1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use chain::channelmonitor;
17 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
18 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
19 use chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
20 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
21 use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC};
22 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
23 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
24 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
25 use ln::chan_utils::HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT;
26 use routing::network_graph::{NetworkUpdate, RoutingFees};
27 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop, RouteHint, RouteHintHop, get_route, get_keysend_route};
28 use routing::scorer::Scorer;
29 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
31 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
32 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
33 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
34 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason};
35 use util::errors::APIError;
36 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
37 use util::config::UserConfig;
39 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
40 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
42 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
43 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
44 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
46 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
47 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
50 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
56 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
57 use core::default::Default;
58 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
60 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
61 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
64 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
65 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
66 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
67 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
68 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
69 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
71 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
73 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
74 let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
75 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
77 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
78 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
80 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
81 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
83 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
84 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
85 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
86 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
87 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
88 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
89 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
90 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
92 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
93 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
95 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
97 } else { assert!(false); }
100 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
101 use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
103 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
104 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS; msg });
106 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
108 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than funding value \d+", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
110 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
112 insane_open_helper(r"Bogus; channel reserve \(\d+\) is less than dust limit \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis + 1; msg });
114 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
116 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
118 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
120 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
124 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
125 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
126 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
127 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
128 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
129 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
132 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
136 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
137 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
138 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
139 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
140 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
141 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
142 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
143 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
144 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
145 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
147 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
149 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
151 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
153 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
156 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
157 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
159 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
160 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
161 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
162 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
163 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
165 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
168 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
170 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
171 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
172 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
173 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
175 let payment_event = {
176 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
177 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
178 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
180 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
181 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
183 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
184 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
185 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
186 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
187 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
190 // deliver(1), generate (3):
191 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
192 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
193 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
194 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
196 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
197 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
198 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
199 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
200 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
201 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
202 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
203 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
205 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
206 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
207 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
208 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
209 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
210 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
211 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
212 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
214 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
215 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
216 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
217 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
219 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
220 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
221 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
223 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
224 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
226 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
227 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
229 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
230 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
233 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
234 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
238 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
239 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
240 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
241 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
242 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
243 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
244 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
245 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
248 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
250 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
252 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
255 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
256 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
258 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
259 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
260 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
261 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
264 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
267 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
269 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
270 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
271 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
272 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
274 let payment_event = {
275 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
276 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
277 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
279 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
280 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
282 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
283 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
284 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
285 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
286 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
287 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
289 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
290 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
292 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
296 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
297 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
298 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
299 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
300 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
301 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
304 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
305 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
306 // update_fee (never committed) ->
308 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
309 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
310 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
311 // <- (1) RAA delivered
312 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
313 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
314 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
315 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
317 // B should send no response here
318 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
319 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
322 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
325 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
326 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
327 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
329 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
330 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
332 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
333 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
334 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
335 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
336 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
338 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
341 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
342 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
343 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
344 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
345 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
347 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
350 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
351 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
353 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
354 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
355 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
357 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
358 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
359 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
360 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
363 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
365 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
367 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
369 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
370 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
371 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
372 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
373 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
374 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
375 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
376 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
377 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
378 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
379 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
381 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
382 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
383 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
384 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
385 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
387 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
388 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
389 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
392 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
393 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
394 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
396 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
397 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
398 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
400 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
401 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
402 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
403 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
405 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
406 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
407 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
410 fn do_test_1_conf_open(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
411 // Previously, if the minium_depth config was set to 1, we'd never send a funding_locked. This
412 // tests that we properly send one in that case.
413 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
414 alice_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
415 alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
416 alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
417 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
418 bob_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
419 bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
420 bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
421 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
422 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
423 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)]);
424 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
425 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
427 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
428 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
429 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
431 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
432 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
433 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
436 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
437 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
438 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
442 fn test_1_conf_open() {
443 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst);
444 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirst);
445 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
448 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
449 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
450 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
451 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
454 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
455 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
456 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
457 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
459 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
461 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
464 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
465 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
468 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
469 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
470 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
472 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
473 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
474 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
476 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
477 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
479 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
481 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
482 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
483 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
484 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
486 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
487 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
489 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
490 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
491 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
492 added_monitors.clear();
494 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
496 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
497 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
499 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
500 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
501 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
502 added_monitors.clear();
505 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
506 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
508 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
509 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
511 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
512 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
513 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
514 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
518 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
519 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
520 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
521 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
522 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
523 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
524 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
525 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
526 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
527 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
528 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
529 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
530 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
531 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
532 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
533 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
534 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
535 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
536 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
540 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
541 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
542 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
543 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
544 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
545 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
548 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
551 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
552 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
554 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
555 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
556 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
557 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
558 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
560 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
562 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
564 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
565 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
566 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
568 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
569 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
570 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
572 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
573 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
574 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
575 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
577 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
578 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
579 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
583 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
584 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
585 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
586 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
587 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
588 let channel_value = 1888;
589 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 700000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
590 let channel_id = chan.2;
594 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
595 *feerate_lock = feerate;
597 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
598 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
599 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
601 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
603 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
605 //Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate of 260 set above.
606 //This value results in a fee that is exactly what the funder can afford (277 sat + 1000 sat channel reserve)
608 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
610 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit so -2 non-HTLC txns from number of outputs
611 let num_htlcs = commitment_tx.output.len() - 2;
612 let total_fee: u64 = feerate as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
613 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
614 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
615 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
618 //Add 2 to the previous fee rate to the final fee increases by 1 (with no HTLCs the fee is essentially
619 //fee_rate*(724/1000) so the increment of 1*0.724 is rounded back down)
621 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
622 *feerate_lock = feerate + 2;
624 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
625 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
627 let update2_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
629 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
631 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
632 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
633 //Should produce and error.
634 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.commitment_signed);
635 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
636 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
637 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
638 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
642 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
643 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
644 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
645 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
646 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
647 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
650 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
653 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
656 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
657 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
659 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
660 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
661 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
662 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
663 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
665 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
667 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
668 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
669 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
670 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
672 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
674 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
675 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
677 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
678 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
679 added_monitors.clear();
681 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
682 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
683 // node[1] has nothing to do
685 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
686 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
687 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
689 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
690 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
691 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
692 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
693 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
694 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
695 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
697 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
698 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
699 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
700 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
701 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
702 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
704 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
705 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
706 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
707 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
709 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
710 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
711 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
713 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
714 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
715 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
716 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
718 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
719 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
720 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
722 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
724 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
725 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
727 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
728 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
731 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
733 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
734 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
735 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
736 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
737 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
741 fn test_update_fee() {
742 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
743 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
744 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
745 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
746 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
747 let channel_id = chan.2;
750 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
751 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
752 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
753 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
754 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
755 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
756 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
757 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
758 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
759 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
760 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
763 // Create and deliver (1)...
766 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
767 feerate = *feerate_lock;
768 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
770 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
771 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
773 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
774 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
775 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
776 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
777 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
779 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
781 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
783 // Generate (2) and (3):
784 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
785 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
786 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
789 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
790 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
791 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
793 // Create and deliver (4)...
795 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
796 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
798 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
799 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
800 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
801 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
802 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
803 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
804 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
806 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
809 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
810 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
811 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
813 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
814 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
816 // Handle (3), creating (6):
817 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
818 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
819 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
820 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
823 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
824 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
825 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
827 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
828 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
829 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
830 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
831 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
832 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
833 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
834 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
835 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
838 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
839 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
840 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
841 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
843 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
844 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
845 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
847 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
848 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
849 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
850 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
851 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
855 fn fake_network_test() {
856 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
857 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
858 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
859 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
860 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
861 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
863 // Create some initial channels
864 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
865 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
866 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
868 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
869 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
870 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
871 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
872 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
874 // Send some more payments
875 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
876 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
877 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
879 // Test failure packets
880 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
881 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
883 // Add a new channel that skips 3
884 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
886 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
887 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
888 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
889 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
890 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
891 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
892 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
894 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
895 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
897 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
898 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
899 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
900 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
902 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
905 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
906 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
907 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
908 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
910 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
913 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
914 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
915 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
916 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
918 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
920 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
921 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
922 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops] }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
924 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
926 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
927 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
928 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
929 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
931 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
934 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
935 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
936 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
937 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
939 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
942 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
943 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
944 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
945 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
947 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
949 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
950 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
951 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops] }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
953 // Claim the rebalances...
954 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
955 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
957 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
958 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
960 // Send some payments across both channels
961 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
962 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
963 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
966 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
967 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
968 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
969 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap(), 1);
971 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
973 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
974 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
975 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
977 // Close down the channels...
978 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
979 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
980 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
981 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
982 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
983 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
984 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
985 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
986 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
987 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
988 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
989 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
990 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
991 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
992 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
996 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
997 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
998 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
999 // commitment dance rounds.
1000 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1001 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1002 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1003 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1004 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1005 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1007 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1008 for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1009 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1010 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1011 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1013 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1015 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1016 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1017 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1018 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1020 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1021 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1023 let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1025 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1026 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1027 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1028 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1031 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1032 let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1034 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1035 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1038 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1039 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1040 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1041 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1043 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1044 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1045 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1046 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1047 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1048 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1049 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1051 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1052 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1053 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1055 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1057 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1058 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1059 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1060 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1062 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1063 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1064 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1065 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1067 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1068 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1069 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1071 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1072 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1074 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1075 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1076 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1077 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1078 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1080 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1081 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1082 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1083 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1084 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1086 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1087 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1089 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1091 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1092 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1093 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1095 &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1096 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1098 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1102 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1103 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1106 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1110 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1111 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1112 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1113 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1114 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1115 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1116 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1118 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1119 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1120 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1121 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1122 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1123 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1125 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1127 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1128 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1130 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1131 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1133 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1134 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1135 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1139 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1140 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1141 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1142 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1143 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1144 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1145 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1146 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1148 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1151 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1153 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1155 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1156 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
1157 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1159 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1160 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1161 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1163 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1164 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1166 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1167 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1168 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1169 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1170 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1171 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1172 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1175 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1177 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1178 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1179 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1180 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1182 // Check we only broadcast 1 timeout tx
1183 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1184 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1185 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1186 assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1187 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3);
1188 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]);
1189 check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]);
1191 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1192 assert_eq!(claim_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
1193 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
1195 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1196 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1197 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
1198 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1199 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1200 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1201 check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1202 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1204 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1205 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1208 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1209 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1210 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1211 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1213 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1214 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1215 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1216 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1217 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1218 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1220 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1226 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1227 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1228 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1229 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1230 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1231 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1233 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1234 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1236 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1237 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1);
1238 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1239 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1240 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1242 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1244 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1245 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1246 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1249 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1251 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1252 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1254 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1258 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1259 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1260 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1261 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1262 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1263 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1265 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1266 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1267 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1268 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1270 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1272 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1273 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1274 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1275 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1278 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1279 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1280 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1281 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1284 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1286 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1287 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1288 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1290 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1292 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1294 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1295 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1296 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1297 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1298 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1299 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1300 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1301 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1303 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1304 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1305 chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1306 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1307 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1309 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1310 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1311 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1312 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1313 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1314 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1315 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1316 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1319 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1320 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1321 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1323 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1324 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1325 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1327 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1329 amount_msat: 3460001,
1330 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1332 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1335 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1338 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1339 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1340 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1341 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1345 false, local_funding, remote_funding,
1346 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1348 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1349 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1351 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1354 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1357 htlc_signatures: res.1
1360 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1361 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1362 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1364 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1365 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1367 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1368 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1370 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1372 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1373 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1374 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1376 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1377 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1378 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1380 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1382 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1383 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1385 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1389 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1390 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1391 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1392 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1393 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1395 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
1396 chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(feerate_per_kw) };
1397 chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(feerate_per_kw) };
1398 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1399 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1400 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1402 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1403 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
1404 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1406 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1408 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1409 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1411 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1412 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1413 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1414 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1415 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1416 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1420 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1421 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1422 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the funder
1423 // receiving 1 update_add_htlc would result in them closing the channel due
1424 // to channel reserve violation. This close could also happen if the fee went
1425 // up a more realistic amount, but many HTLCs were outstanding at the time of
1426 // the update_add_htlc.
1427 chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(6000) };
1428 chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(6000) };
1429 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1430 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1431 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1432 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1434 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1000);
1435 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1436 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1437 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1438 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1439 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1440 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 1000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1441 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1442 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1445 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1446 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1447 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1448 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1451 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1452 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1453 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1454 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1455 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1456 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1457 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1458 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1462 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1463 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1464 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1465 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1466 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
1467 chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(feerate_per_kw) };
1468 chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(feerate_per_kw) };
1470 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1471 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1472 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1474 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1475 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1476 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1477 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1478 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT) / 1000 * 1000;
1479 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1480 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1482 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1483 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1484 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1485 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1486 // commitment transaction fee.
1487 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1489 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1490 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1491 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1492 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1496 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1497 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1498 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1499 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1500 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1501 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1502 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1503 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1505 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1506 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1507 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1508 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1509 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1510 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1512 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1513 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1514 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1515 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1516 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1517 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1519 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1520 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1521 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1522 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1526 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1527 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1528 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1529 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1530 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1531 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1532 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1535 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1536 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1537 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1539 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1540 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1541 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1542 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1544 // Add a pending HTLC.
1545 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1546 let payment_event_1 = {
1547 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1548 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1550 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1551 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1552 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1554 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1556 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1557 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2);
1558 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1559 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1560 let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1562 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1563 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1564 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1565 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1566 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1567 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1568 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1569 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1572 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1573 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1574 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1575 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1578 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1579 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1580 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1581 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1582 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1583 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1584 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1585 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1589 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1590 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1591 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1592 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1593 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1594 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1595 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1596 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1597 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1598 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1600 let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
1601 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1602 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1604 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1605 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1608 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64) -> u64 {
1609 (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1613 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1614 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1615 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1616 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1617 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1618 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1619 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1620 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1621 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1622 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1623 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1625 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1626 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1628 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1629 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1631 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1633 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1634 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1635 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1636 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1641 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1642 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1643 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1645 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1647 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1649 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_0);
1650 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1651 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1652 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1653 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1654 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1655 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1658 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1659 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1661 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1662 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1663 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1664 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1665 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1666 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1667 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1670 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
1672 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1673 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1674 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1675 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1676 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1679 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1680 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1681 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1682 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1683 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1686 // adding pending output.
1687 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1688 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1689 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1690 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1691 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1692 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1693 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1694 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1695 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1697 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1698 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1699 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1701 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1702 let payment_event_1 = {
1703 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1704 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1706 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1707 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1708 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1710 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1712 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1713 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1715 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1716 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1717 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1718 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1721 // split the rest to test holding cell
1722 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1723 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1724 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1725 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1727 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1728 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1731 // now see if they go through on both sides
1732 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1733 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1734 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1735 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1736 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1737 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1739 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1741 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1742 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1743 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1744 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1745 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1748 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1749 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1750 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1751 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1752 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1753 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1755 // flush the pending htlc
1756 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1757 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1758 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1760 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1761 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1762 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1763 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1765 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1766 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1767 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1768 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1770 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1771 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1772 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1774 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1776 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1777 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1778 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1780 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1781 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1783 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1784 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1785 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1786 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1787 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1788 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1790 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1791 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1792 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1793 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1795 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1796 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1798 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1799 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1801 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1802 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1803 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
1805 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1806 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1807 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1809 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1812 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1815 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1816 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1817 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
1819 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1820 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1821 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1823 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1826 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1829 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1830 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1831 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1833 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1);
1834 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1835 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
1837 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
1838 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
1839 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1840 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
1841 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
1843 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1844 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
1848 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
1849 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
1850 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
1851 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
1852 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
1853 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
1854 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
1855 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
1857 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
1858 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
1859 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
1860 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
1861 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
1862 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
1863 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
1864 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
1866 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
1867 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
1868 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
1869 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
1870 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
1871 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1872 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1873 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1874 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1875 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1877 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1878 // Route the first two HTLCs.
1879 let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000);
1880 let (payment_preimage_2, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20000);
1882 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
1883 let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
1885 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
1886 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1887 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1888 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1889 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1892 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
1893 // initial fulfill/CS.
1894 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
1895 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1896 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1898 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
1899 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
1900 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2));
1901 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1902 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1904 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
1905 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
1906 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1907 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1908 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
1910 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
1911 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
1912 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1913 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
1914 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1916 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1917 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1918 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1920 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
1921 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1922 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1924 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
1925 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1926 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1928 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
1929 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
1930 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
1931 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
1932 // on-chain as necessary).
1933 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
1934 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
1935 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1936 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1937 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
1939 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1940 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1941 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1943 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1944 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
1946 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
1947 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
1948 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
1949 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1950 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1952 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
1953 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
1954 let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
1956 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
1957 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1958 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1959 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1960 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1963 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
1964 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
1965 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1966 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1968 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
1970 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
1971 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1972 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1974 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1975 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1977 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
1978 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1979 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1981 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
1982 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1983 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1985 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
1986 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1988 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
1989 expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
1991 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
1992 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
1996 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
1997 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
1998 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
1999 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2000 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2001 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2002 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2004 // Create some initial channels
2005 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2006 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2007 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2008 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2010 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2011 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2012 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2013 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2014 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2015 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2017 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2018 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2019 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2020 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2021 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2023 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2024 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2025 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2026 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2028 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2029 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2030 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2031 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2032 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2034 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2035 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2036 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2037 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2038 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2040 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2041 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2043 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2044 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2045 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2046 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2047 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2049 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2050 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2051 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2052 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2053 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2054 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2056 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2057 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2058 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2059 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2060 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2062 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2063 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2065 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2066 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2068 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2069 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2071 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2072 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2073 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2074 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2076 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2082 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2083 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2084 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2085 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2086 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false);
2087 let node2_commitment_txid;
2089 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2090 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2091 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2092 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2094 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2095 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
2096 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2097 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2098 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2100 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2101 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2102 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2103 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2104 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2106 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2107 // confusing us in the following tests.
2108 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.write().unwrap().remove(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
2110 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2111 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
2112 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2115 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2116 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2117 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2118 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2119 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2120 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2123 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2126 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2127 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2129 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2131 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2133 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2135 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2136 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2137 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2143 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2145 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2146 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
2148 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2149 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2150 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2151 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2152 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2155 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2158 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2159 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2161 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2163 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2164 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2166 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2167 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2168 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2170 nodes[3].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2171 nodes[4].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2172 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2173 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2175 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.write().unwrap().insert(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon);
2176 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2177 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2181 fn test_justice_tx() {
2182 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2183 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2184 alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2185 alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2186 alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2187 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2188 bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2189 bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2190 bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2191 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2192 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2193 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2194 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2195 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2196 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2197 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2198 // Create some new channels:
2199 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2201 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2202 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2203 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2204 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2205 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2206 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2207 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2208 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2209 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2210 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2211 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2212 // Revoke the old state
2213 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2216 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2218 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2219 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2220 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2222 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2223 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2224 node_txn.truncate(1);
2226 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2227 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2228 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2230 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2231 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2232 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2233 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2234 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2235 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2236 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2237 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2238 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2240 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2242 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2243 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2245 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2246 // Create some new channels:
2247 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2249 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2253 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2254 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2255 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2256 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2257 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2258 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2259 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2260 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2261 // Revoke the old state
2262 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2264 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2266 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2267 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2268 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2270 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2271 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2273 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2274 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2276 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2277 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2278 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2279 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2280 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2281 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2282 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2284 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2285 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2286 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2290 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2291 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2292 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2293 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2294 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2295 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2296 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2297 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2298 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2299 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2300 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2301 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2302 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2303 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2304 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2306 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2307 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2308 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2309 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2310 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2311 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2313 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2314 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2316 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2317 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2318 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2319 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2320 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2324 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2325 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2326 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2327 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2328 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2329 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2330 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2332 // Create some new channel:
2333 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2335 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2336 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2337 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2338 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2339 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2341 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2342 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2343 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2344 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2345 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2346 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2347 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2348 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2349 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2351 //Revoke the old state
2352 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2355 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2356 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2357 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2358 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2359 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2360 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2361 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2362 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2364 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2365 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2367 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2368 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2370 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2371 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2372 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2373 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2374 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2375 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2376 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2377 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2379 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2380 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2381 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
2383 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2384 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2385 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2389 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2390 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2391 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2392 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2393 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2394 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2395 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2397 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2399 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2400 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2401 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2402 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2403 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2404 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2406 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2407 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2409 //Revoke the old state
2410 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2413 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2414 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2415 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2416 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2417 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2418 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2419 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2421 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2422 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2425 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2426 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2428 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2429 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 9);
2430 // ChannelMonitor: justice tx revoked offered htlc, justice tx revoked received htlc, justice tx revoked to_local (3)
2431 // ChannelManager: local commmitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2432 // ChannelMonitor: bumped justice tx, after one increase, bumps on HTLC aren't generated not being substantial anymore, bump on revoked to_local isn't generated due to more room for expiration (2)
2433 // ChannelMonitor: local commitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2435 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2436 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2437 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2438 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2439 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2440 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2441 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2443 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2444 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2445 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2446 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2448 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2449 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2450 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2452 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2453 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2454 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2455 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2456 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2457 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2458 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2459 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2461 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2462 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2463 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2467 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2468 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2469 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2470 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2471 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2472 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2473 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2474 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2475 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2477 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2478 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2479 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2480 // PaymentSent event).
2482 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2483 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2484 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2485 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2487 // Create some initial channels
2488 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2489 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2491 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2492 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2493 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2494 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2495 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2497 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2498 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2499 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2501 let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2502 let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2504 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2505 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2506 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2507 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2508 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2509 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2510 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2511 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2512 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2513 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2514 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2515 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2516 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2518 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2519 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2520 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2521 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2522 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2523 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2524 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2525 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2526 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2527 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2528 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2529 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2530 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2531 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2532 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2533 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2534 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2536 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2537 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2538 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2539 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2541 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2542 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2543 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2544 added_monitors.clear();
2546 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2547 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2548 match forwarded_events[0] {
2549 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2550 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2552 if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[1] {
2553 } else { panic!(); }
2554 if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[2] {
2555 } else { panic!(); }
2556 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2558 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2559 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2560 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2561 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2562 added_monitors.clear();
2564 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2566 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2567 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2570 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2571 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2575 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2576 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2577 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2578 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2579 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2580 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2582 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2584 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2585 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2586 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2587 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2588 // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2589 // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2590 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2591 check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2592 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2593 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2595 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2596 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2597 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2598 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2600 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2601 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2602 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2603 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2605 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2606 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2610 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2611 // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2612 // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2613 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2615 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2616 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
2617 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2618 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2619 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2620 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2621 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2622 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2623 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2624 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2625 let commitment_spend =
2626 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2627 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2628 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2629 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2632 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2633 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2634 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2638 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2639 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2640 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2641 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2642 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2643 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2644 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2645 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2646 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2647 check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2648 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2649 // we already checked the same situation with A.
2651 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2652 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2653 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2654 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2655 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2656 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2657 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2658 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2659 let mut first_claimed = false;
2660 for event in events {
2662 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash } => {
2663 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2664 assert!(!first_claimed);
2665 first_claimed = true;
2667 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2668 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2671 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2672 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2675 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2678 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2679 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2680 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2681 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2682 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2683 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
2685 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
2687 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2688 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2689 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2690 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2691 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2692 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2693 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2695 // Create some intial channels
2696 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2697 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2699 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2700 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2701 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2703 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2705 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2706 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2707 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2708 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2709 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2710 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2711 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2713 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2714 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2716 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2717 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2718 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2719 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2720 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2721 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2723 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2725 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2726 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2727 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2728 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2729 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2730 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2731 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2732 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2734 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2735 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2736 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2737 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2738 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2741 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2742 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2743 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2744 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2746 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2747 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2749 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2750 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2751 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2752 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2754 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2758 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2759 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2760 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2762 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2763 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2764 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2765 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2768 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2770 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2771 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2772 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2773 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2774 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2775 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2776 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2778 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2782 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2783 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2784 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2785 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2787 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2788 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2789 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2790 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2791 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2792 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2794 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2797 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2798 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2799 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2801 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2802 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2804 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2805 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2806 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2807 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
2808 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2809 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2810 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2811 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2812 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2816 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
2817 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
2818 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
2819 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
2823 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
2824 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
2825 // and fail backward accordingly.
2827 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2828 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2829 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2830 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2832 // Create some initial channels
2833 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2834 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2836 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2837 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
2838 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2839 // Revoke the old state
2840 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
2842 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2844 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2845 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2846 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2847 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2848 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2850 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2851 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2852 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2853 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2855 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
2856 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2857 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2858 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2859 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2860 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2862 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2863 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
2864 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
2866 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2870 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
2871 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
2872 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
2873 // commitment transaction anymore.
2874 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
2875 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
2876 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
2877 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
2878 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
2879 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
2881 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
2882 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
2883 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
2884 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
2885 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
2886 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2887 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2888 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2889 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2891 // Create some initial channels
2892 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2893 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2895 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
2896 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
2897 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2898 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
2899 // Revoke the old state
2900 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
2902 let value = if use_dust {
2903 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
2904 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
2905 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
2908 let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
2909 let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
2910 let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
2912 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash));
2913 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2914 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2915 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2916 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2917 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2918 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2919 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2920 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
2921 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2922 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
2923 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
2925 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash));
2926 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2927 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2928 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2929 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2930 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2931 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2932 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2933 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
2934 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2935 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
2936 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2937 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
2938 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
2939 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2940 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2942 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash));
2943 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2944 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2945 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2946 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2947 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2948 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2949 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2950 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
2951 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2952 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
2953 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
2954 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
2955 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2956 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
2957 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
2958 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2959 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2961 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
2962 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
2963 let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
2964 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
2965 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2966 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2967 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
2970 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2971 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
2972 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
2973 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2974 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2975 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2977 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
2978 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2980 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
2981 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
2984 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
2985 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2987 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2988 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2989 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2991 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2992 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 3 });
2994 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
2995 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
2998 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
2999 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3001 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3003 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3005 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3006 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3009 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3010 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3012 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3013 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3014 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3015 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3016 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3018 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3019 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3020 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3021 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3023 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3027 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3028 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3029 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3030 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3031 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3032 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3034 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3037 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3038 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3039 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3040 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3041 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3042 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3043 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3045 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3046 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3047 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3049 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3051 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3052 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3054 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3055 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3056 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3057 // that we should update our routing table for.
3058 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3059 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3062 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3065 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3066 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3067 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3069 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3072 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3073 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3074 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3076 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3079 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3082 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3083 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3084 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3088 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3089 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3090 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3091 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3092 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3096 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3097 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3098 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3099 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3100 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3104 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3105 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3106 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3107 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3108 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3109 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3111 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3113 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3114 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3115 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3117 let payment_event = {
3118 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3119 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3120 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3122 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3123 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3126 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3127 let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3129 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3130 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3132 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3135 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3137 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3139 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3140 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3141 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3142 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3143 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3144 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3146 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3147 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3153 onion_routing_packet,
3155 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3157 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3158 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3159 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3161 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3162 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3164 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3167 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3168 assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3170 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3172 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3173 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3177 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3178 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3179 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3180 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3181 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3182 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3183 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3184 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3186 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3187 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
3188 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3189 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3190 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3191 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3193 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3194 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3195 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3197 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3198 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3199 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3200 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3201 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3203 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3204 // registering new transactions
3205 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3206 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3210 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3211 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3212 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3213 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3214 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3215 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3216 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3217 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3219 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3221 let mut payment_event = {
3222 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3223 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3225 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3226 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3227 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3230 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3231 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3233 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3235 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3236 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3237 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3238 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3240 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3241 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3242 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3243 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3244 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3246 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3247 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3248 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3250 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id).unwrap();
3251 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3252 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3253 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3255 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3256 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3257 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3258 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3259 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3263 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3265 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3266 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3267 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3268 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3270 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3272 let mut monitors = nodes[2].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap();
3273 monitors.get(&OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_slice(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]).unwrap(), index: 0 }).unwrap()
3274 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator, &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3276 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3277 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3278 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3279 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3280 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3281 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3282 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3284 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3288 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3289 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3290 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3291 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3292 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3294 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3295 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3296 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3297 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3298 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3300 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3302 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
3303 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3304 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3305 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3306 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3308 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3309 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3311 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3312 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3316 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3317 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3318 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3319 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3320 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3321 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3322 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3323 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3325 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3326 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3327 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3329 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3330 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3331 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3332 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3334 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3335 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3336 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3338 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3339 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3340 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3341 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3343 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3344 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3346 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3347 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3349 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3351 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3352 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3354 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash } => {
3355 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3356 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3358 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3361 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3362 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3363 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3365 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3369 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3370 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3373 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3374 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3375 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3376 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3377 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3378 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3380 let mut as_funding_locked = None;
3381 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3382 let (funding_locked, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3383 as_funding_locked = Some(funding_locked);
3384 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3385 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3386 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3388 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3391 let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3393 let payment_event = {
3394 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3395 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3397 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3398 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3399 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3401 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3403 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3404 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3406 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3407 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3408 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3409 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3410 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3412 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3413 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3414 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3415 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3417 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3418 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3419 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3420 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3421 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3423 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3424 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3425 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3426 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3433 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3434 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3435 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3436 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3437 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a funding_locked prior to a
3438 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to funding_locked time.
3440 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a funding_locked immediately on
3441 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate funding_locked sent
3442 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3444 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3445 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3447 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3448 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3449 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3450 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3451 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3452 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3453 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3454 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3455 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3456 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3457 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3458 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3459 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3460 // Everything was delivered...
3461 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3464 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3465 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3467 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3468 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3471 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3472 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3473 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3475 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3477 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3478 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3480 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
3481 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3482 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
3484 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3485 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3486 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3488 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3491 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3494 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3495 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3497 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3498 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3499 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3500 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3501 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3502 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3503 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3504 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3505 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3506 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3507 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3509 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3512 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3513 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3515 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3516 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3518 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash } => {
3519 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3520 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3522 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3525 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3526 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3527 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3528 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3530 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3531 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3532 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3533 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3535 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3536 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3537 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3538 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3539 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3541 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3542 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3543 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3544 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3551 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3552 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3553 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3554 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3555 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3556 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3557 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3559 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash } => {
3560 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3561 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3563 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3566 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3568 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3569 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3570 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3571 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3572 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3573 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3574 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3575 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3576 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3577 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3578 // Everything was delivered...
3579 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3582 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3583 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3584 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3586 // Channel should still work fine...
3587 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3588 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3589 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3593 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3594 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3595 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3596 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3597 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3601 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3602 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3603 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3604 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3605 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3609 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3610 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3611 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3612 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3613 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3614 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3615 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3616 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3617 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3618 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3620 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3621 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3623 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3624 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3625 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3627 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3628 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3630 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3633 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3635 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3636 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3638 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3639 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3640 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2);
3641 let funding_locked = match events_2[0] {
3642 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3643 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3646 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3648 let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_2[1] {
3649 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3650 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3653 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3656 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3658 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_locked);
3659 nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3660 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3661 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 2);
3662 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_3[0] {
3663 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3664 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3667 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3669 let (as_announcement, as_update) = match events_3[1] {
3670 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3671 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3673 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3676 nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3677 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3678 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3679 let (_, bs_update) = match events_4[0] {
3680 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3681 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3683 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3686 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&as_announcement).unwrap();
3687 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3688 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3690 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3691 let (payment_preimage, _, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
3692 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3694 // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3695 // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3696 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3698 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3699 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3700 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3702 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
3703 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
3704 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
3705 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
3706 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
3707 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
3708 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
3709 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
3711 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
3712 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
3713 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
3714 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
3715 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
3716 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
3718 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
3719 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
3720 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
3721 logger: nodes[0].logger,
3725 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
3726 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
3728 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
3729 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
3730 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3732 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3734 // as_announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
3735 nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
3736 let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3737 let mut found_announcement = false;
3738 for event in msgs.iter() {
3740 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
3741 if *msg == as_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
3743 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
3744 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3747 assert!(found_announcement);
3751 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3752 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3753 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3754 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3755 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3756 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3757 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3758 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3760 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
3762 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3763 let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3764 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
3765 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3767 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3768 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3770 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3771 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3774 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
3775 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3777 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3778 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3780 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3781 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3782 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3783 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3784 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3785 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3786 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3788 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3789 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3790 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3792 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash } => {
3793 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
3794 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
3796 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3799 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
3800 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3801 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3802 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3804 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3807 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3808 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3810 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3811 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3812 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
3813 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3814 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3815 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
3817 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
3818 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3819 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
3820 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3822 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
3823 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
3825 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
3826 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
3828 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
3830 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3831 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3832 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3833 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3834 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
3835 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
3836 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
3837 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3838 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3839 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3841 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
3842 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3843 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3844 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3845 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3846 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3847 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3848 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3850 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3851 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3852 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3853 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3854 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3855 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3856 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3857 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3859 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
3860 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3861 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3862 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3864 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
3865 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3866 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3867 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3869 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3870 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3871 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3873 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3875 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3876 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3878 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
3879 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
3881 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3882 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3883 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
3885 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3888 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3891 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
3892 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3893 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3895 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3898 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
3899 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
3900 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
3901 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3902 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3903 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3904 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3906 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3908 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
3909 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
3910 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
3911 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
3912 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
3913 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
3914 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
3915 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3916 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3917 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3918 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
3919 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
3920 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
3923 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
3926 let mut block = Block {
3927 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
3930 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
3931 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3932 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
3933 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
3934 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
3935 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
3936 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3939 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3941 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3942 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3943 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3944 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3945 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3946 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
3948 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3949 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
3950 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
3951 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
3952 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
3953 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
3957 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
3958 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
3959 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
3962 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
3963 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
3964 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3965 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3966 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3967 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3968 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3969 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3971 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
3972 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
3973 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
3974 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
3976 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
3977 let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
3979 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3981 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
3982 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3984 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
3985 let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
3986 let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
3987 sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3989 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3990 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
3991 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3992 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3993 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3995 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3997 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
3998 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3999 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4000 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4003 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4004 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4005 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4006 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4007 match fail_commit[0] {
4008 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4009 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4010 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4012 _ => unreachable!(),
4014 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4016 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, true);
4021 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4022 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4023 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4027 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4028 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4029 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4030 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4031 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4032 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4033 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4034 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4035 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4036 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4038 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4040 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4042 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4043 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4044 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4046 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4047 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4048 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4049 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4050 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4051 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4052 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4053 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4054 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4055 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4057 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4058 let config = UserConfig::default();
4059 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4060 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4061 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4062 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4063 default_config: config,
4065 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4066 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4067 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4072 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4073 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4075 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4076 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4077 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4078 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4080 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4081 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4082 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4083 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4085 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4086 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4087 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4088 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4090 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4091 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4092 for node in nodes.iter() {
4093 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4094 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4095 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4098 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4102 fn test_dup_htlc_onchain_fails_on_reload() {
4103 // When a Channel is closed, any outbound HTLCs which were relayed through it are simply
4104 // dropped when the Channel is. From there, the ChannelManager relies on the ChannelMonitor
4105 // having a copy of the relevant fail-/claim-back data and processes the HTLC fail/claim when
4106 // the ChannelMonitor tells it to.
4108 // If, due to an on-chain event, an HTLC is failed/claimed, and then we serialize the
4109 // ChannelManager, we generally expect there not to be a duplicate HTLC fail/claim (eg via a
4110 // PaymentPathFailed event appearing). However, because we may not serialize the relevant
4111 // ChannelMonitor at the same time, this isn't strictly guaranteed. In order to provide this
4112 // consistency, the ChannelManager explicitly tracks pending-onchain-resolution outbound HTLCs
4113 // and de-duplicates ChannelMonitor events.
4115 // This tests that explicit tracking behavior.
4116 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4117 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4118 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4119 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4120 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4121 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4122 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4124 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4126 // Route a payment, but force-close the channel before the HTLC fulfill message arrives at
4128 let (payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
4129 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
4130 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4131 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4132 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4134 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4135 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4137 // Connect blocks until the CLTV timeout is up so that we get an HTLC-Timeout transaction
4138 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
4139 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4140 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4141 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4143 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4144 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4146 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4147 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
4148 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4149 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4150 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4151 let claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4153 header.prev_blockhash = nodes[0].best_block_hash();
4154 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
4156 // Serialize out the ChannelMonitor before connecting the on-chain claim transactions. This is
4157 // fairly normal behavior as ChannelMonitor(s) are often not re-serialized when on-chain events
4158 // happen, unlike ChannelManager which tends to be re-serialized after any relevant event(s).
4159 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4160 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4162 header.prev_blockhash = nodes[0].best_block_hash();
4163 let claim_block = Block { header, txdata: claim_txn};
4164 connect_block(&nodes[0], &claim_block);
4165 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
4167 // ChannelManagers generally get re-serialized after any relevant event(s). Since we just
4168 // connected a highly-relevant block, it likely gets serialized out now.
4169 let mut chan_manager_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4170 nodes[0].node.write(&mut chan_manager_serialized).unwrap();
4172 // Now reload nodes[0]...
4173 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4174 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4175 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4176 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4177 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4178 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4179 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4180 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4182 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4183 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4184 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4185 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>
4186 ::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&chan_manager_serialized.0[..]), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4187 default_config: Default::default(),
4189 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
4190 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4191 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4192 logger: nodes[0].logger,
4196 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4198 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4200 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4202 // Note that if we re-connect the block which exposed nodes[0] to the payment preimage (but
4203 // which the current ChannelMonitor has not seen), the ChannelManager's de-duplication of
4204 // payment events should kick in, leaving us with no pending events here.
4205 let height = nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().len() as u32 - 1;
4206 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.block_connected(&claim_block, height);
4207 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4211 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4212 // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4213 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4214 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4215 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4216 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4217 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4218 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4219 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4220 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4221 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4223 // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4224 let channel_value = 100000;
4225 let push_msat = 10001;
4226 let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4227 let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4228 let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4229 let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4230 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4231 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4232 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4234 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, channel_value, 42);
4236 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4237 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4239 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4241 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4242 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4243 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4244 added_monitors.clear();
4247 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4249 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4250 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4251 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4252 added_monitors.clear();
4254 // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4259 // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4260 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4261 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4262 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4264 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4265 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4266 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4267 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4268 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4269 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4270 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4271 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4272 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4273 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4275 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4276 let config = UserConfig::default();
4277 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4278 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4279 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4280 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4281 default_config: config,
4283 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4284 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4285 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4290 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4291 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4293 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4295 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4296 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4298 // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4299 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4300 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4301 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4302 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4304 // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4305 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4306 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4308 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4309 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4310 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4311 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4313 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4314 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4315 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4316 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4318 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4319 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4320 for node in nodes.iter() {
4321 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4322 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4323 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4326 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4330 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4331 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4332 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4333 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4334 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4335 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4336 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4337 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4338 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4339 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4340 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4342 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4343 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4345 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4347 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4348 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4349 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4351 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4352 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4353 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4354 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4355 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4356 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4357 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4358 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4359 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4360 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4362 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4363 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4364 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4365 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4366 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4367 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4369 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4370 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4371 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4376 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4377 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4379 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4380 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4381 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4383 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4385 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4386 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4390 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4391 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4392 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4393 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4394 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4395 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4396 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4397 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4398 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4399 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4400 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4401 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4402 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4403 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4405 let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4406 for monitor in nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().iter() {
4407 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4408 monitor.1.write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4409 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4412 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4414 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4415 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4417 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4418 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4419 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4420 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4422 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4424 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4425 for monitor in nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().iter() {
4426 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4427 monitor.1.write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4428 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4431 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4432 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4433 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4434 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4435 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4436 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4439 let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4440 for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4441 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4442 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4443 assert!(read.is_empty());
4444 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4447 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4448 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4449 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4450 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4451 assert!(read.is_empty());
4452 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4455 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4456 if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4457 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4458 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4460 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4461 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4462 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4464 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4466 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4469 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4470 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4471 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4472 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4474 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4475 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4476 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4478 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4480 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4481 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4483 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4484 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4485 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4486 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4487 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4490 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4491 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4492 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4494 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4495 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4497 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4498 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4499 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4500 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4501 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4503 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4504 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4505 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4506 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4507 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4508 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4509 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4511 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4512 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4514 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4519 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4520 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4522 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4523 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4524 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4525 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4526 for event in events.drain(..) {
4528 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4529 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4530 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4531 all_outputs.push(outp);
4534 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4537 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4538 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4548 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4549 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4550 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4551 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4552 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4553 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4555 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4556 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4557 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4558 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4559 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4560 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4561 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4562 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4563 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4565 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4566 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4568 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4569 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4570 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4571 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4572 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4576 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4577 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4578 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4579 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4580 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4581 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4582 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4584 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4585 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4586 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4587 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4588 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4590 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4591 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4592 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4593 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4595 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4596 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4597 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4598 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4599 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4601 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4602 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4603 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4607 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4608 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4609 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4611 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4612 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4613 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4614 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4616 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4617 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4618 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4619 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4620 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4622 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4623 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4624 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4625 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4626 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4628 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4629 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4630 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4632 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4633 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4634 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4635 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4636 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4640 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4641 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4642 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4643 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4644 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4646 // Create some initial channels
4647 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4649 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4651 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4652 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4653 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4655 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4656 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4657 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4658 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4659 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4660 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4662 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4663 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4666 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4667 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4670 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4671 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4672 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4673 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4674 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4675 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4676 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4678 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4679 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4680 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4682 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4683 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4684 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4688 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4689 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4690 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4691 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4692 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4694 // Create some initial channels
4695 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4697 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4698 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4700 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4702 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4703 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4704 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4706 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4707 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4708 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4709 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4711 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4712 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4714 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4716 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4717 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4718 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4719 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4720 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4721 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4723 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4724 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4725 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4726 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4728 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4729 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4730 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4731 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4732 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4736 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4737 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4738 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4739 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4740 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4742 // Create some initial channels
4743 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4745 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4746 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4747 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4748 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4750 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4752 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4753 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4754 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4755 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4757 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4758 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4759 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4760 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4762 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4763 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4765 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4766 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4767 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4771 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4772 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4773 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4774 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4775 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4776 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4778 // Create some initial channels
4779 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4781 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4782 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4783 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4784 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4786 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4788 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4789 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4790 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4791 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4792 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4793 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4795 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4796 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4797 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4798 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4799 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4800 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4801 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4803 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4804 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4805 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
4806 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4807 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4808 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4810 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4811 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4812 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4813 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4814 // transactions next...
4815 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4816 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4818 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4819 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4820 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
4821 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4823 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
4824 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4827 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4828 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4830 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4831 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4833 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4834 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4835 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4836 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4837 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4841 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4842 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4843 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4844 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4845 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4846 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4848 // Create some initial channels
4849 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4851 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4852 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4853 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4854 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4856 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4857 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4859 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4861 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4862 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4863 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4864 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4865 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4866 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4868 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4869 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4870 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4871 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4873 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4874 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4875 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4877 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4878 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4879 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4880 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4881 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4882 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4884 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4885 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4887 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4888 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4889 // transactions next...
4890 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4891 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4892 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4893 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4895 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4896 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4899 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4900 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4902 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4904 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4905 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4907 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4908 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4910 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4911 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4912 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4913 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4914 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4915 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4916 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4917 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4921 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4922 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4923 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4924 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4925 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4927 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4930 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4931 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4932 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4933 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4935 // Create some initial channels
4936 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4937 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4939 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4940 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4941 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4942 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4943 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4945 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4946 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4947 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4949 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
4950 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4951 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4952 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4953 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4954 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4955 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4956 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4957 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4958 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4960 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4961 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4962 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4963 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4965 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4966 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
4967 assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
4968 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
4969 check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
4970 check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
4971 assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
4972 assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4973 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4974 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
4976 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4977 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
4978 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
4979 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4980 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4981 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4983 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4984 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4987 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, claim_from_onchain_tx } => {
4988 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4989 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4991 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4994 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4995 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
4996 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4997 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
5000 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5001 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5002 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
5003 match msg_events[0] {
5004 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5005 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5007 match msg_events[1] {
5008 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
5009 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5011 match msg_events[2] {
5012 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
5013 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5014 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5015 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5016 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5017 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
5019 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5021 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5022 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5023 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5024 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5025 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5026 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
5027 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
5028 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
5029 check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
5030 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5031 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5032 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5033 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5035 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5036 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5040 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5041 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5042 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5043 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5044 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5045 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5046 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5047 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5048 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5049 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5050 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5051 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5052 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5053 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5055 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5056 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5057 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5059 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5060 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5061 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5062 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5063 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5065 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
5067 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
5068 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5069 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5070 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5071 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], vec![], 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5072 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5074 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5075 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5076 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5078 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5079 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5080 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5081 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5082 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5084 let htlc_timeout_tx;
5085 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5086 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5087 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5088 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5089 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5091 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5092 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5093 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5094 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5095 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5096 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5097 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5099 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5100 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5101 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5102 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5105 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5106 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5107 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5108 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5109 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5111 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5112 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5115 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5116 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5118 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5119 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5120 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5121 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5122 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5123 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5124 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5125 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5126 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5127 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5128 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5129 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5130 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5132 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5133 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5134 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5135 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5136 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5137 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5138 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5139 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5140 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5141 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5143 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5144 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5146 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5148 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5150 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5151 // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5152 // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5153 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5154 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], Some(196*2), true);
5155 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5156 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5157 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5158 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5159 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5160 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5161 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5163 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5164 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5166 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5168 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash } => {
5169 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5170 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5172 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5177 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5178 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5179 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5180 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5181 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5183 // Create some initial channels
5184 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5186 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
5187 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5188 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5189 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5190 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5192 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5193 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5194 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5195 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5196 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5197 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5198 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5200 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5201 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5204 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5205 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5208 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5209 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5210 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5211 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5212 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5213 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5214 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5218 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5219 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5221 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5222 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5223 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5224 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5225 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5226 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5229 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5230 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5231 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5232 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5233 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5234 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5235 // use the same payment hashes.
5236 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5241 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5242 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5243 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5244 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5245 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5246 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5247 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5248 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5249 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5250 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5252 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5253 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5254 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5255 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5256 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5258 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5259 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5260 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5261 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5263 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5265 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5267 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5268 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5270 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200, 0).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5272 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200, 0).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5274 let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5276 let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5277 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5279 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200, 0).unwrap());
5281 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200, 0).unwrap());
5284 let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5286 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5287 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200, 0).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5290 let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5292 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5293 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200, 0).unwrap());
5295 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5296 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5297 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5298 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2).len(), 1);
5299 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5301 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5302 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5303 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1));
5304 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3));
5305 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5));
5306 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6));
5307 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5308 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
5309 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5311 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5312 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5313 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5314 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5315 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5316 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5318 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5319 assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
5320 assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4));
5321 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5322 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
5323 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5325 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5326 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5327 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5328 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5330 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5332 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
5333 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5334 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5335 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5336 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5337 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5338 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5339 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5340 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5341 if deliver_last_raa {
5342 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5344 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5347 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5348 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5349 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5350 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5352 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5353 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5354 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5356 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5357 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5358 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5360 if announce_latest {
5361 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5363 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5365 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5366 let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5367 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5370 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5374 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5375 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5378 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5379 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5380 if deliver_last_raa {
5381 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5383 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5385 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5387 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5388 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5389 let mut a_done = false;
5390 for msg in cs_msgs {
5392 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5393 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5394 // should be failed-backwards here.
5395 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5396 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5397 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5398 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5400 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5405 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5406 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5407 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5409 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5410 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5413 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5414 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5415 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5416 if announce_latest {
5417 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5418 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5419 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5422 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5424 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5428 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5429 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5430 let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5431 let mut as_updates = 0;
5432 for event in as_events.iter() {
5433 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5434 assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5435 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5436 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5438 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5440 if network_update.is_some() {
5443 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5445 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5446 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5447 if announce_latest {
5448 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5449 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5451 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5453 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5454 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5455 let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5456 let mut bs_updates = 0;
5457 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5458 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5459 assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5460 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5461 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5463 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5465 if network_update.is_some() {
5468 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5470 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5471 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5472 if announce_latest {
5473 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5475 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5477 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5478 // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5479 // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5480 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5481 assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5482 assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5486 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5487 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5491 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5492 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5496 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5497 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5498 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5499 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5503 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5504 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5505 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5506 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5507 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5509 // Create some initial channels
5510 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5512 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5513 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5514 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5515 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5517 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5518 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5519 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5520 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5521 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5522 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5524 let htlc_timeout = {
5525 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5526 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5527 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5528 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5529 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5530 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5534 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5535 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5536 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5538 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5539 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5540 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5541 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5542 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5543 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5544 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5545 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5546 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5547 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5548 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5552 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5553 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5554 // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5555 // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5557 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5559 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5560 let seed = [42; 32];
5561 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5562 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5563 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5564 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5565 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5566 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5568 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5569 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5571 // Create some initial channels
5572 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5574 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5575 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5576 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5578 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5579 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5580 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5581 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5582 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5584 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5585 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5586 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5587 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5588 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5590 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5591 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5592 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5593 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5594 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5595 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5596 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5597 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5600 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5601 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5602 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5603 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5604 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5605 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5607 let htlc_timeout = {
5608 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5609 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5610 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5611 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5615 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5616 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5617 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5619 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5620 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5621 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5622 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5623 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5624 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5625 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5626 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5627 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5628 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5629 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5630 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5634 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5635 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5636 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5637 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5638 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5640 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5642 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5643 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5645 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5646 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5647 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5649 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5650 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5651 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5653 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5654 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5655 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5657 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5658 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5659 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5662 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5663 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5664 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5665 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5666 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5667 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5669 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5671 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5672 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5673 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
5674 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5676 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5677 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5678 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5679 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5681 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash } => {
5682 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5683 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
5685 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5688 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5689 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5690 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5691 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5692 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5694 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5695 let mut block = Block {
5696 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5699 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5700 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5701 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5703 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5704 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5705 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5706 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5709 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5710 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5711 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5712 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5713 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5714 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5716 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5717 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5718 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5720 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5722 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5723 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5724 // to "time out" the HTLC.
5726 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5727 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5729 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5730 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5731 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5733 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5734 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5735 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5736 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5739 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5740 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5741 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5742 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5743 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5744 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5746 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5747 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5748 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5749 // actually revoked.
5750 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5751 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5752 assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
5753 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5754 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5756 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5757 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5758 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5759 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5760 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5761 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5762 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5763 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5764 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5765 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5767 if check_revoke_no_close {
5768 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5769 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5772 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5773 let mut block = Block {
5774 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5777 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5778 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5779 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5781 if !check_revoke_no_close {
5782 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5783 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5784 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5785 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5787 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5791 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5792 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5793 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5794 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5795 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5796 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5797 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5799 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5800 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5801 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5803 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5804 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5805 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5807 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5808 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5812 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5813 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5814 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5815 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5816 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5821 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5822 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5823 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5824 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5825 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5826 //Force duplicate channel ids
5827 for node in nodes.iter() {
5828 *node.keys_manager.override_channel_id_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5831 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5832 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5833 let push_msat=10001;
5834 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5835 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5836 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5838 //Create a second channel with a channel_id collision
5839 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5843 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5844 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5845 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5846 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5847 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5849 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5850 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5851 let push_msat=10001;
5852 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5854 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5855 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5856 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5857 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5858 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5860 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5861 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5862 let push_msat=10001;
5863 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5864 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5865 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5867 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5868 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5869 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5871 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5872 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5873 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5875 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5876 let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5877 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5879 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5880 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5881 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5882 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5883 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5884 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5888 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5889 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5890 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5891 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5892 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5894 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5895 let push_msat=10001;
5896 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5897 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5898 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5899 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5901 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5902 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5903 let err_msg = match events[0] {
5904 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5907 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5909 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5912 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5913 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5914 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5915 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5917 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5918 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5919 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5920 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5921 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5922 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5924 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5925 // pending_update_fee.
5927 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5928 *feerate_lock += 20;
5930 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5931 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5933 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5934 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5935 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5936 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5937 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5939 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5942 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5944 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5945 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5946 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5948 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5949 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
5950 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5952 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5953 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
5954 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5955 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5957 // Flush the pending fee update.
5958 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5959 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5960 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5961 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5962 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5964 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5965 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5966 // us to surface its failure to the user.
5967 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5968 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5969 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5970 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5971 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5972 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5974 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5975 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5976 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5978 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, path: _, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data } => {
5979 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5980 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
5981 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
5982 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
5983 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
5984 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
5985 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
5987 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5991 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5992 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5993 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5995 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5996 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5997 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5998 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5999 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6000 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6002 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6003 // pending_update_fee.
6005 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6006 *feerate_lock += 200;
6008 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6009 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6011 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6012 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6013 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6014 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6015 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6017 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6020 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6022 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6023 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6024 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6026 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6028 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1) - amt_1;
6029 let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6030 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6032 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6033 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
6034 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6035 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6036 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
6037 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6038 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6040 // Flush the pending fee update.
6041 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6042 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6043 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6044 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6045 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6046 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6048 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6049 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6050 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6051 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6052 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6053 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6054 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6055 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6056 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6058 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6059 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6060 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6062 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, path: _, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data } => {
6063 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6064 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6065 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6066 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6067 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6068 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6069 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6071 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6074 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6075 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6076 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6077 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6078 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6080 let raa = match send_raa_event {
6081 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6082 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6084 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6085 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6086 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6087 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6088 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6089 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6091 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6092 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6094 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6095 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6096 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6098 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6099 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6101 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6102 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6103 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6104 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6105 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6106 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6107 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6109 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash } => {
6110 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
6111 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
6113 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6117 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6118 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6119 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6122 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6123 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6124 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6125 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6126 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6127 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6128 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6129 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6130 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6131 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6132 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6134 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6135 // pending_update_fee.
6137 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6138 *feerate_lock += 20;
6140 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6141 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6143 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6144 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6145 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6146 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6147 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6149 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6152 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6154 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6155 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6156 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6158 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6160 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6161 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6162 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6163 let payment_event = {
6164 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6165 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6167 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6168 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6170 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6172 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6173 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6174 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6175 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6177 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6178 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6180 // Flush the pending fee update.
6181 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6182 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6183 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6184 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6185 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6186 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6188 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6189 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6190 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6192 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6193 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6196 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6199 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6200 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6201 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6203 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6204 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6205 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 1);
6206 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6207 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6208 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6211 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6212 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6213 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6215 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6216 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6217 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6218 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6219 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6220 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6221 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6222 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6223 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6224 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6226 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6229 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6230 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6231 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6233 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6234 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6235 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6236 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6237 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6238 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6239 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6240 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6241 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6242 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6243 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6245 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6246 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6247 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6250 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6251 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6252 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6255 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6256 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6257 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6258 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6259 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6260 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6261 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6263 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6264 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6266 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6267 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6268 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6269 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6273 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6274 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6275 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6276 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6277 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6278 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6279 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6281 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6282 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6283 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6284 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6286 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6287 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6291 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6292 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6293 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6294 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6295 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6296 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6297 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6299 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6300 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6301 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6302 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6303 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6305 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6306 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6307 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6308 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6309 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6313 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6314 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6315 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6316 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6317 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6318 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6319 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6320 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6322 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], vec![], 100000000, 500000001);
6323 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6324 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6328 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6329 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6330 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6331 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6332 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6333 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6334 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6335 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6336 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6337 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6339 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6340 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6341 let payment_event = {
6342 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6343 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6345 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6346 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6347 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6348 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6352 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6354 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6355 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6356 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6358 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6359 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6361 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6362 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6363 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6365 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6366 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6370 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6371 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6372 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6373 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6374 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6375 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6376 let channel_value = 100000;
6377 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6378 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6380 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6382 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6383 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6385 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
6386 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6387 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6389 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6390 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6392 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6395 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6397 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6398 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6399 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6400 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6401 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6402 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6403 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6404 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6406 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6407 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6408 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6411 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6412 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6413 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6414 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6415 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6416 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6417 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6418 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6419 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6420 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6421 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6425 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6426 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6427 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6428 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6429 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6430 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6431 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6433 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6434 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6435 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6436 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6437 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
6439 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6440 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6441 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6442 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6443 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6445 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6446 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6447 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6448 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6449 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6451 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6452 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6453 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6454 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6455 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6459 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6460 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6461 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6462 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6463 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6464 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6465 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6466 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6468 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6469 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6470 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6471 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6472 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6473 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6475 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6479 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6480 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6481 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6484 for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6485 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6486 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6488 msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6489 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6491 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6492 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6493 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6494 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6495 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6499 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6500 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6501 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6502 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6503 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6504 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6505 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6507 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6508 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6509 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6510 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6511 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6512 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6514 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6515 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6516 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6517 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6518 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6522 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6523 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6524 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6525 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6526 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6527 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6529 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6530 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6531 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6532 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6533 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6534 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6535 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6537 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6538 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6539 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6540 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6541 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6545 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6546 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6547 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6548 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6549 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6550 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6551 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6552 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6554 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6555 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6556 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6557 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6558 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6559 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6561 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6562 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6563 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6564 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6565 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6566 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6567 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6568 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6569 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6570 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6571 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6572 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6573 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6576 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6577 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6578 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6579 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6580 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6582 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6584 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6585 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6586 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6587 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6588 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6592 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6593 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6595 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6596 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6597 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6598 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6599 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6600 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6601 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6603 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6604 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6605 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6607 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6610 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6613 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6615 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6616 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6617 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6618 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6619 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6623 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6624 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6626 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6627 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6628 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6629 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6630 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6632 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6633 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6634 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6635 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6636 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6638 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6641 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6644 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6646 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6647 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6648 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6649 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6650 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6654 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6655 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6657 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6658 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6659 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6660 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6661 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6663 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6664 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6665 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6666 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6667 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6668 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6671 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6672 failure_code: 0x8000,
6675 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6677 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6678 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6679 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6680 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6681 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6685 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6686 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6688 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6689 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6690 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6691 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6692 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6694 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6696 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6697 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6699 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6700 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6701 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6703 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6704 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6705 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6706 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6707 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6708 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6709 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6711 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6715 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6717 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6719 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6720 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6721 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6722 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6723 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6727 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6728 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6730 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6731 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6732 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6733 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6734 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6736 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6738 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6739 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6741 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6742 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6743 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6745 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6746 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6747 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6748 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6749 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6750 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6751 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6753 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6757 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6759 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6761 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6762 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6763 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6764 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6765 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6769 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6770 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6772 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6773 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6774 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6775 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6776 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6778 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6779 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6780 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6782 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6783 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6785 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6786 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6787 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6789 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6791 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6793 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6794 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6795 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6796 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6797 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6798 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6799 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6801 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6804 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6805 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6807 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6808 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6809 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6810 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6811 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6815 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6816 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6817 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6819 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6820 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6821 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6822 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6823 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6824 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6826 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6829 let mut payment_event = {
6830 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6831 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6832 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6833 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6834 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6836 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6837 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6838 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6839 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6840 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6841 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6842 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6843 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6844 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6847 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6848 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6849 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6850 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6852 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6853 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6854 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6856 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6857 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6858 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6859 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6860 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6861 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6862 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6864 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6868 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6870 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6871 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6872 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6873 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6874 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6876 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6878 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6879 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6880 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6881 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6882 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6883 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6885 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6888 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6891 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6892 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6893 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6894 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6896 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6897 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6898 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6899 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6900 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6901 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6903 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6905 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6906 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6907 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6908 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6910 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6911 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6913 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6914 assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
6915 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6916 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6917 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6919 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6920 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6921 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6922 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6924 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6925 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6927 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6929 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6930 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6932 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6935 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6936 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6938 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6941 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
6942 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
6943 if announce_latest {
6944 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
6946 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
6949 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6950 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6951 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6953 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6954 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6955 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6956 // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
6957 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6958 let mut first_failed = false;
6959 for event in events {
6961 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6962 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
6963 assert!(!first_failed);
6964 first_failed = true;
6966 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6969 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6975 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
6976 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
6977 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
6980 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
6981 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
6982 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
6983 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6984 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
6985 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6986 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
6988 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6989 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6990 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6991 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6992 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6994 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6996 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6997 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6999 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7000 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7002 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7004 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7005 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7008 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7010 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7011 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7012 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7013 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7014 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7016 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7017 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7018 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7019 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7020 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7021 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7022 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7023 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7024 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7025 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7026 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7028 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7029 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7030 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7031 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7032 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7033 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7034 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7035 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7037 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7038 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7039 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
7040 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7041 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7042 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7043 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7045 // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
7047 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7048 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7051 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7052 if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
7053 else { first = false; }
7055 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7058 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7059 if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
7060 else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
7062 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7069 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7070 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7071 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7072 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7076 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7077 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7079 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7080 low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7081 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7082 high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7083 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7084 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7085 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7086 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7087 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7089 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7090 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0, &low_our_to_self_config) {
7092 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7093 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7095 } else { assert!(false) }
7097 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7098 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7099 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7100 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7101 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &low_our_to_self_config) {
7103 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7104 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7106 } else { assert!(false); }
7108 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7109 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7110 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7111 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7112 accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7113 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7115 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7117 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7118 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7119 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7123 } else { panic!(); }
7124 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7126 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7127 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7128 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7129 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7130 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &high_their_to_self_config) {
7132 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7133 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7135 } else { assert!(false); }
7139 fn test_data_loss_protect() {
7140 // We want to be sure that :
7141 // * we don't broadcast our Local Commitment Tx in case of fallen behind
7142 // (but this is not quite true - we broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr)
7143 // * we close channel in case of detecting other being fallen behind
7144 // * we are able to claim our own outputs thanks to to_remote being static
7145 // TODO: this test is incomplete and the data_loss_protect implementation is incomplete - see issue #775
7151 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7152 // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7153 // during signing due to revoked tx
7154 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7155 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7158 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7159 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7160 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7162 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7164 // Cache node A state before any channel update
7165 let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7166 let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7167 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7169 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7170 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7172 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7173 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7175 // Restore node A from previous state
7176 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7177 let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7178 chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7179 tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7180 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7181 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7182 monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7184 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7185 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7186 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7187 keys_manager: keys_manager,
7188 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7189 chain_monitor: &monitor,
7191 tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7192 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7196 nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7197 assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7198 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7199 nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7201 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7203 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7204 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7206 let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7208 // Check we don't broadcast any transactions following learning of per_commitment_point from B
7209 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7210 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7213 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7214 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7217 let mut reestablish_1 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7218 for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7219 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
7220 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7221 reestablish_1.push(msg.clone());
7222 } else if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7223 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7225 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7226 assert_eq!(msg.data, "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting");
7228 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7231 panic!("Unexpected event")
7235 // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7236 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7237 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_string() });
7238 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction");
7239 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7241 // Check A is able to claim to_remote output
7242 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7243 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7244 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
7245 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
7246 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
7247 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7248 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can\'t do any automated broadcasting".to_string() });
7249 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
7250 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
7251 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
7255 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7256 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7257 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7258 // to B, B should refuse payment.
7260 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7261 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7262 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7263 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7265 // Create some initial channels
7266 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7268 let scorer = Scorer::new(0);
7269 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7270 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7271 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200, 0).unwrap();
7272 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7273 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7275 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7276 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7277 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7278 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7279 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7281 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7282 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7283 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7284 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7286 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7287 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7288 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7290 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7291 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7292 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7293 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7294 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7295 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7296 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7297 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7298 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7299 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7301 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7303 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7305 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7306 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7308 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7309 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7310 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7311 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7315 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7316 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7317 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7319 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7320 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7321 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7322 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7324 let short_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7325 let short_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7326 let short_id_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7329 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7330 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7332 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7333 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7334 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7335 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7336 let mut chans_disabled: HashSet<u64> = [short_id_1, short_id_2, short_id_3].iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
7337 for e in msg_events {
7339 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7340 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7341 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7342 if !chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7343 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7346 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7350 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7351 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7352 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7353 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7354 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7355 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7357 // Reestablish chan_1
7358 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7359 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7360 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7361 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7362 // Reestablish chan_2
7363 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7364 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7365 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7366 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7367 // Reestablish chan_3
7368 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7369 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7370 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7371 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7373 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7374 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7375 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7376 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7377 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7378 chans_disabled = [short_id_1, short_id_2, short_id_3].iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
7379 for e in msg_events {
7381 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7382 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7383 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7384 if !chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7385 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7388 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7394 fn test_priv_forwarding_rejection() {
7395 // If we have a private channel with outbound liquidity, and
7396 // UserConfig::accept_forwards_to_priv_channels is set to false, we should reject any attempts
7397 // to forward through that channel.
7398 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7399 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7400 let mut no_announce_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
7401 no_announce_cfg.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
7402 no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = false;
7403 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(no_announce_cfg), None]);
7404 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
7405 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
7406 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
7407 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7409 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7411 // Note that the create_*_chan functions in utils requires announcement_signatures, which we do
7412 // not send for private channels.
7413 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7414 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7415 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
7416 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7417 nodes[1].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7419 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[1], 1_000_000, 42);
7420 nodes[1].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7421 nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()));
7422 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
7424 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7425 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7427 let conf_height = core::cmp::max(nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1, nodes[2].best_block_info().1 + 1);
7428 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, conf_height);
7429 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7430 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[2], &tx, conf_height);
7431 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7432 let as_funding_locked = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7433 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7434 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7435 nodes[2].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
7436 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7438 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7439 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
7440 assert!(!nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7442 // We should always be able to forward through nodes[1] as long as its out through a public
7444 send_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], 10_000);
7446 // ... however, if we send to nodes[2], we will have to pass the private channel from nodes[1]
7447 // to nodes[2], which should be rejected:
7448 let route_hint = RouteHint(vec![RouteHintHop {
7449 src_node_id: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
7450 short_channel_id: nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(),
7451 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 1000, proportional_millionths: 0 },
7452 cltv_expiry_delta: MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
7453 htlc_minimum_msat: None,
7454 htlc_maximum_msat: None,
7456 let last_hops = vec![&route_hint];
7457 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], last_hops, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
7459 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7460 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7461 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
7462 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7463 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7465 let htlc_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7466 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7467 assert_eq!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7468 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7469 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fee.is_none());
7471 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7472 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7473 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(), true);
7475 // Now disconnect nodes[1] from its peers and restart with accept_forwards_to_priv_channels set
7476 // to true. Sadly there is currently no way to change it at runtime.
7478 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7479 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7481 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
7482 let mut monitor_a_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7483 let mut monitor_b_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7485 let mons = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap();
7486 let mut mon_iter = mons.iter();
7487 mon_iter.next().unwrap().1.write(&mut monitor_a_serialized).unwrap();
7488 mon_iter.next().unwrap().1.write(&mut monitor_b_serialized).unwrap();
7491 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7492 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
7493 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7494 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
7496 let mut monitor_a_read = &monitor_a_serialized.0[..];
7497 let mut monitor_b_read = &monitor_b_serialized.0[..];
7498 let (_, mut monitor_a) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_a_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7499 let (_, mut monitor_b) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_b_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7500 assert!(monitor_a_read.is_empty());
7501 assert!(monitor_b_read.is_empty());
7503 no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = true;
7505 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
7506 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
7507 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7508 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_a);
7509 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_b);
7510 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7511 default_config: no_announce_cfg,
7513 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
7514 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
7515 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7516 logger: nodes[1].logger,
7520 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
7521 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
7523 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_a).is_ok());
7524 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_b).is_ok());
7525 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7526 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
7528 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7529 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7530 let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7531 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7532 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
7533 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7534 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7535 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7537 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7538 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7539 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7540 let cs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7541 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7542 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_reestablish);
7543 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7544 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7546 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7547 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7548 pass_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], 10_000, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret);
7549 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], our_payment_preimage);
7553 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7554 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7555 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7557 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7558 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7559 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7560 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7562 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7564 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7565 let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], vec![], 3000000, 30);
7566 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7568 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7569 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7570 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7571 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7572 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7573 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7575 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7576 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7577 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7578 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7582 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7583 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7585 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7586 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7587 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7588 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7589 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7591 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7595 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7596 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7597 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7598 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7599 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7600 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7601 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7602 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7606 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7607 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7608 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7609 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7611 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7612 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7613 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7614 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7615 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7616 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7617 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7618 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7619 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7620 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7621 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7622 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7623 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7627 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7629 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7630 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7632 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7634 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7635 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7636 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7637 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7638 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7639 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7640 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7641 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7642 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7643 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7644 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7645 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7646 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7650 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7652 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7653 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7657 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7658 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7659 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7661 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7662 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7663 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7664 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7665 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7667 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7668 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7669 let scorer = Scorer::new(0);
7670 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph,
7671 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7672 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7673 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[1].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph,
7674 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7675 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7677 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7678 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7679 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7681 // Revoke local commitment tx
7682 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7684 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7685 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7686 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7687 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7688 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7689 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7690 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7692 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7693 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7694 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7696 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7697 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7698 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7700 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7701 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7702 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7703 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7705 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7706 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7707 let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7708 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7709 let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7710 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7711 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7712 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7714 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7715 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7721 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7722 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7723 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7725 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7726 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7727 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7728 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7730 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7731 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7732 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7733 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7734 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7735 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7737 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7738 // available, which we check here:
7739 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7740 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7741 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7743 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7744 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7746 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7747 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7748 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7749 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7751 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7752 // output, checked above).
7753 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7754 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7755 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7757 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7758 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7759 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7760 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].get_weight() as u64;
7761 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7765 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7766 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7767 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7768 let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7769 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7771 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7772 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7774 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7775 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7776 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7777 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7778 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7780 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7781 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7787 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7788 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7789 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7790 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7792 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7793 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7795 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7796 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7797 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7798 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7799 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7800 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7801 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7802 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7806 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7807 let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7808 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7809 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7811 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7812 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7813 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7814 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7815 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7816 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7817 // up bumped justice generation.
7818 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7821 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7822 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7826 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7827 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7828 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7831 // Provide preimage for one
7832 // Check aggregation
7834 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7835 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7836 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7837 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7839 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7840 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7841 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7843 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7844 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7845 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7846 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7847 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7849 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7850 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7851 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7852 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7853 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7855 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7859 let feerate_timeout;
7860 let feerate_preimage;
7862 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7863 // 9 transactions including:
7864 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
7865 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
7866 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
7868 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
7869 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7870 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
7871 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7872 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
7873 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
7874 preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
7876 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
7877 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
7878 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
7879 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
7881 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
7882 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7883 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
7884 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].get_weight() as u64;
7886 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7887 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7888 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7889 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7893 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7894 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7896 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7897 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7899 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7900 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7901 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7902 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7903 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7904 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7906 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7907 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7908 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.get_weight() as u64;
7909 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7910 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7912 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7913 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7914 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7915 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7916 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7921 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7922 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7926 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7927 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7928 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7929 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7930 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7931 // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7932 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7933 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7935 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7936 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7937 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7938 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7939 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7941 let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7942 let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7944 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7946 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7947 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7948 let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7950 // Must revoke without gaps
7951 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7952 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7954 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7955 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7956 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7958 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7959 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
7960 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7961 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7962 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
7966 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7967 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7968 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7970 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7971 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7972 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7973 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7975 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7976 // Lock HTLC in both directions
7977 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
7978 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000).0;
7980 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7981 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7982 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7984 // Revoke local commitment tx
7985 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7987 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7988 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7989 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
7990 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7992 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7993 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7994 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7995 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7997 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7998 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
7999 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8000 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8001 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8002 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
8006 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8007 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
8008 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8010 let monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap();
8011 if let Some(monitor) = monitors.get(&OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }) {
8012 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
8013 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
8019 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8020 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8021 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8022 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8023 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8025 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8026 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8027 override_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8029 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8031 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8032 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8033 assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8034 assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8038 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8039 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8040 zero_config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8041 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8042 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8043 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8044 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8046 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8047 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8048 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8050 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8051 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8052 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8056 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8057 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8058 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8059 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8060 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8061 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8063 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8064 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8065 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8066 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8068 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8069 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8070 route.paths.push(path);
8071 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8072 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8073 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8074 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8075 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8076 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8077 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8078 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8082 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8083 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8084 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8085 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8086 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8087 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8089 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8092 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200, 42);
8093 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8094 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8095 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8096 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8097 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8098 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8099 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8101 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8102 // values from previous calls.
8103 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8104 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8105 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8107 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8109 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, user_payment_id, .. } => {
8110 assert_eq!(*user_payment_id, 42);
8111 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8113 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8116 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8121 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8122 // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs
8123 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8124 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8125 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8126 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8128 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8130 let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2, 0);
8132 // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8133 // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8134 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2, 0) {
8135 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8136 } else { panic!(); }
8138 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8140 header: BlockHeader {
8142 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8143 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8144 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8148 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8149 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2, 0) {
8150 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8151 } else { panic!(); }
8153 // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8154 // again with a different user_payment_id (this time getting a new payment secret).
8155 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8156 block.header.time += 1;
8157 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8158 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2, 42).unwrap();
8159 assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8162 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8163 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8164 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8165 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8166 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8167 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8168 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8170 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8171 // values from previous calls.
8172 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8173 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8174 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8176 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, user_payment_id }, .. } => {
8177 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8178 assert_eq!(user_payment_id, 42);
8179 assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8180 // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8182 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8187 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8188 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8189 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8190 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8191 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8192 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8194 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8196 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8197 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8198 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2, 0);
8199 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8201 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8202 // resulting events.
8203 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8205 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8206 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8207 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8208 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8209 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8211 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8212 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8213 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8214 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8215 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8217 // We should fail the payment back
8218 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8219 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8220 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8221 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8222 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8224 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8229 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8230 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8231 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8233 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8234 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8235 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8236 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8238 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8239 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8240 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8241 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8243 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8244 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8245 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8246 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8250 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8251 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8252 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8253 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8255 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8256 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8257 // commitment at same time.
8259 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8260 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8261 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8262 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8264 // Create some initial channel
8265 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8266 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8268 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8269 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8271 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8272 let preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8274 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8275 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8276 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8277 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8279 let monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap();
8280 let monitor = monitors.get(&outpoint).unwrap();
8281 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8282 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8283 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8284 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8285 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8286 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8287 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8290 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8291 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8292 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8293 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (header, 0));
8294 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 200);
8296 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8297 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage));
8298 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8299 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8300 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8301 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8302 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8303 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8304 if let Err(_) = watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8305 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8306 } else { assert!(false); }
8307 } else { assert!(false); };
8308 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8309 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8310 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8311 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8315 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8316 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8317 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8318 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8319 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8321 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8322 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8323 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8324 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8326 // Create some initial channel
8327 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8328 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8330 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8331 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8333 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8334 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8336 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8337 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8338 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8339 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8340 let watchtower_alice = {
8341 let monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap();
8342 let monitor = monitors.get(&outpoint).unwrap();
8343 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8344 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8345 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8346 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8347 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8348 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8349 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8352 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8353 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8354 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8355 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (header, 0));
8356 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8358 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8360 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8361 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8365 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8366 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8367 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8368 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8369 let watchtower_bob = {
8370 let monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap();
8371 let monitor = monitors.get(&outpoint).unwrap();
8372 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8373 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8374 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8375 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8376 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8377 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8378 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8381 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8382 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8384 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8385 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8387 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8389 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8391 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8392 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8393 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8394 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8395 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8396 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8397 if let Err(_) = watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8398 if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8399 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8400 } else { assert!(false); }
8401 } else { assert!(false); };
8402 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8403 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8405 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8406 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8407 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8409 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8412 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8413 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8414 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8418 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8419 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8420 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8422 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8423 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8424 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8425 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8426 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8427 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8432 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8433 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8434 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8437 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8438 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8440 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8441 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8442 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8443 // before receiving funding_signed.
8444 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8445 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8446 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8447 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8449 // Create an initial channel
8450 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8451 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8452 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8453 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8454 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8456 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8457 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8459 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8460 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8462 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8463 let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8464 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8465 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8466 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8470 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8471 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8472 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8473 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8474 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8475 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8476 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8478 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8479 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8480 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8481 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8483 // Create some initial channels
8484 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8486 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8487 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8488 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8489 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8490 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8491 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8493 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8494 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8495 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8496 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8497 // this test before #653 fix.
8498 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8499 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8500 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8501 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8502 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8504 let htlc_timeout = {
8505 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8506 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8507 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8508 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8512 let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8513 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8514 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8515 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8518 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8519 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8520 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8521 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8523 // Steps of the test:
8524 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8525 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8526 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8527 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8528 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8529 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8530 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8531 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8532 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8533 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8534 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8535 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8537 // Create some initial channels
8538 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8539 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8541 // Steps (1) and (2):
8542 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8543 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3_000_000);
8545 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8546 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8547 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8548 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8549 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8550 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8551 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8553 // Steps (3) and (4):
8554 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8555 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8556 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8557 if !broadcast_alice { force_closing_node = 1; } // Bob force-closes
8558 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2).unwrap();
8559 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8560 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8561 check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8562 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8563 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8564 true => alice_txn.clone(),
8565 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8567 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8568 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8569 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8570 if broadcast_alice {
8571 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8572 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8573 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8575 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8576 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8580 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8581 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8582 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
8583 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8584 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8585 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8586 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8587 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8588 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8589 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8591 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8592 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false);
8593 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8594 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8595 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8596 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8598 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8599 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8601 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8604 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8605 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8606 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8607 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8609 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8610 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8611 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8612 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8613 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8616 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8618 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8619 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8620 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8623 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8626 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8627 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8628 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8629 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8631 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8632 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8633 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8634 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8635 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8638 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8640 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8641 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8643 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8644 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8645 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8646 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8647 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8648 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8649 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8650 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8651 if broadcast_alice {
8652 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8653 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8654 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8656 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8657 if broadcast_alice {
8658 // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
8659 // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
8660 // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
8661 // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
8663 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8664 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
8666 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8667 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8672 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8673 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8675 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8676 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8677 // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
8678 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8680 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8681 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8682 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8684 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
8685 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
8686 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
8687 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
8688 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8689 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8690 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8692 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8693 assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8699 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8700 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8701 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8702 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8703 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8707 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8708 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8709 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8711 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8712 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8713 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8714 // updating logic for the existing channel.
8715 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8716 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8717 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8718 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8720 // Create an initial channel
8721 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8722 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8723 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8724 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8726 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8727 // that it is rejected.
8728 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8730 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8731 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8733 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8734 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8735 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8736 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8737 // move forward with it.
8738 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8739 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8741 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8745 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8746 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8748 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8749 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8751 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8752 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8754 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8755 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8756 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8757 added_monitors.clear();
8759 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8761 let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8762 let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8764 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8767 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8768 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8769 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8770 open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8771 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8773 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8774 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8776 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8777 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8778 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8779 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8780 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8782 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8786 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8787 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8788 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8789 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8790 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8791 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8793 let funding_created = {
8794 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8795 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get_mut(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8796 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8797 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8799 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8800 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8801 // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
8802 // still needs to be cleared here.
8803 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8805 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8807 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8808 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8810 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8811 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8812 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8813 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8814 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8816 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8820 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8821 // everything is functional.
8822 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8824 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8825 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8826 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8827 added_monitors.clear();
8830 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8831 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8832 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8833 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
8835 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8836 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
8837 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
8838 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
8842 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
8843 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
8845 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
8846 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
8847 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
8848 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8849 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8850 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8851 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8853 // Create some initial channels
8854 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8855 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8856 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8858 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8859 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8860 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8862 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
8863 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8864 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8866 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
8867 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8868 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8869 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
8870 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8871 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
8872 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8873 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
8874 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8876 // A null channel ID should close all channels
8877 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8878 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8879 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
8880 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8881 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8882 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8884 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8885 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8887 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8890 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8891 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8893 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8895 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
8896 // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
8897 // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
8898 // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
8899 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8900 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8902 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
8903 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8904 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8908 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
8909 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
8911 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
8912 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
8913 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
8914 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
8915 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8916 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8917 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8918 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8920 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8921 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8922 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8924 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100_000, 42);
8925 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
8926 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
8927 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
8930 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
8931 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8932 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8934 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8935 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8937 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8938 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
8940 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8941 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8942 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
8944 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
8945 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8946 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8947 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8948 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8949 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
8950 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8951 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
8952 assert_eq!(msg.data, "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index");
8953 } else { panic!(); }
8954 } else { panic!(); }
8955 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
8958 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
8959 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
8960 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
8961 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
8962 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
8963 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
8964 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
8965 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
8966 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
8967 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
8968 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
8969 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
8970 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
8971 // until we learned about an additional block.
8973 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
8974 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
8975 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8976 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8977 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8978 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8979 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
8981 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8982 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8983 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
8984 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8985 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8987 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id).unwrap();
8988 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8989 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8990 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8991 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
8992 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8994 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
8995 if !test_height_before_timelock {
8996 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
8998 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
8999 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9000 if test_height_before_timelock {
9001 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9002 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9003 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9004 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9006 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9007 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9008 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9009 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9010 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9011 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9013 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9014 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9016 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9017 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9018 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9019 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9020 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9021 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9022 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9024 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9025 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9026 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9027 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9028 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9029 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9030 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9031 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9032 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9037 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9038 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9039 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9043 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9044 // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9045 // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9047 // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9049 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9050 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9051 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9052 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9053 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9054 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9055 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9056 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9057 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9059 // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9060 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9061 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9062 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9064 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9065 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9066 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9067 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9068 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9070 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9072 // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9073 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9074 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9075 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9077 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9078 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9079 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9080 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9081 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9083 // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9085 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9087 // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9088 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9089 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9091 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9092 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9093 let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9095 let monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap();
9096 let mut monitor_iter = monitors.iter();
9097 monitor_iter.next().unwrap().1.write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9098 monitor_iter.next().unwrap().1.write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9101 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9102 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9103 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9104 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9106 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9107 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9108 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9109 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9110 let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9111 let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9112 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9113 assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9115 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9116 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9117 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9118 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9119 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9120 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9121 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9123 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9124 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9125 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9126 logger: nodes[1].logger,
9130 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9131 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9133 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9134 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9135 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9136 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9138 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9139 // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their funding_locked here since they haven't updated
9140 // the commitment state.
9141 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9143 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9145 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9146 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9147 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9149 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9150 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9151 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9152 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9153 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9154 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9155 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9157 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9158 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9162 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9163 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9164 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9165 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9166 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9168 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9169 let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
9170 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9171 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9172 let scorer = Scorer::new(0);
9173 let route = get_keysend_route(
9174 &payer_pubkey, &network_graph, &payee_pubkey, None, &vec![], 10000, 40, nodes[0].logger, &scorer
9177 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9178 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9179 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9180 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9181 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9182 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9183 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9184 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9185 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9189 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9190 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9191 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9192 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9193 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9195 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9196 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9197 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9198 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9200 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9201 let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
9202 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9203 let scorer = Scorer::new(0);
9204 let route = get_keysend_route(
9205 &payer_pubkey, &network_graph, &payee_pubkey, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9206 &vec![], 10000, 40, nodes[0].logger, &scorer
9209 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9210 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9211 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9212 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9213 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9214 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9215 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9216 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9217 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);