1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
4 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
5 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
6 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
8 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
9 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
10 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
11 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
12 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
19 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
20 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
21 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
23 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
24 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
25 use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
26 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
28 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
29 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
34 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, LocalCommitmentTransaction, HTLCType};
35 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
36 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT};
37 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
38 use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
39 use util::logger::Logger;
40 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, U48};
41 use util::{byte_utils, events};
43 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
44 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
45 use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
47 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
49 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
50 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
51 /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
53 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
54 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
55 /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
56 /// the channel to an operational state.
58 /// Note that continuing to operate when no copy of the updated ChannelMonitor could be
59 /// persisted is unsafe - if you failed to store the update on your own local disk you should
60 /// instead return PermanentFailure to force closure of the channel ASAP.
62 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
63 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
64 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
65 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
66 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
67 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
70 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
71 /// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal
72 /// channel operation.
74 /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
75 /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
76 /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
78 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
79 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
80 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
82 /// Should also be used to indicate a failure to update the local copy of the channel monitor.
86 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
87 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::insert_combine this
88 /// means you tried to merge two monitors for different channels or for a channel which was
89 /// restored from a backup and then generated new commitment updates.
90 /// Contains a human-readable error message.
92 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
94 /// Simple structure send back by ManyChannelMonitor in case of HTLC detected onchain from a
95 /// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel.
96 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
97 pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
98 pub(super) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
99 pub(super) source: HTLCSource
102 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
103 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
104 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
107 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
108 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
109 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
110 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
112 /// User needs to notify implementors of ManyChannelMonitor when a new block is connected or
113 /// disconnected using their `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods. However, rather
114 /// than calling these methods directly, the user should register implementors as listeners to the
115 /// BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify
116 /// all registered listeners in one go.
117 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
118 /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
120 /// Implementer must also ensure that the funding_txo txid *and* outpoint are registered with
121 /// any relevant ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected
122 /// callbacks with the funding transaction, or any spends of it.
124 /// Further, the implementer must also ensure that each output returned in
125 /// monitor.get_watch_outputs() is registered to ensure that the provided monitor learns about
126 /// any spends of any of the outputs.
127 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
129 /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated
130 /// with success or failure backward
131 fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate>;
134 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
135 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
137 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
139 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
140 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
141 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
143 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
144 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
145 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
146 #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
147 pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
149 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
150 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
151 broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
152 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
153 pending_htlc_updated: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>)>>>,
155 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>
158 impl<'a, Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
159 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
160 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
161 let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
162 let mut htlc_updated_infos = Vec::new();
164 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
165 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
166 let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs, mut htlc_updated) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator);
167 if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
168 new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
169 outputs: spendable_outputs,
173 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
174 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
175 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
178 htlc_updated_infos.append(&mut htlc_updated);
182 // ChannelManager will just need to fetch pending_htlc_updated and pass state backward
183 let mut pending_htlc_updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
184 for htlc in htlc_updated_infos.drain(..) {
185 match pending_htlc_updated.entry(htlc.2) {
186 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
187 // In case of reorg we may have htlc outputs solved in a different way so
188 // we prefer to keep claims but don't store duplicate updates for a given
189 // (payment_hash, HTLCSource) pair.
190 let mut existing_claim = false;
191 e.get_mut().retain(|htlc_data| {
192 if htlc.0 == htlc_data.0 {
193 if htlc_data.1.is_some() {
194 existing_claim = true;
200 e.get_mut().push((htlc.0, htlc.1));
203 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
204 e.insert(vec![(htlc.0, htlc.1)]);
209 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
210 pending_events.append(&mut new_events);
213 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) {
214 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
215 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
216 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
217 monitor.block_disconnected(disconnected_height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator);
222 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
223 /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
224 /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
225 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>) -> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
226 let res = SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
227 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
230 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
231 pending_htlc_updated: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
233 fee_estimator: feeest,
239 /// Adds or updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
240 pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
241 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
242 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
243 Some(orig_monitor) => {
244 log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor.key_storage));
245 return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor);
249 match monitor.key_storage {
250 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
253 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to update a useless monitor without funding_txo !"));
255 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
256 log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
257 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
258 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
262 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
263 self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn();
266 for (txid, outputs) in monitor.get_watch_outputs().iter() {
267 for (idx, script) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
268 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((*txid, idx as u32), script);
271 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
276 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
277 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
278 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
280 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
284 fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
285 let mut updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
286 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(updated.len());
287 for (k, v) in updated.drain() {
289 pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
291 payment_preimage: htlc_data.1,
296 pending_htlcs_updated
300 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
301 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
302 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
303 let mut ret = Vec::new();
304 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
309 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
310 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
311 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
312 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
313 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
314 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
315 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
316 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
317 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
318 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
319 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
320 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
321 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
322 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
323 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
324 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
325 /// accurate block height.
326 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
327 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
328 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
329 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
330 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
331 /// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
332 /// We use also this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
333 /// It may cause spurrious generation of bumped claim txn but that's allright given the outpoint is already
334 /// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
335 /// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
336 pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
338 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
341 funding_key: SecretKey,
342 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
343 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
344 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
345 payment_base_key: SecretKey,
346 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
347 funding_info: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
348 current_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
349 prev_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
352 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
353 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
357 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
358 struct LocalSignedTx {
359 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
361 tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction,
362 revocation_key: PublicKey,
363 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
364 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
365 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
366 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
368 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
372 enum InputDescriptors {
377 RevokedOutput, // either a revoked to_local output on commitment tx, a revoked HTLC-Timeout output or a revoked HTLC-Success output
380 /// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs
381 /// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build
382 /// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay
383 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
387 pubkey: Option<PublicKey>,
395 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
401 sigs: (Signature, Signature),
402 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
407 impl Writeable for InputMaterial {
408 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
410 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount} => {
411 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
412 script.write(writer)?;
413 pubkey.write(writer)?;
414 writer.write_all(&key[..])?;
416 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
418 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
420 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
422 &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount, ref locktime } => {
423 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
424 script.write(writer)?;
426 preimage.write(writer)?;
427 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
428 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(*locktime))?;
430 &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { ref script, ref sigs, ref preimage, ref amount } => {
431 writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
432 script.write(writer)?;
433 sigs.0.write(writer)?;
434 sigs.1.write(writer)?;
435 preimage.write(writer)?;
436 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
443 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for InputMaterial {
444 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
445 let input_material = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
447 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
448 let pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
449 let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
450 let is_htlc = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
453 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
455 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
456 InputMaterial::Revoked {
465 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
466 let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
467 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
468 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
469 let locktime = Readable::read(reader)?;
470 InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC {
479 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
480 let their_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
481 let our_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
482 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
483 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
484 InputMaterial::LocalHTLC {
486 sigs: (their_sig, our_sig),
491 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
497 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
498 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
499 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
501 /// Outpoint under claim process by our own tx, once this one get enough confirmations, we remove it from
502 /// bump-txn candidate buffer.
504 claim_request: Sha256dHash,
506 /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
507 /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
508 /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
510 htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
512 /// Claim tx aggregate multiple claimable outpoints. One of the outpoint may be claimed by a remote party tx.
513 /// In this case, we need to drop the outpoint and regenerate a new claim tx. By safety, we keep tracking
514 /// the outpoint to be sure to resurect it back to the claim tx if reorgs happen.
515 ContentiousOutpoint {
516 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
517 input_material: InputMaterial,
521 /// Higher-level cache structure needed to re-generate bumped claim txn if needed
522 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
523 pub struct ClaimTxBumpMaterial {
524 // At every block tick, used to check if pending claiming tx is taking too
525 // much time for confirmation and we need to bump it.
527 // Tracked in case of reorg to wipe out now-superflous bump material
528 feerate_previous: u64,
529 // Soonest timelocks among set of outpoints claimed, used to compute
530 // a priority of not feerate
531 soonest_timelock: u32,
532 // Cache of script, pubkey, sig or key to solve claimable outputs scriptpubkey.
533 per_input_material: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, InputMaterial>,
536 impl Writeable for ClaimTxBumpMaterial {
537 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
538 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.height_timer))?;
539 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.feerate_previous))?;
540 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.soonest_timelock))?;
541 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_input_material.len() as u64))?;
542 for (outp, tx_material) in self.per_input_material.iter() {
544 tx_material.write(writer)?;
550 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for ClaimTxBumpMaterial {
551 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
552 let height_timer = Readable::read(reader)?;
553 let feerate_previous = Readable::read(reader)?;
554 let soonest_timelock = Readable::read(reader)?;
555 let per_input_material_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
556 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(per_input_material_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
557 for _ in 0 ..per_input_material_len {
558 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
559 let input_material = Readable::read(reader)?;
560 per_input_material.insert(outpoint, input_material);
562 Ok(Self { height_timer, feerate_previous, soonest_timelock, per_input_material })
566 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
567 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
569 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
570 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
572 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
573 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
575 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
576 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
578 key_storage: Storage,
579 their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
580 their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
581 funding_redeemscript: Option<Script>,
582 channel_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
583 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
584 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
586 our_to_self_delay: u16,
587 their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
589 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
590 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
591 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
592 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
593 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
594 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
595 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
596 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
597 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
598 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
599 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
600 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
601 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
603 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
604 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
605 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
606 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
607 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
608 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
610 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
612 current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
614 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
616 destination_script: Script,
617 // Thanks to data loss protection, we may be able to claim our non-htlc funds
618 // back, this is the script we have to spend from but we need to
619 // scan every commitment transaction for that
620 to_remote_rescue: Option<(Script, SecretKey)>,
622 // Used to track claiming requests. If claim tx doesn't confirm before height timer expiration we need to bump
623 // it (RBF or CPFP). If an input has been part of an aggregate tx at first claim try, we need to keep it within
624 // another bumped aggregate tx to comply with RBF rules. We may have multiple claiming txn in the flight for the
625 // same set of outpoints. One of the outpoints may be spent by a transaction not issued by us. That's why at
626 // block connection we scan all inputs and if any of them is among a set of a claiming request we test for set
627 // equality between spending transaction and claim request. If true, it means transaction was one our claiming one
628 // after a security delay of 6 blocks we remove pending claim request. If false, it means transaction wasn't and
629 // we need to regenerate new claim request we reduced set of stil-claimable outpoints.
630 // Key is identifier of the pending claim request, i.e the txid of the initial claiming transaction generated by
631 // us and is immutable until all outpoint of the claimable set are post-anti-reorg-delay solved.
632 // Entry is cache of elements need to generate a bumped claiming transaction (see ClaimTxBumpMaterial)
633 #[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization
634 pub pending_claim_requests: HashMap<Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial>,
636 pending_claim_requests: HashMap<Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial>,
638 // Used to link outpoints claimed in a connected block to a pending claim request.
639 // Key is outpoint than monitor parsing has detected we have keys/scripts to claim
640 // Value is (pending claim request identifier, confirmation_block), identifier
641 // is txid of the initial claiming transaction and is immutable until outpoint is
642 // post-anti-reorg-delay solved, confirmaiton_block is used to erase entry if
643 // block with output gets disconnected.
644 #[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization
645 pub claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (Sha256dHash, u32)>,
647 claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (Sha256dHash, u32)>,
649 // Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which
650 // we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce
651 // actions when we receive a block with given height. Actions depend on OnchainEvent type.
652 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap<u32, Vec<OnchainEvent>>,
654 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
655 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
656 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
657 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
658 watch_outputs: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<Script>>,
660 // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
661 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
662 // (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep
663 // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
664 // the full block_connected).
665 pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash,
666 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
670 macro_rules! subtract_high_prio_fee {
671 ($self: ident, $fee_estimator: expr, $value: expr, $predicted_weight: expr, $used_feerate: expr) => {
673 $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
674 let mut fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
676 $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
677 fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
679 $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
680 fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
682 log_error!($self, "Failed to generate an on-chain punishment tx as even low priority fee ({} sat) was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
686 log_warn!($self, "Used low priority fee for on-chain punishment tx as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
692 log_warn!($self, "Used medium priority fee for on-chain punishment tx as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
705 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
706 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
707 /// underlying object
708 impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
709 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
710 if self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
711 self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
712 self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
713 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
714 self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
715 self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
716 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
717 self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
718 self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
719 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
720 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
721 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
722 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
723 self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
724 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
725 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
726 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
727 self.to_remote_rescue != other.to_remote_rescue ||
728 self.pending_claim_requests != other.pending_claim_requests ||
729 self.claimable_outpoints != other.claimable_outpoints ||
730 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf ||
731 self.watch_outputs != other.watch_outputs
735 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
736 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
745 impl ChannelMonitor {
746 pub(super) fn new(funding_key: &SecretKey, revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor {
748 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
750 key_storage: Storage::Local {
751 funding_key: funding_key.clone(),
752 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
753 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
754 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
755 payment_base_key: payment_base_key.clone(),
756 shutdown_pubkey: shutdown_pubkey.clone(),
758 current_remote_commitment_txid: None,
759 prev_remote_commitment_txid: None,
761 their_htlc_base_key: None,
762 their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
763 funding_redeemscript: None,
764 channel_value_satoshis: None,
765 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
767 our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
768 their_to_self_delay: None,
770 old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
771 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
772 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
773 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
775 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
776 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
777 current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
779 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
780 destination_script: destination_script,
781 to_remote_rescue: None,
783 pending_claim_requests: HashMap::new(),
785 claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
787 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
788 watch_outputs: HashMap::new(),
790 last_block_hash: Default::default(),
791 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
796 fn get_witnesses_weight(inputs: &[InputDescriptors]) -> usize {
797 let mut tx_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
799 // We use expected weight (and not actual) as signatures and time lock delays may vary
800 tx_weight += match inp {
801 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
802 &InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC => {
803 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 133
805 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
806 &InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC => {
807 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 139
809 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + remotehtlc_sig + preimage_length + preimage + witness_script_length + witness_script
810 &InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC => {
811 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 32 + 1 + 133
813 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
814 &InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC => {
815 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 139
817 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + true_length + op_true + witness_script_length + witness_script
818 &InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput => {
819 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 77
826 fn get_height_timer(current_height: u32, timelock_expiration: u32) -> u32 {
827 if timelock_expiration <= current_height || timelock_expiration - current_height <= 3 {
828 return current_height + 1
829 } else if timelock_expiration - current_height <= 15 {
830 return current_height + 3
836 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
838 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
846 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
847 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
849 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
850 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
851 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
852 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
858 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
859 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
860 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
861 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
862 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
864 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
865 if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
866 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
869 if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
872 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
874 // Prune HTLCs from the previous remote commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
875 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
876 // TODO: We should probably consider whether we're really getting the next secret here.
877 if let Storage::Local { ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
878 if let Some(txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() {
879 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
885 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
886 let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
887 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
888 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
889 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
891 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
892 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
893 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
897 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
898 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
899 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
904 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
911 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
920 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
921 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
922 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
923 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
924 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
925 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
926 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
927 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
929 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
930 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
933 let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
934 log_trace!(self, "Tracking new remote commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
935 log_trace!(self, "New potential remote commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
936 if let Storage::Local { ref mut current_remote_commitment_txid, ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
937 *prev_remote_commitment_txid = current_remote_commitment_txid.take();
938 *current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
940 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs);
941 self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
942 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
943 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
944 Some(old_points) => {
945 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
946 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
947 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
948 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
949 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
951 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
954 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
958 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
963 pub(super) fn provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
964 match self.key_storage {
965 Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
966 if let Ok(payment_key) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_base_key)) {
967 let to_remote_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
968 .push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&payment_key.serialize())[..])
970 if let Ok(to_remote_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
971 self.to_remote_rescue = Some((to_remote_script, to_remote_key));
975 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
979 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
980 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
981 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
982 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
983 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
984 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) {
985 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
986 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
987 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
988 txid: commitment_tx.txid(),
990 revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
991 a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
992 b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
993 delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
994 per_commitment_point: local_keys.per_commitment_point,
1000 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
1001 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
1002 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
1003 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
1006 /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
1007 /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
1008 /// chain for new blocks/transactions.
1009 pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1010 match self.key_storage {
1011 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
1012 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
1013 let our_funding_info = funding_info;
1014 if let Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } = other.key_storage {
1015 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
1016 // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget it's trivially
1017 // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
1018 if funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 != our_funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
1019 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Funding transaction outputs are not identical!"));
1022 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor with a Watchtower one !"));
1025 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1026 if let Storage::Watchtower { .. } = other.key_storage {
1029 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Watchtower monitor with a Local one !"));
1033 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
1034 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
1035 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
1036 self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap())?;
1038 if let Some(ref local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1039 if let Some(ref other_local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1040 let our_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1041 let other_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((other_local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (other_local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1042 if our_commitment_number >= other_commitment_number {
1043 self.key_storage = other.key_storage;
1047 // TODO: We should use current_remote_commitment_number and the commitment number out of
1048 // local transactions to decide how to merge
1049 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
1050 self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
1051 for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
1052 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
1054 if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1055 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
1057 if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1058 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
1060 self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
1061 self.to_remote_rescue = other.to_remote_rescue;
1064 self.current_remote_commitment_number = cmp::min(self.current_remote_commitment_number, other.current_remote_commitment_number);
1068 /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
1069 /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
1070 /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
1071 /// provides slightly better privacy.
1072 /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
1073 /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
1074 pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, new_funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
1075 match self.key_storage {
1076 Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
1077 *funding_info = Some(new_funding_info);
1079 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1080 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
1085 /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
1086 /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
1087 pub(super) fn set_basic_channel_info(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, their_to_self_delay: u16, funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
1088 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
1089 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
1090 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
1091 self.funding_redeemscript = Some(funding_redeemscript);
1092 self.channel_value_satoshis = Some(channel_value_satoshis);
1093 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
1094 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
1097 pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
1098 match self.key_storage {
1099 Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
1100 *funding_info = None;
1102 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1103 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
1108 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1109 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1110 match self.key_storage {
1111 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
1112 match funding_info {
1113 &Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
1117 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1123 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1124 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1125 pub fn get_watch_outputs(&self) -> &HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<Script>> {
1129 /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
1130 /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
1131 /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
1132 /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
1133 pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> {
1134 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
1135 for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1136 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
1137 res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
1143 /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
1144 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
1145 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
1146 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
1147 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
1148 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
1150 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
1151 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
1153 macro_rules! write_option {
1160 &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
1165 match self.key_storage {
1166 Storage::Local { ref funding_key, ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref funding_info, ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid } => {
1167 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1168 writer.write_all(&funding_key[..])?;
1169 writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
1170 writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
1171 writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
1172 writer.write_all(&payment_base_key[..])?;
1173 writer.write_all(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize())?;
1174 match funding_info {
1175 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
1176 writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
1177 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
1178 script.write(writer)?;
1181 debug_assert!(false, "Try to serialize a useless Local monitor !");
1184 current_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
1185 prev_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
1187 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => unimplemented!(),
1190 writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
1191 writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
1192 self.funding_redeemscript.as_ref().unwrap().write(writer)?;
1193 self.channel_value_satoshis.unwrap().write(writer)?;
1195 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1196 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
1197 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
1198 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
1199 match second_option {
1200 Some(second_pubkey) => {
1201 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
1204 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
1209 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
1213 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
1214 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
1216 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
1217 writer.write_all(secret)?;
1218 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
1221 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
1222 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
1223 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
1224 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
1225 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
1226 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
1227 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
1231 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
1232 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
1233 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1234 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
1235 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
1236 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
1237 write_option!(htlc_source);
1241 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
1242 for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1243 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1244 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
1245 (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1246 for script in txouts.iter() {
1247 script.write(writer)?;
1251 if for_local_storage {
1252 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
1253 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
1254 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
1255 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
1258 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
1261 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
1262 ($local_tx: expr) => {
1263 $local_tx.tx.write(writer)?;
1264 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
1265 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
1266 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
1267 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
1268 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
1270 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
1271 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
1272 for &(ref htlc_output, ref sig, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1273 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
1274 if let &Some(ref their_sig) = sig {
1276 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
1280 write_option!(htlc_source);
1285 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1286 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1287 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
1289 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1292 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1293 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1294 serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
1296 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1299 if for_local_storage {
1300 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
1302 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
1305 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
1306 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
1307 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
1310 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
1311 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
1312 if let Some((ref to_remote_script, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue {
1313 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1314 to_remote_script.write(writer)?;
1315 local_key.write(writer)?;
1317 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1320 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_claim_requests.len() as u64))?;
1321 for (ref ancestor_claim_txid, claim_tx_data) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter() {
1322 ancestor_claim_txid.write(writer)?;
1323 claim_tx_data.write(writer)?;
1326 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
1327 for (ref outp, ref claim_and_height) in self.claimable_outpoints.iter() {
1328 outp.write(writer)?;
1329 claim_and_height.0.write(writer)?;
1330 claim_and_height.1.write(writer)?;
1333 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
1334 for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1335 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
1336 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
1337 for ev in events.iter() {
1339 OnchainEvent::Claim { ref claim_request } => {
1340 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1341 claim_request.write(writer)?;
1343 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1344 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1345 htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
1346 htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
1348 OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { ref outpoint, ref input_material } => {
1349 writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
1350 outpoint.write(writer)?;
1351 input_material.write(writer)?;
1357 (self.watch_outputs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1358 for (txid, output_scripts) in self.watch_outputs.iter() {
1359 txid.write(writer)?;
1360 (output_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1361 for script in output_scripts.iter() {
1362 script.write(writer)?;
1369 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
1371 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
1372 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
1373 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
1374 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
1375 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
1376 pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
1377 self.write(writer, true)
1380 /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
1382 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
1383 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
1384 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
1385 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
1386 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
1387 pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
1388 self.write(writer, false)
1391 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
1392 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
1393 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
1394 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
1395 return Some(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
1398 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
1402 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1403 //TODO This can be optimized?
1404 let mut min = 1 << 48;
1405 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
1413 pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1414 self.current_remote_commitment_number
1417 pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1418 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1419 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor)
1420 } else { 0xffff_ffff_ffff }
1423 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
1424 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
1425 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
1426 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
1427 /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
1428 /// revoked remote commitment tx
1429 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1430 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
1431 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
1432 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
1433 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1434 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1436 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1437 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1439 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1440 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1443 Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1448 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1449 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1450 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1451 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1452 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage {
1453 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1454 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1455 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1456 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))),
1457 Some(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key))))
1459 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1460 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1461 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1462 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)),
1466 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
1467 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1468 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1469 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
1472 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
1473 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1475 let local_payment_p2wpkh = if let Some(payment_key) = local_payment_key {
1476 // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
1477 // script_pubkey version.
1478 let payment_hash160 = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_key).serialize());
1479 Some(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script())
1482 let mut total_value = 0;
1483 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1484 let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();
1485 let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new();
1487 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1488 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1490 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1491 txid: commitment_txid,
1494 script_sig: Script::new(),
1495 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1496 witness: Vec::new(),
1498 inputs_desc.push(InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput);
1499 inputs_info.push((None, outp.value, self.our_to_self_delay as u32));
1500 total_value += outp.value;
1501 } else if Some(&outp.script_pubkey) == local_payment_p2wpkh.as_ref() {
1502 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1503 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1504 key: local_payment_key.unwrap(),
1505 output: outp.clone(),
1510 macro_rules! sign_input {
1511 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
1513 let (sig, redeemscript, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage {
1514 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1515 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
1516 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()].0;
1517 chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
1519 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
1520 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1521 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript, revocation_key)
1523 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1527 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1528 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1529 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
1530 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
1532 $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
1534 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
1535 (redeemscript, revocation_key)
1540 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1541 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
1543 for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1544 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1545 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1546 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1547 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1548 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1549 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1552 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1553 txid: commitment_txid,
1554 vout: transaction_output_index,
1556 script_sig: Script::new(),
1557 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1558 witness: Vec::new(),
1560 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1562 inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC });
1563 inputs_info.push((Some(idx), tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry));
1564 total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
1566 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1570 output: vec!(TxOut {
1571 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1572 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1575 let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }]);
1576 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1577 let mut used_feerate;
1578 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
1579 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1580 let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1581 assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
1582 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
1583 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
1584 per_input_material.insert(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: true, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 });
1585 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output) {
1586 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1587 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((single_htlc_tx.txid(), height)); }
1589 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(single_htlc_tx.txid()) {
1590 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1591 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }); }
1593 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1600 if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1601 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1602 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, generating general spend tx with {} inputs and {} other txn to broadcast", inputs.len(), txn_to_broadcast.len());
1603 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1604 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1606 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1607 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1608 if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1609 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
1610 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1611 log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1612 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1613 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1614 let e = entry.get_mut();
1615 e.retain(|ref event| {
1617 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1618 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1623 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1625 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1626 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1634 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1635 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1636 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1638 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1639 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "remote");
1642 // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
1644 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1646 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1647 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1650 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1657 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]);
1659 let mut used_feerate;
1660 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
1661 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
1664 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1666 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(spend_tx.input.len());
1667 let mut soonest_timelock = ::std::u32::MAX;
1668 for info in inputs_info.iter() {
1669 if info.2 <= soonest_timelock {
1670 soonest_timelock = info.2;
1673 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, soonest_timelock);
1674 let spend_txid = spend_tx.txid();
1675 for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
1676 let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.0, info.1);
1677 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, height_timer);
1678 per_input_material.insert(input.previous_output, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: if info.0.is_some() { Some(revocation_pubkey) } else { None }, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: if info.0.is_some() { true } else { false }, amount: info.1 });
1679 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(input.previous_output) {
1680 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1681 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((spend_txid, height)); }
1684 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(spend_txid) {
1685 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1686 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock, per_input_material }); }
1689 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
1691 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1692 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1693 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1695 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1696 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1697 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1698 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1699 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1700 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1701 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1702 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1704 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1705 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1707 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of non-revoked remote commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
1709 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1710 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
1711 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1712 $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1713 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1714 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1715 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1716 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1717 // payment_preimage.
1718 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1719 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1720 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1721 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1723 for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
1724 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
1728 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
1729 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1730 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1731 let e = entry.get_mut();
1732 e.retain(|ref event| {
1734 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1735 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1740 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1742 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1743 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1751 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1752 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1753 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
1755 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1756 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
1760 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1761 let revocation_point_option =
1762 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1763 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1764 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1766 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1767 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1768 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1769 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1770 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
1772 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1773 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1774 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
1777 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1778 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1779 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
1782 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1783 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
1784 match self.key_storage {
1785 Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1786 if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
1787 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1788 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1790 output: outp.clone(),
1794 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
1796 break; // Only to_remote ouput is claimable
1800 let mut total_value = 0;
1801 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1802 let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new();
1803 let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();
1805 macro_rules! sign_input {
1806 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
1808 let (sig, redeemscript, htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1809 Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1810 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize].0;
1811 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1812 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
1813 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
1814 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript, htlc_key)
1816 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1820 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1821 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1822 $input.witness.push($preimage);
1823 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
1824 (redeemscript, htlc_key)
1829 for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1830 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1831 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1832 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1833 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1834 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1835 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1837 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1840 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1841 txid: commitment_txid,
1842 vout: transaction_output_index,
1844 script_sig: Script::new(),
1845 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
1846 witness: Vec::new(),
1848 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1850 inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC });
1851 inputs_info.push((payment_preimage, tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry));
1852 total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
1854 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1858 output: vec!(TxOut {
1859 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1860 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1863 let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC }]);
1864 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1865 let mut used_feerate;
1866 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
1867 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1868 let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
1869 assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
1870 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1871 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1872 output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
1874 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
1875 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
1876 per_input_material.insert(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, locktime: 0 });
1877 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output) {
1878 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1879 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((single_htlc_tx.txid(), height)); }
1881 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(single_htlc_tx.txid()) {
1882 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1883 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material}); }
1885 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1891 // TODO: If the HTLC has already expired, potentially merge it with the
1892 // rest of the claim transaction, as above.
1894 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1895 txid: commitment_txid,
1896 vout: transaction_output_index,
1898 script_sig: Script::new(),
1899 sequence: idx as u32,
1900 witness: Vec::new(),
1902 let mut timeout_tx = Transaction {
1904 lock_time: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1906 output: vec!(TxOut {
1907 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1908 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1911 let predicted_weight = timeout_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC]);
1912 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1913 let mut used_feerate;
1914 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, timeout_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
1915 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&timeout_tx);
1916 let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, vec![0]);
1917 assert!(predicted_weight >= timeout_tx.get_weight());
1918 //TODO: track SpendableOutputDescriptor
1919 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
1920 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
1921 per_input_material.insert(timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script : redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, locktime: htlc.cltv_expiry });
1922 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output) {
1923 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1924 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((timeout_tx.txid(), height)); }
1926 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(timeout_tx.txid()) {
1927 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1928 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }); }
1931 txn_to_broadcast.push(timeout_tx);
1936 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1938 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1939 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1942 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1949 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]);
1951 let mut used_feerate;
1952 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
1953 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
1956 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1958 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(spend_tx.input.len());
1959 let mut soonest_timelock = ::std::u32::MAX;
1960 for info in inputs_info.iter() {
1961 if info.2 <= soonest_timelock {
1962 soonest_timelock = info.2;
1965 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, soonest_timelock);
1966 let spend_txid = spend_tx.txid();
1967 for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
1968 let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.1, (info.0).0.to_vec());
1969 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, height_timer);
1970 per_input_material.insert(input.previous_output, InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*(info.0)), amount: info.1, locktime: 0});
1971 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(input.previous_output) {
1972 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1973 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((spend_txid, height)); }
1976 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(spend_txid) {
1977 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1978 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock, per_input_material }); }
1980 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
1981 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1982 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1983 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1985 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1988 } else if let Some((ref to_remote_rescue, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue {
1989 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1990 if to_remote_rescue == &outp.script_pubkey {
1991 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1992 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1993 key: local_key.clone(),
1994 output: outp.clone(),
2000 (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
2003 /// Attempts to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
2004 fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
2005 //TODO: send back new outputs to guarantee pending_claim_request consistency
2006 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 {
2010 macro_rules! ignore_error {
2011 ( $thing : expr ) => {
2014 Err(_) => return (None, None)
2019 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (None, None); };
2020 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
2021 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
2022 let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
2023 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
2024 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))
2026 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
2027 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
2030 let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
2031 None => return (None, None),
2032 Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
2034 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
2035 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2036 let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
2038 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
2041 if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
2043 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2047 script_sig: Script::new(),
2048 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2049 witness: Vec::new(),
2051 amount = tx.output[0].value;
2054 if !inputs.is_empty() {
2055 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
2056 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
2060 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
2066 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput]);
2067 let mut used_feerate;
2068 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
2069 return (None, None);
2072 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
2074 let (sig, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage {
2075 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
2076 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]);
2077 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
2078 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), revocation_key)
2080 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2084 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2085 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2086 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
2087 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
2089 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
2090 let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
2091 let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
2092 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32);
2093 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
2094 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
2095 per_input_material.insert(spend_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: None, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: tx.output[0].value });
2096 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(spend_tx.input[0].previous_output) {
2097 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2098 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((spend_tx.txid(), height)); }
2100 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(spend_tx.txid()) {
2101 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2102 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32, per_input_material }); }
2104 (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output }))
2105 } else { (None, None) }
2108 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<TxOut>, Vec<(Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial)>) {
2109 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2110 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2111 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2112 let mut pending_claims = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2114 macro_rules! add_dynamic_output {
2115 ($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => {
2116 if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_tx.per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
2117 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
2118 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: $father_tx.txid(), vout: $vout },
2119 key: local_delayedkey,
2120 witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
2121 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
2122 output: $father_tx.output[$vout as usize].clone(),
2128 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
2129 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2130 for (idx, output) in local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().output.iter().enumerate() {
2131 if output.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
2132 add_dynamic_output!(local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness(), idx as u32);
2137 if let &Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } = &self.key_storage {
2138 for &(ref htlc, ref sigs, _) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2139 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2140 if let &Some(ref their_sig) = sigs {
2142 log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Timeout transaction against local commitment transactions");
2143 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
2144 let (our_sig, htlc_script) = match
2145 chan_utils::sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_timeout_tx, their_sig, &None, htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key, &local_tx.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key, &self.secp_ctx) {
2150 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0);
2151 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2152 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
2153 per_input_material.insert(htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, our_sig), preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000});
2154 //TODO: with option_simplified_commitment track outpoint too
2155 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, height_timer);
2156 pending_claims.push((htlc_timeout_tx.txid(), ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: 0, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }));
2157 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
2159 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
2160 log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Success transaction against local commitment transactions");
2161 let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
2162 let (our_sig, htlc_script) = match
2163 chan_utils::sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_success_tx, their_sig, &Some(*payment_preimage), htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key, &local_tx.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key, &self.secp_ctx) {
2168 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
2169 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2170 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
2171 per_input_material.insert(htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, our_sig), preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000});
2172 //TODO: with option_simplified_commitment track outpoint too
2173 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, height_timer);
2174 pending_claims.push((htlc_success_tx.txid(), ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: 0, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }));
2175 res.push(htlc_success_tx);
2178 watch_outputs.push(local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
2179 } else { panic!("Should have sigs for non-dust local tx outputs!") }
2184 (res, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs, pending_claims)
2187 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
2188 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
2189 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
2190 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
2191 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
2192 let mut local_txn = Vec::new();
2193 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
2194 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2196 macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
2197 ($height: expr, $source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2198 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} local commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2199 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2200 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2201 let e = entry.get_mut();
2202 e.retain(|ref event| {
2204 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
2205 return htlc_update.0 != $source
2210 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)});
2212 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2213 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)}]);
2219 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
2220 ($updates: expr) => {
2221 local_txn.append(&mut $updates.0);
2222 spendable_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1);
2223 watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.2);
2224 for claim in $updates.3 {
2225 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(claim.0) {
2226 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2227 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(claim.1); }
2233 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous local commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
2234 let mut is_local_tx = false;
2236 if let &mut Some(ref mut local_tx) = &mut self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2237 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2238 match self.key_storage {
2239 Storage::Local { ref funding_key, .. } => {
2240 local_tx.tx.add_local_sig(funding_key, self.funding_redeemscript.as_ref().unwrap(), self.channel_value_satoshis.unwrap(), &self.secp_ctx);
2246 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2247 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2249 log_trace!(self, "Got latest local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
2250 assert!(local_tx.tx.has_local_sig());
2251 match self.key_storage {
2252 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, .. } => {
2253 let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key, height);
2254 append_onchain_update!(res);
2256 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { }
2260 if let &mut Some(ref mut local_tx) = &mut self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2261 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2262 match self.key_storage {
2263 Storage::Local { ref funding_key, .. } => {
2264 local_tx.tx.add_local_sig(funding_key, self.funding_redeemscript.as_ref().unwrap(), self.channel_value_satoshis.unwrap(), &self.secp_ctx);
2270 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2271 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2273 log_trace!(self, "Got previous local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
2274 assert!(local_tx.tx.has_local_sig());
2275 match self.key_storage {
2276 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, .. } => {
2277 let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key, height);
2278 append_onchain_update!(res);
2280 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { }
2285 macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
2286 ($local_tx: expr) => {
2287 for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$local_tx.htlc_outputs {
2288 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
2289 if let &Some(ref source) = source {
2290 wait_threshold_conf!(height, source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
2298 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2299 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
2301 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2302 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
2306 (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
2309 /// Generate a spendable output event when closing_transaction get registered onchain.
2310 fn check_spend_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
2311 if tx.input[0].sequence == 0xFFFFFFFF && !tx.input[0].witness.is_empty() && tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == 71 {
2312 match self.key_storage {
2313 Storage::Local { ref shutdown_pubkey, .. } => {
2314 let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
2315 let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
2316 for (idx, output) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2317 if shutdown_script == output.script_pubkey {
2318 return Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2319 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: idx as u32 },
2320 output: output.clone(),
2325 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2326 //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it
2327 // comes back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
2334 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if its copy of
2335 /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable local toxic tx in case of
2336 /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our remote side knows
2337 /// a higher revocation secret than the local commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
2338 /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow remote side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
2339 /// broadcast them if remote don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
2340 /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
2341 /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
2342 /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
2343 pub fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&mut self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
2344 log_trace!(self, "Getting signed latest local commitment transaction!");
2345 if let &mut Some(ref mut local_tx) = &mut self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2346 match self.key_storage {
2347 Storage::Local { ref funding_key, .. } => {
2348 local_tx.tx.add_local_sig(funding_key, self.funding_redeemscript.as_ref().unwrap(), self.channel_value_satoshis.unwrap(), &self.secp_ctx);
2353 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2354 let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.with_valid_witness().clone()];
2355 match self.key_storage {
2356 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, .. } => {
2357 res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key, 0).0);
2358 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
2359 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_local_transaction if we get a confirmation.
2361 _ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"),
2369 fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)>) {
2370 for tx in txn_matched {
2371 let mut output_val = 0;
2372 for out in tx.output.iter() {
2373 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2374 output_val += out.value;
2375 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2379 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", block_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2380 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2381 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
2382 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
2383 let mut bump_candidates = HashSet::new();
2384 for tx in txn_matched {
2385 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
2386 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
2387 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
2388 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
2390 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
2391 let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
2392 let funding_txo = match self.key_storage {
2393 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
2394 funding_info.clone()
2396 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2400 if funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
2401 if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
2402 let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(&tx, height, fee_estimator);
2404 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2405 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2406 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2409 let (local_txn, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(&tx, height);
2410 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2412 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2413 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2417 if !funding_txo.is_none() && txn.is_empty() {
2418 if let Some(spendable_output) = self.check_spend_closing_transaction(&tx) {
2419 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
2423 if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
2424 let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, fee_estimator);
2425 if let Some(tx) = tx {
2428 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
2429 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
2433 for tx in txn.iter() {
2434 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
2435 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
2438 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
2439 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
2440 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
2441 let mut updated = self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height);
2442 if updated.len() > 0 {
2443 htlc_updated.append(&mut updated);
2446 // Scan all input to verify is one of the outpoint spent is of interest for us
2447 let mut claimed_outputs_material = Vec::new();
2448 for inp in &tx.input {
2449 if let Some(first_claim_txid_height) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&inp.previous_output) {
2450 // If outpoint has claim request pending on it...
2451 if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&first_claim_txid_height.0) {
2452 //... we need to verify equality between transaction outpoints and claim request
2453 // outpoints to know if transaction is the original claim or a bumped one issued
2455 let mut set_equality = true;
2456 if claim_material.per_input_material.len() != tx.input.len() {
2457 set_equality = false;
2459 for (claim_inp, tx_inp) in claim_material.per_input_material.keys().zip(tx.input.iter()) {
2460 if *claim_inp != tx_inp.previous_output {
2461 set_equality = false;
2466 macro_rules! clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay {
2468 let new_event = OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_request: first_claim_txid_height.0.clone() };
2469 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2470 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2471 if !entry.get().contains(&new_event) {
2472 entry.get_mut().push(new_event);
2475 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2476 entry.insert(vec![new_event]);
2482 // If this is our transaction (or our counterparty spent all the outputs
2483 // before we could anyway with same inputs order than us), wait for
2484 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY and clean the RBF tracking map.
2486 clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay!();
2487 } else { // If false, generate new claim request with update outpoint set
2488 for input in tx.input.iter() {
2489 if let Some(input_material) = claim_material.per_input_material.remove(&input.previous_output) {
2490 claimed_outputs_material.push((input.previous_output, input_material));
2492 // If there are no outpoints left to claim in this request, drop it entirely after ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
2493 if claim_material.per_input_material.is_empty() {
2494 clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay!();
2497 //TODO: recompute soonest_timelock to avoid wasting a bit on fees
2498 bump_candidates.insert(first_claim_txid_height.0.clone());
2500 break; //No need to iterate further, either tx is our or their
2502 panic!("Inconsistencies between pending_claim_requests map and claimable_outpoints map");
2506 for (outpoint, input_material) in claimed_outputs_material.drain(..) {
2507 let new_event = OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, input_material };
2508 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2509 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2510 if !entry.get().contains(&new_event) {
2511 entry.get_mut().push(new_event);
2514 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2515 entry.insert(vec![new_event]);
2520 let should_broadcast = if let Some(_) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2521 self.would_broadcast_at_height(height)
2523 if let Some(ref mut cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2524 if should_broadcast {
2525 match self.key_storage {
2526 Storage::Local { ref funding_key, .. } => {
2527 cur_local_tx.tx.add_local_sig(funding_key, self.funding_redeemscript.as_ref().unwrap(), self.channel_value_satoshis.unwrap(), &self.secp_ctx);
2533 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2534 if should_broadcast {
2535 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(cur_local_tx.tx.with_valid_witness()));
2536 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx.with_valid_witness());
2537 match self.key_storage {
2538 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, .. } => {
2539 let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs, _) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key, height);
2540 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2541 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2542 watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2545 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
2546 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
2549 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { },
2553 if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
2556 OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_request } => {
2557 // We may remove a whole set of claim outpoints here, as these one may have
2558 // been aggregated in a single tx and claimed so atomically
2559 if let Some(bump_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&claim_request) {
2560 for outpoint in bump_material.per_input_material.keys() {
2561 self.claimable_outpoints.remove(&outpoint);
2565 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
2566 log_trace!(self, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
2567 htlc_updated.push((htlc_update.0, None, htlc_update.1));
2569 OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, .. } => {
2570 self.claimable_outpoints.remove(&outpoint);
2575 for (first_claim_txid, ref mut cached_claim_datas) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter_mut() {
2576 if cached_claim_datas.height_timer == height {
2577 bump_candidates.insert(first_claim_txid.clone());
2580 for first_claim_txid in bump_candidates.iter() {
2581 if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate)) = {
2582 if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get(first_claim_txid) {
2583 if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.bump_claim_tx(height, &claim_material, fee_estimator) {
2584 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx);
2585 Some((new_timer, new_feerate))
2587 } else { unreachable!(); }
2589 if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(first_claim_txid) {
2590 claim_material.height_timer = new_timer;
2591 claim_material.feerate_previous = new_feerate;
2592 } else { unreachable!(); }
2595 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
2596 for &(ref txid, ref output_scripts) in watch_outputs.iter() {
2597 self.watch_outputs.insert(txid.clone(), output_scripts.iter().map(|o| o.script_pubkey.clone()).collect());
2599 (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
2602 fn block_disconnected(&mut self, height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) {
2603 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", block_hash, height);
2604 let mut bump_candidates = HashMap::new();
2605 if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
2607 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
2608 //- our claim tx on a commitment tx output
2609 //- resurect outpoint back in its claimable set and regenerate tx
2612 OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, input_material } => {
2613 if let Some(ancestor_claimable_txid) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&outpoint) {
2614 if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&ancestor_claimable_txid.0) {
2615 claim_material.per_input_material.insert(outpoint, input_material);
2616 // Using a HashMap guarantee us than if we have multiple outpoints getting
2617 // resurrected only one bump claim tx is going to be broadcast
2618 bump_candidates.insert(ancestor_claimable_txid.clone(), claim_material.clone());
2626 for (_, claim_material) in bump_candidates.iter_mut() {
2627 if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.bump_claim_tx(height, &claim_material, fee_estimator) {
2628 claim_material.height_timer = new_timer;
2629 claim_material.feerate_previous = new_feerate;
2630 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx);
2633 for (ancestor_claim_txid, claim_material) in bump_candidates.drain() {
2634 self.pending_claim_requests.insert(ancestor_claim_txid.0, claim_material);
2636 //TODO: if we implement cross-block aggregated claim transaction we need to refresh set of outpoints and regenerate tx but
2637 // right now if one of the outpoint get disconnected, just erase whole pending claim request.
2638 let mut remove_request = Vec::new();
2639 self.claimable_outpoints.retain(|_, ref v|
2641 remove_request.push(v.0.clone());
2644 for req in remove_request {
2645 self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&req);
2647 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
2650 pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
2651 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
2652 // * in any unrevoked remote commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
2653 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
2654 // * are in our latest local commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
2655 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
2656 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
2657 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
2658 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
2659 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
2660 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
2661 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2662 ($htlcs: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2663 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
2664 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
2665 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
2666 // time out the HTLC first.
2667 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
2668 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
2669 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
2670 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
2671 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
2672 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
2673 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
2674 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
2675 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
2676 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
2677 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
2678 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
2679 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2680 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2681 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2682 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
2683 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
2684 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
2685 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
2686 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
2687 let htlc_outbound = $local_tx == htlc.offered;
2688 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
2689 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
2690 log_info!(self, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2697 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2698 scan_commitment!(cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
2701 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2702 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
2703 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2704 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2707 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
2708 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2709 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2717 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a local
2718 /// or remote commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
2719 fn is_resolving_htlc_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)> {
2720 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
2722 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
2723 let mut payment_data = None;
2724 let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
2725 || (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
2726 let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
2727 let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
2729 macro_rules! log_claim {
2730 ($tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
2731 // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
2732 // as we have no corresponding source and no valid remote commitment txid
2733 // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
2734 // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
2735 let outbound_htlc = $local_tx == $htlc.offered;
2736 if ($local_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
2737 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
2738 log_error!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
2739 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2740 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2741 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
2743 log_info!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
2744 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2745 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2746 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
2751 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_remote {
2752 ($remote_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
2753 if let &Some(txid) = $remote_txid {
2754 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2755 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
2756 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
2757 log_claim!("revoked remote commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
2758 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
2767 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2768 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2769 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
2770 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
2771 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
2772 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, true);
2773 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
2774 // local commitment transactions or an unrevoked remote commitment
2775 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
2776 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
2777 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
2778 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
2779 } else if !$local_tx {
2780 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2781 check_htlc_valid_remote!(current_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2783 if payment_data.is_none() {
2784 if let Storage::Local { ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2785 check_htlc_valid_remote!(prev_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2789 if payment_data.is_none() {
2790 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, false);
2791 continue 'outer_loop;
2798 if let Some(ref current_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2799 if input.previous_output.txid == current_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2800 scan_commitment!(current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2801 "our latest local commitment tx", true);
2804 if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2805 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2806 scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2807 "our previous local commitment tx", true);
2810 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2811 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
2812 "remote commitment tx", false);
2815 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
2816 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
2817 if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
2818 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2819 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2820 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
2821 htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
2822 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2823 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
2824 htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
2826 log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2827 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2828 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2829 let e = entry.get_mut();
2830 e.retain(|ref event| {
2832 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
2833 return htlc_update.0 != source
2838 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)});
2840 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2841 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)}]);
2850 /// Lightning security model (i.e being able to redeem/timeout HTLC or penalize coutnerparty onchain) lays on the assumption of claim transactions getting confirmed before timelock expiration
2851 /// (CSV or CLTV following cases). In case of high-fee spikes, claim tx may stuck in the mempool, so you need to bump its feerate quickly using Replace-By-Fee or Child-Pay-For-Parent.
2852 fn bump_claim_tx(&self, height: u32, cached_claim_datas: &ClaimTxBumpMaterial, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Option<(u32, u64, Transaction)> {
2853 if cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.len() == 0 { return None } // But don't prune pending claiming request yet, we may have to resurrect HTLCs
2854 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
2855 for outp in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.keys() {
2857 previous_output: *outp,
2858 script_sig: Script::new(),
2859 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2860 witness: Vec::new(),
2863 let mut bumped_tx = Transaction {
2867 output: vec![TxOut {
2868 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
2873 macro_rules! RBF_bump {
2874 ($amount: expr, $old_feerate: expr, $fee_estimator: expr, $predicted_weight: expr) => {
2876 let mut used_feerate;
2877 // If old feerate inferior to actual one given back by Fee Estimator, use it to compute new fee...
2878 let new_fee = if $old_feerate < $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) {
2879 let mut value = $amount;
2880 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, $fee_estimator, value, $predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
2881 // Overflow check is done in subtract_high_prio_fee
2884 log_trace!(self, "Can't new-estimation bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", $amount);
2887 // ...else just increase the previous feerate by 25% (because that's a nice number)
2889 let fee = $old_feerate * $predicted_weight / 750;
2891 log_trace!(self, "Can't 25% bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", $amount);
2897 let previous_fee = $old_feerate * $predicted_weight / 1000;
2898 let min_relay_fee = MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT * $predicted_weight / 1000;
2899 // BIP 125 Opt-in Full Replace-by-Fee Signaling
2900 // * 3. The replacement transaction pays an absolute fee of at least the sum paid by the original transactions.
2901 // * 4. The replacement transaction must also pay for its own bandwidth at or above the rate set by the node's minimum relay fee setting.
2902 let new_fee = if new_fee < previous_fee + min_relay_fee {
2903 new_fee + previous_fee + min_relay_fee - new_fee
2907 Some((new_fee, new_fee * 1000 / $predicted_weight))
2912 let new_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, cached_claim_datas.soonest_timelock);
2913 let mut inputs_witnesses_weight = 0;
2915 for per_outp_material in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.values() {
2916 match per_outp_material {
2917 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref is_htlc, ref amount, .. } => {
2918 log_trace!(self, "Is HLTC ? {}", is_htlc);
2919 inputs_witnesses_weight += Self::get_witnesses_weight(if !is_htlc { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput] } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC] } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC] } else { unreachable!() });
2922 &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount, .. } => {
2923 inputs_witnesses_weight += Self::get_witnesses_weight(if preimage.is_some() { &[InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC] } else { &[InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC] });
2926 &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { .. } => { return None; }
2930 let predicted_weight = bumped_tx.get_weight() + inputs_witnesses_weight;
2932 if let Some((new_fee, feerate)) = RBF_bump!(amt, cached_claim_datas.feerate_previous, fee_estimator, predicted_weight as u64) {
2933 // If new computed fee is superior at the whole claimable amount burn all in fees
2935 bumped_tx.output[0].value = 0;
2937 bumped_tx.output[0].value = amt - new_fee;
2939 new_feerate = feerate;
2943 assert!(new_feerate != 0);
2945 for (i, (outp, per_outp_material)) in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.iter().enumerate() {
2946 match per_outp_material {
2947 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount } => {
2948 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&bumped_tx);
2949 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&bumped_tx.input[i], &script, *amount)[..]);
2950 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &key);
2951 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2952 bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2954 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(pubkey.unwrap().clone().serialize().to_vec());
2956 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec!(1));
2958 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(script.clone().into_bytes());
2959 log_trace!(self, "Going to broadcast bumped Penalty Transaction {} claiming revoked {} output {} from {} with new feerate {}", bumped_tx.txid(), if !is_htlc { "to_local" } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) { "offered" } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) { "received" } else { "" }, outp.vout, outp.txid, new_feerate);
2961 &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount, ref locktime } => {
2962 if !preimage.is_some() { bumped_tx.lock_time = *locktime };
2963 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&bumped_tx);
2964 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&bumped_tx.input[i], &script, *amount)[..]);
2965 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &key);
2966 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2967 bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2968 if let &Some(preimage) = preimage {
2969 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(preimage.clone().0.to_vec());
2971 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec![0]);
2973 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(script.clone().into_bytes());
2974 log_trace!(self, "Going to broadcast bumped Claim Transaction {} claiming remote {} htlc output {} from {} with new feerate {}", bumped_tx.txid(), if preimage.is_some() { "offered" } else { "received" }, outp.vout, outp.txid, new_feerate);
2976 &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { .. } => {
2977 //TODO : Given that Local Commitment Transaction and HTLC-Timeout/HTLC-Success are counter-signed by peer, we can't
2978 // RBF them. Need a Lightning specs change and package relay modification :
2979 // https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2018-November/016518.html
2984 assert!(predicted_weight >= bumped_tx.get_weight());
2985 Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bumped_tx))
2989 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
2991 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor) {
2992 fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2993 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2994 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
2998 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3003 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3004 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3005 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3006 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3009 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
3011 let key_storage = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3013 let funding_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3014 let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3015 let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3016 let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3017 let payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3018 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3019 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
3020 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
3021 let outpoint = OutPoint {
3022 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
3023 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
3025 let funding_info = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
3026 let current_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3027 let prev_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3030 revocation_base_key,
3032 delayed_payment_base_key,
3036 current_remote_commitment_txid,
3037 prev_remote_commitment_txid,
3040 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3043 let their_htlc_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
3044 let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
3045 let funding_redeemscript = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
3046 let channel_value_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
3048 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
3049 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
3053 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3054 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
3055 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
3056 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
3058 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
3063 let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3064 let their_to_self_delay: Option<u16> = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
3066 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
3067 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
3068 *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
3069 *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
3072 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
3075 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
3076 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3077 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3078 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3079 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
3081 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3082 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
3088 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3089 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
3090 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
3091 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3092 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3093 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3094 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
3095 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
3097 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
3098 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3102 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3103 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3104 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
3105 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3106 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
3107 let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
3108 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
3109 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
3110 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3112 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
3113 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3117 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3118 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3119 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
3120 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3121 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
3122 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
3123 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3127 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
3130 let tx = <LocalCommitmentTransaction as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
3131 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3132 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3133 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3134 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3135 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3136 let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3138 let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3139 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3140 for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
3141 let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
3142 let sigs = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3144 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
3145 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3147 htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
3152 tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw,
3159 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3162 Some(read_local_tx!())
3164 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3167 let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3170 Some(read_local_tx!())
3172 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3175 let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
3177 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3178 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3179 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
3180 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
3181 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3182 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
3183 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3187 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3188 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3189 let to_remote_rescue = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3192 let to_remote_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3193 let local_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3194 Some((to_remote_script, local_key))
3196 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3199 let pending_claim_requests_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3200 let mut pending_claim_requests = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_claim_requests_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3201 for _ in 0..pending_claim_requests_len {
3202 pending_claim_requests.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
3205 let claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3206 let mut claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_claim_requests_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3207 for _ in 0..claimable_outpoints_len {
3208 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
3209 let ancestor_claim_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3210 let height = Readable::read(reader)?;
3211 claimable_outpoints.insert(outpoint, (ancestor_claim_txid, height));
3214 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3215 let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3216 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
3217 let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
3218 let events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3219 let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3220 for _ in 0..events_len {
3221 let ev = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3223 let claim_request = Readable::read(reader)?;
3224 OnchainEvent::Claim {
3229 let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
3230 let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3231 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
3232 htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
3236 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
3237 let input_material = Readable::read(reader)?;
3238 OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint {
3243 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3247 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events);
3250 let watch_outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3251 let mut watch_outputs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(watch_outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 3*8)));
3252 for _ in 0..watch_outputs_len {
3253 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3254 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3255 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 3*8));
3256 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
3257 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3259 if let Some(_) = watch_outputs.insert(txid, outputs) {
3260 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3264 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
3265 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
3268 their_htlc_base_key,
3269 their_delayed_payment_base_key,
3270 funding_redeemscript,
3271 channel_value_satoshis,
3272 their_cur_revocation_points,
3275 their_to_self_delay,
3278 remote_claimable_outpoints,
3279 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
3280 remote_hash_commitment_number,
3282 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
3283 current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
3284 current_remote_commitment_number,
3291 pending_claim_requests,
3293 claimable_outpoints,
3295 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
3308 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
3309 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3310 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
3311 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
3312 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
3313 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
3314 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
3315 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
3316 use bitcoin_hashes::hex::FromHex;
3318 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
3319 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, InputDescriptors};
3321 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys, LocalCommitmentTransaction};
3322 use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
3323 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
3324 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
3325 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
3329 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
3330 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
3331 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
3332 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
3333 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3334 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
3336 macro_rules! test_secrets {
3338 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
3339 for secret in secrets.iter() {
3340 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
3343 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
3344 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
3349 // insert_secret correct sequence
3350 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3353 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3354 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3355 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3358 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3359 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3360 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3363 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3364 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3365 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3368 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3369 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3370 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3373 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3374 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
3375 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3378 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3379 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3380 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3383 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3384 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
3385 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3388 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3389 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
3390 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3395 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
3396 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3399 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3400 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
3401 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3404 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3405 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3406 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3407 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3411 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
3412 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3415 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3416 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
3417 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3420 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3421 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
3422 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3425 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3426 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3427 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3430 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3431 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3432 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3433 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3437 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
3438 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3441 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3442 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3443 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3446 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3447 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3448 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3451 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3452 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
3453 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3456 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3457 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3458 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3459 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3463 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
3464 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3467 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3468 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
3469 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3472 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3473 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
3474 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3477 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3478 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
3479 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3482 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3483 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
3484 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3487 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3488 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
3489 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3492 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3493 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3494 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3497 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3498 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
3499 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3502 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3503 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
3504 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3505 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3509 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
3510 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3513 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3514 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3515 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3518 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3519 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3520 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3523 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3524 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3525 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3528 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3529 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3530 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3533 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3534 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
3535 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3538 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3539 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3540 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3541 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3545 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
3546 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3549 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3550 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3551 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3554 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3555 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3556 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3559 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3560 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3561 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3564 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3565 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3566 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3569 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3570 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
3571 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3574 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3575 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
3576 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3579 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3580 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
3581 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3584 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3585 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
3586 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3587 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3591 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
3592 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3595 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3596 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3597 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3600 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3601 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3602 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3605 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3606 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3607 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3610 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3611 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3612 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3615 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3616 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
3617 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3620 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3621 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3622 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3625 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3626 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
3627 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3630 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3631 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
3632 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3633 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3637 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
3638 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3641 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3642 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3643 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3646 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3647 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3648 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3651 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3652 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3653 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3656 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3657 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3658 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3661 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3662 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
3663 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3666 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3667 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3668 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3671 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3672 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
3673 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3676 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3677 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
3678 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3679 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3684 fn test_prune_preimages() {
3685 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3686 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
3688 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
3689 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
3693 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
3694 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3695 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3696 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3697 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3698 b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3703 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3705 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
3707 let mut rng = thread_rng();
3709 let mut preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
3710 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage.0[..]);
3711 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3712 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
3716 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
3717 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3719 let mut res = Vec::new();
3720 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
3721 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3725 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
3726 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
3733 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
3734 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3736 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
3737 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
3743 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
3744 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
3745 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
3746 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
3751 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
3753 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3754 monitor.their_to_self_delay = Some(10);
3756 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
3757 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
3758 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
3759 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
3760 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
3761 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
3762 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
3765 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
3766 let mut secret = [0; 32];
3767 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3768 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3769 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
3770 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3771 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
3773 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
3774 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3775 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3776 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
3777 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3778 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
3780 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
3781 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
3782 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
3783 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3784 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3785 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
3786 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3787 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
3789 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
3790 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
3791 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3792 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3793 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
3794 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
3798 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
3799 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
3800 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
3802 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3803 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3804 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
3805 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3807 macro_rules! sign_input {
3808 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
3809 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3810 offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
3812 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
3813 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
3814 transaction_output_index: Some($idx),
3816 let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
3817 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeem_script, $amount)[..]);
3818 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
3819 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3820 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3821 sum_actual_sigs += $input.witness[0].len();
3822 if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
3823 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
3824 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
3825 $input.witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
3826 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
3827 $input.witness.push(vec![0]);
3829 $input.witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
3831 $input.witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
3832 println!("witness[0] {}", $input.witness[0].len());
3833 println!("witness[1] {}", $input.witness[1].len());
3834 println!("witness[2] {}", $input.witness[2].len());
3838 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
3839 let txid = Sha256dHash::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
3841 // Justice tx with 1 to_local, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
3842 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3844 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3845 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3849 script_sig: Script::new(),
3850 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3851 witness: Vec::new(),
3854 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
3855 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
3858 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3859 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3860 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
3861 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3862 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3864 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3866 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
3867 claim_tx.input.clear();
3868 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3870 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3871 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3875 script_sig: Script::new(),
3876 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3877 witness: Vec::new(),
3880 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3881 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3882 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
3883 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3884 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3886 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3888 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
3889 claim_tx.input.clear();
3890 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3891 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3892 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3896 script_sig: Script::new(),
3897 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3898 witness: Vec::new(),
3900 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3901 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3902 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
3903 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3904 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3906 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3909 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.