 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
10422 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10423 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10424 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10427 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10429 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
10431 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
10432 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
10433 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10435 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10437 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10438 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10441 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10442 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
10443 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10446 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10447 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
10448 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10451 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
10453 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10454 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10456 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
10457 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10459 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
10460 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
10465 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
10466 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
10467 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
10468 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
10469 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10470 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10471 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
10472 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10475 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
10476 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10477 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
10479 // Test the API functions.
10480 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
10482 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
10484 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10486 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10488 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10490 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
10492 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
10496 fn test_connection_limiting() {
10497 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
10498 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10499 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10500 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10501 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10503 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10505 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10506 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10508 let mut funding_tx = None;
10509 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10510 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10511 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10514 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
10515 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
10516 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
10517 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
10518 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10520 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10521 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10522 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10524 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10526 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10527 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10528 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10530 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10533 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
10534 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10535 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10536 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10537 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10539 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
10540 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
10542 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
10543 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
10544 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10545 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10546 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
10547 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10548 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10551 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10552 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10553 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10554 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10555 }, true).unwrap_err();
10557 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
10558 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
10559 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10560 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10561 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
10562 for ev in chan_closed_events {
10563 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
10565 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10566 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10568 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10569 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10570 }, true).unwrap_err();
10572 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
10573 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10574 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10575 }, false).unwrap();
10576 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10578 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
10579 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
10581 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
10582 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10583 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
10584 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
10585 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10587 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10588 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10589 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10591 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
10592 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10593 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
10595 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
10596 // "protected" and can connect again.
10597 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
10598 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10599 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10601 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10603 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
10605 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10606 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10610 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
10611 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
10612 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10613 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10614 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10615 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10617 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10619 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10620 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10622 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10623 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10624 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10625 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10628 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
10630 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10631 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10632 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10634 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
10635 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10636 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10638 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
10639 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10640 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10641 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10645 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
10646 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10647 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10648 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10649 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10650 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
10651 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10652 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
10653 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10655 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10657 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10658 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10660 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
10661 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10662 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10663 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10664 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10665 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10668 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10669 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10671 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10672 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10674 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10676 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
10677 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10680 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
10681 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10682 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10683 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10684 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10686 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10687 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10689 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10690 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
10691 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
10692 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
10696 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10698 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10699 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10701 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
10702 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10703 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10705 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10706 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10708 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10710 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10714 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
10715 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
10716 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
10717 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
10718 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10719 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
10720 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
10721 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
10723 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10724 payment_metadata: None,
10725 keysend_preimage: None,
10726 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10727 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10729 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
10731 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
10732 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
10733 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
10734 node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10735 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
10737 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
10738 } else { panic!(); }
10740 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
10741 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
10743 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10744 payment_metadata: None,
10745 keysend_preimage: None,
10746 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10747 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10749 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
10751 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10752 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
10756 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
10757 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10758 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10759 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10760 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10762 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
10763 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10765 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10766 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10767 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
10768 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
10769 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10771 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10772 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10774 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10775 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
10776 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10777 match &msg_events[0] {
10778 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
10779 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10781 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
10782 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
10783 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
10786 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10789 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10790 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10792 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
10793 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
10794 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10796 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10800 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
10801 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
10802 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
10803 // the channel without the anchors feature.
10804 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10805 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10806 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
10807 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10808 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10809 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
10810 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10812 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
10813 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10814 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10816 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10817 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10819 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10820 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10822 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10825 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10826 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
10828 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10829 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10831 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
10832 // not have generated any events.
10833 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
10837 fn test_update_channel_config() {
10838 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10839 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10840 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
10841 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
10842 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10843 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10844 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
10846 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10847 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10848 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10850 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
10851 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10852 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
10853 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10854 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10856 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10857 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10860 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
10861 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10862 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10864 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
10865 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10866 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
10867 ..Default::default()
10869 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10870 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10871 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10873 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10874 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10877 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
10878 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10879 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10880 ..Default::default()
10882 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10883 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
10884 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10885 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10887 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10888 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10891 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
10892 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
10893 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
10894 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
10895 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
10898 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10899 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10900 ..Default::default()
10902 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
10905 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
10906 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
10907 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10908 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10912 fn test_payment_display() {
10913 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
10914 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
10915 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
10916 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
10917 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10918 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
10924 use crate::chain::Listen;
10925 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
10926 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
10927 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
10928 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
10929 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10930 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
10931 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
10932 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
10933 use crate::util::test_utils;
10934 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
10936 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10937 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10938 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
10940 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
10942 use criterion::Criterion;
10944 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
10945 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
10946 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
10947 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
10948 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
10949 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
10950 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
10952 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
10953 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
10955 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
10956 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
10958 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
10960 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
10963 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
10964 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
10967 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
10968 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
10969 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
10971 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
10972 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
10974 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
10975 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
10976 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10977 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
10978 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
10980 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
10981 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
10982 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
10984 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
10985 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
10986 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
10987 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10989 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10990 }, genesis_block.header.time);
10991 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
10993 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10994 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
10995 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
10996 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
10997 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10999 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
11000 }, genesis_block.header.time);
11001 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
11003 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
11004 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11006 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
11007 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11008 }, false).unwrap();
11009 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
11010 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
11011 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11014 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
11015 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
11016 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
11018 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11019 } else { panic!(); }
11021 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
11022 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11023 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
11024 match events_b[0] {
11025 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11026 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11028 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11031 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11032 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11033 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
11034 match events_a[0] {
11035 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11036 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
11038 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11041 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
11043 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
11044 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
11045 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
11047 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11048 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11049 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
11050 match msg_events[0] {
11051 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
11052 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
11053 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11057 match msg_events[1] {
11058 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11062 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11063 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
11064 match events_a[0] {
11065 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11066 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
11068 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11071 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11072 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
11073 match events_b[0] {
11074 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11075 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11077 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11080 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
11081 macro_rules! send_payment {
11082 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
11083 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
11084 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
11085 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
11086 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
11087 payment_count += 1;
11088 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
11089 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
11091 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
11092 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
11093 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
11094 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
11095 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
11096 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11097 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
11098 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
11099 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
11100 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
11101 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
11103 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
11104 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
11105 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11106 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
11108 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
11109 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
11110 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
11111 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11112 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
11114 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
11117 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
11118 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
11119 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
11120 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11122 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
11126 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
11127 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
11128 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);